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Abstract 
This thesis explores the relationship between United Nations 
sanctions and the rule of law. Its primary contention is that sanctions have 
been applied in such a way that they have undermined the rule of law, thus 
weakening the authority and legitimacy of the U.N. Security Council and the 
U.N. sanctions system. As a consequence, States are less likely to comply 
with their sanctions obligations to the extent necessary to ensure that 
sanctions are effective. The challenge is therefore how to modify the Security 
Council's sanctions practice so that sanctions command such respect and 
inspire such confidence that States both desire and feel compelled to 
implement sanctions fully and effectively. 
The thesis proceeds in four Parts. Part I sets the stage for analysis, 
introducing U.N. sanctions and proposing a basic accountability-based model 
of the rule of law, according to which the central aim of the rule of law is to 
prevent the abuse of power. Part II explores the origins of the Security 
Council's sanctions powers, tracing the path leading to the enshrinement of 
the Security Council's sanctions powers in the U.N. Charter and describing 
the legal basis for the applic ation of sanctions. Part III illustrates how the 
Security Council has acted upon its sanctions powers in practice, charting the 
manner in which the Council's sanctions-related decisions have shaped the 
contours of the U.N. sanctions system. Part IV then operationalises the 
theoretical framework for analysis developed in Part I, critically evaluating the 
extent to which sanctions have strengthened the rule of law. It concludes that 
the U.N. sanctions system exhibits shortcomings in respect of each of the key 
elements of the rule of law and makes proposals for reforming the Security 
Council's sanctions practice so that sanctions can strengthen, rather than 
undermine, the rule of law. 
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Strengthening the Rule of Law or Serving as a Tool of War? 
A Critical Analysis of the United Nations Sanctions System 
By Jeremy Matam Farrall 
"[WA are ushering in an epoch of law among peoples and of justice among nations. 
The Security Council's task is a heavy one, but it will be sustained by our hope, which 
is shared by the people, and by our remembrance of the sufferings of all those who 
fought and died that the rule of law might prevail." 
- French Ambassador Vincent Auriol, at the inaugural meeting of the U.N. Security Council 
17 January 1946 
"We meet at the hinge of history. We can use the end of the cold war to get beyond 
the whole pattern of settling conflicts by force, or we can slip back into ever more 
savage regional conflicts in which might alone makes right. We can take the high 
road towards peace and the rule of law, or we can take Saddam Hussein 's path of 
brutal aggression and the law of the jungle." 
- U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, when the Council authorized the use of force against Iraq 
29 November 1990 
"This Council has a very heavy responsibility to promote justice and the rule of law in 
its efforts to maintain international peace and security." 
- U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, at the Council's meeting on "Justice and the rule of law" 
24 September 2003 
PART I. SETTING THE STAGE FOR ANALYSIS 
Part I lays the groundwork for subsequent analysis. Chapter I provides the overall 
context for discussion, introducing U.N. sanctions and explaining the central thesis and key 
objectives of this project. It also provides an overview of the research methodology 
employed and outlines the path ahead. Chapter 2 builds upon this introduction by outlining a 
theoretical framework for exploring the relationship between sanctions and the rule of law. 
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1. Introducing U.N. sanctions and the path ahead 
Conflict has posed a threat to human societies throughout history. The degree to 
which a society is peaceful depends upon the extent to which that society can control 
conflict. The ability of a particular society to control conflict is generally contingent upon the 
existence of norms of behaviour which restrict the resort to force and of an authoritative 
means for ensuring that those norms are observed.' Prior to the twentieth century the 
"society" of nations had developed neither the norms of behaviour nor the authoritative 
enforcement mechanisms necessary to control international conflict. 2 In the twentieth century 
there were two major attempts to create a system to regulate international conflict. The first 
occurred subsequent to the First World War, taking the form of the League of Nations. The 
second occurred subsequent to the Second World War, leading to the establishment of the 
United Nations. The creators of both the League of Nations and the United Nations 
articulated norms of state behaviour which sought to control the resort to force as a means 
of resolving conflict, and they established forms of "sanctions" to be employed against 
members of the society of nations whose behaviour violated those norms. The League of 
The notion that the ability of society to regulate conflict depends upon the existence or threat 
of state-sanctioned coercion underpins the writings of a multitude of political philosophers and 
legal theorists, including Locke, J.S. Mill, Machiavelli, Marx, Austin, Bentham, Kelsen, Hart and 
Dworkin, to name but a few. 
Pre-twentieth century international law had developed norms relating to international relations 
in times of peace, and in times of war, but it did not seek to prohibit the resort to force as a 
means of resolving disputes: see Kelsen, Hans, The Law of the United Nations: a Critical 
Analysis of its Fundamental Problems (1951) Steven & Sons, London, 732; Crawford, James, 
'Democracy and the Body of International Law' in Fox, Gregory H., & Roth, Brad R., 
Democratic Governance and International Law (2000) Cambridge UP, Cambridge, UK, 91-122, 
98 ("Before 1928, or perhaps 1945, international law made no attempt to outlaw war, which was, 
as Lord McNair said in his inaugural lecture, 'extra-legal rather than illegal'."). This was despite 
the fact that many thinkers, such as St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Vattel and Grotius, had 
emphasised the need for, and articulated the potential content of, such conflict-restricting 
norms much earlier than the twentieth century. 
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Nations collective security experiment ultimately proved a failure. Although the United 
Nations experiment has not been a stunning success, it has nevertheless proven more 
durable than its predecessor. 
This thesis explores the role performed by United Nations sanctions in controlling 
international conflict. 3 In the first forty-five years following the creation of the United Nations 
the Cold War prevented the Organisation's collective security system from functioning as its 
creators had envisaged. During that period the U.N. Security Council, shackled by the Cold 
War use and threat of the permanent member power of veto, imposed mandatory sanctions 
on only two occasions, against Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. By contrast, the post-
Cold War period has witnessed a dramatic increase in the use of U.N. sanctions. Since 
August 1990 the U.N. Security Council has initiated no fewer than eighteen mandatory 
sanctions regimes.4 U.N. sanctions now form a prominent feature of the landscape of 
international relations. 
While the end of Cold War tensions created the preconditions in which a sanctions 
renaissance became possible, two further factors have contributed to the rise in sanctions 
incidence. First, sanctions can often represent the most palatable of the coercive alternatives 
available to the Security Council when faced with the task of taking action to maintain or 
a 	As noted below in section 1.2, unless otherwise qualified the phrase "U.N. sanctions" is used 
in this thesis to refer to mandatory sanctions that are applied against particular State or non-
State actors by the U.N. Security Council under Article 41 of the U.N. Charter. 
Those eighteen sanctions regimes have been applied against Iraq, the former Yugoslavia (all 
states that were a part of the former Yugoslavia), Somalia, Libya, the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) to address the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Liberia, the 
Bosnian Serbs, Haiti, Angola (LTNITA), Rwanda, the Sudan, Sierra Leone, the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia to address the situation in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Eritrea and Ethiopia, Liberia 
(for a second time), certain actors in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Liberia (for a 
third time). For an overview of each of the U.N. sanctions regimes created to date, as well as 
references to the key Security Council resolutions establishing and modifying those regimes, 
4 
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restore international peace and security. From a political perspective, it can be extremely 
difficult to gamer the support necessary to employ collective military sanctions, as the 
governments which would be expected to shoulder the burden of collective forceful action 
are reluctant to assume responsibility for the serious financial, political, and humanitarian 
consequences that are likely to flow from the use of military sanctions. The imposition of 
sanctions is generally thought to entail fewer costs than the use of force. By authorising 
sanctions the Security Council can be seen to be taking strong symbolic action against 
threats to international peace and security, without having to assume the responsibility for, 
nor incur the costs of; using force. Second, there is the perception that the potential of 
sanctions to achieve their policy objectives has increased with advances in international 
technology, communications, and trade. Globalisation has fostered a climate of growing 
interdependence, in which states are increasingly reliant upon trade and communication links 
with the international community. In such an interdependent economic environment, a 
stringent U.N. sanctions regime has the power to devastate a target economy. 
But despite the political appeal of sanctions and their apparent potential to provide 
an effective, non-forcible resolution to major international crises, they have attracted many 
critics. At one end of the spectrum, some policy analysts criticise sanctions for being either 
ineffective or for taking too long to have an effect.' A further criticism is that sanctions can 
have the unintended consequence of galvanising opposition to U.N. intervention and thus 
see Chapter 5, below. For more extensive summaries of the Council's actions shaping the 
contours of each regime, see the Appendices. 
See, e.g., Pape, Robert A., 'Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work' (1997) 22 International 
Security 90-136. 
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strengthening the target government's position of power. 6 At the other end of the spectrum, 
sanctions are criticised due to the devastating impact they can have on the civilian 
populations of target states. International aid workers have expressed concern over the 
manner in which U.N. sanctions cripple economic and social infrastructure, slow the flow of 
crucial humanitarian supplies, and impair the target population's enjoyment of human rights. 
Non-military sanctions have thus been referred to as 'a silent holocaust,' 7 as 'the U.N.'s 
weapon of mass destruction,' 8 and as 'modem siege warfare.' 9 Yet another group of critics, 
representing business, claims that the imposition of sanctions can rebound, boomerang style, 
and harm businesses who usually engage in trade with sanctioned nations, whereas 
maintaining trade provides the opportunity for constructive engagement with "recalcitrant" 
nations.' ° Thus, although sanctions critics may pursue a range of agendas, they often share 
scepticism regarding the extent to which sanctions have made a meaningful contribution to 
efforts to restrict international conflict. 
Galtung, Johan, 'On the Effects of Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of 
Rhodesia' in Nincic, Miroslav & Wallensteen, Peter, Dilemmas of Economic Coercion (1983) 
Prager, New York, 17-60, 46. 
7 	Arbuthnot, Felicity, 'Dying of shame' 298 New Internationalist (January/February 1998). This 
article can be found on-line at: http://www.newintorg/issue298/1raq.html  (last visited 20 July 
2004). 
See, e.g., Normand, Roger, 'Sanctions against Iraq: new weapon of mass destruction' (1998) 64 
Covert Action 4-10; Halliday, Denis J., 'Iraq and the U.N.'s weapon of mass destruction' (1999) 
98 Current History 65-8; Mueller, John & Mueller, Karl, 'Sanctions of mass destruction' (1999) 
Foreign Affairs, v. 78, n.3, 43-53. 
Gordon, Joy, 'Sanctions as siege warfare' The Nation, March 22 1999. This article can be found 
on-line at: http://www.g1obalpolicy.org/security/sanction/iraq1/iraq12.htm  (last visited 10 July 
2004). 
10 	See, e.g., the literature posted on-line by the organisation USA*ENGAGE:< 
http://www.usaengage.org/›. See also, the results of an opinion poll taken on public 
perceptions of Americans relating to the American unilateral sanctions regime against Cuba: 
Crosette, Barbara, 'Americans of Two Minds on Sanctions, a Poll Finds' The New York Times, 
April 23, 2000, Section 1, column 7. 
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1.1 Central thesis and key objectives 
The central contention of this thesis is that sanctions have been applied in such a way 
that they have undermined the rule of law, thus weakening the authority, credibility and 
legitimacy of the Security Council and its sanctions tool. As a consequence, States are less 
likely to have full confidence in the U.N. sanctions system and thus to comply fully with their 
sanctions obligations. The end result is that sanctions are less effective than they could be. 
Until the Security Council's sanctions practice can be reformed or modified, so that there is 
widespread confidence in the legitimacy of the U.N. sanctions system, the Security 
Council's sanctions instrument is unlikely to serve as an effective tool for resolving 
international conflict. Without such reform, the U.N. sanctions system will likely remain a 
destabilising influence upon, rather than a symbol of, the rule of law in international society. 
The challenge is therefore how to modify the application of sanctions so that the 
Security Council in general, and the U.N. sanctions system in particular, command such 
respect and inspire such confidence that States both desire and feel compelled to comply 
with sanctions regimes and thus implement sanctions in practice. It is argued here that the 
path to securing such compliance lies in stiengthening the rule of law. Thus the Security 
Council can induce greater compliance with its sanctions regimes by endeavouring to ensure 
that its sanctions practice reinforces, rather than undermines, the rule of law. 
The major objectives of this thesis are: 
(i) To trace the evolution of the U.N. sanctions system; 
(ii) To demonstrate how the Security Council's sanctions practice has 
undermined the rule of law; and 
(iii)To explore how the Council's sanctions practice might be reformed so 
that sanctions ultimately reinforce the rule of law. 
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1.2 Setting the scope of analysis: defining U.N. sanctions 
The term "sanctions" can have many meanings. In the national sphere "sanctions" 
generally represent a range of action that can be taken against a person who has 
transgressed a legal norm." Thus a person who has committed the crime of manslaughter 
might receive the "sanction" of a term in prison. The nature, scope and length of potential 
national sanctions are generally determined by legislatures. The sanctions are then applied to 
concrete cases by judiciaries or juries, and they are then enforced by police forces and 
penal systems. National sanctions may serve a number of pm -poses, including defining the 
limits of permissible behaviour, punishing wrongdoers, and deterring potential future 
wrongdoers.' 2 But whatever specific purpose a particular sanction may serve, the essence of 
national sanctions lies in their nexus with legal norms. This nexus separates "sanctions" from 
simple acts of coercion. In the national context, "sanctions" are imposed in order to enforce 
the law and they therefore aim to reinforce the rule of law. 
In the international sphere, however, the term "sanctions" is commonly used to 
describe actions that often bear only a slight resemblance to their domestic relative. Media 
commentators, diplomats and scholars often employ the term to refer to a wide array of 
actions, taken for a variety of purposes, by a variety of actors (the "sender(s)") against a 
variety of actors (the "target(s)"). 13 The range of action commonly referred to as 
"sanctions" includes military and non-military action. The term "sanctions" can be used to 
describe action which aims to place physical restrictions upon the ability of a target to 
II 	Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, above note 2,706. 
12 	Doxey, Margaret P., International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective (2nd ed. 1996) St. 
Martin's Press, NY, 7. 
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engage in the use of force itself, or to depict action which seeks to restrict the target's 
freedom in other respects, such as in relations of an economic, financial, diplomatic or 
representative, sporting or cultural nature. 
The fundamental difference between the meaning of "sanctions" in the national 
context and the popular understanding of "sanctions" in the international context is that the 
action commonly referred to as "sanctions" in the international sphere does not necessarily 
serve the purpose of enforcing a legal norrn. 14 The term "sanctions" is widely used to refer to 
action which seeks either to coerce the target into behaving in a particular manner, or to 
punish it for behaviour considered unacceptable by the sender. The motive for imposing 
"sanctions" may be to respond to a breach of a norm or to prevent such a breach, but it may 
also be to pursue a foreign policy agenda or to gain some advantage over the target: 5 Some 
commentators have even employed the term "positive sanctions" to refer to acts of a non-
coercive nature which seek to induce a particular type of behaviour. 16 
13 	Galtung and Doxey both provide useful summaries of the different types of international 
"sanctions": Galtung, 'On the Effects of Economic Sanctions', above note 6, 21; Doxey, 
International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective, ibid, 15. 
14 	This can also be the case with U.N. sanctions, as it is not a requirement that they be applied in 
response to a violation of Charter obligations. Thus they can be interpreted as "political 
measures" which the Security Council has the "discretion" to apply in order to maintain or 
restore international peace and security. See: Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, above 
note 2, 733. 
15 	The US "sanctions" regime against Cuba is one example of a "sanctions" regime imposed in 
pursuit of a foreign policy agenda. Since it first adopted a resolution on the subject in 1992, the 
UN's General Assembly has condemned on an annual basis the continued application of US 
"sanctions" against Cuba. For the initial resolution, see: A/RES/47/19 (24 November 1992). For 
the most recent resolution, see: AIRES/58/7 (18 November 2003). For the annual resolutions in 
between, see: A/RES/58/7 (18 November 2003), preambular paragraph 6. 
16 	The discussion concerning negative and positive sanctions has been described as the "carrots 
and sticks" approach to economic sanctions: see Schrijver, Nico, 'The Use of Economic 
Sanctions by the United Nations Security Council: an International Law Perspective' in Post, 
Harry H.G., International Economic Law and Armed Conflict (1994) Martinus Nijhoff, 
Dordrecht, 123-62; Cortright, David and Lopez, George A., 'Carrots, sticks, and cooperation: 
economic tools of statecraft', paper presented at the third annual conference on preventive 
action, sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, December 12, 1996 (on file 
with author). This approach draws an analogy between the sender's relationship with the 
9 
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The range of actors who impose sanctions on an international basis includes 
individual states, groups of states, the international community as a whole, and non-state 
actors. When one state initiates coercive action, its actions are commonly referred to as 
"unilateral sanctions"." When action is initiated by a group of states, the action becomes 
"multilateral" or "regional" "sanctions". I8 When action is taken by a majority of states, it is 
referred to as "collective" or "universal" sanctions. 19 Finally, even coercive action which is 
target and a farmer's relationship with a mule: sanctions can either be used as a stick, to punish 
the mule when it moves in the wrong direction, or as a carrot to induce it to move in the right 
direction. See, e.g., Bergeijk, Peter A.G. Van, Economic Diplomacy, Trade and Commercial 
Policy: Positive and Negative Sanctions in a New World Order (1994) Edward Elgar 
Publishing, Brookfield, VT, 19; Kuyper, P., 'Trade Sanctions, Security, and Human Rights and 
Commercial Policy' in Maresceau, M. (ed.), The European Community's Commercial Policy 
after 1992: The Legal Dimension (1993) Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 401-38; Cortright, David (ed.), The 
Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention (1997) Rowman & Littlefield, 
Lanham, MD; Amley, Edward A., Jr., 'Peace by Other Means: using rewards in UN efforts to 
end conflicts' (1998) DJILP 235-97. Reisman and Stevick draw a similar conceptual distinction 
between what they term "indulgent" and "deprivatory" techniques: Reisman, W. Michael & 
Stevick, Douglas L., 'The Applicability of International Law Standards to United Nations 
Economic Sanctions Programmes' (1998) 9 EJIL 86-141, 90. 
17 	Unilateral "sanctions" are those initiated by one state as part of its foreign policy. Examples of 
unilateral sanctions abound. For a comprehensive list of the unilateral sanctions imposed in the 
twentieth century, see: Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Schott, Jeffrey J. & Elliott, Kimberly Ann, 
Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (2nd ed., 1990), Institute for International Economics, 
Washington DC. A prominent example of unilateral "sanctions" is the regime which has been 
maintained against Cuba by the USA since the Cuban missile crisis. 
18 	Examples of multilateral/regional "sanctions" regimes include those imposed against Haiti by 
the Organisation of American States and against the Former Yugoslavia by the European 
Union. For a detailed account of the Haiti sanctions see Gibbons, Elizabeth D., Sanctions in 
Haiti: human rights and democracy under assault (1999), especially chapter 3. For analysis of 
the EU sanctions regime against the Former Yugoslavia see: Chinkin, Christine, 'The Legality of 
the Imposition of Sanctions by the European Union in International Law' in Evans, Malcolm D. 
(ed), Aspects of Statehood and Institutionalism in Contemporary Europe (1997) Dartmouth, 
Brookfield, VT, 183-214; Puissochet, Jean-Pierre, 'The Court of Justice and international action 
by the European Community: the example of the embargo against the Former Yugoslavia' (1997) 
20 Fordham IL.! 1557-76. 
19 	The terms collective or universal sanctions have been used to describe enforcement action 
mandated by the League of Nations or the United Nations. See, e.g.: Daoudi, M.S. & Dajani, 
M.S., Economic Sanctions, ideals and experience (1983) Routledge, London, 56-90 (chapter 2). 
The claim of UN sanctions to the title "universal" is strong, given that UN member states, 
which comprise 191 nations, are bound under articles 25 and 48 of the UN Charter to observe 
UN sanctions. Furthermore, a strong argument can be made that non-member states are also 
under a duty to observe UN sanctions. For further discussion of these issues see Chapter 4, 
section 4.2. 
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initiated by non-state actors is sometimes referred to as "sanctions". 2° The range of actors 
who could potentially be the target of "sanctions" popularly understood generally mirrors the 
actors who can impose "sanctions". In practice, forms of "sanctions" have been imposed 
against one state, a group of states, and extra-state entities. 
In this study, however, unless otherwise qualified the term "U.N. sanctions" denotes 
binding, mandatory measures short of the use of force that are applied against particular 
State or non-State actors by the U.N. Security Council, in accordance with Article 41 of the 
U.N. Charter. 21  As provided in Article 41, "U.N. sanctions" thus fall within the following 
description: 
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of 
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call 
upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may 
include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, 
20 	Non-state actors may be sub-state entities, such as secessionist self-determination movements, 
or they may comprise actors whose identity is not defined by a relationship to a particular 
state. Examples of extra-state entities may include international institutions such as the IMF, 
the World Bank or the WTO, and networks of individual citizens. In the East Timor crisis one of 
policy possibilities consistently mooted in the media as a means of influencing the Indonesian 
government to permit the deployment of a peace-keeping force was the imposition of economic 
sanctions by the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund. These "sanctions," imposed 
by non-state entities, would have involved the withholding from Indonesian government of 
massive loans, upon which the Indonesian economy relied heavily. Another form of 
sanctioning which can occur outside the official state system is the establishment of citizens' 
boycotts, of the type that was levelled against French products in Australia during the French 
nuclear testing in the Pacific. Civilian-initiated boycotts have been employed in many regions 
of the world, including India (a boycott of foreign goods was initiated in 1896), Turkey (a 
boycott of Austro-Hungarian goods was initiated in 1908 to protest annexation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina), Egypt (a boycott of British goods was initiated in 1924), and China (eleven 
citizens' boycotts were initiated, mostly against Japan, between 1905 and 1931). For further 
discussion of civilian boycotts, see: Lauterpacht, Hersch, 'Boycott in International Relations' 
(1933) 14 British Yearbook of International Law 125-40; Othman, Maged Taher, Economic 
Sanctions in International Law: a legal study of the practice of the USA (1982) University 
Microfilms International, Ann Arbor, MI, 19- 25. 
21 	 Like the general term "sanctions", the term "U.N. sanctions" can also be used to refer to a 
variety of measures. Without further qualification, U.N. sanctions may denote: military or non-
military action; action that is authorized by the Security Council or the General Assembly; and 
action that is requested and thus "voluntary" or action that is binding and thus "mandatory". 
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air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the 
severance of diplomatic relations. 22 
As noted above, since the United Nations was born in 1945 the Security Council 
has acted upon its Article 41 sanctions powers to impose twenty U.N. sanctions regimes. 23 
In addition to its actions establishing and modifying those twenty sanctions regimes, the 
Security Council has at times requested States to impose measures that might be described 
as "voluntary sanctions". By way of example, in the cases of Southern Rhodesia and South 
Africa, prior to the eventual imposition of mandatory sanctions the Council requested States 
to take certain action against Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, without requiring the 
application of such measures under Chapter VII. 24 Similarly, in the case of Cambodia the 
22 	Article 41, U.N. Charter. Article 41 was designed to be read in concert with Article 39, such that 
U.N. sanctions should be applied to maintain or restore the peace once the Security Council 
has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. 
For a more detailed discussion of the legal basis governing U.N. sanctions, see Chapter 4. 
23 	For an overview of each of those sanctions regimes, see Chapter 5, below. For more detailed 
summaries, see the Appendices. 
24 	For the Southern Rhodesian instance, see: S/RES/217 (20 November 1965), operative paragraph 
8 (calling upon all States to refrain from assisting the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia, as 
well as from providing it with arms and related equipment and material, and to break economic 
relations with Southern Rhodesia, including by imposing an embargo on oil and petroleum 
products). For the South African instance, see: SIRES/181 (7 August 1963), operative 
paragraph 3 ("solemnly" calling upon States to cease selling and shipping arms, ammunition of 
all types and military vehicles to South Africa). 
The status of the measures called for in the South African instance as "voluntary" appears 
clear with the benefit of hindsight: see, e.g., S/RES/418 (4 November 1977), preambular 
paragraph 8 ("Recalling ... resolution 181 ... and other resolutions concerning a voluntary 
arms embargo against South Africa"). Nevertheless, at the time the resolution was adopted the 
Council's call upon States to halt sales and shipments of arms and related equipment to South 
Africa could conceivably have been interpreted to fall within the scope of Article 41. Some 
Council members made a point, however, of clarifying that as far as they were concerned the 
embargo was not mandatory and did not constitute action under Chapter VII of the Charter of 
the United Nations. See, e.g., the statements made by the United States and the United 
Kingdom when resolution 181 (1963) was adopted: S/PV.1056 (7 August 1963), paragraphs 23- 
30 (United States, noting in paragraph 26 that "a number of Council members [were] not 
prepared to agree that the situation in South Africa [was] one which [called] for the kind of 
action appropriate in cases of threats to the peace or breaches of the peace under Chapter VII 
of the United Nations Charter", and observing in paragraphs 27 and 28 that the fact that 
operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of the resolution called upon Member States to take certain 
action did not give those paragraphs a "mandatory character" and that the words "call upon" 
do not carry "mandatory force"), paragraphs 33-38 (United Kingdom, agreeing with the United 
States that the resolution just adopted and the measures which it called upon all States to take 
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Council requested States bordering Cambodia to prevent the import of timber products 
from Khmer-Rouge controlled areas. 25 These instances are not covered as part of the 
current analysis, as the measures requested were neither mandatory nor imposed under 
Chapter VII. 
The Security Council has also taken other initiatives that might be interpreted to fall 
within the scope of Article 41, as they involved action short of the use of military force taken 
under Chapter VII and after the Council had determined the existence of a threat to the 
peace. Those initiatives include the creation of two international criminal tribunals 26 and the 
"should not be regarded as being a resolution within Chapter VII of the Charter"). It is 
noteworthy, however, that subsequent Council decisions suggested that the embargo carried 
legal implications beyond those of a mere "voluntary" measure (see, e.g., SIRES/282 (23 July 
1970), operative paragraph 3: 'Condemns the violations of the arms embargo called for in 
resolutions 181, 182 and 191"). The "voluntary" embargo was also reaffirmed and strengthened 
in a number of subsequent resolutions. See: SIRES/182 (4 December 1963), operative paragraph 
5; S/RES/191 (18 June 1964), operative paragraph 12; S/RES/282 (23 July 1970), operative 
paragraphs 2, 4. 
25 	See S/RES/792 (30 November 1992), operative paragraph 12 (requesting States to respect a 
moratorium called for by Cambodia's Supreme National Council against the export of logs from 
Cambodia). For further details of that case, see: Cortright, David & Lopez, George A., The 
Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s (2000) Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, 
135-45. Unfortunately, however, Cortright and Lopez do not distinguish between the non-
mandatory character of the measures requested in the Cambodian instance and the mandatory 
nature of the other examples of U.N. sanctions to which they refer that have been applied 
under Chapter VII and are therefore mandatory. These authors, who have written prolifically 
and with insight on sanctions, have thus unwittingly encouraged the perception that the 
Cambodian instance ranks among the Iraq, UNITA, and Taliban/AI Qaida cases, to name but a 
few, as an example of a mandatory U.N. sanctions regime. For a recent example of a piece in 
which the Cambodian example is treated as equivalent to mandatory sanctions regimes, see: 
Cortright, David & Lopez, George A., 'Reforming Sanctions', in Malone, David M. (ed.), The 
UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21" Century (2004) Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 
CO, 167-79. The editors of that book have also failed to acknowledge the legal distinction 
between voluntary and mandatory sanctions, reproducing a table entitled "Security Council-
Mandated Sanctions Regimes", which contains the Cambodian instance alongside genuine 
examples of mandatory U.N. sanctions regimes. 
26 	In February 1993 the Council decided to establish an international tribunal to prosecute 
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law in the territory of 
the former Yugoslavia since 1991, requesting the Secretary-General to submit a report 
containing practical proposals for the creation of such a tribunal: see S/RES/807 (22 February 
1993), operative paragraph I. The Secretary-General submitted such a report to the Council in 
May and the Council proceeded to approve the Secretary-General's proposals, to establish the 
International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (commonly referred to as the "ICTY"), and to 
adopt a Statute for the Tribunal. See: gRES/827 (25 May 1993), operative paragraphs 1, 2, 
annex. 
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application of wide-ranging measures designed to prevent and suppress terrorism (the 
"counterterrorism regime"),27 and to prevent non-State actors from acquiring weapons of 
mass destruction and their means of delivery. 28 They have not been considered as examples 
of U.N. sanctions regimes for the purposes of this study, however, as they possess 
characteristics that distinguish them from traditional mandatory U.N. sanctions regimes, 
which have been applied against particular State or non-State actors in order to maintain or 
restore international peace and security. 29 
The Council decided to establish the International Tribunal for Rwanda (commonly referred to 
as the "ICTR") in November 1995. See: S/RES/955 (8 November 1995), operative paragraph I. 
27 	In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the Council 
established a regime of mandatory measures to be taken against terrorists and terrorism and 
created a Committee to monitor the implementation of those measures. The resolution imposing 
those measures — resolution 1373 (2001) - has come to be known as the "Counterterrorism 
resolution" and the Committee so created is referred to as the "Counterterrorism Committee", or 
the "CTC". See: S/RES/1373 (28 September 2001), preambular paragraph 3 (reaffirming that acts 
of international terrorism constitute a threat to international peace and security), preambular 
paragraph 10 (Invoking Chapter VII), operative paragraph 1 (imposing financial sanctions 
against terrorists and those associated with them), operative paragraph 2 (requiring States to 
refrain from providing support to such individuals and entities and to take action to criminalize 
terrorism and to prosecute terrorists) operative paragraph 6 (deciding to establish the CTC, in 
accordance with rule 28 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure). 
28 	In April 2004 the Council adopted resolution 1540 (2004), requiring States to take a range of 
measures designed to prevent non-State actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction 
and their means of delivery. At the same time the Council also established a Committee ("the 
1540 Committee") to administer the application of those measures. See: SIRES/1540 (28 April 
2004), operative paragraphs 1 (requiring States to refrain from providing any form of support to 
non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or 
use weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery), 2 (requiring States to adopt and 
enforce laws prohibiting any non-State actor from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, 
possessing, transporting, transferring or using weapons of mass destruction and their means 
of delivery), 3 (requiring States to take a range of domestic measures to prevent the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction), 4 (establishing the 1540 Committee). 
29 	The case for excluding the international criminal tribunals from a study of mandatory U.N. 
sanctions regimes is self-explanatory, as the tribunals clearly do not constitute sanctions 
regimes in the sense of a collection of mandatory measures to be imposed by States against a 
particular target. The case for excluding the counterterrorism and weapons of mass destruction 
regimes is perhaps not so clear-cut, as those mechanisms share a number of characteristics 
with sanctions regimes, including requiring States to take certain actions short of the use of 
force to address an identified threat to international peace and security. Nevertheless, a 
distinction can be drawn between the sanctions regimes featuring in this study, on the one 
hand, and the counterterrorism and weapons of mass destruction regimes, on the other, due to 
their scope and ambition. Traditional sanctions regimes have been imposed against concrete, 
readily identifiable State and non-State actors, with the aim of inducing a particular response 
from those actors that would result in the lifting of sanctions. In contrast, the counterterrorism 
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As documented below in Chapter 7, the Security Council has acted upon its 
sanctions powers to impose a wide variety of sanctions." Among the broad categories of 
U.N. sanctions employed by the Council have been economic sanctions, financial sanctions, 
representative sanctions, aviation sanctions, and sports, scientific and cultural sanctions. As 
part of the broader category of economic sanctions, the Council has employed both 
"comprehensive sanctions", thus establishing a blanket ban on all but humanitarian trade with 
a target, and it has applied "particular sanctions", which target the import to or export from a 
target of particular strategic items such as arms, diamonds and oil. 
1.3 Research Methodology . 
In preparing this thesis, three main sources of information were drawn upon — 
literature reviews, off-the-record interviews and practical professional experience. 
1.3.1 Literature reviews 
A number of comprehensive literature searches and reviews were conducted while 
this thesis was being compiled. Each review focused upon different themes that were integral 
at a given time to the manner in which the project was evolving. In the earliest days of 
and weapons of mass destruction regimes are applied against a general class of actors 
("terrorists and terrorism" in the case of the counterterrorism regime', and "non-State actors" in 
the case of the weapons of mass destruction regime), in response to a general threat that is 
unlikely ever to be resolved. As Szasz notes, these new forms of Security Council action 
amount to legislating rather than constituting traditional sanctions employed against concrete 
actors with the aim of resolving a particular conflict or situation: Szasz, Paul C., 'The Security 
Council Starts Legislating' (2002) 96 AJIL 900-905, 902 ("In the past ... the Security Council has 
often required states to take certain actions, such as to implement sanctions against a 
particular state ..., but these requirements always related to a particular situation or dispute 
and, even though not explicitly limited in time, would naturally expire when the issue in 
question and all its consequences were resolved. By contrast, as Resolution 1373 (2001), while 
inspired by the attacks of September 11, 2001, is not specifically related to these ... and lacks 
any explicit or implicit time limitation, a significant portion of the resolution can be said to 
establish new binding rules of international law — rather than mere commands relating to a 
particular situation"). 
30 See Part III, Chapter 7, below: "Delineating the Scope of Sanctions". 
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doctoral research, literature reviews were undertaken regarding potentially instructive 
theoretical approaches. Surveys were thus conducted of developments and trends in the 
spheres of international legal theory and international relations theory. At the same time, the 
expanding general literature on sanctions was also reviewed. When the focus of writing 
turned to the practical aspects of the United Nations sanctions system, the main body of 
literature consulted was sanctions-related primary sources, including the decisions, 
deliberations and reports of the Security Council and its sanctions-related subsidiary bodies. 
Access to these documents, which are all issued publicly as part of the United Nations 
documentation system, was gained at U.N. depository libraries in Australia, at the Dag 
Hammarskjold and legal libraries at U.N. headquarters in New York, and via the United 
Nations Official Documents System (ODS). 
1.3.2 Off-the -record interviews and practical professional experience 
With the exception of the earliest period of doctoral research, which was conducted 
on campus at the University of Tasmania Law School, the majority of doctoral research and 
writing was conducted in New York City. In early-1999, while still based in Hobart, a four-
month international research trip was undertaken in order to gain a deeper understanding of 
the manner in which U.N. sanctions operated in practice. During that research trip a number 
of off-the-record interviews were conducted with diplomats, United Nations Secretariat 
staff, and activists and practitioners at U.N.-affiliated non-governmental organizations. 
Those interviews provided valuable insights into how the Security Council and its Sanctions 
Committees functioned in practice. Similarly valuable theoretical insights were gained on the 
same research trip through informal meetings with scholars and academics, as well as 
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through consulting extremely impressive libraries, in Canada, Germany, Japan, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. 
The preparation of this thesis has also benefited from experience gained while 
working for the Security Council Affairs Division of the U.N.'s Department of Political 
Affairs since May 2001. Among the benefits gained have been learning to navigate the high 
seas of United Nations documentation and receiving invaluable, hands-on experience 
observing the formal and informal proceedings of the Security Council and its subsidiary 
organs. While the temptation to draw upon confidential files in compiling this thesis has been 
assiduously resisted, the practical insights gained while working for the United Nations have 
unavoidably informed the recommendations proposed. 
1.4 The Path Ahead 
Analysis in this thesis is divided into four Parts, containing twelve chapters. Part I, 
into which this chapter falls, sets the stage for subsequent analysis. This chapter has 
provided the overall context for discussion, introducing U.N. sanctions and explaining the 
central thesis and key objectives of the project, as well as providing an overview of the 
research methodology employed. Chapter 2 builds upon this introduction by outlining a 
theoretical framework for exploring the extent to which sanctions have strengthened the rule 
of law. It illustrates how the concept of the rule of law has increasingly influenced the 
activities of the United Nations and its Security Council. It then explores what is meant by 
the concept of the rule of law, proposing an accountability-based model, according to which 
the primary aim of the rule of law is to prevent the misuse or abuse of power. The rule of 
law is thus conceptualised as consisting of five basic elements that are generally present in 
systems that aim to prevent the misuse or abuse of power — transparency, consistency, 
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equality, due process and proportionality. The theoretical framework thus proposes that, to 
the extent that the U.N. Security Council and its Sanctions System respect and promote 
those five basic elements, they can be said to reinforce the rule of law. 
Part II explores the origins of the Security Council's sanctions powers, tracing the 
path leading to the enshrinement of the Security Council's sanctions powers in the United 
Nations Charter. Chapter 3 describes the "pre-history" of U.N. sanctions, surveying 
historical precedents in international relations for the employment of non-military coercive 
strategies as a means of compelling the resolution of international disputes, and touching 
upon the sanctions experience of the U.N.'s predecessor - the League of Nations. Chapter 
4 outlines the legal framework underpinning the Security Council's use of sanctions. 
Part III describes how U.N. sanctions have operated in practice, charting the 
contours of the evolving U.N. sanctions system. Chapter 5 outlines the manner in which the 
Security Council's sanctions-related actions have led to the evolution of the U.N. sanctions 
system. It also contains a brief overview of each of the twenty mandatory sanctions regimes 
established to date by the Security Council. Chapter 6 reviews the manner in which the 
Council has established the legal basis for the application of sanctions. It thus describes how 
the Council has determined the existence of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and 
acts of aggression, invoked Chapter VII of the Charter and articulated sanctions objectives. 
Chapter 7 surveys the manner in which the Council has delineated the scope of its sanctions 
regimes, applying different measures to suit different situations. Chapter 8 outlines some 
stiategies the Council has employed to fine-tune the imposition of sanctions, including 
clarifying senders and targets, defining the temporal application of sanctions, and addressing 
the unintended consequences of sanctions upon civilian populations and third States. 
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Chapter 9 focuses upon the manner in which the Council has established subsidiary bodies 
with responsibilities relating to the administration and monitoring of sanctions. Chapter 10 
describes how the Council has also bestowed sanctions-related responsibilities upon other 
international actors, including for sanctions monitoring, implementation and enforcement. 
Part TV then applies the theoretical framework developed in Part I to the U.N. 
sanctions system described in Parts II and III. Chapter 11 scrutinises the relationship 
between the U.N. sanctions system and the rule of law, critically evaluating the extent to 
which sanctions have strengthened the rule of law. It concludes that the U.N. sanctions 
system exhibits shortcomings in respect of each of the key elements of the rule of law and 
outlines policy recommendations designed to address those shortcomings. Chapter 12 
contains concluding remarks and provides a summary of the key policy proposals designed 
to ensure that U.N. sanctions respect, promote and reinforce the rule of law. 
19 
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framework for analysis 
"We are here to strengthen and adapt this great institution, forged 55 
years ago in the crucible of war, so that it can do what people expect of 
it in the new era - an era in which the rule of law must prevail." 
- U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan' 
"[W]hile prescribing norms and standards for national or international 
conduct, the Security Council must scrupulously accept those norms for 
itself" 
- Prime Minister Rao, of India' 
This chapter proposes a theoretical framework designed to assess the extent to 
which the Security Council's application of sanctions has respected and reinforced the rule 
of law. The chapter begins by explaining the relevance of the concept of the rule of law to 
the work of the Security Council, exploring its implicit pedigree in the Charter of the United 
Nations, as well as the manner in which it has proven increasingly influential in the practice of 
the United Nations in general and of the Security Council in particular. It then clarifies the 
understanding employed here of the rule of law, proposing a basic, accountability-based 
model of the rule of law against which the performance of the United Nations sanctions 
system can be measured. That model consists of a core set of characteristics or elements 
that are present in systems of order that seek to resolve conflict by reference to principle 
rather than through the arbitrary exercise of coercive power. According to that model, the 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan- speech delivered at the opening session of the United Nations 
Millennium Summit: PR/GA/9750 (6 September 2000). For discussion of the Millennium Summit 
and the Millennium Declaration, see notes 24-25 and accompanying text, below. 
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Council's sanctions practice can be said to have reinforced the rule of law to the extent that 
it has promoted and respected these core elements of the rule of law. 
2.1 The relationship between the U.N. Security Council and 
international law 
The relationship between the Security Council and law is complex and multifaceted. 
On the one hand the Council is a political body, which takes decisions that are dictated 
largely by political rather than legal considerations. On the other, by virtue of its power to 
issue decisions that are legally-binding upon the Member States of the United Nations and 
to take military and non-military coercive action to enforce those decisions, the Security 
Council is a body whose activities have profound legal implications.' The Council's ability to 
create legal obligations that are binding on practically all States has led some commentators 
to describe some aspects of the Council's activities as quasi-legislative in character. 4 
Prime Minister Rao, of India, speaking at the Security Council Summit Meeting, held at the level 
of Heads of State: S/PV.3046 (31 January 1992), p. 97. For discussion of the Council's Summit 
Meeting, see notes 21-23 and accompanying text, below. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the Council's power to bind U.N. Member States derives from 
Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations. Article 25 provides that: "The Members of the 
United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in 
accordance with the present Charter". Chapter 4 also describes how, through Articles 39, 41 
and 42 of the Charter, the Council is empowered to take military and non-military coercive 
action to address threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. 
Although the Council's quasi-legislative activity may be less sophisticated than the legislative 
activity exhibited by most national parliamentary or congressional legislatures, the legal 
consequences flowing from Council decisions bestow upon those decisions a quality akin to 
legislation. As noted in Chapter 5, the Council's mandatory sanctions-related decisions 
amount to legislating. The Council's resolutions requiring States to take global action to 
counter-terrorism, including resolution 1373 (2001), also provide examples of legislative 
activity. For discussion of the extent to which the decision-making by the Council might be 
considered to approximate legislative activity, see: Kelsen, Hans, The Law of the United 
Nations: a Critical Analysis of its Fundamental Problems (1951) Steven & Sons, London, 736 
("By declaring the conduct of a state to be a threat to, or breach of, the peace, the Security 
Council may create new law"); Simma, Bruno (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations: a 
Commentary (2002: I'd edition) Oxford UP, 708-9 ("By allowing for binding measures under 
Chapter VII, the Chatter authorizes the Security Council to create new law and thus to act, to a 
certain degree, as a legislator"); Szasz, Paul C., 'The Security Council Starts Legislating' (2002) 
96 AJ1L 900-905 (arguing that with the adoption of resolution 1373 (2001) the Security Council 
broke new ground by using its Chapter VII powers to order States to take or refrain from 
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Moreover, the Council has on occasion pronounced itself on the content of international law 
and international legal obligations, thus interpreting and applying international law in a quasi-
judicial manner.' The Council thus sits prominently at the juncture between law and politics 
in international affairs. 
The Security Council's extraordinary ability to create and pronounce upon 
international law raises the question of where the boundaries lie upon Council action. The 
United Nations Charter, which endows the Council with its considerable powers, provides a 
general indication that those powers are not unlimited. Article 24 of the Charter provides: 
1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members 
confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
specified actions in a context not limited to disciplining a particular target); Alvarez, Jose E., 
Ilegemonic International Law Revisited' (2003) 97 AJIL 873-88, 874 (referring to the Security 
Council's "new legislative phase"). 
5 	 Examples of the Security Council's quasi-judicial pronouncements include declarations 
regarding the illegality of declarations of statehood in the cases of Southern Rhodesia 
[S/RES/216 (12 November 1965), operative paragraphs I (condemning the declaration of 
independence by the illegal white minority regime in Southern Rhodesia) and 2 (calling upon all 
States not to recognise nor render assistance to the "illegal regime"); S/RES/2I7 (20 November 
1965), operative paragraph 3 (regarding the declaration of independence by the "racist settler 
minority" as having "no legal validity")] and the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" 
[SIRES/54 1 (18 November 1983), operative paragraphs 1 (deploring the declaration by Turkish 
Cypriot authorities of the purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus) and 2 
(considering that declaration to be legally invalid and calling for its withdrawal); S/RES/550 (11 
May 1984), operative paragraph 2 (condemning the purported exchange of ambassadors 
between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, declaring them illegal and invalid and 
calling for their immediate withdrawal)], as well as declarations regarding boundary 
delimitation, as in the case of the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait [SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), 
preambular paragraphs 6 (noting that by an agreement dated 4 October 1963, the governments 
of Iraq and Kuwait had formally recognised the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait) and 7 
(noting the need for demarcating that boundary), operative paragraphs 2 (demanding that Iraq 
and Kuwait respect the inviolability of their shared boundary), 3 (requesting the Secretary-
General to lend assistance to demarcate the boundary) and 4 (deciding to guarantee the 
inviolability of the boundary)]. 
For further discussion of the quasi-judicial nature of certain Security Council activities, see: 
Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, just noted, chapter 14 in general (359-462); Bowett, 
Derek W., 'Judicial and Political Functions of the Security Council and the International Court 
of Justice' in Fox, Hazel (ed.), The Changing Constitution of the United Nations (1997) The 
British Institute of International and Comparative Law, London, 73-88; Simma, The Charter of 
the United Nations (2"d edition), just noted, 708 (noting that the Council has in fact performed 
quasi-judicial functions in a number of instances, but arguing that quasi-judicial determinations 
by the Council should remain exceptional and should be confined to cases where they are 
indispensable for the exercise of the Council's responsibilities). 
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international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this 
responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf. 
2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the 
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. 6 
The limitation upon Security Council action is thus to be found in the U.N.'s Purposes and 
Principles, which are located in Articles 1 and 2, respectively. The Purposes comprise the 
U.N.'s mission statement, providing a general and ambitious set of goals which encompass: 
the maintenance of international peace and security; 7 the development of friendly relations 
among nations; 8 and the facilitation of international cooperation and promotion of human 
rights. 9 The Principles outline a set of general norms that aim to govern international 
relations, including: the principle of the sovereign equality of Member States;' ° the 
prohibition upon the use or threat of force;" and a proscription upon United Nations 
intervention in the domestic affairs of States, other than in the case of Chapter VII 
enforcement action. 12 
The U.N.'s Purposes and Principles therefore cover a sufficiently broad range of 
activities that, whilst Article 24 makes it clear that there are limits upon the Council's 
freedom to exercise its considerable powers, it remains an open question as to where 
precisely those limits lie. The absence of any institutional mechanism to guarantee that the 
Council exercises its powers in accordance with Article 24 or to extrapolate upon the 
precise meaning of the restrictions implied by that Article has led some commentators to 
6 	Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
7 	Article 1(1) of the Charter. 
8 	Article 1(2) of the Charter. 
9 Article 1(3) of the Charter. 
io 	Article 2(1) of the Charter. 
Article 2(4) of the Charter. 
12 	Article 2(7) of the Charter. 
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conclude that the Security Council can, does and should act above the law. ° Others have 
sought to resolve the uncertainty by exploring and identifying potential legal limits upon 
Council action." Yet others have examined whether the matter might be resolved via judicial 
review of the Council's action by the International Court of Justice. I5 
The question of where the legal boundaries lie upon the exercise of the Council's 
sanctions powers may eventually be resolved as the legal system governing international 
conflict gains greater sophistication. When that moment arrives, a study of U.N. sanctions 
and the rule of law will likely explore the Security Council's sanctions practice from the 
perspective of legality, examining whether the Council's actions have conformed with or 
violated the legal norms regulating the application, implementation and enforcement of 
sanctions and thus constitute the boundaries upon permissible Council action in the field of 
U.N. sanctions. In the current day and age and the present study, however, an analysis of 
U.N. sanctions and the rule of law is less a matter of legality and more a matter of policy. 
As indicated in Chapter 1, the Council's effectiveness is ultimately undermined by 
the perception that the Security Council stands above the law and may act without 
restriction. In order to be an effective body, the Security Council relies upon the expectation 
13 	Dulles, John Foster, War or Peace (1950) Macmillan, NY, 194-5 ("The Security Council is not a 
body that merely enforces agreed law. It is a law unto itself. If it considers any situation a 
threat to the peace, it may decide what measures shall be taken. No principles of law are laid 
down to guide it; it can decide in accordance with what it thinks is expedient"). 
14 	See, e.g.: Bedjaoui, Mohammed, The New World Order and the Security Council: Testing the 
Legality of its Acts (1994) Martinus Nijhoff, Netherlands. 
15 	See, e.g.: Gowlland-Debbas, Vera, 'The Relationship Between the International Court of Justice 
and the Security Council in Light of the Lockerbie Case' (1994) 88 AJIL 643-77; Martenczuk, 
Bernd 'The Security Council, the International Court of Justice and Judicial Review: What 
Lessons from Lockerbie?' (1999) 10 EJIL 517-47; Gowlland-Debbas, Vera, 'The Functions of the 
United Nations Security Council in the International Legal System' in Byers, Michael (ed.), The 
Role of Law in International Politics (2000) Oxford UP, Oxford, 277-313; Dugard, John, 
'Judicial Review of Sanctions', in Gowlland-Debbas, Vera (ed.), United Nations Sanctions and 
International Law (2001) Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 83-91. Like the Security 
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that States will respect and implement its decisions in good faith and in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations. As a body that is so dependent upon the good faith efforts of 
others to obey the law, the Council should in turn accord maximum respect to the rule of 
law. It is in the Council's own best interests to act, and to be perceived to act, in 
accordance with the dictates of principle rather than politics. In the absence of an effective 
review mechanism — whether judicial or otherwise — to monitor the legitimacy of the 
Council's actions, the Council itself should consider it both necessary and desirable to 
promote and respect the rule of law. 
Moreover, as the discussion in the following section illustrates, the Security Council 
has fostered an increasingly close relationship with the rule of law, promoting the notion that 
the establishment and promotion of the rule of law is essential for lasting peace in societies 
emerging from conflict. If the Council's initiatives towards promoting the rule of law are to 
possess genuine authority, the Council must practice what it preaches. In is own activities, 
the Council should serve as an example of the very tenets of the rule of law that it is 
promoting in post-conflict environments. 
2.2 The relationship between the Security Council and the rule of 
law 
Although the phrase "the rule of law" does not appear in the Charter of the United 
Nations, the notion of the rule of law has nevertheless had a significant influence upon United 
Nations activities from the moment of the Organization's conception. 16 At the San Francisco 
Council, the International Court of Justice constitutes one of the primary U.N. organs. For 
further discussion, see Chapter 4, section 4.1. 
16 	Brownlie describes the promotion of the rule of law as the "moral purpose" of the United 
Nations: Brownlie, Ian, The Rule of Law in International Affairs: International Law at the 
Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations (1998) Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1 ("The 
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Conference, a number of speakers emphasized the importance of the rule of law, with some 
arguing that the Charter should contain a reference to the rule of law: 7 In the Security 
Council's very first meeting, some delegates outlined a vision in which the Council would 
play a role in strengthening the rule of law. 18 Some decades later the Organization's other 
high-profile organ — the General Assembly — adopted a resolution with the primary aim of 
political agency behind the formation of the United Nations Charter was the Second World 
War and the associated history of barbarism. The moral purpose of the United Nations was the 
promotion of the Rule of Law in international relations"). 
17 	In a spirited reference to the rule of law made at the first plenary session, the Chinese delegate 
stated: "Let us face hard facts. A long effort is required of all of us before an effective rule of 
law is established in world affairs. We in China know it by bitter experience. The rule of law was 
to have been defended by the old League of Nations; but it was disregarded, as we learned to 
our cost, despite the most solemn covenants entered into by would be defenders ... If there is 
any message which my country, which has been one of the principal victims of aggression and 
the earliest victim, wishes to give this Conference, it is that we must not hesitate to delegate a 
part of our sovereignty to the new international organization in the interests of collective 
security. We must all be ready to make some sacrifices in crder to achieve our common 
purpose. Among nations, no less than among individuals, we must forthwith accept the 
concept of liberty under law": Documents of the UNCIO, Vol. I, 129-130. See also: Evatt, 
Herbert Vere, The United Nations (1948) Harvard UP, Cambridge, MA, 36 (listing as one of nine 
objectives pursued by the Australian delegation at San Francisco: "To declare that justice and 
the rule of law shall be principles guiding the action of the Security Council"). The Australian 
delegation in fact proposed the following amendment to the draft provision that was to become 
Article 1(2): "To develop friendly relations among nations and to take other appropriate 
measures to strengthen universal peace and promote justice and the rule of law": Documents of 
the UNCIO, ibid, Vol. 3, 543. For discussion of the process leading to the adoption of the 
Charter and the establishment of the United Nations, see Chapter 4, section 4.1. For the text of 
Article 1(2), as well as the other provisions of Article 1, which contains the purposes of the 
United Nations, see also Chapter 4. 
18 	A number of speakers referred to the rule of law in the Council's very first meeting, held on 17 
January 1946. See: Security Council Official Records, First Year, First Series, January-
February 1946, 6 (where the first President of the Security Council, representing Australia, 
stated: "I should call attention to the need, in accordance with Article 43 of the Charter, for the 
negotiation of special security agreements, so that the Security Council may have available at 
its call as soon as possible the armed forces, assistance and facilities necessary to maintain 
peace. For the conclusion of these agreements, the advice and assistance of the Military Staff 
Committee will be necessary; one of the first acts of the Security Council will be to call this 
Committee into being and to direct it in the tasks that it is to perform. When this process is 
complete, the Security Council will be fully equipped to perform a function which is unique in 
the history of international organization — the direction of collective action for the maintenance 
of peace, justice, and the rule of law"), 8 (where the representative of China stated that "On this 
Council rests the primary responsibility for meeting international peace and security in the 
world. ... It has also an important role to play in bringing about settlement of international 
disputes by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international 
law"), 9 (where the representative of France stated "The Security Council's task is a heavy one, 
but it will be sustained by our hope, which is shared by the people, and by our remembrance of 
the sufferings of all those who fought and died that the rule of law might prevail"). 
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struiigthening the rule of law. 19 The Assembly has since adopted regular resolutions with the 
same goal. 2° 
But it has been in the period following the end of the Cold War that the notion of the 
rule of law has truly risen to prominence in United Nations practice. In January 1992 world 
leaders gathered in New York for the first ever Summit Meeting of the Security Council, in 
order to discuss the theme "The Responsibility of the Security Council in the Maintenance of 
International Peace and Security". 21 At that meeting, which was to set the agenda for United 
Nations and Security Council action over the following decade,22 a number of speakers 
underlined the importance of strengthening the rule of law in international affairs. 23 In 
19 	The General Assembly first adopted a resolution entitled "Strengthening the Rule of Law" in 
December 1993, as part of its follow-up to the Vienna Conference on Human Rights, which had 
recommended that a comprehensive programme be established within the U.N. Centre for 
Human Rights to help States build and strengthen national structures to facilitate the 
observance of human rights and the maintenance of the rule of law. See: A/RES/48/132 (20 
December 1993). 
20 	Following its first resolution on strengthening the rule of law the Assembly adopted an annual 
resolution on the same topic until 1998. Since 1998 it has adopted biannual resolutions. For the 
most recent resolution on strengthening the rule of law, see: AIRES/57/221 (18 December 2002). 
21 	For the verbatim record of the meeting, see: S/PV.3046 (31 January 1992): Summit Meeting of 
the Security Council on "The Responsibility of the Security Council in the Maintenance of 
International Peace and Security". 
22 	At the end of the meeting the Security Council adopted a presidential statement in which it 
requested the Secretary-General to prepare a wide-ranging report to facilitate the Council's 
efforts to maintain international peace and security, with recommendations for strengthening 
the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping: 
see S/23500 (31 January 1992): Presidential statement dated 31 January 1992, paragraphs 15- 
16. The resulting report, which was entitled "An Agenda for Peace" proved extremely 
influential in determining future United Nations and Security Council policy: S/24111 (17 June 
1992): An agenda for peace. 
23 	See, e.g., S/PV.3046, 8-9 (Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali), 18 (President Mitterand of 
France), 23 (President Borja of Ecuador), 36 (King Hassan II of Morocco), 47 (President Yeltsin 
of the Russian Federation), 50 (a-z) & 50 (President Bush of the United States), 59-60 (President 
Perez of Venezuela), 67 (Federal Chancellor Vranitsky of Austria), 78-9 (Prime Minister Veiga of 
Cape Verde), 97 (Prime Minister Rao of India), 107 (Prime Minister Miyazawa of Japan), 133 
(Minister Shamuyarira of Zimbabwe). 
Three of those statements — those of President Bush of the United States, President Mitterand 
of France and Prime Minister Veiga of Cape Verde — give a flavour of the calls to expand and 
strengthen the rule of law. President Bush urged that "We must advance the momentous 
movement towards democracy and freedom ... and expand the circle of nations committed to 
human rights and the rule of law" (at p. 50). President Mittemnd, whilst not explicitly using the 
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September 2000, world leaders again gathered in New York to mark an important symbolic 
occasion: the U.N.'s Millennium Summit. With the aim of setting the United Nations agenda 
for the twenty-first century, the leaders adopted the Millennium Declaration. 24 The 
Declaration stressed, among other things, that the maintenance of international peace and 
security depends upon fostering and strengthening the rule of law. 25 It thus demonstrated that 
the general membership of the United Nations considered the promotion of the rule of law to 
constitute a key objective for the Organization as it entered the twenty-first century. 
term "rule of law", nevertheless observed that: "Past experience has shown that nothing can be 
done without the determination of States, particularly the major Powers, to reject the law of the 
jungle and the principle that might is right" (at p. 18). Prime Minister Veiga stated that: "The 
United Nations, through its Security Council, has to act— as envisaged by the Charter — as the 
guardian of the security of nations, especially the small countries, and as a catalyst for the 
promotion of the primacy of the rule of law in international relations" (at p.78). 
24 	AIRES/55/2 (18 September 2000): United Nations Millennium Declaration, (hereafter 
"Millennium Declaration"). 
The Millennium Declaration identified seven key objectives with "special significance": 
"Peace, security and disarmament"; "Development and poverty eradication"; "Protecting our 
common environment"; "Human rights, democracy and good governance"; "Protecting the 
vulnerable"; "Meeting the special needs of Africa"; and "Strengthening the United Nations": 
see Millennium Declaration, ibid paragraph 7. Notably, the very first objective listed within the 
first category, "Peace, security and disarmament", was "To strengthen respect for the rule of 
law in international affairs as in national affairs": paragraph 9. Also notable for the purposes of 
this thesis, another objective listed under "Peace, security and disarmament" was: "To 
minimize the adverse effects of United Nations economic sanctions on innocent populations, 
to subject such sanctions regimes to regular reviews and to eliminate the adverse effects of 
sanctions on third parties": see also paragraph 9. 
The rule of law also featured prominently under the category "Human rights, democracy and 
good governance", as Member States pledged "to spare no effort to promote democracy and 
strengthen the rule of law, as well as respect for all internationally recognized human rights and 
fundamental freedoms": paragraph 24. They therefore resolved to take a number of steps in 
pursuit of that pledge, all of which aimed to reinforce the rule of law within their own national 
societies: paragraph 25. Those steps included: a) respecting fully and upholding the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights; b) striving for the full protection and promotion of civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights for all; c) strengthening the capacity to implement 
the principles and practices of democracy and respect for human rights, including minority 
rights; d) combating violence against women and implementing the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; e) taking measures to ensure 
respect for and protection of the human rights of migrants, migrant workers and their families, 
to eliminate acts of racism and xenophobia and to promote greater harmony and tolerance; 
0 working collectively for more inclusive political processes, allowing genuine participation by 
all citizens; and g) ensuring the freedom of the media to perform their role and the right of the 
public to have access to information. 
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More recently, in September 2003, the Security Council held two meetings under 
the agenda item "Justice and the Rule of Law". At those meetings, the focus of discussion 
was largely on the need to promote and strengthen the rule of law within societies that had 
been shattered by conflict. 26 Nevertheless, many speakers argued that the rule of law was 
important not only within post-conflict, national societies, but also in international relations in 
genera1. 22 Moreover, some of those speakers suggested that the Security Council's actions 
should both promote and respect the rule of law. 28 
26 
	
The non-paper circulated by the President of the Security Council at the time (the United 
Kingdom) and on file with the author made this point clear. 
27 	See, e.g.: S/PV.4833 (24 September 2003): Provisional Verbatim Record of the 4833rd Meeting 
of the Security Council, p.2 (Secretary-General Kofi Annan, observing that: "This Council has 
a very heavy responsibility to promote justice and the rule of law in its efforts to maintain 
international peace and security. This applies both internationally and in rebuilding shattered 
societies"), p. 4 (Mr. Khurshid Mehmud Kasuri, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, 
stating that: "Establishing the principles of justice and the rule of law is essential to the 
establishment and maintenance of order at the inter-State and intra-State levels"), p. 5 (Mr. Igor 
Ivanov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, noting that his country 
believed that the principle of the rule of law was "an imperative for the entire system of 
international relations"), p. 13 (Mr. Francois Lonseny Fall, Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Guinea, stating that: "The international community has a stake in ensuring that the rule of law 
replaces the law of the jungle in all areas of activity and at all levels of social and political 
organization"), p. 14, (Ms. Ana Palacio, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain, observing that: 
"The primary objective of the United Nations, and especially of the Security Council, is to 
ensure international peace and security. That goal is inseparable from the existence of a 
concept of law common to all international society, a body of legal categories basically 
accepted by all"), p. 21 (Ambassador James Cunningham, of the United States, noting that: 
"[T]he rule of law is indispensable to international peace and security ... As a nation founded 
by law, the United States is the unflagging champion of the rule of law. By working together in 
support of the rule of law, we believe the international community can strengthen peace and 
help conflict-ridden societies build a better future"), p. 21 (Mrs. Soledad Alvear Valenzuela, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile, stating that: "The rule of law, democracy and human 
rights are the core values of our Organization and the guiding principles of the international 
system. The drafters of the Charter assigned to justice and the rule of law a pre-eminent place 
in an international system that aspires not only to be predictable, but also to make real the idea 
of justice. The rule of law stands as a bulwark against arbitrariness on two levels: first, with 
regard to relations between States and, secondly, with regard to relations between States and 
individuals"); S/PV.4835 (30 September 2003): Provisional Verbatim Record of the 4835 th 
meeting of the Security Council, p. 22 (Ambassador Fogh, of Sweden, observing that: "All 
Members of the United Nations have an obligation to respect and ensure respect for the rule of 
law in international relations"). 
28 	See, e.g.: S/PV.4833 (24 September 2003), p. 9 (Mr. Luis Ernesto Derbez, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of Mexico: "[F]or the sake of justice and the rule of law, the Security Council must 
continue to act on the bases of legality that provide support for its mandate"), p. 22 (Mrs. 
Soledad Alvear Valenzuela, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile: "The rule of law offers the 
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Not surprisingly, the connection between the Security Council and the rule of law 
has also been highlighted in the field of sanctions. In meetings at which the Security Council 
has imposed or modified sanctions, speakers have emphasised that one goal of sanctions is 
to reinforce respect for the rule of law or have observed that sanctions serve as one of the 
key tools in the Council's arsenal to address actors which have transgressed the norms of 
international society. 29 Thus sanctions have been portrayed as an instrument which can be 
Security Council the possibility of basing its work on a concept that embodies the core values 
of the United Nations"); S/PV.4835 (24 September 2003), p. 13 (Ambassador Pfanzelter, of 
Austria: "[A]mong the foremost duties of the United Nations is ensuring and enforcing 
compliance with international norms. The Security Council has a special responsibility in that 
regard. A Council dedicated to the resolute implementation of international law is the best 
incentive for the implementation of law at the national level"), p. 16 (Ambassador Helg, of 
Switzerland: "Justice and respect for law must prevail first and foremost in relations between 
States. They must also constantly guide the action of the Security Council and the other 
bodies of the United Nations"). 
29 	In connection with the Iraq sanctions regime, see: S/PV.2933 (6 August 1990): Provisional 
Verbatim record of the 2933 d meeting of the Security Council, p. 18 (United States, speaking 
just before the Council adopted resolution 661 (1990), applying sanctions against Iraq: "Iraq 
must learn that its disregard for international law will have crippling political and economic 
costs .. Our concerted resolve will demonstrate that the international community does not — 
and will not— accept Baghdad's preference for the use of force, coercion and intimidation."), 25 
(Canada, also just before the adoption of resolution 661 (1990): "These measures are essential 
to safeguard the rule of law and to deter future aggressors."), 28 (United Kingdom, also before 
adoption of resolution 661 (1990): "Today the Security Council faces its responsibilities. It 
must succeed this time where the League of Nations failed and where it itself has faltered in the 
past. ... It should make of the Council what the Founding Fathers intended it to be, and it 
should set a new precedent for the further and better management of a world order based on 
respect for law, sovereignty and territorial integrity."); S/PV.2938 (25 August 1990): 
Provisional Verbatim record of the 29386 meeting of the Security Council, 36 (Canada: 
commenting that the primary objective of the resolution just adopted — resolution 665 (1990) — 
was to "bring about respect for the rule of law"); S/PV.2943 (25 September 1990): Provisional 
Verbatim record of the 2943" meeting of the Security Council, 7-10 (Secretary-General: "The 
power at the disposal of the Security Council is the power commanded by the solidarity of 
nations opposed to the transgression of the Charter of the United Nations. It is first and 
foremost the power of principle. What makes the Council's task particularly onerous — and, I 
am sure, ultimately fruitful — is that principles must be consistently applied and the Council's 
actions mast be based on equity and perceived to be so. The world has not had an experience 
of enforcement provisions under Chapter VII being used in the manner and on the scale in 
which they are in the present crisis. Now that they are actually applied, the United Nations is 
being subjected to an unprecedented test. It needs to demonstrate that the way of enforcement 
is qualitatively different from the way of war; that as such actions issues from a collective 
engagement, it requires a discipline all its own; that it strives to minimize undeserved suffering 
to the extent humanly possible, and to search for solutions to the special economic problems 
confronted by states arising from the carrying out of enforcement measures; that what it 
demands from the party against which it is employed is not surrender but the righting of the 
wrong that has been committed; and that it does not foreclose diplomatic efforts to arrive at a 
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used to strengthen, reinforce and promote the rule of law. A link has also been drawn 
between the rule of law and the need to minimise the unintended consequences of sanctions 
upon civilian populations and third States. 3° 
2.3 Proposing a basic model of the rule of law and a framework 
for analysis 
Although the rule of law has become increasingly influential in the practice of the 
Security Council, the concept defies easy definition. 31 Moreover, despite the common usage 
of the term in the Security Council and other prominent international fora, surprisingly few 
peaceful solution consistent with the principles of the Charter and the determinations made by 
the Security Council. ... The world situation generally, and in particular the situation in the 
Middle East as a whole, presents itself as a proving ground for our probity in establishing the 
rule of law. If peace is to be made secure, justice must have the last word"), 32 (France: 
describing sanctions against Iraq as the "instrument" of the policy of a "new international 
order", which aims to ensure "the primacy of law and justice over force and arbitrary acts"), 67 
(Ethiopia: Ethiopia's position with respect to Iraq's invasion, and its close cooperation with the 
rest of the Council members to bring about the withdrawal of Iraqi troops and the restoration of 
the legitimate Government of Kuwait, are prompted by our country's commitment to the system 
of collective security. We strongly believe that the resolve and solidarity manifested by the 
international community in defence of the rule of law are the surest means of deterring 
aggression"), 
In connection with the Libya sanctions regime, see: S/PV.3063, p. 67 (the United States: "That 
message is the surest guarantee that the United Nations Security Council, using its specific, 
unique powers under the Charter, will preserve the rule of law and ensure the peaceful 
resolution of threats to international peace and security, now and in the future"); S/PV.3063: 
Zimbabwe, p. 53 ("Zimbabwe attaches great importance to the rule of law in relations between 
States. As the body entrusted with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, the Council must attach due importance to international law, 
including international conventions"). 
30 	Statement by Mrs. Soledad Alvear Valenzuela, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile, during the 
High-Level Meeting of the Security Council on "Justice and the Rule of Law", held on 24 
September 2003: S/PV.4833, p. 22 ("One of the areas in which the Council can make a 
contribution to the rule of law and international justice is that of sanctions imposed pursuant 
to Chapter VII. It is necessary to reduce to a minimum the negative impact which economic 
sanctions can have on innocent civilian populations and to address the issue of the adverse 
impact of sanctions on third countries"). See also paragraph 9 of the Millennium Declaration, 
as referred to in note 25, above. 
31 	Watts, Sir Arthur, 'The International Rule of Law' (1993) 36 German YBIL 15-45, 15 ("[T]he rule 
of law is more easily invoked than understood. While its fundamental importance is 
acknowledged and usually taken for granted, it is not a concept with any readily definable 
content"). 
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studies have focussed upon the concept of the rule of law in international affairs. 32 The 
theoretical model of the rule of law employed here draws inspiration from the growing 
literature on the rule of law in international affairs, as well as from pertinent statements made 
in the debates of the Security Council. It does not pretend to be a sophisticated, final-word 
model for analysing the rule of law in international affairs in general. Rather, it is a pared-
down, bare-bones model, identifying certain basic elements which should be present in any 
system which claims to promote and respect the rule of law. In an international society 
where the line between politics and law — between power and principle — remains blurred 
and where the underlying legal structure lacks sophistication, the starting-point for an 
analysis of the rule of law performance of the U.N. sanctions system must almost inevitably 
be such a basic model. A highly developed theory or model must await a more sophisticated 
international legal system. 
Commentators have approached the subject of the international rule of law from a 
number of perspectives. Academics have argued that, although the international legal system 
may be less-developed than most domestic legal systems, sufficient precedents of law-
respecting and law-abiding behaviour exist in international relations to suggest that 
interactions between States are often regulated by the rule of law. 33 Some of these works 
32 	Brownlie has published a valuable monograph on the international rule of law, based upon a 
lecture series he presented at the Hague Academy of International Law in 1995. See: Brownlie, 
Ian, The Rule of Law in International Affairs, above note 16. For useful shorter pieces 
addressing the international rule of law in general, see the works listed in the following 
footnote. 
33 	See, e.g.: Brownlie, The Rule of Law in International Affairs, ibid; Fitzxnaurice, G.G., 'The 
United Nations and the Rule of Law' (1953) 38 The Grotius Society Transactions 135-150; 
Watts, 'The International Rule of Law', above note 31; Brownlie, Ian, 'The Decisions of the 
Political Organs of the United Nations and the Rule of Law', in Macdonald, Ronald St. J. (ed.), 
Essays in honour of Wang Tieys (1994) Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, Netherlands, 91-102; Falk, 
Richard, 'The United Nations and the rule of law' (1994) 4 Transnational Law & 
Contemporary Problems 611-42; Teitel, Ruti G., 'Humanity's Law: Rule of Law for the New 
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take the view that the rule of law exists in systems in which conflicts are regulated with 
reference to specified legal rules. 34 Others interpret the rule of law to consist of a collection 
of general principles that aim to ensure an ordered and just society. 35 International legal 
practitioners, for their part, have documented the growing breadth of subjects addressed by 
international codification, as well as the ever-rising numbers of States that have signed onto 
international treaties, thus demonsliating the increasing reach of the international rule of 
law. 36 Peace-keeping practitioners have also explored the lessons of the U.N.'s peace-
keeping endeavours in order to propose methods for bstering the establishment of the rule 
of law in post-conflict environments. 37 
Despite their different points of focus and inflection, these studies of the international 
rule of law share some common threads. All analysts differentiate the rule of law from 
Global Politics' (2002) 35 Cornell ILJ 355-87; Bacchus, James, 'Groping towards Grotius: the 
WTO and the international rule of law' (2003) 44 Harvard ILJ 533-50. 
34 	See, e.g., Fitzmaurice, 'The United Nations and the Rule of Law', ibid, 136-7 ("[T]he term "Rule 
of Law" ... denotes essentially the subordination of the will of individual States, in their 
dealings and transactions inter se, to the body or rules known and applied by international 
tribunals under the name of international law"). 
35 	See, e.g., Brownlie, Ian, The Rule of Law in International Affairs, above note 16, 212-13 
(proposing general principles including that: (1) Powers must be based on authority conferred 
by law; (2) That law must conform to standards of substantive and procedural justice; 
(3) There must be a separation of powers; (4) A body determining facts and applying legal 
principles with dispositive effect should observe certain standards of procedural fairness; and 
(5) All legal persons are subject to rules of law which are applied on the basis of equality). 
36 	See, e.g.: Corell, Hans, 'The Visible College of International Law: "Towards the Rule of Law in 
International Relations" (2001) ASIL Proceedings 262-70; Kohona, Palitha T.B., 'The 
international rule of law and the role of the United Nations' (2002) 36 International Lawyer 
1131-44; Corell, Hans, 'Developing the Rule of Law among Nations: a challenge for the United 
Nations', Lecture given to the United Nations Association of the United Kingdom, 7 July 2003: 
available on-line at www.un.org/law/counsel/info.htm  (last visited on 10 December 2003). 
37 	For examples of the growing literature surrounding the rule of law and peace operations 
initiated by the United Nations and/or regional organizations, see: The United Nations 
Association of the United States of America & The Project on Justice in Times of Transition of 
Harvard University, A Policy Report of the Partnership Program on Peace-building and Rule 
of Law (2003) United Nations Association of the United States of America, NY, NY; Howard, 
Jessica & Oswald, Bruce, The Rule of Law on Peace Operations (2003) Melbourne, Australia 
(on file with author). 
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politics.38 In systems that respect and promote the rule of law, the use of power is 
circumscribed, so that policy is exercised in accordance with the dictates of principle, rather 
than being employed arbitrarily or for the purpose of expediency or self-interest. 39 
Moreover, a key tenet of the rule of law is that rules are applied equally, with no one 
considered to be above the law. "° 
As already indicated, the Security Council's debates also hint at the broad 
parameters of the concept of the rule of law. Ambassadors and high-level U.N. officials 
have suggested that the rule of law aims to ensure that conflict is resolved by principle rather 
than by brute force — by "right" rather than "might" and by "the force of law" rather than the 
"law of force". 41 They haw emphasised that political power must be subject to the law and 
that the Security Council should lead by example, observing the very norms it applies. 42 In 
38 	See, e.g.: Watts, 'The International Rule of Law', above note 31, 23 ("The rule of law is the 
counterweight to political power; together they establish a balance in which the exercise of 
power is subject to legal constraints which ensure that power is not abused"); Bacchus, 
'Groping towards Grotius', above note 33, 546 ("The rule of law is, above all, not politics"). 
39 	Watts, 'The International Rule of Law', above note 31, ("[A]ction which is despotic, 
capricious, or otherwise unresponsive to legal regulation ... is incompatible with the 
international rule of law"); Brownlie, 'The Decisions of the Political Organs of the United 
Nations, above note 33, 92 ("Powers exercised by politicians and officials must be based upon 
authority conferred by law"); Bacchus, 'Groping towards Grotius', above note 33, 546 ("With 
the rule of law, the law is certain, not arbitrary. With the rule of law, the law is written 
beforehand, and the rules are defined and known in advance"). 
Watts, 'The International Rule of Law', above note 31, 30-32; Brownlie, 'The Decisions of the 
Political Organs of the United Nations', above note 33, 92 ("All legal persons are subject to 
rules of law which are applied on the basis of equality"); Bacchus, 'Groping towards Grotius', 
above note 33, 546 ("With the rule of law, the law is written to apply to all equally, and all, in 
practice and in reality, are equal before the law. With the rule of law, no one is beneath the 
concern of the law or above it"). 
41 	 See, e.g.: S/PV.2977 (Part II: 16 February 1991), 229-30 (statement by the representative of 
Sweden, made during the Gulf War "[T]he basic and most immediate question is: Shall the force 
of law or the law of force prevail?"). 
42 	 See, e.g.: S/PV.3046 (31 January 1992), 97 (statement by Prime Minister Rao of India: "[W]hile 
prescribing norms and standards for national or international conduct, the Security Council 
must scrupulously accept those norms for itself'); S/PV.4835 (30 September 2003), 16 
(statement by the epresentative of Switzerland: "Justice and the rule of law "Justice and 
respect for law must prevail first and foremost in relations between States. They must also 
constantly guide the action of the Security Council and the other bodies of the United 
Nations"). 
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the context of sanctions, speakers have stressed that the Security Council should not engage 
in "double standards" when choosing whether to impose sanctions and that once sanctions 
are employed they should be applied in a consistent and uniform marmer.43 They have 
spoken of the need for the Security Council and its Sanctions Committees to act 
transparently,44 and they have emphasised the need to ensure that sanctions are applied 
proportionately, so that the negative effects upon civilian populations and third States are 
minirnised.45 
2.3.1 A working model of the rule of law 
A common thread running through any characterisation of the rule of law is that 
power should be exercised in accordance with principle. At its core, the rule of law thus 
seeks to prevent the abuse of power. The understanding of the rule of law employed in this 
thesis uses this key premise as the bedrock on which to construct an accountability-based 
43 	S/PV.2977 (Part I: 13 February 1991), 27-8 (statement by the representative of Cuba: "The 
economic sanctions imposed by resolution 661 (1990) were unparalleled in the history of the 
United Nations. They were so all-encompassing, so complete, that in effect they represented a 
double standard from the Security Council. Throughout its history, the Council had never done 
anything similar, even when there were invasions of small countries by major powerful 
neighbours or when foreign territories had been occupied without the Council's feeling obliged 
even to consider Chapter VII. Panama and Grenada can be invaded by a powerful neighbour 
without the Council even considering any kind of sanctions. Southern Lebanon can continue 
to be occupied. Many other such cases might come to anyone's mind"). See also the statement 
by Prime Minister Veiga, of Cape Verde at the Council's Summit Meeting: S/PV.3046 (31 
January 1992), p. 79 ("The Council, in addressing aggression and illegal occupation, must be 
even-handed. Whenever a selective approach is taken in this respect, it necessarily damages 
the Council's credibility and substantially weakens its moral authority. Equally damaging to the 
Council's credibility is what could be perceived to be selective implementation of its 
resolutions"). 
44 	S/PV.4833 (24 September 2003), 9 (statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mexico: 
"[Nor the sake of justice and the rule of law, the Security Council must continue to act on the 
bases of legality that provide support for its mandate"). 
45 	S/PV.4833 (24 September 2003), 22 (statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile: "One 
of the areas in which the Council can make a contribution to the rule of law and international 
justice is that of sanctions imposed pursuant to Chapter VII. It is necessary to reduce to a 
minimum the negative impact which economic sanctions can have on innocent civilian 
populations and to address the issue of the adverse impact of sanctions on third countries"). 
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model of the rule of law which is designed to prevent and reduce the abuse of power. The 
model also gathers together some of the other threads that emerge from the sources noted 
above, proposing five basic elements which are generally present in any system that seeks to 
prevent or reduce the abuse of power. Those elements are transparency, consistency, 
equality, due process and proportionality. 
The concept of the rule of law proposed here should be differentiated from the issue 
of legality, as the rule of law is considered to be a matter of process rather than of 
substance. One example of how this rule of law-based approach might differ from a legality-
based approach is a hypothetical situation in which the law bestows unlimited power upon a 
particular actor. According to a formalistic, legality-based approach, that actor might 
technically be authorized to undertake actions that amount to a misuse or abuse of that 
power. In such an instance, a simple inquiry into the issue of legality would likely conclude 
that there is no illegality, for the acts at issue were "authorized". According to the rule of law 
approach being proposed here, however, despite the fact that formal legality might 
technically be assured, the question of abuse of power could nevertheless be explored. A 
key principle of the rule of law is that no actor is above the law. The corollary of that 
principle is that no actor can be granted unrestricted power. Thus in the hypothetical 
example just explored, a rule-of-law-based enquiry would likely conclude that an abuse of 
power did in fact take place and that the rule of law was thus undermined. 
In the context of Security Council action, the rule of law cuts both ways. On the one 
hand, the Council may strengthen or reinforce the rule of law by preventing or reducing the 
misuse or abuse of power by other actors within its sphere of competence — whether in a 
domestic context (generally in national, post-conflict environments) or on the international 
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plane. On the other hand, the key to the Council's potential to promote the rule of law lies in 
its own relationship with power. In order to ensure that its actions genuinely promote the rule 
of law, the Council should ensure that its own extraordinary powers are not themselves 
susceptible to misuse or abuse. This thesis focuses upon this aspect of the Security Council's 
relationship with the rule of law. 
The basic model of the rule of law proposed here consists of five key principles 
which seek to prevent the abuse of power: transparency, consistency, equality, due process 
and proportionality. These principles, which are interrelated but distinct, 46 exist in systems 
which respect and promote the rule of law. Thus, to the extent that they are evident in the 
U.N. sanctions system, that system can be said to reinforce and strengthen the rule of law. 
i. 	Transparency 
The principle of -transparency requires that in the exercise of power, decision-
making should be open and transparent. The reasoning leading to a particular decision 
should therefore be apparent to those affected by the ultimate decision. Moreover, it should 
be clear that power is exercised in accordance with legitimate authority. In the context of 
U.N. sanctions, transparency requires that the Security Council's decision-making process 
is open and transparent. 
Consistency 
The principle of consistency requires that power be exercised in a consistent 
manner. Decisions should thus be made in a predictable rather than an arbitrary manner. 
46 
	
Thus for example, where the requirements of transparency are routinely satisfied, it is likely that 
the demands of consistency will be fulfilled. It is possible, however, that the requirements of 
transparency might be satisfied, yet in an inconsistent manner. It is also possible, of course, 
that the exercise of power might be absolutely consistent, yet consistently non-transparent. 
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Consistency contributes to the rule of law by promoting standards of behaviour. In the 
context of U.N. sanctions, the principle of consistency requires that the Security Council 
should seek to ensure, to the extent possible, that its practice is consistent from one 
sanctions regime to another. 
Equality 
The principle of equality requires that all parties over whom power is wielded are 
considered equal before that power and that any decisions affecting the rights, entitlements 
and obligations of those parties are made in a consistent manner. In a political context, one 
method of achieving equality is to provide all parties with the opportunity to elect their 
leaders, thus providing democratic representation. In the context of U.N. sanctions, equality 
requires that if sanctions are imposed against one State in a given set of circumstances, then 
they should be applied against other parties in a similar set of circumstances. It also requires 
that the Security Council itself be democratically representative of the broader U.N. 
membership and that all of its members have the opportunity to stand for election to the 
Council. 
iv. 	Due Process 
The principle of due process requires that parties against which coercive power is 
proposed to be exercised should be given a fair hearing and granted the opportunity to 
express their point of view regarding the potential decision. In the context of U.N. sanctions, 
the principle of due process requires that States, non-State actors and individuals against 
which coercive measures are to be applied should be afforded the possibility to present their 
version of events and, in the case of individuals, to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. 
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v. 	Proportionality 
The principle of proportionality requires that the consequences of a decision 
affecting the rights, entitlements and obligations of other parties are proportional to the harm 
caused by that party and consistent with the overall objectives for which the decision is 
being taken. In the context of sanctions, proportionality requires that the coercive 
consequences of the application of sanctions, which may be felt by civilian populations, third 
States or individuals, remain in proportion to the harm caused by the target against which 
sanctions are imposed and are consistent with he objectives for which sanctions were 
employed. The adverse effects of sanctions upon innocent civilian populations and third 
States should thus be minimised. 
2.3.2 A framework for subsequent analysis 
Based upon the model of the rule of law proposed above, in order to possess 
maximum potential to reinforce the rule of law, the Security Council's sanctions powers 
should be employed in such a manner that power is exercised in accordance with principle 
rather than politics. In order to be certain that the Council's considerable sanctions powers 
are not susceptible to abuse, sanctions should be applied with maximum respect for the key 
elements of the rule of law noted above. This thesis thus aims to ascertain the extent to 
which the U.N. sanctions system respects and promotes those five key elements of the rule 
of law. If U.N. sanctions have indeed promoted the elements of transparency, consistency, 
equality, due process and proportionality, then they have reinforced and strengthened the 
rule of law. In order to lay the groundwork for a critical analysis of the extent to which the 
Security Council's sanctions practice has respected and promoted the core elements of the 
rule of law, discussion will now turn to the evolution of the U.N. sanctions system. 
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PART II. THE ORIGINS OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL'S 
SANCTIONS POWERS 
Part H explores the origins of the Security Council's sanctions powers, tracing the 
path leading to the enshrinement of the Security Council's sanctions powers in the United 
Nations Charter. Chapter 3 describes the "pre-history" of U.N. sanctions, surveying 
historical precedents in international relations for the employment of non-military coercive 
strategies as a means of compelling the resolution of international disputes, and touching 
upon the sanctions experience of the U.N.'s predecessor - the League of Nations. Chapter 
4 illustrates how U.N. sanctions were designed to operate in theory, outlining the legal 
framework for the Security Council's use of sanctions. 
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sanctions 
Although the framework for collective international security created by the founders 
of the United Nations in San Francisco in 1945 represented a ground-breaking development 
in the endeavour to restrict the ability of states to resort to force,' the idea of non-military 
international sanctions was not novel. The measures of non-military coercion placed at the 
disposal of the U.N. Security Council under Article 41 of the U.N. Charter may never have 
been grouped together as part of such a comprehensive system of collective international 
security, however precedents did exist in international relations' for most of the forms of 
non-military coercion envisaged by Article 41. 3 Just a generation earlier the concept of 
collective non-military sanctions had also featured in the thinking of the founders of the 
League of Nations, who had engaged in the international community's first genuine attempt 
at collective security through international organisation. 4 The Covenant of the League of 
The U.N. Charter went further than previous attempts to collaborate to preserve international 
peace. Its predecessor, the League of Nations, had itself broken ground, improving upon the 
laissez-faire "balance of power" arrangements that had preceded it under the Concert of 
Europe by attempting to limit the ability of member states to resort to war. The U.N.'s 
framework for collective security went beyond this by attempting to restrict the general use of 
force against another state's territory, whether it amounted to an act of war or not: see U.N. 
Charter, Article 2(4). 
The term "international relations" as it is used here is not restricted to the relations between 
states as conceptualised by the post-Peace of Westphalia international system. It also 
embraces the historical relations between quasi-state entities which were considered to be 
sovereign and independent in the pre-Westphalian world. Many quasi-states resembled 
contemporary states, possessing similar characteristics. Some, however, were smaller entities 
which would now be considered principalities, districts or cities. Examples include the "city-
states" of ancient Greece and the "sovereign principalities" of medieval Europe. 
As discussed above in Chapter I, the term "U.N. sanctions" is used here to represent the range 
of measures provided for in Article 41 of the U.N. Charter. These measures short of the use of 
armed force include, but are rot restricted to, economic, transport, communications and 
diplomatic sanctions. For discussion of the legal basis for U.N. sanctions, see Chapter 4. For 
discussion of the potential scope of U.N. sanctions, see Chapter 7. 
Collective security is considered to be a product of the twentieth century. Although 
precedents had existed for collaborative arrangements in international relations, such 
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Nations, which established a framework for collective security through the League, 
contained an Article providing for the application of non-military sanctions against a State 
which resorted to war.' But the evolution of U.N. non-military sanctions began well before 
even the League of Nations sanctions experiment. In fact, the notion at the core of U.N. 
sanctions - that coercive measures short of force can be adopted in order to compel the 
resolution of international disputes - has influenced decision-making in the arena of 
international relations and developments in the sphere of international law for countless 
generations.6 
arrangements were characterised as falling under the category of a balance of power 
arrangement, rather than as a centralised attempt at collective security. Examples of pre-
twentieth century balance of power arrangements can be found in the alliances that arose after 
the Peace of Westphalia, and after the Congress of Vienna. See: Lorenz, Joseph P., Peace, 
Power and the United Nations (1999) Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 10-16; Larus, Joel (ed.), 
From Collective Security to Preventive Diplomacy (1965) John Wiley, NY, intro, 1-8. 
For further details relating to the League's sanctions provision, see section 3.3, below. 
Historically a debate raged between international law commentators as to whether the relations 
which existed between pre-Westphalian communities could legitimately be studied as the 
subject of international law. For an example of the view that pre-Westphalian international 
relations did not give rise to genuine international law, see: Oppenheim, L., International Law; 
a Treatise, below note 21, Vol. I, 3-4 ("International Law in the meaning of the term as used in 
modern times did not exist during antiquity and the first part of the Middle Ages. It is in its 
origin essentially a product of Christian civilisation, and began gradually to grow from the 
second half of the Middle Ages"). Oppenheim does subsequently acknowledge, however, that 
"the roots of [international] law go very far back into history". See ibid 44. For examples of the 
view that relations between quasi-state entities dating from pre-Westphalian times gave rise to 
a form of international law, see: Verosta, Stephan, 'International Law in Europe and Western 
Asia between 100 and 650 A.D.' (1964) 113 Recueil des Cours 485-617, 491 ("There is no doubt 
that from the earliest periods of international relations between sovereign political units ... a 
body of rules of a general hw of nations can be traced showing all the characteristics of 
international law"); Phillipson, Coleman, The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece 
and Rome (1911) Macmillan, London, vol 1, 60 ("That the ancients possessed a complete 
system of international law no one can justifiably assert. That they possessed important 
elements thereof which contributed greatly to subsequent juridical evolution is undeniable"); 
Korff, Baron S.A., 'An Introduction to the History of International Law' (1924) 18 AJIL 246-59, 
258 ("international law is as old as human civilization in general"). 
46 
3. From Aegina to Abyssinia: a prehistory of U.N. sanctions 
3.1 International coercion short of force in ancient and medieval 
Times 
States and quasi-state entities have employed a variety of non-military coercive 
strategies as a means of pursuing foreign policy objectives since at least the days of ancient 
Greece.' In 492 B.C. the Greek city-state Aegina took non-military coercive action against 
Athens by seizing an Athenian ship and Inlding its passengers hostage.' The action was 
taken in retaliation for the refusal of Athens to release ten Aeginetan citizens whom it was 
holding captive. 9 Just over half a century later, in 432 BC, Athens itself took non-military 
coercive action by imposing a ban upon the importation of products from Megara. 1° The aim 
of the action was ostensibly to secure the release of three Athenian women who had been 
kidnapped." These two incidents provide early examples of non-military coercive strategies 
7 	 Unfortunately, no comprehensive history exists as yet of the precursors of U.N. sanctions. For 
useful, if brief, contemporary discussion of the history of economic sanctions, see: Hufbauer, 
Gary Clyde, Schott, Jeffrey J. & Elliott, Kimberly Ann, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered 
(1985), Institute for International Economics, Washington DC, 4; Ellings, Richard, Embargoes 
and World Power (1985) Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 17-18; Simons, Geoffrey L., Imposing 
economic sanctions: legal remedy or genocidal tool? (1999) Pluto Press, London, 13-16. For 
earlier discussions of the use of force short of war in international relations see: Hindmarsh, 
Albert E., Force in Peace: Force short of war in international relations (1933) Kennikat Press, 
London; Wild, Payson S., Sanctions and Treaty Enforcement (1934) Harvard UP, Cambridge 
Mass.; Royal Institute of International Affairs, Sanctions: the Character of International 
Sanctions and their Application (1935) OUP, New York; Colbert, Evelyn S., Retaliation in 
International Law (1948) King's Crown Press, NY. 
Phillipson, The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome, above note 6, vol. 
2,354. 
Ibid. 
10 	Many economic sanctions commentators point to this episode as the earliest recorded instance 
of economic sanctioning: see, e.g., Hufbauer, Schott, & Elliott, Economic Sanctions 
Reconsidered, above note 7, 4, 21; Doxey, Margaret P., International Sanctions in 
Contemporary Perspective (2nd ed. 1996) St. Martin's Press, NY, 3; Renwick, Robin, Economic 
Sanctions (1981) Center for International Affairs, Cambridge, MA, I. 
11 	Hufbauer et al speculate, however, that the motives underlying the Athenian action may have 
been more complex than the simple release of the women, as Athens soon began to wage war 
upon Megara: ibid 4. 
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that have continued to play a role in international relations right up to the contemporary 
era. 12 
Throughout the ancient and medieval eras states and quasi-states employed a range 
of non-military coercive strategies as part of their foreign policy. These strategies included: 
conducting diplomatic relations with another state in a less than courteous manner; 13 
authorising the seizure of property belonging to another state or its citizens;" authorising the 
kidnapping of citizens of another state; 15 and placing a maritime blockade upon the flow of 
12 	The tool of unilateral economic sanctions represents an obvious contemporary parallel of the 
boycott imposed against Megara by Athens. A contemporary parallel of Aegina's action might 
be viewed in the strategy employed by Iran, under the leadership of the Ayatollah Khomeini, of 
taking hostage US consular workers. Although the strategy was illegal, as confirmed 
unanimously by the International Court of Justice, it nevertheless represented a form of non-
military coercion which had the aim of forcing the US to relinquish Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, 
the former Shah of Iran, to whom the US had granted asylum. For the International Court's 
judgment on the merits, see: United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 
Judgment, [1980] ICJ Rep. 3. For a critical discussion of the manner in which international law 
operated in the case of the Iran hostages crisis, see: Falk, Richard, 'The Iran Hostage Crisis: 
Easy Answers and Hard Questions' (1980) 74 AJIL 411-17. 
13 	The Roman and Persian empires sometimes employed the strategy of registering dissatisfaction 
with the other power by failing to notify the other power upon the installation of a new leader: 
Verosta, 'International Law in Europe and Western Asia between 100 and 650 A.D.', above 
note 6, 521 (noting that during periods of strong rivalry, "the omission of the usual notification 
of the ascension to the throne of the wronged state could be used as a diplomatic 
demonstration of the tension existing between the two great powers"). 
14 	In 1567 Portugal confiscated English property within its jurisdiction, in response to a raid that 
had been led by an aglish national, George Fenner, against Santiago in the Cape Verde 
Islands: see Livermore, H.V., A New History of Portugal (1966) Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 156. 
In 1569 Queen Elizabeth of England authorised two English citizens and their agents to seize 
property belonging to the King of Portugal or any Portuguese citizens in order to compensate 
them for the loss of their ship, which had been sunk by the Portuguese armada in 1565: see 
Clark, Grover, 'The English Practice with Regard to Reprisals by Private Persons' (1933) 27 AJIL 
694-723, 717-20. 
15 	One example of this was the retaliatory action taken by Aegina against Athens: see note 8 and 
accompanying text, above. A specific measure of retaliation by kidnapping, termed 
androlepsia, evolved in ancient Athens itself. If an Athenian citizen had been unjustly 
murdered in another state and that state refused to punish the murderer, then the relatives of 
the victim were authorised under Athenian law to seize three citizens of that state and to hold 
them until restitution was made or the murderer surrendered: see Phillipson, The International 
Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome, above note 6, vol 2,349-50. In 1414, in a 
medieval example of state-sanctioned lidnapping, Henry V authorised an English citizen, 
William Waldern, whose shipment of wool had been illegally seized in Genoan waters, to 
capture Genoan citizens and hold them until full restitution was paid for their shipment: Clark, 
Grover, ibid 713-4. 
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goods to and from another state. I6 These non-military measures were generally applied by 
individual states or quasi-states, but on occasion groups of states or quasi-states did co-
operate in an attempt to apply international coercion: 7 
3.2 International coercion short of force under classic 
international law 
By the end of the nineteenth century states commonly employed a number of non-
military coercive strategies in their foreign relations. Classic international law: 8 which sought 
to reflect and to guide state practice in international relations, recognised the right of states to 
employ these non-military coercive measures in certain circumstances. In an era when states 
reserved the freedom to resort to war as the ultimate means of settling differences, 19 non- 
16 	The Athens/Megara episode, outlined above in note 10 and accompanying text, is one example 
of this. Another example is the commercial blockade imposed by Venice against Bologna 
during the 1270s in order to coerce Bologna into purchasing the majority of its wheat from 
Venice rather than from Ravenna, its traditional wheat provider: see Lane, Frederic C., Venice: 
A Maritime Republic (1973) The Johns Hopkins UP, Baltimore, 59. 
17 	During the medieval Christian crusades Popes and church councils passed decrees prohibiting 
Christian nations from selling to the Saracens any arms, ships, lumber for ship construction, or 
other goods useful in warfare: Nussbaum, Arthur, A Concise History of the Law of Nations 
(2nd ed.: 1954) Macmillan, New York, 20. The Hanseatic League also employed a collective 
system of trade boycotts against foreign adversaries during the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries. From 1385-92 the Hanseatic League applied such a boycott against the Russian 
principality of Novgorod: Nussbaum, ibid 59. 
18 	The era of classic international law is generally considered to have begun with the peace of 
Westphalia in 1648 and to have ended with the outbreak of WWI. The nineteenth century 
represented the culmination of the age of "classic international law": see, e.g., Kennedy, David, 
'International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion' (1996) 65 Nordic 
Journal of International Law 385-420, 397 ("The broad period from 1648 to 1914 is remembered 
primarily for the developments in legal philosophy which refined this [international] state 
system until their culmination in the classic synthesis of the late nineteenth century"). 
19 	Although war was considered to be an undesirable and regrettable state of affairs, it was 
nevertheless regarded as an inevitable phenomenon that classic international law was 
powerless to prevent in a world of sovereign states. Lawrence and Westlake represent typical 
views of the period on the relationship between international law and war: Lawrence, T.J., The 
Principles of International Law (1923: 7 th ed.) D.C. Heath & Co., Boston, 311 ("To 
[international law] war is a fact that alters in a variety of ways the legal relations of all the 
parties concerned ... [I]t does not pronounce upon the moral questions that occupy such a 
large space in the writings of the early publicists. Grotius, for instance ... devotes several 
chapters to an attempt to distinguish between just and unjust causes of war. Such matters as 
these are supremely important; but they belong to morality and theology, and are as much out 
of place in a treatise on International Law as would be a discussion on the ethics of marriage in 
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military coercive measures were considered to form a valuable tool of foreign policy, with 
the potential both to deter other states from waging war and to compel them to resolve 
disputes that could not be resolved by other means. 
International law classified the nineteenth century precursors of U.N. non-military 
sanctions as "measures of constraint short of war". 2° The legal character of these coercive 
measures short of war was complicated. Although generally employed against states with 
which one was technically considered to be at peace, coercive measures short of war were 
sufficiently aggressive in character that international law treatises located them in a grey area 
between the laws of peace and the laws of war. 21 
a book on the law of personal status"); Westlake, John, International Law, below note 21, Vol. 
II, 3 ("International law did not institute war, which it found already existing, but regulates it 
with a view to its greater humanity"). 
20 	Hall, William E., A Treatise in International Law (1909: 6th ed.; edited by Atlay, J.B.) 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 360-9. Among the variations on this phrase adopted by other 
commentators are "forcible measures short of war" [Walker, Thomas Alfred, A Manual of 
Public International Law (1895) University Press, Cambridge, 94; Wheaton, Henry, Elements 
of International Law (1904: 4' ed.; edited by Atlay, J.B.), Stevens & Sons, London, 411-16; 
Westlake, John, International Law, below note 21, Vol. II, 1], "force short of war" [Hindmarsh, 
Force in Peace: Force short of war in international relations, above note 7], "compulsive 
means of settlement of state differences" [Oppenheim, L., International Law; a Treatise, below 
note 21, Vol. II, 29], "measures of redress short of war" [Butler, Geoffrey & Maccoby, Simon, 
The Development of International Law (1928) Longmans, Green & Co, London, 173], and 
"methods of applying force which are held not to be inconsistent with the continuance of 
peaceful relations between the powers concerned" [Lawrence, ibid 311]. 
21 	Classic international law treatises tended to divide their analyses of international law into two 
main sections: one describing the "laws of peace" and the other outlining the "laws of war": 
see, e.g., Oppenheim, L., International Law; a Treatise (1905) Longmans, Green & Co, London, 
2 vols (Vol. I: Peace; & Vol.II: War and Neutrality); Westlake, John, International Law (1913: 
2'd edition) Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 2 vols (Vol. I: Peace; & Vol. II: War). The laws of peace 
incorporated principles applicable to intercourse between states in times of peace, such as 
those relating to statehood, territorial rights, diplomatic relations and treaties. The laws of war, 
on the other hand, addressed the questions of how war was declared, who was invested with 
the power to declare war, and what rules should apply between states (including those who 
claimed neutrality) once war had been declared. The ambiguous nature of coercive acts short 
of war is illustrated by the fact that most treatises located them within their section on the laws 
of war. See, e.g., Von Martens, G.F., Compendium of the Law of Nations (1802) Corbett & 
Morgan, London, 271-7; Wheaton, Elements of International Law (1904: 4th ed.), ibid 411-16; 
Oppenheim, ibid, Vol. II: War, 29-51; Westlake, ibid, Vol. II, 1-19; Lawrence, ibid 311-20; 
Wheaton, Henry, Wheaton 's International Law (1944: 76 ed.; edited by Keith, A. Ben-iedale) 
Stevens & Sons, London, 90-98. For examples of treatises which locate coercive measures 
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According to classic international law doctrine, when a state was party to a dispute 
which stemmed from the initial hostile act of another state and which could not be resolved 
by non-coercive means,22 it was permitted to take retaliatory action in the form of certain 
coercive measures short of warfare in an attempt to compel a resolution of the dispute. 23 
Among the coercive measures short of war that a state might employ were retorsion, 
reprisals and pacific blockade. 24 
3.2.1 Retorsion 
Retorsion consisted of a response to an initial action that was technically legal but 
nevertheless hostile in nature. 25 It generally involved a response which was either identical or 
short of force within the section on the laws of peace see: Walker, ibid 94-101; Hall, ibid 360- 
69. 
The confusion evident in classic international law regarding whether coercive measures short 
of war formed a part of the laws of peace or of the laws of war foreshadowed the contemporary 
uncertainty as to whether U.N. sanctions should be considered to fall within the purview of 
international human rights law or international humanitarian law, or both, or neither. A common 
complaint of anti-sanctions activists is that there is a logical inconsistency in international law 
if it places restrictions upon the ability of warring parties to target civilians under international 
humanitarian law, but does not similarly restrict the ability of U.N. sanctions to target civilians 
because sanctions are not technically considered to be a measure of warfare. 
22 	See, e.g., Oppenheim, ibid, Vol. II, 41 ("[A]ll ... compulsive means of settling international 
differences ... are admissible only after negotiations have been conducted in vain for the 
purpose of obtaining reparation from the delinquent State"). 
23 	Wheaton, Elements of International Law (1904: 4th ed), above note 20,411 ("Every State has ... 
a right to resort to force, as the only means of redress for injuries inflicted upon it by others"). 
24 	Nineteenth-century commentators on international law sometimes differed in the manner in 
which they used the terms retaliation, retorsion and reprisals. The most common confusion 
surrounded the definition of, and relationship between, retaliation and retorsion, but there was 
also a significant degree of difference over the characteristics of all three categories, regardless 
of the usage adopted. The approach adopted here is to treat "retaliation" as a broad term 
encompassing all of the non-military coercive measures permissible under international law and 
to treat "retorsion" and "reprisals" as terms with more specific meaning. For discussion of the 
different terminological approaches, see: Colbert, Retaliation in International Law, above 
note 7, 1-2. 
25 Oppenheim, International Law; a Treatise, above note 21, Vol. II, 31("Retorsion is the 
technical term for the retaliation of discourteous or unkind or unfair and inequitable acts by 
acts of the same or a similar kind"); Hindmarsh, Force in Peace, above note 7, 57 ("Measures 
of retorsion [are] those evidences of unfriendly feeling which are not in themselves violative of 
rules or principles of international law"). 
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closely analogous to the initial hostile act. 26 Examples of the type of action taken as part of 
retorsion included imposing higher trade tariffs upon goods imported from or exported to the 
other state27 and restricting the legal rights of citizens of the other state who were within the 
territorial jurisdiction of one's own state. 28 
3.2.2 Reprisals 
Reprisals consisted of coercive action that was prima facie illegal, but which was 
considered justified if it responded to an initial illegal act. 29 Unlike retorsion, reprisals could 
26 	Oppenheim, ibid 33 ("The essence of retorsion consists in retaliation for a noxious act by an 
act of the same kind. But a State in making use of retorsion is by no means confined to acts of 
the same kind as those complained of, acts of a similar kind being equally admissible"); Hall, A 
Treatise in International Law, above note 20, 360 ("[Retorsion] consists in treating the 
subjects of the state giving provocation in an identical or closely analogous manner with that 
in which the subjects of the state using retorsion are treated"). 
27 	One example of this type of retorsion occurred in 1885 when the Bismarck regime, responding 
to what it perceived to be unfair customs policies on the part of Russia, forbade the 
Reichsbank from making advances on the security of Russian state loans: Hindmarsh, Force in 
Peace, above note 7, 58. Japan also applied this type of retorsion against Russia in 1904, prior 
to the Russo-Japanese war. Russia had introduced regulations excluding Japanese fisherman 
from Russian waters, and in response Japan threatened to impose differential duties on 
Russian imports: Wheaton, Wheaton 's International Law (1944: Th ed.) above note 21, 91. 
28 	Hall, A Treatise in International Law, above note 20, 360 ("[I]f the productions of a particular 
state are discouraged or kept out of a country by differential import duties, or if its subjects are 
put at a disadvantage as compared with other foreigners, the state affected may retaliate upon 
its neighbours by like laws and tariffs"); Oppenheim, International Law; a Treatise, above 
note 21, Vol. II, 32 ("In practice States have frequently made use of retorsion in cases of unfair 
treatment of their citizens abroad through rigorous passport regulations, exclusion of 
foreigners from certain professions, and in the cases of the levy of exorbitant protectionist or 
fiscal duties, of refusal of the usual mutual judicial assistance, of refusal of admittance of 
foreign ships to harbours, and in similar cases"). 
29 	Oppenheim, ibid 34 ("[R]eprisals are otherwise illegal acts performed by a State for the purpose 
of obtaining justice for an international delinquency by taking the law into its own hands"). 
The type of reprisals discussed here is sometimes referred to as "public" or "general" reprisals. 
They are reprisals taken by or on behalf of the state as a whole, rather than for the benefit of 
particular individuals. Where action was authorised for the benefit of individuals who had 
suffered legal loss, the reprisals were termed "private" or "special". Private reprisals, which had 
fallen into disuse by the eighteenth century, were once available to a private citizen who had 
been the victim of a legal wrong committed in another city, principality or state. In such a case 
the relevant authority in the victim's home city, principality or state could issue "letters of 
marque and reprisal", authorising the aggrieved individual, or agents on that individual's 
behalf, to seize goods belonging to the original perpetrator of the wrong (or even goods 
belonging to the perpetrator's fellow citizens) to a value equivalent to the amount necessary to 
redress the legal harm suffered. For general discussion of "private reprisals" see: Clark, Grover, 
'The English Practice with Regard to Reprisals by Private Persons', above note 14; Colbert, 
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consist of a response that was not necessarily in-kind or analogous to the initial hostile act, 3° 
but international law nevertheless required that reprisals be neither disproportionate nor 
excessive?' The most common form of reprisals involved the appropriation of property 
belonging to the other state or its nationals.32 Such property could be detained whilst in the 
waters or ports of the state imposing the reprisals, 33 or it could be seized on the high seas by 
the reprising state's navy or by ships authorised to participate in the reprisals. 34 Another 
Retaliation in International Law, above note 7, 9-42; Hindmarsh, Force in Peace, above note 
7,43-56. 
30 	Oppenheim, ibid 34 ("Whereas retorsion consists in retaliation of discourteous, unfriendly, 
unfair, and inequitable acts by acts of the same or a similar kind ... reprisals are otherwise 
illegal acts performed by a State for the purpose of obtaining justice for an international 
delinquency by taking the law into its own hands. It is, of course, possible that a State 
retaliates to an illegal act committed against itself by the performance of an act of a similar kind. 
Such retaliation would be a retorsion in the ordinary sense of the term, but it would not be 
retorsion in the technical meaning of the term as used by those writers on International Law 
who correctly distinguish between retorsion and reprisals "). 
31 	Hall, A Treatise in International Law, above note 20, 363 ("To make reprisals either 
disproportioned to the provocation, or in excess of what is needed to obtain redress, is to 
commit a wrong"); Oppenheim, ibid 38 ("Reprisals ... must be in some proportion to the wrong 
done and to the amount of compulsion necessary to get reparation"). 
32 	Westlake, International Law, above note 21, Vol II, 7-8 ("Reprisals ... may be defined as the 
taking possession, at sea or on land, of the ships or other property of a foreign state or its 
subjects"); Clark, Grover, 'The English Practice with Regard to Reprisals ...', above note 14, 
702 (stating that reprisals involve "the use of force to secure compensation for a loss by the 
taking of property"). Oppenheim, however, did not consider reprisals to be limited to the 
seizure of property: Oppenheim, ibid 38 ("An act of reprisal can be performed against anything 
and everything that belongs or is due to the delinquent State or its citizens. Ships sailing under 
its flag may be seized, treaties concluded with it may be suspended, a part of its territory may 
be militarily occupied, goods belonging to it or its citizens may be seized, and the like"). 
33 	The technical term for detaining foreign ships or other property located in one's jurisdiction 
was "embargo". A distinction was sometimes drawn between this type of action, known as a 
"hostile embargo" because it involved the detention of foreign shipping and property, and a 
"civil embargo", which involved the effective detention of ships of one's own nationals by 
means of prohibiting them from sailing to specified destinations: see, e.g., Hindmarsh, Force in 
Peace, above note 7, 64; Wheaton, Wheaton 's International Law (1944: 7' ed.) above note 21, 
92-3. 
34 	Westlake notes that the technical difference between reprisals and embargo (which he 
nevertheless considers to form a sub-category of reprisals) is that embargo represents 
detention and reprisals represent capture: Westlake, International Law, above note 21, Vol II, 
8. 
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form of reprisal was to prohibit the ships of one's own nationals from sailing for the state 
which had taken the initial hostile action. 35 
3.2.3 Pacific Blockade 
The pacific blockade evolved in the nineteenth century as an alternative measure of 
coercion short of war. 36 Sometimes imposed as a measure of reprisal and sometimes 
employed as a tool of third-party intervention, 37 a pacific blockade was deemed to exist 
when a state or group of states blockaded the coasts or ports of the other party to the 
dispute during a period when relations with the blockaded state were technically considered 
35 	This action was sometimes referred to as a "civil embargo": see note 33, above. The U.S., under 
the presidency of Thomas Jefferson, implemented a civil embargo in 1807 to prevent US 
vessels from leaving US waters. The aim of the embargo was to place pressure upon the UK 
and France, then at war with one another, to cease hostilities. See Sears, Louis M., Jefferson 
and the Embargo (1927) Duke UP, Durham, N.C.; Hindmarsh, Force in Peace, above note 7, 66- 
70. 
36 	Prior to the nineteenth century international law had considered any use of the measure of 
blockade to constitute an act of warfare. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the 
consensus among international law commentators was that the usage of the blockade during 
"peaceful" relations had become so widespread that international law could no longer credibly 
confine the use of blockade exclusively to periods of war. For discussion of the earlier debate 
between commentators as to whether pacific blockade should be recognised as a permissible 
measure of coercion short of war, see: L'Institut de Droit International, 'Rapport de M. Perels 
sur le blocus pacifique' (1888) 9 L 'Annuaire de L 'Institut de Droit International 276-86, 280- 
83; Hogan, Albert E., Pacific Blockade (1908) Clarendon Press, Oxford, 21-31. 
Most commentators trace the earliest example of "pacific blockade" to 1827, when Great Britain, 
France and Russia imposed a blockade against Turkish troops occupying Greece [see, e.g., 
Hogan, ibid 14, 29; Oppenheim, International Law; a Treatise, above note 21, Vol. II, 43; 
Westlake, International Law, above note 21, Vol. II, 11; Bertram, Anton, 'The Economic 
Weapon as a Form of Peaceful Pressure' (1932) 17 Problems of Peace and War (Grotius 
Society Papers) 139-74, 157]. Hindmarsh and Keith, however, cite an incident from 1814 as the 
first example of pacific blockade [Ilindmarsh, ibid 72; Wheaton, Wheaton 's International Law 
(1944: r ed.) above note 21, 96 (referring to an instance of "pacific blockade" perpetrated by 
English and Swedish ships against Norwegian ports in 1814)]. Colbert notes that the pacific 
blockade originated early in the nineteenth century, but she considers the first retaliatory 
pacific blockade to have been imposed in 1831: Colbert, Retaliation in International Law, 
above note 7, 61. 
37 	Oppenheim, Hogan and Hindmarsh all consider pacific blockade to be a tool which could be 
applied as an act either of reprisal or of third-party intervention: Oppenheim, ibid 48; Hogan, 
ibid 19; Hindmarsh, ibid 72-3. 
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to be peaceful. 38 The legal elements of pacific blockade were similar to those of belligerent 
blockade,39 as international law required that for any blockade to be considered genuine the 
blockading state must notify the target state of its intent to blockade, and it must be capable 
of imposing the blocicade. 40 A major difference between the pacific blockade and belligerent 
blockade, however, was that whereas in a belligerent blockade the blockading state was 
within its rights to bar all shipping between the blockaded state and the external world,4 ' a 
state imposing a pacific blockade was considered not to possess the right to restrict the 
shipping of third-party states. 42 
38 	L'Institut de Droit International, 'Rapport de M. Perels sur le blocus pacifique', above note 36, 
277 ("Le blocus pacifique n'est autre chose que la fermeture des ports ou de districts 
particuliers de la cOte d'un pays, en dehors du cas de guerre declaree et dans le but 
d'empecher les relations commerciales maritimes." This can be translated as "The pacific 
blockade consists of no other thing than the closure of ports or of particular parts of the coast 
of a nation during a period in which war has not been declared and with the goal of interrupting 
maritime commercial relations"). This report, made on behalf of a special commission of the 
Institute that was charged with the task of studying the law relating to the application of 
blockades in times of peace, was considered authoritative as the Institute included within its 
membership many of the most eminent international law scholars and diplomats of the day. 
39 	On blockade under classic international law in general, see: Oppenheim, International Law; a 
Treatise, above note 21, Vol II, 398-419; Hall, A Treatise in International Law, above note 20, 
695-714; Westlake, International Law, above note 21, Vol. II, 255-76. For discussion of how the 
law of blockade might be applied in the contemporary context, given the advance of maritime 
and military technology, see: Fraunces, Michael G., 'The International Law of Blockade: New 
Guiding Principles in Contemporary State Practice'(1992) 101 Yale L.J. 893-918; Jones, Thomas 
David, 'The International Law of Maritime Blockade — A Measure of Naval Economic 
Interdiction' (1983) 26 Howard Law Journal 759-79. 
40 	Declaration of Paris (1856), paragraph 4 ("Blockades, in order to be binding, must be 
effective, that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of 
the enemy"); L'Institut de Droit International, 'Rapport de M. Perels sur le blocus pacifique', 
above note 36, 286 ("Le blocus pacifique doit etre &three et notifie officiellement, et maintenu 
par une force suffisante", which can be translated as "Pacific blockade must be declared and 
notified officially, and maintained by a sufficient force"). 
41 	Oppenheim, International Law; a Treatise, above note 21, Vol. II, 399 ("Although blockade is 
... a means of warfare against the enemy, it concerns neutrals as well, because the ingress and 
egress of neutral vessels are thereby inderdicted and may be punished"), 400 ("Blockade as a 
means of warfare is admissible only in the form of a universal blockade. If the blockading 
belligerent were to allow the ingress or egress of one nation, no blockade would exist"). 
42 	L'Institut de Droit International, 'Rapport de M. Perels sur le blocus pacifique', above note 36, 
277 ("Les navires de pavilions neutres peuvent entrer librement malgre le blocus", which can 
be translated as "the ships of neutral parties can freely enter [the blockaded state's waters] 
despite the blockade"); Hall, A Treatise in International Law, above note 20, 367 ("It is only 
under the supreme necessities of war, when the gain or loss of belligerent states is wholly out 
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3.2.4 The possibilities and limitations of coercive me asures short of war under 
classic international law 
Under the classic international law system coercive measures short of war 
functioned at best as a means for enforcing international law. In the ideal scenario such 
measures would be employed by a state with a genuine grievance and they would force the 
state against which they were employed to address that grievance. The timely employment 
of coercive measures short of war might therefore ensure the resolution of international 
disputes and prevent the outbreak of war. When employed in the manner envisaged by 
classic international law, coercive measures short of war could thus constitute genuine 
sanctions that were imposed in response to violations of international law. 
In practice, however, coercive measures short of war constituted a means of self-
help that was open to abuser° Even in those cases where states may have wanted to apply 
coercive measures in accordance with the dictates of classic international law, their ability to 
engage in effective reprisals was contingent upon size and strength. 44 In reality, small states 
were far less likely to engage in, and far more likely to fall victim to, non-military coercive 
measures than large, powerful states. 45 Furthermore, even if the states which were party to a 
dispute were evenly-balanced, and even if the state imposing coercive measures short of 
war acted within the letter of classic international law, the state against which the measures 
of proportion to the loss inflicted upon neutral individuals, that other states can be reasonably 
asked to forego their right of intercourse with the enemy"). 
43 	Oppenheim, International Law; a Treatise, above note 21, Vol. II , 42 ("[T]he institution of 
reprisals may give and has in the past given occasion to abuse in the case of a difference 
between a powerful and a weak State"), 48 (conceding that pacific blockade may also be open 
to abuse). 
44 	Hindmarsh, Force in Peace, above note 7, 81 ("These measures have long been the ultimate 
means, short of war, of enforcing international obligations. They are self-help methods; their 
application is usually arbitrary and limited in practice to the coercion of small or weak states"). 
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were imposed was within its rights to interpret the measures as warlike and to respond 
accordingly. 46 Ironically, if the state against which the coercive measures short of war were 
employed chose to treat them as an act of war, then war was deemed to have begun at the 
moment when the coercive measures were imposed. ° Thus a state that acted within the 
letter of the law and with the aim of resolving a dispute could find itself, by virtue of having 
implemented coercive measures short of war, as the party responsible for escalating 
relations to the status of war. Classic international law's coercive measures short of war 
were a double-edged sword, with the potential to act not just as a means for resolving 
conflict or enforcing international law but also as a trapdoor to war. 
Ultimately the international system of the classic international law era collapsed. 
Despite concerted initiatives through the Hague Peace Conferences to foster an international 
community in which the resort to conflict would be minimised, the early twentieth century 
ushered in a period of unprecedented international conflict. The First World War 
emphatically sounded the funereal bugle of both the Concert of Europe balance-of-power 
arrangements and the classic international law era. 
46 	Lawrence, The Principles of International Law, above note 19, 321 ("It is true that [reprisals] 
may be used to inflict injury on small states, and extort from them a compliance with 
unreasonable demands"). 
46 	Hogan, Pacific Blockade, above note 36, 27 ("One state can treat as an act of war what was 
intended by another merely as an embargo or as reprisals"); Lawrence, ibid 320 ("The power 
against which reprisals of any kind are instituted can, if it pleases, resort to war in return"). 
47 Hall, A Treatise in International Law, above note 20, 361 ("It of course remains true that 
reprisals are acts of war in fact, though not in intention, and that ... the state affected 
determines for itself whether the relation of war is set up by them or not. If it elects to regard 
them as doing so, the outbreak of war is thrown back by the expression of its choice to the 
moment at which the reprisals were made"). 
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3.3 Non-military sanctions under the League of Nations System 
"The economic weapon, conceived not as an instrument of war but as a 
peaceful means of pressure, is the great discovery and the most precious 
possession of the League. Properly organised, it means the substitution 
of economic pressure for actual war."48 
The League of Nations was created at the end of World War 1 when the Covenant 
of the League of Nations was signed at Versailles as part of the post-War peace settlement. 
The Covenant sought to circumscribe the general right of states to resort to warfare by 
restricting it to action which responded to an initial aggressive act taken by another State in 
violation of the Covenant itself. 49 The Covenant further stipulated that the aims of such 
permitted resorts to war must be the maintenance of right and justice" and the protection of 
the Covenant of the League of Nations!' 
Non-military sanctions assumed a central enforcement role in the League's collective 
security scheme, as they were to be imposed against states that resorted to war in violation 
of the Covenant. Article 16.1 of the League Covenant provided that: 
48 	Bertram, Anton, 'The Economic Weapon ...' , above note 36, 169. 
49 	The types of resort to war that would violate the Covenant were spelled out by Articles 12, 13 
and 15. Article 12 placed League Member states under an obligation to submit any serious 
disputes to arbitration, judicial settlement or Council enquiry and to refrain from resorting to 
war until three months after the conclusion of such pacific attempts to resolve the dispute. 
Under Article 13 states agreed to refrain from resorting to war against any member state which 
had complied with pacific attempts at dispute resolution. Article 15 provided that when member 
states refused to submit a dispute to pacific resolution, that dispute would be submitted to the 
League Council, which would complete a report suggesting how the dispute should be 
resolved. Paragraph 6 of Article 15 provided that if the report was unanimously accepted by 
the Members of the League Council, then member states agreed to refrain from going to war 
with any party to the dispute which subsequently complied with the recommendations of the 
Council's report. Paragraph 7 of Article 15 provided that if the Council failed to reach unanimity 
as to what to recommend in its report, then member states reserved the right to take "such 
action as they consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice". 
50 	Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 15.7. 
51 Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 16.2. 
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Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants 
under Articles 12, 13, or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed 
an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby 
undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial 
relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the 
nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, 
commercial, or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-
breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the 
League or not. 52 
Article 16.1 seemed to suggest, therefore, that if a member state were to resort to war in a 
manner that violated its obligations under the Covenant, it would automatically be 
considered to have committed an act of war against all of the other League of Nations 
member states, who would then be required to implement immediately coercive measures 
that would result in the effective financial, commercial and cultural isolation of the rogue 
state." 
In practice, however, the framework for sanctions outlined in Article 16.1 was 
subsequently compromised by the manner in which it was interpreted by member states. The 
fast major point of contention was the question of who should be responsible for interpreting 
whether a resort to war in violation of the Covenant had actually occurred. The second 
major point of contention was the question of whether, once a determination had been made 
that such a resort to war had occurred, states could actually be obligated to employ non- 
52 	Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 16.1. 
53 	In advocating for the inclusion of Article 16.1 in the Covenant, the U.S. President Woodrow 
Wilson had remarked: "Suppose somebody does not abide by these engagements, then what 
happens? An absolute isolation, a boycott. The boycott is automatic. There is no "if' or "but" 
about it in the Covenant ... No goods can be shipped in or out, no telegraphic messages can 
be exchanged, except through the elusive wireless, perhaps; there shall be no communication 
of any kind between the peoples of the other nations and the people of that nation. The 
nationals, the citizens of the Member States, will never enter their territory until the matter is 
adjusted, and their citizens cannot leave their territory. It is the most complete boycott ever 
conceived in a public document, and I want to say with confident prediction that there will be 
no more fighting after that. There is not a nation that can stand that for six months": as quoted 
by Daoudi, M.S. & Dajani, M.S., Economic Sanctions, ideals and experience (1983) Routledge, 
London, 26. 
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military sanctions. 54 Ultimately, the interpretation of Article 16.1 which came to be widely 
accepted was that if a question arose as to whether a member state had resorted to war in 
violation of the Covenant, the determination of a central organ of the League, such as the 
League Council, could provide guidance, 55 but that it remained up to individual states to 
decide for themselves whether they considered there to have been a resort to war in 
violation of the Covenant." This meant that states could effectively avoid the obligation to 
apply non-military sanctions by deciding that there had been no breach of the Covenant. 57 
League of Nations sanctions against Italy 
Although the existence of Article 16.1 has been credited with having played a role in 
the resolution of some other conflicts," the League's first and only concrete experiment with 
collective non-military sanctions occurred in 1935-6, as a response to the invasion of 
54 	The rationale for arguing that states could avoid what appears from the text of the Covenant to 
be a strict obligation to employ non-military sanctions was grounded in the fact that under 
classic international law states had reserved the right to determine what response they should 
take when another state declared war against them. The argument was therefore that even if it 
was perfectly clear that a resort to war in violation of the Covenant had occurred, it 
nevertheless remained the fundamental prerogative of each state to determine what response it 
should make to such a resort to war. 
55 	Clark, Evans (ed), Boycotts and Peace: a Report by the Committee on Economic Sanctions 
(1932) Harper, New York, 94 (stating that the opinions and recommendations of the League 
Council possess "only a moral value"). 
56 	The League Assembly's Resolution 4 of September 27, 1921 stated: "[lit is the duty of each 
Member of the League to decide for itself whether a breach of the Covenant has been 
committed": League of Nations document A.1921.P, 453. See also Kelsen, Hans, The Law of the 
United Nations: a Critical Analysis of its Fundamental Problems (1951) Steven & Sons, 
London, 726 ("Mt was upon each Member of the League to decide for itself whether the 
violation of the Covenant referred to in Article 16, paragraph 1, had been committed; and ... the 
Member was obliged to take economic provided for in this paragraph only if it decided the 
question in the affirmative"). 
57 	Schiffer, Walter, 'The Idea of Collective Security' in Lams, Joel (ed.), From Collective Security 
to Preventive Diplomacy (1965) John Wiley, NY, 187-202, 190 ("Participation in the economic 
sanctions was considered compulsory in the case of a breach of the Covenant. But it was left 
to each member of the League to decide whether such a breach actually had occurred"). 
58 	See, e.g., Fiedorowicz, George de, 'Historical Survey of the Application of Sanctions' (1937) 22 
Problems of Peace and War (Grotius Society Papers) 117-31, 119 (stating that in 1921 the 
"threat of possible enforcement of Art. XVI had a prohibitive influence in the Albanian-Serb-
Croat-Slovene war-like struggle"). 
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Abyssinia by Italy. A dispute had been brewing between Italy and Abyssinia since late 
1934, and various attempts to resolve it through pacific means had failed." The League of 
Nations Council was in the process of writing a report which would make recommendations 
as to what should be done to resolve the dispute when Italian forces invaded Abyssinian 
territory on October 3, 1935, rendering the League's report redundant. 6° 
The Abyssinian government sought to invoke Article 16 of the Covenant at a 
meeting of the League Council on October 5. 6 ' The Council immediately established a sub-
committee to verify that a resort to war in violation of the Covenant had indeed taken 
place. 62 On October 7 the sub-committee presented its findings, concluding that Italy had 
indeed resorted to war in violation of its obligations under the Covenant. 63 That same day 
the League Council unanimously indicated in a roll-call that they agreed with the findings of 
the sub-committee, and the matter was then referred to the League Assembly. On October 
9, 50 of the 54 League member states present concluded that Italy had violated Article 12 
of the Covenant and agreed to implement the measures prescribed in Article 16. 64 
In order to implement sanctions under Article 16, the League Assembly established 
a Co-ordinating Committee to make recommendations as to what measures the member 
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For a detailed account of the various attempts at negotiation, arbitration and conciliation, see: 
League of Nations Information Section, The League From Year to Year (1935) League of 
Nations Information Section, Geneva, 53-88, 53-69. 
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Royal Institute, Sanctions, above note 7, 70-72. 
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League of Nations Information Section, The League From Year to Year (1935), above note 59, 
75. 
62 
	
This sub-committee consisted of representatives of the UK, Chile, Denmark, France, Portugal 
and Roumania: League of Nations Information Section, ibid 76. 
63 
	
League of Nations document C 417, 1935, VII: Report of the Committee of Six on Responsibility 
for the Outbreak of Hostilities. 
64 	Of the four member states who did not vote in favour of applying Article 16 measures, three 
(Austria, Hungary and Italy) expressed the view that Italy had not violated the Covenant and 
one (Albania) advocated against the application of sanctions: League of Nations Information 
Section, The League From Year to Year (1935), above note 59, 78. 
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states who had agreed to impose sanctions should employ. ° The Co-ordinating Committee, 
which comprised a representative of each of the states which had agreed to impose 
sanctions, proved too large and unwieldy to engage in the necessary detailed discussion, so 
a sub-committee was formed. It was composed of the main member states whose 
cooperation was considered essential to the success of the sanctions. These states 
numbered eighteen, and the sub-committee became known as the "Sub-Committee of 
Eighteen". The Sub-Committee of Eighteen completed its initial work quickly and by 
October 19 had forwarded its findings to the Co-ordinating Committee. The Co-ordinating 
Committee ultimately recommended that participating governments should: prevent the 
export of aims and arms-related material to Italy; 66 prohibit financial transactions between 
individuals and institutions within its jurisdiction and Italian ndividuals and institutions; 67 
prohibit the import of goods originating in Italy;" and prohibit the export to Italy of goods 
considered necessary for the waging of war, such as rubber, bauxite, aluminium and iron 
65 	According to the Royal Institute, the coordinating committee was comprised of those member 
states who had voted in favour of imposing Article 16 sanctions, which in its estimations 
amounted to 50. See Royal Institute, Sanctions, above note 7, 71. According to Bradley, 
however, the committee consisted of all member states except for Italy: Bradley, Phillips, 'Some 
Legislative and Administrative Aspects of the Application of Article XVI of the Covenant' 
(1937) 22 Problems of Peace and War (Grotius Society Papers) 13-29, 21. According to 
Fiedolowicz, four of the member states took no action in the Italian sanctions episode at all: 
Fiedorowicz, 'Historical Survey of the Application of Sanctions', above note 58, 129. This 
assertion seems to reinforce the Royal Institute's claim, however Fiedorowicz notes the number 
of League of Nations member states as fifty-eight! 
66 	Co-ordinating Committee of the League Assembly for the application of Article 16 sanctions 
against Italy, Proposal No. I, as reproduced in Royal Institute, Sanctions, ibid 70-71. 
67 	Co-ordinating Committee of the League Assembly for the application of Article 16 sanctions 
against Italy, Proposal No. 2, as reproduced in Royal Institute, ibid 71. 
68 	Co-ordinating Committee of the League Assembly for the application of Article 16 sanctions 
against Italy, Proposal No. 3, as reproduced in Royal Institute, ibid 71. 
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ore. 69 The recommendations of the Co-ordinating Committee were adopted by the League 
Assembly on November 2," and sanctions came into effect on November 18. 7 ' 
The League of Nations experiment with non-military sanctions ultimately failed to 
achieve the aim of forcing Italy to withdraw from Abyssinia. On July 4, 1936, less than eight 
months after they had first been imposed, the sanctions were officially terminated by the 
League Assembly. 72 Although there was evidence that the sanctions had affected the Italian 
economy considerably, Th they were widely considered to have failed because they were 
subverted by the four major powers of the time, two of which were still member states of 
the League.74 A particular criticism of the sanctions regime was that it should have included 
an embargo upon oil and petroleum products, without which it is arguable that Italy could 
not have continued its occupation of Abyssinia. 75 Political and historical commentators have 
69 	Co-ordinating Committee of the League Assembly for the application of Article 16 sanctions 
against Italy, Proposal No. 4, as reproduced in Royal Institute, ibid 71 
70 	Fifty-two member states agreed to enforce proposals 1 and 2, fifty agreed to enforce proposal 
3, and fifty-one agreed to impose proposal 4. For a full list of those states, see: League of 
Nations Information Section, The League From Year to Year (1935), above note 59, 84-5. 
71 	League of Nations Information Section, ibid 82. 
72 	Of the 45 member states which voted, only one - Abyssinia itself - voted against terminating 
the sanctions: Geneva, vol. IX, no. 7 (July 1936). 
73 	In January 1936 Italian exports to thirty of its regular trading partners had declined 53 percent 
compared to the figures of the preceding year, and in February they had declined by 59 
percent: Geneva, vol. IX, no. 5 (May 1936), 175. 
74 	Lorenz notes that "France sabotaged all efforts to embargo oil, without which the Italian army 
would have ground to a halt; Britain allowed Rome passage through the Suez Canal, which was 
essential to the Italian supply line; Germany, no longer a member of the League, happily took 
up the slack in the sale of arms and other commodities; and the United States, driven by 
economic self-interest, refused to support the embargo in every respect except for a ban on 
arms shipments to both belligerents": Lorenz, Joseph P., Peace, Power and the United Nations 
(1999) Westview Press, Boulder, CO, above note 4, 25. Fiedorowicz is even more condemnatory 
of those League of Nations member states who did not apply sanctions, noting, "it is already a 
common secret in one or another of the countries claiming to impose all the restrictions 
recommended, that the trade exchange with Italy was bigger during these restrictions than 
before their so-called "enforcement": Fiedorowicz, 'Historical Survey of the Application of 
Sanctions', above note 58, 129. 
75 Daoudi, M.S. & Dajani, M.S., Economic Sanctions, ideals and experience (1983) Routledge, 
London, 63 ("The one sanctions that could have been most effective, had it been implemented 
properly, was the oil sanction. Oil was an absolute necessity to the Italian war machine; 
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speculated that the two major powers ostensibly involved in the imposition of sanctions, 
France and Britain, were afraid of creating a sanctions regime which was too stringent in 
case that s ategy had the effect of pushing Mussolini into partnership with Hitler. 76 Ironically 
that partnership developed despite a weaker sanctions regime, 77 and the military build-ups 
and aggression of the 1930s culminated in the outbreak of a Second World War The 
League of Nations, which had been established with the lofty goal of ensuring international 
peace by eradicating the use of war, was powerless to prevent the concerted efforts of 
major powers to wage war. 
deprived of their oil supplies, the Italian army would have had no choice but to retreat"); Dell, 
Robert E., The Geneva Racket (1941) Robert Hale, London, 117 ("If the League put an embargo 
on oil and if the United States did likewise, Mussolini was doomed"). 
76 	See, e.g., Millward, Alex, 'Only Yesterday: some reflections on the "thirties" with particular 
reference to sanctions' (1957) 1 International Relations 281-90,283 (stating that in the view of 
England and France, "Germany was the enemy, and it was all-important to keep Italy on their 
side rather than drive her into the arms of Nazi Germany"). 
77 	The former British Prime Minister Anthony Eden seems to have felt that the League's 
sanctions, even without the inclusion of an oil embargo, nevertheless represented one of the 
reasons why Mussolini entered into partnership with Hitler: Eden, Anthony, The Eden 
Memoirs: Facing the Dictators (1962) Cassell, London, 387 ("There was a failure to see in 
advance that any effective sanctions, even economic ones, must carry with them the risk of 
war"). 
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3.4 Learning from the League's Experience 
Commentators suggested many explanations as to why the League of Nations 
system in general, and the non-military sanctions experiment in particular, had failed. Among 
the reasons posited for the failure of the League system as a whole were: that the League 
had been doomed from the moment of its creation, enmeshed as it was in a peace settlement 
that had been perceived as unfair and vengeful by the nations who had been vanquished in 
the first World War; 78  the League's inability to secure the participation and commitment of 
all the major powers; 79  and the failure of the League Covenant to outlaw not simply the 
resort to war, but also the aggressive use of force short of war. ° The major weaknesses of 
the League's sanctions mechanism were perceived to be: the absence of a definitive 
objective test for determining when sanctions would be applied; 81 the failure to secure the 
participation of the major powers in the application of sanctions; 82 and the failure to prevent 
78 	Schiffer, 'The Idea of Collective Security', above note 57, 198 ("The guarantee against 
aggression, which he League provided for its members, was ... bound to appear as a 
guarantee of the results of victory, and the common interest on which the League's 
functioning depended became an interest of the victorious powers not so much in peace as 
such as in the maintenance of the concrete political situation created by the peace treaties"). 
79 	Hindmarsh, Force in Peace, above note 7, 170 ("The experience of the League emphasizes 
above all the fact that the defection of a single powerful state is sufficient to prevent the 
realization of an effective organization for world peace"). 
80 	Clark, Evans (ed), Boycotts and Peace, above note 55, 94 ("All these difficulties would be 
removed were the provisions of Article 16 extended in such a manner as to be applicable 
against a state which resorts to any act of force whatever and not only to war"); Hindmarsh, 
ibid 124 ("It is hardly to be expected that a lasting world peace structure can be founded on a 
basis so limited as the prohibition of a legal status of war, while practically all the concrete evils 
associated with that status are allowed to continue"). 
81 	Murray, Gilbert, 'A League of Nations: the First Experiment' in Larus, From Collective Security 
to Preventive Diplomacy, above note 57, 176-86, 186 ("I think the obligations of this Article 
should be made clear and definite. Nations have not much scruple in evading a loosely 
expressed obligation; they do not like to be seen publicly breaking a perfectly specific 
pledge"); Hindmarsh, ibid 171 ("To be effective sanctions must become operative at some 
moment determinable by objective tests"). 
82 	Highley, Albert E., The Actions of the States Members of the League of Nations in Application 
of Sanctions Against Italy, 1935/1936 (1938) Journal de Geneve, Geneva, 229 ("The real key to 
the successful application of sanctions is loyal and vigorous leadership by the great Powers 
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neighbouring nations from opting out of the coalition of states imposing sanctions, whether 
due to the fear of retaliation or anxiety about losing trade revenue." 
When international leaders gathered in San Francisco in 1945 to create a new 
international organization, after another devastating world war, the failures of the League 
weighed heavily upon their minds." The ultimate structure of the new organisation, the 
United Nations, was determined to a large degree by the perceived failures of the structure 
of the League of Nations. The perceived failures of the League's sanctions experiment 
exerted a similar influence over the ultimate design of the U.N.'s system for collective 
security and over the mechanism of non-military sanctions incorporated within that collective 
security system. 
applying them plus a determination to make them succeed. Otherwise there is no hope of 
obtaining and retaining the essential cooperation of the lesser Powers and of bringing the 
Aggressor to terms"); Hindmarsh, ibid 171 ("[S]tates are reluctant as yet to undertake general 
commitments which may require them to apply coercive sanctions in regions of the world 
where they have no direct interests"). 
83 	Hindmarsh, ibid 171 ("[There is an] unwillingness [on the part] of small states to commit 
themselves to the application of coercive sanctions against powerful neighbors"). 
84 	Winston Churchill is quoted as having said during the War, "When the war is over, we must 
build up a League of Nations based upon organised force and not disorganised nonsense": 
Nicolson, Harold, Diaries and Letters (1966) Atheneum, New York, vol. 1: 1930-1939, 393. 
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sanctions 
This chapter outlines the legal framework governing the application of U.N. 
sanctions. Section 4.1 discusses the manner in which the United Nations was established 
with the basic purpose of maintaining international peace. It also describes how the U.N.'s 
Security Council was granted primary responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of 
international peace and security. Section 4.2 outlines the manner in which U.N. sanctions are 
designed to work in theory, introducing the U.N. Charter provisions that empower the 
Security Council to impose sanctions in order to maintain or restore the peace. Section 4.3 
explains how the Security Council's use of sanctions in practice has led to the evolution of 
the U.N. sanctions system. The section thus sets the scene for the chapters to come in Part 
III, which trace the contours of the U.N. sanctions system. 
4.1 The birth of the United Nations and the creation of the U.N. 
Security Council 
The United Nations was born in the final months of World War II, when delegations 
from around the globe gathered in San Francisco to create an international organisation 
which would "save subsequent generations from the scourge of war".' The founders of the 
United Nations were also motivated by a desire to avoid repeating the failures of the League 
Preamble to the United Nations Charter: see Charter of the United Nations, Department of 
Public Information, New York, NY, 3. The United Nations Charter was signed on 26 June 1945 
and entered into force on 24 October of the same year: see the introductory note to the Charter. 
For accounts of the drafting history of the United Nations Charter, which can be traced back to 
as early as December 1941, see: Evatt, Herbert Vere, The United Nations (1948) Harvard UP, 
Cambridge, MA; Hilderbrand, Robert C., Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations 
and the Search for Postwar Security (1990) UNC Press, Chapel Hill, NC; Simma, Bruno (ed.), 
The Charter of the United Nations: a Commentary (2002: 2" edition) Oxford UP, 1-12; 
Schlesinger, Stephen C., Act of Creation: 7he Founding of the United Nations (2003) 
Westview Press, Boulder, CO. 
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of Nations. The new organisation was established by the United Nations Charter, which lists 
the U.N.'s Purposes and Principles, defines the rights and obligations of States Members of 
the United Nations, and establishes the major U.N. organs.' 
The formal Purposes of the United Nations, outlined in Article 1 of the United 
Nations Charter, each aim to further the basic goal of preserving international peace and 
security. 3 They recognise that in order to secure genuine peace and security, action must be 
taken not only to resolve existing or potential international conflicts, 4 but also to minimise the 
development of future international disputes by attempting to eradicate the causes of 
conflict.' In order to facilitate the realisation of the formal purposes of the United Nations, 
the Charter established six major U.N. organs: the General Assembly, the Security Council, 
the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of 
Justice, and the Secretariat. 6 Three of the U.N. organs were created in order to facilitate the 
development of broader strategies to eradicate the causes of conflict: the General Assembly, 
Charter of the United Nations, ibid. 
Article 1 states: "The Purposes of the United Nations are: 
I. To maintain international peace and security; and to that end: to take effective collective 
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression 
of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful 
means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or 
settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the 
peace; 
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to 
strengthen universal peace; 
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, 
social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without discrimination as to race, sex, 
language, or religion; and 
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common 
ends. 
See Article 1(1) of the United Nations Charter, ibid. 
See Articles 1(2) - 1(4) of the United Nations Charter, above note 3. 
Article 7 of the Charter establishes these entities as the principal organs of the United Nations. 
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which would discuss questions within the scope of the Charter and make recommendations 
on those questions to Member States and the Security Counci1; 7 the Economic and Social 
Council, which would initiate studies and reports and make recommendations on a range of 
matters, including international economic, social, cultural, educational and health questions, 
as well as human rights;8  and the Trusteeship Council, which would monitor conditions in 
"trust territories" administered by U.N. Member States. 9 Two of the organs were 
established to perform the function of resolving and preventing the exacerbation of existing 
conflict: the International Court of Justice, which would adjudicate legal disputes between 
States willing to submit disputes to its jurisdiction; 19 and the Security Council, which was 
given primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security." The 
final U.N. organ, the U.N. Secretariat, was created primarily in order to provide 
7 	 Chapter IV (Articles 9-22) of the Charter details the composition, functions and powers, voting, 
and procedure of the General Assembly. The General Assembly's freedom to make 
recommendations is circumscribed to some extent, however, by Article 12, which provides that 
the General Assembly cannot make recommendations relating to a matter that is being 
addressed by the Security Council, unless the Security Council so requests. 
Chapter X (Articles 61-74) of the Charter details the composition, functions and powers, 
voting, and procedure of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The Charter also 
makes provision for the establishment of intergovernmental agencies to assist with 
activities within ECOSOC's sphere (United Nations Charter, Articles 57-9). 
9 	 Chapter XIII (Articles 86-91) of the Charter details the composition, functions and powers, 
voting, and procedure of the Trusteeship Council. The establishment of the Trusteeship 
Council reflected the fact that, at the time the Charter was framed, many territories remained 
under the colonial authority of other nations. The pace of self-determination in a changing 
world has rendered this U.N. organ all but defunct. 
10 	Chapter XIV (Articles 92-96) of the Charter outlines the role of the International Court of 
Justice within the United Nations system. The composition and procedure of the International 
Court of Justice are defined in the Charter of the International Court of Justice, which appears 
as an annex to the United Nations Charter. 
11 	Chapter V (Articles 23-32) of the Charter details the composition, functions and powers, voting, 
and procedure of the Security Council. Chapter VI (Articles 33-38) outlines a framework for the 
pacific settlement of disputes, under which the Security Council has a guiding role. Chapter VII 
(Articles 39-51) outlines a framework for addressing disputes which threaten international 
peace and security, for which the Security Council has a primary role. For further discussion 
see section 4.2, below. 
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administrative support to the other U.N. organs, with the exception of the International 
Court of Justice.' 2 
In an attempt to increase the likelihood that the new organisation would succeed 
where its predecessor, the League of Nations, had failed, the U.N. founders incorporated in 
the United Nations Charter features designed to ensure not just the participation of as wide 
a collection of States as possible, but also the active participation of the most powerful 
States. The founders secured the membership of the Great Powers of the time - the United 
States of America, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, China and France - by granting 
them permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council. ' 3 Along with 
12 	Chapter XV (Articles 97-101) establishes the Secretariat. Although the primary role of the 
Secretariat is to support and sustain the activities of the other U.N. organs, the Charter does 
provide scope for the Secretary-General — the leader of the Secretariat — to engage in activities 
designed to resolve conflict. The Secretary-General can do so at the request of a primary organ 
of the U.N., such as the Security Council or the General Assembly, in accordance with Article 
98 (Article 98 provides that the Secretary-General shall perform such tasks as are entrusted to 
him by the General Assembly, the Security Council, ECOSOC and the Trusteeship Council). 
The Secretary-General also has limited scope to undertake initiatives, however, under Article 99 
(Article 99 provides that: "The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security 
Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace 
and security"). For further discussion of the "Good Offices" role of the Secretary-General in 
international dispute resolution, see: Franck, Thomas M. & Nolte, Georg, 'The Good Offices 
Function of the UN Secretary-General', in Roberts, Adam & Kingsbury, Benedict, United 
Nations, Divided World: The UN's Roles in International Relations (1994: 2nd edition), 143-82; 
Merrills, J.G., International Dispute Settlement (1998— 3'd edition), 226-32. 
13 	Article 23 of the Charter designates these States as permanent members of the Security 
Council. The decision as to which States would become permanent members was effectively 
made by a process of self-selection, with the Great Powers themselves determining who should 
be counted amongst their ranks. Initially the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet 
Union were to be permanent members, but by the time of the San Francisco Conference 
membership had expanded to include China and France. The question of permanent 
membership was not uncontroversial, with a number of smaller States, and in particular Mexico, 
advocating for forms of semi-permanent membership that would be subject to periodic review 
in the form of elections by the broader U.N. membership. For discussion of the various 
proposals, see: Simpson, Gerry, 'The Great Powers, Sovereign Equality and the Making of the 
United Nations Charter' (2000) 21 AYBIL 133-58, 141-2, 149-50. 
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permanent membership came the power of the veto, ensuring that the permanent five would 
never themselves be subjected to collective security action. 14 
14 	Article 27(3) bestowed the veto power upon the permanent members of the Security Council. 
Since an amendment to the Charter in 1965 expanded the membership of the Security Council 
from 11 to 15 and increased the number of required affirmative votes from 7 to 11, that 
provision has provided: "Decisions of the Security Council on all [non-procedural] matters 
shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the 
permanent members". For discussion of that amendment to the Charter, which was initiated by 
the General Assembly on 17 December 1963 via General Assembly resolution 1991 A (XVIII) 
and entered into force on 31 August 1965, see: Simma, The Charter of the United Nations (2"d 
edition), above note 1, 1356-7. For discussion of the general process required to amend the 
Charter, as provided for by Article 108, see also Simma, 1341-63. 
The idea of the veto was floated in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, which emerged from the 
Dumbarton Oaks Conference. That Conference consisted of a two-stage set of negotiations, 
held between August and October 1944, in which the United States and the United Kingdom 
met first with the Soviet Union, and then with China. For an account of the discussions at 
Dumbarton surrounding the veto proposal, see: Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks, above note 1, 
183-228. For the proposals arising from Dumbarton Oaks, see: U.S. Department of State, 
Proposals for a general international organization as developed at Dumbarton Oaks (1944) 
Washington, D.C., USA. 
At San Francisco, the proposed incorporation of the veto attracted heated debate. Some States 
were against the very idea of the veto, arguing that a system which would enable one country 
to prevent the Organization from taking urgent action to maintain or restore international peace 
and security would be both fundamentally flawed and unjust. See, e.g., the positions of the 
delegates from the Netherlands and Mexico: Documents of the United Nations Conference on 
International Organization (1945) United Nations Information Organizations, New York, Vol. 
XI: Commission III: Security Council, 163-4 (where Mr. Loudon of the Netherlands states: "The 
Netherlands Delegation fully realizes that in the present state of the international community, it 
may be necessary to invest certain powers with special rights if a new organization for the 
maintenance of peace and security is to be established at all. Such a position the great powers 
have in fact always enjoyed in the past. Now, however, this special status is going to be 
officially recognized and sanctioned. We believe this to be regrettable. Why? Because this new 
system legalizes the mastery of might which in international relations, when peace prevailed, 
has been universally deemed to be reprehensible"), 333 (where the record notes: "[T]he 
requirement of unanimity among the great powers was declared by the Delegate of Mexico to 
be unprecedented and against all concepts of justice"). 
Other States argued for the incorporation of certain restrictions upon the use of the veto, such 
as providing that the veto could only be used in regard to decisions on preventive or 
enforcement action (i.e. Chapter VII action), but not for matters involving the peaceful 
settlement of disputes (i.e. Chapter VI action). See, e.g., the position of Australia, as recalled by 
the head of the Australian delegation to San Francisco, Herbert Vere Evatt: Evatt, The United 
Nations, above note 1, 36 (listing as one of the Australian objectives at the San Francisco 
conference "To exclude the veto of the permanent members from all arrangements relating to 
the peaceful settlement of disputes, and to confine such veto to decisions involving the 
application of economic and military sanctions"); Evatt, Herbert V., The Task of the United 
Nations (1949) Duell, Sloan and Pearce, NY, NY, 47-8 ("The principle of the unanimity of the 
great powers on great matters involving enforcement measures is one of the rocks on which 
the United Nations has had to be built. The peaceful settlement of disputes is quite a different 
matter. As it is now, any one of the permanent members of the Security Council can use its 
right to the individual veto so that it prevents the Council taking measures to mediate, to bring 
the parties together, or to call upon the parties fighting to cease fighting"). 
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4.2 The legal basis and effect of the Security Council's sanctions 
powers 
As their League predecessors had done almost three decades earlier, the U.N.'s 
founders included non-military sanctions as one of the major tools in the new international 
organisation's arsenal for resolving international conflict. They sought, however, to create a 
non-military sanctions mechanism that would come into operation in a more clear-cut 
manner than League of Nations non-military sanctions, and which would be assured of the 
support" of the major powers and States in genera1. 15 Rather than leaving the decision as to 
whether to impose sanctions in the hands of individual States, 16 the Charter centralised 
decision-making by bestowing upon the Security Council, through Chapter VII, the power 
Ultimately, however, the Great Powers were unprepared to compromise in relation to the veto, 
maintaining that they would not sign the United Nations Charter unless the veto was retained 
as proposed. In a telling gesture, Senator Connally of the United States tore up a copy of the 
United Nations Charter by way of demonstrating what would happen if the veto was not 
retained as originally proposed. For a dramatic description of that event, see: Schlesinger, Act 
of Creation, above note 1, 223. 
For examples of the literature surrounding the topic of the veto, see: Simma, The Charter of the 
United Nations (rd edition), above note 1, 476-523; Bailey, Sydney D. & Daws, Sam, The 
Procedure of the UN Security Council (31° ed. 1998) Clarendon Press, Oxford, 227-39; Sellen, 
Keith L., 'The United Nations Security Council Veto in the New World Order' (1992) Military 
LR 138 187-262. 
15 	For comparisons of the relative merits of the sanctioning systems of the League of Nations and 
the United Nations, see Kelsen, Hans, 'The Old and the New League: the Covenant and the 
Dumbarton Oaks Proposals' (1945) 39 AJIL 45-83; Kelsen, Hans, The Law of the United 
Nations: a Critical Analysis of its Fundamental Problems (1951) Steven & Sons, London, 724- 
56; and Nossal, Kim Richard, 'Economic Sanctions in the League of Nations and the United 
Nations' in Leyton-Brown, David (ed), The Utility of International Economic Sanctions (1987) 
Croom Helm, Beckenham, Kent, 7-22. 
16 	Ironically, the aim of the founders of the League of Nations had also been to take the decision 
as to whether to impose sanctions out of the hands of States by requiring them to impose 
sanctions automatically when a member State resorted to war in violation of the Covenant. As 
discussed in chapter 3, however, that provision was interpreted in such a way that ultimately, 
although member States were considered to be ipso facto at war with the rogue State, they 
were nevertheless deemed to retain the right to respond to that situation in whatever manner 
they desired. 
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to authorise sanctions." Furthermore, the Charter granted the Security Council the power to 
obligate Member States to observe and enforce sanctions.' 8 
The legal basis for the Security Council's power to impose U.N. non-military 
sanctions is located in Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which outlines the general powers 
and responsibilities of the U.N. Security Council with respect to the maintenance of 
international peace and security. Comprising Articles 39-51 of the Charter, Chapter VII 
provides a broad framework for taking action to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. Articles 39 and 41 are the key provisions governing the application of non-military 
sanctions. Article 39 requires the Security Council to determine the existence of any "threat 
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and to decide what action should be 
taken, in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. ° Article 41 describes the types of non-military sanctions that can be authorised by 
I? 	Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, above note 15, 726 ("[T]he enforcement actions under 
Article 16 of the Covenant were almost completely decentralized, whereas the enforcement 
measures to be taken under Article 39 of the Charter are strictly centralized"). Kelsen 
subsequently describes the centralization of enforcement measures under the United Nations 
Charter as "a great progress": ibid, 746. See also Gowlland-Debbas, Vera, Collective Responses 
to Illegal Acts in International Law: United Nations Action in the Question of Southern 
Rhodesia (1990) Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 367 ("Whilst Under the League system it was left 
up to each Member State to decide whether another State had breached its obligations under 
the Covenant, the Charter centralizes this decision in the Security Council"). 
18 	Article 25 of the Charter provides that Member States agree to accept and carry out the 
decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the Charter. For further discussion of 
Article 25, as well as of the argument that the Security Council's power to bind States extends 
to States non-Members, see notes 28 to 43 and accompanying text, below. 
19 	Article 39 reads: "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security." 
There are no widely-accepted definitions of what constitutes a "threat to the peace", a "breach 
of the peace", or an "act of aggression". This lack of a precise definition was intentional, as the 
founders aimed to give the Security Council maximum flexibility in determining when it was 
necessary to respond to a particular situation: see Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks, above note 
1, 138 (noting that during the Dumbarton Oaks conferences the decision was made not to 
provide a specific definition of "aggression", in order to avoid limiting the breadth of the 
Council's powers, particularly in the face of the advancing technology of warfare). At the time 
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the Counci1, 20 and Article 42 describes the types of military action that the Council can 
mandate if it considers that non-military sanctions would prove, or have proven, 
inadequate.21 
Article 41 contains an inclusive list of the coercive measures short of force that may 
be authorised by the Security Council in response to a threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression. It provides that U.N. non-military sanctions may include 
measures designed to interrupt, completely or partially, communications or economic or 
diplomatic relations between the international community and the target against which they 
are imposed.22 A literal reading of Article 41 in isolation would suggest that the Security 
Council has the broad power to authorise non-military sanctions in order to give effect to 
any of its decisions, but in practice Article 41 was designed to be read in conjunction with 
the Charter was framed, however, it is likely that a breach of the peace would have been 
considered to be a full-blown conflict between States, a threat to the peace would have 
encompassed a situation likely to result in a full-blown conflict between States, and an act of 
aggression would have described an act of military intervention by one State against another. 
For discussion of the manner in which these triggers for Chapter VII action have operated in 
relation to the various sanctions regimes, see Chapter 6, section 6.1. For more general 
discussion of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression, see: Simma, 
The Charter of the United Nations (2nd edition), above note 1,717-28; and Chesterman, Simon, 
Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian intervention and international law (2001) OUP, 
Oxford, 127-62. On threats to the peace in particular, see: Osterdahl, Inger, Threat to the Peace: 
the interpretation by the Security Council of Article 39 of the UN Charter (1998) Iustus 
Forlag, Uppsala; and Fielding, Lois E., 'Taking a Closer Look at Threats to Peace: The Power of 
the Security Council to Address Humanitarian Crises' (1996) 73 University of Detroit Mercy LR 
551-68. 
20 	The full text of Article 41 reads: "The Security Council may decide what measures not 
involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may 
call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include 
complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, 
radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations." 
21 	The full text of Article 42 reads: "Should the Security Council consider that measures provided 
for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action 
by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, 
or land forces of Members of the United Nations." 
22 	Article 41, above note 20. For discussion of the types of sanctions employed by the Council in 
practice, see Chapter 7. 
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Article 39, meaning that non-military sanctions should, as a rule, be authorised by the 
Council only after it has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression. 23  The basic objective of the Council in authorising non-military 
sanctions should therefore be the maintenance or restoration of international peace and 
secluity. 24 
Two further provisions in Chapter VII are relevant to the application of sanctions. 
Article 48 provides that the Security Council may determine whether the action required to 
carry out its decisions shall be taken by all or some of the Members of the United Nations, 25 
and that the Council's decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations 
23 	This sequence of events for Security Council action under Chapter VII is suggested both by a 
contextual reading of Articles 39, 41 and 42, and by many commentators: see, e.g., Kelsen, The 
Law of the United Nations, above note 15, 729 ("[U]nder the Charter action can be taken only 
... after the Council has determined the existence of a threat to, or breach of, the peace"); 
Goodrich, Leland M., & Hambro, Edvard, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and 
Documents (1949: 2d  ed.) World Peace Foundation, Boston, MA, 277 ("It is clear from the 
wording of [Article 41], taken together with that of Article 39, that a decision to use 'measures 
not involving the use of armed force' can only be taken following a determination, explicit or 
implicit, that a 'threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression' exists"); 
Gowlland-Debbas, Collective Responses, above note 17, 381 ("In accordance with a strict 
interpretation of the Charter, before the Security Council can initiate measures on the basis of 
either Articles 41 or 42 of Chapter VII, it must make a prior determination or finding qualifying 
the situation within the terms of Article 39 as constituting a threat to international peace and 
security"); Shaw, Malcolm N., International Law (1997: 4th ed.) Cambridge UP, Cambridge, UK, 
855 ("Before the Council can adopt measures relating to the enforcement of world peace, it 
must first determine the existence of any 'threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of 
aggression' ... Once such a determination has been made, in accordance with Article 39 of the 
Charter, the way is clear for the adoption of recommendations or decisions to deal with the 
situation"); Simma, The Charter of the United Nations (rd edition), above note I, 739 (noting 
that a reading of Articles 39, 41 and 42 suggests that the Security Council can make 
determinations regarding concrete measures to maintain or restore the peace only once the 
requirements of Article 39 have been met). 
On two occasions, however, the Security Council did impose sanctions without having made a 
prior explicit determination of a threat to international peace and security — in the case of the 
sanctions regimes imposed against the Bosnian Serbs and against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia to address the situation in Kosovo. For discussion of the legal ramifications of the 
Council's approach in those instances, see Chapter 6, section 6.1.1. 
24 Article 41, above note 20. 
25 	Article 48(1). In practice, the Security Council has not called upon particular States to impose 
mandatory sanctions. For discussion of the Council's practice in relation to identifying the 
actors who must apply mandatory sanctions, see Chapter 8, section 8.1. 
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both directly and through their action in international agencies. 26 Article 50 further provides 
that when enforcement or preventive measures are taken against a State, any other State 
which finds itself confronted by special economic problems arising from the implementation 
of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a 
solution of those problems.27 
The legal effect of U.N. sanctions stems from the fact that a decision by the Security 
Council to impose sanctions creates a legal obligation for States to take action to implement 
those sanctions. For States that are Members of the United Nations, that legal obligation 
flows from Articles 25, 103 and 2(5) of the United Nations Charter. Under Article 25, U.N. 
Member States Are required to carry out the decisions of the Security Counci1. 28 Thus, when 
the Council decides to impose non-military sanctions, U.N. Member States are legally 
obligated to comply with and implement those sanctions. Article 103 further requires U.N. 
Member States to grant precedence to their legal obligations under the Charter, meaning 
that they cannot claim previous legal obligation as an excuse to avoid obligations arising from 
a decision of the Security Counci1. 29 Article 2(5) of the Charter also requires Member States 
to refrain from giving assistance to States subject to action under Articles 41 and 42. 3° 
Although the obligation to implement U.N. sanctions is clearly established for States 
Members of the United Nations, there has been some debate regarding whether that 
26 	Article 48(2). 
27 	Article 50. For discussion of the practice of the Security Council in relation to the unintended 
consequences of sanctions upon third States, see also Chapter 8, section 8.4. 
28 	Article 25 states that "The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the 
decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter". 
29 	Article 103 states that "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of 
the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other 
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail". 
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obligation might not also extend to States that are not Members of the U.N.. The traditional, 
restrictive view is that under general principles of international law States cannot be bound 
by an obligation under a treaty to which they are not party, unless that treaty obligation 
reflects a peremptory obligation under customary international law. 31 A permissive view 
holds, however, that the Security Council has the power and the capacity to adopt decisions 
that are legally binding upon non-Member States. 32 The basis for such an interpretation is to 
be found in the Charter, in the decisions of the Security Council, and in relevant state 
practice in response to those decisions. The Charter-based case for the existence of an 
obligation upon non-Member States is located in Article 2(6), which provides that the 
United Nations should ensure that States non-Members act in accordance with the 
Charter's principles, particularly where necessary for the maintenance of international peace 
and security. 33  Article 2(6) can be interpreted to mean that there is no essential difference 
Article 2(5) states that "All Members shall ... refrain from giving assistance to any state 
against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action". 
31 	See, e.g.: Simma, Bruno (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations.- A Commentary (1995) C.H. 
Beck, Munchen, 627 (maintaining that, in the absence of a Security Council declaration that 
touches upon an obligation that is erga omnes, the Council's decisions cannot create a legal 
obligation for States non-members of the United Nations to impose sanctions); Goodrich, 
Leland M., & Hambro, Edvard, Charter of the United Nations. - Commentary and Documents 
(1949: 2" ed.) World Peace Foundation, Boston, MA, 108-9 (stating: "It is doubtful whether an 
international instrument like the Charter can impose legal obligations on states which are not 
parties to it. The traditional theory, which is not unanimously held, is that treaties cannot 
obligate third parties. If this theory is accepted, the authority of the United Nations under this 
paragraph is based exclusively upon the will and power of the contracting parties"). 
32 	For examples of a more permissive view of the extent to which the Council's decisions can bind 
States non-members, see: Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, above note 15, 85-6 
(contending that Article 2(6) could be interpreted to mean that there was no essential 
difference between the obligations of Members and non-Members, given that almost all of the 
obligations of Member States might be considered necessary for the maintenance of 
international peace and security); Kelsen, Hans, 'Sanctions in International Law Under the 
Charter of the United Nations' (1946) 31 Iowa LR 449-543, 502 (acknowledging that Article 2(6) 
was not in conformity with general international law at the time the Charter entered into force, 
but suggesting that Article 2(6) might in future become part of general international law). 
33 	Article 2(6) states that "The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of 
the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the 
maintenance of international peace and security". 
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between the obligations of Members and non-Members, given that almost all of the 
obligations of Member States might be considered necessary for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 34 In fact, the founders included Article 2(6) in the Charter 
because the aim of the United Nations was not simply to maintain peace within the 
Organization, but to maintain peace within the whole international community. 35 The 
revolutionary attempt by the founders to apply the Charter to States non-parties has been 
described as heralding a transition from an old to a new international law. 36 
The Council's practice relating to the imposition of sanctions indicates that it 
considers its decisions to bind both Member States and non-Member States. Although the 
Council differentiated between the obligations of States Members of the U.N. and States 
not Members of the U.N. in its initial experiment with sanctions, to address the case of the 
illegal white minority regime in Southern Rhodesia, 37 it Ins not subsequently drawn such a 
distinction, employing almost unifonmly the phrase "All States shall" when outlining the 
measures to be imposed as part of a sanctions regime. 38 Moreover, the Council also 
34 	Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, above note 15, 85-6. 
35 	Ibid 106. 
36 	'bid 109-10. See also: Kelsen, Hans, 'Sanctions in International Law', above note 32, 502 
(acknowledging that Article 2(6) was not in conformity with general international law at the 
time the Charter entered into force, but suggesting that Article 2(6) might in future become part 
of general international law). 
37 	In resolution 232 (1966) the Council decided that "all States Members of the United Nations" 
should impose certain sanctions against Southern Rhodesia: S/RES/232 (16 December 1966), 
operative paragraph 2. The Council subsequently urged "States not Members of the United 
Nations" to act in accordance with those sanctions: ibid, operative paragraph 7. Interestingly, 
however, although the Council in general continued to distinguish between the duties of 
"States Members of the United Nations" and "States non-members of the United Nations" in 
its subsequent resolutions relating to the Southern Rhodesia sanctions regime, in one decision 
the Council addressed its call to all States. See: S/RES/320 (29 September 1972), operative 
paragraph 2 (calling upon "all States to implement fully all Security Council resolutions 
establishing sanctions against Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), in accordance with Article 25 
and Article 2(6), of the Charter of the United Nations"). 
38 See, e.g.: SIRES/418 (4 November 1977), operative paragraph 2, imposing sanctions against 
South Africa; S/RES/661 (6 August 1990), operative paragraphs 34, imposing sanctions 
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appears to have sought to extend the obligation upon Member States under Article 103 to 
non-Members, by calling upon "all States, including States not Members of the U.N." to act 
in accordance with sanctions regimes, notwithstanding the existence of any prior, potentially 
conflicting legal obligation. 39 The inclusion of such a provision serves two purposes. First, it 
against Iraq; SIRES/713 (25 September 1991), operative paragraph 6, imposing sanctions 
against the former Yugoslavia (all States of the former Yugoslavia); S/RES/733 (23 January 
1992), operative paragraph 5, imposing sanctions against Somalia; SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), 
operative paragraphs 3-6, imposing sanctions against Libya; SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), 
operative paragraphs 3.9, imposing sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia-Montenegro) to address the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina; SIRES/788 (19 November 
1992), operative paragraph 8, imposing sanctions against Liberia; S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), 
operative paragraph 12, imposing sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs [although the phrase 
used in that provision does not explicitly require all States to implement the sanctions, stating 
instead that the Council "decides that import to, export from and transhipment through ... areas 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces ... shall be permitted only 
with proper authorisation from the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina", in subsequent 
resolutions tightening the sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs, the Council made it clear that 
the sanctions regime was intended to bind States in general by using the phrase "decides that 
States shall ...". See: S/RES/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraphs 7-181; S/RES/841 (15 
June 1993), operative paragraph 5-8, imposing sanctions against Haiti; S/RES/864 (15 
September 1993), operative paragraph 19, imposing sanctions against Angola (UNITA); 
SIRES/918 (17 May 1994), operative paragraph 13, imposing sanctions against Rwanda; 
SIRES/1054 (11 March 1996), operative paragraph 3, imposing sanctions against the Sudan; 
S/RES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraphs 56, imposing sanctions against Sierra 
Leone; SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 8, imposing sanctions against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) to address the situation in Kosovo; 
S/RES/1267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraphs 3-4, imposing sanctions against 
Afghanistan (the Taliban); S/RES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 6, imposing 
sanctions against Ethiopia and Eritrea; SIRES/l343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraphs 5-7, 
imposing sanctions against Liberia. 
39 	The Council outlined provisions of this nature, calling upon all States, including States non- 
members of the United Nations, to act strictly in accordance with sanctions, notwithstanding 
the existence of any prior legal obligation, in connection with the sanctions regimes against 
Iraq, Libya, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), Haiti, and the Sudan. In 
connection with the sanctions regime against Iraq, see: SIRES/661 (6 August 1991), operative 
paragraph 5. In connection with the sanctions regime against Libya, see: SIRES/748 (31 March 
1992), operative paragraph 7; S/RES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraph 12. In 
connection with the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro), see: S/RES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 11. In connection with the 
sanctions regime against Haiti, see: S/RES/841 (15 June 1993), operative paragraph 9; 
S/RES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 12. In connection with the Sudan sanctions 
regime, see: S/RES/1054 (26 April 1996), operative paragraph 5. 
In addition, the Council also addressed similar calls to "all States" or simply "States" to act 
strictly in accordance with the sanctions, notwithstanding the existence of any prior legal 
obligation, in respect of its sanctions regimes against South Africa, Iraq, Libya, UNITA, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (to address the situation in Kosovo), 
Afghanistan/the Taliban/A1 Qaida, Ethiopia and Eritrea, and Liberia (in the second instance). In 
connection with the sanctions regime against South Africa, see: S/RES/418 (4 November 1977), 
operative paragraph 3 (calling upon all States to do so). In connection with the Iraq sanctions 
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represents an explicit indication that the Council considers the phrase "all States" to include 
States not Members of the U.N.. Second, it reinforces that the Council expects States not 
Members b grant precedence to the implementation of sanctions even in situations where 
such implementation might conflict with a prior legal obligation. 
Perhaps the strongest evidence in favour of the view that non-Member States are 
obligated to impose sanctions is to be found in examples of state practice, as even the 
--- 
restrictive view acknowledges that where a treaty norm has reached the status of general or 
customary international law, it can bind States non-parties. ° Thus, if it can be shown that 
non-Member States have implemented sanctions in practice and that they have done so out 
of a belief that they are legally-bound to so act, then it might be said that a norm of 
regime, see: SIRES/670 (25 September 1990), operative paragraph 3 (requiring all States to do 
so); SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 25 (calling upon all States). In connection 
with the sanctions regime against Libya, see: 51RE51883 (11 November 1993), operative 
paragraph 8 (addressing the Governments of all States). In connection with the sanctions 
regime against UNITA, see: S/RES/864 (15 September 1993), operative paragraph 20 (calling 
upon States). That provision was reiterated in: SIRES/1127 (28 August 1997); SIRES/1130 (29 
September 1997); SIRES/1173 (12 June 1998); SIRES/1176 (24 June 1998); S/RES/1412 (17 May 
2002); SIRES/1432 (15 August 2002); SIRES/1439 (18 October 2002). In connection with the 
Rwandan sanctions regime, see: SIRES/918 (17 May 1994), operative paragraph 15 (calling 
upon all States). In connection with the Sierra Leone sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1132 (8 
October 1997), operative paragraph 11 (calling upon all States); S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000), 
operative paragraph 9 (again calling upon all States). In connection with the Kosovo sanctions 
regime, see: SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 10 (calling upon all States). In 
connection with the Afghanistan/Taliban/A1 Qaida sanctions regime, see: SIRES/l267 (15 
October 1999), operative paragraph 7 (calling upon all States); SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), 
operative paragraph 17 (against calling upon all States). In connection with the Ethiopia and 
Eritrea sanctions regime, see: SIRES/I298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 9 (calling upon all 
States). In connection with the Liberia sanctions regime (in the second instance), see: 
SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 22 (calling upon all States). 
40 	A norm can be identified as one of customary international law where there is evidence of 
widespread state practice adhering to that norm, as well as the requisite opinio juris on the part 
of States adhering to that norm. As articulated by the International Court of Justice in the 
North Sea Continental Shelf Case, the element of opiniojuris requires that States engage in a 
particular practice out of a sense of legal obligation. See: North Sea Continental Shelf Case 
(1969) ICJ Reports 3, 44 (paragraph 77) ("Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled 
practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a 
belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it ... 
The States concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal 
obligation"). For a detailed exposition and analysis of customary international law, see: Byers, 
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customary international law has evolved to the effect that non-Member States are legally 
obligated to impose sanctions. There have in fact been a number of instances of non-
Member States implementing sanctions. Among the non-Members that have issued 
statements detailing action taken to apply U.N. sanctions have been the Republic of Korea 
(prior to becoming a U.N. Member State), Switzerland (also prior to becoming a U.N. 
Member State) and The Holy See. 4 ' The extent to which those non-Member States decided 
to act in accordance with the Iraq sanctions regime out of a belief that they were legally 
obliged to so act is unclear.42 Nevertheless, the fact that they reported at all on steps taken 
Michael, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules (1999) Cambridge UP, Cambridge, especially 
129-203. 
41 	See, for instance, the communications sent to the Secretary-General outlining steps taken to 
implement the sanctions against Iraq by: the Republic of Korea [S/21487 (10 August 1990), 
annex: Letter dated 10 August 1990 from the Permanent Observer of the Republic of Korea 
addressed to the Secretary-General; S121617 (24 August 1990), annex: Note verbale dated 23 
August 1990 from the Permanent Observer of the Republic of Korea addressed to the 
Secretary-General; S/23016 (9 September 1991), annex: Note verbale dated 9 September 1991 
from the Permanent Observer of the Republic of Korea addressed to the Secretary-General]; 
Switzerland [S/21585 (22 August 1990), annex: Note verbale dated 22 August 1990 from the 
Permanent Observer Mission of Switzerland addressed to the Secretary-General; S/22958 (19 
August 1991), annex: Note verbale dated 19 August 1991 from the Permanent Observer 
Mission of Switzerland addressed to the Secretary-General] and The Holy See [S/22802 (16 
July 1991), annex: Note verbale dated 9 July 1991 from the Permanent Observer of the Holy 
See addressed to the Secretary-General]. Switzerland also submitted similar communications in 
relation to implementation of the sanctions regimes against the former Yugoslavia and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro). See: S/23338 (31 December 1991), annex: 
Note verbale dated 31 December 1991 from the Permanent Observer Mission of Switzerland 
addressed to the Secretary-General; S/24160 (24 June 1992), annex: Note verbale dated 24 
June 1992 from the Permanent Observer Mission of Switzerland addressed to the Secretary-
General. 
42 	The Republic of Korea and the Holy See did not provide any indication of their reasons for 
implementing the sanctions. Switzerland, however, initially claimed that as a non-member State 
it was not legally bound by the Council's decision to apply sanctions, whilst at the same time 
reporting various steps that it had taken which effectively amounted to implementing the 
sanctions. Subsequent communications seemed to indicate relatively routine implementation of 
the Council's sanctions-related decisions. See: S/21585, ibid, p. 2 ("These measures ... were 
taken independently ... As a non-Member of the United Nations, Switzerland is not in fact 
legally bound by the decisions of the Security Council, nor, in this case, by resolution 661 
(1990). Nevertheless, the aforementioned ordinances, which were adopted independently by 
the Federal Council, correspond in substance to the resolutions adopted by the Security 
Council"); S/22958, ibid, p. 2 (noting that exceptions from Switzerland's regulations prohibiting 
commercial and financial interaction with Iraq were only possible within the framework 
established by resolution 661 (1990), and stating that the arms sanctions outlined in resolution 
687 (1991) were being "strictly implemented" by Switzerland); S/23338, ibid, p. 2 (outlining 
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to implement sanctions suggests the possibility of an emerging norm of customary 
international law which, once fully developed, would provide that U.N. mandatory sanctions 
bind all States. 
In practice, however, the question of whether U.N. sanctions technically create a 
legal obligation upon States non-members of the U.N. is effectively moot, as United Nations 
membership has expanded beyond 190 States, leaving but a handful of States beyond the 
sphere of the legal obligations clearly established for U.N. Member States. 43 U.N. sanctions 
are therefore practically universal in their legal effect, even in the event that they are not 
technically legally binding upon that handful of States. 
4.3 When theory and practice diverge: the Charter's 
implementation lacuna 
In theory, the virtually universal nature of the legal obligation upon States to 
implement U.N. sanctions should mean that when the Security Council decides to apply 
sanctions, they will then be implemented universally. Experience has demonstrated, 
however, that the Council's authorisation of mandatory sanctions is rarely sufficient in itself 
to guarantee that sanctions will actually be implemented. In some instances, a State may not 
be able to ensure the watertight implementation of sanctions. In other cases, a State may 
steps taken by Switzerland that amounted to implementation of the arms embargo against the 
former Yugoslavia, in response to the Secretary-General's request for information on measures 
taken by Switzerland to "comply" with the arms embargo); S/24160, ibid, p. 2 (noting that 
Switzerland was not a member of the United Nations, before proceeding to outline a series of 
measures taken against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) in the weeks 
immediately after the Security Council established the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro) sanctions regime). 
43 	In 2002 Switzerland and East Timor (Timor Leste) became the 190 th and 191' States to join the 
United Nations. The Security Council recommended that Switzerland be granted membership in 
S/RES/1426 (24 July 2002) and it was admitted on 10 September 2002. The Council 
recommended to the General Assembly that East Timor be admitted as a Member State in 
S/RES/1414 (23 May 2002) and it was admitted under the name "Timor Leste" on 27 September 
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stand to lose so much from the observation of sanctions, or to gain so much from their 
violation, that it might turn a blind eye to sanctions violations, or resolve not to implement 
them at all. 
The U.N. founders did not outline a detailed blueprint for a system to guarantee the 
practical implementation of U.N. sanctions. Although the U.N. Charter provides the 
Security Council with the authority to impose sanctions, it is silent upon the question of what 
steps could or should be taken to ensure that sanctions are in fact applied. The founders 
were clearly mindful, however, of the possibility that sanctions might not be fully 
implemented. Article 50 of the Charter, which provides that any State confronted by 
"special economic problems" arising from the application of U.N. sanctions has the right to 
consult the Council to seek a solution to its problem," appears to have been designed to 
address the likelihood that a State might consider violating a sanctions regime if its economy 
relies heavily upon trade with a State subject to U.N. sanctions. 45 In addition, the founders 
bestowed upon the Council, through Article 29 of the Charter, the power to establish 
2002. An example of a State that is not a Member of the United Nations is the Holy See, which 
nevertheless continues to maintain an observer mission to the United Nations. 
44 	Logically, Article 50 excludes a State that is the target of sanctions from approaching the 
Council in relation to its "special economic problems." The Article states: "If preventive or 
enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, 
whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special 
economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to 
consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems." 
4$ 	Article 50 has not proven particularly effective in offsetting the economic problems faced by 
States who would normally benefit from trade with a target State. In fact, it has been described 
as a "dead letter": see Malone, David M., Decision-Making in the UN Security Council: the 
Case of Haiti, 1990-1997 (1998) Clarendon Press, Oxford, 21. Although Article 50 grants 
specially-affected States the right to consult the Security Council about their economic 
problems, it does not require or obligate the Council to take subsequent action to alleviate 
those problems. In practice, despite numerous petitions from specially-affected countries in 
relation to various sanctions regimes, the Council has taken minimal action to ease the plight of 
such States in a limited number of cases and in a restricted manner. The action that it has taken 
has consisted of appealing to States to provide technical, financial and material assistance to 
the country concerned, and inviting the competent organs and specialized agencies of the 
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subsidiary organs to facilitate the Council's work. 46 Article 30 of the Charter also empowers 
the Council to adopt its own rules of procedure.47 Through these mechanisms, the U.N. 
founders therefore afforded the Council the flexibility to take whatever steps it might 
consider necessary or appropriate to guarantee the implementation of its decisions. 
Rather than creating a comprehensive system to oversee the administration and 
implementation of sanctions, the Security Council has generally responded to the need to 
take additional steps to guarantee sanctions implementation on an ad hoc, case-by-case 
basis.48 It has also called upon particular actors to facilitate the implementation of particular 
sanctions regimes.49 Nevertheless, despite the absence of a sophisticated, pre-designed 
sanctions machinery," sufficient patterns can be detected in the Council's sanctions practice 
United Nations system to review their programmes of assistance to affected countries, with a 
view to alleviating hardships. For further discussion, see Chapter 8, section 8.4.2. 
46 	Article 29 of the Charter states that "The Security Council may establish such subsidiary 
organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions". 
47 	Article 30 of the Charter states that "The Security Council shall adopt its own rules of 
procedure, including the method of selecting its own President." Although the Council has 
never adopted a formal set of rules of procedure, it has agreed upon a set of provisional rules 
of procedure, which are followed in practice. See S/96/Rev.7: Provisional Rules of Procedure of 
the Security Council (1982) United Nations, NY. For a description of the negotiations leading 
to the formulation and adoption of the provisional rules, see Bailey & Daws, The Procedure of 
the Security Council, above note 14,9-17. 
48 	A number of commentators have criticised the ad hoc approach to the establishment of 
Sanctions Committees, arguing that the Council should adopt a more comprehensive, overall 
approach to the question of sanctions: see, e.g., Bianchi, Andrea, 'Ad-hocism and the Rule of 
Law' (2002) 13 EJIL 263-72; Minear, Larry, Cortright, David, Wagler, Julia, Lopez, George A., & 
Weiss, Thomas G., Toward More Humane and Effective Sanctions Management: Enhancing 
the Capacity of the United Nations System (1998) Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for 
International Studies, Providence, RI, xxxvi; Reisman, W. Michael & Stevick, Douglas L., 'The 
Applicability of International Law Standards to United Nations Economic Sanctions 
Programmes' (1998) 9 EJIL 86-141. 
49 	For details relating to those particular actors, see Chapter 10. 
50 	The approach of the Security Council to law enforcement generally has been described as 
"unsystematic and largely unconscious". See: Gowlland-Debbas, Vera, 'The Functions of the 
United Nations Security Council in the International Legal System' in Byers, Michael (ed.), The 
Role of Law in International Politics (2000) Oxford UP, Oxford, 277-313, 311: ("Focusing on 
the practice of the Security Council in law enforcement ... illustrates how a political organ can 
contribute to the evolution of the international legal system, albeit in an unsystematic and 
largely unconscious fashion") 
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to indicate the evolution of an organic U.N. sanctions system. The contours of that system, 
which continue to be shaped by the Security Council's actions in relation to each of its 
sanctions regimes, form the focus of analysis in Part III. 
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PART III. SANCTIONS IN PRACTICE: THE SECURITY 
COUNCIL'S USE OF SANCTIONS AND THE 
EVOLVING U.N. SANCTIONS SYSTEM 
Part III describes how U.N. sanctions have operated in practice, charting the 
contours of the evolving U.N. sanctions system. Chapter 5 outlines the manner in which the 
Security Council's sanctions-related actions have led to the evolution of the U.N. sanctions 
system. It also contains a brief overview of each of the twenty mandatory sanctions regimes 
established to date by the Security Council. Chapter 6 reviews the manner in which the 
Council has established the legal basis for the application of sanctions. It thus describes how 
the Council has determined the existence of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and 
acts of aggression, invoked Chapter VII of the Charter and articulated sanctions objectives. 
Chapter 7 surveys the manner in which the Council has delineated the scope of its sanctions 
regimes, applying different measures to suit different situations. Chapter 8 outlines some 
strategies the Council has employed to fine-tune the imposition of sanctions, including 
clarifying senders and targets, defining the temporal application of sanctions, and addressing 
the unintended consequences of sanctions upon civilian populations and third States. 
Chapter 9 focuses upon the manner in which the Council has established subsidiary bodies 
with responsibilities relating to the administration and monitoring of sanctions. Chapter 10 
describes how the Council has also bestowed sanctions-related responsibilities upon other 
international actors, including for sanctions monitoring, implementation and enforcement 
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regimes 
This chapter introduces the U.N. sanctions system. Section 5.1 outlines the marmer 
in which the Security Council's sanctions-related actions have led to the evolution of the 
U.N. sanctions system. Section 5.2 provides an overview of the twenty U.N. sanctions 
regimes established by the Security Council to date. 
5.1 The Security Council's sanctions practice and the evolution of 
the U.N. sanctions system 
Since its creation, the U.N. Security Council has imposed mandatory sanctions in 
accordance with its sanctions powers on twenty occasions.' As noted in the previous 
chapter, the Council's approach to the application of sanctions has been ad hoc rather than 
systematic. Nevertheless, despite the absence of a pre-designed framework for the 
implenrntation of sanctions, the Security Council has, through its use of sanctions, spawned 
a complex network of sanctions-related actors and sanctions-specific legal obligations 
which, taken together, constitute an evolving, albeit rudimentary, sanctions system. In its role 
as the creator and overseer of U.N. sanctions, the Security Council engages in a form of 
quasi-legislative activity. 2 Through the adoption of resolutions and other decisions,' the 
For overviews of the twenty sanctions regime, see section 5.2, below. For more detailed 
summaries, see the Appendices. 
For further discussion of the quasi-legislative nature of certain Security Council decisions, see 
the references noted in Chapter 2, section 2.1. 
The Council usually adopts its decisions in the form of resolutions. Occasionally, however, its 
decisions take the form of a presidential statement or a letter or note by the President of the 
Security Council. For discussion of what constitutes a decision of the Council and when those 
"decisions" are considered binding, see: Bailey, Sydney D. & Daws, Sam, The procedure of the 
UN Security Council (3 rd ed. 1998) Clarendon Press, Oxford, 263-73. 
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Council shapes each sanctions regime, sculpting the parameters both of the sanctions regime 
itself and of the legal framework governing that regime. 
When the Council imposes a new sanctions regime, it generally identifies a threat to 
or breach of international peace and security, outlines the objectives of the sanctions regime, 
defines the scope of the measures to be applied, and stipulates which parties are obliged to 
implement the sanctions. In its formative sanctions decisions, the Council has also clarified 
the steps which a target must take in order for the sanctions to be suspended or terminated, 
created subsidiary organs to facilitate sanctions implementation, and identified a time-limit, 
after which either the sanctions regime will expire or the Security Council will review the 
sanctions in order to decide whether they should continue. 
The Security Council generally delegates the responsibility for the day-to-day 
administiation of that regime to a subsidiary organ, most often a Sanctions Committee. It has 
also established other sanctions-related subsidiary bodies, including Panels of Experts, 
Monitoring Mechanisms and Special Commissions, to administer and monitor the 
implementation of sanctions. These subsidiary bodies generally undertake responsibilities 
that are specific to an individual sanctions regime, rather than having a broader, system-wide 
focus connected with the implementation of sanctions in general!' Thus, once a sanctions 
regime has been established, the Council's role subsequently becomes one of oversight. In 
its oversight role, the Council responds to developments on the ground, expanding the scope 
of the sanctions if necessary to induce the compliance of a non-compliant target, or 
contracting the scope of the sanctions in order to reward partial compliance. In instances 
An exception to this tendency was the establishment of the Informal Working Group of the 
Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (the "Working Group on Sanctions"). For 
further discussion of that Working Group, see Chapter 9, section 9.2. 
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where the objectives of a sanctions regime have been partially or fully achieved, the Council 
might also decide to suspend or terminate the sanctions. 
5.2 The Security Council's many and varied sanctions regimes 
The Security Council has established twenty mandatory U.N. sanctions regimes, the 
vast majority of which were initiated after the conclusion of the Cold War. Despite the 
frequent occurrence between 1945 and 1989 of conflicts which could have been considered 
threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression, thus potentially warranting 
the application of sanctions, the Council was able to reach the necessary consensus to 
impose sanctions on just two occasions - against the illegal white minority regime in Southern 
Rhodesia and against South Africa. By contrast, since the end of the Cold War no less than 
eighteen sanctions regimes have been established. In the 1990s, the Security Council 
established fourteen sanctions regimes, against: Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Libya, 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), Liberia, the Bosnian Serbs, Haiti, 
the Angolan rebel group the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
("UNITA"), Rwanda, the Sudan, Sierra Leone, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and 
Afghanistan/the Taliban/A1 Qaida. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the 
Council has initiated four further sanctions regimes, against Ethiopia and Eritrea, Liberia (for 
the second time), certain actors in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and 
Liberia (for the third time). 
This section contains a brief summary of each of the twenty mandatory sanctions 
regimes established by the Security Council to date. The summaries are arranged in 
accordance with the chronological order in which the sanctions regimes were created, and 
they contain the key information about each regime, including when and why sanctions were 
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established, what type of sanctions were applied, and whether the sanctions have been 
terminated or remain in place at the time of writing. 5 
5.2.1 The Southern Rhodesia sanctions regime 
The Security Council established its first mandatory non-military sanctions regime in 
December 1966, imposing a range of measures against the white minority regime that had 
taken control of Southern Rhodesia in November 1965. 6 The major objectives of the 
Southern Rhodesia sanctions regime were to end the reign of the minority regime,' and to 
enable the self-determination and independence of the Southern Rhodesian people.' The 
regime initially consisted of a range of targeted trade sanctions, but it was subsequently 
expanded to incorporate a blend of comprehensive trade sanctions, as well as financial, 
representative and aviation sanctions. 9 In December 1979, shortly after the minority regime 
For more detailed accounts of the regimes as a whole, see the Appendices, which identify the 
following characteristics for each regime: constitutional basis; objectives; scope; actors 
involved in administration, implementation and enforcement; and "notable aspects". 
S/RES/232 (16 December 1966). A year earlier the Council had imposed voluntary sanctions 
upon Southern Rhodesia, calling upon all States to impose diplomatic, arms and oil sanctions 
against the illegal regime. See: SIRES/2l7 (20 November 1965), operative paragraphs 6 (calling 
upon all States not to recognize the illegal regime nor entertain diplomatic relation with it), 8 
(calling upon all States to desist from providing the illegal regime with arms, equipment and 
military material, and to break off economic relations, including by imposing an embargo on oil 
and petroleum products). 
See, e.g., SIRES/232 (16 December 1966), preambular paragraph 2; SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), 
preambular paragraph 3 and operative paragraph 3; S/RES/277 (18 March 1970), operative 
paragraph 9; SIRES/288 (17 November 1970), operative paragraph 2; SIRES/326 (2 February), 
operative paragraph 4; SIRES/423 (14 March 1978), in general. 
See, e.g., S/RES/232 (16 December 1966), operative paragraph 4; S/RE51253 (29 May 1968), 
preambular paragraphs 7, 8, operative paragraph 2; SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), preambular 
paragraph 5, operative paragraph 4; S/RES/288 (17 November 1970), preambular paragraph 4, 
operative paragraph 2; SIRES/3l8 (28 July 1972), operative paragraphs 1, 2; S/RES/326 (2 
February), preambular paragraph 3; SIRES/328 (10 March 1973), preambular paragraph 7, 
operative paragraph 3; SIRES/386 (17 March 1976), preambular paragraph 4; S/RES/403 (14 
January 1977), preambular paragraph 3; S/'RES/424 (17 March 1978), preambular paragraph 4; 
SIRES/445 (8 March 1979), preambular paragraph 8; SIRES/448 (30 April 1979), preambular 
paragraph 7; SIRES/460 (21 December 1979), operative paragraph 1; SIRES/463 p February 
1980), operative paragraph 1. 
For discussion of the different types of sanctions applied by the Council in its various regimes, 
see Chapter 7. For the provisions outlining the scope of the Southern Rhodesia sanctions 
92 
5. The Security Council's may and varied sanctions regimes 
relinquished control of Southern Rhodesia and thirteen years after sanctions were first 
applied, the Security Council terminated the Southern Rhodesia sanctions regime. I° 
5.2.2 The South Africa sanctions regime 
The Security Council imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa in 
November 1977," with the aim of restricting the South African Government's ability to 
threaten international peace and security. 12 Among additional goals also articulated by the 
Council while the sanctions were in place were bringing about the elimination of the policy of 
apartheid: 3 the establishment of a democratic society; ' 4 and the enjoyment of equal rights 
by all South African citizens.' 5 Despite many calls to strengthen the sanctions, not least of 
which came from the U.N.'s own General Assembly, 16 the Council did not subsequently 
regime, including relevant exemptions, see: S/RES/232 (16 December 1966), operative paragraph 
2; S/RES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraphs 3-6; SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), operative 
paragraphs 2, 9; SIRES/388 (6 April 1976), operative paragraphs 1, 2; S/RES/409 (27 May 1977), 
operative paragraph I. 
t0 	The sanctions regime against Southern Rhodesia was terminated by SIRES/460 (21 December 
1979), operative paragraph 2. 
For the Security Council resolution establishing the South Africa sanctions regime, see: 
SIRES/418 (4 November 1977), operative paragraphs 2, 4. 
12 	SIRES/418 (4 November 1977), operative paragraphs 1 and 2; SIRES/558 (13 December 1984), 
preambular paragraphs 4, 5. 
13 
 
SIRES/418 (4 November 1977), preambular paragraph 1; S/RES/473 (13 June 1980), preambular 
paragraph 7, operative paragraph 4, 7; SIRES/569 (26 July 1985), operative paragraph 5; 
S/RES/591 (28 November 1986), preambular paragraph 7; S/RES/765 (16 July 1992), operative 
paragraph 7. 
14 	See, e.g., S/RES/473 (13 June 1980), preambular paragraph 7, operative paragraph 4; SIRES/569 
(26 July 1985), preambular paragraph 5, operative paragraph 5; SIRES/59 1 (28 November 1986), 
preambular paragraph 7. 
15 	See, e.g., S/RES/473 (13 June 1980), preambular paragraph 7, operative paragraphs 4 and 7; 
S/RES/569 (26 July 1985), preambular paragraph 5; S/RES/591 (28 November 1986), preambular 
paragraph 7. 
16 	Beginning in 1977, the General Assembly adopted annual resolutions urging the Security 
Council to strengthen the mandatory sanctions regime. See, e.g., AIRES/32/105 (14 December 
1977), Section G, operative paragraph 1; AJRES/33/183 (24 January 1979), Section E; 
A/RES/34/93 (12 December 1979), Sections C, D, F; AIRES/35/206 (16 December 1980), Section 
C; A/RES/36/172 (17 December 1981), Sections B, D; AIRES/37/69 (9 December 1982), Section 
C; AIRES/38/39 (5 December 1983), Section D; AIRES/39/72 (13 December 1984), Section A; 
AIRES/40/64 (10 December 1985), Section A; AIRES/4l/35 (10 November 1986), Section B; 
A/RES/42/23 (20 November 1987), Section C; A/RES/43/50 (5 December 1988), Section C; 
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modify the South African sanctions regime. The sanctions were eventually terminated in 
1994, after free and fair elections had been held and Nelson Mandela had been inaugurated 
as the President of South Africa: 7 
5.2.3 The Iraq sanctions regime 
The Security Council imposed sanctions against Iraq in August 1990, four days after 
that State had invaded Kuwait. I8 The Iraq sanctions regime, which had the initial aim of 
securing Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait° consisted of comprehensive economic and 
financial sanctions.2° The sanctions were retained after the conclusion of the Gulf War, with 
their objectives becoming to bring about the establishment of a Compensation Commission 
to administer reparations claims arising from the Gulf War, and to disarm Iraq of nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons, as well as of anti-ballistic missiles with a range of greater 
than 150 km. In May 2003, after Saddam Hussein's Government had been toppled by 
invading forces led by the United States, the Security Council terminated many of the 
AIRES/44/27 (22 November 1989), Section C; A/RES/45/176 (19 December 1990), Sections B, F; 
A/RES/46/79 (13 December 1991), Section E; AIRES/47/1 16 (18 December 1992), Section D. The 
General Assembly's calls upon the Security Council to strengthen the sanctions regime ceased 
in 1993, when the General Assembly adopted a resolution welcoming the process of transition 
to democracy that had begun in South Africa and lifting the sanctions which it had called upon 
Member States to apply against the Government of South Africa: see A/RES/48/1 (8 October 
1993). 
17 	S/RES/919 (25 May 1994), operative paragraph 1. 
18 	For the Security Council resolution establishing the Iraq sanctions regime, see: S/RES/661 (6 
August 1990). 
19 	SIRES/661 (6 August 1990), operative paragraph 2. 
20 	SIRES/661 (6 August 1990), operative paragraphs 3-4. For subsequent provisions clarifying or 
modifying the scope of the Iraq sanctions regime, including the application of relevant 
exemptions, see: SIRES/666 (13 September 1990); SIRES/670 (25 September 1990), operative 
paragraphs 3-6; SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraphs 20, 23-4; SIRES/706 (15 August 
1991), operative paragraphs 1-2; S/RES/778 (2 October 1992), operative paragraph 1; SIRES/986 
(14 April 1995), operative paragraphs 1-2, 7-10; SIRES/l137 (12 November 1997), operative 
paragraph 4; S/RES/1409 (14 May 2002), operative paragraph 2; SIRES/l454 (30 December 
2002), operative paragraph 1; SIRES/1483 (22 May 2003), operative paragraphs 10, 23. 
21 	S/RES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraphs 8-10, 12, 22. 
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sanctions, whilst retaining a general arms embargo and imposing new, targeted financial 
sanctions against members of the former Hussein regime and their immediate family 
members. 22 
5.2.4 The former Yugoslavia sanctions regime 
The Security Council imposed sanctions against Yugoslavia in September 1991, in 
an attempt to address the conflict that soon led to the dissolution of that State. 23 The regime, 
which consisted of a general arms embargo, 24 was maintained after the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia, becoming a general arms embargo against all of the successor States of the 
former Yugoslavia!' The Council did not make any major subsequent modifications to the 
regime,26 and it was eventually terminated in June 1996 after the signing of the Dayton 
Peace Agreement and the entry into force of a regional arms control agreement!' 
22 	SIRES/1483 (22 May 2003), operative paragraphs 10, 23. 
23 	For the Security Council resolution establishing the former Yugoslavia sanctions regime, see: 
SIRES/7 13 (25 September 1991). 
24 	SIRES/713 (25 September 1991), operative paragraph 6. 
25 	By resolution 727 (1992), of 8 January 1992, adopted after the disintegration of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Council had reaffirmed the embargo and decided that it 
would apply in accordance with paragraph 33 of the further report of the Secretary-General 
pursuant to resolution 721 (1991), such that it would continue to apply to "all areas that have 
been part of Yugoslavia, any decisions on the question of the recognition of the independence 
of certain republics notwithstanding." See: SIRES/727 (8 January 1992), operative paragraph 6; 
S/23363 and Add.1 (5 and 7 January 1992): Further report of the Secretary-General pursuant 
to resolution 721 (1991), paragraph 33. 
26 For decisions affecting the application of exemptions from the sanctions, however, see: 
S/RES/743 (21 February 1992); SIRES/1031 (15 December 1995). 
27 For the resolution providing for the regime's termination upon the effective implementation of a 
regional arms control agreement that was part of the Dayton Peace Agreement, see: SIRES/l021 
(22 November 1995), operative paragraph I. The regime was ultimately terminated upon 
notification by the Chairman of the Yugoslavia Sanctions Committee that the regional arms 
control agreement was operating effectively: see SCA/8/96(4) (18 June 1996): Note verbale from 
the Chairman of the 724 Committee to all States. 
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5.2.5 The Somalia sanctions regime 
The Security Council imposed sanctions against Somalia in January 1992, with the 
aim of establishing peace and stability in that country. 28 The Somalia sanctions regime initially 
consisted of a general arms embargo. 29 There have been no major modifications to the 
regime, which remains in place at the time of writing, but in July 2002 the Council clarified 
that the embargo prohibited the direct or indirect supply to Somalia of technical advice, 
financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities. 30 The Council has 
also outlined a number of exemptions from the regime, for equipment and clothing used by 
humanitarian workers. 31 
5.2.6 The Libya sanctions regime 
The Security Council established sanctions against Libya in March 1992, with the 
objective of ensuring that the Libyan Government cooperated with investigations into the 
terrorist bombings of two international flights — American airline Pan Am's flight 103, over 
Lockerbie, Scotland, and of the French airline UTA's flight 772, over Niger — and 
renounced terrorism. 32 The Libya sanctions regime initially consisted of an arms embargo 
28 
	
For the Security Council resolution establishing the Somalia sanctions regime, see: S/RES/733 
(23 January 1992). 
29 	SIRES/733 (23 January 1992), operative paragraph 5. 
30 	SIRES/1425 (22 July 2002), operative paragraph 2. 
31 	For provisions affecting the application of exemptions from the sanctions, see: SIRES/1356 (19 
June 2001), operative paragraphs 2-4; S/RES/1425 (22 July 2002), operative patagraph 1. 
32 	For the Security Council resolution establishing the Libya sanctions regime, see: SIRES/748 (31 
March 1992). Pan Am flight 103 was destroyed above Lockerbie in Scotland in December 1988, 
resulting in 270 deaths. UTA flight 772 was destroyed on 19 September 1989, resulting in 171 
deaths. For further details relating to these events, see: S/1999/726 (30 June 1999): Report of the 
Secretary-General Submitted Pursuant to Paragraph 16 of Security Council Resolution 883 
(1993) and Paragraph 8 of Resolution 1192 (1998), paragraphs 15, 16. The governments of 
the UK and the US had been investigating the fate of Pan Am flight 103 and the French 
government had been investigating the fate of UTA flight 772, and their investigations had led 
them to suspect that Libyan citizens had been involved in the bombings. See, e.g., S/23306 (31 
December 1991), annex (containing a communiqué from the Presidency of the French Republic 
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and aviation, travel and diplomatic sanctions." It was subsequently expanded in November 
1993, to incorporate financial sanctions, further aviation sanctions, and sanctions against 
particular items used in the refinement and export of oi1. 34 The sanctions were suspended in 
April 1999, after Libya transferred two Lockerbie bombing suspects to the Netherlands for 
trial before a Scottish court." They were eventually terminated in September 2003, after the 
Libyan Government had sent a letter to the President of the Security Council outlining the 
steps taken by it to comply with its obligations under the sanctions regime, including 
accepting responsibility for the actions of Libyan officials, paying appropriate compensation, 
renouncing terrorism, and committing to cooperating with requests for further information. 36 
5.2.7 The sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro) 
The Security Council imposed sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia-Montenegro) in May 1992, in order to induce it to cease engaging in acts of 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stating that the judicial enquiry conducted into the attack 
on flight UTA 772 placed "heavy presumptions of guilt" on Libyan nationals) and S/23308 (31 
December 1991), annex (containing a Statement issued by the United States Government and a 
Joint Declaration of the United States and the United Kingdom, demanding that the Libyan 
Government surrender for trial those charged with the bombing of Pan Am 103 and pay 
appropriate compensation). 
33 	S/RES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraphs 4-6. 
34 
 
SIRES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraphs 3-6. 
35 	The Security Council provided for the possibility that the sanctions might be suspended in 
SIRES/1192 (27 August 1998), operative paragraph 8. The sanctions were subsequently 
suspended when the Secretary-General reported that the conditions for suspension had been 
satisfied: S/I 999/378 (5 April 1999): Letter Dated 5 April from the Secretary-General Addressed 
to the President of the Security Council; S/PRST/1998/10 (8 April 1999) Presidential 
Statement of 8 April 1999. 
36 	The sanctions were terminated in: SIRES/1506 (12 September 2003), operative paragraph 1. For 
the text of the letter itself, see: S/2003/818 (15 August 2003): Letter dated 15 August 2003 from 
the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya addressed to the President of the Security 
Council. 
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interference in Bosnia and Herzegovina.37 The sanctions regime initially consisted of a 
complex blend of economic, financial, diplomatic, sporting and cultural sanctions. 38 The 
sanctions were subsequently modified on a number of occasions. 39 The major modifications 
were designed first to strengthen the implementation of sanctions in order to secure 
improved compliance,'" and then subsequently to relax certain aspects of the sanctions in 
order to reward such improved compliance.41 The sanctions regime against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) was eventually terminated in October 1996, 
after free and fair elections had been held in Bosnia and Herzegovina:" 
For the Security Council resolution establishing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro) sanctions regime, see: SIRES/757 (30 May 1992). The specific objective of the 
sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) was to bring 
about compliance with demands that had been outlined by the Council two weeks earlier, 
including: adherence to a cease-fire; cooperation with the peace process being initiated by the 
European Community; and the effective withdrawal, disbandment or disarmament of all military 
forces operating in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the exception of the United Nations 
Protection Force and the forces of the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. For the original 
text of those demands, see: S/RES/752 (15 May 1992), operative paragraphs 1-5. When the 
Council applied sanctions, it stated that the sanctions would be terminated once authorities in 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) had taken effective measures to 
comply with those deman ds. See: SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 3. 
38 	S/RES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraphs 4-8. 
39 	For subsequent modifications to the regime, including the provision of exemptions, see: 
S/RES/760 (18 June 1992); SIRES/787 (16 November 1992); SIRES/820 (17 April 1993); 
SIRES/943 (23 September 1994); SIRES/967 (14 December 1994); SIRES/992 (11 May 1995). 
ao 	The Security Council made such modifications in November 1992 and April 1993. See: 
S/RES/787 (16 November 1992), operative paragraph 9 (strengthening the application of the 
economic sanctions); S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraphs 15-16, 21, 23-5, 27-8 
(strengthening the application of both the economic and financial sanctions). 
41 SIRES/943 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 1 (suspending the sporting and cultural 
sanctions, as well as sanctions against civilian, non-cargo carrying aircraft and ferries). The 
suspensions were temporary, but they were subsequently extended on multiple occasions until 
the sanctions regime was terminated as a whole. See: SIRES/970 (12 January 1995), operative 
paragraph 1; S/RES/988 (21 April 1995), operative paragraph 1; S/RES/1003 (5 July 1995), 
operative paragraph 1; SIRES/1015 (15 September 1995), operative paragraph 1. 
42 	For the resolution terminating the regime, see: SIRES/1074 (1 October 1996), operative 
paragraph 2. 
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5.2.8 The first Liberia sanctions regime 
The Security Council imposed a mandatory arms embargo against Liberia in late-
1992, in an attempt to bring about the establishment of peace and stability.° The first 
Liberia sanctions regime was applied for almost a decade. Although the Security Council 
frequently called upon States throughout the duration of the sanctions regime to comply with 
and implement the arms embargo,'" thus demonstrating its concern about sanctions 
violations, it did not make any subsequent modifications to the sanctions regime. The regime 
was eventually terminated in March 2001, when the Council replaced it immediately with a 
more extensive sanctions regime, designed to induce the Liberian Government to cease 
providing support to rebel groups in Sierra Leone. 45 
5.2.9 The sanctions regime against the Bosnian Serbs 
In April 1993, following a series of attacks by Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces 
against towns in eastern Bosnia including Srebrenica, the Security Council applied sanctions 
against the Bosnian Serbs, 46 with the objective of inducing Bosnian Serb participation in the 
Bosnian peace plan. 47 The Bosnian Serb sanctions regime initially consisted of 
43 
	
SIRES/788 (19 November 1992), operative paragraph 8. 
44 
	
See, e.g., SIRES/813 (26 March 1993), operative paragraph 9; SIRES/950 (21 October 1994), 
operative paragraph 6; SIRES/972 (13 January 1995), operative paragraph 6; S/RES/1001 (30 
June 1995), operative paragraph 10; S/RES/1014 (15 September 1995), operative paragraph 11; 
S/RES/1020 (10 November 1995), operative paragraph 11; S/RES/1041 (29 January 1996), 
operative paragraph 14; S/PRST/1996/16: Presidential statement of 9 April 1996; 
S/PRST/1996/22: Presidential statement of 6 May 1996; SIRES/1059 (31 May 1996), operative 
paragraph 11; S/RES/1071 (30 August 1996), operative paragraph 12; SIRES/1083 (27 November 
1996), operative paragraph 10; S/RES/1100 (27 March 1997), operative paragraph 9; S/RES/1116 
(27 June 1997), operative paragraph 7. 
45 	For the provisions terminating the regime and establishing the second Liberia sanctions 
regime, see: SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraphs 1 (terminating the first Liberia 
sanctions regime), 5-7 (imposing the second Liberia sanctions regime). For details relating to 
the second Liberia sanctions regime, see summary R, below. 
46 S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 12. 
47 SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraphs 10 and 31. 
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comprehensive sanctions. 48 The implementation of the sanctions was subsequently 
strengthened in September 1994, with the imposition of additional targeted economic, 
financial and travel sanctions.49 The sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs were suspended on 
27 February 1996, after the Security Council was informed that Bosnian Serb forces had 
withdrawn from the zones of separation established in the Peace Agreement s° The regime 
was ultimately terminated in October 1996, once free and fair elections had been held in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 51 
5.2.10 The Haiti sanctions regime 
The Security Council imposed sanctions against Haiti in June 1993, in order to bring 
about the reinstatement of the democratically-elected government of President Jean- 
Bertrand Aristide.52 The Haiti sanctions regime initially consisted of targeted petroleum, arms 
48 	 S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 12 (deciding that "import to, export from, and 
transshipment through ... areas under the control of the Bosnian Serb forces, with the 
exception of essential humanitarian supplies, including medical supplies and foodstuffs 
distributed by international humanitarian agencies, shall be permitted only with the proper 
authorization from ... the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina"). Although 
the Council did not explicitly articulate the items for which import to, export from and 
transshipment through the areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb 
forces would be prohibited, it is likely, considering the Council's previous practice in relation 
to the sanctions regimes against Southern Rhodesia, Iraq and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), that the intention was to prohibit transshipment of products 
and commodities. 
49 	S/RES/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraphs 7, 11-15. 
50 	S/1996/946 (15 November 1996), annex: Final Report of the Security Council Committee 
established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia, paragraph 4(h) 
(referring to letters that the 724 Committee had sent to States and international organizations: 
SCA/8/96(2); SCA/8/96(2-1)). In November 1995 the Council had provided for the possibility 
that the sanctions might be suspended if Bosnian Serb forces withdrew behind zones of 
separation established in the Bosnia Peace Agreement and implemented their obligations under 
that Agreement. See: S/RES/1022 (22 November 1995, operative paragraphs 2, 3. 
51 SIRES/l074 (1 October 1996), operative paragraph 2. The Council had decided that the 
sanctions regime would be terminated upon the occurrence of free and fair elections the 
previous November. See: SIRES/1022 (22 November 1995), operative paragraph 4. 
52 	For the Security Council resolution establishing the Haiti sanctions regime, see: SIRES/841 (15 
June 1993). 
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and financial sanctions. 53  It was suspended for a short period from 27 August to 13 October 
1993, when it appeared that the de facto authorities in Haiti were complying with the 
Council's demands to implement two peace agreements — "the Governor's Island 
Agreement" and "the New York Pact". 54 Sanctions were reimposed, however, once it 
became dear that the compliance of the de facto authorities had been only partial and 
temporary." In May 1994 the Council strengthened the sanctions considerably, imposing 
comprehensive economic sanctions and targeted aviation and travel sanctions." At the end 
of September 1994, the Council decided that the sanctions would be terminated upon the 
return of President Aristide to Haiti. 57 They thus terminated on October 15 th , 1996, after 
President Aristide's arrival in Haiti. 58 
5.2.11 The UNITA sanctions regime 
The Security Council imposed sanctions against the Angolan rebel group the 
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola ("UNITA") in September 1993, with 
the aim of ensuring that it stopped fighting and adhered to its commitments under a set of 
peace accords, entitled the "Acordos de Paz". 59 The UNITA sanctions regime initially 
consisted of arms and petroleum sanctions. ° It was subsequently expanded on two 
53 
 
SIRES/841 (15 June 1993), operative paragraphs 5,7-8. 
54 
 
SIRES/861 (27 August 1993), operative paragraph I. 
55 	SIRES/873 (13 October 1993), operative paragraphs 1-3. 
56 	S/RES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraphs 2-3, 6-8. 
57 
 
SIRES/944 (29 September 1994), operative paragraph 4. 
58 	Early that day the Secretary-General sent a letter to the President of the Security Council 
confirming that President Aristide had returned to Haiti: S/1994/1169: Letter dated 15 October 
1994 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council. The 
Council adopted a resolution immediately, welcoming President Aristide' s return, as well as the 
fact that the sanctions would be lifted: SIRES/948 (15 October 1995), operative paragraphs 1, 
10. 
59 	For the resolution imposing sanctions against UNITA, see: S/RES/864 (15 September 1993). 
60 S/RES/864 (15 September 1993), operative paragraph 19. 
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occasions: in August 1997, when travel, representative and aviation sanctions were 
applied;61 and in June 1998, when financial and diamond sanctions and further 
representative sanctions were imposed.62 In May 2002, after the death of the UNITA 
leader Jonas Savimbi and when it appeared that the decades-long conflict between UNITA 
and the Angolan Government was drawing to a close, the Security Council narrowed the 
scope of the sanctions by suspending the travel sanctions against UNITA officials and their 
families.63 The UNITA sanctions regime was terminated seven months later, in December 
2002, after UNITA had taken significant steps to implement various peace agreements. 64 
5.2.12 The Rwanda sanctions regime 
The Security Council imposed sanctions against Rwanda in May 1994, in an attempt 
to address ongoing violence. 65 The Rwanda sanctions regime initially consisted of a general 
arms embargo against the territory of Rwanda. 66 Although no significant modifications have 
61 
	
SIRES/1127 (28 August 1997), operative paragraphs 45. The imposition of the additional 
sanctions was subsequently delayed tntil the end of October 1997. See: S/RES/1130 (29 
September 1997), operative paragraph 2. 
62 
	
SIRES/1173 (12 June 1998), operative paragraphs 11-12. The date for the imposition of the 
additional sanctions was delayed slightly, until 1 July 1998. See: SIRES/1176 (24 June 1998), 
operative paragraph 2. 
63 
	
SIRES/1412 (17 May 2002), operative paragraph 1. The suspension was for a period of ninety 
days. In August 2002, the Council subsequently extended the suspension twice before the 
sanctions regime was eventually terminated. See: SIRES/i432 (15 August 2002), operative 
paragraph 1; SIRES/1439 (18 October 2002), operative paragraph I. 
64 
	
SIRES/i448 (9 December 2002), operative paragraph 2. By preambular paragraph 3 of the same 
resolution, the Council welcomed the steps taken by the Angolan Government and UNITA 
toward the full implementation of the Acordos de Paz, the Lusaka Protocol, Security Council 
resolutions and other recent initiatives aimed at achieving peace, including: a Memorandum of 
Understanding dated 4 April 2002 [S/2002/483 (26 April 2002), annex]; a declaration on the 
peace process by the Angolan Government [S/2002/1337 (6 December 2002), annex]; and the 
completion of the work of a Joint Commission. 
65 
	
For the Security Council resolution establishing the Rwanda sanctions regime, see: SIRES/9i8 
(17 May 1994). 
66 
	
SIRES/918 (17 May 1994), operative paragraph 13. 
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been made to the scope of the regime, which remains in place at the time of writing, the 
embargo no longer applies to the Rwandan Government.° 
5.2.13 The Sudan sanctions regime 
The Security Council imposed sanctions against the Sudan in March 1996, with the 
objective of inducing the extradition of three suspects wanted in connection with an 
assassination attempt that had been made against President Mubarak, of Egypt, in Addis 
Abbaba, Ethiopia, in June 1995.68 The Sudan sanctions regime initially consisted of 
diplomatic and targeted travel sanctions. 69 It was subsequently strengthened in August 1996, 
to include aviation sanctions." In September 2001 the Security Council took note of steps 
taken by the Government of the Sudan to comply with its demands under the sanctions 
regirne,7I as well as of a collection of correspondence it had received advocating the lifting 
of the sanctions against Sudan. 72 It also welcomed the accession of Sudan to various 
international conventions for the suppression of terrorism, 73 and proceeded to terminate the 
sanctions. 74 
67 	The application of the arms embargo was narrowed slightly in August 1995, from an embargo 
against the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to the territory of Rwanda in general, to 
an embargo against the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to non-Government entities 
in Rwanda or entities in States neighbouring who might forward them to non-Government 
entities in Rwanda. See: S/RES/1011 (16 August 1995), operative paragraphs 7-8, 11. 
68 	For the Security Council resolution establishing the Sudan sanctions regime, see: S/RES/1054 
(11 March 1996). 
69 	S/RES/1054 (11 March 1996), operative paragraph 3. 
70 	S/RES/1070 (16 August 1996), operative paragraph 3. 
71 	S/RES/1372 (28 September 2001), preambular paragraph 2. 
72 	S/RES/1372 (28 September 2001), preambular paragraphs 3-5. 
73 	SIRES/1372 (28 September 2001), preambular paragraph 6. 
74 	S/RES/1372 (28 September 2001), operative paragraph 1. 
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5.2.14 The Sierra Leone sanctions regime 
The Security Council imposed sanctions against Sierra Leone in October 1997, with 
the aim of inducing the military junta which had come to power via a military coup d'etat to 
return control of the country to the democratically-elected Government. 75 The Sierra Leone 
sanctions regime initially consisted of targeted travel sanctions, petroleum sanctions and an 
arms embargo. 76 In March 1998, shortly after the return to power of the Sierra Leone 
Govemment, the petroleum sanctions were terminated. 77 Then in June 1998, the remaining 
sanctions were terminated, but they were replaced immediately by new sanctions targeting 
the former military junta and leaders of the major rebel group in Sierra Leone — the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) — with the aim of re-establishing Government control 
throughout Sierra Leone and of ensuring the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 
into the civilian population of soldiers from those groups. 78 The new sanctions consisted of 
an arms embargo and targeted travel sanctions." The scope of the sanctions regime 
expanded in July 2000, when the Council imposed diamond sanctions. 8° The diamond 
sanctions, which were imposed for a period of limited duration, were extended for two 
additional periods before expiring in June 2003.8 ' The targeted arms embargo and travel 
sanctions remain in place at the time of writing. 
75 	For the Security Council resolution establishing the Sierra Leone sanctions regime, see: 
SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997). 
76 	SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraphs 5-6. 
77 	SIRES/1156 (16 March 1998), operative paragraph 2. 
78 	For the resolution terminating the existing sanctions and imposing the new sanctions, see: 
SIRES/1171 (5 June 1998), operative paragraphs 1 (terminating the remaining sanctions imposed 
by resolution 1132 (1997)), 2-5 (imposing the new sanctions). 
79 	SIRES/1171 (5 June 1998), operative paragraphs 2-3, 5. 
80 	SIRES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraphs 1, 5-6. 
81 	For the extensions of the diamond sanctions, see: SIRES/1385 (19 December 2001), operative 
paragraph 3; SIRES/1446 (4 December 2002), operative paragraph 2. On 5 June 2003, the 
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5.2.15 The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia sanctions regime 
The Security Council imposed sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
in March 1998, after a period of rising tension between Serbian authorities and the Kosovar 
Albanian community and with the aim of fostering peace and stability in Kosovo. 82 The 
"Kosovo sanctions regime" consisted of a general arms embargo. 83 The Council did not 
make any significant subsequent modifications to the sanctions, 84 and they were eventually 
terminated in September 2001, after the Council had determined that the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia had complied with the major requirements connected to the Kosovo sanctions 
regime." 
5.2.16 The Afghanistan/Taliban/A1 Qaida sanctions regime 
The Security Council imposed sanctions against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 
October 1999, with the objective of ensuring that the Taliban surrendered for prosecution 
Usama Bin Laden and ceased providing sanctuary to international terrorists. 86 The Taliban 
President of the Security Council noted in a press statement that the most recent period of 
extension had expired and reported that the members of the Council agreed not to renew the 
diamond sanctions, in light of the Government of Sierra Leone's increased efforts to manage its 
diamond industry and ensure proper control over diamond areas, and in light of its full 
participation in the Kimberley Process. See: SC/7778 (5 June 2003): Press statement on the 
Sierra Leone Diamond Embargo by the President of the Security Council. 
82 	For the Security Council resolution establishing the sanctions regime against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, which had been subject to an earlier sanctions regime under the name 
"the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), see: SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998). 
For discussion of the initial sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia-Montenegro), see summary G, above. 
83 	SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 8. 
84 	For provisions affecting the application of exemptions from the sanctions regime, however, see: 
SIRES/1203 (24 October 1998), operative paragraph 15; SIRES/1244 (10 June 1999), operative 
paragraph 16. 
85 SIRES/1367 (10 September 2001), operative paragraph 1. 
86 For the Security Council resolution establishing the Taliban/AI Qaida sanctions regime, see: 
S/RES/1267 (15 October 1999). 
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sanctions regime initially consisted of financial and aviation sanctions, 87 however the 
objectives, scope, target and geographical application of the sanctions regime have evolved 
considerably since the sanctions were first applied. In December 2000, the scope of the 
sanctions regime against the Taliban expanded, to include further aviation sanctions, as well 
as aims, representative and chemical sanctions. 88 The Council also applied financial 
sanctions against Usama Bin Laden and his associates, including members of the 
organization Al Qaida. 89 On 15 January 2002, shortly after the defeat of the Taliban, the 
Council terminated aspects of the aviation and financial sanctions affecting the operations of 
the national Afghanistan airline, Ariana.9° The next day, the Council revamped the sanctions 
regime, allowing the existing aviation sanctions to lapse, but imposing a new range of 
sanctions - of targeted financial, travel and arms sanctions - against the Taliban, Usama Bin 
Laden, Al Qaida, and individuals and entities associated with those parties." Moreover, the 
sanctions no longer concentrated predominantly upon activities taking place in Afghanistan, 
making the Taliban/A1 Qaida sanctions regime the first U.N. sanctions regime to focus upon 
targets without a specific geographic base. Since January 2002, there has been no significant 
expansion in the scope of the Taliban/A1 Qaida sanctions regime. 92 
87 	SIRES/1267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraph 4. 
88 	SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraphs 5, 8, 10-11. 
89 	S/RES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraphs 8. 
90 	S/RES/1388 (15 January 2001), operative paragraphs 1-2. 
91 
 
SIRES/1390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraphs 1-2. 
92 	In December 2002, however, the Council did provide for the possibility of exemptions from the 
financial sanctions, where such funds, assets or resources were necessary for "basic" or 
"extraordinary" expenses. The Council also permitted States to allow frozen accounts to earn 
interest and receive outstanding payments owed prior to the application of the sanctions. See: 
SIRES/1452 (20 December 2002), operative paragraphs 1-2. 
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5.2.17 The sanctions regime against Ethiopia and Eritrea 
The Security Council imposed sanctions against both Ethiopia and Eritrea h May 
2000, in an attempt to induce them to cease hostilities and engage in a meaningful peace 
process. 93 The Ethiopia and Eritrea sanctions regime, which was imposed for an initial 
period of twelve months, consisted of arms sanctions, including a general aims embargo as 
well as a prohibition upon technical assistance or training related to the provision, 
manufacture, maintenance or use of arms and related materiel." There were no major 
subsequent modifications to the Ethiopia and Eritrea sanctions regime. 95 On 15 May 2001, 
the Council adopted a presidential statement, confirming that the sanctions regime would 
expire the following day. 96 In that statement, the Council emphasized the importance of the 
Algiers Peace Agreement, which the parties had signed on 12 December 2000, 9' 
recognized that the signing of the Algiers Agreement was consistent with the objectives of 
the Ethiopia/Eritrea sanctions regime, and stated that it had not extended the sanctions 
beyond the expiration date of 16 May 2001. 98 
5.2.18 The second Liberia sanctions regime 
The Security Council imposed sanctions against Liberia for the second time in 
March 2001, with the objective of ensuring that the Liberian Government ceased providing 
For the Security Council resolution establishing the Ethiopia and Eritrea sanctions regime, see: 
S/RES1I298 (17 May 2000). 
94 SIRES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 6. 
95 	For decisions affecting the application of exemptions from the sanctions, however, see: 
SIRES/1312 (31 July 2000), operative paragraph 5; S/RES/1320 (15 September 2000), operative 
paragraph 10. 
96 S/PRST/2001/14 (15 May 2001): Presidential statement of 15 May 2001. 
97 S/2000/1183 (13 December 2000), Identical letters dated 12 December 2000 from the 
representative of Algeria addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the 
Security Council, annex. 
98 S/PRST/2001/14 (15 May 2001): Presidential statement of 15 May 2001. 
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support for the Sierra Leonean rebel group the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).99 The 
second Liberia sanctions regime initially consisted of arms, diamond and travel sanctions,' °° 
but its scope subsequently expanded to include timber sanctions and additional travel 
sanctions.' ° ' With the improvement of the situation in Sierra Leone, the objective of the 
regime also broadened, to include the aim of inducing the Liberian Government to cease 
providing support to rebel groups in the region, including in C8te d'Ivoire. 1°2 In December 
2003, two and a half years after it initiated the second Liberia sanctions regime and three 
months after Charles Taylor had resigned as Liberian President and taken refuge in Nigeria, 
the Council terminated the second Liberia sanctions regime and replaced it with a third. 1°3 
5.2.19 The sanctions regime against certain actors in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC) 
The Security Council imposed sanctions against certain actors in the DRC in July 
2003, with the aim of fostering peace and stability and contributing to the implementation of 
the DRC peace process. 1°4 The DRC sanctions regime consists of arms sanctions, requiring 
99 	For the Security Council resolution establishing the second Liberia sanctions regime, see: 
SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001). 
100 	S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraphs 5-7. The arms, diamond and travel sanctions 
were all extended on two occasions. See: S/RES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 5; 
SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 10. 
101 	S/RES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraphs 17, 28. 
102 	In May 2002, when the Council extended the sanctions, it determined that the active support 
provided by the Liberian Government for armed rebel groups in the region, including the RUF, 
constituted a threat to international peace and security: SIRES/1408 (6 May 2002), preambular 
paragraph 11. In May 2003, when the Council again extended the initial sanctions and 
introduced additional timber and travel sanctions, it determined that the active support 
provided by the Liberian Government for armed rebel groups in the region, including to rebels 
in Cote d'Ivoire and former RUF combatants who continued to destabilize the region, 
constituted a threat to international peace and security: S/RES/1478 (6 May 2003), preambular 
paragraph 13. 
103 	S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraph 1. For details concerning the third Liberia 
sanctions regime, see summary T, below. 
104 	For the Security Council resolution establishing the DRC sanctions regime, see: S/RES/1493 (28 
July 2003). 
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all States to prevent the supply of arms and related materiel and the provision of military 
assistance, advice or training, to all foreign and Congolese armed groups and militias 
operating in the territory of North and South Kivu and of Ituri, as well as to groups in the 
DRC that are not party to the "Global and all-inclusive agreemenf ) . 105 
5.2.20 The third Liberia sanctions regime 
The Security Council established a third sanctions regime against Liberia in 
December 2003, with the aim of securing the implementation of a ceasefire and a 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, bringing about the establishment of an effective 
Certificate of Origin regime for trade in Liberian diamonds, and ensuring that the Transitional 
Government of Liberia gained full authority and control over Liberian timber producing 
areas, and that government timber revenues were used for the benefit of the Liberian 
people. 1°6 The new sanctions regime initially consisted of arms, travel, diamond and timber 
sanctions. 1°7 In March 2004, the Council also imposed financial sanctions against former 
President Taylor and his immediate family and former senior colleagues.' °8 
105 	SIRES/1493 (28 July 2003), operative paragraph 20. 
106 	For the Security Council resolution establishing the third Liberian sanctions regime, see: 
S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003). 
107 	S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraphs 2, 4, 6, 10. 
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SIRES/1532 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 1. 
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threats, invoking Chapter VII, and setting objectives 
This chapter contains two main sections. The first section outlines the manner in 
which the Security Council has identified the existence of threats to the peace, breaches of 
the peace or acts of aggression in situations where it has proceeded to apply sanctions. The 
second section describes the different types of objectives for which the Council has applied 
sanctions. 
6.1 Determining the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace or act of aggression 
As noted in Chapter 4, Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations requires the 
Security Council to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, 
or act of aggression and to decide what measures shall be taken, including the application of 
sanctions, in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. Although the 
Council has rarely invoked Article 39 explicitly in its sanctions-related decisions,' it has 
nevertheless made a determination of the type envisaged by Article 39 in connection with 
each of the sanctions regimes established to date. 2 In characterising the nature of the various 
situations in response to which it has been necessary to establish a sanctions regime, the 
Council has almost exclusively made findings of a threat to the peace, making only one 
The Council expressly invoked both Articles 39 and 41 of the Council as the basis for its action 
when it imposed its first mandatory sanctions regime, against the illegal minority regime in 
Southern Rhodesia. See: S1RE51232 (16 December 1966), preambular paragraph 4. 
The provisions outlining the Council's relevant determinations are contained in the analysis in 
sections B-D, below. For discussion of whether the Council must determine the existence of a 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression prior to applying sanctions, see 
section 6.1.1, below. 
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determination of a breach of the peace 3 and no clear determination of an act of aggression. 4 
The following sections analyse the Council's sanctions-related practice with respect to 
determinations of the kind envisaged by Article 39. Section A explores whether the Security 
Council must make a prior determination of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act 
of aggression before imposing sanctions. Sections B, C and D then outline the Council's 
sanctions-related determinations of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, and act of 
aggression. 
6.1.1 The question of whether the Council must make a determination of a threat 
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression prior to imposing 
sanctions 
As noted in Chapter 4, before the Security Council applies sanctions it should first 
determine the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, in 
accordance with Article 39 of the Charter. In practice, however, while the Council has 
made a determination of the type envisaged by Article 39 in connection with each sanctions 
regime established to date, 5 on two occasions it did not do so until the sanctions had already 
been imposed. In its resolutions establishing the sanctions regimes against the Bosnian Serbs 
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, respectively, the Council noted that it was acting 
3 	 The Council made such a determination before applying sanctions against Iraq. See: SIRES/660 
(2 August 1990), preambular paragraph 2. For further discussion of that determination, see 
section 6.1.3, below. 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the Council is yet to make an explicit determination of an act 
of aggression warranting the application of sanctions, it has made a number of references to 
"aggressive acts" and "acts of aggression" by States that were already subject to U.N. 
sanctions, doing s) in relation to both Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. For further 
discussion see section 6.1.4. 
See the discussion in sections 6.1.2 - 6.1.4, below. 
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under Chapter VII and proceeded to apply sanctions, without having made a prior 
determination of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. 6 
From a legal perspective, the Council's failure to make a determination of a breach 
or threat to the peace or an act of aggression prior to imposing sanctions was problematic. 
Did the absence of such a determination render the invocation of Chapter VII, and therefore 
the application of sanctions, illegitimate? Or might it be argued that the invocation of Chapter 
VII de facto amounted to an implicit determination of a threat to the peace? In the case of 
the Bosnian Serbs, the lack of a determination of a threat to the peace might have been due 
to the fact that the sanctions were imposed by a resolution whose primary focus was to 
strengthen the existing sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro)! As the Council had already identified a threat to international peace and 
security in the situation in the former Yugoslavia in general, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
particular, perhaps it did not consider it necessary to make another explicit determination of 
a threat. Another possibility is that, in the absence of an explicit statement that there did not 
exist a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, the Council's 
invocation of Chapter VII might be interpreted to amount to an implicit determination of a 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.' In any event, the Council 
In relation to the sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs, see: S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), Section 
B, preambular paragraph 2 (invoking Chapter VII); SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative 
paragraph 12 (applying comprehensive sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs). In relation to the 
sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to address the situation in Kosovo, see: 
SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), preambular paragraph 8 (invoking Chapter VII), operative 
paragraph 8 (applying an arms embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including 
Kosovo). 
The main purpose of resolution 820 (1993) was to strengthen the implementation of the 
sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro): see SIRES/820 (17 
April 1993), in general. 
For further discussion of this possibility, see the following discussion of the case of the 
sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to address the situation in Kosovo. 
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subsequently made multiple explicit determinations of a threat to the peace in decisions 
connected to the sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs. 9 
In the case of the sanctions regime applied against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia to address the situation in Kosovo, the Council's failure to make such a 
determination can be attributed to the positions of the Russian and Chinese delegations, 
which did not consider the situation in Kosovo to constitute a threat to regional or 
international peace and security. 19 Given that two of the permanent members of the Security 
Council maintained this position, it is puzzling that the Security Council was able to adopt the 
decision imposing sanctions. When it came to the vote, China abstained, thus maintaining 
some consistency vis-à-vis its position on the lack of a threat to the peace." It is very 
difficult, however, to reconcile the Russian position that there was no threat to the peace 
with its subsequent vote in favour of the resolution imposing sanctions. I2 One possible 
interpretation of the legal chain of events in the Kosovo instance is that a decision by the 
Security Council to invoke Chapter VII and impose sanctions must amount to an implicit 
determination of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. ° In any 
9 	 See: SIRES/942 (23 September 1994), preambular paragraph 7; SIRES/1022 (22 November 1995), 
preambular paragraph 10 (each determining that the situation in the former Yugoslavia 
constituted a threat to international peace and security). 
10 	See the Chinese and Russian statements before the Security Council on the occasion of the 
adoption of the resolution establishing the sanctions regime: S/PV.3868 (31 March 1998): 
Provisional verbatim record of the 3868" meeting of the Security Council, 10-11 (Russian 
Federation, contending that although the events in Kosovo had "an adverse regional impact", 
the situation in Kosovo did not constitute a threat to regional, much less international peace 
and security), 11-12 (China, stating that: "The question of Kosovo is, in its essence, an internal 
matter of the Federal Republic"; and observing: "We do not think that the situation in Kosovo 
endangers regional and international peace and security"). 
For the vote on resolution 1160 (1998), see: S/PV.3868 (31 March 1998): Provisional verbatim 
record of the 3868 6 meeting of the Security Council, 12. 
12 	See also the vote on resolution 1160 (1998): ibid. 
13 	The representative of the United Kingdom in fact made such an argument just after the 
Security Council had adopted the resolution imposing sanctions against the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) to address the situation in Kosovo: see S/PV.3868 (31 
114 
6. Establishing the legal basis of sanctions: identifying  threats, invoking Chapter VII and setting 
objectives 
case, the Council ultimately affirmed that the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo did in 
fact constitute a threat to peace and security in the region." 
6.1.2 Threats to the peace 
The practice of the Security Council has not been entirely consistent in relation to 
making determinations of a threat to the peace, whether in terms of the phrases utilized to 
make determinations, or the amount of detail the determinations incorporate. Nevertheless, 
the Council has made a determination of a threat to the peace in relation to each of its 
sanctions regimes: 5 Conceptually, the situations in which the Council Ins determined the 
existence of threats to the peace sufficient to require the application of sanctions can be 
divided into two broad categories' 6 : threats that contain a clear international or 
transboundary dimension; and threats that have arisen in situations of internal crisis: 7 
March 1998): Provisional wrbatim record of the 3868th  meeting of the Security Council, 12 
(contending that, "In adopting this resolution, the Security Council sends an unmistakable 
message: that by acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council considers that the 
situation h Kosovo constitutes a threat to international peace and security in the Balkans 
region"). 
14 	See: SIRES/1199 (23 September 1998), preambular paragraph 14 ("Affirming that the 
deterioration of the situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, constitutes a threat to 
peace and security in the region"); SIRES/1203 (24 October 1998), preambular paragraph 15 
("Affirming that the unresolved situation in Kosovo constitutes a continuing threat to peace 
and security in the region); S/RES/I244 (10 June 1999), preambular paragraph 12 ("Determining 
that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and 
security"). 
15 	Even in the case of the Iraq sanctions regime, where sanctions were initially applied in 
response to a breach of the peace, after the Gulf War the Security Council recharacterised the 
basis for the continued application of sanctions, treating it as a threat to the peace. See notes 
24-26 and accompanying text, below. In addition, as discussed in section A, above, although 
the Council imposed sanctions without a prior explicit determination of a threat to the peace on 
two occasions - in connection with its sanctions regimes against the Bosnian Serbs and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - in both instances it subsequently confirmed the existence of 
such a threat. 
16 	The Council's tendency to avoid explicit articulations of the key factor or factors constituting a 
threat to the peace makes it difficult to categorize the types of situations in which the Council 
has determined the existence of a threat to the peace. In general, the Council tends to outline in 
the preambular paragraphs of a resolution the various circumstances at play in a particular 
situation, before making a simple determination that that situation constitutes a "threat to 
peace and security". The categories used here were chosen after a consideration of the major 
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i. 	Threats with a clear international dimension 
Within the broad category of threats with an international or transboundary 
dimension, the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace in four 
different types of situations: (a) where a State has a history of maintaining an aggressive 
foreign policy, combined with the potential to possess or to produce weapons of mass 
destruction; (b) where a State or non-State entity has engaged in or provided support for 
acts of international terrorism; (c) where two States have been engaged in international 
conflict; and (d) where States have undertaken acts of interference in the affairs of another 
State. 
factor or factors discernable in the relevant decisions of the Security Council as the basis for 
each determination of a threat to the peace. They are not mutually exclusive, as illustrated by 
the treatment of some sanctions regimes in more than one category (for example South Africa, 
Rwanda and Sierra Leone each feature in two or more of the different categories outlined 
below). 
For other attempts to categorize the Security Council's determinations of threats to the peace, 
analysing the Council's practice under Article 39 in general, rather than as specifically 
connected to the application of sanctions, see: Simma, Bruno (ed.), The Charter of the United 
Nations: a Commentary (2002: I'd edition) Oxford UP, 722-6 (using the categories "internal 
conflicts", "violations of human rights and humanitarian law", "violations of democratic 
principles", "terrorism" and "arms control"); Osterdahl, Inger, Threat to the Peace: the 
interpretation by the Security Council of Article 39 of the UN Charter (1998) Justus Forlag, 
Uppsala, 85-6 (noting that the recent practice of the Security Council implied that the following 
categories gave rise to a threat to the peace: "civil wars", "serious human rights crimes", "lack 
of democracy" and "serious violations of international humanitarian law"); Chesterman, Simon, 
Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian intervention and international law (2001) OUP, 
Oxford, 127-62 (using the categories "internal armed conflicts", "humanitarian crises" and 
"disruption to democracy"); Majlessi, Sherwin, 'Use of Economic Sanctions under 
International Law: A Contemporary Assessment' (2001) Canadian YBIL 253-331, 267-9 (using 
the categories "massive violations of human rights that may provoke countermeasures", 
"extreme violence within a State (Civil War)", "non-compliance with international obligations", 
"concerns about the future conduct of a State (measures with respect to armament)" and 
"massive flows of refugees"); and Fielding, Lois E., 'Taking a Closer Look at Threats to Peace: 
The Power of the Security Council to Address Humanitarian Crises' (1996) 73 University of 
Detroit Mercy LR 551-68, 563-4 (using the categories "civil war"). 
17 	The use of the term "internal crisis" does not, of course, preclude the possibility that the 
situation might in fact result in transboundary consequences (as in the case of massive flows 
of refugees fleeing conflict). Interestingly, given the traditional underpinnings of the U.N.'s 
collective security system, twelve of the nineteen U.N. sanctions regimes (a significant 
majority) have been established to address threats arising from internal crises, including the 
sanctions regimes against: Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, 
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(a) 	States with an aggressive history and the potential to possess or produce 
weapons of mass destruction: the cases of South Africa and Iraq 
In the case of South Africa, an important component of the Security Council's 
characterization of a threat to the peace was the combination of South Africa's aggressive 
foreign policy and its attempts to acquire the capacity to produce nuclear weapons. 
November 1977 the Council expressed grave concern that South Africa was at the 
threshold of producing nuclear weapons, I9 and strongly condemned the Government of 
South Africa for its acts of repression, its continuance of the system of apartheid and its 
attacks against neighbouring States. 2° It then noted that it was acting under Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations, 21 determined that, having regard to the policies and acts 
of the South African Government, the acquisition by South Africa of arms and related 
materiel constituted a threat to international peace and security, 22 and applied mandatory 
sanctions against South Africa. 23 
Liberia, the Bosnian Serbs, Haiti, Angola (UNITA), Rwanda, Sierra Leone, the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia to address the situation in Kosovo, and the DRC. 
18 	As discussed below, in relation to the Council's characterization of threats to the peace in 
cases of internal crisis, the South African Government's policy of apartheid and the manner in 
which it denied the majority of its population of their right to self-determination were also 
important background factors leading to the Council's determination of the existence of a 
threat to the peace in the case of South Africa. Although some commentators have contended 
that the international threat posed by South Africa was the decisive factor in the Council's 
determination of a threat to the peace [see, e.g., Simma, The Charter of the United Nations (2'd 
edition), above note 16, 724 (suggesting that the Council's action in relation to the situation in 
South Africa reflected the country's aggressive stance towards its neighbors)], it is unclear 
that the Council would have made a determination of a threat to the peace in the absence of the 
South African Government's policy of apartheid and its repression of the black South African 
majority. Similarly, it is unlikely that the Council would have terminated the sanctions regime if 
the South African Government had renounced its aggressive external policies and made a 
commitment not to pursue any longer its quest to obtain nuclear weapons, without also 
abolishing the policy of apartheid and enabling the right of the majority of its population to 
self-determination. 
19 SIRES/41 8 (4 November 1977), preambular paragraph 5. 
20 SIRES/4 18 (4 November 1977), preambular paragraph 6. 
21 SIRES/4 18 (4 November 1977), preambular paragraph 10. 
22 SIRES/418 (4 November 1977), operative paragraph I. The Council reaffirmed its determination 
of this threat in resolution 421 (1977): SIRES/421 (9 December 1977), preambular paragraph 1. In 
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In the case of the sanctions against Iraq, as applied after the Gulf War, the Council 
referred to the threat posed to peace and security in the area by weapons of mass 
destruction, as well as to the need to establish a zone free of such weapons in the Middle 
East.24 It then noted that it was acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, 25 before reaffirming 
the continued application of the sanctions. 26 
(b) 	International Terrorism: the cases of Libya, Sudan and the Taliban & Al Qaida 
In the case of Libya, in January 1992 the Security Council characterised acts of 
terrorism as a threat to international peace and security, 27 expressed deep concern that 
investigations into the Pan Am and UTA bombings had implicated officials of the Libyan 
government,28 deplored the fact that the Libyan government had not yet cooperated with 
attempts to establish responsibility for the bombings,29 and urged the Libyan government to 
cooperate with international investigations.3° Four months later, after Libya had failed to 
resolution 473 (1980) the Council also characterised apartheid as seriously disturbing 
international peace and security: S/RES/473 (13 June 1980), operative paragraph 3. 
23 	SIRES/41 8 (4 November 1977), operative paragraph 2. 
24 	SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), preambular paragraph 17. This reference to a threat to international 
peace and security raises the question of whether the cessation of Gulf War hostilities also 
signified the effective dissipation of the breach of international peace and security that the 
Council had identified in resolution 660 (1990). If so, then it was necessary for the Council to 
identify an alternative threat to or breach of international peace and security to which the 
continued application of sanctions would respond. It is also possible, however, that the 
Council's affirmation of the thirteen prior resolutions on the situation (SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), 
operative paragraph 1) was meant to signify that the breach of international peace and security 
was continuing. According to such a reading of the situation, the breach of international peace 
and security would not fully dissipate until Iraq complied with its obligations under resolution 
687 (1991). 
25 	SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), preambular paragraph 26. 
26 	S/RES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraphs 20-24. 
27 	SIRES/731 (21 January 1992), preambular paragraph 2. This characterisation was implicit in the 
statement of the Council affirming "the right of all States ... to protect their nationals from acts 
of international terrorism that constitute threats to international peace and security." 
28 	SIRES/73 1 (21 January 1992), preambular paragraph 6. 
29 SIRES/73 1 (21 January 1992), operative paragraph 2. 
30 
 
SIRES/731 (21 January 1992), operative paragraph 3. 
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respond to its requests, the Council stated that the suppression of acts of terrorism was 
"essential for the maintenance of international peace and security"?' and determined that the 
Libyan Government's failure to demonstrate by concrete steps its renunciation of terrorism 
and its failure to respond fully and effectively to the requests of resolution 731 (1992) 
constituted a threat to international peace and security. 32 The Council then invoked Chapter 
VII of the Charter?' before applying sanctions. 34 
In the case of the Sudan, in January 1996 the Council condemned the "terrorist 
assassination attempt" that had been made against President Mubarak, of Egypt, in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia, on 26 June 1995. 35 The Council then called upon the Government of 
Sudan to extradite to Ethiopia three assassination attempt suspects who were believed to be 
in Sudan, and to refrain from assisting, supporting or facilitating terrorist activities and from 
giving shelter or sanctuary to "terrorist elements". 36 In March 1996, after the Secretary-
General had reported that Sudan had failed to comply with the Council's requests?' the 
Council reaffirmed that the suppression of acts of international terrorism, including those in 
which States were involved, was essential for the maintenance of international peace and 
security. 38 It then determined that the Government of Sudan's non-compliance with its 
31 	S/RES/748 (31 March 1992), preambular paragraph 4. 
32 	S/RES/748 (31 March 1992), preambular paragraph 7. 
33 	S/RES/748 (31 March 1992), preambular paragraph 10. 
34 	The sanctions were outlined in: S/RES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraphs 3-6. 
35 	S/RES/1044 (31 January 1996), operative paragraph I. For a detailed account of the 
assassination attempt and of the Ethiopian Government's efforts to achieve the extradition of 
the three suspects from Sudan, see: S/1996/10 (9 January 1996), annex III: Submission by 
Ethiopia to the United Nations Security Council on the assassination attempt on President 
Hosni Mubarak on 26 June 1995 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
36 	SIRES/1044 (31 January 1996), operative paragraph 4. 
37 See: S/1996/179 (11 March 1996): Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security 
Council resolution 1044 (1996), paragraph 31. 
38 	S/RES/1054 (26 April 1996), preambular paragraph 9. 
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requests to extradite the three suspects to Ethiopia, and to refrain from assisting, supporting 
or facilitating terrorist activities as well as from giving shelter or sanctuary to terrorists, 
constituted a threat to international peace and security. 39 The Council then noted that it was 
acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,4° before imposing sanctions against Sudan. 4I 
In the case of the Taliban/A1 Qaida sanctions regime, in October 1999 the Security 
Council strongly condemned the continuing use of Afghan territory, especially areas 
controlled by the Taliban, for the sheltering and training of terrorists and planning of terrorist 
acts, and reaffirmed its conviction that the suppression of international terrorism was 
essential for the maintenance of international peace and security. 42 The Council then 
determined that the failure of the Taliban to comply with a demand it had made in December 
1998 to stop providing sanctuary and training for international terrorists and their 
organizations and to cooperate with efforts to bring indicted terrorists to justice, constituted 
a threat to international peace and security. 43 It then noted that it was acting under Chapter 
VII of the Charter, before proceeding to apply sanctions against the Taliban. 44 In 
subsequent decisions related to the Taliban and Al Qaida sanctions regime, there has been a 
subtle evolution in the Council's characterisation of the threat to the peace. While the 
Taliban regime retained power in Afghanistan, the Council again determined - on two 
occasions - that the failure of the Taliban to comply with the requirements of the sanctions 
39 	SIRES/1054 (26 April 1996), preambular paragraph 10. 
4o 	S/RES/1054 (26 April 1996), preambular paragraph 11. 
41 	S/RES/1054 (26 April 1996), operative paragraphs 3, 4. 
42 	SIRES/1267 (15 October 1999), preambular paragraph 5. 
43 
 
SIRES/1267 (15 October 1999), preambular paragraph 8. The Security Council had made that 
demand in resolution 1214 (1998): SIRES/I214 (8 December 1998), operative paragraph 13. 
S/RES/1267 (15 October 1999), preambular paragraph 10. 
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regime constituted a threat to international peace and security, 45 whilst also reaffirming that 
the suppression of international terrorism was essential for the maintenance of international 
peace and security. 46 Since January 2002, however, the Council has simply reaffirmed that 
acts of international terrorism constitute a threat to international peace and security. 47 
(c) 	International conflict: the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea 
In the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea, in late-January 1999 the Security Council 
expressed grave concern at the escalating arms build-up on both sides of the border 
between Eritrea and Ethiopia. 48 At the time, the Council also expressed its strong support 
for the mediation efforts that had been undertaken by the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU), and in particular for the Framework Agreement which had been approved by the 
OAU's Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution in December 
1998. 49 Two weeks later, after conflict broke out between the two countries, the Council 
stressed that the situation constituted a threat to peace and security 50 and demanded an 
immediate halt to hostilities. 51 On 12 May 2000, after a fresh outbreak of hostilities between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Council stressed that the situation constituted a threat to peace and 
security, 52 and demanded that both parties immediately cease all military actions and refrain 
45 	S/RES1I333 (19 December 2000), preambular paragraph 14; S/RES/1363 (30 July 2001), 
preambulat paragraph 2. 
46 S/PRST/2000/12: Presidential statement dated 7 April 2000; S/RES/1333 (19 December 2000), 
preambular paragraph 7. 
47 SIRES/1390 (16 January 2002), preambular paragraph 9; S/RES/I455 (17 January 2003), 
preambular paragraph 7. 
48 S/RES/1226 (29 January 1999), preambular paragraph 2. 
49 S/RES/1226 (29 January 1999), operative paragraph 1. For the text of the Framework Agreement, 
see: S/1998/1223 (28 December 1998), annex. 
50 S/RES/1227 (10 February 1999), preambular paragraph 4. 
51 SIRES/1227 (10 February 1999), operative paragraph 2. 
52 S/RES/1297 (12 May 2000), preambular paragraph 9. 
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from the further use of force. 53 Five days later, with hostilities continuing, the Council 
determined that the situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea constituted a threat to regional 
peace and security, 54 and, acting under Chapter VI1, 55 it imposed sanctions against both 
Eritrea and Ethiopia. 56 
It is unclear why the Security Council decided to make a determination of a threat to 
the peace in the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea, rather than to characterize the situation as a 
breach of the peace. The existence of hostilities between States would seem to give rise to 
the archetypal instance of a breach of the peace. The same might also be said for the case of 
the sanctions against the former Yugoslavia. Although the sanctions were applied before 
Yugoslavia had dissolved, thus ecplaining why a threat rather than a breach was initially 
determined by the Council, in the post-Yugoslavia environment, with most of the successor 
entities of Yugoslavia recognized as States by the United Nations, it would have been open 
to the Security Council to define the ongoing conflict as a breach of the peace. In decisions 
relating to the application of the aims embargo dating from after the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia, however, the Council reaffirmed on a number of occasions that the situation in 
the former Yugoslavia continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security. 57 
(d) 	Interference: the cases of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia- 
Montenegro) and Liberia 
In the case of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), the 
Security Council expressed deep concern in May 1992 about the rapid and violent 
53 	S/RES/1297 (12 May 2000), operative paragraph. 
54 	S/RES/1298 (17 May 2000), preambular paragraph 13. 
55 S/RES/1298 (17 May 2000), preambular paragraph 14. 
56 S/RES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 6. 
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deterioration of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 58 and made certain demands of all 
parties that were active in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including that all forms of interference 
from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina should cease immediately." Two weeks later, the 
Council deplored the fact that its demands had not been complied with, 6° and determined 
that the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and other parts of the former Yugoslavia 
constituted a threat to international peace and security. 61 The Council then invoked Chapter 
VII of the Charter, 62 before imposing sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serb ia - Montenegro). 63 
In the case of the second Liberia sanctions regime, the precise characterisation of 
the threat to the peace evolved in response to developments on the ground. In March 2001, 
the Council determined that the active support provided by the Liberian Government for 
armed rebel groups in neighbouring countries, and in particular for the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, constituted a threat to international peace and security. 64 It 
then noted that it was acting under Chapter VII of the Charter before imposing sanctions. 65 
57 	See, e.g., SIRES/72 1 (27 November 1991), preambular paragraph 4; SIRES/743 (21 February 
1992), preambular paragraph 5; SIRES/1021 (22 November 1995), preambular paragraph 5. 
58 	SIRES/752 (15 May 1992), preambular paragraph 3. 
59 	S/RES/752 (15 May 1992), operative paragraph 3. The full set of demands included that: all 
parties and others concerned in Bosnia and Herzegovina stop fighting immediately (S/RES/752 
(15 May 1992), operative paragraph 1); all forms of interference from outside Bosnia and 
Herzegovina cease immediately (S/RES/752 (15 May 1992), operative paragraph 3); Bosnia and 
Herzegovina's neighbours take swift action to end all interference in and respect the territorial 
integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SIRES/752 (15 May 1992), operative paragraph 3); the 
Yugoslav People's Army be disbanded and disarmed (SIRES/752 (15 May 1992), operative 
paragraph 4); and all irregular forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina also be disbanded and 
disarmed (SIRES/752 (15 May 1992), operative paragraph 5). 
so 	SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), preambular paragraph 4. 
61 	S/RES/757 (30 May 1992), preambular paragraph 17. 
62 	SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), preambular paragraph 18. 
63 	SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraphs 3-8. 
64 	S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), preambular paragraph 8. 
65 	S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), preambular paragraph 9. 
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In May 2002, when the Council extended the sanctions, it determined that the active 
support provided by the Liberian Government for armed rebel groups in the region, 
including the RUF, constituted a threat to international peace and security. 66 In May 2003, 
when the Council again extended the initial sanctions and introduced additional timber and 
travel sanctions, it determined that the active support provided by the Liberian Government 
for armed rebel groups in the region, including to rebels in Cote d'Ivoire and former RUF 
combatants who continued to destabilize the region, constituted a threat to international 
peace and security. ° 
In these situations, it is interesting that the Security Council opted to determine the 
existence of a threat to the peace rather than a breach of the peace or an act of aggression. 
In each of the cases, the action giving rise to the determination of a threat was clearly of an 
international character. Thus, it would have been open to the Council to determine either the 
existence of a breach of the peace or of an act of aggression. The fact that the Council 
opted to characterize those situations as threats to the peace thus suggests that in future the 
determination of breaches of the peace or of aggression will continue to be considerably 
rarer than determinations of threats to the peace. 
Threats arising from internal crisis 
Within the broad category of threats arising from internal crisis, the Security Council 
has determined the existence of a threat to the peace in the four following types of situation: 
a) Where a racist minority has prevented the majority from exercising its right to self-
determination; b) Where a Government maintains a policy of apartheid; c) Where there is 
66 	S/RES/1408 (6 May 2002), preambular paragraph 11. 
67 	SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), preambular paragraph 13. 
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general civil war, with no entity in effective control of the apparatus of Government; 
d) Where power has been seized from a democratically-elected Government; e) Where a 
Government has been subject to or threatened by the use of military force by a rebel group; 
0 Where there has been a serious humanitarian crisis; and g) Where a Government has used 
oppressive force against a minority, in violation of that minority's fundamental rights, 
including the right to self-determination. 
(a) 	The denial of the right to self-determination by a racist minority regime68: the 
case of Southern Rhodesia 
In the case of Southern Rhodesia, the denial of the right to self-determination by the 
illegal white minority regime was the major factor prompting the Council to determine the 
existence of a threat to the peace. 69 In late-1965, the Council condemned the unilateral 
68 	The term "racist regime" was used consistently by the Security Council in respect of the 
Southern Rhodesian and South African regimes. For some of the many examples of the use of 
this term in relation to the Southern Rhodesian regime, see: SIRES/326 (2 February 1973), 
operative paragraph 3; SIRES/386 (17 March 1976), operative paragraph 6; SIRES/423 (14 
March 1978), operative paragraph 5; SIRES/424 (17 March 1978), preambular paragraph 8; 
SIRES/445 (8 March 1979), preambular paragraphs 7, 9, operative paragraphs 1, 6; SIRES/448 
(30 April 1979), preambular paragraphs 4, 5, operative paragraph 2; SIRES/455 (23 November 
1979), preambular paragraph 8, operative paragraph 4. For some of the many examples of the 
use of this term in relation to the South African regime, see: SIRES/326 (2 February 1973), 
operative paragraph 1; S/RES/473 (13 June 1980), preambular paragraph 4, operative paragraphs 
1, 9; S/RES/546 (6 January 1984), preambular paragraph 3; S/RES/571 (20 September 1985), 
preambular paragraphs 4, 6, operative paragraph 1; SIRES/574 (7 October 1985), preambular 
paragraph 5, operative paragraph 1; SfRES/591 (28 November 1986), preambular paragraph 8. 
69 	Although some commentators have contended that an equally important factor was the 
potential for the spread of armed conflict throughout Southern Africa [see, e.g., Simma, The 
Charter of the United Nations (2" edition), above note 16, 724 (suggesting that the Council's 
action in relation to the situation in Southern Rhodesia was driven in part by concern for the 
danger of armed conflict in Southern Africa)), a close reading of the Security Council's 
decisions suggests that in the case of Southern Rhodesia, initially at least, the external policies 
of the illegal regime were not a significant consideration in the determination of a threat to the 
peace. 
The Council did not refer to the aggressive external policies of the illegal regime in its initial 
resolutions applying and modifying the Southern Rhodesian sanctions regime. In fact, the 
Council did not refer to the aggressive foreign policies of the illegal Southern Rhodesian 
regime in its relevant resolutions until more than six years after the sanctions were first 
imposed. Once the Council did address the illegal regime's aggressive foreign policy, which it 
first did in relation to the regime's actions against Zambia [see SIRES/326 (2 February 1973)], it 
proceeded to adopt a number of resolutions addressing the regime's aggressive external 
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declaration of independence by Ian Smith's white minority," and determined that the 
continuance of the illegal regime constituted a threat to international peace and security." 
More than twelve months later, with the Smith regime still in power, the Council noted that it 
policies against various States in the region, including: Mozambique [see: S/RES/386 (17 March 
1976); SIRES/4 11 (30 June 1977); SIRES/445 (8 March 1979)], Botswana [(SIRES/403 (14 January 
1977); S/RES/411 (30 June 1977)], Zambia again [S/RES/411 (30 June 1977); S/RES/424 (17 
March 1978); S/RES/445 (8 March 1979); S/RES/455 (23 November 1979)], and Angola (see: 
SIRES/445 (8 March 1979))]. Nevertheless, although in several of those resolutions the Council 
portrayed the aggressive policies of the illegal regime as a significant factor in the overall threat 
to the peace [see, e.g., S/RES/411 (30 June 1977), preambular paragraph 8 ("Cognizant of the 
fact that the recent acts of aggression perpetrated by the illegal regime against the People's 
Republic of Mozambique together with that regime's constant acts of aggression and threats 
against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Botswana and the Republic 
of Zambia aggravate the existing serious threat to the security and stability of the region); 
SIRES/424 (17 March 1978), preambular paragraph 8 ("Reaffirming that the existence of the 
minority racist regime in Smithern Rhodesia and the continuance of its acts of aggression 
against Zambia and other neighbouring States constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security"); SIRES/445 (8 March 1979), preambular paragraph 7 ("Reaffirming that the existence 
of the illegal racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia and the continuance of its acts of 
aggression against neighbouring independent States constitutes a threat to international peace 
and security"); S/RES/455 (23 November 1979), preambular paragraph 8 ("Reaffirming that the 
existence of the minority racist regime in Southern Rhodesia and the continuance of its acts of 
aggression against Zambia and other neighbouring States constitute a threat to international 
peace and security")], the significance of those determinations should not be overemphasized 
as far as the Council's oversight of the Southern Rhodesian sanctions regime was concerned. 
First, the Council did not adopt any resolutions explicitly referring to or addressing the illegal 
Southern Rhodesian igime's aggressive foreign policies for more than six years after the 
sanctions regime was established. Second, even when the Council did adopt a resolution 
explicitly addressing the illegal regime's foreign policies, it did not yet characterize those 
policies as a threat to the peace. Rather, it reaffirmed its earlier determinations of a threat to 
international peace and security [see, e.g., SIRES/328 (10 March 1973), preambular paragraph 
4]. In fact, the Council did not explicitly incorporate the illegal regime's aggressive foreign 
policies as part of a determination of a threat to the peace for more than eleven years after the 
sanctions regime was established. Third, the Council's determinations of a threat to the peace 
as being based in part on the aggressive foreign policies of the illegal regime featured not in 
resolutions that were integrally connected with the sanctions regime, but in resolutions that 
specifically addressed the consequences of the illegal regime's aggressive foreign policies. 
Fourth, even when the Security Council did incorporate the aggressive external policies of the 
illegal regime as part of a determination of a threat to international peace and security, the basis 
of the original determinations of a threat to the peace — the existence of the illegal racist 
minority regime in Southern Rhodesia — was mentioned prior to the reference to the regime's 
aggressive external policies. See, e.g.: S/RES/424 (17 March 1978), preambular paragraph 8; 
SIRES/445 (8 March 1979), preambular paragraph 7; SIRES/455 (23 November 1979), preambular 
paragraph 8 (each reaffirming that the existence of the minority racist regime in Southern 
Rhodesia and the continuance of its acts of aggression against neighbouring States 
constituted a threat to international peace and security). 
70 	SIRES/216 (12 November 1965), operative paragraph 1; S/RES/217 (20 November 1965), 
operative paragraph 3. 
71 SIRES/2 17 (20 November 1965), operative paragraph 1. 
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was acting in accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, 72 determined that the 
situation in Southern Rhodesia constituted a threat to international peace and security, 73 and 
applied sanctions. 74 At the same time, the Council also reaffirmed "the inalienable rights of 
the people of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence". 75 In subsequent decisions 
modifying the scope of the sanctions regime, the Council reaffirmed the ongoing nature of the 
threat posed to international peace and security by the illegal minority regime in Southern 
Rhodesia 76 and invoked Chapter VII" and Article 41 78 of the Charter. On multiple 
occasions, the Council also reaffirmed the importance of the objectives of ending the 
rebellion in Southern Rhodesia79 and enabling the self-determination and independence of 
the Southern Rhodesian people. 89 
(b) 	Apartheid: the case of South Africa 
72 	S/RES/232 (16 December 1966), preambular paragraph 4. 
73 	S/RES/232 (16 December 1966), operative paragraph I. 
74 	S/RES/232 (16 December 1966), operative paragraph 2. 
75 	SIRES/232 (16 December 1966), operative paragraph 4. 
76 	See, e.g., SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), preambular paragraph 9; SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), 
preambular paragraph 6; SIRES/328 (10 March 1973), preambular paragraph 4; S/RES/445 (8 
March 1979), preambular paragraph 7; and SIRES/455 (23 November 1979), preambular 
paragraph 8. 
77 	See, e.g., SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), preambular paragraph 10; SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), 
preambular paragraph 7; S/RES/388 (6 April 1976), preambular paragraph 5; S/RES/409 (27 May 
1977), preambular paragraph 5. 
78 	See S/RES/277 (18 March 1970), operative paragraph 9. 
79 	See, e.g., SIRES/232 (16 December 1966), preambular paragraph 2; S/RES/253 (29 May 1968), 
preambular paragraph 3 and operative paragraph 3; SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), operative 
paragraph 9; S/RES/288 (17 November 1970), operative paragraph 2; SIRES/326 (2 February), 
operative paragraph 4; S/RES/423 (14 March 1978), in general. 
80 See, e.g., SIRES/232 (16 December 1966), operative paragraph 4; S/RES/253 (29 May 1968), 
preambular paragraphs 7, 8, operative paragraph 2; SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), preambular 
paragraph 5, operative paragraph 4; SIRES/288 (17 November 1970), preambular paragraph 4, 
operative paragraph 2; SIRES/318 (28 July 1972), operative paragraphs 1, 2; SIRES/326 (2 
February), preambular paragraph 3; STRES/328 (10 March 1973), preambular paragraph 7, 
operative paragraph 3; S/RES/386 (17 March 1976), preambular paragraph 4; SIRES/403 (14 
January 1977), preambular paragraph 3; S/RES/424 (17 March 1978), preambular paragraph 4; 
SIRES/445 (8 March 1979), preambular paragraph 8; S/RES/448 (30 April 1979), preambular 
paragraph 7; SIRES/460 (21 December 1979), operative paragraph 1; S/RES/463 (2 February 
1980), operative paragraph 1. 
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As noted above, an important component of the Security Council's determination of 
a threat to the peace in the case of South Africa was the combination of the South African 
Government's aggressive foreign policies and its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Another 
important factor leading to the characterization of a threat to the peace, however, was the 
South African Government's policy of apartheid, repression of the majority of its 
population, and denial of the right to self-determination. On 31 October 1977, five days 
before it imposed sanctions against South Africa, the Council recalled its earlier calls to the 
South African regime to end violence against its people and to take urgent steps to eliminate 
apartheid and racial discrimination, 81 and noted that it was convinced that the violence and 
repression by the South African racist regime had greatly aggravated the situation in South 
Africa and would lead to violent conflict and racial conflagration with serious international 
repercussions. 82 At the same time, the Council also reaffirmed the legitimacy of the struggle 
of the South African people for the elimination of apartheid and racial discrimination, 83 and 
affirmed the right to the exercise self-determination by all the people of South Africa, 
irrespective of race, colour or creed.84 The Council then strongly condemned the South 
African regime for its repression of its black people and of other opponents of apartheid, 85 
expressed support for and solidarity with those people struggling for the elimination of 
apartheid,86 and made certain demands of the South African regime." 
81 
 
SIRES/417 (31 October 1977), preambular paragraph 1. 
82 	SIRES/4 17 (31 October 1977), preambular paragraph 4. 
83 	S/RES/417 (31 October 1977), preambular paragraph 5. 
84 S/RES/417 (31 October 1977), preambular paragraph 6. 
85 
 
SIRES/417 (31 October 1977), operative paragraph 1. 
86 	SIRES/417 (31 October 1977), operative paragraph 2. 
87 	S/RES/417 (31 October 1977), operative paragraph 3. Those demands included that the racist 
regime of South Africa: (a) End violence and repression against black people and opponents of 
apartheid; (b) Release all persons imprisoned under arbitrary security laws and all those 
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Five days later, when the Council imposed sanctions against South Africa, it again 
called upon the South African Government to end violence against its people and to take 
urgent steps to eliminate apartheid and racial discrimination. 88 While it recognized that the 
military build-up by South Africa and its persistent acts of aggression seriously disturbed the 
security of those States,89 in addition to condemning the Government of South Africa for its 
attacks against neighbouring States, the Council also condemned it for its acts of repression 
and its continuance of the system of apartheid. 9° Thus, although the Council's determination 
of a threat to the peace focussed upon the danger posed by South Africa's acquisition of 
arms and related materie1,91 the Council was clearly concerned by the South African 
Government's internal policies, as well as its foreign policy. Moreover, in subsequent 
decisions addressing the situation in South Africa, the Council characterized the South 
African Government's policy of apartheid as "seriously disturbing international peace and 
security", 92 and reaffirmed the importance of the objectives of eliminating apartheid, 
detained for their opposition to apartheid; (c) Cease indiscriminate violence against peaceful 
demonstrators against apartheid, murders in detention and torture of political prisoners; 
(d) Abrogate bans on organizations and the news media opposed to apartheid; (e) Abolish the 
"Bantu education" system and all other measures of apartheid and racial discrimination; and 
(f) Abolish the policy of bantustanization, abandon the policy of apartheid and ensure 
majority rule based on justice and equality. 
88 	SIRES/418 (4 November 1977), preambular paragraph 1. 
89 	S/RES/418 (4 November 1977), preambular paragraph 2. 
90 	S/RES/418-(4 November 1977), preambular paragraph 6. 
91 S/RES/418 (4 November 1977), operative paragraph 1 (determining that, having regard to the 
policies and acts of the South African Government, the acquisition by South Africa of arms 
and related materiel constituted a threat to international peace and security). The Council 
reaffirmed its determination of this threat in resolution 421 (1977): SIRES/42l (9 December 1977), 
preambular paragraph I. In resolution 473 (1980) the Council also characterised apartheid as 
seriously disturbing international peace and security: SIRES/473 (13 June 1980), operative 
paragraph 3. 
92 	SIRES/473 (13 June 1980), operative paragraph 3. 
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establishing a democratic society, and ensuring the enjoyment of equal rights by all South 
Africans.93 
(c) 
	
	
General civil war: the cases of the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Liberia and 
Rwanda 
The Security Council has applied sanctions to address situations of general civil war, 
where no single entity is effectively exercising the powers of government, in the cases of the 
former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Liberia and Rwanda. 
In the case of the former Yugoslavia, in September 1991 the Council stated that it 
was deeply concerned by the fighting in Yugoslavia, which was "causing a heavy loss of 
human life and material damage," and by "the consequences for the countries of the 
• 	13 94 region . The Council then expressed concern that the continuation of the situation in 
Yugoslavia constituted a threat to international peace and security, 95 and invoked Chapter 
93 
	
For statements regarding the importance to international peace and security of eliminating 
apartheid, see: SIRES/4 18 (4 November 1977), preambular paragraph 1; SIRES/424 (17 March 
1978), preambular paragraph 7 (stating that the Council was "conscious that the liberation of 
Zimbabwe and Namibia and the elimination of apartheid in South Africa were necessary for the 
attainment of justice and lasting peace in the region and in the furtherance of international 
peace and security"); S/RES/473 (13 June 1980), preambular paragraph 7, operative paragraph 4, 
7; SIRES/569 (26 July 1985), operative paragraph 5; SIRES/59 1 (28 November 1986), preambular 
paragraph 7; S/RES/765 (16 July 1992), operative paragraph 7. 
For statements regarding the importance of establishing a democratic society in South Africa, 
see: See, e.g., SIRES/473 (13 June 1980), preambular paragraph 7, operative paragraph 4; 
S/RES/569 (26 July 1985), preambular paragraph 5, operative paragraph 5; SIRES/591 (28 
November 1986), preambular paragraph 7. 
For statements regarding the importance of the enjoyment of equal rights by all South 
Africans, see: SIRES/473 (13 June 1980), preambular paragraph 7, operative paragraphs 4 and 7; 
S/RES/569 (26 July 1985), preambular paragraph 5; SIRES/591 (28 November 1986), preambular 
paragraph 7. 
94 	S/RES/713 (25 September 1991), preambular paragraph 3. 
95 	S/RES/713 (25 September 1991), preambular paragraph 4. 
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VII of the Charter before imposing an embargo upon the delivery of weapons arxi military 
equipment to Yugoslavia.96 
In the case of Somalia, in January 1992 the Security Council expressed alarm at the 
rapid deterioration of the situation in Somalia, as well as at the heavy loss of human life and 
widespread material damage resulting fom conflict, and expressed its awareness of the 
potential consequences of the conflict for stability and peace in the region. 97 The Council 
then expressed concern that the continuation of the situation constituted a threat to 
international peace and security," and invoked Chapter VII of the Charter before imposing 
an arms embargo against Somalia. 99 
In the case of the first Liberia sanctions regime, in November 1992 the Security 
Council reaffirmed its belief that a particular peace agreement offered the best framework 
96 The invocation of Chapter VII appeared in the same operative paragraph by which the Council 
imposed the embargo: see SIRES/713 (25 September 1991), operative paragraph 6. When the 
embargo was first imposed, the international community had not yet acknowledged the break-
up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). In resolution 713 (1991), the Council 
therefore applied the arms embargo against the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 
general. It was not until resolution 752 (1992) that Council resolutions began to refer to "the 
former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia": see, e.g.: SIRES/752 (15 May 1992), 
preambular paragraph 3, operative paragraph 6; S/RES/757 (30 May 1992), preambular 
paragraphs 2, 10, 17. Upon the break-up of Yugoslavia the embargo remained in place, 
subsequently applying to all the States of the former Yugoslavia: see S/RES/727 (8 January 
1992), operative paragraph 6 (reaffirming that the embargo applied to all the States of the former 
Yugoslavia, in accordance with the interpretation provided by the Secretary-General in his 
further report pursuant to Security Council resolution 721 (1991). For the relevant part of that 
report, see: 5/23363 and Add. I (5 and 7 January 1992), paragraph 33). 
The Council's decision to apply sanctions against the SFRY might be interpreted as a 
movement away from the traditional approach to the operation of Chapter VII, likely held by the 
framers of the Charter, which viewed conventional State versus State conflict as the type of 
breach of or threat to peace and security that would require the application of Article 41 or 
Article 42 measures. Although the Council identified the potential threat posed to other States 
in the region by the conflict in the SFRY (see note 95, above), the application of sanctions 
against the SFRY implicitly acknowledged that conflicts traditionally viewed as "internal" and 
therefore beyond the scope of Chapter VII intervention could in fact pose a threat to 
international peace and security. 
97 
 
SIRES/733 (23 January 1992), preambular paragraph 3. 
98 SIRES/733 (23 January 1992), preambular paragraph 4. 
99 	The invocation of Chapter VII appeared in the same operative paragraph by which the Council 
imposed the embargo: see SIRES/733 (23 January 1992), operative paragraph 5. 
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for a peaceful resolution of the Liberian conflict.'" The Council then expressed regret that 
the parties to the conflict had not respected or implemented that agreement, m1 determined 
that the deterioration of the situation in Liberia constituted a threat to international peace and 
security, 1°2 and invoked Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter before imposing sanctions against 
Liberia.' °3 
In the case of Rwanda, in May 1994 the Security Council strongly condemned the 
ongoing violence in Rwanda, 1°4 and expressed its deep concern that the consequences of 
the violence in Rwanda, including the internal displacement of a significant percentage of the 
Rwandan population and the massive exodus of refugees, constituted a humanitarian crisis of 
"enormous proportions".'" Noting that it was deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the 
human suffering caused by the conflict, 106 the Council determined that the situation in 
Rwanda constituted a threat to peace and security in the region, 1°7 and invoked Chapter VII 
of the Charter,'" before imposing sanctions against Rwanda.'" 
(d) 
	
	Seizure of power from a democratically-elected Government: the cases of 
Haiti and Sierra Leone 
In the case of the sanctions against Haiti, in June 1993 the Security Council received 
a letter from the representative of Haiti to the United Nations, requesting that it make 
100 	SIRES/788 (19 November 1992), preambular paragraph 2. The Yamoussoukro IV Agreement, of 
30 October 1991, had endeavoured to create the conditions necessary for the holding of free 
and fair elections. For details, see: S/24815 (17 November 1992), annex. 
101 	SIRES/788 (19 November 1992), preambular paragraph 4. 
102 	SIRES/788 (19 November 1992), preambular paragraph 5. 
103 	S/RES/788 (19 November 1992), operative paragraph 8. 
104 	SIRES/918 (17 May 1994), preambular paragraph 5. 
105 	SIRES/91 8 (17 May 1994), preambular paragraph 8. 
106 	S/RES/918 (17 May 1994), preambular paragraph 18. 
107 	S/RES/918 (17 May 1994), section B, preambular paragraph I. 
108 	S/RES/918 (17 May 1994), section B, preambular paragraph 2. 
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universal and mandatory the trade embargo against Haiti which had been recommended by 
the Organization of American States (OAS). HO In response, the Council expressed its 
strong support for the efforts made by the U.N. Secretary-General, the OAS Secretary-
General and the international community to reach a political solution to the crisis in Haiti," 
noted with concern the incidence of humanitarian crises, including mass displacements of 
population, becoming or aggravating threats to international peace and security, 112 and 
stated that it deplored the fact that the legitimate Government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide had 
not been reinstated.' 13 The Council then considered that the request from the representative 
of Haiti warranted "exceptional" measures by the Council in support of the efforts that had 
already been take to resolve the situation within the OAS framework,"" and it determined 
that, in those "unique and exceptional circumstances", the continuation of the situation in 
Haiti threatened international peace and security in the region. ' 15 The Council then noted that 
it was acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, 116 and imposed sanctions against the de 
facto authorities in Haiti. ' 17 
In the case of Sierra Leone, in October 1997 the Security Council recalled its earlier 
statements condemning the military coup that had taken place in Sierra Leone on 25 May 
109 
 
SIRES/918 (17 May 1994), operative paragraph 13. 
S/25958 (16 June 1993): Letter dated 7 June 1993 from the Representative of Haiti addressed 
to the President of the Security Council. 
Il 	SIRES/84 1 (16 June 1993), preambular paragraph 6. 
112 	SIRES/841 (16 June 1993), preambular paragraph 9. 
113 
 
SIRES/841 (16 June 1993), preambular paragraph 10. 
114 	SIRES/84 1 (16 June 1993), preambular paragraph 13. 
115 	SIRES/841 (16 June 1993), preambular paragraph 14. 
116 	SIRES/841 (16 June 1993), preambular paragraph 15. 
117 	S/RES/84 1 (16 June 1993), operative paragraphs 5,6 and 8. 
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1996, 118 and deplored the fact that the military junta had not taken steps to allow the 
restoration of the democratically-elected Government and a return to constitutional order. 119 
The Council then expressed its grave concern at the continued violence and loss of life in 
Sierra Leone following the military coup, at the deteriorating humanitarian conditions in that 
country, and at the consequences for neighbouring countries. 120 The Council then 
determined that the situation in Sierra Leone constituted a threat to international peace and 
security in the region, 121 and invoked Chapter VII of the Charter before imposing 
sanctions . 122 
(e) 	The use or threat of military force by rebel groups against a Government: the 
cases of the Bosnian Serbs, Angola (UNITA), Sierra Leone and the DRC 
The Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace in several 
situations where aimed rebel groups have used or threatened to use military force against a 
Government, including in the cases of the Bosnian Serbs, UMTA, Sierra Leone and the 
DRC. The objectives of sanctions applied to address such a threat have generally been to 
induce the rebel group to engage in a peace process, including through the disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration of rebel troops into civilian population. 
118 	S/RES/1132 (8 October 1997), preambular paragraph I. Those statements had taken the form of 
three presidential statements: S/PRST/29 (27 May 1996): Presidential statement of 27 May 
1996; S/PRST/36 (11 July 1996): Presidential statement of 11 July 1996; and S/PRST/42 (6 
August 1997): Presidential statement of 6 August 1997. 
119 	S/RES/1132 (8 October 1997), preambular paragraph 7. 
120 	SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), preambular paragraph 8. 
121 	SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), preambular paragraph 9. 
122 	S/RES/1132 (8 October 1997), preambular paragraph 10. The major objective of the Sierra Leone 
sanctions regime was achieved on 10 March 1998, with the return to power of the 
democratically-elected Government. The initial sanctions were subsequently terminated, but 
were replaced immediately by new sanctions. The basis of the threat to the peace for the 
application of the subsequent sanctions therefore shifted to the threat posed to a legitimate 
Government by a rebel group. For further details, see the discussion below in the section 
addressing the Council's determinations of threats to the peace in situations where internal 
crises are caused by the use or threat of military force against a Government by rebel groups. 
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In the case of the sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs, on 17 April 1993 the 
Security Council expressed grave concern at the refusal of the Bosnian Serb party to 
participate in the Bosnian peace plan, I23 expressed determination to strengthen the 
implementation of its earlier relevant resolutions, I24 and noted that it was acting under 
Chapter VII, 125 before imposing sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs. 126 As noted above, 
the Council did not make an explicit determination of a threat to or breach of international 
peace and security before imposing the sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs. 127 It did make 
such a determination in September 1994, however, when it strengthened the sanctions 
against the Bosnian Serbs. At that time, the Council reaffirmed the need for a lasting peace 
settlement to be signed and implemented in good faith by all the Bosnian parties, 128 and 
noted that it viewed the measures it was about to impose as a means towards the end of 
producing a negotiated settlement to the conflict. 129 The Council then determined that the 
situation in the former Yugoslavia continued to constitute a threat to international peace and 
securitym and invoked Chapter VII of the Charter, 131 before strengthening the sanctions. 
In the case of the sanctions against UNITA, in September 1993 the Security 
Council expressed grave concern at the continuing deterioration of the political and military 
123 	S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 3. 
124 	S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), Section B, preambular paragraph 1. 
125 	S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), Section B, preambular paragraph 2. 
126 	S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 12. 
127 	For further discussion of the reasons why the Security Council might not have made such a 
determination and analysis of the potential consequences of a failure to make such a 
determination, see notes 7-9 and accompanying text, above. 
128 	S/RES1942 (23 September 1994), preambular paragraph 4. 
129 	S/RES/942 (23 September 1994), preambular paragraph 5. 
130 	S/RES/942 (23 September 1994), preambular paragraph 7. 
131 SIRES/942 (23 September 1994), preambular paragraph 8; S/RES/1022 (22 November 1995), 
preambular paragraph 11; S/RES/1074 (1 October 1996), preambular paragraph 9. 
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situation in Angola: 32 and strongly condemned UNITA for not having taken the necessary 
steps to comply with its previous demands to respect the results of the election that had 
been held in September 1992 and to cease its military actions immediately. 133 The Council 
then determined that, as a result of UNITA's military actions, the situation in Angola 
constituted a threat to international peace and security: 34 and it noted that it was acting 
under Chapter VII of the Charter: 35 before imposing sanctions against UNITA. 
In the case of Sierra Leone, upon the return to power of the Sierra Leone 
Government the basis of the threat to the peace shifted subtly from the seizure of power 
from a democratically-elected Government to the use or threat of military force by a rebel 
group against a legitimate Government: 36 Although the Council has not explicitly 
acknowledged this shift in its resolutions,' 37 the change can nevertheless be inferred from 
132 	SIRES/864 (15 September 1993), preambular paragraph 3. 
133 	51RES1864 (15 September 1993), section B, preambular paragraph 1. Those demands included 
that UNITA respect the results of the election that had been held on 29 and 30 September 1992 
and that it cease its military actions. See, e.g.: S/RES/804 (29 January 1993), operative paragraph 
3 (demanding that the parties cease fire immediately and restore a meaningful dialogue on a 
clear timetable for the implementation of the Accords); S/RES/811 (12 March 1993), operative 
paragraph 2 (demanding that UNITA accept unreservedly the results of the elections and abide 
fully by the Acordos de Paz), operative paragraph 3 (strongly demanding an immediate cease-
fire throughout the country and the resumption of dialogue); SIRES/834 (1 June 1993), 
operative paragraph 3 (reiterating the demand that UNITA accept unreservedly the results of 
the election); SIRES/851, operative paragraph 4 (reiterating the demand that UNITA accept the 
results of the election), operative paragraph 5 (condemning UNITA for its continuing military 
actions and demanding that they cease). 
134 	S/RES/864 (15 September 1993), section B, preambular paragraph 4. 
135 
 
SIRES/864 (15 September 1993), section B, preambular paragraph 5. 
136 	The Government was returned to power on 10 March 1998. The Security Council welcomed that 
development in resolution 1156 (1998): SIRES/1156 (16 March 1998), operative paragraph 1. For 
the resolutions modifying the Sierra Leone sanctions regime after the Government regained 
power, see: SIRES/1156 (16 March 1998); SIRES/1171 (5 June 1998); SIRES/1299 (19 May 2000); 
SIRES/1306 (5 July 2000); S/RES/1385 (19 December 2001); SIRES/1446 (4 December 2002). 
137 	In its first resolution maintaining the sanctions regime after the Government's return to power, 
the Council invoked Chapter VII of the Charter, but did not make an explicit determination of a 
threat to the peace. See: S/RES/I 171 (5 June 1998), preambular paragraph 4. In subsequent 
resolutions modifying the sanctions regime, the Council did determine explicitly that the 
situation in Sierra Leone continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security in 
the region,'" but without articulating clearly the basis for such a determination. See, e.g., 
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multiple statements by the Council that the objective of the sanctions regime subsequent to 
the restoration to power of the Sierra Leone Government was the re-establishment 
throughout Sierra Leone of Government control, as well as the disarmament, demobilization 
and reintegration of rebel forces, including led by the former military junta and the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF). 138 
In the case of the DRC, in July 2003 the Security Council welcomed the conclusion 
of the Global and All Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the DRC, 139 whilst expressing 
deep concern at the continuation of hostilities in the eastern part of the DRC, particularly in 
North and South Kivu and Ituri, and by the grave violations of human rights and international 
humanitarian law that accompanied those hostilities.'" The Council then noted that the 
situation in the DRC continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the 
region,'" and stated that it was acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, 142 before imposing 
the sanctions.' 43 
Serious humanitarian crises 
In a number of the situations already treated above, the Security Council has 
identified a serious humanitarian crisis as part of the background circumstances at play in a 
SIRES/1306 (5 July 2000), preambular paragraph 4; SIRES/1385 (19 December 2001), preambular 
paragraph 9; S/RES/1446 (4 December 2002), preambular paragraph 9. 
138 See, e.g., SIRES/I171 (5 June 1998), operative paragraph 7; SIRES/I306 (5 July 2000), operative 
paragraph 6; SIRES/1385 (19 December 2001), operative paragraph 3; SIRES/l446 (4 December 
2002), operative paragraph 2 
139 	S/RES/1493 (28 July 2003), preambular paragraph 5. 
140 S/RES/I493 (28 July 2003), preambular paragraph 6. 
141 	SIRES/1493 (28 July 2003), preambular paragraph 11. The Council had originally made a 
determination of a threat to the peace an early resolution relating to the mandate of the United 
Nations Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC). See: SIRES/1291, preambular paragraph 
20 (determining that the situation in the DRC constituted a threat to international peace and 
security in the region). 
142 SIRES/1493 (28 July 2003), preambular paragraph 12. 
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situation that ultimately led to a determination of a threat to the peace. This was especially 
evident in relation to the cases of Haiti and Rwanda. 
In the case of Haiti, the Council noted with concern the incidence of humanitarian 
crises, including mass displacements of population, becoming or aggravating threats to 
international peace and security.'" Although the seizure of power from the democratically-
elected Government of President Aristide was an important factor contributing to the 
Council's determination of a threat to the peace, there can be little doubt that the 
humanitarian crisis at play formed another important factor leading the Council to determine 
that, in those "unique and exceptional circumstances", the continuation of the situation in 
Haiti threatened international peace and security in the region. 145 
In the case of Rwanda, the Council expressed its deep concern that the 
consequences of the violence in Rwanda, including the internal displacement of a significant 
percentage of the Rwandan population and the massive exodus of refugees, constituted a 
humanitarian crisis of "enormous proportions". 146 Then, noting that it was deeply disturbed 
by the magnitude of the human suffering caused by the conflict, 147 the Council determined 
that the situation in Rwanda constituted a threat to peace and security in the region, 148  and 
invoked Chapter VII of the Charter,'" before imposing sanctions against Rwanda. m 
143 SIRES/1493 (28 July 2003), operative paragraph 20. 
144 
 
SIRES/841 (16 June 1993), preambular paragraph 9. 
145 
 
SIRES/841 (16 June 1993), preambular paragraph 14. 
146 	SIRES/9 18 (17 May 1994), preambular paragraph 8. 
147 
 
SIRES/91 8 (17 May 1994), preambular paragraph 18. 
148 SIRES/9 18 (17 May 1994), section B, preambular paragraph 1. 
149 	SIRES/918 (17 May 1994), section B, preambular paragraph 2. 
150 	S/RES/918 (17 May 1994), operative paragraph 13. 
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(g) 
	
The violation by a Government of a minority's fundamental rights (including 
the right to self-determination): the case of Kosovo 
In the case of the sanctions imposed against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to 
address the situation in Kosovo, as noted above the Council did not make an initial 
determination of a threat to the peace before invoking Chapter VII of the Charter and 
imposing sanctions. 151 Nevertheless, in the resolution imposing sanctions against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia the Council pointed to certain background factors that might be 
considered to have prompted the Council to apply sanctions. Thus, the Council condemned 
the excessive use of force by Serbian police forces against civilian and peaceful 
demonstrators in Kosovo, as well as acts of terrorism in Kosovo, including by the Kosovo 
Liberation Army. 152 It also called upon the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to take the 
necessary steps to achieve a political solution to the issue of Kosovo through dialogue, 153 
called upon the authorities in Belgrade and the leadership of the Kosovo Albanian 
community to enter into dialogue on political status issues, 154 and agreed that the principles 
for a solution to the Kosovo problem should be based on he territorial integrity of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and should take into account the rights of the Kosovo 
Albanians and all who lived in Kosovo, as well as expressing support for an enhanced status 
for Kosovo, including a greater degree of autonomy and self-administration. 155 
151 	The Council invoked Chapter VII in preambular paragraph 8, and imposed sanctions in 
operative paragraph 8, of: SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998). For discussion of the potential legal 
consequences flowing from the fact that the Council did not make a determination of a threat to 
the peace, see notes 10-14 and accompanying text, above. 
152 	SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), preambular paragraph 3. 
153 	SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 1. 
154 	SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 4. 
155 	SIRES/I160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 5. 
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In subsequent decisions related to the Kosovo sanctions regime, which were not 
directly concerned with the sanctions regime, but which nevertheless recalled the obligation 
of States to implement the sanctions or provided exemptions from the sanctions for actors 
who were mandated by the U.N. to operate in Kosovo as part of the U.N.'s efforts to 
address the situation in Kosovo, I56 the Council ultimately affirmed that the deterioration of 
the situation in Kosovo constituted a threat to peace and security in the region.' 57 The 
Council also expressed grave concern at the indiscriminate use of force by Serbian security 
forces and the Yugoslav army, resulting in numerous civilian casualties, the displacement of 
hundreds of thousands of people, and a substantial flow of refugees, I58 expressed deep 
concern at reports of increasing violations of human rights and international humanitarian 
law,' 59 and reaffirmed its support for a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo problem, including 
an enhanced status for Kosovo, a greater degree of autonomy, and self- adminis 6° 
156 	See, e.g., SIRES/1199 (23 September 1998), operative paragraph 7 (recalling the obligations of all 
States to implement the sanctions); SIRES/1203 (24 October 1998), operative paragraph 15 
(deciding that the sanctions would not apply to equipment for the use of the Verification 
missions established by agreement between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the OSCE 
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and NATO); S/RES/1244 (10 June 1999), operative 
paragraph 16 (deciding sanctions would not apply to arms and related materiel for the use of 
the international civil and security presences it had established). 
157 	See: S/RES/1199 (23 September 1998), preambular paragraph 14 ("Affirming that the 
deterioration of the situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, constitutes a threat to 
peace and security in the region"); S/RES/1203 (24 October 1998), preambular paragraph 15 
("Affirming that the unresolved situation in Kosovo constitutes a continuing threat to peace 
and security in the region); S/RES/1244 (10 June 1999), preambular paragraph 12 ("Determining 
that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and 
security"). 
158 	S/RES/1199 (23 September 1998), preambular paragraphs 6,7. 
159 	S/RES/1199 (23 September 1998), preambular paragraph 11. 
160 	S/RES/1199 (23 September 1998), preambular paragraph 12; SRES/1203 (24 October 1998), 
preambular paragraph 8. 
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6.1.3 Breaches of the peace 
The Security Council has made one finding so far of a breach of the peace requiring 
the application of sanctions — in the case of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. When 
Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August, the Council immediately adopted resolution 660 (1990), 
in which it determined the existence of a breach of the peace, 16 ' and demanded that Iraq 
withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait. 162 Four days later, when Iraq had not withdrawn 
from Kuwait, the Council noted that it was acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, 163 
determined that Iraq had failed to comply with the demands outlined in resolution 660 
(1990),' 64 and imposed sanctions. 165 As noted above, after the Gulf War the basis for the 
continued application of the sanctions shifted from being a breach of the peace to a threat to 
the peace. 166 
6.1.4 Acts of aggression 
Although Article 39 of the Charter empowers the Security Council to take action to 
address "acts of aggression", it does not provide any guidance as to the meaning of what has 
been described as a "very problematical concept". 167 When the Charter was being drafted, 
the question of whether to include a definition of "acts of aggression" was fiercely 
161 	S/RES/660 (2 August 1990), preambular paragraph 2. 
162 	S/RES/660 (2 August 1990), operative paragraph 1. 
163 	SIRES/66 1 (6 August 1990), preambular paragraph 7. 
164 
 
SIRES/661 (6 August 1990), operative paragraph 1 
165 	S/RES/661 (6 August 1990), operative paragraphs 2-4. 
166 For details, see notes 24-26 and accompanying text, above. 
167 Kelsen, Hans, The Law of the United Nztions: a Critical Analysis of its Fundamental 
Problems (1951) Steven & Sons, London, 727 ("Mlle Charter does not define the very 
problematical concept 'act of aggression'"). 
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debated: 68 Ultimately, the founders decided that it would be prudent to provide the Council 
with the flexibility to determine for itself when an act of aggression of had taken place. The 
main rationales for this decision were that a defined list of acts of aggression, even if it were 
inclusive rather than exclusive, might impair the Council's ability to respond to unforeseen 
forms of aggression, and that such a list might lead the Council to treat as less important acts 
not included in the list: 69 As the San Francisco Conference left the phrase "acts of 
aggression" undefined, there was considerable conjecture in subsequent years regarding 
what acts might be said to amount to aggression: 7° That conjecture has dissipated 
somewhat with the contributions made to the endeavour of defining aggression by the U.N. 
168 	For accounts of the discussions concerning aggression at the Dumbarton and San Francisco 
Conferences, see: Rifaat, Ahmed M., International Aggression (1979) Almqvist & Wiksell, 
Uppsala, 105-16 (tracing the treatment of the question of aggression at Dumbarton and San 
Francisco); Hilderbrand, Robert C., Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and 
the Search for Postwar Security (1990) UNC Press, Chapel Hill, NC, 137-8 (noting that at the 
Dumbarton Oaks conferences the British and American delegates were initially opposed to the 
idea of including aggression in Article 39, but that such a reference was included at the 
insistence of the Soviet delegates); Documents of the United Nations Conference on 
International Organization (1945) United Nations Information Organizations, New York, Vol. 
XI: Commission III: Security Council, 17 (containing the comments from the San Francisco 
Conference of the Rapporteur of Committee 3 of Commission 111 (on the Security Council), 
which had been charged, inter alia, with redrafting the provisions of what was to become 
Article 39). 
169 	See, e.g., Hlderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks, ibid, 138 (observing that at Dumbarton Oaks the 
decision was made not to provide a specific definition of "aggression", in order to avoid 
limiting the breadth of the Council's powers, particularly in the face of the advancing 
technology of warfare); Comments of the Rapporteur of Committee 3 of Commission III on the 
Security Council, ibid (commenting on a proposition to define acts of aggression and 
observing: "Although this proposition evoked considerable support, it nevertheless became 
clear to a majority of the Committee that a preliminary definition of aggression went beyond the 
possibilities of this Conference and the purpose of the Charter. The progress of the technique 
of modern warfare renders very difficult the definition of all cases of aggression. It may be 
noted that, the list of such cases being necessarily incomplete, the Council would have a 
tendency to consider of less importance the acts not mentioned therein; these omissions 
would encourage the aggressor to distort the definition or might delay action by the Council. 
Furthermore, in the other cases listed, automatic action by the Council might bring about a 
premature application of enforcement measures"). 
170 	See, e.g., Brownlie, Ian, International Law and the Use ofForce by States (1963) OUP, Oxford, 
UK, 351-8 (discussing, in 1963, potential forms of aggression, drawing upon the relevant 
approaches by different commentators at the time). See also Rifaat's extensive "select 
bibliography": Rifaat, International Aggression, above note 168, 327-34 (Appendix IV). 
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General Assembly's Resolution on the Definition of Aggression"' and the International 
Court of Justice's decision in the Nicaragua Case."2 Nevertheless, while those 
contributions provide the Security Council with useful guidance in determining whether acts 
of aggression have taken place, they do not restrict the Council's discretion to reach its own 
conclusions.' 73 
In light of the founders' reasons for not defining acts of aggression, it is interesting 
that the Council has not made greater use of its flexibility to identify acts of aggression as the 
basis for the application of sanctions. In fact, the Council has only once referred to acts of 
aggression in a resolution applying sanctions, doing so in the case of the South Africa 
171 	A/RES/3314 (XXIX) (14 January 1975), operative paragraph 1 (approving the Definition of 
Aggression, which is attached as an Annex), Annex: Definition of Aggression (containing the 
Definition of Aggression). For discussion of the process leading up to the adoption of the 
Definition of aggression, charting the deliberations of the First through Fourth Special 
Committees on the Question of Defining Aggression, see: Rifaat, ibid, 222-64. 
172 	Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua 
v. United States) (1986) I.C.J. Rep. 14-546, 103, paragraph 195 (stating that the definition of 
aggression contained in Article 3(g) of the General Assembly's Definition of Aggression might 
be taken to reflect customary international law, and proceeding to observe: "The Court sees no 
reason to deny that, in customary law, the prohibition of armed attacks may apply to the 
sending by a State of armed bands to the territory of another State"). 
173 	The Resolution on the Definition of Aggression makes this point crystal clear. See, e.g., 
A/RES/3314 (XXIX) (14 January 1975), operative paragraph 4 (calling the Security Council's 
attention to the Definition of Aggression and recommending that it should "as appropriate" 
take the Definition into account as "guidance" in determining "in accordance with the Charter" 
the existence of an act of aggression), Annex: Definition of Aggression, preambular paragraph 
4 ("Bearing in mind that nothing in this Definition shall be interpreted as in any way affecting 
the scope of the provisions of the Charter with respect to the functions and powers of the 
organs of the United Nations"), Article 2 ("The first use of armed force by a State in 
contravention of the Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression, 
although the Security Council may, in conformity with the Charter, conclude that a 
determination that an act of aggression has been committed would not be justified in the light 
of other relevant circumstances, including the fact that the acts concerned or their 
consequences are not of sufficient gravity"), Article 4 ("The acts enumerated above are not 
exhaustive and the Security Council may determine that other acts constitute aggression under 
the provisions of the Charter"). See also: Simma, The Charter of the United Nations, above 
note 16, 722 ("The GA has provided a definition of the concept of aggression, but this 
definition is neither intended nor able to limit the jurisdiction of the Security Council under 
Article 39. However, the SC might use it as a basis for an own determination"). 
143 
6. Establishing the legal basis of sanctions: identifying threats, invoking Chapter VII and setting 
objectives 
sanctions regime! 74 Moreover, even on that occasion the Council immediately proceeded to 
make a clear determination of a threat to the peace, thus suggesting that the relevant acts of 
aggression formed one of a number of background factors combining to form a threat to the 
peace, rather than constituting the primary reason for the application of sanctions. I75 The 
Council's apparent reluctance in practice to make acts of aggression the primary trigger for 
the employment of sanctions, combined with the fact that instances of aggression can in any 
case be characterized as breaches of or threats to the peace, 176 suggests that sanctions-
related determinations of acts of aggression will continue to be rare in future. 
174 	SIRES/418 (4 November 1977), preambular paragraph 2 (recognizing that "the military build-up 
by South Africa and its persistent acts of aggression against neighbouring States" seriously 
disturbed the security of those States). 
The Security Council has, however, referred to the "aggressive acts", "acts of aggression" or 
"aggression" of targets against which sanctions were already being applied, doing so in the 
case of the sanctions regimes against Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and Iraq. In relation to 
Southern Rhodesia, see: SIRES/326 (2 February 1973), preambular paragraphs 2, 5; SIRES/328 
(10 March 1973), operative paragraph 2; SIRES/386 (17 March 1976), preambular paragraph 3, 
operative paragraph 2; S/RES/423 (14 March 1978), preambular paragraph 3; S/RES/424 (17 
March 1978), preambular paragraphs 3, 6, 8; S/RES/445 (8 March 1979), preambular paragraphs 
5, 7; S/RES/455 (23 November 1979), preambular paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, operative paragraphs 1, 
4, 5. In relation to South Africa, see: SIRES/418 (4 November 1977), preambular paragraph 2; 
SIRES/455 (23 November 1979), operative paragraph 2; SIRES/546 (6 January 1984), preambular 
paragraph 3, operative paragraph 3; SIRES/57 1 (20 September 1985), preambular paragraphs 3, 
4, 6, 7, operative paragraphs 3, 5, 6, 8; SIRES/574 (7 October 1985), preambular paragraphs 4, 5, 
operative paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 6, 7. In relation to Iraq, see: S/RES/667 (16 September 1990), 
preambular paragraph 6, operative paragraph 1. Interestingly, a reference to the Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait as an act of aggression had been included in the original draft resolution for what 
was to become resolution 660 (1990), but it was removed due to the objections of the USSR. 
See: Greenwood, Christopher, `New World Order or Old?: the Invasion of Kuwait and the Rule 
of Law' (1992) 55 Modern LR 153-78, 159. 
175 	For the determination of a threat to the peace, see S/RES/418 (4 November 1977), operative 
paragraph 1. For the provision applying sanctions against South Africa, see operative 
paragraph 2 of that resolution 418 (1977). For discussion of the Council's determination of a 
threat to the peace in the case of South Africa, see section 6.1.2, above. 
176 	Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, above note 167, 727 ("Breaches of the peace' include 
'acts of aggression.' It is superfluous to mention `acts of aggression'"); Dinstein, Yoram, War, 
Aggression and Self-Defence (1994: 2d ed.) Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 283 ("Attempts are 
sometimes made to demarcate an unblurred line between the categories of a breach of the 
peace and aggression. But the Charter (or, for that matter, the practice of the Council) does not 
provide any clear guidance in discriminating between the two expressions. In pragmatic terms, 
as long as the authority of the Council to act in a given context is unassailable under the 
Charter, it is of little consequence whether one stamp or the other is affixed to the measures 
concerned"); Simma, The Charter of the United Nations, above note 16, 722 ("Aggression 
144 
6. Establishing the legal basis of sanctions: identifiring threats, invoking Chapter VII and setting 
objectives 
6.2 Invoking Article 41 and Chapter VII of the Charter 
In addition to making a determination of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace 
or act of aggression, before imposing sanctions the Council generally invokes either the 
specific basis in the Charter of the United Nations for the application of sanctions — Article 
41 — or the more general basis of Chapter VII. Explicit invocations of Article 41 have in fact 
been few and far between, with the Council only referring to that provision as the basis for 
the application of sanctions on a handful of occasions.' 77 In most instances, the Council has 
simply noted that it was acting under Chapter VII of the Charter before applying, modifying 
or terminating sanctions." 8 It is unclear why the Security Council has not invoked Article 41 
presumes the direct or indirect application of the use of force; thus, it always constitutes a 
breach of the peace, too"). 
177 	The Council has made rare explicit references to Article 41 in resolutions connected with the 
sanctions regimes against Southern Rhodesia and UNITA. In connection with the Southern 
Rhodesia sanctions regime, see: SIRES/232 (16 December 1966), preambular paragraph 4 
("Acting in accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter"); S/RES/253 (29 May 1968), 
operative paragraph 9 (requesting all States Members of the United Nations or of the 
specialized agencies to take "all possible further action under Article 41 of the Charter" to deal 
with the situation in Southern Rhodesia); S/RES1277 (18 March 1970), operative paragraphs 9 
(deciding to apply additional sanctions, "in accordance with Article 41 of the Charter") 11 
(requesting all States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies to take "all 
possible further action under Artiole 41 of the Charter" to deal with the situation in Southern 
Rhodesia); and S/RES/409 (27 May 1977), operative paragraph 3 (deciding that the 253 
Committee would report to the Council on the possible application of further measures under 
Article 41). In connection with the UNITA sanctions regime, see: S/RES/1295 (18 April 2000), 
operative paragraph 6 (undertaking to consider by a certain date the application of additional 
measures against UNITA "under Article 41 of the Charter"). 
178 	In general, resolutions applying, modifying or terminating sanctions have included a provision 
noting that the Council was "acting under Chapter MI of the Charter". For the relevant 
references with respect to each sanctions regime, see Table [XX], located in the Appendices. 
For examples of resolutions that have modified or terminated sanctions regimes without 
explicitly invoking either Article 41 or Chapter VII, see: SIRES/460 (21 December 1979) 
(operative paragraph 2, which terminates the Southern Rhodesian sanctions regime, records 
the decision to terminate the measures "taken against Southern Rhodesia under Chapter VII", 
without invoking Chapter VII in connection with the action of terminating the sanctions); 
SIRES/743 (21 February 1992) (providing an exemption — in operative paragraph 11 - from the 
former Yugoslavia sanctions regime for weapons and military equipment for the use of the 
United Nations Protection Force, without specifying the constitutional basis for that action); 
SIRES/l312 (31 July 2000) (providing an exemption — in operative paragraph 5 - from the 
sanctions regime against Ethiopia and Eritrea, without specifying the constitutional basis for 
that action. Interestingly, however, the Council subsequently explicitly referred to this 
resolution after invoking Chapter VII in connection with a provision outlining an additional 
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on a more regular basis, as the invocation of the more general Chapter VII does not appear 
to add anything significant over and above what a more specific reference to Article 41 
would provide. I79 It is understandable that, in instances where the Council makes 
authorisations of the use of military force in a manner that does not appear to have been 
envisaged by the founders of the Charter, it might wish to locate the basis of such action in 
Chapter VII in general rather than in Article 42 of the Charter. In connection with the 
application or modification of sanctions regimes, however, the constitutional basis is so 
clearly located in Article 41 that a general reference to Chapter VII does not provide any 
meaningful additional flexibility or strengthen the Council's hand in terms of the 
implementation of sanctions. 
6.3 Outlining the objectives of sanctions 
As U.N. sanctions are imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations, the general objective of any sanctions regime will be to address the threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression that led to the imposition of sanctions, and 
thus to maintain or restore international peace and security. In addition to that general 
objective, however, sanctions regimes generally possess a more specific objective, or set of 
objectives, the achievement of which should ensure the maintenance or restoration of peace 
and thus lead to the termination of sanctions. Thus, although the specific objectives of a 
sanctions regime stem from the general objectives of addressing the identified threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression and maintaining or restoring international 
exemption from the sanctions regime: see S/RES/1320 (15 September 2000), operative paragraph 
10). 
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peace and security, they are usually more detailed, consisting of particular steps that must be 
taken by the target to ensure that the sanctions are suspended or terminated. 180 
Although the Security Council has not always articulated the specific objectives of its 
sanctions regimes in a methodical manner, it often provides at least an indication of those 
objectives. Such indications usually appear the form of demands made of the target, of an 
expression of the Council's readiness to consider suspending or terminating the sanctions 
upon the satisfaction of certain conditions, or of a statement that the sanctions shall be 
imposed until certain developments have occurred. Analysis of those indications illustrates 
that the Security Council has imposed or maintained sanctions in order to achieve the 
following general categories of objectives: (a) Ending a rebellion, invasion or act of external 
interference; (b) Restoring to power a legitimate Government; (c) Facilitating the exercise or 
179 	Osterdahl, Threat to the Peace, above note 19, 89 ("In the case of non-military enforcement 
measures it is ... difficult to see why the Security Council only refers to "Chapter VII" since 
Article 41 easily covers the non-military enforcement measures taken by the Council"). 
180 As this section is designed to document the manner in which the practice of the Council has 
contributed to the evolution of the U.N. sanctions framework, the focus here is upon the 
explicit objectives of sanctions regimes. In addition to the explicit general and specific 
objectives, however, there may of course be other factors motivating the Council as a whole, or 
certain of its members, to seek the imposition or continued application of sanctions. For 
analysis of the many potential implicit objectives of sanctions, see: Doxey, Margaret P., 
International sanctions in Contemporary perspective (1987) Macmillan, London, 90-97 
(exploring the various potential "motives and purposes" of international sanctions); Doxey, 
Margaret P., International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective (2nd ed. 1996) St. Martin's 
Press, NY, 54-8 (outlining and categorizing the potential goals of international sanctions, 
including U.N. sanctions, some or all of which might be at play in a given sanctions regime). 
The Libya sanctions regime provides one example of which implicit objectives. That regime 
remained in a state of suspended animation for more than four years after Libya handed over 
for trial before a Scottish court in the Netherlands the two suspects for the Lockerbie bombing. 
Eventually the regime was terminated, after the Libyan Government agreed to pay 
compensation to the relatives of the victims of Pan Am flight 103. The payment of such 
compensation had not featured as an explicit objective of the sanctions regime. Thus, although 
it was an important factor in the ultimate termination of that regime, it was not something that 
Libya was required to do by the decisions of the Council. Rather, it was an implicit objective 
pursued by certain members of the Council. For further discussion of the explicit objectives of 
the Libya sanctions regime, see section 6.3.6, below. 
147 
6. Establishing the legal basis of sanctions: identifying threats, invoking Chapter VII and setting 
objectives 
protection of human rights; (d) Bringing about disarmament or arms control; (e) Facilitating 
the establishment and consolidation of peace; and (f) Addressing international terrorism. 
6.3.1 Ending a rebellion, invasion or external interference 
The Security Council applied sanctions with the objective of ending a rebellion in the 
case of the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia. 181 Bringing about the withdrawal of ai 
invading force was a major objective of the sanctions regimes against Iraq and the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro). 182 In the case of the Iraq sanctions, the 
Council also sought to ensure that Iraq paid compensation for liabilities arising from its 
invasion of Kuwait.' 83 Securing the cessation of external forms of interference formed one of 
the objectives of the main objectives of the sanctions regimes against the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) and Liberia (in the second instance)." 4 In the case of 
181 	In the case of Southern Rhodesia, one objective of the sanctions regime was to bring the 
rebellion in Southern Rhodesia to an end. See, e.g., SIRES/232 (16 December 1966), preambular 
paragraph 2; SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), preambular paragraph 3 and operative paragraph 3; 
SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), operative paragraph 9; SIRES/288 (17 November 1970), operative 
paragraph 2; SIRES/326 (2 February), operative paragraph 4; SIRES/423 (14 March 1978), in 
general. 
182 	The aim of ensuring the withdrawal of an invading force formed a major objective of the 
sanctions regimes against Iraq and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro). In 
connection with Iraq, see: S/RES/661 (6 August 1990), operative paragraph 2 (deciding to apply 
sanctions in order to secure Iraq's compliance with the demand that it withdraw immediately 
and unconditionally its forces from Kuwait). In connection with the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), see: SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 3 
(deciding that the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) 
would be applied until that country had complied with the requirements of resolution 752 
(1992), one of which was that those units of the former Yugoslav People's Army and elements 
of the Croatian Army then in Bosnia and Herzegovina be withdrawn, or become subject to the 
authority of the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or be disbanded and disarmed with 
their weapons placed under effective international monitoring: SIRES/752 (15 May 1992), 
operative paragraph 4).. 
183 	In the case of Iraq, after the Gulf War one of the objectives of the sanctions regime became to 
ensure the establishment of a compensation fund to cover the losses incurred by foreign 
governments, nationals and corporations. See: S/RES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 
22 (deciding that the comprehensive and financial sanctions would be terminated once Iraq had 
established a compensation programme and complied with the disarmament requirements). 
184 	One of the initial objectives of the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia-Montenegro) was to ensure that that country ceased engaging in interference in 
148 
6. Establishing the legal basis of sanctions: identibiing threats, invoking Chapter VII and setting 
objectives 
the sanctions regime against Haiti, one objective was securing the departure from the target 
of key players in a coup d'etat. 1 " 
6.3.2 Restoring a legitimate and/or democratically -elected Government to power 
The Security Council applied sanctions with the objective of restoring the authority 
of a legitimate Government in the case of the sanctions regime against Iraq. 186 In the case of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. See: S/RES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 3 (deciding that 
the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) would be 
applied until that country had complied with the requirements of resolution 752 (1992), one of 
which was that all forms of interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina cease 
immediately and that Bosnia and Herzegovina's neighbours take swift action to end all such 
interference: S/RES/752 (15 May 1992), operative paragraph 3. 
In the case of the sanctions regime imposed against Liberia (in the second instance), the major 
objective was to ensure that Liberia ceased interfering in events in neighbouring Sierra Leone, 
by refraining from providing support to the armed rebel group the Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF). See: SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraphs 2 [detailing a number of specific 
goals. Among the more specific goals connected to that overall objective, the Council 
demanded that the Liberian Government take the following concrete steps: (a) Expel all RUF 
members from Liberia and prohibit all RUF activities on its territory (operative paragraph 2(a)); 
(b) Cease all financial and military support to the RUF and take steps to ensure that no such 
support was provided from Liberia or by Liberian nationals (operative paragraph 2(b)); 
(c) Cease all import of Sierra Leone rough diamonds controlled through the Certificate of Origin 
regime of the Government of Sierra Leone, in accordance with resolution 1306 (2000) (operative 
paragraph 2(c)); (d) Freeze funds or financial resources or assets that were made available by 
its nationals or within its territory for the benefit of the RUF or entities owned or controlled by 
the RUF (operative paragraph 2 (d)); and (e)Ground all Liberia-registered aircraft operating 
within its jurisdiction until it updated its register of aircraft pursuant to Annex VII to the 
Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944 and provide the Council with 
updated information concerning the registration and ownership of each aircraft registered in 
Liberia (operative paragraph 2 (e))], 8, 9, 10, 11 (each containing statements to the effect that 
the sanctions would be terminated once Liberia had complied with the demands in operative 
paragraph 2); SIRES/l408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 5 (deciding to extend the 
sanctions and noting that at the end of the period of extension it would decide whether to 
terminate the sanctions, based upon an assessment of whether Liberia had complied fully with 
the demands of operative paragraph 2 of resolution 1343 (2001)); SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), 
operative paragraphs 1, 3, 10, 12, 17 (reaffirming that the objective of the sanctions remained 
achieving the compliance of the Liberian Government with the demands outlined in resolution 
1343 (2001). 
185 See: S/26747 (15 November 1993): Presidential statement of 15 November 1993 (stressing that 
the sanctions would remain ñ force until the objectives of the Governor's Island Agreement 
were fulfilled, including the departure of the Commander-in-Chief of the Haitian armed forces); 
SIRES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 18(a) (deciding that the sanctions would not be 
terminated until certain conditions had been satisfied, including the retirement of the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Haiti Armed Forces and the resignation or departure from Haiti of 
the Chief of Police of Port-au-Prince and the Chief of Staff of the Haiti Armed Forces), operative 
paragraph 18(b) (deciding that the sanctions would not be terminated until certain conditions 
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the sanctions regimes against Haiti and Sierra Leone, major objectives included: the 
reinstatement of a democratically-elected Government (both Haiti and Sierra Leone), 187 
ensuring the return of constitutional order (both Haiti and Sierra Leone), I88 and bringing 
about the restoration of democracy (Haiti). 189 In the case of the sanctions regimes against 
had been satisfied, including the change of leadership of the police and military high command 
in Haiti, as required by the Governor's Island Agreement). 
186 	Restoring the authority of a legitimate Government was one of the objectives of the sanctions 
regime against Iraq. See: S/RES/661 (6 August 1990), operative paragraph 2 (deciding to apply 
sanctions in order to secure Iraq's compliance with the demand that it withdraw immediately 
and unconditionally its forces from Kuwait and to restore the authority of the legitimate 
Government of Kuwait). 
187 	In connection with Haiti, see: S/RES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 16 (expressing 
willingness to consider lifting the sanctions if the Secretary-General reported that the de facto 
authorities in Haiti had signed and begun implementing in good faith an agreement to reinstate 
the government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide); S/RES/873 (13 October 1993), operative 
paragraph 1 (providing that the sanctions, which had been suspended but were about to be 
reimposed, might not be reimposed if the Secretary-General were to report that the authorities 
in Haiti were implementing in full the agreement to rinstate the legitimate Government of 
President Aristide and had established the necessary measures to enable the United Nations 
Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) to carry out its mandate); S/26747 (15 November 1993): Presidential 
statement of 15 November 1993 (stressing that the sanctions would remain in force until the 
objectives of the Governor's Island Agreement were fulfilled, including the return of the 
democratically-elected President Aristide; SIRES/917 (6 May 1994), preambular paragraph 8 
(reaffirming that the goal of the international community remained the restoration of democracy 
in Haiti and the return of President Aristide); S/RES/940 (31 July 1994), preambular paragraph 8 
(reaffirming that the goal of the international community remained the restoration of democracy 
in Haiti and the prompt return of President Aristide), operative paragraph 17 (noting that the 
sanctions would be lifted following the return to Haiti of President Aristide); SIRES/944 (29 
September 1994), operative paragraph 4 (deciding that the Haiti sanctions regime would be 
terminated on the day after President Aristide had returned to Haiti). In connection with Sierra 
Leone, see: SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraphs 1 (demanding that the military 
junta take immediate steps to relinquish power in Sierra Leone and make way for restoration of 
democratically elected Government and a return to constitutional order), 19 (expressing the 
intention to terminate the sanctions when the demand in operative paragraph 1 had been 
complied with). 
188 	In connection with Haiti, see: 5/26747 (15 November 1993): Presidential statement of 15 
November 1993 (stressing that the sanctions would remain in force until the objectives of the 
Governor's Island Agreement were fulfilled, including the creation of a new police force 
permitting the restoration of constitutional order); S/RES/917 (6 May 1994), operative 
paragraph 18(e) (deciding that the sanctions would not be terminated until certain conditions 
had been satisfied, including the return of the democratically elected President and the 
maintenance of constitutional order). In connection with Sierra Leone, see: SIRES/1132 (8 
October 1997), operative paragraphs 1 (demanding that the military junta take immediate steps 
to relinquish power in Sierra Leone and make way for restoration of democratically elected 
Government and a return to constitutional order), 19 (expressing the intention to terminate the 
sanctions when the demand in operative paragraph 1 had been complied with). 
189 	S/RES/917 (6 May 1994), preambular paragraph 8 (reaffirming that the goal of the international 
community remained the restoration of democracy in Haiti and the return of President Aristide), 
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Sierra Leone and UNITA, the Council also sought to ensure the re-establishment of 
Government control throughout Sierra Leone and Angola.'" 
63.3 Facilitating the exercise or protection of human rights 
The Security Council has imposed sanctions with the objective of facilitating the 
exercise or protection of human rights on a number of occasions. Sanctions have thus been 
applied: to enable the exercise of self-determination and independence (in the cases of 
Southern Rhodesia and South Africa); 19 ' to eliminate apartheid (South Africa);' 92 to bring 
operative paragraph 18(e) (deciding that the sanctions would not be terminated until certain 
conditions had been satisfied, including the return of the democratically elected President and 
the maintenance of constitutional order); S/RES/940 (31 July 1994), preambular paragraph• 8 
(again reaffirming that the goal of the international community iemained the restoration of 
democracy in Haiti and the prompt return of President Aristide), operative paragraph 17 
(affirming readiness to review the sanctions with a view to lifting them immediately following 
the return to Haiti of President Aristide). 
190 	In connection with UNITA, see: SIRES/1l73 (12 June 1998), operative paragraph 2 (demanding 
that UNITA cooperate fully in the immediate extension of State administration throughout the 
national territory. That demand had been a requirement of both the Acordos de Paz and the 
Lusaka Protocol). In connection with Sierra Leone, see: SIRES/l171 (5 June 1998), operative 
paragraph 7 (expressing readiness to terminate the sanctions once the control of the 
Government of Sierra Leone had been fully re-established over all its territory, and when all 
non-governmental forces had been disarmed and demobilized); SIRES/1306 (5 July 2000), 
operative paragraph 6 (affirming that that a key factor in determining whether to extend the 
diamond sanctions would be the extent of the Government's authority over the diamond-
producing areas); S/RES/1385 (19 December 2001), operative paragraph 3 (affirming that that a 
key factor in determining whether to extend the diamond sanctions would be the extent of the 
Government's authority over the diamond-producing areas); S/RES/1446 (4 December 2002), 
operative paragraph 2 (affirming that that a key factor in determining whether to extend the 
diamond sanctions would be the extent of the Government's authority over the diamond-
producing areas). 
191 	In connection with Southern Rhodesia, see: SIRES/232 (16 December 1966), operative 
paragraph 4; SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), preambular paragraphs 7, 8, operative paragraph 2; 
SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), preambular paragraph 5, operative paragraph 4; SIRES/288 (17 
November 1970), preambular paragraph 4, operative paragraph 2; SIRES/3 18 (28 July 1972), 
operative paragraphs 1, 2; SIRES/326 (2 February), preambular paragraph 3; SIRES/328 (10 
March 1973), preambular paragraph 7, operative paragraph 3; S/RES/386 (17 March 1976), 
preambular paragraph 4; S/RES/403 (14 January 1977), preambular paragraph 3; S/RES/424 (17 
March 1978), preambular paragraph 4; SIRES/445 (8 March 1979), preambular paragraph 8; 
SIRES/448 (30 April 1979), preambular paragraph 7; SIRES/460 (21 December 1979), operative 
paragraph 1; SIRES/463 (2 February 1980), operative paragraph I. In the case of South Africa, 
statements reflecting the objective of enabling self-determination and independence took the 
form of affirmations of the need to bring about the establishment of a democratic society and 
the enjoyment of equal rights by all South African citizens. For decisions related to bringing 
about the establishment of a democratic society, see: SIRES/473 (13 June 1980), preambular 
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about the occurrence of free and fair elections (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro), the Bosnian Serbs and Haiti); 193 to secure the enjoyment of minority rights 
within a target, including greater autonomy and self-administration (Kosovo, in the case of 
the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia); 194 to bring an end to acts 
of repression against a civilian population (also in the Kosovo instance); 195 and to facilitate 
the return of refugees and displaced persons (Kosovo again).' 96 
paragraph 7, operative paragraph 4; SIRES/569 (26 July 1985), preambular paragraph 5, 
operative paragraph 5; SIRES/591 (28 November 1986), preambular paragraph 7. For decisions 
related to the objective of bringing about the enjoyment of equal rights by all South African 
citizens, see: SIRES/473 (13 June 1980), preambular paragraph 7, operative paragraphs 4 and 7; 
SIRES/569 (26 July 1985), preambular paragraph 5; SIRES/591 (28 November 1986), preambular 
paragraph 7. 
192 	SIRES/418 (4 November 1977), preambular paragraph 1; SIRES/473 (13 June 1980), preambular 
paragraph 7, operative paragraph 4, 7; SIRES/569 (26 July 1985), operative paragraph 5; 
SIRES/591 (28 November 1986), preambular paragraph 7; SIRES/765 (16 July 1992), operative 
paragraph 7. 
193 	In connection with the sanctions regimes against both the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia-Montenegro) and the Bosnian Serbs, see: SIRES 1022 (22 November 1995), operative 
paragraph 4 (deciding that the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro) and the sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs would be terminated on the tenth 
day following the occurrence of free and fair elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, provided 
that the Bosnian Serbs had withdrawn from the zones of separation as stipulated in the 
Bosnian Peace Agreement). In connection with Haiti, see: SIRES/917 (6 May 1994), operative 
paragraph I 8(c) (listing as one of the conditions for the termination of the sanctions the 
adoption of legislative actions called for in the Governor's Island Agreement and the creation 
of an environment in which free and fair elections could be organized). 
194 	SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 5 (expressing support for "an enhanced 
status for Kosovo which would include a substantially greater degree of aitonomy and 
meaningful self-administration"); SIRES/1199 (23 September 1998), preambular paragraph 12 
(reaffirming support for a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo problem, including an enhanced 
status for Kosovo, a substantially greater degree of autonomy, and meaningful self-
administration); S/RES/1203 (24 October 1998), preambular paragraph 8 (recalling its support for 
a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo problem, including an enhanced status for Kosovo, a 
substantially greater degree of autonomy, and meaningful self-administration); SIRES/l244 (10 
June 1999), preambular paragraph 11 (reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial 
autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo). 
195 
 
SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 16 (deciding to review the situation on the 
basis of whether the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had taken a number of steps, including 
withdrawing its special police units and preventing action by its security forces against the 
civilian population); SIRES/i199 (23 September 1998), operative paragraph 4 (demanding that 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia implement immediately a number of measures towards 
achieving a political solution to the situation in Kosovo, including: ceasing all action by 
security forces affecting the civilian population and withdraw the security units used for 
civilian repression; and agreeing with the Kosovo Albanian community on a timetable for 
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6.3.4 Bringing about disarmament or antis control 
The Security Council has incorporated disarmament-related objectives in a number 
of its sanctions regimes. Among those objectives have been: containing an aggressive target 
(South Africa); 197 bringing about a target's complete disarmament (Ira .198 q), securing a 
target's cooperation with an arms control monitoring body (Iraq); 199 inducing targets to 
implementing confidence-building measures and finding a political solution to the situation in 
Kosovo). 
196 	SIRES/1199 (23 September 1998), operative paragraph 4 (demanding that the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia implement immediately a number of measures towards achieving a political 
solution to the situation in Kosovo, including facilitating, in agreement with the UNHCR and 
the ICRC, the safe return of refugees and displaced persons and free and unimpeded access to 
Kosovo for humanitarian organizations and supplies). 
197 	In the case of South Africa, the most explicit objective of the sanctions regime was to prevent 
South Africa from acquiring arms, so as to diminish the South African Government's capacity 
to pose a threat to international peace and security. See: S/RES/418 (4 November 1977), 
operative paragraphs 1 and 2; S/RES/558 (13 December 1984), preambular paragraphs 4, 5. 
198 	After the Gulf War one of the major objectives of the Iraq sanctions regime became ensuring 
Iraq's complete disarmament. See in general: SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraphs 8, 
9, 10, 12, 22. In order to comply with its obligation to disarm completely, Iraq was required to 
undertake the following measures: (a) To accept unconditionally the destruction, removal or 
rendering harmless of all chemical and biological weapons (SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative 
paragraph ka)) and all ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty 
kilometres (SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 8(b)); (b)To agree to on-site 
inspection of its armament facilities (SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 9(a)); and 
(c) To refrain from the use, development, construction or acquisition of chemical and biological 
weapons (SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 10), ballistic missiles with a range 
greater than one hundred and fifty kilometres (S/RES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 
10), and nuclear weapons (SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 12). 
199 	The Council made it clear that the objectives of the Iraq sanctions included ensuring that Iraq 
cooperated unconditionally with the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), the 
United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In relation to cooperation with UNSCOM, in late-
1997 the Council imposed targeted travel sanctions against particular Iraqi officials, making it 
clear that the objective of those sanctions was to ensure that Iraq cooperated unconditionally 
with the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), whose task it was to monitor and 
verify Iraq's compliance with its disarmament obligations under the sanctions regime. See: 
SIRES/1137 (12 November 1997), operative paragraph 6 (deciding that the targeted travel 
sanctions imposed by that resolution would terminate one day after the Executive Chairman of 
UNSCOM had reported to the Council that Iraq was cooperating unconditionally with 
UNSCOM). With respect to cooperation with UNMOVIC and the IAEA, in late-1999 the 
Council created the United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission 
(UNMOVIC) to replace UNSCOM. At the same time it provided that, if Iraq were to cooperate 
with UNMOVIC and the IAEA, and if they were both to report to the Council that the system 
of ongoing monitoring and verification was fully operational, then the elements of the 
sanctions regime not connected to arms and related materiel would be suspended for a 
renewable period of 120 days: S/RES/1284 (17 December 1999), operative paragraph 33. By 
providing for that possibility the Council signalled that the major objective of the components 
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conclude and implement a regional arms control agreement (former Yugoslavia); 200 and 
securing the disarmament and demobilization of rebel groups (Sierra Leone and certain 
actors in the DRC). 20I 
6.3.5 Facilitating the establishment and consolidation of peace 
Although as noted above the underlying objective of any sanctions regime should be 
the maintenance or restoration of peace and security, on a number of occasions the Council 
has articulated particular objectives associated with the establishment and consolidation of 
peace. Among those objectives have been the following: establishing peace and stability in 
general (the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Liberia (in the first instance), and the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia);202 bringing about a peaceful, definitive settlement to a conflict 
of the sanctions regime not directed at arms and related materiel was to ensure that the system 
of monitoring and verification was fully operational. 
200 	SIRES/1021 (22 November 1995), operative paragraph 1 (deciding that the sanctions against the 
former Yugoslavia would be terminated upon the conclusion and entry into force of a regional 
arms control agreement, which formed part of the overall proposed Peace Agreement, by the 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). 
201 	In connection with Sierra Leone, see: SIRES/1171 (5 June 1998), operative paragraph 7 
(expressing readiness to terminate the sanctions once the control of the Government of Sierra 
Leone had been fully re-established over all its territory, and when all non-governmental forces 
had been disarmed and demobilized). In connection with the DRC, see: See: SIRES/1493 (28 
July 2003), operative paragraph 22 (deciding to review the situation in the DRC in twelve 
months, with a view to renewing the sanctions if no significant progress had been made in the 
peace process, including in particular if support were still being provided to armed groups, if 
there were no effective ceasefire, and if there had not been progress in the disarmament, 
demobilization, repatriation, reintegration or resettlement ("DDRRR") of foreign and Congolese 
armed groups). 
202 	In connection with the former Yugoslavia, see: SIRES/713 (25 September 1991), operative 
paragraph 6. In that resolution the Council did not set particular conditions for the suspension 
or termination of the sanctions, stating that the embargo would remain in place until it 
"decide[d] otherwise following consultation between the Secretary-General and the 
Government of Yugoslavia" (see also operative paragraph 6). In connection with Somalia, see: 
S/RES/733 (23 January 1992), operative paragraph 5. As with the sanctions regime against the 
former Yugoslavia, in relation to Somalia the Council simply stated that the embargo would 
remain in place until it decided otherwise (see also operative paragraph 5). Unlike the case of 
the former Yugoslavia, however, the Council has not subsequently set any explicit 
requirements for the termination of the sanctions. In connection with Liberia (in the first 
instance), see: SIRES/788 (19 November 1992), operative paragraph 8. As with the regimes 
against the former Yugoslavia and Somalia, the Council set no explicit requirements for 
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between two countries (Ethiopia and Eritrea); 203 ensuring the establishment and observance 
of cease-fires (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), the Bosnian 
Serbs, UNITA, Rwanda, Ethiopia and Eritrea and certain actors in the DRC); 2" securing 
the engagement of the target or other relevant actors in a peace process (the Federal 
termination of the sanctions, stating that they would remain in place until it (the Council) 
decided otherwise (see also operative paragraph 8). In fact, it was notable that the Council did 
not terminate the arms embargo in July 1997 after welcoming both the successful holding of 
presidential and legislative elections and the fact that the elections had been certified as "free 
and fair" by the Chairman of ECO WAS and the U.N. Secretary-General. See: S/PRST/1997/41 
(30 July 1997): Presidential statement of 30 July 1997. The joint statement of certification that 
the elections had been free and fair was contained in: S/1997/581 (24 July 1997), annex. In 
connection with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, see: SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), 
operative paragraph 8 (deciding that all States should apply sanctions, for the purposes of 
fostering peace and stability in Kosovo). 
203 	S/RES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 17 (deciding that the sanctions would be 
terminated immediately if the Secretary-General were to report that there had been a peaceful, 
definitive settlement to the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea). 
204 	In connection with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), see: SIRES/757 
(30 May 1992), operative paragraph 3 (deciding that the sanctions against the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) would be applied until that country had complied with the 
requirements of resolution 752 (1992), one of which was that all parties involved in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina stop fighting immediately, respect the cease-fire of 12 April and cooperate with 
the efforts of the EC to bring about a negotiated settlement: S/RES/752 (15 May 1992), 
operative paragraph 1). In the case of the Bosnian Serbs one of the objectives was to ensure 
the withdrawal behind zones of separation of Bosnian Serb forces. See: S/RES/1022 (22 
November 1995), operative paragraph 2 (deciding that the proposed suspension of the 
sanctions would not take place until the day after the Bosnian Serb forces had withdrawn 
behind the zones of separation established in the Peace Agreement), operative paragraph 4 
(deciding that the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) 
and the sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs would be terminated on the tenth day following 
the occurrence of free and fair elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, provided that the Bosnian 
Serbs had withdrawn from the zones of separation as stipulated in the Bosnian Peace 
Agreement). In connection with UNITA, see: S/RES/864 (15 September 1993), operative 
paragraph 17 (deciding that the sanctions against UNITA would come into force ten days later 
unless the Secretary-General notified it that an effective cease-fire had been established and 
that agreement had been reached on the implementation of the Peace Accords ('Acordos de 
Paz') and relevant Security Council resolutions). In connection with Rwanda, see: SIRES/918 
(17 May 1994), operative paragraph 1 (demanding that the parties to the conflict immediately 
cease hostilities, agree to a cease-fire, and bring an end to the violence in Rwanda). In 
connection with Ethiopia and Eritrea, see: SIRES/l298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 2 
(demanding that both parties cease immediately all military action and refrain from the further 
use of force); operative paragraph 3 (demanding that both parties withdraw their forces from 
military engagement and take no further action that would aggravate tensions). In connection 
with the DRC, see: SIRES/1493 (28 July 2003), operative paragraph 22 (deciding to review the 
situation in the DRC in twelve months, with a view to renewing the sanctions if no significant 
progress had been made in the peace process, including in particular if support were still being 
provided to armed groups, if there were no effective ceasefire, and if there had not been 
progress in the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration or resettlement 
("DDRRR") of foreign and Congolese armed groups). 
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Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), the Bosnian Serbs, the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, and Ethiopia and Eritrea);205 facilitating the implementation of, or progress in, a 
peace process (Haiti, UNITA and Rwanda, Liberia (in the second instance), and certain 
actors in the Democratic Republic of the Congo );206 brin • g gin about progress in a process of 
205 	In connection with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), see: SIRES/820 
(17 April 1993), operative paragraphs 10 (deciding that the sanctions would come into force 
nine days later, unless the Secretary-General had reported that the Bosnian Serbs had signed 
the Bosnian peace plan and had ceased its military actions) and 31 (expressing readiness to 
review the sanctions with a view to lifting them once all Bosnian parties had accepted the 
Bosnian peace plan and were cooperating in good faith in its implementation); S/RES/943 (23 
September 1994), operative paragraph 4 (providing that the suspensions of sanctions outlined 
in the same resolution would terminate if the Secretary-General were to report that the 
authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) were not effectively 
implementing the sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs). In connection with the sanctions 
regime against the Bosnian Serbs, see also the provisions from resolution 820 (1993) just noted 
concerning the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), as 
well as: SIRES/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 3 (demanding that the Bosnian 
Serbs accept the proposed territorial settlement unconditionally and in full), operative 
paragraph 21 (expressing readiness to reconsider the sanctions if the Bosnian Serbs accepted 
the proposed territorial settlement unconditionally and in full). In connection with the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, see: SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 1 (calling upon 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to take the necessary steps to achieve a political solution 
to the issue of Kosovo through dialogue); SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 16 
(deciding to review the situation on the basis of whether the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
had taken a number of steps, including beginning a substantive dialogue on "political status 
issues). In connection with Ethiopia and Eritrea, see: S/RES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative 
paragraph 4 (demanding that the parties reconvene substantive talks aimed at achieving a 
definitive peaceful settlement of the conflict). The Security Council stipulated that such talks 
should be carried out under OAU auspices, on the basis of the "Framework Agreement" and 
other arrangements suggested by the OAU as recorded in a Communiqué issued by the OAU 
current Chairman on 5 May 2000: S/2000/394, annex. 
206 	In connection with Haiti, see: S/RES/861 (27 August 1993), operative paragraph 3 (expressing 
readiness to terminate the sanctions if the Secretary-General were to conclude that the relevant 
provisions of the Governor's Island Agreement had been fully implemented); 5/26747 (15 
November 1993): Presidential statement of 15 November 1993 (stressing that the sanctions 
would remain in force until the objectives of the Governor's Island Agreement were fulfilled, 
including the departure of the Commander-in-Chief of the Haitian armed forces, the creation of 
a new police force permitting the restoration of constitutional order, and the return of the 
democratically-elected President Aristide). In connection with UNITA, see: SIRES/864 (15 
September 1993), operative paragraph 17 (deciding that the sanctions against UNITA would 
come into force ten days later unless the Secretary-General notified it that an effective cease-
fire had been established and that agreement had been reached on the implementation of the 
Peace Accords CA cordos de Paz') and relevant Security Council resolutions; SIRES/1127 (28 
August 1997), operative paragraph 7 (deciding that the sanctions would come into force one 
month later, unless the Council had decided on the basis of a report of the Secretary-Genet-al 
that UNITA had taken concrete and irreversible steps to comply with its obligations under the 
'Lusaka Protocol', including: demilitarizing its forces; transforming its radio station Vorgan into 
a non-partisan broadcasting facility; cooperating fully in the process of the normalization of 
State administration throughout Angola; immediately providing the Joint Commission, 
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national reconciliation (UNITA);207 and securing cooperation with peace-keeping operations 
or other peace-related international actors (Haiti and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). 208 
established under the Lusaka Protocol, with accurate and complete information on the strength 
of its armed personnel, so that verification, disarmament and demobilization could take place, in 
accordance with the Lusaka Protocol); SIRES/l295 (18 April 2000), preambular paragraph 5 
(noting that the sanctions against UNITA were intended to promote a political settlement to 
the conflict in Angola, by requiring UNITA to comply with the obligations which it had 
undertaken under the Acordos de Paz and the Lusaka Protocol, and by curtailing the ability of 
UNITA to pursue its objectives by military means); SIRES/1432 (15 August 2002), operative 
paragraph 2 (deciding that the Council might consider reviewing the sanctions, taking into 
account all available information on the implementation of the peace accords). In connection 
with Rwanda, see: SIRES/918 (17 May 1994), preambular paragraph 6 (stressing the importance 
of the Arusha agreement to the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Rwanda and the necessity 
for the parties to the conflict to implement that agreement), operative paragraph 19 (inviting the 
Secretary-General and his Special Representative, in coordination with the Organization of 
African Unity and countries in the region, to continue their efforts to achieve a political 
settlement in Rwanda within the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement). In connection 
with Liberia (in the second instance), see: SIRES/l343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 3 
(stressing that the Council's demands were intended to lead to progress in the peace process 
in Sierra Leone and calling upon the President of Liberia to ensure that the RUF met the 
following objectives: (a) Allowing the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) free 
access throughout Sierra Leone; (b) Releasing all abductees; (c) Entering its fighters in the 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process; and (d) Returning all weapons and 
other equipment seized from UNAMSIL); SIRES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 3 
(stressing that its demands were intended to lead to consolidation of the peace process in 
Sierra Leone and to further progress in the peace process in the Mano River Union as a whole); 
S/RES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 3 (stressing that the demands it was making of 
the Liberian Government were intended to consolidate peace and stability in Sierra Leone and 
to build and strengthen peaceful relations among the countries of the region). In connection 
with the DRC, see: SIRES/l493 (28 July 2003), operative paragraph 22 (deciding to review the 
situation in the DRC in twelve months, with a view to renewing the sanctions if no significant 
progress had been made in the peace process, including in particular if support were still being 
provided to armed groups, if there were no effective ceasefire, and if there had not been 
progress in the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration or resettlement 
("DDRRR") of foreign and Congolese armed groups). 
207 	S/RES/1412 (17 May 2002), operative paragraph 2 (deciding that, in determining whether to 
extend the suspension of the travel sanctions against UNITA officials and their families, the 
Council would take into account the progress achieved in the process of national 
reconciliation). 
208 	In connection with Haiti, see: SIRES/873 (13 October 1993), operative paragraph 1 (providing 
that the sanctions, which had been suspended but were about to be reimposed, might not be 
reimposed if the Secretary-General were to report that the authorities in Haiti were implementing 
in full the agreement to reinstate the legitimate Government of President Aristide and had 
established the necessary measures to enable the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) to 
carry out its mandate); S/RES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 18(d) (listing as one of the 
conditions for the termination of sanctions the creation of the proper environment for the 
deployment of UNMIH). UNMIH was established by the Security Council in September 1993, 
in order to assist the Government of Haiti in the implementation of the Governor's Island 
Agreement, which had called for assistance for modernizing the armed forces of Haiti and 
establishing a new police firce with the presence of United Nations personnel. For the 
establishment of UNMIH, see S/RES/867 (23 September 1993), operative paragraphs 14. 
UNMIH's mandate was extended on a number of occasions, ultimately expiring in late June 
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6.3.6 Addressing international terrorism 
The Council's sanctions regimes against Libya, the Sudan and Afghanistan/the 
Taliban/A1 Qakla have each had as a major objective the goal of addressing international 
terrorism. In connection with some or all of those regimes the Council has also outlined the 
following particular objectives: securing the cooperation of a target with investigations into 
acts of terrorism (Libya, the Sudan and Afghanistan/the Taliban/A1 Qaida); 209 ensuring that a 
1996: see SIRES/905 (23 March 1994), operative paragraph 2; SIRES/933 (30 June 1994), 
operative paragraph 1; SIRES/940 (31 July 1994), operative paragraphs 9-11 [revising as well as 
extending UNMIH's mandate]; SIRES/975 (30 January 1995), operative paragraph 8; 
SIRES/1007 (31 July 1994), operative paragraph 9; SIRES/1048 (29 February 1996), operative 
paragraph 5. UNMIH was succeeded by the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti, which 
was established by S/RES/1063 (28 June 1996), operative paragraph 2, in order to facilitate the 
transition back to democracy in Haiti. In connection with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
see: SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 16 (deciding to review the situation on 
the basis of whether the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had taken a number of steps, 
including: allowing access to Kosovo to humanitarian organizations, representatives of the 
Contact Group and other embassies; accepting a mission by the Personal Representative of the 
Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that would include a 
new and specific mandate for addressing the problems in Kosovo, as well as the return of the 
long-term missions of the OSCE; and facilitating a mission to Kosovo by the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights); SIRES/1199 (23 September 1998), operative paragraph 4 
(demanding that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia implement immediately a number of 
measures towards achieving a political solution to the situation in Kosovo, including: enabling 
continuous and effective monitoring in Kosovo by the EC Monitoring Mission and diplomatic 
missions accredited to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; and facilitating free and unimpeded 
access to Kosovo for humanitarian organizations and supplies). 
209 	In connection with the Libya, see: SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 1 (deciding 
that Libya must cooperate with investigations into the bombings of Pan Am flight 103 and 
UTA flight 772 by the French, British and American governments), operative paragraph 3 
(deciding hat the sanctions would apply until the Council had decided that Libya had 
complied with aims including that Libya cooperate with investigations into the bombings); 
S/RES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraph 16 (reaffirming the initial objectives ofthe 
sanctions regime, whilst providing for the possibility that the sanctions might be suspended if 
the Secretary-General were to report to it that the Libyan Government had ensured the 
appearance of those charged with the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 before the appropriate 
United Kingdom or United States court and had satisfied that French judicial authorities with 
respect to the bombing of UTA flight 772); SIRES/1192 (27 August 1998), operative paragraph 
8 (deciding that the sanctions would be suspended immediately if the Secretary-General were 
to report to it that the Lockerbie suspects had arrived in the Netherlands for the purpose of 
being tried before the Scottish Court, or if they had appeared for trial before an appropriate 
court in the United Kingdom or the United States. In connection with the Sudan, see: 
SIRES/1054 (26 April 1996), operative paragraph 1(a) (demanding that Sudan extradite to 
Ethiopia three suspects wanted in connection with the assassination attempt against the 
President of Egypt, which had taken place in Addis Ababa on 26 June 1995). In connection 
with the Taliban and Al Qaida, see: S/RES/1267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraph 1 
(insisting that the Taliban cooperate with efforts to bring indicted terrorists to justice), 
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operative paragraph 2 (demanding that the Taliban turn over Bin Laden to appropriate 
authorities in a country where he had been indicted, or to appropriate authorities in a country 
where he would be returned to such a country, or to appropriate authorities in a country where 
he would be arrested and effectively brought to justice), operative paragraph 14 (deciding that 
the sanctions would be terminated once the Secretary-General had reported to the Security 
Council that the Taliban had turned over Usama Bin Laden to authorities in a country where he 
had been indicted); S/RES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 1 (demanding again 
that the Taliban cooperate with efforts to bring indicted terrorists to justice), operative 
paragraph 2 (demanding that the Taliban turn over Bin Laden to appropriate authorities in a 
country where he had been indicted, or to appropriate authorities in a country where he would 
be returned to such a country, or to appropriate authorities in a country where he would be 
arrested and effectively brought to justice), operative paragraph 24 (deciding that the 
sanctions would be terminated once the Taliban had complied with the Council's demands). 
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target desists from assisting, supporting and providing shelter to terrorists (Libya, the Sudan 
and the Taliban and Al Qaida);21° and inducing the formal renunciation of terrorism by a 
target (Libya).211 
210 	In connection with Libya, see: SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 2 (deciding that 
Libya must commit itself definitively to ceasing all forms of terrorism and all assistance to 
terrorist groups), operative paragraph 3 (deciding that the sanctions would apply until the 
Council had decided that Libya had complied with those aims). In connection with the Sudan, 
see: SIRES/1054 (26 April 1996), operative paragraph 1(b) (demanding that Sudan desist from 
assisting, supporting and facilitating terrorist activities and from giving shelter or sanctuary to 
terrorist elements). In connection with the Taliban and Al Qaida, see: S/RES/1267 (15 October 
1999), operative paragraph 1 (insisting that the Taliban: cease providing sanctuary and training 
for international terrorists; take measures to ensure that its territory was not being used by 
terrorists or for the organization of terrorist acts against other States; and cooperate with 
efforts to bring indicted terrorists to justice); S/RES11333 (19 December 2000), operative 
paragraph 1 (demanding again that the Taliban: cease providing sanctuary and training for 
international terrorists; take measures to ensure that its territory was not being used by 
terrorists or for the organization of terrorist acts against other States; and cooperate with 
efforts to bring indicted terrorists to justice), operative paragraph 3 (demanding that the 
Taliban close all terrorist camps on its territory), operative paragraph 24 (deciding that the 
sanctions would be terminated once the Taliban had complied with the Council's demands). 
211 	S/RES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 2 (deciding that Libya must commit itself 
definitively to demonstrating by concrete actions its renunciation of terrorism), operative 
paragraph 3 (deciding that the sanctions would apply until the Council had decided that Libya 
had complied with aims including that Libya renounce terrorism). 
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One of the major decisions facing the Security Council when it imposes a sanctions 
regime is how to delineate the scope of the sanctions to be applied. As Article 41 contains 
an inclusive, rather than an exclusive or exhaustive, list of measures that might be taken to 
address threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or aggression, it provides the Security 
Council with the power to apply a wide variety of measures and grants it considerable 
flexibility to determine which particular measures might be appropriate for each individual 
case. This chapter describes the different types of sanctions that have been imposed by the 
Security Council when acting upon its sanctions powers. 
In practice, the scope of sanctions employed by the Security Council has varied 
from sanctions regime to sanctions regime and even within a particular regime, as the 
Council has expanded or contracted the measures applied in order to induce or reward a 
target's compliance. With the exception of regimes consisting of basic arms embargoes, no 
two sanctions regimes have been the same. Often sanctions regimes contain a blend of the 
different types of sanctions available, meaning that it can be misleading to describe a 
particular sanctions regime according to a categorized term or phrase, such as "economic 
sanctions", "trade sanctions", "comprehensive sanctions", "targeted sanctions" or "smart 
sanctions". Nevertheless, in order to aid analysis, the sanctions applied by the Security 
Council can be broadly divided into the categories of economic and non-economic 
sanctions, with each of those broad categories containing numerous sub-categories.' 
The division of types of sanctions into "economic" and "non-economic" is not unproblematic. 
Often, as part of the application of a sanctions regime that might be described as "economic", 
the Council also requires States to undertake activities whose character as "economic" is not 
clear. Thus, for example, in respect of the implementation of arms sanctions, the Council targets 
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Although an individual U.N. sanctions regime might not fall neatly into one of the categories 
or sub-categories described below, its Narious components will be reflected in the various 
categories and sub-categories. 
In order to determine the scope of a particular sanctions regime at a particular time, 
it is necessary to take into account both the range of prohibitions directed against a target 
and any exemptions provided from those prohibitions. Analysis here considers both the 
different types of prohibitions that have been employed by the Security Council in its 
application of sanctions and any exemptions provided from those prohibitions by the 
Council. Although exemptions are most commonly provided from sanctions regimes that are 
comprehensive, almost every U.N. sanctions regime has contained exemptions of some 
kind. The application of exemptions is generally regulated by the relevant Sanctions 
Committee, with the Security Council stipulating whether the fact that an item or activity is 
exempt from sanctions means that States or other actors seeking to take advantage of that 
exemption must simply notify the relevant Committee or must seek the Committee's 
authorisation prior to importing or exporting the exempt product or engaging in the exempt 
activity.2 
a product or commodity (i.e. arms and related materiel) that can be described as economic, but 
in a number of instances the Council has clarified that the arms sanctions require States to 
prevent the provision of assistance, advice or training in relation to the use, manufacture or 
maintenance of arms and related materiel. The character of those activities as economic is not 
so clear. For further discussion of issues related to the application of arms sanctions, see 
below. 
2 	For further details relating to exemption responsibilities bestowed upon the Sanctions 
Committees, see Chapter 9, section 9.1.2. 
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7.1 Economic and financial sanctions 
Economic sanctions are measures that aim to prevent the flow of commodities or 
products to or from a target. 3 Financial sanctions are closely related to economic sanctions, 
but their focus is upon prohibiting the flow to and from the target of financial and economic 
resources, rather than commodities, products or supplies. Economic sanctions can be 
"comprehensive", in which case they seek to halt the flow to and from a target of all 
commodities and products, or they can be "particular", in which case they aim to prevent the 
flow to or from a target of particular commodities or products. 4 In theory, particular 
economic sanctions might be employed against any product or commodity. 
In sanctions terminology, a distinction is sometimes drawn between "embargoes" and 
"sanctions", with the former representing prohibitions against the export to the target of a 
particular product or commodity and the latter encompassing either the export to or the import 
from the target of particular products or commodities. Thus, for example, sanctions upon arms 
are often referred to as "arms embargoes", due to the fact that they usually aim to prohibit the 
export to, rather than the import from, a target of arms. 
"Particular sanctions" may be distinguished from "targeted sanctions" and "smart sanctions", 
as the former denotes the type of activity sanctioned, whereas the primary focus of the latter is 
upon the actors sanctioned. The two can overlap, however, as with diamond sanctions 
("particular sanctions") imposed against a rebel group (thus becoming "targeted sanctions"). 
The concepts of "targeted sanctions" and "smart sanctions" have been explored by an 
intergovernmental initiative designed to lead to the reform of sanctions practice. The initiative, 
sponsored in turn by the Swiss, German and Swedish Governments, has resulted in the 
convening of three series' of workshops and conferences — in Interlaken, Bonn-Berlin and 
Stockholm, respectively - with the participation of diplomats, academics and United Nations 
and non-governmental practitioners. For reports arising from the Interlaken, Bonn-Berlin and 
Stockholm processes, see: Expert Seminar on Targeting UN Financial Sanctions, 17-19 
March 1998, Interlaken, Switzerland, Swiss Federal Office for Foreign Economic Affairs, Bern 
("Final Report of Interlaken I": available on-line at: 
http://www.smartsanctions.ch/Papers/s clussbericht.pdf); Second Interlaken Seminar on 
Targeting UN Financial Sanctions, 29-31 March 1999, Swiss Federal Office for Foreign 
Economic Affairs, Bern ("Final Report of Interlaken II": available on-line at: 
http://www.smartsanctions.ch/Papers/12/finrep.pdf); Targeted Financial Sanctions: A Manual 
for Design and Implementation. Contributions from the Interlaken Process (2001) Thomas J. 
Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Providence, RI; Design and Implementation of 
Arms Embargo and Travel Sanctions and Aviation-related Sanctions: Results of the Bonn-
Berlin Process (2001) Bonn International Center for Conversion, Bonn (available on-line at: 
http://www.bicc.de/events/unsanc/2000/pdf/booklet/booklet  sanctions.pdf); Smart Sanctions: 
the Next Steps. The Debate on Arms Embargoes and Travel Sanctions within the 'Bonn-
Berlin Process' (2001) Nomos, Baden-Baden; Making Targeted Sanctions Effective: 
Guidelines for the Implementation of UN Policy Options. Results from the Stockholm Process 
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7.1.1 Comprehensive economic sanctions 
The term "comprehensive sanctions" is generally used to describe a sanctions regime 
that seeks to prevent the flow to and from a target et all commodities and products. 
Comprehensive sanctions regimes therefore effectively incorporate all of the forms of 
particular sanctions discussed below, as well as other particular prohibitions that have not 
been included below as they have not yet formed an explicit component of a sanctions 
regime. In practice, the Security Council has not applied any truly comprehensive sanctions 
regimes, as it has provided limited exemptions from each of the sanctions regimes imposed 
to date, generally for humanitarian purposes. Nevertheless, five sanctions regimes might be 
described as "comprehensive" sanctions regimes, including those against Southern 
on the Implementation of Targeted Sanctions (2003) Uppsala University, Uppsala (available 
on-line at: http://www.smartsanctions.se/reports/Final%2Oreport%complete.pdf).  
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Rhodesia,5 Iraq,6 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), 7 the Bosnian 
Serbs8 and Haiti. 9 
i. 	Humanitarian exemptions from comprehensive sanctions 
The Security Council has exempted from each of its comprehensive sanctions 
regimes the export to the target of some humanitarian supplies. In outlining exempt supplies, 
5 	The sanctions against Southern Rhodesia were not initially comprehensive, as they targeted 
the import from Southern Rhodesia of key Southern Rhodesian exports and the export to 
Southern Rhodesia of arms and related materiel, aircraft and motor vehicles and associated 
parts, and oil and oil products: SIRES/232 (16 December 1966), operative paragraph 2. The 
sanctions became comprehensive, however, seventeen months later: S/RES/253 (29 May 1968), 
operative paragraph 3. 
The sanctions against Iraq were comprehensive from the time of their application until May 
2003. See: S/RES/661 (6 August 1990), operative paragraph 3; 51RES1687 (3 April 1991), 
operative paragraphs 20 (deciding implicitly that the comprehensive sanctions and financial 
sanctions imposed by resolution 661 (1990) would continue, by explicitly noting the types of 
commodities and products to which those prohibitions would no longer apply. For further 
details relating to those exemptions, see the section below), 22 (deciding that the 
comprehensive and financial sanctions would have no further force or effect once Iraq had 
complied with the disarmament requirements of resolution 687 (1991)); SIRES/1483 (22 May 
2003), operative paragraph 10 (terminating all sanctions except the arms sanctions). 
The sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) were intended 
to be comprehensive from the time of their initial application, however one of the exemptions 
provided from the sanctions was for transhipments via the Danube. Due to the wide abuse of 
those transhipments by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), the Council 
subsequently tightened, then abolished the use of transhipments, making the sanctions more 
"comprehensive". For the relevant decisions, see: SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative 
paragraph 4; SIRES/787 (16 November 1992), operative paragraph 9; SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), 
operative paragraph 15. 
The sanctions regime against the Bosnian Serbs was comprehensive from the moment it was 
applied. The Council required States to prevent the import to, export from, and transshipment 
through areas under the control of the Bosnian Serb forces, of commodities and products other 
than essential humanitarian supplies: SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 12. 
Interestingly, the Council did not explicitly articulate the items for which import to, export from 
and transshipment through the areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian 
Serb forces would be prohibited — neglecting even to mention a word such as "commodities", 
"products", "goods" or "supplies". It is likely, however, given the context of the prohibition 
and considering the Council's past practice, that the intention was to prohibit the flow to and 
from the Bosnian Serbs of products and commodities. Another indicator that the sanctions 
were intended to be comprehensive was that the Council specified that exemptions would be 
permitted from the sanctions for "essential humanitarian supplies including medical supplies 
and foodstuffs distributed by humanitarian agencies", provided that such exemptions were 
authorised by the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina: see also operative 
paragraph 12. 
The Haiti sanctions regime initially consisted of an arms embargo, a petroleum embargo and 
financial sanctions: SIRES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraphs 5, 8. The Council applied 
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the Council has both articulated particular exempt items and identified classes of supplies 
that may be exempt with the approval of the relevant Sanctions Committee. Among the 
particular items which the Council has exempted from comprehensive sanctions regimes by 
the Council are: medical supplies (all comprehensive sanctions regimes), 1° educational 
equipment and material (Southern Rhodesia)," informational materials (Southern Rhodesia 
and Haiti)," foodstuffs (all comprehensive sanctions regimes)," petroleum and petroleum 
comprehensive sanctions eleven months later: SIRES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraphs 
6, 7. 
10 	In connection with Southern Rhodesia, see: S/RES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraph 3(d) 
(exempting "supplies intended strictly for medical purposes"). In connection with Iraq, see: 
S/RES/661 (6 August 1990), operative paragraph 3(c). In connection with the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), see: SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 4(c) 
(exempting "supplies intended strictly for medical purposes"). In connection with the Bosnian 
Serbs, see: SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 12 (exempting "medical supplies" 
without qualification). Such exemptions were subject to the proviso, however, that they had 
been authorised by the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina). In relation to 
the sanctions regime against Haiti, see: SIRES/9l7 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 7(a) 
(exempting "supplies intended strictly for medical purposes"). 
In comprehensive sanctions regimes other than that against Iraq, the exemption against 
medical supplies has generally operated without controversy. In the case of the Iraq sanctions 
regime, however, the ability of Iraq to import medical supplies was restricted by the Iraq 
Sanctions Committee's application of the "no dual-use requirement", which meant that medical 
and other exempted supplies could not be exported to Iraq where they had potential for 
diversion or conversion to military use. For further discussion of this matter, see the case-
study of the Iraq sanctions regime in Chapter 7, below. 
11 	SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraph 3(d) (exempting "educational equipment and 
material for use in schools and other educational institutions"). 
12 	In connection with Southern Rhodesia, see: S/RES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraph 3(d) 
(exempting "publications" and "new material"). In relation to Haiti, see: SIRES/917 (6 May 
1994), operative paragraph 8 (exempting "informational materials, including books and other 
publications, needed for the free flow of information"). 
13 	While foodstuffs have been exempted from each comprehensive sanctions regime to date, the 
operation of the exemption has varied. In the case of the two earliest comprehensive sanctions 
regimes, the export to the target of foodstuffs was contingent upon the existence of 
"humanitarian circumstances". With respect to Southern Rhodesia, see: S/RES/253 (29 May 
1968), operative paragraph 3(d) (exempting foodstuffs from the Southern Rhodesian sanctions 
regime "in special humanitarian circumstances"). In connection with Iraq, see: S/RES/661 (6 
August 1990), operative paragraph 3(c) (exempting foodstuffs from the Iraq sanctions regime 
"in humanitarian circumstances"). In the Iraq instance, the Council delegated to the Iraq 
Sanctions Committee the responsibility for determining whether humanitarian circumstances 
existed: SIRES/666 (13 September 1990), operative paragraphs 1, 5. After the conclusion of Gulf 
War hostilities, the Secretary-General commissioned a report to ascertain whether 
"humanitarian circumstances" did in fact exist. That report concluded that humanitarian 
circumstances did exist and warned that the Iraqi people might soon face a "catastrophe", 
including "epidemic and famine" if "massive life-supporting needs" were not met: S/22366 (20 
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products (Haiti); 14 and clothing (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro)). 15 
Among the classes of items that have been exempted by the Council are: "materials 
and supplies essential for civilian need" (Iraq), 16 and "commodities and products for 
essential humanitarian need" (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), the 
Bosnian Serbs and Haiti)." As a general rule, where the Security Council specifies particular 
exempt items, those items may be exported to the target with simple notification to the 
March 1991), annex: Report to the Secretary-General on humanitarian needs in Kuwait and 
Iraq in the immediate post-crisis environment by a mission to the area led by Mr. Martti 
Ahtisaari (the "Ahtisaari report"), paragraph 37. The Iraq Sanctions Committee considered the 
Ahtisaari report, decided that humanitarian circumstances did in fact exist and communicated 
its decision to the Security Council, thus permitting States to export foodstuffs to Iraq upon 
simple notification to the Committee that such exports were to take place: S/22400 (22 March 
1991): Note by the Secretary-General, annex (containing a letter from the President of the 
Security Council to the Secretary-General, informing the Secretary-General that the Iraq 
Sanctions Committee had taken the decision during its 36 th meeting). The Security Council 
soon endorsed the Committee's decision: SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 20. In 
the three latter comprehensive sanctions regimes, by contrast, foodstuffs were exempted 
without qualification. For the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), the 
Bosnian Serbs and Haiti. In the three subsequent comprehensive sanctions regimes, the 
Council has exempted foodstuffs without qualification. With respect to the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), see: S/RES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 4(c). In 
connection with the Bosnian Serbs, see: SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 12. 
With respect to Haiti, see: SIRES/9 17 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 7(a). 
14 SIRES/9 17 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 7(c) and (d) (exempting such items when 
authorized by the Haiti Sanctions Committee or requested by the President and Prime Minister 
of Haiti and approved by the Haiti Sanctions Committee). 
15 	SIRES/943 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 3 (exempting "clothing for essential 
humanitarian need"). It subsequently reaffirmed that exemption in SIRES/970 (12 January 1995), 
operative paragraph 5, and S/RES/988 (21 April 1995), operative paragraphs 13, 15. 
16 	S/RES/687 (8 April 1991), operative paragraph 20 (exempting from the Iraq sanctions regime 
"materials and supplies considered essential for civilian needs"). 
17 	In connection with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), see: S/RES/760 
(18 June 1992), sole operative paragraph (exempting from the sanctions regime against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) "commodities and products for essential 
humanitarian need"). With respect to the Bosnian Serbs, see: S/RES/942 (23 September 1994), 
operative paragraph 7(b) ("products for essential humanitarian needs", when approved by the 
724 Committee). In connection with Haiti, see: S/RES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 
7(b) ("commodities and products for essential humanitarian needs", as approved by the Haiti 
Sanctions Committee under the no-objection procedure). 
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relevant Sanctions Committee. 18 Where the Council identifies a class of supplies that are 
exempt, however, exports of items potentially falling within that class must be approved or 
authorized by the relevant Sanctions Committee before they may proceed.' 9 
Other exemptions from comprehensive sanctions 
In addition to humanitarian exemptions, the Council has also provided for certain 
other exemptions from comprehensive sanctions regimes. In the case of the sanctions regime 
against Iraq, the Security Council permitted Iraq to export limited amounts of oil in order to 
enable it to finance the purchase of exempt commodities and products and the payment of 
reparations for liabilities arising from the Gulf War. 2° In the case of the sanctions regime 
18 	One exception to this rule was the exemption from the Haiti sanctions regime for petroleum and 
petroleum products. In that instance, the Council stipulated that such exemptions would be 
provided on an exceptional, case-by-case basis under a no-objection procedure: SIRES/841 (16 
June 1993), operative paragraph 7. 
19 	For discussion of the responsibilities bestowed upon the Sanctions Committees with respect to 
determining the application of such exemptions, see Chapter 9, section 9.1.2. 
20 	The program established to implement that exemption became known as the "Oil-for-Food 
Programme". It is beyond the scope of this section to explore in depth the details of the Oil-for-
Food Programme. For further details, see the case-study on the Iraq sanctions regime in 
Chapter 7, below. For the decision establishing the Oil-for-Food Programme, see: SIRES/986 (14 
April 1995), operative paragraphs 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10. In addition to financing the purchase by the 
Iraqi Government of medicine, health supplies, foodstuffs and supplies for essential civilian 
needs [SIRES/986 (14 April 1995), operative paragraph 8(a)], the Council decided that the 
proceeds from the sale of oil would fund: (a) the distribution of humanitarian relief to the three 
northern governorates not under the complete control of the Iraqi Government [S/RES1986 (14 
April 1995), operative paragraph 8(b)]; (b) the Compensation Fund established to address 
claims for Iraqi reparations arising from the Gulf War [SIRES/986 (14 April 1995), operative 
paragraph 8(c)]; (c) the costs of on-the-ground inspection and auditing of the implementation 
in Iraq of the OFFP [SIRES/986 (14 April 1995), operative paragraph 8(d)]; (d) the operating 
costs of UNSCOM [SIRES/986 (14 April 1995), operative paragraph 8(e)]; (e) reasonable 
expenses incurred in order to export the permitted oil from Iraq [SIRES/986 (14 April 1995), 
operative paragraph 8(0]; and (f) to replenish the accounts of frozen Iraqi assets from which 
funds had been transferred to the escrow account established under resolution 687 (1991) in 
order to cover the costs of the Compensation Commission and UNSCOM under resolution 778 
(1992) [SIRES/986 (14 April 1995), operative paragraph 8(g)]. 
The Security Council had attempted to establish an earlier version of the OFFP in 1991 [see 
SIRES/706 (15 August 1991); SIRES/712 (19 September 1991)], but it had not been possible to 
implement the programme in the absence of cooperation from the Iraqi Government. In order to 
ensure an alternative source of funding for the activities of the Compensation Commission and 
UNSCOM, the Council had then adopted resolution 778 (1992), requiring States in which funds 
belonging to Iraq had been frozen in accordance with the sanctions regime to transfer those 
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imposed against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) to address the 
situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, exemptions were provided initially for transhipments 
through Serbia-Montenegro of commodities and products. 21 The Council also provided for 
subsequent, temporary exemptions from that sanctions regime for the export of anti-serum 
for diphtheria,22 and for activities connected with repairs to river locks on the Danube. 23 
Finally, in relation to the sanctions regime against Haiti, the Security Council exempted 
equipment for journalists.' 
funds temporarily to the escrow account established to fund, inter alia, the activities of the 
Commissions: see resolution 778 (1992) (2 October 1992). 
21 	S/RES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 6. Such transhipments nevertheless required the 
approval of the 724 Committee. Due to the fact that a number of violations of the sanctions 
regime resulted from abuses of the permitted transhipments, however, the Council 
subsequently restricted, then prohibited, such transhipments. See: SIRES/787 (16 November 
1992), operative paragraph 9 (prohibiting the transshipment through the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of particular products and commodities, including crude 
oil, petroleum products, coal, energy-related equipment, iron, steel, other metals, chemicals, 
rubber, tyres, vehicles, aircraft and motors of all types); SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative 
paragraph 15 (prohibiting all transhipments through the Federal Republic of Yu goslavia (Serbia 
and Montenegro). In that operative paragraph the Council nevertheless provided for the 
possibility that transhipments could still be exempt if specifically authorised by the 724 
Committee and so long as they were subject to effective monitoring as they passed along the 
Danube. 
22 	SIRES/967 (14 December 1994), operative paragraph 1. This exemption was recommended by 
the 724 Committee: see S/1996/946 (15 November 1996), annex: Final Report of the Security 
Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia, 
(hereafter "Final Report of the 724 Committee"), paragraph 16(g). The Council permitted the 
export of the serum for a limited period of 30 days in order to address a shortfall of the serum in 
places other than the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). In permitting 
the export of the serum the Council stipulated that payment for the serum could only be paid 
into frozen accounts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro): ibid, 
operative paragraph 2. 
23 	SIRES/992 (11 May 1995), operative paragraph 1 (providing an exemption for the use of 
Rumanian river locks by vessels registered in or owned by a person or entity from the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) while locks on the Serbian bank of the 
Danube were undergoing repair), operative paragraph 2 (exempting supplies essential to those 
repairs). 
24 SIRES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 8. The Council provided, however, that the 
conditions and terms regulating the operation of this exemption would be determined by the 
Haiti Sanctions Committee 
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7.1.2 Particular economic sanctions 
Discussion here does not consider every potential form of particular economic 
sanctions, as such a list could potentially be almost limitless. Rather, it considers those types 
of particular sanctions that have already been employed by the Security Council in one or 
more of its sanctions regimes. The most common form of particular economic sanctions 
applied by the Security Council has been aims sanctions, but the Security Council has also 
employed particular economic sanctions to prevent the flow to or from targets of petroleum, 
asbestos, forms of transport, diamonds, chemicals and timber products. 
i. 	Arms sanctions 
Arms sanctions have been the most frequently applied form of particular sanctions, 
with every sanctions regime except the one against Sudan incorporating prohibitions against 
aims at some stage of its development. Arms sanctions have featured as a part of eight 
sanctions regimes consisting solely of arms sanctions, including those against South Africa, 28 
the former Yugoslavia,26 Somalia,27 Liberia in the first instance,28 Rwanda,29 Kosovo,36 
Ethiopia and Eriirea, 31 and the DRC.32 Arms sanctions have also constituted one component 
of seven sanctions regimes that have also contained other types of sanctions, including those 
2$ 
	
S/RES/418 (4 November 1977), operative paragraph 2. In operative paragraph 4 of that 
resolution, the Council also required all States to refrain from helping South Africa to develop 
nuclear weapons. 
26 	SIRES/7 13 (25 September 1991), operative paragraph 6. 
27 	S/RES/733 (23 January 1992), operative paragraph 5. 
28 	SIRES/788 (19 November 1992), operative paragraph 8. 
29 	See: S/RES/918 (17 May 1994), operative paragraph 13. 
30 	See: SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 8. 
31 	See: SIRES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 6. 
32 	 See: SIRES/1493 (28 July 2003), operative paragraph 20. 
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against Southern Rhodesia (before the sanctions regime became comprehensive),33 Libya,34 
Haiti, (also before the sanctions regime became comprehensive),35 UNITA, 36 Sierra 
Leone,37 the Taliban and Al Qaida,38 and Liberia in the second instance. 39 Finally, arms 
sanctions have also formed an implicit part of each of the five comprehensive sanctions 
regimes applied to date.° In the case of Iraq, arms sanctions formed an explicit component 
of the sanctions regime after the conclusion of the Gulf War, with the Security Council's 
attention being focused on the question of Iraq's possession of weapons of mass 
destructi" Arms sanctions were also maintained against Iraq after the other sanctions had 
been terminated.42 
The Security Council has employed a number of formulations in outlining the scope 
of arms sanctions to be applied. In the first case of U.N. sanctions, against Southern 
Rhodesia, the Council required States Members of the United Nations to prevent the sale or 
shipment to Southern Rhodesia of "arms, ammunition of all types, military aircraft, military 
33 
 
SIRES/232 (16 December 1966), operative paragraph 2(d). 
34 	S/RES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 5. 
35 
 
SIRES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 5. 
36 	S/RES/864 (15 September 1993), operative paragraph 19. 
37 	SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 6; S/RES/1171 (5 June 1998), operative 
paragraph 2. 
The sanctions regime against the Taliban did not initially prohibit the supply of arms. Rather, it 
consisted of non-economic sanctions, including aviation and financial sanctions: S/RES/1267 
(15 October 1999), operative paragraph 4. Little more than a year after the sanctions regime was 
initiated, however, arms became contraband: S/RES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative 
paragraph 5. The arms sanctions were subsequently reaffirmed and extended to cover the sale 
or supply of arms and related materiel to Usama Bin Laden, Al Qaida and their associates: see 
S/RES/1390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraph 2(c). 
39 
 
SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 5. 
40 As noted above, five sanctions regimes have been comprehensive, including those against 
Southern Rhodesia, Iraq, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), the Bosnian 
Serbs and Haiti. 
41 For the provision outlining all of the specific arms sanctions against Iraq, see: S/RES/687 (3 
April 1991), operative paragraph 24. 
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vehicles, and equipment and of anus and ammunition". 43 In three other cases, the Council 
has required States to implement "a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of 
weapons and military equipment" to the target." In the majority of cases, however, the 
Council has required States to prevent the sale or supply to the target of "arms and related 
materiel". 45 
The Council first used the phrase "arms and related materiel" in relation to the 
sanctions regime against South Africa, when it noted that the phrase included "weapons, 
ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary police equipment, and spare parts 
for all of those articles". 46 That elaboration has provided the basis for a fairly standard 
interpretation of the phrase, with some minor vanations.47 On some occasions, however, the 
42 	SIRES/1483 (22 May 2003), operative paragraph 10. Exempt from the continuing arms sanctions, 
however, were arms and related materiel for the Coalition Authority. 
43 
 
SIRES/232 (16 December 1966), operative paragraph 2(d). 
44 	The Council used this phrase in respect of the sanctions against the former Yugoslavia 
[S/RES/713 (25 September 1991), operative paragraph 6], Somalia [SIRES/733 (23 January 1992), 
operative paragraph 5], and Liberia in the first instance [S/RES/788 (19 November 1992), 
operative paragraph 8]. 
45 	The phrase "arms and related materiel" has been used by the Council in the application of 
arms sanctions against: South Africa, Iraq, Libya, Haiti, UNITA, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to address the situation in Kosovo, the Taliban, Usama Bin 
Laden and Al Qaida, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Liberia (in the second instance), and the DRC. For 
the specific provisions in which the phrase was located, see the notes that follow. 
Interestingly, there has been a subtle difference in the precise form of the word used by the 
Council to refer to "materiel". In the regimes against South Africa, Iraq, Haiti, UNITA, Rwanda, 
Sierra Leone and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Council used the French "materiel". 
In the regime against Libya the Council used the English "material". In the more recent regimes, 
against Ethiopia and Eritrea, Liberia, and certain actors in the DRC, the Council has used a 
hybrid form, "materiel". 
46 	S/RES/418 (4 November 1977), operative paragraph 2. 
47 	For the use of the phrase in the sanctions regime against Haiti, see: S/RES/841 (16 June 1993), 
operative paragraph 5 (defining the phrase as including "weapons and ammunition, military 
vehicles and equipment, police equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned"). For its use 
in the sanctions regime against UNITA, see: S/RES/864 (15 September 1993), operative 
paragraph 19 (defining the phrase as including "weapons and ammunition, military vehicles 
and equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned"). For its use in the sanctions regime 
against Rwanda, see: SIRES/918 (17 May 1994), operative paragraph 13 (defining the phrase as 
including "weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary police 
equipment and spare parts"). For its use in the sanctions regime against Sierra Leone, see: 
SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 6 (defining the phrase as including 
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Council has provided a quite different interpretation of the phrase," or has not elaborated at 
all on its meaning. 49 The Council has also clarified that, in addition to the standard 
interpretation of the phrase, it can also encompass "nuclear, strategic and conventional 
weapons", 5° and "the provision of any types of equipment, supplies and grants of licensing 
arrangements, for the manufacture or maintenance of [items encompassed by the phrase 
arms and related materiel]". 51 
In its oversight of the various sanctions regimes incorporating arms sanctions, the 
Council has made it clear that the obligations imposed by arms sanctions can extend beyond 
the requirement to prevent the flow to a target of arms and related materiel. In the case of 
Rwanda, the Council clarified that the arms sanctions required all States to prevent the sale 
"weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare 
parts for the aforementioned"); SIRES/I171 (5 June 1998), operative paragraph 2. For its use in 
the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to address the situation in 
Kosovo, see: SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 8 (defining the phrase as 
including "weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment and spare parts for the 
aforementioned"). For its use in the sanctions regime against the Taliban, Usama Bin Laden 
and Al Qaida, see: SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 5; SIRES/1390 (16 
January 2002), operative paragraph 2(c) (each defining the phrase as including "weapons and 
ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the 
aforementioned"). For its use in the sanctions regime against Ethiopia and Eritrea, see: 
S/RES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 6 (defining the phrase as including "weapons 
and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts for 
the aforementioned"). For its use in the sanctions regime against Liberia (in the second 
instance), see: SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 5 (defining the phrase as 
including "weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment 
and spare parts for the aforementioned"). 
48 	In the case of Iraq, the Council noted that the phrase included "conventional military 
equipment, including for paramilitary forces, and spare parts and components and their means 
of production": SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 24(a). 
49 	This occurred in the case of the sanctions against certain actors in the DRC. See: S/RES/1493 
(28 July 2003), operative paragraph 20 (using the phrase "arms and related materiel" without 
defining what it meant). 
50 	In the case of South Africa, the Council clarified that the phrase included "in addition to all 
nuclear, strategic and conventional weapons, all military, paramilitary police vehicles and 
equipment, as well as spare parts for all of those items": SIRES/591 (28 November 1986), 
operative paragraph 4. 
51 	In the case of Libya, the Council noted that the phrase included, in addition to the standard 
interpretation, "the provision of any types of equipment, supplies and grants of licensing 
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or supply of arms and related materiel to States neighbouring Rwanda, if they v,ould be 
forwarded to non-Government actors in Rwanda. 52 The Council has also required States to 
prevent the provision of assistance, advice or training in respect of the use, manufacture or 
maintenance of arms and related materiel to the target of the sanctions regimes against 
Somalia,53 Libya,54 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to address the situation in Kosovo, 55 
the Taliban and Al Qaida,56 Ethiopia and Eritrea,57 Liberia (in the second instance),58 and 
certain parties in the DRC.59 Moreover, in the case of Somalia the Council has clarified that 
the application of arms sanctions can require the prohibition of financing of acquisitions and 
arrangements, for the manufacture or maintenance of the aforementioned": S/RES/748 (31 
March 1992), operative paragraph 5(a). 
52 	S/RES1997 (9 June 1995), operative paragraph 4. The Council reaffirmed this provision in 
S/RES/1011 (16 August 1995), operative paragraph 9. 
53 	S/RES/1425 (22 July 2002), operative paragraph 2 (prohibiting the provision to Somalia of 
technical advice, final and other assistance, and training related to military activities). For 
discussion of the manner in which this provision first introduced the possibility that financial 
activities might be prohibited under arms sanctions, see below. 
54 	S/RES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 5(b), 5(c) (prohibiting the provision to Libya 
of technical advice, assistance or training and requiring States to withdraw any officials or 
agents who were advising the Libyan authorities on military matters). 
55 	S/RES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 8 (prohibiting the arming and training of 
forces for terrorist activities in Kosovo). 
56 	SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 5(b) (prohibiting the provision of 
technical advice, assistance or training in connection with the military activities of the Taliban); 
S/RES/1390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraph 2(c) (prohibiting the provision of technical 
advice, assistance or training in connection with the military activities of the Taliban, Usama 
Bin Laden, Al Qaida and their associates). 
57 	S/RES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 6(b) (prohibiting the provision to Ethiopia and 
Eritrea of technical advice, assistance or training related to the provision, manufacture, 
maintenance or use of arms and related materiel). 
58 	S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 5(b) (prohibiting the provision to Liberia of 
technical advice, assistance or training related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or 
use of arms and related materiel). 
59 	S/RES/1493 (28 July 2003), operative paragraph 20 (prohibiting the provision to all foreign and 
Congolese armed groups and militias operating in the territory of North and South Kivu and of 
Ituri, and to groups not party to the Global and All-inclusive agreement, of any assistance, 
advice or training related to military activities). 
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deliveries of weapons and military equipment,6° as well as the provision of financial 
assistance related to military activities. 6I 
Exemptions from arms sanctions 
The Council has provided exemptions from aims sanctions in a number of sanctions 
regimes. Where the Council provides such exemptions, the export of arms and related 
materiel can generally proceed upon simple notification to the relevant Sanctions 
Committee. Exemptions have been provided in the following situations: (a) for the supply of 
necessary items to United Nations or international peace-keeping forces or international 
civilian police forces (the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Liberia (in the first instance), Rwanda, 
Sierra Leone, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to address the situation in Kosovo, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, and certain actors in the DRC);62 (b) for protective clothing for United 
60 	S/RES/1425 (22 July 2002), operative paragraph 1. 
61 SIRES/1425 (22 July 2002), operative paragraph 2. 
62 	In connection with he former Yugoslavia, see: SIRES/743 (21 February 1992), operative 
paragraph 2 (exempting weapons and military equipment destined for the sole use of the United 
Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)); SIRES/103 1 (15 December 1995), operative paragraph 
22 (exempting weapons and military equipment destined for the sole use of the Member States 
participating in the Multinational Implementation Force (IFOR), or for international police 
forces). In connection with Somalia, the Council initially elaborated no explicit exemptions from 
the embargo: see SIRES/733 (23 January 1992), operative paragraph 5. It is likely, however, that 
the Council's authorization of the establishment of the United Nations Operation in Somalia 
(UNOSOM) and its successor the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), as well 
as of the United Task Force (UNITAF), each of which comprised significant military 
components and were endowed with a mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations, amounted to an implicit exemption from the embargo for those entities and their 
activities. For the purposes of identifying an implicit exemption from the arms embargo for 
UNOSOM and UNITAF, the provisions of resolution 794 (1992) are significant. It is 
noteworthy that the endowment of those operations with a Chapter VII mandate to use 
necessary measures to establish a secure environment for humanitarian activities [see, e.g., 
SIRES/794 (3 December 1992), operative paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15] is located in the 
same resolution in which the Council calls upon States, acting nationally or through regional 
agencies or arrangements, to use such measures as may be necessary to ensure the strict 
implementation of the arms sanctions [see SIRES/794 (3 December 1992), operative paragraph 
16]. It is highly unlikely that the Council would have endowed those operations with such a 
robust Chapter VII mandate without also intending that they would be exempt from the arms 
sanctions. In connection with Liberia (in the first instance), see: S/RES/788 (19 November 1992), 
operative paragraph 9 (exempting from the first Liberian sanctions regime weapons and military 
equipment destined for the sole use of the peace-keeping forces of the Economic Community 
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Nations, media and humanitarian personnel (Somalia, the Taliban/A1 Qaida and Liberia (in 
the second instance); 63 (c) for non-lethal military equipment for humanitarian or protective 
use (Somalia, the Taliban/A1 Qaida, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Liberia (in the second instance), 
and the DRC);64 (d) where requested by an exiled democratic Government (Haiti); 65 (e) for 
of West African States (ECOWAS)). That exemption was subsequently reaffirmed in SIRES/8 13 
(26 March 1993), operative paragraph 13. In connection with Rwanda, see: SIRES/918 (17 May 
1994), operative paragraph 16 (exempting from the arms sanctions activities related to the 
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and the United Nations Observer 
Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNAMUR)). In connection with Sierra Leone, see: S/RES/1171 (5 
June 1998), operative paragraph 3 (exempting the arms and related materiel for the use of the 
Military Observer Ctoup of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOMOG)); 
S/RES/1299 (19 May 2000), operative paragraph 3 (exempting arms and related materiel for the 
use in Sierra Leone of Member States cooperating with the United Nation Assistance Mission 
in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and with the Government of Sierra Leone). In connection with the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, see: S/RES/1203 (24 October 1998), operative paragraph 15 
(exempting equipment for the use of the OSCE and NATO verification missions); S/RES/1244 
(10 June 1999), operative paragraph 16 (exempting equipment for the use of the international 
civil and security presences — which subsequently evolved into UNMIK and KFOR). In 
connection with Ethiopia and Eritrea, see: SIRES/1320 (15 September 2000), operative paragraph 
10 (exempting arms and related materiel for the sole use in Ethiopia or Eritrea of the United 
Nations). In connection with certain actors in the DRC, see: S/RES/1493 (28 July 2003), 
operative paragraph 21 (exempting supplies to MONUC and the Interim Emergency 
Multinational Force led by France). 
63 	In connection with Somalia, see: S/RES/1356 (19 June 2001), operative paragraph 2 (exempting 
protective clothing exported to Somalia for the personal use of United Nations personnel, 
representatives of the media and humanitarian and development workers). In connection with 
the Taliban & Al Qaida, see: SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 6 (exempting 
protective clothing for the personal use of United Nations personnel, representatives of the 
media, and humanitarian workers). In connection with Liberia (in the second instance), see: 
SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 5(d) (exempting protective clothing for the 
personal use of United Nations personnel, media representatives, and humanitarian and 
development workers). 
In connection with Somalia, see: S/RES/1356 (19 June 2001), operative paragraph 3 (exempting 
supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use). 
Such exemptions required the prior approval of the Somalia Sanctions Committee, however: 
S/RES/1356 (19 June 2001), operative paragraph 4. In connection with the Taliban and Al Qaida, 
see: SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 6 (exempting non-lethal supplies 
intended for humanitarian use, as approved by the 1267 Committee). In connection with 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, see: SIRES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 7 (exempting supplies 
of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian use, as approved in advance 
by the Ethiopia and Eritrea Sanctions Committee). In connection with Liberia (in the second 
instance), see: S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraphs 5(c) (exempting non-lethal 
military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, as approved by the 1343 
Committee). In connection with certain actors in the DRC, see: S/RES/1493 (28 July 2003), 
operative paragraph 21 (exempting non-lethal military equipment intended for humanitarian or 
protective use, as well as related technical assistance and training). In order to be exempt, such 
training and assistance must be notified in advance to the Secretary-General and his Special 
Representative. 
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arms and related materiel destined for the use of a legitimate Government (UNITA, 
Rwanda, and Sierra Leone); 66 and (f) for equipment and supplies connected to demining 
programmes (Rwanda, and Ethiopia and Eritrea). 67 
Sanctions against weapons of mass destruction 
In addition to targeting arms in general, the Council has also taken specific action to 
target weapons of mass destruction. As noted above, in the case of South Africa the 
Council clarified that the phrase "arms and related materiel" can encompass nuclear, 
strategic and conventional weapons.68 In the case of Iraq, although the comprehensive 
sanctions imposed against that country in theory should have prevented the flow to or from 
Iraq of any goods other than a limited group of humanitarian exemptions, after the Gulf War 
the Council clarified in some detail the manner in which the sanctions prohibited the 
65 	SIRES/873 (13 October 1993), operative paragraph 3 (providing that exemptions could be 
granted from the arms sanctions against Haiti if approved by the Haiti Sanctions Committee, on 
a case-by-case basis, under the no-objection procedure in response to a request by President 
Aristide or Prime Minister Malval). 
66 	In connection with UNITA, see: SIRES/864 (15 September 1993), operative paragraph 19 
(preventing the sale or supply to Angola, other than through points of entry to be designated 
by the Government of Angola, of arms and related materiel and military assistance. In 
connection with Rwanda, see: SIRES/1011 (16 August 1995), operative paragraph 7 (exempting 
the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to the Rwandan Government via specified entry 
points until I September 1996), operative paragraph 8 (exempting the sale or supply to the 
Rwandan Government of arms and related materiel in general from 1 September 1996). In 
connection with Sierra Leone, see: SIRES/1171 (5 June 1998), operative paragraph 2 (exempting 
the supply of arms and related materiel to the Government of Sierra Leone through named 
points of entry). 
67 	In connection with against Rwanda, see: SIRES/1005 (17 July 1995), sole operative paragraph 
(exempting explosives to be used for the purpose of demining, when authorized by the Rwanda 
Sanctions Committee). In connection with Ethiopia and Eritrea, see: SIRES/1312 (31 July 2000), 
operative paragraph 5 (exempting equipment and related materiel for the use of the United 
Nations Mine Action Service, as well as the provision of related technical assistance and 
training by that Service); SIRES/1320 (15 September 2000), operative paragraph 10 (exempting 
equipment and related materiel, including technical assistance and training, for use solely for 
demining within Ethiopia or Eritrea under the auspices of the United Nations Mine Action 
Service). 
68 	In the case of South Africa, the Council clarified that the phrase included "in addition to all 
nuclear, strategic and conventional weapons, all military, paramilitary police vehicles and 
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possession and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by Iraq. Thus, the Council noted 
that, in order to ensure that Iraq did not increase its capacity to re-arm, States were 
required to continue to prevent the sale, supply or provision to Iraq of: (a) Arms and related 
materie1;69 (b) Items relating to chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles with a 
range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometres, and nuclear weapons; 7° (c) Technology 
relating to arms and related material, chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles with 
a range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometres, and nuclear weapons., 71 and (d) 
Personnel or training or technical support services relating to arms and related material, 
chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred 
and fifty kilometres, and nuclear weapons. 72 
iii. 	Petroleum sanctions 
Petroleum sanctions consist of a prohibition upon the export to or import from a 
target of petroleum and petroleum products. The Council has imposed petroleum sanctions 
on four occasions, as part of its sanctions regimes against Southern Rhodesia, 73 Haiti, 74 
UNITA75 and Sierra Leone.76 In the case of Libya, while the Council did not impose 
equipment, as well as spare parts for all of those items": S/RES/591 (28 November 1986), 
operative paragraph 4. 
69 	S/RES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 24(a). 
70 	SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 24(b). 
71 SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 24(c). 
72 	SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 24(d). 
73 SIRES/232 (I 6 December 1966), operative paragraph 2 (f). The petroleum sanctions were part of 
the Southern Rhodesian sanctions regime before it became comprehensive. 
74 
 
SIRES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 5. The petroleum sanctions were part of the 
Haiti sanctions regime before it became comprehensive. 
75 	S/RES/864 (15 September 1993), operative paragraph 19. 
76 	SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 6. The petroleum sanctions were terminated 
in March 1998, however, upon the return to power of the democratically-elected Government: 
S/RES/1156 (16 March 1998), operative paragraph 2. 
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petroleum sanctions as such, it nevertheless imposed sanctions against the export to Libya of 
particular items used in the refinement and export of petroleum and petroleum products. 77 
Thus, it was indirectly seeking to impair the ability of Libya to export petroleum and 
petroleum products. 
Exemptions from petroleum sanctions 
Exemptions have been outlined from petroleum sanctions on three of the four 
occasions on which those measures have been employed. In the case of the sanctions 
against Haiti, an exemption was provided for non-commercial quantities of petroleum or 
petroleum products, including propane gas for cooking, for verified essential humanitarian 
needs. 78 In the case of the sanctions against UNITA, exemptions were provided for the sale 
or supply of petroleum and petroleum products to Angola, through points of entry 
designated by the Government of Angola. 79 In the case of the sanctions against Sierra 
Leone, the Council provided for the possibility of exemptions upon application to the Sierra 
Leone Sanctions Committee by the democratically-elected Government of Sierra Leone, 8° 
by other Governments or United Nations agencies for verified humanitarian purposes," and 
77 	SIRES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraph 5. The prohibition upon particular goods 
used in the refinement and export of oil required States to prevent the export to Libya of goods 
such as pumps, boilers, furnaces, and prepared catalysts. For a full list of the items see the 
annex attached to resolution 883: SIRES/883 (11 November 1993), annex. 
78 	SIRES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 7. This exemption would only apply, however, if 
authorized by the Haiti Sanctions Committee on an exceptional, case-by-case basis under a no-
objection procedure, and in the event that such exemptions were granted they were subject to 
the proviso that arrangements were made for the effective monitoring of delivery and use of the 
exempted items. 
79 	SIRES/864 (15 September 1993), operative paragraph 19. 
80 	SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 7(a). Such applications could be authorized 
by the Sierra Leone Sanctions Committee, on a case-by-case basis and subject to a no-
objection procedure. 
81 	SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 7(b). Such applications could be authorized 
by the Sierra Leone Sanctions Cbmmittee, on a case-by-case basis and subject to a no-
objection procedure. 
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for the needs of the Monitoring Group of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOMOG). 82 
iv. Asbestos, iron ore, sugar and leather sanctions 
In the case of Southern Rhodesia, the Council imposed sanctions against the import 
from Southern Rhodesia of a number of that country's most important export products. 83 
The list of contraband products included asbestos, iron ore, sugar and leather.84 
v. Sanctions against trade in forms of transport: aircraft, vehicle and 
watercraft sanctions 
The Security Council has imposed sanctions against three forms of transport: 
aircraft, motor vehicles and watercraft." In general, in imposing sanctions against forms of 
transport the Council has also prohibited trade in parts of those forms of transport. The 
Council has imposed aircraft sanctions, 86 prohibiting the export to a target of aircraft and 
aircraft parts, on three occasions, as part of its sanctions regimes against Southern 
Rhodesia,87 Libya,88 and UNITA. 89 The Council has imposed vehicle sanctions, preventing 
82 	SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 7(b). Such applications could be authorized 
by the Sierra Leone Sanctions Committee, on a case-by-case basis and subject to a no-
objection procedure, and with the proviso that there be acceptable arrangements for effective 
monitoring of such deliveries. 
83 	SIRES/232 (16 December 1966), operative paragraph 2(a). 
84 	Also included in the list were chrome, pig-iron, tobacco, cooper, meat and meat products and 
hides and skin: see ibid. 
85 	The forms of transport considered here are civilian. Trade in military or paramilitary transport is 
generally prohibited under arms sanctions. For further details, see the section above on arms 
sanctions. 
86 	As used here, "aircraft sanctions" are to be distinguished from "aviation sanctions". The 
former prohibit trade with the target in aircraft or aircraft parts, whereas the latter seek to 
interrupt flights. As described below, aviation sanctions can be "external" in application, 
meaning that they aim to interrupt flights to and from a target, or they can be "internal" in 
application, in which case they aim to interrupt flights within the target. 
87 	SIRES/232 (16 December 1966), operative paragraph 2 (e). 
88 	S/RES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 4(b) (requiring States to prohibit the supply to 
Libya of any aircraft or aircraft components); SIRES/883 (11 November 1993), operative 
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the export to a target of vehicles and vehicle parts, on two occasions, as part of its sanctions 
regimes against Southern Rhodesia" and UNITA. 9 ' Finally, the Council has imposed 
watercraft sanctions, prohibiting the export to a target of watercraft and watercraft parts, on 
one occasion, as part of its sanctions regime against and UNITA. 92 
vi. 	Diamond sanctions 
Diamond sanctions are measures that seek to prohibit the import from a diamond- 
producing target of diamonds. The Security Council has imposed diamond sanctions on 
three occasions, as part of its sanctions regimes against UNITA, 93 Sierra Leone" and 
Liberia.95 The Council has also prohibited the export to targets of equipment or services 
connected with the extraction of diamonds in the cases of UNITA. 96 
Exemptions from diamond sanctions 
paragraph 6(c) (requiring States to prohibit the provision for operation within Libya of any 
aircraft, aircraft components, or engineering or servicing of aircraft and aircraft components). 
89 	SIRES/1127 (28 August 1997), operative paragraph 4(d)(ii) (prohibiting the provision of aircraft 
or aircraft parts to Angola, other than through points of entry designated by the Angolan 
Government). 
90 S/RES/232 (16 December 1966), operative paragraph 2 (e). 
91 	S/RES/I 173 (12 June 1998), operative paragraph 12(d). 
92 	SIRES/1173 (12 June 1998), operative paragraph 12(d). 
93 	SIRES/1173 (12 June 1998), operative paragraph 12(b). 
94 	S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph I. The diamond sanctions were initially imposed 
for a period of twelve months, but they were subsequently extended on two occasions, for 
periods of eighteen and six months: S/RES/1385 (19 December 2001), operative paragraph 3; 
SIRES/1446 (4 December 2002), operative paragraph 2. In June 2003, when the most recent 
period of extension expired, the members of the Council agreed not to renew the diamond 
sanctions, in light of the Government of Sierra Leone's increased efforts to manage its diamond 
industry and ensure proper control over diamond areas, and in light of its full participation in 
the Kimberley Process: SC/7778 (5 June 2003): Press statement on the Sierra Leone Diamond 
Embargo by the President of the Security Council. For discussion of the Council's use of 
time-limits in the application of sanctions, see Chapter 8, section 8.3.2. 
95 
 
SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 6. As with the diamond sanctions against 
Sierra Leone, the diamond sanctions against Liberia were initially limited to twelve months, 
however they have since been extended for two additional periods of twelve months: see 
S/RES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 5; SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative 
paragraph 10. 
96 	SIRES/1173 (12 June 1998), operative paragraph 12(c). 
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The Council has provided for the possibility of exemption from the diamond 
sanctions for the Governments of Sierra Leone and Liberia if they were to implement an 
effective Certificate-of-Origin regime to ensure that diamond exports were not being 
improperly used to finance conflict.97 In the case of Sierra Leone, the Sierra Leone 
Government did in fact establish an effective Certificate-of-Origin regime, thus bringing the 
exemption into play. 98 In the case of Liberia, however, the Liberian Government has yet to 
establish an effective Certificate-of-Origin regime, thus leaving the exemption dormant. 
vii. Chemical sanctions 
The Security Council has imposed chemical sanctions on one occasion, as part of its 
sanctions regime against the Taliban, requiring States to prevent the sale to Taliban-
controlled areas of the chemical acetic anhydride. 99 
viii. Timber sanctions 
Timber sanctions seek to prohibit the import from a timber-rich target of timber and 
timber products. The Security Council has experimented with timber sanctions on one 
97 	In relation to Sierra Leone, see: S/RES/I 306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 5. In relation to 
Liberia, see: SIRES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 8; SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), 
operative paragraph 14. 
98 
	
The Sierra Leone Sanctions Committee decided, at its 21' meeting on 21 March 2001, that the 
new Certificate of Origin regime for the trade in Sierra Leone diamonds was in effective 
operation: see S/2000/966 (6 October 2000): Letter dated 6 October 2000 from the Chairman of 
the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1132 (1997) concerning 
Sierra Leone addressed to the President of the Security Council; S/2001/300 (30 March 2001): 
Letter dated 28 March 2001 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee 
established pursuant to resolution 1132 (1997) concerning Sierra Leone addressed to the 
President of the Security Council. See also: S/2002/50 (14 January 2002), annex: Report of the 
1132 Committee for 2001, paragraph 11. The Security Council welcomed the establishment 
and implementation of the Certificate of Origin regime in: SIRES/1385 (19 December 2001), 
operative paragraph 1. 
SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 10. Acetic anhydride is used in the 
production of opium. The Council therefore imposed sanctions against the export of that 
chemical to Taliban-controlled territory with the aim of restricting the ability of both the Taliban 
and terrorists to profit from the sale of illicit opium. 
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occasion, as part of its sanctions regime against Liberia (in the second instance).loo in that 
instance, the Council required all States to prevent the import of all round logs and timber 
products originating in Liberia. 101 
7.1.3 Financial sanctions 
Financial sanctions are measures seeking to interrupt the ability of the target to 
engage in financial relations with the external world. Financial sanctions can be general in 
nature, thus requiring States to freeze any financial resources or assets in their jurisdiction 
that belong to the target, or to prohibit the transfer of financial resources or assets, including 
the provision of insurance, to parties either located in the target or acting on behalf of parties 
located in the target. Financial sanctions have also been more targeted, however, seeking to 
freeze the personal financial resources and assets of key policy-makers connected with a 
target. The Security Council has employed general financial sanctions as part of its sanctions 
100 	On a previous occasion, the Council had requested States to respect a moratorium outlined by 
Cambodia's Supreme National Council upon the export from Cambodia of logs: see SIRES/792 
(30 November 1992), operative paragraph 12. As noted in section 1.2 of Chapter 1, the 
Cambodian instance does not represent an example of mandatory U.N. sanctions. 
Nevertheless, the measures requested in that case indicated a willingness on the part of the 
Council to focus upon timber products as the subject of a sanctions regime where appropriate. 
lot 	S/RES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 17. A year earlier the Council had foreshadowed 
the potential for the logging industry to be sanctioned, by calling upon the Liberian 
Government to demonstrate, including through the establishment of transparent and 
internationally verifiable audit regimes, that the revenue derived from its shipping and timber 
industries was being used for legitimate social, humanitarian and development and not for 
purposes that violated the objectives of the sanctions regime: SIRES/1408 (6 May 2002), 
operative paragraph 10. Before it eventually applied the logging sanctions, the Council noted 
that it considered that the audits commissioned by the Liberian Government did not 
demonstrate that the revenue derived from the shipping and timber industries was being used 
for legitimate social, humanitarian and development purposes, nor that it was not being used in 
violation of the sanctions: S/RES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 16. This decision by 
the Council is interesting for two reasons. First, it suggests that if compliance with the 
objectives of the sanctions regime is not forthcoming from the Liberian Government, then the 
next area that is likely to be sanctioned is the shipping industry. Second, the Council's 
decision to apply sanctions on the basis that the Liberian Government had not demonstrated 
that its revenue was not being used to violate the sanctions might be interpreted to have 
followed a rationale of "guilty until proven innocent". 
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regimes against Southern Rhodesia, 	aqui' L  ibya,m4 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia-Montenegro), I°5 the Bosnian Serbs, 1°6 and Haiti.'" In the case of the sanctions 
102 	SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraph 4 (prohibiting the transfer to the illegal regime in 
Southern Rhodesia or any commercial or public utility undertaking, including tourist 
enterprises, or to persons or bodies within Southern Rhodesia, of any funds for investment or 
any other financial or economic resources); S/RES/388 (6 April 1976), operative paragraphs 1 
(clarifying that the sanctions prohibited the insurance of all commodities and products 
exported to, imported from, or bcated in, Southern Rhodesia), 2 (prohibiting the granting to 
any commercial, industrial or public utility in Southern Rhodesia the right to use any trade 
name, trade mark or registered design in connexion with the sale or distribution of any 
products, commodities or services); S/RE51409 (27 May 1977), operative paragraph 1 (requiring 
Member States to prohibit the use or transfer of funds in their territories by the illegal South 
Rhodesian regime). 
103 	SIRES/661 (6 August 1990), operative paragraph 4 (prohibiting the provision to the 
Government of Iraq, to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in Iraq or 
Kuwait, or to persons or bodies within Iraq or Kuwait, of any funds or other financial or 
economic resources); SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraphs 20 (deciding implicitly 
that the comprehensive sanctions and financial sanctions imposed by resolution 661 (1990) 
would continue, by explicitly noting the types of commodities and products to which those 
prohibitions would no longer apply. For further details relating to those exemptions, see the 
section below), 22 (deciding that once Iraq had complied with the disarmament requirements 
under resolution 687 (1991) the comprehensive and financial sanctions would have no further 
force or effect). 
104 	S/RES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraph 3 (requiring States in which there were 
funds or other financial resources owned or controlled by the Government or public authorities 
of Libya or any Libyan undertaking, to freeze those funds and resources and to ensure that 
neither they nor any other funds nor financial resources were made available to or for the 
benefit of the Government or public authorities of Libya or any Libyan undertaking). 
105 	S/RES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 5 (requiring States to refrain from providing any 
funds or other financial or economic resources to any commercial, industrial or public utility 
operating in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and to prevent the 
removal of funds or resources from their territories to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro)); SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 21 (requiring States 
to freeze funds in their territories belonging to or controlled by the authorities of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or commercial, industrial or public 
undertakings from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)); SIRES/820 
(17 April 1993), operative paragraph 27 (requiring States to prevent the provision of services, 
financial or otherwise, to any person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)). 
106 	SIRES/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 11 (requiring States to freeze any funds or 
other financial assets or resources held within their territories if they belonged to an entity that 
was owned, controlled or incorporated by a person or entity from those parts of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces, or to an agent of such entities or 
people), operative paragraph 12 (requiring States to ensure that any payments accruing in their 
territories for entities doing business in, or owned, controlled or incorporated by persons or 
entities from those areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the Bosnian Serb 
forces, would be paid only into frozen accounts) and operative paragraph 13 (requiring States 
to prohibit the provision of services, both financial and non-financial, to any person or body 
for the purposes of business being carried on in those areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina under 
the control of Bosnian Serb forces). 
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regimes against UNITA and the Taliban and Al Qaida, in addition to applying general 
financial sanctions against the targets, the Council has also directed financial sanctions 
against the personal finances of target policy-makers. 1°8 
The Security Council has also clarified that States can be required to impose 
financial sanctions as part of their obligations to implement arms sanctions. In the case of the 
arms sanctions against Somalia, the Council clarified that States were to prevent the 
financing of acquisitions and deliveries of weapons and military equipment, m9 as well as the 
provision of financial assistance related to military activities. 110 
Exemptions from financial sanctions 
107 	SIRES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 8 (requiring States in which there were funds 
owned or controlled by the Government of Haiti or the de facto authorities in Haiti to freeze 
those funds and resources and to ensure that neither they nor any other funds nor financial 
resources were made available to or for the benefit of the de facto authorities in Haiti). 
108 	In connection with UNITA, see: SIRES/1173 (12 June 1998), operative paragraph 11 (requiring 
all States except Angola in which there were funds and financial resources of UNITA as an 
organization or of senior UNITA officials and adult members of their immediate families to 
freeze them and ensure that they were not made available for the use of those parties). In 
connection with the Taliban and Al Qaida, see: SIRES/1267 (15 October 1999), operative 
paragraph 4(b) (requiring States to freeze funds and other financial resources owned or 
controlled by the Taliban and to ensure that no funds or financial resources were made 
available to or for the benefit of the Taliban);S/RES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative 
paragraph 8(c) (requiring States to freeze funds and other financial assets of Usama bin Laden 
and individuals and entities associated with him, including those in Al Qaida, and to ensure 
that neither those nor any other funds were made available to or for the benefit of Usama bin 
Laden or individuals or entities associated with him, including Al Qaida);S/RES/1390 (16 
January 2002), operative paragraph 2(a) (requiring States to freeze the funds and other financial 
assets or economic resources of Usama Bin Laden, members of Al Qaida and the Taliban and 
other individuals, groups, undertakings or entities associated with them, and to ensure that 
neither those nor any other funds were made available to or for the benefit of those individuals, 
groups, undertakings and entities). 
In addition to those cases, in the case of Haiti the Security Council "strongly urged" States to 
apply financial sanctions against officers of the Haitian military and police and members of 
their immediate families, the major participants in the coup d'etat of 1991 and in the illegal 
governments since the coup, as well as their immediate families, and those employed by the 
Haitian military, as well as their immediate families: SIRES/917 (6 May 1994), operative 
paragraph 4. However, due to the fact that the phrase adopted was "strongly urges" rather 
than "decides", that instance does not qualify as an example of mandatory sanctions. 
109 SIRES/1425 (22 July 2002), operative paragraph I. 
110 SIRES/1425 (22 July 2002), operative paragraph 2. 
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The Security Council has provided exemptions from most instances of financial 
sanctions.'" The majority of those exemptions have had a humanitarian dimension. The 
Council has thus provided exemptions from financial sanctions for the purchase of 
commodities and products that were exempt from comprehensive sanctions, doing so in 
respect of its sanctions regimes against Southern Rhodesia, I12 Iraq, 113 the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) 114 and the Bosnian Serbs.'  The Council has also 
provided exemptions for the provision of finance for pension purposes (Southern 
Rhodesia), H6 for the provision of basic services (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia-Montenegro)),H7 for payments related to activities of United Nations or other 
international actors (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro)), n8 for 
Only in the case of the sanctions regime against UNITA did the Security Council fail to outline 
any exemptions. 
112 	S/RES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraph 4 (exempting payments "exclusively for 
pensions or for strictly medical, humanitarian or educational purposes or for the provision of 
news material and in special humanitarian circumstances, food-stuffs"). 
113 
 
SIRES/66l (6 August 1990), operative paragraph 4 (exempting payments relating to supplies 
that were "intended strictly for medical purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, 
foodstuffs"); S/RES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 20 (exempting financial 
transactions related to the sale or supply to Iraq of medicine and health supplies, foodstuffs, 
and materials and supplies for essential civilian needs). 
114 SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraphs 5 (exempting "payments exclusively for strictly 
medical or humanitarian purposes and foodstuffs"); S/RES/760 (18 June 1992), sole operative 
paragraph (exempting financial transactions related to the purchase of "commodities and 
products for essential humanitarian need"); SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 27 
(exempting the provision of financial and other services whose supply may be necessary for 
humanitarian or other exceptional purposes). 
115 
 
SIRES/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 11 (exempting payments for supplies 
intended strictly for medical purposes or commodities and products for essential humanitarian 
needs). 
116 	SIRES/409 (27 May 1977), operative paragraph 1 (exempting the transfer of funds to offices or 
agencies established exclusively for pensions purposes). 
117 	S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 27 (exempting the provision of financial and 
other services to businesses in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) 
engaged in telecommunications, postal services and legal services consistent with the 
sanctions). 
118 	S/RES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraphs 10 (exempting financial transactions related to 
the activities of UNPROFOR, the Conference on Yugoslavia, and the EC Monitoring Mission). 
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payments on the ground of humanitarian need (the Taliban and Al Qaida), 119 and to enable 
access to frozen personal finances for "basic" or "extraordinary" expenses (the Taliban and 
Al Qaida). 1 20 
In addition to exemptions with a humanitarian dimension, the Council has also 
outlined some exemptions from financial sanctions that do not have an immediately 
identifiable humanitarian connection, including for finds derived from the sale or supply of 
petroleum or petroleum products and agricultural products or commodities, in the case of 
Libya,12 ' and for payments authorized by legitimate Governments with sovereignty over the 
area in which the target is located, in the case of the Bosnian Serbs and Haiti. 122 
7.2 Non-economic sanctions 
Non-economic sanctions are measures that seek to interrupt a target's relations with 
the external world in areas other than basic trade. The Security Council has employed the 
following examples of non-economic sanctions: diplomatic and representative sanctions; 
119 	Such an exemption was provided in relation to the Taliban sanctions regime, before it was 
expanded to target Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaida and individuals, groups and entities 
associated with them. See: SIRES/1267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraph 4(b) (exempting 
payments on the grounds of humanitarian need, as approved by the Taliban Sanctions 
Committee on a case-by-case basis). 
120 	SIRES/1452 (20 December 2002), operative paragraph 1 (exempting funds, assets or resources 
necessary for "basic" or "extraordinary" expenses); SIRES/1452 (20 December 2002), operative 
paragraph 2 (qualifying that States might allow for frozen accounts to earn interest and to 
receive outstanding payments owed under contracts, agreements or obligations that had arisen 
prior to the application of sanctions). 
121 	S/RES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraph 4 (exempting funds or financial resources 
derived from the sale or supply of any petroleum or petroleum products, including natural gas 
and natural gas products, or agricultural products or commodities, originating in Libya). 
122 	In connection with the sanctions regime against the Bosnian Serbs, see: SIRES/942 (23 
September 1994), operative paragraph 11 (exempting payments authorised by the Government 
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina). In connection with the sanctions regime against 
Haiti, see: SIRES/873 (13 October 1993), operative paragraph 2 (providing for the possibility of 
exemptions from the financial sanctions upon the request of President Aristide or Prime 
Minister Malval of Haiti). 
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transportation sanctions; travel sanctions; aviation sanctions; sporting, cultural and scientific 
sanctions; and telecommunications sanctions. 
7.2.1 Diplomatic and representative sanctions 
Diplomatic and representative sanctions aim to interrupt the official relations 
between a target and the external world. The distinction between the two is that diplomatic 
sanctions are applied against a target that is recognized as a State by the international 
community and therefore maintains diplomatic relations with other States. Representative 
sanctions, on the other hand, are applied against a target that is not recognized as a State 
and whose official relations with the external world are more correctly described as 
"representative" rather than "diplomatic". In applying diplomatic and representative 
sanctions, the Council has required States to refrain from recognizing 123 a target or to restrict 
or terminate diplomatic or representative relations with a target, whether directed against 
activities within the States applying the sanctions or against activities within the target. The 
Council has employed diplomatic sanctions as part of its sanctions regimes against Libya 124 
and Sudan, 125 and it has applied representative sanctions as part of its sanctions regimes 
123 	The term recognizing in this context denotes the legal act of recognition. 
124 	SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 6(a) (requiring all States to significantly 
reduce the number and level of staff at Libyan diplomatic missions and consulates and to 
restrict or control the movement of staff who remained within their territory); S/RES/883 (11 
November 1993), operative paragraph 7 (reaffirming the diplomatic sanctions and clarifying that 
the sanctions were to apply to missions and consulates established subsequent to resolution 
748 (1992)). 
125 	S/RES/1054 (26 April 1996), operative paragraph 3(a) (requiring States to reduce the number 
and level of staff at Sudanese diplomatic missions and consular posts, and to restrict or control 
the movement within their territory of all such staff who were to remain). 
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against Southern Rhodesia, 126 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), 127 
UNITA' 28 and the Taliban. 129 
Exemptions from diplomatic and representative sanctions 
The Security Council has not outlined any exemptions from diplomatic sanctions, 
and it has only designated an exemption from representative sanctions on one occasion. In 
that instance, it exempted from the representative sanctions against UNITA contact with 
UNITA initiated by representatives of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation, 
the United Nations and observer States to the Lusaka Protocol. ' 3° 
7.2.2 Transportation sanctions 
Transportation sanctions are measures that aim to prevent the flow of transportation, 
whether by land, sea or air, to a target. 131 Although transportation sanctions will implicitly be 
applied in respect of any goods or commodities prohibited by economic sanctions, the 
Security Council has nevertheless taken the step on a number of occasions of stating 
explicitly that the flow of transportation to or from the target was prohibited as part of a 
126 	S/RES1277 (18 March 1970), operative paragraph 2 (requiring States to refrain from recognizing 
the illegal regime or rendering any assistance to it); SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), operative 
paragraph 9(a) (requiring States to sever diplomatic and other relations with the illegal regime). 
127 	SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 8(a) (requiring States to reduce the level of staff 
at diplomatic missions and consular posts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro)). 
128 	SIRES/1127 (28 August 1997), operative paragraph 4(c) (requiring States to close all UNITA 
offices in their territories); SIRES/1173 (12 June 1998), operative paragraph 12(a) (requiring 
States to prevent all official contacts with the UNITA leadership in areas of Angola to which 
State administration had not been extended). 
129 S/RES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraphs 8(a) (requiring States to close all offices 
on their territories belonging to the Taliban). 
130 	SIRES/1173 (12 June 1998), operative paragraph 12(a). 
131 	Transportation sanctions are to be distinguished from sanctions against trade in forms of 
transport, as described above. Transportation sanctions target the transportation of products 
and commodities, whereas sanctions against means of transport prohibit trade in those means 
of transport as types of products. 
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sanctions regime, doing so in relation to the sanctions regimes against Southern Rhodesia, I32 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) I33 and the Bosnian Serbs. 134 
Exemptions from transportation sanctions 
In some cases where the Council has explicitly applied sanctions against 
transportation, it has irovided exemptions for the transport of humanitarian items exempt 
from sanctions (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) and the Bosnian 
Serbs). 135 The Council has also provided exemptions for cases of force majeure (the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) and the Bosnian Serbs),' 36 and where 
S/RES1277 (18 March 1970), operative paragraph 9(b) (requiring States to interrupt all 
transportation to and from Southern Rhodesia). 
133 	S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 22 (requiring States to prohibit the transport of 
any commodities or products across the land borders, or to the ports, of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); operative paragraph 24 (requiring States to impound 
all means of transport owned or operated from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) or suspected of having violated the arms embargo or sanctions); operative 
paragraph 25 (requiring States to detain any other means of transport suspected of having 
violated the embargo or the sanctions); operative paragraph 28 (requiring States to prohibit 
commercial maritime traffic from entering the territorial sea of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)). 
134 SIRES/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 15 (prohibiting all commercial river traffic 
from entering the ports of those areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the 
control of the Bosnian Serb forces). 
135 	In connection with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), see: SIRES/820 
(17 April 1993), operative paragraph 22 (exempting from the prohibition upon the transport of 
any commodities or products across the land borders, or to the ports, of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), of medical supplies and foodstuffs, other essential 
humanitarian supplies when approved on a case-by-case basis by the 724 Committee, and 
limited transhipments when authorised on an exceptional basis by the Committee); operative 
paragraph 28 (exempting from the prohibition against the entry of commercial maritime traffic 
into the territorial sea of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) those 
ships that were authorised on a case-by-case basis by the 724 Committee). In connection with 
the Bosnian Serbs, see: SIRES/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 15 (exempting 
from the prohibition on the entry into the ports of those areas of the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina under the control of the Bosnian Serb forces of all commercial river traffic those 
shipments authorised on a case-by-case basis by the sanctions committee, or by the 
Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or in the case offorce majeure). 
136 	In connection with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), see: SIRES/820 
(17 April 1993), operative paragraph 28 (exempting from the prohibition against the entry of 
commercial maritime traffic into the territorial sea of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia 
and Montenegro) those ships seeking safe harbour in the case of force majeure). In 
connection with the Bosnian Serbs, see: S/RES/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 
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requested by a legitimate Government with sovereignty over the area in which the target is 
located (the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the case of the Bosnian Serbs). 137 
7.2.3 Travel sanctions 
Travel sanctions are measures that seek to prohibit or inhibit the ability of individuals 
associated with the target of a sanctions regime to travel internationally. Travel sanctions 
have been applied against a population as a whole, against individual target policy-makers 
and those related to or associated with them, and against violators of sanctions. The Security 
Council has applied travel sanctions against all nationals of a target on one occasion — in the 
case of the sanctions regime against Southern Rhodesia." 8 The Council has directed travel 
sanctions against particular individuals or groups of individuals associated with the target's 
policy-makers in relation to nine sanctions regimes, including as part of its regimes against 
Iraq, 139 Libya,' 4° the Bosnian Serbs,' 41 Haiti,' 42 UNITA, '43 us dan,  144 Sierra Leone, 145 the 
15 (exempting from the prohibition on the entry into the ports of those areas of the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the Bosnian Serb forces cases offorce majeure). 
137 	S/RES/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 15 (exempting from the prohibition on the 
entry into the ports of those areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the 
control of the Bosnian Serb forces of all commercial river traffic those shipments authorised by 
the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
138 	SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraph 5 (requiring States to prevent the entry into their 
territories of persons travelling on a Southern Rhodesian passport or a passport purported to 
have been issued by the illegal minority regime, as well as persons ordinarily resident in 
Southern Rhodesia and suspected of having furthered or encouraged, or of being likely to 
further or encourage, the unlawful actions of the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia). 
139 	SIRES/1137 (12 November 1997), operative paragraph 4 (requiring States to prevent the entry 
into or transit through their territories of all Iraqi officials and members of the armed forces who 
were responsible for or participated in instances of interference with the work of (JNSCOM). 
140 	SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 6(c) (requiring States to take steps to deny 
entry to or expel Libyan nationals who had been denied entry to or expelled from other States 
because of their involvement in terrorist activities). 
141 S/RES/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 14 (requiring States to prevent the entry to 
their territories of: members of the authorities in those areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina under 
the control of the Bosnian Serb forces and those acting on behalf of such authorities; officers 
of the Bosnian Serb military and paramilitary forces and those acting on behalf of such forces; 
persons found to have provided financial, material, logistical, military or other tangible support 
to Bosnian Serb forces in violation of the sanctions; and persons in or resident of those areas 
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Taliban and Al Qaida 146 and Liberia (in the second instance). 147 In relation to the second 
sanctions regime against Liberia, the Council also applied travel sanctions against those who 
had violated sanctions.'" 
Exemptions from travel sanctions 
The Security Council has provided exemptions from travel sanctions in a number of 
instances, exempting travel: on humanitarian grounds (Southern Rhodesia, Sierra Leone and 
Liberia — in the second instance); 149 to facilitate a peace process (the Bosnian Serbs and 
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces who 
found to have violated or contributed to the violation of the sanctions against the Bosnian 
Serb party). 
142 	S/RES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 3 (requiring States to prevent the entry into their 
territory of: officers of the Haitian military, including the police, and their families; the major 
participants in the 1991 coup d 'etat and members of the illegal governments in power since the 
coup, as well as their immediate families; and people employed by or acting on behalf of the 
Haitian military and their immediate families). 
143 	SIRES/1127 (28 August 1997), operative paragraph 4 (requiring States to prevent the entry into 
or transit through their territories of senior UNITA officials and all adult members of their 
immediate families, and to suspend or cancel any travel documents issued to people in those 
categories). 
144 	S/RES/1054 (26 April 1996), operative paragraph 3(b) (requiring States to restrict the entry into 
or transit through their territory of members of the Government of Sudan, officials of that 
Government, and members of the Sudanese armed forces). 
145 	SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 5 (requiring States to prevent the entry into 
or transit through their territories of the military junta and adult members of their families); 
SIRES/1171 (5 June 1998), operative paragraph 5 (requiring States to prevent the entry into or 
transit through their territories of leading members of the former military junta and of the 
Revolutionary United Front). 
146 	SIRES/1390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraph 2(b) (requiring States to prevent the entry 
into or transit through their territories of Usama Bin Laden, members of Al Qaida and the 
Taliban, and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them). 
147 	SIRES/I343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 7(a) (requiring States to prevent the entry into 
or transit through their territories of senior members of the Liberian Government and armed 
forces, as well as the spouses of those individuals and any other individuals providing 
financial or military support to rebel groups in countries neighbouring Liberia, and in particular 
the RUF in Sierra Leone). 
148 SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 28 (requiring all States to prevent the entry into 
or transit through their territories of individuals determined by the 1343 Committee to be in 
violation of the arms sanctions imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 1343 (2001)). 
149 	In connection with Southern Rhodesia, see: S/RES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraph 5 
(exempting from the travel sanctions travel "on exceptional humanitarian grounds"). In 
connection with Sierra Leone, see: SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 5 
(exempting from the travel sanctions travel for "verified humanitarian purposes", when 
authorized by the Sierra Leone Sanctions Committee). In connection with Liberia (in the second 
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Liberia — in the second instance); 150 consistent with the purposes of a sanctions regime (the 
Bosnian Serbs, Haiti, Sierra Leone, the Taliban & Al Qaida, and Liberia — in the second 
instance); 151 for the fulfilment of a judicial process (the Taliban and Al Qaida); 152 and on 
official intergovernmental business (Liberia — in the second instance)." 3 The Council has also 
begun to issue a standard exemption providing that nothing would oblige a State to refuse 
entry to its own nationals, doing so in relation to the sanctions regimes against UNITA," 4 
Sierra Leone, 155 the Taliban/A1 Qaida156 and Liberia (in the second instance). 157 
instance), see: S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 7(b) (providing that the travel 
sanctions would not apply when travel was justified on the grounds of humanitarian need). 
150 	In connection with the Bosnian Serbs, see: S/RES/942 (23 September 1994), operative 
paragraph 14 (exempting travel for purposes consistent with the pursuit of the peace process, 
when authorized by the 724 Committee or the Security Council). In connection with Liberia (in 
the second instance), see: SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 7(b) (exempting 
travel that would assist in the peaceful resolution of conflict in the subregion). 
151 	In connection with the Bosnian Serbs, see: S/RES/942 (23 September 1994), operative 
paragraph 14 (exempting travel for purposes consistent with the relevant resolutions of the 
Council, when authorized by the 724 Committee or the Security Council). In connection with 
Haiti, see: S/RES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 3 (providing for the possibility of 
exemptions from the travel sanctions when approved, by the Haiti Sanctions Committee, for 
purposes consistent with the relevant Security Council resolutions addressing the situation in 
Haiti). In connection with Sierra Leone, see: SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 
5 (providing for the possibility of exemptions from the travel sanctions, when approved by the 
Sierra Leone Sanctions Committee, for purposes consistent with ensuring that the military junta 
relinquished power in Sierra Leone and made way for the restoration of the democratically 
elected Government and a return to constitutional order); SIRES/ 1171 (5 June 1998), operative 
paragraph 5 (providing simply that exemptions could be authorized by the Sierra Leone 
Sanctions Committee, without stipulating the cases in which such exemptions might be 
provided). In connection with the Taliban and Al Qaida, see: SIRES/1390 (16 January 2002), 
operative paragraph 2(b) (providing for the possibility of exemptions from the travel sanctions 
where approved by the Taliban/AI Qaida Sanctions Committee). In connection with Liberia (in 
the second instance), see: S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 7(b) (providing that 
the travel would not be prohibited where it would promote Liberian compliance with the 
objectives of the sanctions regime). 
152 S/RES/1390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraph 2(b) (exempting travel where necessary for 
the fulfilment of a judicial process). 
153 SIRES/l343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 7(a) (providing that the travel sanctions would 
not apply to representatives of the Liberian Government travelling on official business to 
United Nations headquarters or to official meetings of the Mano River Union, ECO WAS or the 
OAU). 
154 SIRES/1127 (28 August 1997), operative paragraph 4(a). 
155 S/RES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 5; SIRES/1171 (5 June 1998), operative 
paragraph 5. 
156 S/RES/1390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraph 2(b). 
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7.2.4 Aviation sanctions 
Aviation sanctions aim to prohibit flights to and from a target or to inhibit a target's 
ability to utilize flights within its own area of influence. 158 The Security Council has employed 
aviation sanctions banning all flights to and from a target as part of its sanctions regimes 
against Southern Rhodesia,'" Iraq,' 6° Libya,161  the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia- 
Montenegro), 162 Halu..,163 UNITA164 and the Taliban and Al Qaida. 165 The Council has 
imposed sanctions targeting the operations of a target's national airline in the case of the 
sanctions regimes against Libya, 166 5udan167 and the Taliban. 168 In examples of sanctions 
157 	SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 7(a); S/RES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative 
paragraph 28. 
158 	As noted above, aviation sanctions are to be distinguished from aircraft sanctions, which 
prohibit trade in aircraft and aircraft parts. 
159 	SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraph 6 (requiring States to prevent airline companies 
from flying to or from Southern Rhodesia and from linking up with Southern Rhodesian 
airlines). 
160 	S/RES/670 (25 September 1990), operative paragraph 3 (requiring all States to prevent aircraft 
destined for, or originating from Iraq or Kuwait, from departing from or over-flying their 
territory). 
161 	S/RES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 4(a) (requiring States to deny permission to 
any aircraft to take off from, land in, or overfly their territory if it was destined to land in or had 
taken off from the territory of Libya). 
162 	SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 7(a) (requiring States to deny permission to any 
aircraft to take off from, land in, or overfly their territories if it was destined for or had departed 
from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)). 
163 	S/RES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 2 (requiring States to deny permission to any 
aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory if it was destined for or had originated 
from Haiti). 
164 	SIRES/1127 (28 August 1997), operative paragraph 4(d)(i) (requiring States to prevent aircraft 
from arriving in, departing from, or overflying their territories if they had originated from or 
were destined for places not on a list of places cleared by the Angolan Government). 
165 	SIRES/1267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraph 4(a) (requiring States required to deny 
aircraft permission to land in or fly over their territories if owned or operated by the Taliban); 
SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 11 (requiring States to prevent all aircraft 
flying to or from Taliban-controlled territories from landing in, departing from or over-flying 
their territories). 
166 	S/RES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 6(b) (requiring States to prevent the operation 
of all Libyan Arab Airlines offices); SIRES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraph 6(a) 
(requiring States to ensure the immediate closure of all Libyan Arab Airlines offices within their 
territories), operative paragraph 6(b) (requiring States to prohibit any commercial transactions 
with Libyan Arab Airlines by their nationals or from their territory, including the honouring or 
endorsement of any tickets or other documents issued by that airline). 
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that aim to inhibit a target's ability to utilize flights within its own sphere of influence, the 
Council has prohibited the provision of technical assistance, advice, training, insurance and 
insurance-related payments related to the use, manufacture or maintenance of aircraft within 
areas controlled by a target as part of its sanctions regimes against Libya, 169 the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia- Montenegro) 17° and UNITA. 171 
Exemptions from aviation sanctions 
The Security Council has provided exemptions from most instances of aviation 
sanctions. Exemptions have been granted from aviation sanctions prohibiting flights to or 
from a target in the following situations: when carrying medical supplies, foodstuffs and other 
humanitarian items (Iraq, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), Libya, 
Haiti, UNITA, and the Taliban & Al Qaida); 172 in cases of medical emergency (UNITA); 173 
167 	SIRES/1070 (16 August 1996), operative paragraph 3 (requiring States to deny aircraft 
permission to take off from, land in or overfly their territories where those aircraft were owned 
by Sudan Airways or the Sudanese Government, or by an undertaking that was owned or 
controlled by Sudan Airways or the Sudanese Government). 
168 	SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 8(b) (requiring States to close all offices 
on their territories belonging to Afghan airlines). 
169 	SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 4(b) (requiring States to prohibit the provision 
to Libya of aircraft engineering or servicing of, or airworthiness certification or aircraft 
insurance to, Libyan aircraft); SIRES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraph 6(d) 
(requiring States to prohibit the supply of any materials destined for the construction, 
improvement or maintenance of Libyan airfields, or of engineering or other services for the 
maintenance of Libyan airfields), operative paragraph 6(e) (requiring States to prohibit the 
provision of advice, assistance, or training to Libyan pilots, flight engineers, or aircraft and 
ground maintenance personnel associated with the operation of aircraft and airfields within 
Libya); operative paragraph 6(f) (requiring States to prohibit the renewal of any direct 
insurance for Libyan aircraft). 
170 	S/RES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 7(b) (requiring States to prohibit the provision 
of maintenance services and parts in support of aircraft registered in that country). 
171 	SIRES/1127 (28 August 1997), operative paragraph 4(d)(iii) (requiring States to prohibit the 
provision of engineering, servicing, certification or insurance for aircraft registered in Angola, 
other than those designated by the Angolan Government). 
172 	In connection with Iraq, see: SIRES/670 (25 September 1990), operative paragraph 3 (exempting 
aircraft carrying food, in humanitarian circumstances, when authorized by the 661 Committee in 
accordance with resolution 666 (1990), and supplies intended strictly for medical purposes). In 
connection with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), see: SIRES/757 (30 
May 1992), operative paragraph 7(a) (exempting flights made for humanitarian or other 
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for instances of religious obligation (the Taliban and AlaiQ daN;174 ) for flights by the United 
Nations or other international actors (Iraq, Libya, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro) and Taliban and Al Qaida); 175 in order to enable the inspection and verification 
of cargo (Iraq); 176 where authorized by a Sanctions Committee (Iraq); 177 for regularly 
purposes consistent with the sanctions regime, when approved by the 724 Committee). In 
connection with Libya, see: SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 4(a) (providing 
exemptions from the prohibition against flights to or from Libya when approved by the Libya 
Sanctions Committee on grounds of "significant humanitarian need"). In connection with Haiti, 
see: SIRES/9 17 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 2 (exempting flights approved for 
humanitarian purposes by the Haiti Sanctions Committee). In connection with UNITA, see: 
SIRES/1127 (28 August 1997), operative paragraph 5 (exempting "flights carrying food, 
medicine or supplies for essential humanitarian needs", when approved in advance by the 
UNITA Sanctions Committee). In connection with the Taliban and Al Qaida, see: S/RES/1267 
(15 October 1999), operative paragraph 4(a) (exempting flights pursuant to a humanitarian need, 
when approved in advance by the 1267 Committee); SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative 
paragraph 11 (exempting flights approved in advance by the Committee on the grounds of 
humanitarian need, when approved in advance by the 1267 Committee). 
173 	S/RES/1127 (28 August 1997), operative paragraph 5 (exempting "cases of medical emergency", 
when approved in advance by the UNITA Sanctions Committee). 
174 
 
SIRES/1267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraph 4(a) (exempting flights connected with the 
Hajj pilgrimage, which are qualified as a sub-category of cases of "humanitarian need", when 
approved in advance by the 1267 Committee); SIRES/I333 (19 December 2000), operative 
paragraph 11 (exempting flights approved in advance by the Committee on the grounds of 
religious obligation, such as the performance of the Hajj, when approved in advance by the 
1267 Committee). 
175 	In connection with Iraq, see: SIRES/670 (25 September 1990),operative paragraphs 3, 4(c) 
(exempting flights certified by the United Nations as solely for the purpose of the United 
Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group). In connection with Libya, see: S/RES/910 (14 April 
1994), operative paragraph 1 (exempting U.N. aircraft carrying a reconnaissance team to explore 
the feasibility of deploying a team of U.N. observers to monitor Libya's withdrawal from the 
Aouzou strip); SIRES/91 5 (4 May 1994), operative paragraph 4 (exempting U.N. aircraft carrying 
the observer group subsequently established for that purpose. The observer group - the 
United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG) - was established in operative 
paragraph 2 of the same resolution). In connection with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia-Montenegro), see: S/RES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 10 (exempting flights 
connected to the activities of UNPROFOR, the CY and the EC Monitoring Mission). The 
Council reaffirmed the ongoing exemption of these entities in subsequent resolutions: see, e.g., 
S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 30. In connection with the Taliban and Al 
Qaida, see: SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 12 (exempting flights being 
undertaken for humanitarian purposes by humanitarian organizations, when they featured on a 
list approved by the 1267 Committee). 
176 	SIRES/670 (25 September 1990),operative paragraph 4(a) (permitting aircraft destined for or 
originating from Iraq or Kuwait to land if for the purpose of inspection to ensure that it was not 
carrying cargo in violation of the sanctions). 
177 
 
SIRES/670 (25 September 1990),operative paragraph 4(b) (exempting flights approved by the 
Iraq Sanctions Committee). 
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scheduled commercial passenger flights (Haiti); 178 and to facilitate the achievement of the 
objectives of a sanctions regime (the Taliban and Al Qaida). 179 The Council also outlined 
exemptions from sanctions aiming to inhibit the operation of flights on one occasion, 
exempting from the Libya sanctions regime the provision of materials for the construction, 
improvement or maintenance of Libyan airfields for emergency equipment and equipment 
and services directly related to civilian air traffic control.' 8° 
7.2.5 Sporting, cultural and scientific sanctions 
Sporting, cultural and scientific sanctions are measures that aim to prohibit sporting, 
cultural and scientific relations between the target and the external world. 181 The Security 
Council has employed sporting, cultural and scientific sanctions once, as part of the 
sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro). 182 
7.2.6 Telecommunications sanctions 
Telecommunications sanctions, which are listed in Article 41 as one potential 
measure that might be applied as part of a sanctions regime, would entail disrupting 
178 SIRES/9 17 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 2 (exempting regularly scheduled commercial 
passenger flights). 
179 
 
SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 11 (exempting flights approved in 
advance by the Committee on the grounds that the flight was likely to promote Taliban 
compliance with the objectives of the sanctions regime or discussion of a peaceful resolution 
of the conflict in Afghanistan). 
180 	SIRES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraph 6(d). 
181 Sporting, cultural and scientific sanctions could be treated as three separate types of 
sanctions. They are treated as a single category here, because they were applied at the same 
time by the Council in the case of the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia-Montenegro). 
182 S/RES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 8(b) (requiring States to prevent the 
participation in sporting events on their territory of persons or groups representing the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)); operative paragraph 8(c) (requiring States 
to suspend scientific and technical cooperation and cultural exchanges and visits involving 
persons or groups officially sponsored by or representing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro)). 
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telecommunications between the target of a sanctions regime and the outside world. 
Although the Security Council has not yet employed telecommunications sanctions, it 
nevertheless expressed its readiness to consider imposing such measures as part of the 
sanctions regime against UNITA. 183 In another action linked to the potential disruption of a 
target's telecommunications, the Council encouraged the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia-Montenegro) to sever telecommunications links between it and the areas of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina under the control of the Bosnian Serbs, while that group was subject to 
U.N. sanctions.'" 
183 	S/RES/1221 (12 January 1999), operative paragraph 8 [expressing its readiness to consider the 
imposition of telecommunications sanctions and requesting the 864 Committee to explore and 
report on that possibility]. 
184 	SIRES/988 (21 April 1995), operative paragraph 10. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia- 
Montenegro) had severed such telecommunications once before, in August 1994, so the 
Council's encouragement was phrased in terms of reinstating that severance. 
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defining temporal application and addressing 
unintended consequences 
In its decisions establishing the legal basis for sanctions and delineating their scope, 
the Council often employs other mechanisms to fine-tune its sanctions regimes. Among these 
mechanisms, the Council has clarified sanctions senders and targets, defined the temporal 
application of sanctions, and sought to address the unintended consequences of its sanctions 
regimes upon civilian populations and third States. 
8.1 Identifying the actors who must apply sanctions 
As noted above, Article 48 of the Charter provides that the Security Council may 
decide to call upon some or all Members of the United Nations to take action to implement 
its decisions.' In practice, however, the Council has tended to leave the obligations created 
by its sanctions regimes general, stipulating simply that either all Member States were 
required to impose the sanctions (as in the case of the sanctions regime against the illegal 
minority regime in Southern Rhodesia) or that "all States" were required to impose the 
sanctions.' The Council has, however, called upon particular States to take action to 
improve the implementation or enforcement of sanctions. 3 
8.2 Identifying sanctions targets and targeting decision-makers 
As the Charter framework for collective security was designed to address disputes 
between States, the founders of the U.N. likely envisaged sanctions being applied against 
Article 48, Charter of the United Nations. 
See Chapter 4, section 4.2, above. 
For details of the actions required or requested of particular States, see Chapter 10, below. 
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State targets. In practice, sanctions have been applied against a range of targets, including 
single and multiple States, failed States, as well as against pseudo-State-, sub-State- and 
extra-State-actors. In addition, the practice of the Security Council demonstrates an 
increasing recognition of the desirability of applying measures that seek to impact decision-
makers within the general group against which sanctions are imposed. When the Council 
imposes sanctions, it therefore undertakes a two-step process of targeting. The first step is 
to identify the general target against which the sanctions will be imposed, and the second 
step is to consider implementing measures that will directly target decision-makers within the 
general target. 
8.2.1 Identifying the target(s) against which sanctions are to be applied: the 
diverse range of targets 
i. 	Single State targets 
The Security Council has targeted single States in the manner likely envisaged by the 
founders of the U.N. in the cases of the sanctions against South Africa, the former 
Yugoslavia, Libya, Sudan, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to address the situation in 
Kosovo, and Liberia to address its support of rebel groups in the region. In each of these 
instances, the sanctions were imposed against a functioning Government and were applied to 
the territory of the State as a whole. In the case of the former Yugoslavia sanctions regime, 
however, the maintenance of the sanctions after the dissolution of Yugoslavia meant that 
their target effectively became the successor States of the former Yugoslavia. 
Multiple States targets 
As just mentioned, the continuation of the former Yugoslavia sanctions beyond the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia effectively led, albeit unintentionally, to the first application of a 
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U.N. sanctions regime against multiple State targets. The Council subsequently imposed 
sanctions against multiple State targets in the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea, in an attempt to 
resolve the conflict between those two countries. 
De facto State targets 
The term `de facto State targets" is used here to denote targets which are in de 
facto control of the machinery of Government within a State, but which are not recognized 
by the international community to be the legitimate, or de jure, Government of that State. 
The Security Council has imposed sanctions against de facto State targets in the cases of 
the Southern Rhodesia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), Haiti, 
Sierra Leone and Afghanistan. In the case of Southern Rhodesia, the sanctions were applied 
against the illegal white minority regime led by Ian Smith. In the case of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), sanctions were applied against the de facto 
Government of Serbia-Montenegro, led by Slobodan Milosevic. 4 In the case of Haiti, the 
sanctions were employed against the de facto authorities who had seized power from the 
democratically-elected Government of President Aristide. In the case of Sierra Leone, the 
sanctions were initially applied against the military junta that had seized power from the 
democratically-elected Government of Sierra Leone. Finally, in the case of Afghanistan, the 
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) is treated here as a case of a de facto 
State target rather than as a State target due to a dispute concerning that entity's international 
status which took place while sanctions were imposed. The international community refused to 
recognize the claim made by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) to the 
former Yugoslavia's membership n the United Nations. It was also hesitant to grant the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) membership in its own right until it had 
engaged meaningfully in the peace process in the former Yugoslavia. Ultimately, it was 
admitted to membership in the United Nation on 1 November 2000, under the name "the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia". See: SIRES/1326 (31 October 2000) (recommending to the General 
Assembly that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia be admitted to membership); A/RES/55/12 (1 
November 2000) (resolution of the General Assembly admitting the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia as a Member State). 
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sanctions were initially imposed against the Taliban regime. 5 In the cases of Southern 
Rhodesia, Haiti and Sierra Leone, the sanctions were applied against the entire territories of 
the States over which the de facto authorities were exercising control. In the case of the 
sanctions against the Taliban, however, the sanctions were applied against Taliban-
controlled territory, which initially amounted to approximately 90 percent of the total 
tenitory of Afghanistan. 
iv. Failed State targets 
The Security Council has applied sanctions against targets which have effectively 
constituted failed States in the cases of Somalia, Liberia and Rwanda. In each of those 
instances the relevant country found itself in a state of chaotic civil war and the Security 
Council imposed an aims embargo with the aim of fostering peace and stability. In the case 
of the sanctions against Rwanda, however, the sanctions regime was modified fifteen months 
after its initial application, such that it exempted the then Government and targeted sub-State 
actors in Rwanda and neighbouring States. 6 
v. Sub-State targets 
The main characteristic of sub-State targets is that they operate within, and tend to 
pose a threat to the peace and security of, a State. In general, sub-State targets are rebel 
groups that seek to acquire control of the State from the existing Government. The Security 
With the Security Council's subsequent modification of the Taliban sanctions regime, such 
that the sanctions subsequently targeted first the activities within Afghanistan of the Taliban, 
Usama Bin Laden, Al Qaida, and associates of those entities, then second the activities of 
those entities wherever they may take place, the target of the regime changed from being a 
pseudo-State to a sub-State actor (in the case of the Taliban) and extra-State actors (in the 
cases of Bin Laden and Al Qaida and their associates). For discussion of those aspects of the 
sanctions regime, see the discussion of sub-State and extra-State actors. 
For further discussion, see the discussion on sub-State targets. 
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Council has applied sanctions against sub-State actors in the case of the Bosnian Serbs, 
UNITA, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and the Taliban. In the case of the Bosnian Serbs and 
UNITA, the sanctions targeted those sub-State actors from the point at which they were 
imposed until they were terminated. In the case of the sanctions against Rwanda, the 
sanctions were initially imposed against a failed-State target. The sanctions regime was 
subsequently modified, however, to exempt the new Rwandan Government from the arms 
embargo, making the new target of the sanctions non-Government forces operating in 
Rwanda, and in particular forces of the former Rwandan Government.' In the case of the 
sanctions against Sierra Leone and the Taliban, the Security Council initially imposed the 
sanctions against pseudo-State targets, before focusing them against sub-State targets. In 
the case of Sierra Leone, the target shifted once the Sierra Leone Government was returned 
to power, such that the sanctions were directed against the former military junta and 
members of the RUF. For its part, the Taliban changed from a pseudo-State to a sub-State 
target once it lost control of the reins of power in Afghanistan. 8 
vi. 	Extra-State targets 
An extra-State target is one which does not maintain a connection with a particular 
geographical base or operate solely within a particular State. The only examples of extra- 
Although the resolutions of the Security Council modifying the sanctions refer generally to 
"non-governmental forces", it is clear from various statements by the Security Council that the 
main target of the sanctions was former Rwandan Government. See for example the following 
provisions expressing great concern at reports that elements of the former Rwandan regime 
were making military preparations and undertaking incursions into Rwanda: SIRES/997 (9 June 
1995), preambular paragraph 5; S/RES/1011 (16 August 1995), preambular paragraph 7; 
S/RES/1013 (7 September 1995), preambular paragraph 5. See also the mandate of the 
International Commission of Inquiry established to investigate violations of the Rwandan 
sanctions: S/RES/1013 (7 September 1995), operative paragraph 1. 
The Taliban is treated as a sub-State actor rather than an extra-State actor due to the fact that it 
remains integrally connected to, and operative in, Afghanistan. 
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State targets to date are Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaida, and their associates. Initially, the 
sanctions against Bin Laden and Al Qaida and their associates were connected to their 
activities in Afghanistan. In Janimry 2002, however, the Security Council abolished the 
geographical nexus between Afghanistan and the Taliban/A1Qaida sanctions regime. 
8.2.2 Targeting decision-makers 
As noted by former Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali, sanctions tend to be 
a "blunt instmment". 9 Responding in part to a concern in respect of the unintended 
consequences of sanctions upon civilian populations, m the Security Council has 
experimented with measures designed to ensure that its sanctions regimes have a more direct 
impact upon policy-makers. Examples of the types of tailored measures applied by the 
Council are targeted financial sanctions and travel restrictions." Tailored measures have thus 
9 	 S/1995/1 (25 January 1995): Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the 
Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, 
paragraph 70 ("Sanctions, as is generally recognized, are a blunt instrument. They raise the 
ethical question of whether suffering inflicted on vulnerable groups in the target country is a 
legitimate means of exerting pressure on political leaders whose behaviour is unlikely to be 
affected by the plight of their subjects. Sanctions also always have unintended or unwanted 
effects"). 
10 	For more detailed discussion of the Council's initiatives to minimise the unintended 
consequences of sanctions, see section 8.4, below. 
II 	For further discussion of financial and travel sanctions, see Chapter 7, sections 7.1.3 and 7.2.3. 
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been employed as part of the sanctions regimes against Iraq, 12 Libya, 13 the Bosnian Serbs," 
Haiti, 15 UNITA, I6 Sudan, 17 Sierra Leone, 18 the Taliban/A1 Qaida l9 and Liberia. 20 
8.3 Defining the temporal application of sanctions 
When crafting a sanctions regime, the Security Council has occasionally 
experimented with the temporal application of the sanctions to be applied. Traditionally, a 
decision by the Council to impose sanctions required States to implement the sanctions 
immediately and for an unspecified duration. In some of its sanctions regimes, however, the 
Council has begun to experiment with the temporal application of sanctions, both in terms of 
12 	In the case of Iraq, the Council applied travel sanctions against Iraqi officials and military 
personnel who had obstructed the work of UNSCOM: SIRES/I137 (12 November 1997), 
operative paragraph 4. 
13 	In the case of Libya, travel sanctions were Toplied against Libyan nationals who had been 
involved in terrorist activities: SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 6(c). 
14 	In the case of the Bosnian Serbs, travel sanctions were applied against Bosnian Serb 
authorities, officers of the Bosnian Serb forces, people providing support to the Bosnian Serb 
forces, and residents of Bosnian Serb-controlled areas who had themselves violated the 
sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs: SIRES/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 14. 
15 	In the case of Haiti, travel sanctions were applied against officers of the Haitian military and 
police and their immediate families, major participants in the coup d'etat of 1991 and illegal 
governments since the coup and their immediate families, and those employed by or acting on 
behalf of the Haitian military and their immediate families: SIRES/917 (6 May 1994), operative 
paragraph 3. 
16 	In the case of the sanctions against UNITA, travel and financial sanctions were imposed 
against UNITA officials and adult members of their immediate families: SIRES/1127 (28 August 
1997), operative paragraphs 4(a), 4(b) (applying the travel sanctions); SIRES/1173 (12 June 
1998), operative paragraph 11 (applying the financial sanctions). 
17 	In the case of Sudan, travel sanctions were imposed against Members of the Government of 
Sudan, Sudanese Government officials, and members of the Sudanese armed forces: 
SIRES/1054 (26 April 1996), operative paragraph 3(b). 
18 	In the case of Sierra Leone, travel sanctions were applied against the members of the military 
junta and the RUF and adult members of their immediate families: SIRES/1132 (5 July 2000), 
operative paragraph 5; SIRES/1171 (5 June 1998), operative paragraph 5. 
19 	Financial, travel and arms sanctions have been imposed against the Taliban, Usama Bin Laden 
and Al Qaida and their associates: SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 8(c); 
SIRES/1390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraphs 2(a), 2(b), 2(c). 
20 	In the case of the second sanctions regime imposed against Liberia, travel sanctions have been 
imposed against senior members of the Liberian Government and armed forces and their 
spouses, and against individuals providing support to armed rebel groups in neighbouring 
States [SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 7(a)], as well as against individuals 
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when the sanctions enter into force and in terms of the length of time for which sanctions 
must be applied. 
8.3.1 Time-delays 
The Security Council has employed time-delays in respect of the entry into force of 
sanctions in eight of its sanctions regimes, including those against Libya,2 ' the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), 22 the Bosnian Serbs," Haiti,24 UNITA," 
found to have violated the arms embargo against Liberia [SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative 
paragraph 28]. 
21 	In connection with the sanctions regime against Libya, see: SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), 
operative paragraph 3 (providing that the sanctions would enter into force on 15 April 1992); 
SIRES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraph 2 (providing that the additional sanctions 
would enter into force on 1 December 1993). In the first of these instances, the Council did not 
explicitly provide that the sanctions would not come into force if Libya were to comply with the 
objectives of the sanctions regime before the date stipulated. In the second instance, however, 
it provided for the possibility that the additional sanctions might not enter into force if the 
Secretary-General were to report before the date of entry into force that Libya had complied 
with the requirements of the sanctions regime: see S/RES/883 (11 November 1993), operative 
paragraphs 2, 16. 
22 	See: SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraphs 10, 11, (providing that the additional 
sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) outlined in 
resolution 820 (1993) would come into effect 9 days later, unless the Secretary-General were to 
report that the Bosnian Serb party had signed the peace plan and ceased its military attacks). 
Although the Council had already used a time-delay as part of the Libya sanctions regime, the 
use of the time-delay in connection with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro) constituted the first occasion on which a time-delay had clearly been used to 
provide the target with a window of time in which they could avoid falling subject to the 
additional sanctions. 
23 	S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraphs 10, 11 (providing that the sanctions against 
the Bosnian Serbs, contained in operative paragraph 12, would come into effect 9 days later, 
unless the Secretary-General were to report that the Bosnian Serbs had signed the peace plan 
and ceased its military attacks). Interestingly, the Council did not employ a time-delay in 
September 1994, when it subsequently strengthened the Bosnian Serb sanctions regime: see 
S/RES/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraphs 6, 7, 11-15. 
24 	See: SIRES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraphs 3, 4 (providing that the initial sanctions 
would come into force one week after the resolution, unless the Secretary-General reported 
before that time that the imposition of the sanctions was not warranted); S/RES/873 (13 
October 1993), operative paragraph 1 (providing that the reimposition of sanctions would come 
into effect five days later, unless the Secretary-General were to report that the de facto 
authorities were implementing in full the agreement to reinstate the Government of President 
Aristide and had established the necessary measures to enable UNMIH to carry out its 
mandate); S/RES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 5 (providing that the comprehensive 
sanctions outlined in operative paragraphs 6-8 of that resolution would come into effect fifteen 
days later, unless the Secretary-General were to report that the Haitian military had taken the 
steps required of them under the Governor's Island Agreement). 
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Sudan, 26  the Taliban & Al Qaida," and Liberia (in the second instance). 28 The rationale for 
utilising time-delays is generally to provide the target with a period of grace during which it 
can avoid falling subject to the sanctions by satisfying the conditions tied to the termination of 
sanctions. In some instances, however, the Council has not explicitly declared its readiness 
to prevent the entry into force of the sanctions upon the satisfaction of certain conditions. 29 It 
25 	See, e.g.: S/RES/864 (15 September 1993), operative paragraph 17 (deciding that the sanctions 
would enter into force ten days later, unless the Secretary-General notified it that an effective 
cease-fire had been established and that agreement had been reached on the implementation of 
the Peace Accords and relevant Security Council resolutions); SIRES/1127 (28 August 1997), 
operative paragraph 7 (deciding that the sanctions would enter into force thirty-three days 
later, unless it were to decide, on the basis of a report by the Secretary-General, that UNITA 
had taken concrete and irreversible steps to comply with the obligations enunciated in that 
resolution); SIRES/1173 (12 June 1998), operative paragraph 14 (deciding that the sanctions 
would enter into force thirteen days later, unless it were to decide, on the basis of a report by 
the Secretary-General, that UNITA had fully complied by 23 June 1998 with all its obligations 
under that resolution). 
It is noteworthy that, on two occasions, the Council extended the initial date for the application 
of sanctions, in response to what appeared to be positive developments on the ground. The 
date for the entry into force of the sanctions outlined in resolution 1127 (1997), initially set for 
30 September 1997 (SIRES/1127 (28 August 1997), operative paragraph 7), was delayed for a 
period of thirty days: SIRES/1130 (29 September 1997), operative paragraph 2 (delaying the 
entry into force until 30 October 1997). The date for the entry into force of resolution 1173 
(1998), initially set for 25 June 1998, was also delayed, this time by six days: SIRES/1176 (24 
June 1998), operative paragraph. In both cases, the additional time seemed to be permitted in 
response to observations made by the Secretary-General relating to potential positive 
developments on the ground. 
26 	S/RES/1054 (26 April 1996), operative paragraph 2 (deciding that the sanctions would enter into 
force on 10 May 1996 — two weeks after the adoption of the resolution); SIRES/1070 (16 
August 1996), operative paragraph 4 (deciding that the additional sanctions would enter into 
force more than ninety days later, unless the Council had decided before then that Sudan had 
complied with the objectives of the sanctions). 
27 	SIRES/l267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraph 3 (providing that the initial sanctions would 
enter into force on 14 November 1999, unless the Council had decided that the Taliban had 
fully complied with its obligations under the sanctions regime); SIRES/1333 (19 December 
2000), operative paragraph 22 (providing that the modified sanctions would enter into force one 
month later). In subsequent modifications to the sanctions regime, however, the Council 
provided that the additional sanctions were to come into effect immediately. See, e.g., 
SIRES/l390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraphs I, 2. 
28 	SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 8 (deciding that the diamond and travel 
sanctions against Liberia would enter into force two months later, unless the Security Council 
were to determine that Liberia had complied with the objectives of the sanctions regime); 
S/RES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 17 (deciding that the timber sanctions against 
Liberia were to come into effect two months later, unless the Council were to decide otherwise). 
29 	See, e.g.: SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 3 (providing simply that the 
sanctions against Libya would enter into force on 15 April 1992); SIRES/1054 (26 April 1996), 
operative paragraph 2 (deciding simply that the sanctions against Sudan would enter into force 
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is unclear what the rationale might be for employing time-delays in the absence of a desire to 
induce the early compliance of a target with the objectives of a sanctions regime, but one 
possibility is that the Council is mindful of granting States sufficient time to make the 
necessary arrangements to ensure that the sanctions will be effectively implemented once 
they enter into force. 
In respect of a number of those sanctions regimes the Council has used a 
combination of immediate and time-delayed sanctions over the course of the regime, without 
blending the two in a particular decision applying or modifying sanctions. In the cases of 
Haiti and Liberia (in the second instance), however, the Council provided for the staggered 
application of sanctions, stipulating that some sanctions were to be effective immediately, 
whilst others would enter into force after a time-delay." 
8.3.2 Time-limits 
The Security Council has employed time-limits in connection with six of its sanctions 
regimes. The Council first experimented with a time-limit in May 2000, as part of the 
on 10 May 1996 — two weeks after the adoption of the resolution); S/RES/1333 (19 December 
2000), operative paragraph 22 (providing simply that the modified sanctions against the 
Taliban, Bin Laden and Al Qaida, would enter into force one month later). 
30 	In connection with the Haiti sanctions regime, see: SIRES/9l7 (6 May 1994), operative 
paragraphs 2, 3 (stipulating that the aviation and travel sanctions were to be applied "without 
delay"), operative paragraph 5 (providing that the comprehensive sanctions outlined in 
operative paragraphs 6-8 of that resolution would come into effect fifteen days later, unless the 
Secretary-General were to report that the Haitian military had taken the steps required of them 
under the Governor's Island Agreement). 
In connection with the sanctions regime against Liberia (in the second instance), see: 
SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 8 (deciding that the diamond and travel 
sanctions would enter into force two months later), operative paragraph 9 (deciding that the 
arms sanctions were established for an initial period of 14 months, without referring to any 
time-delay. Thus, the implication was that the sanctions were to come into effect immediately); 
SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 17 (deciding that the timber sanctions were to 
come into effect two months later), 28 (imposing the additional travel sanctions without 
specifying any time-delay, thus implying that the travel sanctions were to enter into force 
immediately). 
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sanctions regime against Ethiopia and Eritrea. The sanctions were established for a period of 
twelve months,31 at the end of which the Council did not decide to extend the sanctions any 
further and they therefore expired?' Since then the Council has employed time-limits as part 
of its sanctions regimes against Sierra Leone, 33 the Tahban and Al Qaida, 34 Liberia (in the 
second instance),35 certain actors in the DRC, 36 and Liberia (in the third instance). 37 
31 	S/RES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 16 (deciding that the sanctions were 
established for twelve months and that the Council would decide at the end of that period 
whether Ethiopia and Eritrea had complied with the objectives of the sanctions regime and thus 
whether to extend the sanctions). 
12 	On 15 May 2001, the Council adopted a presidential statement, confirming that the sanctions 
regime would indeed expire the following day: S/PRST/2001/14 (15 May 2001): Presidential 
statement of 15 May 2001. In that statement, the Council emphasized the importance of the 
Algiers Peace Agreement, which the parties had signed on 12 December 2000 (S/2000/1183 (13 
December 2000), annex), recognised that the signing of the Algiers Agreement was consistent 
with the objectives of the Ethiopia/Eritrea sanctions regime, and stated that, under the existing 
circumstances, it had not extended the sanctions beyond the expiration date of 16 May 2001. 
The Council urged the parties, however, to focus their efforts on reconstruction, development 
and reconciliation rather than on weapons procurement and other military activities, and 
expressed the intention take appropriate measures if the situation between Eritrea and Ethiopia 
again threatened regional peace and security. 
33 	The Council incorporated a time-limit as part of its Sierra Leone sanctions regime when it 
imposed diamond sanctions for an initial period of eighteen months: S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000), 
operative paragraphs 1, 5, 6. The sanctions were subsequently extended on two occasions, for 
periods of eleven and six months (S/RES/ 1385 (19 December 2001), operative paragraph 3; 
SIRES/1446 (4 December 2002), operative paragraph 2), before ultimately expiring in June 2003. 
See: SC17778 (5 June 2003): Press statement on the Sierra Leone Diamond Embargo by the 
President of the Security Council (noting that the members of the Council had agreed not to 
renew the diamond sanctions, in light of the Government of Sierra Leone's increased efforts to 
manage its diamond industry and ensure proper control over diamond areas, and in light of its 
full participation in the Kimberley Process). 
34 	The Council incorporated a time-limit as part of its sanctions regime against the Taliban and Al 
Qaida in December 2000, when it decided that the additional measures against the Taliban 
would terminate after twelve months, unless it (the Council) were to decide otherwise: 
SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 23. In its subsequent resolutions, 
however, the Council has not incorporated time-limits, noting instead that it would review the 
sanctions after twelve months and decide how to improve them. See, e.g., SIRES/1390 (16 
January 2002), operative paragraph 3; SIRES/1455 (17 January 2003), operative paragraphs 1, 2; 
SIRES/1526 (30 January 2004), operative paragraph 3. 
35 	In connection with the sanctions regime against Liberia (in the second instance), the Council 
has outlined time-limits for most of the sanctions imposed. The arms sanctions were applied for 
an initial period of fourteen months (S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraphs 5, 9), 
which has subsequently been extended for two further periods of twelve months (SIRES/l408 
(6 May 2002), operative paragraph 5; SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 10). The 
diamond and travel sanctions, which came into effect two months after the application of the 
arms sanctions, were applied for an initial period of twelve months (S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), 
operative paragraphs 6, 7, 8), which has subsequently been extended for two further periods of 
twelve months (SIRES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 5; SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), 
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8.4 Addressing the unintended consequences of sanctions 
As noted in Chapter 1, U.N. sanctions have received considerable criticism due to 
the negative consequences that have resulted from their application both for civilian 
populations living in a target State, as well as for States that would normally benefit from 
engaging in trade or other relations with the target. This section outlines the manner in which 
the Council has sought to address unintended consequences both for civilian populations and 
for third States.38 
8.4.1 Security Council action to address the humanitarian impact of sanctions 
upon civilian populations 
The United Nations has been quite sensitive to the charge that sanctions have 
brought suffering upon civilian populations. 39 For its part, the Security Council and its 
operative paragraph 10). The timber sanctions, have been applied for an initial period of ten 
months, beginning on 6 July 2003 (SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 17). 
Interestingly, the Council did not set a time-limit for the additional travel sanctions applied in 
May 2003: SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 28. It is questionable, however, 
whether the relevant provisions in and of themselves would result in the termination of the 
sanctions at he end of the time-period specified. The provisions state that the relevant 
sanctions would terminate after the stipulated period if the Council were to decide that the 
Liberian Government had complied with the conditions of the sanctions regime. 
36 	SIRES/1493 (28 July 2003), operative paragraph 20 (applying the arms sanctions for an initial 
period of 12 months). 
37 	S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraph 18 (deciding that the Liberia III sanctions 
were established for 12 months). Interestingly, the Council did not provide for an express time-
limit when it imposed subsequent financial sanctions as part of the same sanctions regime, 
noting instead that the measures would be reviewed within 12 months. See: SIRES/1532 (12 
March 2004), operative paragraphs 1 (imposing financial sanctions), 5 (deciding to review the 
financial sanctions at least once a year). 
38 	The focus of discussion here is upon actual action taken by the Security Council to address 
the unintended consequences of sanctions. For policy recommendations suggesting how the 
performance of sanctions might be modified to minimise unintended consequences, see 
Chapters 11 and 12. 
39 	See, for example: S/1995/1 (25 January 1995): Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position 
Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United 
Nations, paragraph 70 ("Sanctions, as is generally recognized, are a blunt instrument. They 
raise the ethical question of whether suffering inflicted on vulnerable groups in the target 
country is a legitimate means of exerting pressure on political leaders whose behaviour is 
unlikely to be affected by the plight of their subjects. Sanctions also always have unintended 
or unwanted effects"); and the statement by senior United Nations official Lakhdar Brahimi in 
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sanctions-related subsidiary bodies have noted that the aim of sanctions is not to harm 
civilian populations.4° The Council and its permanent members have also issued a number of 
statements to the effect that more must be done to minimize the humanitarian impact of 
sanctions.4 ' In terms of concrete action, the Security Council has sought to address the 
negative humanitarian consequences of sanctions upon civilian populations in three main 
ways. First, the Council has outlined humanitarian exemptions from comprehensive and 
complex sanctions regimes. Second, it has moved towards targeted, "smart sanctions". 
Third, it has begun to request more frequent assessments of the humanitarian and socio-
economic impact of sanctions. 
i. 	The exemptions process 
As already noted in Chapter 7, the Security Council has outlined humanitarian 
exemptions from each of the comprehensive sanctions regimes applied to date, articulating 
particular exempt items, as well as classes of supplies that can be exempt with the approval 
his foreword to: Gibbons, Elizabeth D., Sanctions in Haiti: human rights and democracy under 
assault (1999) Praeger, Westport, CT, x ("The dilemma UN officials face [with respect to 
sanctions regimes] is a familiar one: they, of course, wholeheartedly support the international 
community's agenda aimed at restoring and promoting democracy and are professionally 
bound to implement the decisions of the Organization that employs them. But more and more 
there is uneasiness among UN staff because, unfortunately, sanctions do produce extensive 
and lasting damage that affects a majority of the innocent population rather than the intended 
targets"). 
ao 	For an example of a statement by the Council itself, see: S/PRST/2000/12 (7 April 2000): 
Presidential statement of 7 April 2000, paragraph 17. For similar statements by the Council's 
sanctions-related subsidiary bodies, see: S/1999/644 (4 June 1999), annex: Report on the visit 
by the Chairman of the 864 Committee to Central and Southern Africa, May 1999, paragraph 
18; S/1999/829 (28 July 1999), annex: Report on the visit by the Chairman of the 864 Committee 
to Europe and participation in the seventieth ordinary session of the Council of Ministers of 
the Organization of African Unity, July 1999,   paragraph 23. 
41 See, e.g., S/1995/300 (13 April), annex: Humanitarian impact of sanctions (containing a non-
paper by the five permanent members of the Council), paragraph 1; S/1999/92(29 January 1999): 
Note by the President of the Security Council: Work of the Sanctions Committees, paragraphs 
1, 9, 10 and 11. 
211 
8. Fine-tuning sanctions: senders and targets, temporal application and unintended consequences 
of the relevant Sanctions Committee. 42 The Council has also provided for exemptions from 
financial sanctions for the purchase of humanitarian items and to finance pensions, the 
provision of basic services, payments on the ground of humanitarian need, and "basic" or 
"extraordinary" personal expenses of individuals subject to fmancial sanctions. 43 The Council 
has also expressed its support, via the issuance of a Presidential Note, for the idea that food, 
pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, and basic agricultural and medical equipment should be 
exempt from any sanctions regime. 44 In that note it also expressed the view that 
consideration should be given to drawing up lists of items that should be excluded from 
sanctions regimes and it recognized that civilian populations in target States should have 
access to appropriate resources and procedures for financing humanitarian imports. 45 
Towards the end of the comprehensive Iraq sanctions regime's tenure, the Security 
Council also refined the exemptions process in a way that might provide a positive 
precedent, should comprehensive sanctions again be employed. In May 2002, the Council 
adopted a "Goods Review List" ("GRL"). 46 The GRL contained an exhaustive list of 
potential "dual-use" items, the supply to Iraq of which must first be approved via a process 
which involves careful consideration of the items by the United Nations Monitoring 
Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), which then recommended the approval or refusal of the application by the 
42 	See also Chapter 8, as well as the discussion of the element of consistency earlier in this 
chapter. 
43 	See also Chapter 7. 
44 
	
S/1999/92 (29 January 1999): Note by the President of the Security Council: Work of the 
Sanctions Committees, paragraph 16. 
45 
	
Ibid. 
46 
	
The GRL was adopted by SIRES/1409 (14 May 2002), operative paragraph 2. It was refined by 
S/RES/1454 (30 December 2002), operative paragraph I. 
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661 Committee.47 Anything that was not on the list was considered to be exempt from 
sanctions, thus requiring simple notification to the Committee. After the introduction of the 
GRL process the flow of exempted goods and commodities to Iraq under the Oil-for-Food 
Programme increased substantially. 48 
Smart sanctions 
As charted in Chapters 5 and 7, there has been an evolution in the Security 
Council's practice towards "smart" or "targeted" sanctions. 49 The Council has thus sought to 
target decision-makers more directly, through the employment of individual travel and 
financial sanctions. It has also focused its sanctions regimes increasingly upon strategic 
goods, prohibiting particular items — such as arms, diamonds and timber — the export or 
import of which is perceived to contribute to the relevant threat to the peace. 
Humanitarian impact assessment 
The Council has requested the Secretary-General and sanctions-related subsidiary 
bodies to undertake a number of monitoring and evaluation activities in relation to the 
humanitarian situation in areas subject to sanctions. The Secretary-General has thus been 
requested to report on the humanitarian situation in general in a target State, 5° to appoint a 
47 	For the GRL itself, see: S/2002/515 (20 May 2002); and SIRES/1454 (30 December 2002), Annex 
A. For the procedures relating to the application of the GRL, see: SIRES/1409 (14 May 2002), 
attachment; SIRES/1454 (30 December 2002), Annex B. 
48 	For details of the improvements resulting from the introduction of the GRL, see the report of 
the Secretary-General dated 12 November 2002: S/2002/1239 (12 November 2002). 
49 For monographs studying this evolution, see: Smart Sanctions: the Next Steps. The Debate on 
Arms Embargoes and Travel Sanctions within the 'Bonn-Berlin Process' (2001) Nomos, 
Baden-Baden; Cortright, David & Lopez, George A. (eds), Smart Sanctions: Targeting 
Economic Statecraft (2002) Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD. 
50 For the Iraq sanctions, see: SIRES/666 (13 September 1990), operative paragraphs 3-5. 
For the Haiti sanctions, see: SIRES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 16. 
For the Ethiopia and Eritrea sanctions, see: S/RES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 15. 
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committee of experts to report on the humanitarian situation in a target State, 51 and to report 
on the actual or potential humanitarian implications of sanctions within a target State.52 
Sanctions-related subsidiary bodies, for their part, have been tasked with: reporting on the 
humanitarian needs of the civilian population within a target State;53 determining whether 
humanitarian circumstances Ind arisen, thus requiring the provision of exemptions for food-
stuffs;54 reporting on the potential and actual economic, humanitarian and social impact of 
sanctions;55 and making recommendations to the Council on ways to limit unintended effects 
of sanctions on a civilian population. 56 
8.4.2 Security Council action to address the impact of sanctions upon third States 
As noted in Chapter 4, the framers of the United Nations Charter implicitly 
recognised the inequity inherent in requiring a greater sacrifice of some States than others by 
51 	For the Iraq sanctions, see: SIRES/1302 (8 June 2000), operative paragraph 18. 
52 	For the Afghanistan/Taliban/A1 Qaida sanctions, see: SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), 
operative paragraph 15(d). The Secretary-General subsequently submitted four reports to the 
Council in 2001 on the humanitarian implications of the sanctions: S/20011241 (20 March 2001); 
S120011695 (13 July 2001); S/200111086 (19 November 2001); and S12001/1215 (18 December 
2001). In connection with the sanctions regime against Liberia (in the second instance), see: 
SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 13(a); SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative 
paragraph 19. The Secretary-General has thus submitted the following reports: S/2001/939 (5 
October 2001); and S/2003/793 (5 August 2003). 
53 	In the Iraq case the Council established three panels to explore different aspects of the 
situation in Iraq, the second of which would address the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi 
people. See: S/1999/100: Note by the President of the Security Council (30 January 1999) 
(deciding to establish). The Humanitarian Panel reported in: S/1999/356 (30 March 1999), Annex 
54 	In the Iraq case, the Council made such a request of the 661 Committee in: SIRES/666 (13 
September 1990), operative paragraphs 1, 5. 
55 	The Council requested the 1267 Committee to undertake such a task in relation to the Taliban & 
Al Qaida sanctions regime. See: S/RES/1267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraph 6(c). With 
respect to the second Liberia sanctions regime, the Council made such a request of the Liberia 
Panel of Experts on multiple occasions. See: SIRES/1395 (27 February 2002), operative 
paragraph 4; SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 25(c). 
56 	The Council made such a request of both the 1343 Committee and the Liberia Panel of Experts 
in connection with the second Liberian sanctions regime. See: SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), 
operative paragraph 14(g) (aimed at the 1343 Committee); SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative 
paragraph 25(c) (aimed at the Liberia Panel of Experts). 
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providing such States the right, under Article 50, to consult the Security Council in respect 
of special economic problems resulting from the implementation of Council-mandated 
preventive or enforcement measures. 57 States have consulted the Security Council under 
Article 50 concerning the economic consequences experienced as a result of implementing 
the sanctions regimes against Southern Rhodesia, Iraq, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia-Montenegro) and Haiti. In general, the Council has referred Article 50 requests to 
subsidiary bodies such as Sanctions Committees and technical missions for further 
consideration. 58 
57 	Article 50, United Nations Charter. 
58 	In the case of Southern Rhodesia, the Council tasked technical missions to explore the issue of 
special assistance for Zambia and Botswana. See: S/RES/326 (2 February 1973), operative 
paragraph 9 (regarding Zambia); SIRES/403 (14 January 1977), operative paragraph 6 (regarding 
Botswana). In the Iraq, Libya, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) and Haiti 
instances, the Council requested Sanctions Committees to examine requests for special 
assistance and to make appropriate recommendations to the Council in connection with is 
sanctions regimes against. For Iraq, see: SIRES/669 (24 September 1990), preambular paragraph 
4. For Libya, see: SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 9(f); SIRES/883 (11 
November 1993), operative paragraph 10. For the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro), see: SIRES/843 (18 June 1993), operative paragraph 2. For Haiti, see: SIRES/917 (6 
May 1994), operative paragraph 14(g). 
In the cases of Iraq and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), the 661 and 
724 Committees took the step of establishing Article 50 Working Groups to focus on the issue 
of special assistance. For a brief description of the activities of the 661 Working Group, see: 
S/1996/700 (26 August 1996), annex: Report of the Security Council Committee established by 
resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, paragraph 105. For 
a tangential reference to the 724 Working Group, see: S/1996/946 (15 November 1996), annex: 
Final Report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 
(1991) concerning Yugoslavia, paragraph 42. 
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Where those subsidiary bodies have found such requests to be valid, 59 the Council's 
typical response has been to appeal, either directly (in the form of resolutions and 
presidential statements) or indirectly (by requesting the Secretary-General to make such an 
appeal), to all States to provide technical, financial and material assistance to the country 
concerned, and to invite the competent organs and specialized agencies of the United 
Nations system, including the international financial institutions and regional development 
banks, to review their programmes of assistance to the county in question, with a view to 
alleviating those hardships.6° 
59 
	
For examples of such recommendations with respect to the Iraq sanctions, see: S/21786 (18 
September 1990): Special report to the Security Council concerning the application of Jordan 
for special assistance; S/22021 & Add.1 & Add.2 (19 and 21 December 1990, and 19 March 
1991): Recommendations of the 661 Committee concerning the applications for special 
assistance of Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Djibouti, India, Lebanon, Mauritania, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, 
Tunisia, Uruguay, Viet Nam, Yemen and Yugoslavia. For recommendations relating to the 
sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), see: S/26040 & 
Add. 1 & Add.2 (2 July, 4 August and 10 December 1993): Recommendations of the 724 
Committee concerning the applications for special assistance of Albania, Bulgaria, the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Uganda and Ukraine. 
The Council has appealed directly to States and international organizations regarding the 
provision of special assistance in the Southern Rhodesian and Iraq cases. In the Southern 
Rhodesian case, see: SIRES/253 (29 May 1968) operative paragraph 15 (concerning Zambia); 
SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), operative paragraph 16 (concerning Zambia); SIRES/329 (10 March 
1973), operative paragraphs 3 and 4 (concerning Zambia); S/RES/386 (17 March 1976), 
operative paragraphs 4, 5 (concerning Mozambique); S/RES/411 (30 June 1977), operative 
paragraphs 9, 10 (concerning Mozambique); SIRES/406 (25 May 1977), operative paragraphs 5, 
7 (concerning Botswana). In the Iraqi case, see: 5/22508 (29 April 1991): Presidential statement 
of 29 April 1991 (making a "solemn appeal" on behalf of the members of the Security Council to 
States, international financial institutions and United Nations bodies to respond positively and 
speedily to the recommendations of the 661 Committee for assistance to countries confronted 
with special economic problems arising from the implementation of sanctions). 
The Council has made indirect appeals with respect to the sanctions regimes against Southern 
Rhodesia, Iraq and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro). For Southern 
Rhodesia, see: SIRES/386 (17 March 1976), operative paragraph 6 (requesting the Secretary-
General, in collaboration with the appropriate organizations of the United Nations system, to 
organize, with immediate effect, all forms of financial, technical and material assistance to 
Mozambique). For Iraq, see: 5/21826, 22033 and 22398 (24 September and 21 December 1990 and 
21 March 1991): Letters dated 24 September and 21 December 1990 and 21 March 1991 from the 
President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General, endorsing the 
recommendations of the 661 Committee concerning the applications for special assistance of 
Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Djibouti, India, Lebanon, Mauritania, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Poland, Romania, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, 
Uruguay, Viet Nam, Yemen and Yugoslavia. For the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia- 
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Montenegro), see: S126056, 26282 and 26905: (6 July, 9 August and 20 December 1993): Letters 
dated 6 July, 9 August and 20 December 1993 from the President of the Security Council 
addressed to the Secretary-General, endorsing the recommendations of the 724 Committee 
concerning the applications for special assistance of Albania, Bulgaria, the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Uganda and Ukraine. 
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sanctions administration and monitoring 
When the Security Council applies sanctions, the primary responsibility for 
implementing the sanctions falls upon States. In order to ensure that States do in fact 
implement sanctions, however, the Council has bestowed additional responsibilities for the 
implementation, administiation, monitoring and enforcement of sanctions to a range of 
actors. Those actors fall into two broad categories: subsidiary bodies established by the 
Council in order to undertake administrative, monitoring and analytical tasks; and other 
international actors, upon whom the Council has bestowed responsibilities for monitoring 
and enforcement of sanctions. uscussion in this and the next Chapter explores these two 
broad categories. In this Chapter, analysis explores the various sanctions-related subsidiary 
organs created by the Council, including Sanctions Committees, a Working Group on 
Sanctions, Panels of Experts, Monitoring Mechanisms and Security Council missions. 
As noted in Chapter 4, the Security Council possesses the power to create 
subsidiary organs by virtue of Article 29 of the United Nations Charter, which provides that 
it may establish "such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its 
functions.'" Further authority is derived from rule 28 of the Council's provisional rules of 
procedure, which provides that "the Security Council may appoint a commission or 
committee or a rapporteur for a specified question.”2 In order to facilitate the implementation 
of sanctions, the Council has established a number of different types of subsidiary organs, 
Article 29 of the U.N. Charter. 
S/96/Rev.7 (December 1982): Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, Rule 28. 
The Council has consistently referred to Rule 28 of the provisional rules of procedure when 
creating Sanctions Committees. 
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including Sanctions Committees, Disarmament Commissions and Commissions of Inquiry, 
bodies of experts, Monitoring Mechanisms and United Nations Operations. 3 
9.1 Sanctions Committees 
Sanctions Committees have been the most common form of subsidiary organ 
established to facilitate the administration, monitoring and implementation of sanctions. The 
Security Council has established nineteen distinct Sanctions Committees.4 The Committees, 
which come to be known colloquially both by the name of the sanctions regime with which 
they are connected and by the name of the resolution by which they were created, have 
collectively undertaken responsibilities for the administration of all but the sanctions regime 
against the Sudan. In all but one case they have undertaken responsibilities focused solely 
upon one particular sanctions regime.5 Twelve of the Sanctions Committees were 
established by the same resolution that initiated a sanctions regime. 6 Six of the remaining 
The Security Council does not always invoke Article 29 or Rule 28 when establishing a 
subsidiary organ. Moreover, its practice has been inconsistent in terms of the language used 
to establish such entities. Thus, an entity might even be considered a subsidiary organ where 
the Council "welcomes" or "endorses" its establishment by the Secretary-General. In relation 
to the various sanctions-related subsidiary organs, the Council has tended to invoke Rule 28 in 
respect of Sanctions Committees, but not in respect of Panels of Experts or Monitoring 
Mechanisms. In respect of the Panels and Mechanisms, the Council has sometimes decided to 
establish them directly, whilst sometimes requesting the Secretary-General to establish them. In 
either instance, however, the entities can be considered subsidiary organs of the Council. For 
further discussion of the question of subsidiary organs, see: Simma, Bruno (ed.), The Charter 
of the United Nations: a Commentary (2002: Td edition) Oxford UP, 539-63; Bailey, Sydney D. 
& Daws, Sam, The procedure of the UN Security Council (3 r(  ed. 1998) Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 333-78. 
For a list of all of the Security Council's Sanctions Committees, along with references to the 
provisions outlining their mandates, see Table D in the Appendices. 
The former Yugoslavia Committee ("the 724 Committee"), which was initially established in 
connection with the former Yugoslavia sanctions regime, subsequently assumed 
responsibilities for the administration of the sanctions regimes against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) and the Bosnian Serbs. 
Those twelve Committees were established with respect to Iraq ("the 661 Committee"), Libya 
("the 748 Committee"), Haiti ("the 841 Committee"), UNITA ("the 864 Committee"), Rwanda 
("the 918 Committee"), Sierra Leone ("the 1132 Committee"), the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia ("the 1160 Committee"), the Taliban & Al Qaida ("the 1267 Committee"), Ethiopia 
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seven Committees were established to undertake responsibilities in respect of sanctions 
regimes that had already been initiated, but in connection with which no Sanctions 
Committee had previously been established.' The remaining Sanctions Committee was 
established to succeed a dissolved Committee. 8 
9.1.1 Composition 
The composition of Sanctions Committees has evolved slightly since the first 
Sanctions Committee was established to oversee the sanctions regime against Southern 
Rhodesia. The Southern Rhodesian Sanctions Committee initially consisted of 
representatives of seven of the States Members of the Security Council, with a fixed 
Chairman. 9  From the end of March 1969, the Chairmanship rotated every two months, in 
alphabetical order.' ° Then, from October 1970, the Committee was expanded to include a 
representative of each State Member of the Security Council, with the chairmanship of the 
Committee rotating each month in accordance with the Presidency of the Council." A 
further adjustment was made to the organization of the Committee's work on March 1972, 
and Eritrea ("the 1298 Committee"), Liberia II ("the 1343 Committee"), Liberia III ("the 1521 
Committee") and Weapons of Mass Destruction ("the 1540 Committee"). 
7 	 Among those Committees were those relating to: Southern Rhodesia ("the 253 Committee"), 
South Africa ("the 421 Committee"), the former Yugoslavia ("the 724 Committee"), Somalia 
("the 751 Committee"), Liberia (in the first instance: "the 985 Committee") and the DRC ("the 
1533 Committee"). 
8 	The 1518 Committee was established to succeed the 661 Committee, which had been dissolved. 
Like the 661 Committee, it undertakes responsibilities relating to the administration of the Iraq 
sanctions regime. 
9 	 S/8697 (31 July 1968). The initial Chairman was India, with the other members of the Committee 
being Algeria, France, India, Paraguay, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
India was replaced as Chairman at the end of 1968, when its term on the Council expired, by 
another non-permanent member — Pakistan. See: Gowlland-Debbas, Vera, Collective Responses 
to Illegal Acts in International Law: United Nations Action in the Question of Southern 
Rhodesia (1990) Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 607. 
10 	Gowlland-Debbas, Collective Responses, ibid, 607. 
11 	S/9951 official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-fifih Year, Supplement for July, 
August and September 1970: 5/9951). 
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when the President of the Security Council issued a note stating that the Chairmanship of the 
Committee would subsequently rotate on a one-year basis and that the Chairman and two 
Vice-Chairmen would be elected at the beginning of each year: 2 
The composition of each of the subsequent Sanctions Committees has followed the 
model that evolved through the experience of the Southern Rhodesian Sanctions Committee. 
Each Committee has thus consisted of a representative of each of the States Members of the 
Security Council, leading them to be described as "Committees of the whole." I3 In addition, 
the Chairmanship and Vice-Chairmanship of each Sanctions Committee have rotated 
annually, on the basis of an informal election within the Council at the end of each calendar 
year. In practice, the positions of Chair and Vice-chair have almost exclusively been filled by 
representatives of non-permanent members of the Council. Thus, Sanctions Committee 
office-bearers have tended to serve in their positions for a maximum of two years, reflecting 
the two-year term of their delegation on the Security Council. 
9.1.2 Mandates 
As Sanctions Committees are ad hoc entities, their mandates can vary quite 
markedly. In order to ascertain the mandate of a particular Sanctions Committee, it is 
necessary to analyse both the resolution in which the Committee was established, as well as 
any subsequent resolutions that either modify the scope of the sanctions regime for which the 
Committee has responsibility or that add to the Committee's existing collection of tasks. 
Although the mandates of most Committees exhibit particular characteristics that are not 
shared by other Committees, the Council has tended to delegate a number of core 
12 	S/1 0578 (29 March 1 972) Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-seventh Year, 
Supplement for January, February and March 1972: S/10578]. 
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responsibilities to most, if not all, Committees. Among the more generic responsibilities 
delegated to Sanctions Committees, however, have been receiving reports from Member 
States on actions taken to implement sanctions, and reporting to the Council, with 
observations and recommendations on the implementation of the relevant sanctions regime. I4 
Sanctions Committees have also been requested or required to undertake a range of 
additional duties, including: reporting on specific matters; administering exemptions from 
sanctions regimes; considering requests for special assistance under Article 50 of the 
Charter; performing tasks connected with sanctions monitoring; taking action to improve 
sanctions implementation; liaising with other sanctions-related subsidiary organs of the 
Security Council; refining their own working methods; administering the lists of those subject 
to targeted sanctions; and considering the humanitarian impact of sanctions. 
i. 	Reporting activities 
As part of the more specific reporting activities, Committees have been requested or 
required to undertake the following duties: examining reports of the Secretary-General on 
the implementation of sanctions; 15 reporting to the Council on action which could be taken to 
13 	 Bailey & Daws, The Procedure of the Security Council, above note 3, 365. 
14 	In the initial Security Council sanctions committee-creating resolution, in relation to the regime 
imposed against Southern Rhodesia, the Council established a general duty to report to the 
committee with observations relating to the areas of its mandate: SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), 
operative paragraph 20. Later in the paragraph the Council referred to the committee's "duty" 
to report: operative paragraph 20 (b). This duty has applied to each subsequent sanctions 
committee. 
15 	The Council has requested Sanctions Committees to undertake such a task in respect of the 
sanctions regimes against Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and Iraq. 
In connection with the sanctions regime against Southern Rhodesia, see: S/RES1253 (29 May 
1968), operative paragraph 20(a). 
In connection with the sanctions regime against South Africa, see: SIRES/421 (9 December 
1977), operative paragraph 1(a). 
In connection with the sanctions regime against Iraq, see: SIRES/66l (6 August 1990), 
operative paragraph 6(a). 
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address the refusal of States to implement sanctions; 16 reporting on proposals for extending 
the scope and effectiveness of the sanctions; 17 reporting on the possible application of 
further measures under Article 41; 18 and providing oral reports to the Council via the 
relevant Committee Chairman. 19 
The administration of exemptions 
Among the tasks related to the administration of sanctions exemptions, Committees 
have assumed the following responsibilities: considering applications for exemptions from a 
sanctions regime; 29 considering applications for exemptions from the prohibition upon the 
16 	The Council requested that the Southern Rhodesian Sanctions Committee undertake such a 
task. See: S/RES/320 (29 September 1972), operative paragraphs 4 and 5. The Council requested 
that the Committee submit this report no later than 31 January 1973. The Committee was late in 
submitting the report, however, as the Council's subsequent requests to it to expedite its 
preparation of that report attest: see, e.g., S/RES/326 (2 February 1973), operative paragraph 8; 
SIRES/328 (10 March 1973), operative paragraph 6. 
17 	The Council has requested Sanctions Committees to undertake such a task in respect of its 
sanctions regimes against Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, and Liberia (in the second 
instance). 
In connection with the sanctions regime against Southern Rhodesia, see: SIRES/320 (29 
September 1972), operative paragraphs 4 and 5. The Council requested that the Committee 
submit this report no later than 31 January 1973. The Committee was late in submitting the 
report, however, as the Council's subsequent requests to it to expedite its preparation of that 
report attest: see, e.g., SIRES/326 (2 February 1973), operative paragraph 8; SIRES/328 (10 
March 1973), operative paragraph 6; SIRES/445 (8 March 1979), operative paragraph 8. 
In connection with the sanctions regime against South Africa, see: S/RES/421 (9 December 
1977), operative paragraph 1(b); SIRES/473 (13 June 1980), operative paragraph 11; S/RES/591 
(28 November 1986), operative paragraph 13. 
In connection with the sanctions regime against Liberia (in the second instance), see: 
SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 14(g). 
18 	The Council requested that the Southern Rhodesian Sanctions Committee undertake such a 
task. See: SIRES/409 (27 May 1977), operative paragraph 3. 
19 	The Council requested the Chairman of the 1267 Committee to undertake such a task in relation 
to the Taliban and Al Qaida sanctions regime. See: SIRES/1455 (17 January 2003), operative 
paragraph 9 (requesting that the Chairman of the 1267 Committee report orally every 90 days on 
the work of the Committee and the Monitoring Group and on the reports received from States 
on steps taken to implement the sanctions), operative paragraph 14 (requesting that the 
Chairman of the 1267 Committee provide the Council by 1 August 2003 and by 15 December 
2003 detailed oral assessments of Member State implementation of the sanctions, with a view 
to recommending further measures for Council consideration to improve the sanctions). 
20 	The Council has requested Sanctions Committees to undertake such a task in respect of its 
sanctions regimes against Iraq, Somalia, Libya, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro), the Bosnian Serbs, Haiti, UNITA, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, the Taliban and Al 
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Qaida, Ethiopia and Eritrea and liberia (in the second instance). In connection with Iraq, see: 
SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 20. In connection with Somalia, see: SIRES/1356 
(19 June 2001), operative paragraph 4. In connection with Libya, see: S/RES/748 (31 March 
1992), operative paragraph 9(e) (requesting that the 748 Committee consider and decide 
expeditiously upon any application by States for the approval of flights on grounds of 
significant humanitarian need). In connection with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro), see: SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 13(e) (requesting the 724 
Committee to consider and approve guidelines for the trans-shipment through the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) of exempted items), operative paragraph 13(f) 
(requesting the 724 Committee to consider and decide expeditiously upon applications for 
exemptions from the aviation sanctions); SIRES/787 (16 November 1992), operative paragraph 9 
(requesting the 724 Committee to consider, on a case-by-case basis, applications for 
exemptions to the ban on transshipment of particular goods under resolution 787 (1992)); 
SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 22(b) (requesting the 724 Committee to 
consider, on a case-by-case basis under the no-objection procedure, applications for 
exemptions from the sanctions for the importation of essential humanitarian supplies that were 
not medical supplies or foodstuffs), operative paragraph 22(c) (requesting the 724 Committee to 
authorize limited transhipments through the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro)), operative paragraph 27 (requesting the 724 Committee to consider, 
on a case-by-case basis, applications for exemptions from the financial sanctions for the 
provision of services for humanitarian or other exceptional purposes), operative paragraph 28 
(requesting the 724 Committee to consider, on a case-by-case basis, applications for 
exemptions from the prohibition on commercial maritime traffic entering the territorial sea of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)). In connection with the Bosnian 
Serbs, see: SIRES/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 7(ii)(b) (requesting the 724 
Committee to decide upon applications for exemptions from the sanctions for the provision of 
commodities or products for essential humanitarian needs), operative paragraph 13 (requesting 
the 724 Committee to receive and process, on a case-by-case basis, applications for exemptions 
from the sanctions for the provision of services necessary for humanitarian or other 
exceptional purposes), operative paragraph 15 (requesting the 724 Committee to receive and 
process, on a case-by-case basis, applications for exemptions from the prohibition upon the 
movement of commercial riverine traffic). In connection with Haiti, see: SIRES/841 (16 June 
1993), operative paragraph 10(d) (requesting the 841 Committee to consider and decide 
expeditiously upon requests for the imports of petroleum and petroleum products for essential 
humanitarian needs); S/RES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 14(e) (requesting the 841 
Committee to decide expeditiously upon applications by States for exemptions from the 
aviation sanctions). In connection with UNITA, see: SIRES/1127 (28 August 1997), operative 
paragraph 11 (b) (requesting that the 864 Committee decide upon and give favourable 
consideration to requests for the exemptions from the sanctions outlined in the resolution); 
S/RES/1173 (12 June 1998), operative paragraph 13 (requesting that the 864 Committee 
authorize, on a case-by-case basis and under the no-objection procedure, exemptions from the 
additional sanctions for verified medical and humanitarian purposes). In connection with 
Rwanda, see: SIRES/1005 (17 July 1995), sole operative paragraph (deciding that the 918 
Committee would receive applications, and provide authorisation where appropriate, for 
exemptions from the arms embargo for explosives to be used in humanitarian demining 
programmes). In connection with Sierra Leone, see: SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative 
paragraph 10(e) (deciding that the 1132 Committee would consider requests for exemptions 
from the petroleum sanctions). In connection with the Taliban & Al Qaida, see: SIRES/1267 (15 
October 1999), operative paragraph 6(f); SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraphs 
16(c), 16(d) (requesting the 1267 Committee to establish and maintain a list of approved 
organizations and governmental relief agencies which were providing humanitarian assistance 
to Afghanistan. Organizations on the list could then be exempted from the aviation sanctions 
for activities involving the provision of humanitarian supplies, in accordance with operative 
paragraph 12 of the same resolution); SIRES/I452 (20 December 2002), operative paragraphs 1, 
3 (although he language of the resolution provided that exemptions from the financial 
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import from a target subject to comprehensive sanctions for the purchase of exempt 
products and commodities;21 determining whether humanitarian circumstances had arisen 
requiring exemptions for food- stuffs; 22 and receiving notifications regarding the provision of 
supplies that are exempt from a sanctions regime and that do not require its approval in. 23 
Considering requests for special assistance under Article 50 of the Charter 
In relation to the consideration of requests for special assistance under Article 50 of 
the Charter, Committees have been tasked with examining such requests and making 
appropriate recommendations to the Security Counci1. 24 
sanctions for basic expenses would apply upon notification to the 1267 Committee by States, it 
nevertheless required that there be no "negative decision" by the Committee within 48 hours in 
relation to such notification. Thus, the regime being established was effectively one in which 
the Committee was considering applications for exemptions). In connection with Ethiopia and 
Eritrea, see: S/RES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 8(e). In connection with Liberia II, 
see: S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 14(d). 
21 	The Council provided for such an exemption in the case of Iraq, and therefore requested that 
the 661 Committee undertake such a task. See: S/RES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 
23. 
22 	The Council requested that the Iraq Sanctions Committee undertake such a task. See: 
S/RES/666 (13 September 1990), operative paragraphs 1, 5. 
23 	The Council requested that Sanctions Committees perform such a role in the sanctions regimes 
against the Bosnian Serbs, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. In connection with the Bosnian Serbs, 
see: S/RES/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 7(ii)(b) (in relation to supplies 
intended strictly for medical purposes and foodstuffs). In connection with Rwanda, see: 
SIRES/1011 (16 August 1995), operative paragraph 11(a) (deciding that the 918 Committee 
would receive notifications from all States of all exports from their territories of arms or related 
materiel to Rwanda, as well as notification from the Government of Rwanda of all imports it 
received of arms and related materiel, and that the Committee would report regularly to the 
Council on notifications so received). The Committee thus submitted the following reports: 
S/1996/329/Rev.1 (2 May & 27 August 1996); S/1996/396/Rev.1 (30 May & 27 August 1996); 
S/1996/407/Rev.1 (5 June & 27 August 1996); and S/1996/697 (27 August 1996). In connection 
with Sierra Leone, see: SIRES/1l71 (5 June 1998), operative paragraph 4 (requesting that the 
1132 Committee report to the Security Council on the notifications received from the 
Government of Sierra Leone and from States relating to the registration of legitimate arms 
imports to Sierra Leone). The Committee thus submitted the following reports: S/1998/740 (7 
August 1998): Letter dated 7 August 1998 from the Chairman of the 1132 Committee 
addressed to the President of the Security Council; S/1998/1170 (15 December 1998): Letter 
dated 15 December 1998 from the Chairman of the 1132 Committee addressed to the 
President of the Security Council. 
24 	The Council has requested Sanctions Committees to undertake such a task in respect of its 
sanctions regimes against Iraq, Libya, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) 
and Haiti. In connection with Iraq, see: S/RES/669 (24 September 1990), preambular paragraph 4. 
In connection with Libya, see: SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 9(f) (requesting 
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iv. 	Sanctions Monitoring 
Among the tasks related to sanctions monitoring, Committees have been requested 
or required to undertake the following tasks: monitoring the implementation of sanctions; 25 
developing a mechanism to monitor the sale or supply to a target of items prohibited under a 
sanctions regime; 26 monitoring the sale and supply from a target subject to comprehensive 
sanctions of commodities exempted from the sanctions for the purposes of financing the 
purchase of humanitarian items;27 considering information concerning violations of sanctions 
and recommending appropriate measures of response; 28 drawing up rules for monitoring 
the 748 Committee to give special attention to any communications in accordance with Article 
50 from any State with special economic problems that might arise from the carrying out of the 
sanctions against Libya); SIRES/883 (II November 1993), operative paragraph 10 (requesting 
the 748 Committee to examine requests for assistance under Article 50 and make 
recommendations to the President of the Security Council for appropriate action). In 
connection with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), see: SIRES/843 (18 
June 1993), operative paragraph 2 (requesting the 724 Committee to make recommendations to 
the President of the Council regarding requests made for assistance under Article 50 of the 
Charter). In connection with Haiti, see: S/RES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 14(g) 
(requesting the 841 Committee to examine requests for assistance under the provisions of 
Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations and make recommendations to the President of 
the Security Council for appropriate action). 
25 In connection with the Iraq sanctions regime, see: S/RES/700 (17 June 1991), operative 
paragraph 5 (requesting the Committee to monitor the prohibition upon the provision to Iraq of 
arms and related materiel). 
26 In connection with Iraq, see: S/RES/715 (11 October 1991), operative paragraph 7 (requesting 
the 661 Committee, in cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA, to develop a mechanism to 
monitor the implementation of the prohibition upon "dual use items"). That mechanism was 
eventually established by the Council in resolution 1051 (1996): SIRES/1051 (27 March 1997), 
operative paragraph 1. 
27 	In connection with Iraq, see: SIRES/986 (14 April 1995), operative paragraph 1(a) (delegating to 
the 661 Committee the task of approving transactions under the OFFP for, inter alia, the sale of 
oil and the purchase of permitted goods), operative paragraph 6 (requesting the 661 Committee 
to monitor the sale of oil from Iraq to Turkey under the Oil-for-Food Programme (OFFP)). 
28 The Council has requested that Sanctions Committees undertake such a task in respect of the 
sanctions regimes against the brmer Yugoslavia, Somalia, Libya, the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), Liberia (in the first instance), Haiti, UNITA, Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Taliban & Al Qaida, Ethiopia and Eritrea and 
Liberia (in the second instance). In connection with the former Yugoslavia, see: S/RES/724 (15 
December 1991), operative paragraphs 5(b)(iii) and (iv). In connection with Somalia, see: 
S/RES/751 (24 April 1992), operative paragraphs 11(b) and (c). In connection with Libya, see: 
SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraphs 9(c) and (d). In connection with the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), see: SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative 
paragraphs 13(c) and (d); S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 18. In connection with 
Liberia I, see: SIRES/985 (13 April 1995), operative paragraphs 4(b) and (c); S/PRST/1999/1 (7 
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January 1999): Presidential statement of 7 January 1999. In connection with Haiti, see: 
SIRES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 10(c); SIRES/9 17 (6 May 1994), operative 
paragraph 14(c) and (d); SIRES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 10(e) (requesting the 
841 Committee to make periodic reports to the Security Council on information regarding 
alleged violations of the sanctions, identifying where possible those reported to be engaged in 
such violations). In connection with UNITA, see: SIRES/864 (15 September 1993), operative 
paragraphs 22(c) (requesting that the 864 Committee consider information brought to its 
attention by States concerning violations of the sanctions and to recommend appropriate 
measures in response thereto), 22 (d) (requesting that the 864 Committee make periodic reports 
to the Council on information submitted to it regarding alleged violations of the sanctions, 
identifying where possible persons or entities, including vessels, reported to be engaged in 
such violations); S/RES/932 (30 June 1994), operative paragraph 8 (requesting the Committee to 
report to it on compliance with the sanctions regime and in particular on possible violations by 
two neighbouring States); S/RES/1221 (12 January 1999), operative paragraph 8 (the Council's 
request was implicit, as it expressed its readiness to pursue reports of sanctions violations, to 
take steps to reinforce the imp lementation of the sanctions, and to consider the imposition of 
additional measures, including in the area of telecommunications, on the basis of a report to be 
prepared by the 864 Committee). In connection with Rwanda, see: SIRES/918 (17 May 1994), 
operative paragraph 14(b) (requesting the 918 Committee to consider information concerning 
violations of the embargo and to make recommendations to the Council on increasing the 
effectiveness of the embargo), operative paragraph 14(c) (requesting the 918 Committee to 
recommend appropriate measures in response to violations of the embargo and to provide 
information on a regular basis to the Secretary-General, for general distribution to Member 
States). In connection with Sierra Leone, see: SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 
10(b) (requesting that the 1132 Committee consider information on violations of the sanctions 
and to recommend appropriate measures in response to those violations), operative paragraph 
10(c) (requesting that the 1132 Committee make periodic reports to the Security Council on 
information regarding alleged violations of the sanctions, identifying where possible the actors 
reported to be engaged in such violations); SIRES/1171 (5 June 1998), operative paragraph 6 
(requesting that the 1132 Committee consider information concerning violations of the new 
sanctions and recommend appropriate measures in response to those violations); 
S/PRST/1999/1: Presidential statement of 7 January 1999 (urging the Sierra Leone Sanctions 
Committee to investigate violations of the arms embargo and to report to it with 
recommendations); S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 7(b) (requesting that the 
1132 Committee consider information concerning violations of the diamond sanctions, 
identifying where possible those involved in such violations), operative paragraph 7(c) 
(requesting that the 1132 Committee make periodic reports to the Security Council on alleged 
violations of the diamond sanctions, identifying where possible those involved in such 
violations). In connection with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, see: SIRES/1160 (31 March 
1998), operative paragraph 9(c). In connection with the Taliban and Al Qaida, see: SIRES/l267 
(15 October 1999), operative paragraphs 6(b), 6(d); SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative 
paragraph 16(g). In connection with the sanctions regime against Ethiopia and Eritrea, see: 
SIRES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraphs 8(b), (c). In connection with Liberia II, see: 
SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 14(b). At the same time, the Council also 
requested the 1343 Committee to consider, and take appropriate action on, information brought 
to its attention concerning alleged violations of the first sanctions regime imposed against 
Liberia, whilst that sanctions regime had been in force: see SIRES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative 
paragraph 14. The Council's decision to ask the 1343 Committee to assume responsibilities 
relating to the earlier sanctions regime raises interesting legal issues, as the Council was 
effectively asking the Committee to explore and act upon violations of a terminated sanctions 
regime, thus leading to the potential conclusion that it was effectively resurrecting that earlier 
regime. 
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sanctions, including provisions relating to the monitoring of exemptions;29 considering 
information on the transport of arms into countries neighbouring a target for eventual use in 
that target" investigating reports of violations of sanctions; 31 and suggesting methods for 
improving monitoring of sanctions implementation. 32 
v. 	Improving sanctions implementation 
Among the tasks related to improving sanctions implementation, Committees have 
been requested or required to undertake the following duties: seeking the cooperation of 
States neighbouring a target in the effective implementation of sanctions; 33 sending a mission, 
led by the Chairman of the Committee, to the region in which a target is located, in order to 
demonstrate the Security Council's determination to give full effect to sanctions; 34 drawing to 
29 	The Council requested that the 724 Committee perform such a role in relation to the sanctions 
regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro). See: S/RES/820 (17 
April 1993), operative paragraph 22(a). 
30 S/PRST/1995/22: Presidential statement of 27 April 1995 (requesting the 918 Committee to 
consider information provided by States and organizations on the transport of arms into 
countries neighbouring Rwanda for eventual use in Rwanda). 
31 S/RES/1202 (15 October 1998), operative paragraph 14 (requesting the Chairman of the 864 
Committee to investigate reports that the leader of UNITA had travelled outside Angola in 
violation of the sanctions, and that UNITA forces had received military training and 
assistance, as well as arms, also in violation of the sanctions). 
32 	In connection with the sanctions regime against the Taliban and Al Qaida, see: SIRES/1267 (15 
October 1999), operative paragraph 12. 
33 	The Council requested the Somalia Sanctions Committee to undertake such a responsibility. 
See: S/RES/954 (4 November 1994), operative paragraph 12. 
34 The Council has requested the Chairmen of Sanctions Committees to undertake such a task in 
respect of its sanctions regimes against Somalia and the Taliban & Al Qaida. In connection 
with Somalia, see: S/RES/1474 (8 April 2003), operative paragraph 8. The Council had been 
encouraging the Chairman of the 751 Committee to undertake such a mission for some time. It 
made reference to the fact that the Chairman was scheduled to undertake a mission to the 
region in October 2002: S/RES/1425 (22 July 2002), operative paragraph 10 (requesting the Panel 
of Experts to brief the Chairman prior to his mission, which was then scheduled to take place in 
October 2002). At the time of writing this mission has still not taken place. In connection with 
the Taliban & Al Qaida, see: S/RES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 16(f) 
(requesting the 1267 Committee to consider a visit to countries in the region by the Chairman of 
the Committee to enhance the full and effective implementation of the sanctions); SIRES/1455 
(17 January 2003), operative paragraph 11 (requesting the 1267 Committee to consider a visit to 
selected countries by the Chairman of the Committee and/or Committee members to enhance 
the full and effective implementation of the sanctions). 
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the attention of Member States their obligations in connection with aviation sanctions in the 
event that aircraft registered in a target State were to land in their territore consulting with 
regional organizations and arrangements on ways to strengthen the implementation of the 
sanctions;36 liaising with a target regarding the establishment of a certificate-of-origin regime 
35 	In connection with the Libya sanctions regime, see: S/PRST/1996/18 (18 April 1996): 
Presidential statement of 18 April 1996. (noting that the Council had requested the 748 
Committee to draw to the attention of Member States their obligations under resolution 748 
(1992) in the event that Libyan-registered aircraft were to land in their territory). 
36 	The Council requested Sanctions Committees to undertake such a task in its sanctions regimes 
against UNITA and Sierra Leone. 
In connection with the UNITA sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1221 (12 January 1999), operative 
paragraph 9 (encouraging the Chairman of the 864 Committee to consult with the OAU and 
SADC on ways to strengthen the implementation of the sanctions). 
In connection with the Sierra Leone sanctions regime, see: S'RES/1132 (8 October 1997), 
operative paragraph 9 (requesting the 1132 Committee to examine reports from ECOWAS 
regarding action taken to ensure the strict implementation of the arms and petroleum 
sanctions), operative paragraph 10(h) (requesting the 1132 Committee to liaise with the 
ECOWAS Committee on the implementation of the sanctions); S/RES/1171 (5 June 1998), 
operative paragraph 6 (requesting that the 1132 Committee liaise with the ECO WAS Committee 
on the implementation of the sanctions); S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 22 
(requesting that the 1132 Committee strengthen contacts with regional organizations, in 
particular ECOWAS and the Organization of African Unity, and relevant international 
organizations, including INTERPOL, with a view to identifying ways to improve effective 
implementation of the arms and travel sanctions). 
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for the legitimate trade in diamonds;37 and holding a hearing to assess the role of the 
diamond trade in fuelling conflict in a target n 
vi. 	Liaising with other subsidiary organs 
The tasks delegated to Committees in connection with liaising with other sanctions- 
related subsidiary organs have included the following: forwarding to the Council reports of 
Panels of Experts, Monitoring Mechanisms and other subsidiary organs; 39 notifying the 
37 	The Council requested Sanctions Committees to undertake such a task in relation to its 
sanctions regime against Sierra Leone. See: SIRES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraphs 4,5 
(requesting that the 1132 Committee communicate with the Sierra Leone Government regarding 
the establishment of a certificate-of-origin regime for trading diamonds and to report to the 
Council when an effective regime was in operation). The Committee decided, at its 21' meeting 
on 21 March 2001, that the new Certificate of Origin regime for the trade in Sierra Leone 
diamonds was in effective operation: see S/2000/966 (6 October 2000): Letter dated 6 October 
2000 from the Chairman of the 1132 Committee addressed to the President of the Security 
Council; S/2001/300 (30 March 2001): Letter dated 28 March 2001 from the Chairman of the 
1132 Committee addressed to the President of the Security Council. See also: S/2002150 (14 
January 2002), annex: Report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to 
resolution 1132 (1997) concerning Sierra Leone, paragraph 11. The Government of Sierra 
Leone submitted a number of reviews on the effectiveness of the Certificate of Origin regime: 
see: S120011127 (12 February 2001), enclosure: Second Review of the new Certificate of Origin 
Regime for the Export of Sierra Leone diamonds; S/2001/794 (16 August 2001), enclosure: 
First Review of the new Certificate of Origin Regime for the Trade in Sierra Leone diamonds; 
S/2002/38 (9 January 2002), enclosure: Third Review of the Certificate of Origin Regime for the 
Export of Sierra Leone diamonds; 5/2002/826 (25 July 2002), enclosure: Fourth Review of the 
Certificate of Origin Regime for the Export of Sierra Leone diamonds. 
38 	SIRES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 12 (requesting that the 1132 Committee hold an 
exploratory hearing in New York, no later than 31 July 2000, to assess the role of diamonds in 
the Sierra Leone conflict and the link between trade in Sierra Leone diamonds and trade in arms 
and related materiel in violation of the Sierra Leone sanctions, involving representatives of 
interested States and regional organizations, the diamond industry and other relevant experts, 
and to report to the Council on the hearing). The Committee ultimately circulated the following 
report on the hearing: S/2000/1150 (4 December 2000), annex: Summary report on the 
exploratory hearing on Sierra Leone diamonds (31 July and 1 August 2000). 
39 	The Council has requested Sanctions Committees to undertake such a task in respect of the 
sanctions regimes against Somalia, UNITA. 
In connection with the Somalia sanctions regime, see: S/RES/1407 (3 May 2002), operative 
paragraph 2 (requesting that the 751 Committee forward to the Council the report of the 
preparatory team of experts on the implementation of the sanctions against Somalia). 
In connection with the UNITA sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1237 (7 May 1999), operative 
paragraph 7 (requesting the Chairman of the Conmittee to submit to it no later than 31 July 
1999 an interim report of the expert panels and to submit the final report of the panels within six 
months of their formation); S/RES/1336 (23 January 2001), operative paragraph 6 (requesting 
that the written addendum to the monitoring mechanism's final report be submitted by the 
Chairman of the 864 Committee 19 April 2001); SIRES/1348 (19 April 2001), operative paragraph 
(requesting that the mechanism's supplementary report be submitted by the Chairman of the 
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Council of any lack of cooperation with Panels of Experts, Monitoring Mechanisms and 
other subsidiary organs;4° reviewing the reports of a monitoring mechanism, with a view to 
offering guidance on future worlc;41 and cooperating with other relevant Sanctions 
Committees.42 
vii. Refining working methods 
Among the tasks delegated to Committees in connection with refining their own 
working methods, Committees have been requested or required to undertake the following 
duties: promulgating and updating guidelines to facilitate the implementation of sanctions,'" 
864 Committee by 19 October 2001); S/RES/1374 (19 October 2001), operative paragraph 8 
(requesting that the additional report of the mechanism be submitted by the Chairman of the 
864 Committee by 19 April 2002); S/RES/1404 (18 April 2002), operative paragraph 7 (requesting 
that the additional report of the monitoring mechanism be submitted by the Chairman of the 864 
Committee by 19 October 2002); SIRES/1439 (18 October 2002), operative paragraph 6 
(requesting that the additional report of the monitoring mechanism be submitted by the 
Chairman of the 864 Committee by 19 December 2002). 
The Council has issued such a request of Sanctions Committees in the case of Somalia. See: 
SIRES/1407 (3 May 2002), operative paragraph 7 (making such a request in respect of the work 
of the preparatory team of experts on the implementation of the Somalia sanctions regime). 
SIRES/1374 (19 October 2001), operative paragraph 4 (calling upon the Committee to undertake, 
by 31 December 2001, a review of the final and supplementary reports of the monitoring 
mechanism, with a view to examining the recommendations of the reports and to offering 
guidance to the monitoring mechanism on its future work). 
42 	The Council has requested Sanctions Committees to cooperate in respect of its sanctions 
regimes against Sierra Leone, the Taliban and Al Qaida, and Liberia (in the second instance). 
In connection with the Sierra Leone sanctions regime, see: S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative 
paragraph 7(e) (requesting that the 1132 Committee continue its cooperation with other 
relevant sanctions committees, and in particular with the 985/Liberia Sanctions Committee and 
the 864/UNITA Sanctions Committee). 
In connection with the Taliban & Al Qaida sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1390 (16 January 
2002), operative paragraph 5(f) (requesting the 1267 Committee to cooperate with other relevant 
Security Council Sanctions Committees and with the 1373 (Counterterrorism) Committee). 
In connection with the sanctions regime against Liberia (in the second instance), see: 
S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 14(h) (requesting that the 1343 Committee 
cooperate with other relevant Security Council Sanctions Committees, in particular the 
1132/Sierra Leone Committee and the 864/Angola (UNITA) Committee). 
43 	The Council has made such a request of Sanctions Committees in respect of the sanctions 
regimes against Libya, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), Haiti, UNITA, 
Sierra Leone, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Taliban and Al Qaida, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea and Liberia (in the second instance). 
In connection with the Libya sanctions regime, see: S/RES/883 (11 November 1993), operative 
paragraph 9. 
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streamlining procedures for processing applications for exemptions from sanctions; 44 and 
making relevant information publicly available through appropriate media, including through 
the improved use of information technology. 45 
In connection with the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro), see: SIRES 1022 (22 November 1995), operative paragraph 8 (requesting the 724 
Committee to review and amend its guidelines in the light of the fact that the sanctions had 
been suspended). 
In connection with the Haiti sanctions regime, see: In connection with the Haiti sanctions 
regime, see: S/RES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 10(0; SIRES/9l7 (6 May 1994), 
operative paragraph 14(0. 
In connection with the UNITA sanctions regime, see: SIRES/864 (15 September 1993), operative 
paragraph 22 (requesting the 864 Committee to promulgate guidelines that might be 
necessary to facilitate the implementation of the sanctions); S/RES/1127 (28 August 1997), 
operative paragraph 11 (a) (requesting that the 864 Committee draw up guidelines for the 
implementation of the additional sanctions, including the designation of UNITA officials and 
family members whose travel was to be prohibited); S/RES/I 173 (12 June 1998), operative 
paragraph 20 (a) (requesting the 864 Committee to draw up guidelines for the implementation of 
the new sanctions and to consider ways of strengthening the effectiveness of all the sanctions 
now imposed against UNITA). 
In connection with the Sierra Leone sanctions regime, see: S/RES/1132 (8 October 1997), 
operative paragraph 10(d) (the guidelines were adopted by the Committee at its 2 nd meeting, on 
31 October 1997: SC/6435 (31 October 1997): Press release); SIRES/1171 (5 June 1998), 
operative paragraph 6. (the Committee adopted consolidated guidelines on 18 June 1998: 
SC/6532 (18 June 1998): Press release); S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 7(d). 
In connection with the Kosovo sanctions regime, see: S/RES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative 
paragraph 9(d). 
In connection with the Taliban & Al Qaida sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1390 (16 January 
2002), operative paragraph 5(d). 
In connection with the sanctions regime against Ethiopia and Eritrea, see: SIRES/1298 (17 May 
2000), operative paragraph 8(d). 
In connection with the sanctions regime against Liberia (in the second instance), see: 
SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 14(c). 
44 	The Council requested the 724 Committee to undertake such a task in respect of the sanctions 
regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro). See: SIRES/943 (23 
September 1994), operative paragraph 2 (requesting the 724 Committee to adopt appropriate 
streamlined procedures for expediting its consideration of applications for exemptions from the 
sanctions for legitimate humanitarian assistance, in particular for applications from UNHCR and 
the ICRC). In April 1995 the Council again urged the Committee to conclude its elaboration of 
streamlined procedures and invited the Chairman of the 724 Committee to report to it on the 
matter as soon as possible: S/RES/988 (21 April 1995), operative paragraph 11. The Council also 
reaffirmed on multiple occasions its request that the ICRC, UNHCR and other organizations in 
the U.N. system be granted priority in the processing of applications for exemptions from the 
sanctions for the provision of humanitarian assistance. See, e.g.: S/RES/970 (12 January 1995), 
operative paragraph 4; SIRES/988 (21 April 1995), operative paragraph 12. 
45 	The Council requested Sanctions Committees to undertake such a task in relation to its 
sanctions regimes against Sierra Leone, the Taliban & Al Qaida, Ethiopia and Eritrea and 
Liberia (in the second instance). 
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viii. Administering lists for targeted sanctions 
Among the tasks delegated to Sanctions Committees in connection with the 
administration of the lists of those subject to targeted sanctions, Committees have been 
requested or required to undertake the following duties: establishing and maintaining a list of 
persons and entities against which targeted sanctions were to be applied; 46 designating 
In connection with the sanctions regime against Sierra Leone, see: S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000), 
operative paragraph 23. 
In connection with the Taliban/A1 Qaida sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1333 (19 December 
2000), operative paragraph 16(e); SIRES/1390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraph 5(e). 
In connection with the sanctions regime against Ethiopia and Eritrea, see: S/RES/1298 (17 May 
2000), operative paragtaph 13. 
In connection with the sanctions regime against Liberia (in the second instance), see: 
SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 14(0. 
46 	The Council has requested Sanctions Committees to perform such a role in its sanctions 
regimes against Iraq, the Bosnian Serbs, UNITA, Sierra Leone, the Taliban & Al Qaida and 
Liberia (in the second instance). 
In connection with the Iraq sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1483 (22 May 2003), operative 
paragraph 19 (deciding that the 661 Committee would identify individuals and entities whose 
funds, financial assets and economic resources should be frozen and transferred to the 
Development Fund for Iraq, in accordance with the financial sanctions imposed by operative 
paragraph 23 of the same resolution). 
In connection with the Bosnian Serb sanctions regime, see: S/RES/942 (23 September 1994), 
operative paragraph 14. 
In connection with the UNITA sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative 
paragraph 11(a) (requesting that the 864 Committee draw up guidelines for the implementation 
of the additional sanctions, including the designation of UNITA officials and family members 
whose travel was to be prohibited), operative paragraph 24 (requesting the UNITA Committee 
to update the list of UNITA officials and adult members of their immediate families who were 
subject to travel sanctions and to expand the information contained in that list to include date 
and place of birth and any known addresses). 
In connection with the Sierra Leone sanctions regime, see: S/RES/1132 (8 October 1997), 
operative paragraph 10(0; S/RES/1171 (5 June 1998), operative paragraph 6. 
In connection with the sanctions regime against the Taliban & Al Qaida, see: SIRES/l333 (19 
December 2000), operative paragraph 16(b) (requesting the 1267 Committee to establish and 
maintain a list of individuals and entities designated as being associated with Usama bin 
Laden, against which financial sanctions were to be applied); S/RES/1390 (16 January 2002), 
operative paragraph 5(a) (requesting the 1267 Committee to update regularly the list of 
individuals and groups associated with Usama Bin Laden, Al Qaida and the Taliban, against 
which financial, travel and arms sanctions would be applied). 
In connection with the sanctions regime against Liberia (in he second instance), see: 
SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph I4(e) (requesting the 1343 Committee to 
designate the individuals subject to the travel sanctions and update that list regularly), 
operative paragraph 14(i) (requesting that the 1343 Committee establish a list of RUF members 
present in Liberia, whom the Liberian Government was required to expel in accordance with the 
objectives of the sanctions regime). 
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particular aircraft that would be subject to aviation sanctions; 47 designating particular points 
of entry and landing that would be prohibited under aviation sanctions;" designating financial 
resources that would be subject to financial sanctions; 49 and keeping States regularly 
informed of the list of parties against which tirgeted sanctions were to be applied." 
Considering the humanitarian impact of sanctions 
Among the tasks delegated to Sanctions Committees in relation to considering the 
humanitarian impact of sanctions, Committees have been requested or required to undertake 
the following duties: reporting on the impact of sanctions, including their humanitarian 
implications; 51 and making recommendations to the Council on ways to limit any unintended 
effects of the sanctions on a civilian population. 52 
9.1.3 Working methods 
There is no requirement that the Committees follow the same working methods. 53 
Each Committee adopts its own set of guidelines, outlining the working methods to be 
47 The Council requested the 1267 Committee to undertake such a task in relation to the Taliban & 
Al Qaida sanctions regime. See: S/RES/1267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraph 6(e). 
48 The Council requested the 1267 Committee to undertake such a task in respect of the sanctions 
regime against the Taliban and Al Qaida. See: SIRES/l333, operative paragraph 16(a) 
(requesting the 1267 Committee to establish and maintain a list of all points of entry and 
landing for aircraft within the territory of Afghanistan under Taliban control). 
49 The Council requested the 1267 Committee to undertake such a task in relation to the Taliban & 
Al Qaida sanctions regime. See: SIRES/1267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraph 6(e). 
50 	The Council requested the 1267 Committee to undertake such a task in relation to the Taliban 
and Al Qaida sanctions regime. See: S/RES/1455 (17 January 2003), operative paragraph 4 
(requesting the 1267 Committee to communicate to Member States the list of individuals and 
groups associated with Usama Bin Laden, Al Qaida and the Taliban at least every three 
months). 
51 The Council requested the 1267 Committee to undertake such a task in relation to the Taliban & 
Al Qaida sanctions regime. See: SIRES/1267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraph 6(c). 
52 
	
	In connection with the sanctions regime against Liberia (in the second instance), see: 
SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 14(g). 
53 The information provided here is based in part upon data accessible in the public domain, and 
in part upon data gathered from interviews conducted with diplomats, U.N. Secretariat staff, 
members of the U.N.'s non-governmental organisation community, and academics. 
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followed. In theory it is therefore possible that a newly-established Committee might adopt a 
set of working methods or procedures that differs completely from those of other Sanctions 
Committees, even though it might have been created with a mandate that is identical to that 
of another Committee. In practice, however, there are generally many similarities between 
the guidelines and working procedures of the various Committees. This is probably due to 
the fact that a number of diplomats represent their State on multiple Sanctions Committees, 
thus bringing with them certain expectations of what will be included within the new 
Committee's guidelines and working procedures. 
Among the key shared working methods are that the Committees must adopt 
decisions according to consensus. 54 Thus a decision cannot be adopted if even one 
Sanctions Committee member does not want it to be adopted. As a practical matter, many 
Sanctions Committees have embraced what is known as the "no-objection procedure". 
According to the no-objection procedure, potential decisions of the Committee are 
circulated to all members, who then have a period of 48 hours in which to raise any 
objections. If any objection is raised, then the potential decision cannot be adopted. If, 
however, no objection is received by the Chainnan of the Committee by the time the 48 
hours have elapsed, then the decision is deemed to have been approved by all the members 
of the Committee. 
54 	Scharf, Michael P., & Dorosin, Joshua L., 'Interpreting U.N. Sanctions: the Rulings and Role of 
the Yugoslavia Sanctions Committee' (1993) 19 Brooklyn JIL 771-827, 774. Scharf and Dorosin, 
writing in relation to the workings of the 724 Sanctions Committee, note that although 
consensus was technically required only for questions governed by the "no-objection" 
procedure, in practice the committee made all of its decisions by consensus. 
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9.2 The Security Council Working Group on Sanctions 
The Security Council established an Informal Working Group of the Security 
Council on General Issues of Sanctions (the "Working Group on Sanctions") in April 
2000. 55 The mandate of the Working Group was to develop general recommendations for 
improving the effectiveness of sanctions. The Group was supposed to report its findings to 
the Council by 30 November 2000, 56 but by the middle of 2004 the Group had still not 
issued any public report. In December 2003, the President of the Council noted that the 
proposed "outcome document" was still in draft form, due to "divergent views on the 
recommended duration and termination of sane tions". 57 At the same time, the President also 
announced that the members of the Council had agreed to extend the Working Group's 
mandate for an additional year. 58 
9.3 Disarmament Commissions and Commissions of Inquiry 
The Security Council has established Commissions to perform particular tasks 
related to the implementation of sanctions in the cases of Iraq and Rwanda. In the case of 
Iraq, the Council established three Commissions: the United Nations Compensation 
Commission (UNCC), the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), and the 
United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). In 
connection with the sanctions regime against Rwanda, the Council established an 
International Commission of Inquiry to explore how to improve the implementation of 
55 	For the establishment and mandate of the Working Group, see: S/2000/319 (17 April 2000): Note 
by the President of the Security Council. 
56 	Ibid, paragraph 4. 
57 	See: SC/7960 (18 December 2003): Press statement by the President of the Security Council 
concerning the Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions. 
58 	Ibid. 
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sanctions against Rwanda. Like the Sanctions Committees, the Commissions are considered 
to be subsidiary organs of the Council. The method for determining the composition of the 
Commissions has varied, however. The UNCC has functioned somewhat like a Committee 
of the whole, with each member of the Security Council represented on its primary decision-
making body — the Governing Counci1. 59 The personnel serving on the other Commissions 
have generally been appointed by the Secretary-General. ° The Commissions have all been 
expected, however, to report to the Council on their work on a regular basis. 
9.3.1 The Iraq Commissions: UNCC, UNSCOM, UNMOVIC 
The UNCC was established in May 1991, in order to process claims and distribute 
compensations for losses arising from Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait. 61 By the 
end of 2003 the Commission had received over 2.5 million compensation claims, 98% of 
59 	For information regarding the Governing Council of the 	UNCC, see: 
http://www.unog.ch/uncc/governin.htm  (last visited 19 January 2004). 
60 	The Secretary-General appointed 21 experts to UNSCOM, 6 to the Rwanda International 
Commission of Inquiry, and 17 to UNMOVIC. For documents concerning those appointments, 
see: S/22614 (17 May 1991): Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9(b) of 
resolution 687), paragraph 3 (reporting the appointment of 21 experts to UNSCOM, including 
the initial Executive Chairman Rolf Ekeus); S/19951879 (20 October 1995): Letter dated 16 
October from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (noting that six 
people had been appointed to the Commission); S/2000/60 (27 January 2000): Letter dated 26 
January 2000 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council 
(recommending the appointment of Hans Blix as Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC); 5/2000161 
(27 January 2000): Letter dated 27 January 2000 from the President of the Security Council 
addressed to the Secretary-General (approving the appointment of Blix as Executive Chairman); 
5/2000/207 (10 March 2000): Letter dated 10 March 2000 from the Secretary-General to the 
President of the Security Council (reporting the appointment of 16 Commissioners to serve 
alongside Executive Chairman Hans Blix). 
61 	SIRES/692 (20 May 1991), operative paragraph 3. 
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which had been resolved. 62 The Governing Council has held more than 50 sessions and has 
reported regularly to the Security Counci1. 63 
The Council first foreshadowed the establishment of a Special Commission to 
monitor and oversee Iraq's compliance with its disarmament obligations in April 1991. 64 The 
Special Commission was to cooperate in the implementation of its tasks with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which would monitor and verify Iraq's 
compliance with its obligation not to posses, develop or acquire nuclear weapons. 65 
UNSCOM was duly established66 and it oversaw the monitoring of the Iraq disarmament 
program until it was replaced by the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection 
Commission, "UNMOVIC", in late-1999.67 UNSCOM's mandate was to carry out 
immediate on-site inspections based on Iraq's declarations regarding its weapons holdings 
and programmes, to undertake the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of all nuclear, 
biological or chemical weapons and anti-ballistic missiles with a range of greater than 150 
km, or components for the manufacture or development thereof, and to develop a plan for 
62 	For general information on the UNCC, see: http://www.unog.ch/uncc/  (Last visited 19 January 
2004). 
63 	For the Commission's most recent report to the Council, see: S/2003/914 (24 September 2003): 
Letter dated 18 September 2003 from the President of the Governing Council of the United 
Nations Compensations Commission addressed to the President of the Security Council. 
S/RES1687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 9(b)(i). 
65 	S/RES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 13. 
66 The Secretary-General's recommendations for the establishment of UNSCOM and for the 
overall plan for disarming Iraq were submitted to the Security Council in April and May 1991: 
see S/22508 (18 April 1991): Report of the Secretary-General on the inplementation of 
paragraph 9 (b)(i) of resolution 687 (1991); S/22614 (17 May 1991): Report of the Secretary-
General pursuant to paragraph 9(b) of resolution 687). The Secretary-General's proposals 
were endorsed by the Council in the following decisions: S/22509 (19 April 1991): Letter dated 
19 April 1991 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General; 
SIRES/699 (June 17 1991), operative paragraph 1. 
67 The Security Council replaced UNSCOM by UNMOVIC in SIRES/1284 (December 17 1999), 
operative paragraph 1. For further details relating to both UNSCOM and UNMOVIC, see 
discussion below in the Iraq case-study. 
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the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with its disarmament 
obligations under resolution 687 (1991). 68 
UNSCOM reported to the Council on its activities on a regular basis. 69 During its 
tenure, the Special Commission played a constructive role in monitoring Iraq's compliance 
with its disarmament obligations under the sanctions regime." Ultimately, however, the 
Commission confronted major difficulties in undertaking its mandated activities, due to Iraq's 
refusal to allow it to resume operations after its inspectors had been withdrawn from Iraq in 
late-1998. In December 1999 the Council decided to replace UNSCOM with 
UNMOVIC. 
The decision to establish UNMOVIC was made in response to the 
recommendations of a panel that had been established in January 1999 to explore the 
68 	A detailed examination of the activities of UNSCOM is beyond the scope of this thesis. For 
details regarding UNSCOM's mandate, see: S/RES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraphs 8- 
13. For a concise summary of UNSCOM's activities, see: Report of the first Panel established 
pursuant to the note by the President of the Security Council on 30 January 1999, 
concerning disarmament and current and future ongoing monitoring and verification issues, 
below note 100. For a personal account of UNSCOM's operations, see: Butler, Richard, The 
Greatest Threat: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Crisis of Global Security (2000) 
Public Affairs, NY. 
69 	The Security Council established a number of reporting requirements for UNSCOM. UNSCOM 
thus submitted the following reports: one report pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) on its 
activities [S/23165 (25 October 1991)]; nine half-yearly reports pursuant to resolution 699 (1991) 
on its activities [S/23268 (4 December 1991); S/24108/Corr.1 (16 April 1992); S/24984 (17 
December 1992); S/25977 (21 June 1993); S/26910 (21 December 1993); S/1994/750 (24 June 
1994); S/1994/1422 (15 December 1994); S/1995/494 (20 June 1995); and S/1995/1038 (17 
December 1995)]; eight half-yearly reports pursuant to resolution 715 (1991) on the 
implementation of its plan to ensure ongoing monitoring and Verification of Iraq's disarmament 
activities [S/23801 (10 April 1992); S/24661 (19 October 1992); S/25620 (19 April 1993); S/26684 
(5 November 1993); S/1994/489 (22 April 1994); S/1994/1138 (7 October 1994); S/1995/284 (10 
April 1995); and S/1995/864 (11 October 1995)]; and eight half-yearly reports pursuant to 
resolution 1051 (1996) - which sought to consolidate UNSCOM's multiple reporting 
requirements - on its activities in general [S/1996/258 (11 April 1996); S/1996/848 (11 October 
1996); S/1997/301 (11 April 1997); S/1997/774 (6 October 1997); S/1998/332 (16 April 1998); 
S/1998/920 (6 October 1998); S/1999/401 (9 April 1999); and S/1999/1037 (8 October 1999)]. 
70 	For an overview of UNSCOM's achievements, as well as the questions remaining in relation to 
the extent to which Iraq had complied fully with its obligations, see: Report of the first Panel 
established pursuant to the note by the President of the Security Council on 30 January 
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disarmament„ monitoring and verification issues arising from the implementation of the Iraq 
sanction.' UNMOVIC was thus created with the aim of establishing a reinforced system of 
ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with its disarmament obligations. 72 
The Inspection Commission did not have an auspicious beginning, as it was unable to 
establish operations in Iraq for almost three years. It was not until the Council adopted 
resolution 1441 (2002), in November 2002, that Iraq finally agreed to UNMOVIC's 
deployment on its territory. During the subsequent three months, UNMOVIC's role became 
quite prominent, as the international community scrutinised the extent to which Iraq was 
complying with its disarmament obligations, as required by resolution 1441 (2002) and 
previous resolutions. 73 Since the conclusion of the second Gulf War, however, the 
1999, concerning disarmament and current and future ongoing monitoring and verification 
issues, below note 100, paragraphs 12-30. 
71 The Panel was one of three panels established to investigate different issues arising from the 
Security Council's action to address the situation in Iraq. For the decision establishing the 
Panel, see: S11999/100: Note by the President of the Security Council (30 January 1999). For 
further discussion of the three panels, see the section below on Panels of Experts. 
72 SIRES/1284 (17 December 1999), operative paragraphs 1,2. 
73 For UNMOVIC's quarterly reports, which have been submitted in accordance with paragraph 
12 of resolution 1284 (1999), in the form of annexes to notes by the Secretary-General, see: 
S/2000/516 (I June 2000), annex: First quarterly report of the Executive-Chairman of 
UNMOVIC under paragraph 12 of resolution 1284 (1999); S/2000/835 (28 August 2000), 
annex: Second quarterly report of the Executive-Chairman of UNMO VIC under paragraph 12 
of resolution 1284 (1999); S/2000/1134 (1 December 2000), annex: Third quarterly report of 
the Executive-Chairman of UNMOVIC under paragraph 12 of resolution 1284 (1999); 
S/2001/177 (27 February 2001), annex: Fourth quarterly report of the Executive-Chairman of 
UNMOVIC under paragraph 12 of resolution 1284 (1999); S/2001/515 (24 May 2001), annex: 
Fifth quarterly report of the Executive-Chairman of UNMOVIC under paragraph 12 of 
resolution 1284 (1999); S/2001/833 (30 August 2001) annex: Sixth quarterly report of the 
Executive-Chairman of UNMOVIC under paragraph 12 of resolution 1284 (1999); 
5/2001/1126 (29 November 2001), annex: Seventh quarterly report of the Executive-Chairman 
of UNMO VIC under paragraph 12 of resolution 1284 (1999); S/2002/195 (26 February 2002), 
annex: Eighth quarterly report of the Executive-Chairman of UNMOVIC under paragraph 12 
of resolution 1284 (1999); S/2002/606 (31 May 2002), annex: Ninth quarterly report of the 
Executive-Chairman of UNMOVIC under paragraph 12 of resolution 1284 (1999); 
5/2002/981 (3 September 2002) annex: Tenth quarterly report of the Executive-Chairman of 
UNMOVIC under paragraph 12 of resolution 1284 (1999); S/200211303 (27 November 2002), 
annex: Eleventh quarterly report of the Executive-Chairman of UNMOVIC under paragraph 
12 of resolution 1284 (1999); S/2003/232 (28 February 2003), annex: Twelfth quarterly report 
of the Executive-Chairman of UNMOVIC under paragraph 12 of resolution 1284 (1999). 
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Commission's work has effectively been placed on hold, as it has not been authorised by the 
occupying powers to resume its inspections in Iraq. 
9.3.2 The International Commission of Inquiry on Rwanda 
The Security Council experimented with the idea of an International Commission of 
Inquiry into the implementation of sanctions in connection with the Rwanda sanctions regime. 
The International Commission of Inquiry for Rwanda was established in September l995. 
It consisted of six "impartial and internationally respected persons,"75 including legal, military 
and police experts, and it was mandated: to collect information and investigate reports 
relating to the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to former Rwandan govemment 
forces in the Great Lakes region, in violation of the Rwandan sanctions; to investigate 
allegations that such forces were receiving military training in order to destabilize Rwanda; to 
identify parties aiding and abetting the illegal acquisition of arms by former Rwandan 
government forces, in violation of the sanctions; and to recommend measures to end the 
illegal flow of arms in the subregion. 76 
The Commission's mandate was initially for a short period, 77 but it was subsequently 
maintained or re-activated by the Council on two occasions. 78 During its tenure, the 
74 	SIRES/1013 (7 September 1995), operative paragraph 2. 
75 	The initial resolution provided for five to ten such people to be appointed, but in mid-October 
the Secretary-General noted that six people had been appointed to the Commission: S/1995/879 
(20 October 1995): Letter dated 16 October from the Secretary-General to the President of the 
Security Council. 
76 	SIRES/1013 (7 September 1995), operative paragraph 1. 
77 S/RES/1013 (7 September 1995), operative paragraph 4. Interestingly, the Council did not 
specify a duration for the Commission's mandate, but it did request the Secretary-General to 
submit, within three months from the Commission's establishment, an interim report on the 
Commission's findings, and to submit a final report as soon as possible thereafter, thus 
implying that the mandate would not be much longer than three months. 
78 	SIRES/1053 (23 April 1996), operative paragraph 2; 
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International Commission of Inquiry submitted a total of four reports to the Council." 
Among the Commission's findings were that arms and related materiel had indeed been 
delivered to former Rwandan government forces in Zaire, via the Seychelles, in violation of 
the Rwandan arms embargo. 8° The Commission outlined a number of recommendations in 
the course of its reports, including some that were designed to facilitate the implementation 
of Security Council arms embargoes in general, as well as others that aimed to improve the 
implementation of the Rwandan arms embargo in particular. 
79 
	
S/1996/67 (29 January 1996), annex: Interim report of the International Commission of Inquiry 
on the Rwanda arms embargo"); S/19961195 (14 March 1996), annex: Report of the 
International Commission of Inquiry on the Rwanda arms embargo; S11997/1010 (24 
December 1997), annex: Final report of the International Commission of Inquiry on the 
Rwanda arms embargo [this report was originally annexed to a letter dated 1 November 1996 
from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, but it was not circulated as 
an official document of the Council until more than a year later]; 5/1998/63 (26 January 1998), 
annex: Addendum to the final report of the International Commission of Inquiry on the 
Rwanda arms embargo. 
80 
	
See: Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on the Rwanda arms embargo, above 
note 79, paragraphs 21-39. The Commission's investigations centred upon allegations that had 
appeared in a Human Rights Watch report [Rearming with impunity: international support for 
the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide (1995) Washington, D.C., USA] that shipments of 
arms had found their way into the possession of the former-Rwandan Government military 
forces, via Zaire. The Commission concluded that the report was accurate and that two 
shipments of arms, originating in the Seychelles, had indeed made their way into the hands of 
Rwandan Government forces [Report of the International Commission of Inquiry, above note 
79, paragraph 64]. Authorities in the Seychelles had authorized the sale with the understanding 
that they intended for use in Zaire, as they had been provided with "end-user certificates", 
purportedly issued by the Government of Zaire. Once it became apparent that the shipments 
might have been delivered to a destination other than Zaire, the Seychelles cancelled 
subsequent additional scheduled shipments Report of the International Commission of 
Inquiry, above note 79, paragraph 65]. Ironically, the arms had originally been seized by the 
Seychelles from a ship named Malo because they were being transported to Somalia in 
violation of the United Nations sanctions regime against that country [Report of the 
International Commission of Inquiry, above note 79, paragraph 29]. The Commission found 
that two individuals were instrumental in facilitating the shipments — Colonel Theoneste 
Bagora, a high-ranking officer of the former-Rwandan government forces, and Mr. William 
Ehlers, a South African National who was the director of a company called "Delta Aero". It 
further concluded that it was highly probable that a violation of the sanctions had taken place, 
involving the supply of more than 80 tons of rifles, grenades and ammunition in two 
consignments flown to Goma airport on 17 and 19 June 1994 and subsequently transferred to 
the Rwandan government forces, then in Gisenyi, Rwanda. It also concluded that the 
Government of Zaire, or elements thereof, had aided and abetted the violation. It also 
recommended that there should be further investigation into the role of Mr. Ehlers. 
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Among the Commission's general recommendations were that: (a) Upon the 
imposition of an arms embargo against a State or a part thereof, the Security Council should 
consider urging neighbouring States to establish within their respective Governments an 
office to monitor, implement and enforce the embargo within its own territory and to gather 
information that might be used by investigating bodies dispatched by the Counci1; 81 
(b) Where the States concerned could not staff and equip such offices within their existing 
resources, consideration be given to establishing a trust fund, within the context of Article 50 
of the United Nations Charter, to provide such assistance; 82 (c) The Council should consider 
expanding the functions of future Sanctions Committees, to include liaising with the offices in 
neighbouring States, as well as receiving, analysing and circulating to Member States reports 
submitted by those offices;83 and (d) Consideration should be given to requesting States 
producing arms and materiel to take any measures necessary under their domestic law to 
implement the provisions of the arms embargo, and in particular to prosecute their nationals 
involved in violations of the embargo. 84 
Among the Commission's specific recommendations were that: (a) The Council 
should consider inviting the Government of South Africa to investigate the participation of a 
particular South African citizen in the negotiations that had led to the delivery of arms to 
former Rwandan armed forces in Goma, Zaire, in violation of the sanctions; 85 (b) The 
81 	Ibid, paragraph 77. 
82 	'bid, paragraph 79. 
83 	'bid, paragraph 80. 
84 	See: Third report of the International Commission of Inquiry on the Rwanda arms embargo, 
above note 79, paragraph 110. The Commission noted that some States had reported that they 
were unable to prosecute nationals accused of crimes in a third country. It therefore 
recommended that Member States be invited to introduce into their domestic legislation the 
capacity to prosecute such individuals. 
85 	Ibid, paragraph 86. 
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Council should consider calling upon the Government of Bulgaria to make available to the 
918 Committee the findings of an internal investigation into allegations that a Bulgarian 
company had been willing to sell arms in violation of Security Council resolutions; 86 (c) The 
Council should call upon the Government of Zaire to investigate the apparent complicity of 
its own personnel and officials in the purchase of arms from the Seychelles;" (d) The 
Council should consider inviting the Government of Zaire to station United Nations 
observers on its territory to monitor the implementation of the sanctions against Rwanda and 
to deter future violations;88 (e) The Security Council should consider expanding the sanctions 
to include a freeze on the assets of individuals and organizations involved in raising funds to 
finance the insurgency against Rwanda; 89 and (f) The Security Council should encourage 
Tanzanian authorities to liaise with UNHCR and to consult with the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to see if legal grounds existed for detaining individuals accused 
of intimidating people in Rwandan refugee camps into participating in acts that violated the 
arms embargo. 9° 
9.4 Bodies of Experts: Groups, Committees, Teams and Panels of 
Experts 
The Security Council has established bodies of experts to investigate the 
implementation of sanctions in connection with seven of its sanctions regimes, including those 
against Iraq, Somalia, UNITA, the Taliban & Al Qaida, Liberia (in the second instance), 
Liberia (in the third instance) and certain actors in the DRC. Although there have been a 
86 	Ibid, paragraph 87. 
87 	Ibid, paragraph 88. 
88 	Ibid, paragraph 91(a). 
89 Ibid, paragraph 114. 
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number of variations in the specific title of the various bodies of experts, with examples 
including "Panel", "Group of Experts", "Panel of Experts" and "Team of Experts", the 
expert bodies are generally established to serve for short periods, consisting of a matter of 
weeks or months. In a number of instances the mandate of expert bodies has been 
extended, and in others the expert body has subsequently been reconstituted where the 
Council has considered such a step to be desirable. Like Sanctions Committees and 
Commissions, expert bodies are subsidiary organs of the Council, with a responsibility to 
report to the Council on their activities. In sneral, expert bodies have reported to the 
Council via the relevant Sanctions Committee, with the Chairman of that Sanctions 
Committee forwarding or presenting regular written and oral reports to the Council on behalf 
of the relevant expert body. 
9.4.1 The group of experts on the Iraq Sanctions Regime 
In June 1998, the Council requested the Secretary-General to establish a group of 
experts to determine, in consultation with the Government of Iraq, whether Iraq was able to 
export the amount of petroleum and petroleum products permissible under the Oil-for-Food 
Programme. 91 The group was also to report on Iraqi production and transportation 
capacity. 92 The group submitted its report within two months. 93 In its report it noted that the 
oil industly of Iraq was in a "lamentable state". 94 Among the group's conclusions were that 
there was a need for rapid and adequate investment in spare parts and repair of oil 
90 	Ibid, paragraph 115. 
91 	SIRES/1153 (20 February 1998), operative paragraph 12. 
92 	Ibid. 
93 	See: S/1998/330 (15 April 1998), annex: Report of the group of experts established pursuant to 
paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1153 (1998). 
94 	Ibid, paragraph 7. 
246 
9. Sanctions administration and monitoring: bestowing responsibility upon subsidiary bodies 
production wells,95 and that the Iraqi Government's estimates for the potential volume of oil 
that could be exported was "optimistic". 96 
9.4.2 Ad Hoc Panels on the Iraq Sanctions Regime 
In January 1999, when Iraq was refusing to allow UNSCOM to resume its activities 
on Iraqi territory, 97 the Security Council decided to establish three separate ad hoc panels.98 
The panels were established with the following objectives: a) Panel I would make 
recommendations on how to re-establish an effective disarmament monitoring and 
verification regime in Iraq; b) Panel H would address the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi 
people; and c) Panel 1.11 would consider outstanding issues relating to prisoners of war and 
Kuwaiti property. 99 The work of the first two panels was directly related to the 
administiation, implementation and enforcement of sanctions. The panels submitted their 
reports within two months. m The recommendations of the first two panels were clearly 
95 	Ibid, paragraph 24. 
96 	Ibid, paragraph 33. 
97 	The UNSCOM inspectors had been withdrawn from Iraq on 16 December 1998, due to security 
concerns arising from the impending bombardment of Baghdad by US and British warplanes. 
98 See: S/1999/100: Note by the President of the Security Council (30 January 1999). 
99 	Ibid. 
100 For the reports of the panels, see: S/1999/356 (30 March 1999): Letters dated 27 and 30 March 
1999, respectively, from the Chairman of the Panels established pursuant to the note by the 
President of the Security Council of 30 January 1999 (S/1999/100) addressed to the President of 
the Security Council, Annex I [containing the Report of the First Panel established pursuant 
to the note by the President of the Security Council of 30 January 1999 (S/1999/100) 
concerning disarmament and current and future ongoing monitoring and verification issues], 
Annex II [containing the Report of the Second Panel established pursuant to the note by the 
President of the Security Council of 30 January 1999 (S/1999/100) concerning the current 
humanitarian situation in Iraq], Annex III [containing the Report of the Third Panel 
established pursuant to the note by the President of the Security Council of 30 January 1999 
(S/1999/100) on prisoners of war and Kuwaiti property]. 
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taken into account by the Counci1, 101 as demonstrated by the actions it subsequently took to 
replace UNSCOM with UNMOVIC and to reinvigorate the Oil-for-Food Programme. 1°2 
9.4.3 The Panel of Experts on UNITA sanctions 
Acting upon a recommendation that had been made by the UNITA Sanctions 
Committee, the Security Council decided in May 1999 to establish expert panels to facilitate 
the effective implementation of the UNITA sanctions. m3 The mandate of the panels, 
included: (a) collecting information relating to the violations of the arms, petroleum, diamond 
and financial sanctions; (b) identifying those committing or facilitating the violations of those 
sanctions; and (c) recommending measures to end such violations and to improve the 
implementation of the sanctions. m4 In late-July 1999, the 864 Committee appointed ten 
experts to the expert panels. 1°5 The experts came from a variety of countries, possessing 
expertise in fields conducive to the investigation of violations of different aspects of the multi-
faceted UNITA sanctions regime. 
The experts convened for the first time in late-August 1999, in New York, when 
they decided to act as one panel rather than two. 1°6 During the six-month period of the 
Panel's operation, its members visited close to thirty countries and met with a wide range of 
people, including Government officials, diplomats, NG0s, police and intelligence sources, 
101 	For the major recommendations of the First Panel, see Report of the First Panel, ibid, 
paragraphs 61-68. For the major recommendations of the Second Panel, see Report of the 
Second Panel, ibid, paragraphs 43-57. 
102 	See, in particular, SIRES/1284 (17 December 1999). 
103 	SIRES/1237 (7 May 1999), operative paragraph 6. 
104 	Ibid. 
105 	S/1999/837 (30 July 1999), annex: List of experts appointed to the expert panels established in 
accordance with paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1237 (1999). 
106 	S/2000/203 (10 March 2000), enclosure: Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of 
Security Council Sanctions against UNITA, paragraph 8. 
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industry associations, corporations and journalists. 107 The Panel circulated a brief interim 
report on 30 September 1999, and on 28 February 2000 it submitted its full report to the 
864 Committee. 1°8 The report contained the Panel's findings and conclusions on violations 
of the arms, petroleum, diamond and financial sanctions against UNITA, as well as on 
violations of the diplomatic and travel sanctions against UNITA. 1°9 The Panel made thirty-
nine recommendations on how the sanctions violations might be addressed." ° In April 2000, 
the Security Council acted upon one of the recommendations put forth in the report of the 
Panel of Experts by requesting the Secretary-General to establish a monitoring mechanism 
on the sanctions against UNITA." 
107 	Ibid. 
108 	S/1999/1016 (30 September 1999), annex: Interim report of the Expert Panel established by the 
Security Council in resolution 1237 (1999) of 7 May 1999; S/2000/203 (10 March 2000), 
annex 1, enclosure: Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions 
against UN! TA. 
109 	Interestingly, the question of sanctions against UNITA representation and travel was not 
actually included in the mandate for the Panel as outlined by the Council in resolution 1237 
(1999). It is unclear how the Panel came to consider that these sanctions were within the scope 
of its mandate. In the first paragraph of the Panel's report it notes that resolution 1237 (1999) 
established it to investigate violations of Security Council sanctions against UNITA. It then 
lists the "sanctions at issue", among which it includes the travel and representation sanctions, 
despite the fact that the Council had not included those sanctions within the mandate exp licitly 
outlined for the Panel of Experts in operative paragraph 6 of resolution 1237 (1999). See: Report 
of the UNITA Panel of Experts, ibid, paragraph 1. 
110 	The Panel outlined its recommendations in clusters, arranged according to the different 
elements targeted by the UNITA sanctions. See: Report of the UNITA Panel of Experts, ibid, 
paragraphs 52-58 (containing recommendations relating to arms and military equipment), 70-74 
(containing recommendations relating to petroleum and petroleum products), 109-114 (relating 
to diamonds), 126-128 (containing recommendations relating to UNITA finances and assets), 
157-162 (containing recommendations relating to UNITA representation and travel abroad), 
and 170-181 (containing recommendations on "related matters", including facilitating the 
implementation of sanctions by improving coordination between various international actors 
such as SADC and Interpol). 
III 	S/RES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 3. For details relating to the establishment of 
the monitoring mechanism on the UNITA sanctions, see the section below on monitoring 
mechanisms. 
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9.4.4 The Panel of Experts on the Sierra Leone sanctions regime 
The Security Council requested the Secretary-General to establish a Panel of 
Experts to investigate matters relating to the implementation of the Sierra Leone sanctions 
regime in July 2000. 112 The Panel, which would consist of no more than five members and 
would operate for a period of four months, was to undertake the following tasks: 
(a) collecting information on possible violations of the arms embargo against Sierra Leone 
and on the link between the trade in diamonds and the trade in arms and related materiel, 
including through visits to Sierra Leone and other States and through making appropriate 
contacts;"" (b) considering the adequacy of air traffic systems in the region for detecting 
flights suspected of violating the arms sanctions; 114 (c) participating in an exploratory hearing 
in New York on the role of diamonds in the Sierra Leone conflict and the link between the 
trade in diamonds and the trade in arms in that country; 115 and (d) reporting to the Council, 
through the 1132 Committee and by 31 October 2000, with its observations and 
recommendations on strengthening the implementation of the arms and diamond sanctions.' 16 
The Panel of Experts submitted its written report to the Council in December 
2000." 7 In its report, the Panel outlined findings on the illicit trade in Sierra Leone 
diamonds," 8 on the flow of arms and related materiel and other forms of military assistance 
112 	SIRES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 19. 
113 	S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 19(a). 
114 	S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 19(b). 
115 	S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 19(c). For details relating to the exploratory 
hearing, see: S/2000/1150 (4 December 2000), annex: Summary report on the exploratory 
hearing on Sierra Leone diamonds (31 July and 1 August 2000). 
116 	S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 19(d). 
117 S/2000/1195 (20 December 2000), enclosure: Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant 
to Security Council resolution 1306 (2000), paragraph 19, in relation to Sierra Leone. 
118 	See in general: ibid, paragraphs 1-18, 65-150. 
250 
9. Sanctions administration and monitoring: bestowing responsibility upon subsidiary bodies 
into Sierra Leone, 119 and on air traffic control systems in West Africa. u° The Panel's report 
remains perhaps the most sophisticated analysis yet completed by a body charged with the 
administration, implementation or enforcement of a United Nations sanctions regime, of the 
challenges that must be overcome in order to facilitate the effective implementation of a 
sanctions regime. The report contained a range of insightful observations and provided 
numerous concrete recommendations for action that might be taken to address violations of 
the Sierra Leone sanctions and United Nations sanctions in genera1. 121 The Security Council 
has subsequently acted upon many of the Sierra Leone Panel's recommendations in 
addressing the situations in Sierra Leone, Liberia and West Africa in general, and in its 
oversight of other arms embargoes and diamond sanctions. 
9.4.5 The Afghanistan/Taliban/AI Qaida Committee of Experts 
The Security Council requested the Secretary-General to appoint a committee of 
experts to make recommendations on improving the monitoring of the 
Afghanistan/Taliban/A1 Qaida sanctions in December 2000. 122 The Committee of Experts 
was requested to report to the Council within sixty days on how to monitor the arms 
embargo against the Taliban and the closure of terrorist training camps. 123 In its report, the 
Committee of Experts outlined the activities it had taken to fulfil its mandate and made a 
number of key recommendations.' 24 As part of its operations, the Committee of Experts had 
119 	See in general: ibid, paragraphs 19-31, 167-273. 
120 	See in general: ibid, paragraphs 32-46,274-315. 
121 For a more detailed discussion of those recommendations, see the analysis of the Rwanda 
sanctions regime in the Appendices. 
122 SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 15. 
123 SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 15(a). 
124 S/2001/511 (22 May 2001): Letter dated 21 May from the Secretary-General addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, enclosure [containing the Report of the Committee of 
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consulted with a range of actors, including representatives of the States sharing a border 
with Afghanistan and of two States with a major strategic interest in events in Afghanistan — 
the United States and the Russian Federation. 125 The Committee concluded that the arms 
embargo and the closure of the terrorist training camps could best be monitored by 
stmigthening mechanisms that were already in place in the six countries bordering 
Afghanistan. 126 It therefore recommended that the Council establish an office for sanctions 
monitoring and coordination, consisting of a Headquarters team and a number of Sanctions 
Enforcement Support Teams, each working alongside the border control services in the 
countries neighbouring Afghanistan. 127 Among the Committee's other recommendations 
were: that the Headquarters Office be located in Vienna; that the Sanctions Enforcement 
Support Teams should be based with existing United Nations offices in the countries 
neighbouring Afghanistan; and that the Council consider specifying a prohibition against 
aircraft turbine fuel and fluids and lubricants for use in armoured vehicles, as part of the arms 
embargo. 128 
9.4.6 The Liberia II Panel of Experts 
The Security Council requested the Secretary-General to establish a Panel of 
Experts on the second Liberian sanctions regime in March 2001. 129 The Panel was 
Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1333 (2000), paragraph 15 (a), 
regarding monitoring of the arms embargo against the Taliban and the closure of terrorist 
training camps in the Taliban-held areas of Afghanistan]. 
125 'bid, paragraphs 11-19 [listing the range of actors with which the Committee of Experts met] 
126 	Ibid, paragraph 94. 
127 	Ibid, paragraph 96. For discussion of these bodies, which formed the UNITA monitoring 
mechanism, see the section below on monitoring mechanisms. 
128 	Ibid, paragraphs 97-102. 
129 SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 19. 
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established for an initial period of six months, 13° but it was subsequently "re-established" or 
"established" on four separate occasions."' The Panel's initial mandate included the 
following tasks: (a) investigating violations of the sanctions; 132 (b) collecting information on 
the compliance of the Liberian Government with the demands articulated by the Counci1; 133 
(c) investigating possible links between the exploitation of natural resources and other forms 
of economic activity in Liberia, and the fuelling of conflict in Sierra Leone and other 
neighbouring countries, as highlighted by the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone; 134 
(d) collecting hformation linked to the illegal activities of individuals who had violated the 
arms sanctions against Sierra Leone; 135 (e) reporting to the Council with observations and 
recommendations on the matters within its mandate; 136 (f) keeping the 1343 Committee 
updated on its activities;" 7 and (g) bringing relevant information to the attention of the States 
concerned and to allow them the right of reply.' 38 
The Security Council subsequently required the Panel to undertake the following 
additional tasks: (a) conducting a follow-up assessment mission to Liberia and neighbouring 
130 	Ibid. 
131 	S/RES/1395 (27 February 2002), operative paragraph 3 (deciding to re-establish the Panel of 
Experts, for a period of five weeks); S/RES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 16 
(requesting the Secretary-General to establish for a period of three months a Panel of Experts 
consisting of no more than five members); SIRES/1458 (28 January 2003), operative paragraph 3 
(deciding to re-establish the Liberia Panel of Experts, for a period of three months); SIRES/1478 
(6 May 2003), operative paragraph 25 (requesting the Secretary-General to establish for a 
period of five months a Panel of Experts of up to six members). 
132 	S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 19(a). 
133 	SIRES/l343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 19(b). 
134 	S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 19(c). 
135 	S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 19(d). 
136 	SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 19(e). 
137 	S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 19(f). 
138 	SIRES/l343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 20. This task has subsequently been 
reaffirmed upon each "re-establishment" and "establishment" of the Panel. See: S/RES/1408 (6 
May 2002), operative paragraph 17; S/RES/1458 (28 January 2003), operative paragraph 5; 
S/RES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 26. 
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States in order to investigate and compile a brief independent audit of the Liberian 
Government's compliance with the Council's demands under the sanctions regime, as well 
as of any violations of the sanctions and to report to the Council with its observations and 
recommendations on those matters;139 (b) conducting a further follow-up assessment mission 
to Liberia and neighbouring States, reporting on the Liberian Govemment's compliance with 
the Council's demands under the sanctions regime, on the potential economic, humanitarian 
and social impact of the sanctions, and on any violations of the sanctions; 14° (c) conducting a 
further follow-up assessment mission to Liberia and neighbouring States, reporting on the 
Liberian Government's compliance with the Council's demands under the sanctions regime 
and on any violations of the sanctions;"' (d) reviewing audits of how the Liberian 
Government was utilizing its revenue from shipping and timber; 142 (e) conducting a further 
follow-up assessment mission to Liberia and neighbouring States, reporting on the Liberian 
Government's compliance with the Council's demands under the sanctions regime and on 
any violations of the sanctions;" 3 (f) investigating whether any revenues of the Liberian 
Government were being used in violation of the sanctions regime; 144 (g) assessing the 
possible humanitarian and socio-economic impact of the logging sanctions and making 
recommendations through the 1343 Committee on how to minimize any such impact' 45 and 
(h) reporting to the Council through the Committee with its observations and 
139 	SIRES/1395 (27 February 2002), operative paragraph 4. 
140 	SIRES/1395 (27 February 2002), operative paragraph 4. 
141 SIRES/1458 (28 January 2003), operative paragraph 4 
142 Ibid. 
143 S/RES/I478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 25(a). 
144 SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 25(b). 
145 SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 25(c). 
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recommendations on how to improve the effectiveness of implementing and monitoring the 
sanctions.' 46 
In the course of its various mandates, the Liberia Panel of Experts submitted four 
reports to the Security Council.' 47 In its reports the Panel outlined detailed findings on the 
implementation and violation of the various components of the 1343 Liberia sanctions 
regime, providing numerous recommendations for further action by the Security Counci1. 148 
9.4.7 The Team and Panel of Experts on Somalia 
The Security Council first expressed its intention to establish a mechanism to 
generate independent information on violations of the sanctions against Somalia and to 
improve the implementation of the sanctions in March 2001.' 49 Two months later it 
requested the Secretary-General to establish a team of two experts to prepare for the 
establishment of a subsequent Panel of Experts on the implementation of the Somalia arms 
embargo. 15° The preparatory team's mandate included: a) investigating violations of the 
embargo; b) detailing information on violations and the enforcement of the embargo; 
c) undertaking field research in Somalia and its neighbour States; d) assessing the capacity 
146 	SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 25(d). 
147 	S/2001/1015 (26 October 2001), enclosure: Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security 
Council resolution 1343 (2001), paragraph 19, concerning Liberia (hereafter "First report 
of the Panel of Experts on Liberia"); S/2002/470 (19 April 2002), annex: Report of the Panel of 
Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1395 (2002), paragraph 4, in 
relation to Liberia (hereafter "Second report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia"); S/2002/1115 
(25 October 2002), annex: Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security 
Council resolution 1408 (2002), paragraph 16, concerning Liberia (hereafter "Third report 
of the Panel of Experts on Liberia"); S12003/498 (24 April 2003), annex: Report of the Panel of 
Experts appointed pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 1458 (2003), 
concerning Liberia (hereafter "Fourth report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia"). 
148 	For discussion of the findings and recommendations of the Liberia Panel of Experts, see the 
study of the second Liberian sanctions regime located in the Appendices. 
149 	S/PRST/2002/8 (28 March 2002): Presidential statement of 28 March 2002. 
150 	S/RES/I 407 (3 May 2002), operative paragraph 1. 
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of States in the region to implement the embargo fully; and e) providing recommendations on 
practical steps for strengthening the enforcement of the embargo."' The preparatory team 
submitted its report in early-July 2002. 152 It noted that there had been a common perception 
that the embargo had not been enforced effectively, 153 and it suggested that the Council 
could take the following steps in order to improve the embargo's enforcement: a) clarifying 
the scope of the embargo, making it clear that the provision of financing and services in 
support of military activities in Somalia constituted a violation of the embargo; 154 
b) enhancing end-user verification; 155 c) establishing a Panel of Experts in the region; 156 and 
d) promoting transparency and accountability over financial institutions in Somalia: 57 
In late-July 2002, shortly after the publication of the preparatory team's report, the 
Security Council requested the Secretary-General to establish a Panel of Experts on the 
Somalia embargo, consisting of three members, for a period of six months.' 58 Upon the 
expiration of the Panel's mandate, the Council re-established it for a further six months: 59 
The Panel's initial mandate was practically identical to that of the preparatory team, 169 with 
the following additional tasks: a) taking into account the recommendations of the team of 
151 	Ibid. 
152 	S/2002/722 (3 July 2002), annex: Report of the team of experts appointed pursuant to Security 
Council resolution 1407 (2002), paragraph 1, concerning Somalia. 
153 	Ibid, paragraph 27. 
154 	Ibid, paragraphs 63-68. 
155 	Ibid, paragraphs 69-71. 
156 	Ibid, paragraphs 72-79. 
157 	Ibid, paragraphs 80-81. 
158 	S/RES/1425 (22 July 2002), operative paragraph 3. 
159 	S/RES/1474 (8 April 2003), operative paragraph 3. The Council requested the Secretary-General 
to appoint up to four experts in operative paragraph 4 of the same resolution. The Secretary-
General circulated a letter on 30 April 2003 detailing the appointments made: see S/20031515 (1 
May 2003). 
160 	S/RES/1425 (22 July 2002), operative paragraph 3. 
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experts on methodology; 161 b) notifying the Council, through the 751 Committee, of any lack 
of cooperation it experienced in conducting its work ., 162 c) briefing the Chairman of the 751 
Committee prior to his scheduled mission to the region; 163 and d) providing an oral briefing 
to the Council, through the Committee, in November 2002. 164 
The Panel of Experts on Somalia submitted its report in March 2003, 165 concluding 
that the arms embargo had "no normative value" due to the fact that it had been consistently 
violated since its imposition. It therefore recommended that the Security Council and the 
751 Committee should send a clear signal that in future the embargo would be enforced 
vigorously and violators penalised. 166 Among the Panel's concrete recommendations were 
that: a) a system should be created to prevent the forging and abuse of end-user certificates 
for arms sales; 167 b) the 751 Committee should draw up a list of individuals deemed to be in 
violation of the arms embargo, against whom financial sanctions might be implemented; 168 
c) targeted travel sanctions might be implemented against those individuals who had been 
violating the embargo and against whom financial sanctions either have not been effective or 
would be unlikely to be effective; 169 d) where individuals who systematically violate the 
embargo are closely affiliated with political institutions, their representative privileges could 
161 SIRES/1425 (22 July 2002), operative paragraph 5. 
162 	SIRES/1425 (22 July 2002), operative paragraph 9. 
163 	S/RES/I425 (22 July 2002), operative paragraph 10. 
164 	Ibid. The Panel provided such a briefing on 14 November 2002: see S/PRST/2002/35 (12 
December 2002): Presidential statement of 12 December 2002 [expressing the Council's 
appreciation for the Panel's oral briefing]. 
165 S/2003/223 (25 March 2003), enclosure: Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia pursuant to 
Security Council resolution 1425 (2002). 
166 	Ibid, paragraphs 172-175. 
167 	Ibid, paragraph 187. 
168 	Ibid, paragraph 188. 
169 Ibid, paragraph 189. 
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be revoked; 170 and e) the Panel's mandate should be extended for six months in order to 
investigate further violations of the embargo and to organize a Somali-based effort to identify 
and impede embargo violators.' 71 
In April 2003, when the Security Council re-established the Panel, it bestowed upon 
it the following tasks: a) focussing on ongoing violations of the embargo, including transfers 
of ammunition, single use weapons and small arms; b) identifying those who continued to 
violate the embargo inside and outside Somalia, as well as their active supporters, and to 
provide the 751 Committee with a draft list for possible future actions; c) exploring the 
possibility of establishing a monitoring mechanism for the implementation of the embargo, 
with partners inside and outside Somalia, in cooperation with regional and international 
organizations, including the AU; d) refining the recommendations provided in the Panel's first 
report; 172 and e) providing a briefing, through the 751 Committee, to the Council on its work 
in the middle of its term and submitting a report, again through the Committee, at the end of 
its mandated period.' 73 
9.4.8 The Liberia III Panel of Experts 
In December 2003, at the same time that it initiated the third Liberian sanctions 
regime, the Council also requested the Secretary-General to establish a Panel of Experts for 
a period of five months.' 74 The mandate of the Panel, which was to consist of up to five 
members, included: (a) conducting an assessment mission to Liberia and neighbouring States 
170 	Ibid, paragraph 190. 
171 	Ibid, paragraph 191. 
172 	SIRES/1474 (8 April 2003), operative paragraph 3. 
173 
 
SIRES/1474 (8 April 2003), operative paragraph 7. 
174 	S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraph 22. 
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and to report on the implementation of the Liberian sanctions, including on violations 
involving rebel movements and neighbouring States, as well as on information relevant to the 
designation of individuals to be subject to travel sanctions and concerning various sources of 
funding for the illicit trade of arms., 175 (b) assessing progress towards the goals of the 
sanctions; 176 and (c) reporting to the Council through the 1521 Committee with observations 
and recommendations, including how to minimize any humanitarian and socio-economic 
impact of the timber sanctions.' 77 
9.4.9 The DRC Group of Experts 
In March 2003 the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to establish 
for a period of approximately three months a Group of Experts on the DRC sanctions.' 78 
The mandate of the Group, which was to consist of no more than four experts, included: 
(a) analysing information gathered by the United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC 
(MONUC) regarding the implementation of the sanctions; 179 (b) gathering and analysing 
information gathered in the DRC and other countries regarding the flow of arms and related 
materiel, as well as on networks operating in violations of the sanctions; 18° 
(c) recommending measures to improve the capacity of States to implement the sanctions; 181 
(d) reporting to the Council with recommendations and through the 1533 Committee on the 
175 S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraph 22(a). 
176 S/RES/I521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraph 22(b). 
177 SIRES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraph 22(c). 
178 	S/RES/1533 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 10. 
179 S/RES/1533 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 10(a). For discussion of MONUC's 
monitoring role, see section 9.6, below. 
180 SIRES/1533 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 10(b). 
181 	S/RES/1533 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 10(c). 
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implementation of the sanctions; 182 (e) keeping the 1533 Committee abreast of its 
activities; 183 (f) exchanging with MONUC information that would facilitate MONUC's 
monitoring mandate; 184 and (g) providing the 1533 Committee with a list of individuals who 
had violated the sanctions, as well as of those who had supported those individuals.' 85 
9.5 Monitoring Mechanisms 
The Security Council has established monitoring mechanisms to monitor the 
implementation of sanctions in connection with four of its sanctions regimes, including those 
against Iraq, UNITA, the Taliban & Al Qaida, and Somalia. Although Monitoring 
Mechanisms have generally been established with short-term mandates, in practice they 
have tended to serve for longer periods than the various expert bodies. Like expert bodies, 
however, Monitoring Mechanisms are technically subsidiary organs of the Council, with a 
responsibility to report on their activities. They generally report to the Council via the 
relevant Sanctions Committee, with the Chairman of that Sanctions Committee forwarding 
or presenting regular written and oral reports to the Council on their behalf. 
9.5.1 The Iraq Export/Import Monitoring Mechanism 
In the case of Iraq, the Security Council established an export/import monitoring 
mechanism. In October 1991, the Council requested the 661 Committee to develop, in 
cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA, a mechanism to monitor sales or supplies to 
Iraq of items that could be used for the production or acquisition of weapons, in 
182 SIRES/1533 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 10(d). 
183 SIRES/1533 (12 March 2004), operative paragiaph 10(e). 
184 SIRES/1533 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 10(f). 
185 S/RES/1533 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 10(g). 
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contravention of the arms and related sanctions. 186 In July 1995 the 661 Committee 
approved a joint-proposal for that mechanism submitted by UNSCOM and the IAEA. 1 " 
The proposal for the mechanism was then submitted to the Security Council for its 
consideration, and in March 1996 the Council decided to establish the mechanism. 188 The 
monitoring mechanism consisted of a Joint Export/Import Monitoring Unit established by 
UNSCOM and the IAEA, and all States were required to notify the mechanism if their 
nationals planned to export to Iraq any items or technologies that might have "dual-use" 
potential.' 89 Iraq was also required to inform the mechanism of any plans to receive potential 
"dual-use" items or technologies. 199 
When the Security Council established UNMOVIC, it requested the Executive 
Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director-General of the IAEA to establish a unit which 
would assume the monitoring mechanism's responsibilities and to resume the revision and 
updating of the lists of items and technology to which the mechanism applied and thus the 
export to Iraq of which must be notified to the unit.' 91 The updated list, which was circulated 
by the Executive-Chairman of UNMOVIC in June 2001, 192 came into effect on 13 July 
2001. 193 In its quarterly reports to the Council, UNMOVIC generally summarized the unit's 
activities during the reporting period. On the whole those activities consisted of reviewing 
186 	SIRES/715 (11 October 1995), operative paragraph 7. 
187 S/19961700 (26 August 1996), annex: Report of the Security Council Committee established by 
resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, annex, paragraph 
32 (page 8). 
188 S/RES/I051 (27 March 1996), operative paragraph I. 
189 	S/RES/1051 (27 March 1996), operative paragraph 5. 
190 S/RES/1051 (27 March 1996), operative paragraph 6. 
191 	S/RES/1284 (17 December 1999), operative paragraph 8. 
192 S/2001/560 (15 October 2001): Letter dated 1 June 2001 from the Executive Chairman of 
UNMOVIC addressed to the President of the Security Council. 
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notifications sent to it by States. The Unit also reviewed the distribution plans for the Oil-for-
Food programme to ensure that they contained no "prohibited" items. 194 After the adoption 
of the Goods Review List (GRL) by the Council in May 2002: 95 the unit's work increased 
substantially as it was involved in the process of reviewing applications to export 
humanitarian supplies to Iraq under the Oil-for-Food programme to ensure that the items or 
technologies proposed to be supplied to Iraq did not feature on the GRL. 196 
9.5.2 The UNITA Monitoring Mechanism 
The Security Council requested the Secretary-General to establish a monitoring 
mechanism on the UNITA sanctions in April 2000, after the UNITA Panel of Experts had 
recommended that such a monitoring mechanism be created. 197 The monitoring mechanism 
was to continue the work of the Panel of Experts by collecting additional information on, and 
investigating relevant leads relating to, allegations of violations of the UNITA sanctions.'" It 
would consist of up to five experts and it would have a time-bound mandate of six 
months: 99 After its initial establishment, the mandate of the UNITA monitoring trechanism 
was extended five times, for one period of three months, three subsequent periods of six 
193 S/2001/833 (30 August 2001), annex: Sixth quarterly report of the Executive-Chairman of 
UNMOVIC, paragraph 7. 
194 	See, e.g., S/2002/I95 (26 February 2002), annex: Eighth quarterly report of the Executive- 
Chairman of UNMOVIC, paragraph 13. 
195 	The GRL was adopted by the Council in resolution 1409 (2002): SIRES/1409 (14 May 2002), 
operative paragraphs 2-3. For further details on the GRL process, see the case-study on Iraq. 
196 See, e.g., S/2002/606 (31 May 2002), annex: Ninth quarterly report of the Executive-Chairman 
of UNMOVIC, paragraphs 20-21; S12002/98I (3 September 2002), annex: Tenth quarterly report 
of the Executive-Chairman of UNMOVIC, paragraph 28. 
197 SIRES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 3. 
198 	Ibid. 
199 	Ibid. 
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months, and a final period of two months. 20° The size of the mechanism contracted over the 
course of its mandates, consisting of five experts for the second and third mandates, four 
experts for the fourth and fifth mandates, and two experts for the final mandate. 20 ' 
During the course of its two-and-a-half-year tenure, the monitoring mechanism 
submitted a total of six reports. 202 Among the monitoring mechanism's major initiatives, it: 
(a) Identified individuals and companies involved in activities that violated, or promoted 
violation of, the UNITA sanctions; (b) Identified States that had been complicit in activities 
that violated, or promoted violation of, the UNITA sanctions; (c) Commissioned a 
professional asset tracer to investigate the flow of UMTA's financial assets; and 
(d) Identified, and monitored the activities of, individuals and non-governmental 
organisations who appeared to have been acting as foreign representatives of UNITA. 203 
Among the major recommendations made by the monitoring mechanism have been that: 
200 	See: S/RES11336 (23 January 2001), operative paragraph 3 [extending the mechanism's mandate 
for three months]; S/RES/1348 (19 April 2001), operative paragraph 3 [extending the 
mechanism's mandate for six months]; SIRES/1374 (19 October 2001), operative paragraph 3 
[extending the mechanism's mandate for a further six months]; SIRES/1404 (18 April 2002), 
operative paragraph 3 [extending the mechanism's mandate for a further six months]; 
S/RES/1439 (18 October 2002), operative paragraph 2 [deciding to extend the mechanism's 
mandate for a further two months]. 
201 
	
See: S/RES/1336 (23 January 2001), operative paragraph 5 [requesting the Secretary-General to 
reappoint five experts to the monitoring mechanism]; SIRES/1348 (19 April 2001), operative 
paragraph 5 [requesting the Secretary-General to appoint five experts to the monitoring 
mechanism]; S/RES/1374 (19 October 2001), operative paragraph 7 [requesting the Secretary-
General to appoint four experts to the monitoring mechanism]; SIRES/1404 (18 April 2002), 
operative paragraph 6 [requesting the Secretary-General to appoint four experts to the 
monitoring mechanism]; SIRES/1439 (18 October 2002), operative paragraph 5 [requesting the 
Secretary-General to appoint two experts to the monitoring mechanism]. 
202 
	
S/2000/1225 (21 December 2000), enclosure: Final Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on 
Angola Sanctions; S/2001/363 (18 April 2001), enclosure: Addendum to the final report of the 
Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA; S/2001/966 (12 October 2001), 
enclosure: Supplementary report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA; 
S/2002/486 (26 April 2002), annex: Additional report of the Monitoring Mechanism on 
Sanctions against UNITA; 5/2002/1119 (16 October 2002), annex: Additional report of the 
Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA; S/2002/1339(10 December 2002), annex: 
Final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA. 
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(a) Better networks of regulatory bodies should be established in the spheres most relevant 
to the effective implementation of sanctions — for instance, the establishment of an effective 
international regulatory regime for diamonds, and the promotion of better cooperation 
among SADC Member States in the implementation, monitoring and enforcement of the 
UNITA sanctions; and (b) The Security Council should establish a permanent mechanism to 
monitor its sancfions.204 
9.5.3 The Taliban & Al Qaida Monitoring Mechanism 
In July 2001, on the recommendation of the Taliban & Al Qaida Committee of 
Experts, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to establish a monitoring 
mechanism. 205 The monitoring mechanism's mandate was initially for a period of five and a 
half months, to coincide with the period remaining before the initial expiry of the sanctions 
then being applied against the Taliban and Usama Bin Laden. 206 Following the establishment 
of the monitoring mechanism, the mandate of the Monitoring Group was extended for two 
further periods of twelve months. 207 Its final mandate expired in January 2004, when it was 
replaced by the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team ("the 1526 Monitoring 
Team").2°8 
203 	For further details of the monitoring mechanism's activities, see the discussion of the UNITA 
sanctions regime in the Appendices. 
204 For further details of the mechanism's recommendations, see the discussion of the UNITA 
sanctions regime in the Appendices. 
205 	SIRES/1363 (30 July 2001), operative paragraph 3. For the recommendations of the Taliban & Al 
Qaida Committee of Experts, see: S/2001/511 (22 May 2001), enclosure: Report of the Committee 
of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1333 (2000), paragraph 15 
(a), regarding monitoring of the arms embargo against the Taliban and the closure of 
terrorist training camps in the Taliban-held areas of Afghanistan. 
206 	SIRES/1363 (30 July 2001), operative paragraph 3. 
207 	SIRES/1390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraphs 9, 10; SIRES/1455 (17 January 2003), 
operative paragraphs 8, 12, 13. 
208 For discussion of the 1526 Monitoring Team, see sub-section v., below. 
264 
9. Sanctions administration and monitoring: bestowing responsibility upon subsidiary bodies 
The original mandate of the Taliban& Al Qaida Monitoring Mechanism included the 
following tasks: (a) Monitoring the implementation of the sanctions; 2" (b) Offering assistance 
to States bordering the territory of Afghanistan under Taliban control, and other States as 
appropriate, to increase their capacity regarding the implementation of the sanctions; 21° and 
(c) Collating, assessing, verifying, and reporting and making recommendations on, 
information regarding violations of the sanctions. 211 The Monitoring Mechanism was to 
consist of two bodies: a Monitoring Group and a Sanctions Enforcement Support Team. 212 
The Sanctions Enforcement Support Team was never actually deployed, however, 
due to the complex situation that developed on the ground in Afghanistan after 11 
September 2001. The Monitoring Group nevertheless functioned as planned, submitting one 
report on its work in 2001 and three during 2002.2 ' 3 The reports contain detailed accounts 
of the activities of the Monitoring Group during the reporting periods, as well as 
observations and recommendations for improving the implementation of the sanctions. In its 
reports the Monitoring Group has documented thoroughly its activities and outlined 
209 	SIRES/1363 (30 July 2001), operative paragraph 3(a). 
210 SIRES/1363 (30 July 2001), operative paragraph 3(b). 
211 	SIRES/1363 (30 July 2001), operative paragraph 3(c). 
212 	S/RES/I363 (30 July 2001), operative paragraph 4. The Monitoring Group would be based in 
New York and would consist of up to five experts. Its mandate would be to monitor the 
implementation of the sanctions, including in the fields of arms embargoes, counter-terrorism 
and related legislation, as well as money laundering, financial transactions and drug trafficking: 
SIRES/1363 (30 July 2001), operative paragraph 4(a). The Sanctions Enforcement Support Team 
would be located in the States neighbouring Afghanistan and would consist of up to fifteen 
members with expertise in areas such as customs, border security and counter-terrorism: 
SIRES/1363 (30 July 2001), operative paragraph 4(b). The Sanctions Enforcement Support Team 
would report at least once a month to the Monitoring Group, and the Monitoring Group would 
report to the 1267 Committee: S/RES/1363 (30 July 2001), operative paragraph 5. 
213 S/2002/65 (15 January 2002), annex: First Report of the Monitoring Group on Afghanistan 
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1363 (2001); S120021541 (15 May 2002), 
enclosure: Report of the Monitoring Group pursuant to Resolution 1390 (2002); S/2002/1050 
(17 December 2002), enclosure: Second report of the Monitoring Group Pursuant to 
Resolution 1390 (2002); S/2002/1338 (17 December 2002), enclosure: Third report of the 
Monitoring Group Pursuant to Resolution 1390 (2002). 
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extremely detailed recommendations for improving the implementation of the various 
sanctions against the Taliban and Al Qaida. Thus, the Group has outlined specific 
recommendations for: a) improving the operation of the consolidated list of individuals and 
entities subject to sanctions; 214 b) improving the implementation of the financial sanctions; 215 
214 	Report of the Monitoring Group pursuant to Resolution 1390 (2002), above note 213, 
paragraphs 68-73 (recommending that the list of individuals and entities associated with the 
Taliban, Al Qaida and Bin Laden should contain the minimum criteria needed to enhance 
implementation, including names according to their "correct cultural construction", so that 
they could be recognized by implementing authorities, and as many "identifiers" as possible, to 
avoid potential cases of mistaken identity, that it should be produced in all of the official 
languages of the United Nations, and that it should be disseminated as widely as possible to 
ensure implementation); Second report of the Monitoring Group Pursuant to Resolution 1390 
(2002), above note 213, paragraphs 126-133 (recommending that: the United Nations 
consolidated list should be used by all States as an authoritative reference for the 
implementation of sanctions against the Taliban, Al Qaida and Usama Bin Laden and their 
associates; the list should be updated regularly and States should submit to the 1267 
Committee for possible addition to the list the names and identifying information of all persons 
believed to be members of or associated with Al Qaida or the Taliban; States should assist the 
1267 Committee in better identifying individuals or entities already on the list, providing 
confirmation of details such as date and place of birth, passport numbers for all known 
nationalities and physical description; and the 1267 Committee should establish a mechanism 
capable of responding immediately to inquiries concerning the identification of persons being 
detained as suspected members or associates of Al Qaida or the Taliban); Third report of the 
Monitoring Group Pursuant to Resolution 1390 (2002), above note 213, paragraphs 95-98 
(recommending that: the list be issued in a revised format; and that all individuals known to 
have attended Al Qaida training camps must be considered suspected terrorists and their 
names should be submitted for designation on the list). 
215 	Report of the Monitoring Group pursuant to Resolution 1390 (2002), above note 213, 
paragraphs 74-5 (recommending that States should become parties to the International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, and that States involved in the 
trade of rough diamonds should participate in the Kimberley Process); Second report of the 
Monitoring Group Pursuant to Resolution 1390 (2002), above note 213, paragraphs 134-143 
(recommending that: States should assist each other as much as possible in the investigation 
and sharing of intelligence concerning individuals believed to be members or associates of Al 
Qaida or the Taliban, in order to ensure that the application and maintenance of financial 
sanctions is justified; bank secrecy rules should not be an obstacle to the provision to the 
Monitoring Group of information requested by it concerning individuals and entities alleged to 
have links to Al Qaida; the 1267 Committee should establish procedures regarding the possible 
granting of humanitarian exceptions to the sanctions; States should review their laws and 
procedures regarding oversight of charities, in order to ensure that they are not used to funnel 
funds to individuals and entities associated with Al Qaida and the Taliban; banking 
institutions submit to appropriate national authorities reports on suspicious transactions; and 
that an international organization should be granted responsibility for working with States to 
ensure that hawala and other alternative systems for the transfer of money are not exploited or 
misused by terrorists); Third report of the Monitoring Group Pursuant to Resolution 1390 
(2002), above note 213, paragraphs 99-102 (recommending that assets belonging to 
individuals and entities on the list should not be released without prior approval from the 1267 
Committee; and that Member States should be encouraged to introduce mechanisms to enable 
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c) improving the implementation of the arms sanctions; 21 6 d) improving the implementation of 
the travel sanctions; 2 " and e) increasing the number of reports received from States on 
measures taken to implement the sanctions. 21 8 
9.5.4 The Somalia Monitoring Group 
In December 2003, the Council requested the Secretary-General to establish a 
Monitoring Group connected with the Somalia sanctions regime for a period of 6 months. 2 ' 9 
The Somalia Monitoring Group's mandate included: (a) investigating violations of the arms 
embargo;22°  (b) making recommendations for strengthening the implementation of the arms 
the monitoring of electronic transfers, and particularly of international transfers, in order to 
detect suspicious activity). 
216 Report of the Monitoring Group pursuant to Resolution 1390 (2002), above note 213, 
paragraphs 76-78 (recommending that arms -producing States should become members of the 
Wassenaar Arrangement, work towards the standardization of "end-user" certificates, and 
register and license all nationals operating as arms brokers or dealers); Second report of the 
Monitoring Group Pursuant to Resolution 1390 (2002), above note 213, paragraphs 146-151 
(recommending that States should take steps to require the registration of all arms brokers 
dealing from their territories, to criminalize the operation of non-registered arms brokers, and to 
ensure the strict use of end-user certificates in any transactions involving the provision of 
arms and elated materiel); Third report of the Monitoring Group Pursuant to Resolution 
1390 (2002), above note 213, paragraphs 105-107 (recommending that Member States should 
be encouraged: to become party to the 1991 Montreal Convention and the 1997 International 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings; to participate in the "Container 
Security Initiative"; and to adopt the recommendations made by the Secretary-General in his 
report dated 20 September 2002 on small arms). For the report of the Secretary-General on small 
arms, see: S/2002/1053 (20 September 2002): Report of the Secretary-General on small arms. 
217 Second report of the Monitoring Group Pursuant to Resolution 1390 (2002), above note 213, 
paragraphs 144-145 (recommending that: States should ensure that their border control officials 
are given adequate resources, training and technology to improve their ability to detect 
falsified documents; and the 1267 Committee should issue guidelines to States on action to be 
taken in the event that a designated individual attempts to enter or transit their territory); Third 
report of the Monitoring Group Pursuant to Resolution 1390 (2002), above note 213, 
paragraphs 103-104 (recommending that: the 1267 Committee consider all individuals on the 
consolidated list to be actual or suspected Al Qaida terrorists, so that Member States can 
detain, prosecute or extradite them to another country that has issued a warrant or return them 
for detention in their country of origin; and that Member States should put in place appropriate 
measures to comply fully with the travel sanctions). 
218 Second report of the Monitoring Group Pursuant to Resolution 1390 (2002), above note 213, 
paragraphs 152-153 (recommending that the 1267 Committee should encourage those States 
which had not yet complied with their obligation to submit such reports to do so). 
219 SIRES/l519 (16 December 2003), operative paragraph 2. 
220 SIRES/l519 (16 December 2003), operative paragraph 2(a). 
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embargo;221 (c) carrying out field investigations in Somalia, neighbouring States and other 
appropriate States; 222 (d) assessing progress made by States in the region in implementing 
the arms embargo, including through a review of national customs and border control 
regimes;223 (e) reporting with a draft list of those who continued to violate the arms embargo 
inside and outside Somalia, for possible future measures by the Counci1; 224 and (f) making 
recommendations based on its investigations and the previous reports of the Somalia Panel 
of Experts.225 
9.5.5 The Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team ("the 1526 
Monitoring Team") 
In January 2004, the Council decided to establish for a period of eighteen months an 
Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team. 226 The mandate of "the 1526 
Monitoring Team", which would comprise up to eight experts, included: (a) submitting 
written reports to the 1267 Committee on the implementation of the Taliban/A1 Qaida 
sanctions, including concrete recommendations;227 (b) analysing reports submitted by States 
pursuant to resolution 1455 (2003); 228 (c) facilitating areas of convergence between the 
1267 Committee and the Counter-Terrorism Committee; 229 (d) reporting to the 1267 
221 	SIRES/1519 (16 December 2003), operative paragraph 2(b). 
222 	SIRES/1519 (16 December 2003), operative paragraph 2(c). 
223 S/RES/1519 (16 December 2003), operative paragraph 2(d). 
224 	S/RES/1519 (16 December 2003), operative paragraph 2(e). 
225 	SIRES/1519 (16 December 2003), operative paragraph 2(f). 
226 	SIRES/1526 (30 January 2004), operative paragraph 6. 
227 	SIRES/1526 (30 January 2004), operative paragraph 7. 
228 	S/RES/1526 (30 January 2004), Annex. 
229 	Ibid. 
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Committee on a regular basis;23° and (e) assisting the 1267 Committee in preparing its oral 
and written reports to the Counci1. 231 
9.6 United Nations Operations 
The Council has called upon United Nations Operations to play a role in the 
implementation and monitoring of sanctions in connection with the sanctions regimes against 
Somalia, Liberia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and certain actors in the DRC. 
In the case of Somalia, when the Council established the second U.N. operation to 
undertake activities in that country — the United Nations Operation in Somalia H 
(UNOSOM II) — it requested the Secretary-General to support the implementation of the 
Somalia sanctions regime from within Somalia, utilizing as available and appropriate the 
forces of LTNOSOM 11. 232 Although the Secretary-General did not subsequently report 
exclusively or explicitly on the actions taken by UNOSOM II to implement the embargo, he 
nevertheless referred consistently to actions taken by the Operation to bring about the 
disarmament of the various factions within Somalia — activities which were linked to the 
overall objectives of the arms embargo. 233 
230 	Ibid. 
231 	Ibid. 
232 	S/RES/814 (26 March 1993), operative paragraph 10. For the provisions establishing UNOSOM 
II, see: SIRES/814 (26 March 1993), operative paragraphs 5, 6. For UNOSOM II's full mandate, 
see: S125354 and Add. 1 and 2 (3, 11 and 22 March 1993): Further report of the Secretary-
General pursuant to paragraphs 18 and 19 of resolution 794 (1992) on the situation in 
Somalia, paragraphs 56-88 [proposing a detailed mandate for UNOSOM II, which was 
subsequently endorsed by the Council in paragraph 5 of resolution 814 (1993)]. 
233 	See, e.g., S/26317 (17 August 1993): Further report of the Secretary-General submitted in 
pursuance of paragraph 18 of resolution 814 (1993), paragraphs 14-18; S/26738 (12 
November 1993): Further report of the Secretary-General submitted in pursuance of 
paragraph 19 of resolution 814 (1993) and paragraph A 5 of resolution 865 (1993), 
paragraphs 38-40, 83-84. 
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In the case of the sanctions regime against Liberia (in the first instance), September 
1993 the Council entrusted the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), 
with the responsibility for assisting in monitoring compliance with the arms embargo. 234 In 
November 1995, when the Council adjusted UNOMIL's mandate, it again requested the 
Operation to monitor compliance with the arms embargo and to verify its impartial 
application.'" 
In the case of the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to 
address the situation in Kosovo, in July 1998, the Council decided that the United Nations 
Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP), which was based in the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, would monitor and report on illicit arms flows and other activities 
prohibited by the Kosovo sanctions regime.236 
In the case of the DRC, when the Council first imposed sanctions in July 2003 it 
requested the United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) to deploy 
military observers in North and South Kivu and in Ituri and to report to it regularly on 
information concerning arms supply and the presence of foreign military.'" In March 2004 
234 	S/RES/866 (22 September 1993), operative paragraph 3(b). UNOMIL was established by 
operative paragraph 2 of the same resolution. Its mandate was extended on several occasions, 
but it was eventually terminated in September 1997. For the Council's decisions in relation to 
UNOMIL's mandate, see: S/RES/911 (21 April 1994), operative paragraph 2; SIRES/950 (21 
October 1994), operative paragraph 2; SIRES/972 (13 January 1995), operative paragraph 2; 
S/RES/985 (13 April 1995), operative paragraph 1; S/RES/1001 (30 June 1995), operative 
paragraph 3; S/RES/1014 (15 September 1995), operative paragraph 2; SIRES/1020 (10 
November 1995), operative paragraph 2; S/RES/1041 (29 January 1996), operative paragraph 2; 
SIRES/1059 (31 May 1996), operative paragraph 2; SIRES/1071 (30 August 1996), operative 
paragraph 2; S/RES/1083 (27 November 1996), operative paragraph 4; SIRES/1100 (27 March 
1997), operative paragraph 1; SIRES/1116 (27 June 1997), operative paragraph I. Ultimately 
UNOMIL was terminated on 30 September 1997, as foreshadowed on the last occasion on 
which its mandate was extended: S/RES/1116 (27 June 1997), operative paragraph 1. 
235 	SIRES/1020 (10 November 1995), operative paragraph 2(c). 
236 SIRES/1186 (1998) (21 July 1998), operative paragraph I. 
237 SIRES/1493 (28 July 2003), operative paragraph 19. 
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the Council expanded MONUC's sanctions monitoring role, requesting it to use all means to 
inspect the cargo of aircraft and any transport vehicle using the ports, airports, military bases 
and border crossings in North and South Kivu and in Ituri. 238 At the same time, the Council 
also authorized MONUC to seize arms and related materiel violating the DRC sanctions. 239 
9.7 Security Council missions 
The Security Council has also included responsibilities relating to the monitoring of 
sanctions in the terms of reference of a Security Council mission, doing so for a mission 
dispatched to Kosovo in April 2000 to investigate the implementation of resolution 1244 
(1999). In that instance, the overall purpose of the mission was to enhance support for the 
implementation of the Council's decisions addressing the situation in Kosovo, but one 
component of the mission's terms of reference was to review the ongoing implementation of 
the sanctions.24° 
238 	S/RES11533 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 3. 
239 S/RES/1533 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 4. 
240 For the decision to send the mission, as well as the mission's terms of reference, see: 
S/2000/320 (14 April 2000): Letter dated 14 April 2000 from the President of the Security 
Council addressed to the Secretary-General and annex. For the report on the mission's 
activities, submitted to the Council upon the mission's return to headquarters, see: S/2000/363 
(29 April 2000): Report of the Security Council mission on the implementation of Security 
Council resolution 1244 (1999). 
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actors for sanctions monitoring and enforcement 
In addition to delegating responsibilities to its own subsidiary organs, the Council has 
also called upon various international actors to perform sanctions-related tasks, including the 
Secretary-General and the U.N. Secretariat, States with a particular relationship with or 
proximity to the target of a sanctions regime, and regional organizations. 
10.1 The U.N. Secretary-General 
The Secretary-General has been called upon to undertake a wide variety of tasks in 
relation to the administration, implementation and monitoring of U.N. sanctions regimes. The 
responsibilities requested, invited or required of the Secretary-General fall into four broad 
categories: (a) administration and coordination; (b) planning; (c) monitoring and evaluation; 
and (d) implementation. 
10.1.1 Administration and Coordination 
The Secretary-General has been requested to undertake a range of responsibilities 
connected with the administration and coordination of efforts designed to facilitate the 
implementation of sanctions. Those responsibilities have included providing support to the 
Council and its subsidiary organs, establishing subsidiary bodies connected with sanctions, 
and coordinating activities designed to facilitate the implementation or enforcement of 
sanctions. 
i. 	Providing administrative support 
The Secretary-General has provided administrative support in relation to almost all 
of the sanctions regimes. Among the support activities requested of the Secretary-General 
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by the Council have been the following responsibilities: receiving reports from States on 
measures taken to implement sanctions;' providing assistance to Sanctions Committees in 
the discharge of their tasks, including making the necessary arrangements in the Secretariat 
for that purpose;2 liaising with the relevant Sanctions Committee concerning the 
implementation of a humanitarian programme designed to address the humanitarian 
consequences of sanctions;3 publicizing information on violations of the sanctions;4 
publicizing the provisions imposing sanctions; 5 developing an information package and media 
In connection with the Southern Rhodesia sanctions regime, see: S/RES/232 (16 December 
1966), operative paragraph 8 (implicit); SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraph 18 
(implicit); S/RES1277 (18 March 1970), operative paragraph 19 (implicit). In connection with the 
Libya sanctions regime, see: SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 8; SIRES/883 (11 
November 1993), operative paragraph 13 (implicit). In connection with the sanctions regime 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), see: S/RES/757 (30 May 
1992), operative paragraph 12 (implicit). In connection with the Haiti sanctions regime, see: 
S/RES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 13. In connection with the Sudan sanctions 
regime, see: S/RES/1054 (26 April 1996), operative paragraph 7 (implicit). In connection with the 
Sierra Leone sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 13 
(implicit). In connection with the Ethiopia and Eritrea sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1298 (17 
May 2000), operative paragraph 11 (implicit). 
In connection with the Southern Rhodesia sanctions regime, see: SIRES/314 (28 February 
1972), operative paragraph 7; SIRES/318 (28 July 1972), operative paragraph 10. In connection 
with the South Africa sanctions regime, see: SIRES/421 (9 December 1977), operative paragraph 
3. In connection with the Iraq sanctions regime, see: SIRES/661 (6 August 1990), operative 
paragraph 8. In connection with the sanctions regime against the former Yugoslavia, see: 
SIRES/724 (15 December 1991), operative paragraph 5(d). In connection with the Libya 
sanctions regime, see: S/RES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 11. In connection with 
the Haiti sanctions regime, see: SIRES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 14. In 
connection with the Rwanda sanctions regime, see: SIRES/918 (17 May 1994), operative 
paragraph 17. In connection with the Sierra Leone sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1132 (8 
October 1997), operative paragraph 12. In connection with the sanctions regime against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to address the situation in Kosovo, see: SIRES/1160 (31 March 
1998), operative paragraph 11; In connection with the Afghanistan/Taliban/AI Qaida sanctions 
regime, see: STRES/1267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraph 11. In connection with the 
Ethiopia and Eritrea sanctions regime, see: S/RES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 10. 
In connection with the implementation of the Oil-for-Food Programme, see: SIRES/I284 (17 
December 1999), operative paragraph 23 (requesting the Secretary-General to provide Iraq and 
the 661 Committee with a daily statement of the status of the escrow account established under 
the Oil-for-Food Programme). 
In connection with the sanctions regime against Liberia (in the first instance), see: 
S/PRST/1994/33: Presidential statement of 13 July 1994 (requesting the Secretary-General to 
ensure that all information on violations of the arms embargo was made promptly available to it 
and publicised more widely). 
In connection with the Sierra Leone sanctions regime, see: S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative 
paragraph 24 (requesting the Secretary-General to publicize the provisions of the resolutions 
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campaign designed to educate the public on sanctions; 6 making financial an-angements to 
support the activities of sanctions-related subsidiary bodies;7 forwarding to the Council 
reports of sanctions-related subsidiary bodies; 8 and playing a role in the administration of 
exemptions from sanctions regirnes. 9 
extending the diamond sanctions, as well as the obligations they imposed). The Council 
repeated that request in: S/RES11385 (19 December 2001), operative paragraph 5; SIRES/1446 (4 
December 2002), operative paragraph 5. 
In connection with the UNITA sanctions regime, see: S/RES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative 
paragraph 30. 
In connection with the UNITA sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1237 (7 May 1999), operative 
paragraph 11 (requesting the Secretary-General to establish a Trust Fund to finance the 
activities of the expert panels on UNITA, which subsequently became a single Panel of 
Experts); S/RES/I 439 (18 Gtober 2002), operative paragraph 4 (requesting the Secretary-
General to close the Trust Fund for the UNITA Panel of Experts and to arrange for the 
remaining funds to be reimbursed to contributors); In relation to the UNITA monitoring 
mechanism, see: SIRES/1336 (23 January 2001), operative paragraph 5 (requesting the 
Secretary-General to make the necessary financial arrangements to support the work of the 
UNITA monitoring mechanism). That request was repeated in: SIRES/1348 (19 April 2001), 
operative paragraph 5; S/RES/1374 (19 October 2001), operative paragraph 7; SIRES/1404 (18 
April 2002), operative paragraph 6; SIRES/1439 (18 October 2002), operative paragraph 5. 
In connection with the Sierra Leone sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative 
paragraph 19 (requesting the Secretary-General to provide the necessary resources to support 
the work of the Sierra Leone Panel of Experts). 
In connection with the Afghanistan/Taliban/AI Qaida sanctions regime, see: SIRES/l363 (30 
July 2001), operative paragraph 9 (requesting the Secretary-General to make the necessary 
arrangements to support the work of the Afghanistan/Taliban/A1 Qaida monitoring mechanism, 
as an expense of the Organization and through a United Nations Trust Fund, and to keep the 
1267 Committee informed of the financial arrangements supporting the mechanism); S/RES/1455 
(17 January 2003), operative paragraph 10 (requesting the Secretary-General to ensure that the 
Taliban/AI Qaida Monitoring Group and the 1267 Committee and its Chairman had access to 
sufficient expertise and resources to discharge their responsibilities). 
In connection with the sanctions regime against Liberia (in the second instance), see: 
S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 19 (requesting the Secretary-General to 
provide the necessary resources for the activities of the Liberia Panel of Experts). The Council 
repeated that request in: SIRES/l478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 25. 
In connection with the Rwanda sanctions regime, see: S/RES/1161 (9 April 1998), operative 
paragraph 7 (requesting the Secretary-General to submit interim and final reports by the 
Commission of Inquiry on the Rwandan arms embargo). 
The Council requested the Secretary-General to play such a role in connection with the 
sanctions regimes against Rwanda, Sierra Leone and certain actors in the DRC. In connection 
with Rwanda, see: SIRES/i01 1 (16 August 1995), operative paragraph 7 (requesting the 
Secretary-General to notify Member States of the locations listed by the Government of 
Rwanda as points of entry through which arms exempt from the embargo might enter the 
country). In connection with Sierra Leone, see: S/RES/1171 (5 June 1998), operative paragraph 2 
(requesting the Secretary-General to receive from the Government of Sierra Leone the list of 
points of entry through which arms and related materiel would be permitted to enter Sierra 
Leone). In connection with the DRC, see: SIRES/1493 (28 July 2003), operative paragraph 21 
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Establishing new subsidiary bodies or programmes 
Among the Secretary-General's responsibilities for establishing new subsidiary 
bodies or programmes he has been requested, invited or directed to establish: 
Commissions,' ° bodies of experts," monitoring mechanisms, 12 and financial accounts or 
(requesting the Secretary-General to receive notifications from States wishing to take 
advantage of the exemption for the provision of technical assistance and training for 
humanitarian or protective non-lethal military equipment). 
10 	 The Secretary-General has been requested to establish Commissions linked to the sanctions 
regimes against Iraq and Rwanda In connection with Iraq, see: S/RES1692 (20 May 1991), 
operative paragraph 4 (requesting the Secretary-General to implement the Council decision to 
establish the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC)). In connection with Rwanda, 
see: S/RES/1013 (7 September 1995), operative paragraph 1 (requesting the Secretary-General to 
establish the International Commission of Inquiry to investigate violations of the Rwandan 
sanctions regime). The Secretary-General was subsequently requested first to maintain the 
Commission, then to re-activate it. See: SIRES/1053 (23 April 1996), operative paragraph 2; 
SIRES/1161 (9 April 1998), operative paragraph I. 
11 	 The Secretary-General has been requested to establish various bodies of experts in connection 
with the sanctions regimes against Iraq, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia II, Liberia III and the 
DRC. In connection with Iraq, see: SIRES/1153 (20 February 1998), operative paragraph 12 
(requesting the Secretary-General to establish a group of experts to determine whether Iraq was 
able to export the permitted amount of oil under the Oil-for-Food Programme); S/RES/1284 (17 
December 1999), operative paragraph 30 (requesting the Secretary-General to establish a group 
of experts, including oil industry experts, to report on Iraq's petroleum production and export 
capacity and to make recommendations for increasing that capacity). In connection with 
Somalia, see: SIRES/1407 (3 May 2002), operative paragraph 1 (requesting the Secretary-
General to establish a preparatory team of experts on the Somalia embargo); S/RES/1425 (22 
July 2002), operative paragraphs 3-4 (requesting the Secretary-General to establish a Panel of 
Experts on the Somalia embargo); S/RES/1474 (8 April 2003), operative paragraphs 45 
(requesting the Secretary-General to implement the Council's decision to re-establish the 
Somalia Panel of Experts). In connection with Sierra Leone, see: SIRES/1306 (5 July 2000), 
operative paragraph 19 (requesting the Secretary-General to establish a Panel of Experts on the 
Sierra Leone sanctions). In connection with Liberia II, see: S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), 
operative paragraph 19 (requesting the Secretary-General to establish a Panel of Experts). The 
Council repeated that request on multiple occasions, after the Panel's previous mandate had 
elapsed. See: SIRES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 16; S/RES/1478 (6 May 2003), 
operative paragraph 25. In connection with Liberia III, see: S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003), 
operative paragraph 22 (requesting the Secretary-General to establish a Panel of Experts). In 
connection with the DRC, see: SIRES/l533 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 10 (requesting 
the Secretary-General to create a group of experts on the DRC sanctions). 
12 	 The Council has requested the Secretary-General to establish monitoring mechanisms in 
connection with the sanctions regimes against Somalia, UNITA and the Taliban/A1 Qaida. In 
connection with UNITA, see: SIRES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 3 (requesting the 
Secretary-General to establish a monitoring mechanism). In connection with the Taliban/A1 
Qaida, see: S/RES/1363 (30 July 2001), operative paragraph 3 (requesting the Secretary-General 
to establish a monitoring mechanism). In connection with Somalia, see: S/RES/1519 (16 
December 2003), operative paragraph 2 (requesting the Secretary-General to establish a 
monitoring group on Somalia). 
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sources of funding connected to subsidiary bodies or programmes. ° The Secretary-General 
has also been requested to appoint various actors to sanctions-related subsidiary bodies or 
programmes, 14 and to assign an existing subsidiary body to continue to undertake 
responsibilities in connection with sanctions monitoring. 15 
Coordinating role 
The Security Council has been requested to undertake a number of responsibilities 
for the coordination of efforts to improve the implementation, monitoring or enforcement of 
sanctions, including: coordinating the submission of reports by States and other international 
13 	In connection with the Iraq sanctions regime, see: S/RES/986 (14 April 1995), operative 
paragraphs 78 (requesting the Secretary-General to establish an escrow account for the 
purposes of the Oil-for-Food Programme). 
14 	The Council has requested the Secretary-General to appoint actors to subsidiary bodies or 
programmes with respect to the sanctions regimes against Iraq, UNITA, the Taliban/AI Qaida, 
Liberia II and Liberia III. In connection with Iraq, see: S/RES/1284 (17 December 1999), 
operative paragraph 5 (requesting the Secretary-General to appoint the Executive-Chairman of 
UNMOVIC, as well as a "College of Commissioners"); SIRES/1302 (8 June 2000), operative 
paragraphs 7 (requesting the Secretary-General to appoint overseers to approve petroleum and 
petroleum product exports under the OFFP), 18 (inviting the Secretary-General to appoint 
independent experts to prepare a comprehensive report on the humanitarian situation in Iraq). 
In connection with UNITA, see: S/RES/1336 (23 January 2001), operative paragraph 5 
(requesting the Secretary-General to reappoint five experts to the monitoring mechanism); 
S/RES/1348 (19 April 2001), operative paragraph 5 (requesting the Secretary-General to appoint 
five experts to the monitoring mechanism); SIRES/1374 (19 October 2001), operative paragraph 
7 (requesting the Secretary-General to appoint four experts to the monitoring mechanism); 
S/RES/1404 (18 April 2002), operative paragraph 6 (requesting the Secretary-General to appoint 
four experts to the monitoring mechanism); SIRES/1439 (18 October 2002), operative paragraph 
5 (requesting the Secretary-General to appoint two experts to the monitoring mechanism). In 
connection with the Taliban/A1 Qaida, see: SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative 
paragraph 15(a) (requesting the Secretary-General to appoint a committee of experts to make 
recommendations for monitoring the Afghanistan/Taliban/A1 Qaida sanctions regime); 
SIRES/1455 (17 January 2003), operative paragraph 8 (requesting the Secretary-General to 
reappoint experts to the Afghanistan/Taliban/AI Qaida Monitoring Group); SIRES/1526 (30 
January 2004), operative paragraph 7 (requesting the Secretary-General to appoint eight 
members to the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team). In connection with 
Liberia II, see: SIRES/1395 (27 February 2002), operative paragraph 5 (requesting the Secretary-
General to appoint experts to the Liberia Panel of Experts). The Council repeated that request 
in: SIRES/l458 (28 January 2003), operative paragraph 6. In connection with Liberia III, see: 
SIRES/1549 (17 June 2004), operative paragraph 3 (requesting the Secretary-General to appoint 
five experts to the regarding-established Liberia III Panel of Experts). 
15 	The Secretary-General was thus requested to assign the Afghanistan/Taliban/A1 Qaida 
Monitoring Group to monitor the implementation of the sanctions for a period of twelve 
months. See: SIRES/1390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraph 9. 
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actors concerning action taken to enforce sanctions; 16 coordinating the collection of 
information gained from the monitoring activities;" and struaigthening the collaboration 
between international actors involved in monitoring or enforcing sanctions. I8 
10.1.2 Planning 
The Security Council has requested the Secretary-General to undertake various 
planning activities related to sanctions administration, implementation and monitoring. The 
Secretary-General has been requested, invited or directed to undertake planning or make 
recommendations for the following: improving sanctions implementation; 19 monitoring 
sanctions implementation; 2° strengthening sanctions enforcement;21 and implementing 
16 	In connection with the former Yugoslavia sanctions regime, see: S/RES/787 (16 November 
1992), operative paragraph 14 (requesting the Secretary-General to coordinate the submission 
by States and regional agencies or arrangements of reports outlining action taken to halt 
maritime and riparian traffic to verify that cargo was not being transported in violation of the 
arms embargo). 
17 	In connection with the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia- 
Montenegro), see: S/RE51838 (10 June 1993), operative paragraph 2 (requesting the Secretary-
General to contact Member States, nationally or through regional organizations or 
arrangements, to ensure the availability of any relevant material derived from aerial surveillance 
and to report thereon to the Security Council). 
18 	In connection with the UNITA sanctions regime, see: S/RES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative 
paragraph 29 (requesting the Secretary-General to strengthen collaboration between the United 
Nations and regional and international organizations, including Interpol, which might be 
involved in monitoring or enforcing the implementation of the UNITA sanctions). 
19 	The Secretary-General was requested to perform such a task with respect to the sanctions 
regimes against Iraq and Somalia. In connection with Iraq, see: SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), 
operative paragraph 26 (requesting the Secretary-General to develop guidelines for the full 
implementation of the sanctions against arms and weapons of mass destruction and their 
development or servicing). In connection with Somalia, see: S/RES/814 (26 March 1993), 
operative paragraph 10 (requesting the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of 
the arms embargo from within Somalia, submitting recommendations regarding more effective 
measures if necessary). 
20 	The Secretary-General was requested to play such a role with respect to the sanctions regimes 
against Iraq, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) and Rwanda, In 
connection with the Iraq sanctions regime, see: SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraphs 
9 (deciding that the Secretary-General would develop a plan for the formation of UNSCOM), 10 
(requesting the Secretary-General to develop, in cooperation with UNSCOM, a plan for the 
future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with its obligation not to use, 
develop, construct or acquire weapons of mass destruction); SIRES/699, operative paragraph 4 
(requesting the Secretary-General to submit recommendations for ensuring that Iraq met its 
obligation to cover the costs of UNSCOM's operations). In connection with the Federal 
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humanitarian programmes designed to minimize the humanitarian consequences of 
sanctions." 
10.1.3 Monitoring and Evaluation 
The Secretary-General has been requested to undertake a range of monitoring and 
evaluation activities in relation to the various U.N. sanctions regimes, including reporting to 
the Council on the following matters: the implementation of sanctions or of the resolutions 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), see: SIRES/787 (16 November 1992), operative 
paragraph 16 (requesting the Secretary-General to submit recommendations for facilitating the 
implementation of its resolutions by deploying observers on the borders of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina). The Secretary-General was subsequently requested to submit an additional 
report on this subject: S/RES/838 (10 June 1993), operative paragraph 1. In connection with 
Rwanda, see: S/RES/997 (9 June 1995), operative paragraph 6 (requesting the Secretary-General 
to report on consultations with the Governments of countries neighbouring Rwanda on the 
possibility of deploying observers to monitor the implementation of the Rwandan sanctions. 
The Secretary-General submitted the requested report in July 1995: S/1995/552 (9 July 1995): 
Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of paragraph 6 of Security Council 
resolution 997 (1995) of 9 June 1995); SIRES/101 1 (16 August 1995), operative paragraph 2 
(requesting the Secretary-General to make recommendations on the establishment of a 
commission to investigate allegations of arms flows to former Rwandese Government Forces in 
the Great Lakes region). 
21 In connection with the Afghanistan/Taliban/AI Qaida sanctions regime, see: S/RES/1333 (19 
December 2000), operative paragraph 15(c) (requesting the Secretary-General, in consultation 
with the 1267 Committee, to report on the implementation of the sanctions, to assess problems 
involved in enforcing the sanctions, to make recommendations for strengthening sanctions 
enforcement, and to evaluate the actions of the Taliban to come into compliance). 
22 In connection with the Iraq sanctions regime and the Oil-for-Food Programme, see: SIRES/687 
(3 April 1991), operative paragraph 19 (directing the Secretary-General to develop 
recommendations for the establishment of a compensation fund to cover Iraq's liabilities for 
loss, damage or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations as a result of its 
invasion and occupation of Kuwait); S/RES/706 (15 August 1991), operative paragraph 5 
(requesting the Secretary-General to submit a plan for implementing the Council's first attempt 
at an Oil-for-Food Programme); SIRES/1210 (4 November 1998), operative paragraph 9, 
(requesting the Secretary-General to compile a detailed list of the parts and equipment 
necessary to enable the full level of production of petroleum and petroleum products 
permissible under the terms of the Oil-for-Food Programme. The Council repeated that request 
in: SIRES/1242 (21 May 1999), operative paragraph 9; S/RES/1281 (10 December 1999), 
operative paragraph 9); SIRES/l281 (10 December 1999), operative paragraph 6 (requesting the 
Secretary-General to make recommendations for the expenditure of sums expected to be 
available); S/RES/I302 (8 June 2000), operative paragraphs 13 (requesting the Secretary-General 
to submit recommendations to the 661 Committee for minimizing the delay in paying the full 
amount of each purchase of Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products under the Oil-for-Food 
Programme), 14 (requesting the Secretary-General to submit to the 661 Committee 
recommendations for utilizing excess funds in an account for the inspection and auditing of the 
OFFP for the humanitarian components of the Programme; S/RES/1483 (22 May 2003), 
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providing for the application or modification of sanctions; 23 the occurrence of events which 
would result in the imposition of sanctions,24 the occurrence of events which would result in 
operative paragraph 16 (requesting the Secretary-General to undertake planning for phasing 
out the Oil-for-Food Programme). 
23 	The Secretary-General was requested to report on the implementation of sanctions and/or the 
resolution in which sanctions were imposed in connection with the sanctions regimes against 
Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, the Sudan, Sierra Leone, the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Taliban/A1 Qaida. In connection with Southern 
Rhodesia, see: SIRES/232 (16 December 1966), operative paragraph 9; S/RES/253 (29 May 1968), 
operative paragraph 19; S/RES/277 (18 March 1970), operative paragraph 20. In connection with 
South Africa, see: S/RES/418 (4 November 1977), operative paragraph 6; SIRES/473 (13 June 
1980), operative paragraph 12; SIRES/558 (13 December 1984), operative paragraph 4 [in this 
case requesting the Secretary-General to rport to the South Africa Sanctions Committee, 
rather than directly to the Council, on the implementation of resolution 558 (1984)1; S/RES/569 
(26 July 1985), operative paragraph 8; S/RES/591 (28 November 1986), operative paragraph 14. 
In connection with Iraq, see: SIRES/661 (6 August 1990), operative paragraph 10 (requesting 
the Secretary-General to report to it within thirty days on the implementation of resolution 661 
(1990)); SIRES/1284 (17 December 1999), operative paragraph 32 (requesting the Secretary-
General to report on the implementation of operative paragraphs 15 to 30 of resolution 1284 
(1999), by which the Council established UNMOVIC and modified the OFFP). In connection 
with Somalia, see: S/RES/733 (23 January 1992), operative paragraph 10; S/RES/1425 (22 July 
2002), operative paragraph 14 (requesting the Secretary-General to report on the measures 
taken by States to ensure the effective implementation of sanctions). In connection with Haiti, 
see: S/RES/940 (31 July 1994), operative paragraph 14 (requesting the Secretary-General to 
report on the implementation of the resolution by which the Council authorized the 
establishment of the multinational force to strengthen the implementation of the sanctions); 
SIRES/9 17 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 16 (requesting the Secretary-General to report on 
the situation in Haiti, including on the effectiveness of the implementation of sanctions). In 
connection with Rwanda, see: S/RES/1053 (23 April 1996), operative paragraph 12 (requesting 
the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of resolution 1053 (1996)). In connection 
with the Sudan, see: SIRES/1054 (26 April 1996), operative paragraph 7 (requesting the 
Secretary-General to report on information received from States on steps taken to implement 
the sanctions). In connection with Sierra Leone, see: SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative 
paragraph 13 (requesting the Secretary-General to report on measures taken by States to 
implement the sanctions). In connection with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, see: 
SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 14. In connection with the Taliban/A1 Qaida, 
see: SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 15(c). 
24 	In connection with the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia- 
Montenegro), see: S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraphs 10 (requesting the 
Secretary-General to report to the Council if within nine days of the adoption of resolution 820 
(1993) the Bosnian Serbs had signed and begun to implement the peace plan, in which case the 
additional sanctions would not be imposed), 11 (in the event that the Bosnian Serbs did sign 
and begin to implement the peace process, thus meaning that the sanctions were not in fact 
imposed, requesting the Secretary-General to report if the Bosnian Serbs subsequently 
renewed military attacks or failed to comply with the peace plan, in which case the sanctions 
would immediately be reimposed). 
In connection with the sanctions regime against the Bosnian Serbs, see: SIRES/820 (17 April 
1993), operative paragraphs 10 (requesting the Secretary-General to report if within nine days 
of the adoption of resolution 820 (1993) the Bosnian Serbs had signed and begun to implement 
the peace plan, in which case the sanctions would not be imposed); 11 (in the event that the 
Bosnian Serbs did sign and begin to implement the peace process, requesting the Secretary- 
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the suspension of sanctions, 25 the occurrence of events which would result in the 
reimposition of sanctions, 26 the occurrence of events which would result in the strengthening 
General to report if the Bosnian Serbs subsequently renewed military attacks or failed to 
comply with the peace plan, in which case the sanctions would immediately come into effect). 
In connection with the Haiti sanctions regime, see: SIRES/841 (16 June 1993), operative 
paragraphs 3 (requesting the Secretary-General to report if, having regard to the views of the 
OAS Secretary-General, the imposition of sanctions was not warranted), 4 (requesting the 
Secretary-General to report if at any time he determined, having regard to the views of the OAS 
Secretary-General, that the de facto authorities in Haiti had failed to comply in good faith with 
their commitments, in which case the sanctions would come into force immediately). 
In connection with the UNITA sanctions regime, see: SIRES/864 (15 September 1993), operative 
paragraphs 17 (requesting the Secretary-General to report if, before the date on which the 
sanctions were to come into force, an effective cease-fire had been established and agreement 
had been reached on the implementation of the Acordos de Paz and relevant Security Council 
resolutions, in which case the sanctions would not come into force), 18 (in the event that the 
sanctions were not to come into force due to the establishment of a cease-fire and the 
achievement of an agreement upon the implementation of the Acordos de Paz and relevant 
Security Council resolutions, requesting the Secretary-General to report if UNITA 
subsequently broke the cease-fire or ceased participating constructively in the establishment 
of a cease-fire and the achievement of an agreement upon the implementation of the Acordos 
de Paz and relevant Security Council resolutions, in which case the sanctions would come into 
force immediately); SIRES/1075 (11 October 1996), operative paragraph 13 (requesting the 
Secretary-General to report if UNITA had made substantial and genuine progress in fulfilling 
its obligations under the peace process by a certain date, in which case additional sanctions 
would not be imposed); SIRES/1127 (28 August 1997), operative paragraph 7 (requesting the 
Secretary-General to report if, before the date on which additional sanctions were to come into 
force, UNITA had taken concrete and irreversible steps to implement its obligations under the 
Lusaka Protocol, in which case the sanctions would not come into effect. The Secretary-
General did subsequently report that UNITA had taken certain steps to implement its 
obligations, thus prompting the Council to postpone the date on which the additional 
sanctions would come into force by a further month and to affirm its willingness to review 
further the application of the additional sanctions: SIRES/1130 (29 September 1997), operative 
paragraphs 2, 3); SIRES/1173 (12 June 1998), operative paragraph 14 (requesting the Secretary-
General to report if, two days before the date on which the additional sanctions were to come 
into force, UNITA had complied with its demand to cooperate without conditions in the 
extension of State administration throughout Angola, in which case the sanctions would not 
come into effect). 
In connection with the Sudan sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1070 (16 August 1996), operative 
paragraph 4 (requesting the Secretary-General to report if Sudan had complied with the 
objectives of the sanctions regime prior to the date on which the additional sanctions were to 
come into effect, in which case the sanctions might not enter into force). 
In connection with the Afghanistan/Taliban/A1 Qaida sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1267 (15 
October 1999), operative paragraph 3 (requesting the Secretary-General to report if the Taliban 
had complied with its obligations under the sanctions regime before 14 November 1999, in 
which case the Council might decide that the sanctions would not come into operation). 
25 In connection with the Libya sanctions regime, see: SIRES/883 (11 November 1993), operative 
paragraph 16 (requesting the Secretary-General to report in the event that Libya had ensured 
the appearance of those charged with the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 before the appropriate 
United Kingdom or United States court and had satisfied that French judicial authorities with 
respect to the bombing of UTA flight 772, in which case the sanctions would be suspended); 
SIRES/1192 (27 August 1998), operative paragraph 8 (requesting the Secretary-General to 
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of sanctions 27 or the occurrence of events which would result in the termination of 
sanctions.28 The Secretary-General has also been requested to report to the Council on: 
report in the event that the Lockerbie suspects had arrived in the Netherlands for trial before a 
Scottish court, in which case the sanctions would be suspended). 
In connection with the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro), see: SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 31 (requesting the Secretary-
General ID report to the Council if the Bosnian Serbs had signed the peace plan and were 
implementing their obligations in good faith, in which case the Council would review the 
sanctions with a view to lifting them gradually). 
In connection with the sanctions regime against the Bosnian Serbs, see: SIRES/820 (17 April 
1993), operative paragraph 31 (requesting the Secretary-General to report if the Bosnian Serbs 
had signed the peace plan and was implementing its obligations in good faith, in which case 
the Council would review the sanctions with a view to lifting them gradually). 
26 	In connection with the Libya sanctions regime, see: S/RES/883 (11 November 1993), operative 
paragraph 16 (requesting the Secretary-General, in the event that sanctions were suspended, 
to report on Libya's ongoing compliance with the remaining objectives of the sanctions 
regime). 
In connection with the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro), see: SIRES/943 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 3 (requesting the 
Secretary-General to report every thirty days on whether the Co-Chairmen of the Steering 
Committee of the ICFY had certified that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro) were effectively implementing their decision to close the border 
between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina to goods and products prohibited under the sanctions regime and to 
report immediately if there was evidence that those authorities were not effectively 
implementing their decision to close the border). The Council repeated that request in: 
SIRES/970 (12 January 1995), operative paragraph 5; SIRES/988 (21 April 1995), operative 
paragraph 13; SIRES/1003 (5 July 1995), operative paragraph 2; SIRES/1015 (15 September 
1995), operative paragraph 2. Also in connection to the sanctions regime against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), see: S/RES/1022 (22 November 1995), operative 
paragraphs 1 (requesting the Secretary-General to report if the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
had failed to sign the Peace Agreement, in which case the suspension of the sanctions would 
lapse after five days), 3 (requesting the Secretary-General to report if the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia was failing to meet its obligations under the Peace Agreement, in which case the 
suspension of the sanctions would lapse after five days). 
In connection with the Haiti sanctions regime, see: S/RES/861 (27 August 1993), operative 
paragraph 2 (requesting the Secretary-General to report if, having regard to the views of the 
OAS Secretary-General, he concluded that the parties to the Governor's Island Agreement or 
any other authorities in Haiti had not complied in good faith with that Agreement, in which 
case the sanctions would be re-imposed immediately); S/26460: Presidential statement of 17 
September 1993 (requesting the Secretary-General to report if he determined, having received 
the views of the OAS Secretary-General, that there had been a serious and consistent non-
compliance with the Governor's Island Agreement, in which case the sanctions would be 
reinstated immediately); S/26567: Presidential statement of 11 October 1993 (requesting the 
Secretary-General to report urgently on whether the incident in which organized armed civilian 
groups had threatened journalists and diplomats waiting to meet a contingent of UNMIH 
constituted non-compliance by the armed forces of Haiti with the Governor's Island 
Agreement, thus warranting the reimposition of sanctions). 
27 In connection with the UNITA sanctions regime, see: SIRES/903 (16 March 1994), operative 
paragraph 10; SIRES/922 (31 May 1994), operative paragraph 7 (expressing readiness to 
strengthen the sanctions against UNITA in the light, inter alia, of a recommendation by the 
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the humanitarian situation in a target State; 29 the work of sanctions-related subsidiary 
bodies;3° the implementation of humanitarian programmes designed to minimize the 
Secretary-General either to impose additional sanctions or to review those in effect). In 
subsequent decisions the Council again expressed its readiness to consider further measures, 
in the light of recommendations by the Secretary-General. See: SIRES/1055 (8 May 1996), 
operative paragraph 28; SIRES! 1064 (11 July 1996), operative paragraph 28. 
28 In connection with the former Yugoslavia sanctions regime, see: SIRES/IO21 (22 November 
1995), operative paragraphs I (noting that the process of terminating the sanctions would 
begin once the Secretary-General had reported that a Peace Agreement had been signed 
formally by Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), 2 
(requesting the Secretary-General to prepare such a report in the appropriate circumstances). 
In connection with the Haiti sanctions regime, see: SIRES/84l (16 June 1993), operative 
paragraph 16 (expressing willingness to review the sanctions with a view to lifting them if the 
Secretary-General were to report, having regard to the views of the OAS Secretary-General, he 
determined that the de facto authorities in Haiti had signed and begun implementing in good 
faith an agreement to reinstate the legitimate Government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide); 
SIRES/861 (27 August 1993), operative paragraph 3 (expressing willingness to review the 
sanctions with a view to lifting them if the Secretary-General were to report, having regard to 
the views of the OAS Secretary-General, he were to conclude that the relevant provisions of 
the Governor's Island Agreement had been fully implemented). 
In connection with the UNITA sanctions regime, see: S/RES/I173 (12 June 1998), operative 
paragraph 15 (requesting the Secretary-General to report if UNITA had complied with all its 
relevant obligations, in which case the additional sanctions would be reviewed and 
terminated). 
In connection with the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to address 
the situation in Kosovo, see: SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 16 (requesting 
the Secretary-General to report in the event that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had 
complied with the objectives of the sanctions regime, in which event the Council would take 
action to terminate them). 
In connection with the Ethiopia and Eritrea sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1298 (17 May 2000), 
operative paragraph 17 (requesting the Secretary-General to report in the event that there were 
a peaceful, definitive settlement of the conflict, in which case the sanctions would be 
terminated). 
29 In connection with the Iraq sanctions regime, see: SIRES/666 (13 September 1990), operative 
paragraphs 3-5 (requesting the Secretary-General to seek information on the availability of food 
in Iraq and Kuwait and to report such information to the 661 Committee). 
In connection with the Haiti sanctions regime, see: SIRES/9l7 (6 May 1994), operative 
paragraph 16 (requesting the Secretary-General to report on the situation in Haiti, including on 
humanitarian situation). 
In connection with the Ethiopia and Eritrea sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1298 (17 May 2000), 
operative paragraph 15 (requesting the Secretary-General to report on the humanitarian 
situation in Ethiopia and Eritrea). 
30 In connection with the Iraq sanctions regime, see: SIRES/699, operative paragraph 3 
(requesting the Secretary-General to report on the work of UNSCOM). 
In connection with the Rwanda sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1013 (7 September 1995), 
operative paragraph 4 (requesting the Secretary-General to report on the establishment of the 
International Commission of Inquiry and to submit the interim and final reports of the 
Commission. The interim report was to be submitted three months after the establishment of 
the Commission and the final report was to be submitted as soon as possible thereafter). 
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consequences of sanctions; 31 monitoring activities related to sanctions implementation; 32 
good offices efforts to facilitate the achievement of the objectives of a sanctions regime; 33 the 
31 	The Secretary-General was requested to undertake an extensive collection of responsibilities in 
relation to the implementation of the Oil-for-Food Programme. The main monitoring task was to 
report regularly cn the general implementation of the Programme. See: SIRES/986 (14 April 
1995), operative paragraph 11; SIRES/1111 (4 June 1997), operative paragraph 3; SIRES/1143 (4 
December 1997), operative paragraph 4; SIRES/1153 (20 February 1998), operative paragraph 
10; SIRES/1210 (4 November 1998), operative paragraph 6; SIRES/1242 (21 May 1999), operative 
paragraph 6; SIRES/1281 (10 December 1999), operative paragraph 5; SIRES/1302 (8 June 2000), 
operative paragraph 5; S/RES/1330 (5 December 2000), operative paragraph 5; S/RES/1360 (3 
July 2001), operative paragraph 5 (requesting on that occasion that the Secretary-General 
report within 90 and 150 days on the implementation of the OFFP); S/RES/1409 (14 May 2002), 
operative paragraph 7 (requesting on that occasion that the Secretary-General report on the 
implementation of the OFFP within 180 days). 
For the Secretary-General's other monitoring and evaluation tasks in connection with the 
implementation of the Oil-for-Food Programme, see: SIRES/1153 (20 February 1998), operative 
paragraph 5 (requesting the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of the 
distribution plan for the Oil-for-Food Programme. That request was reiterated in: SIRES/1210 (4 
November 1998), operative paragraph 7; and S/RES/1242 (21 May 1999), operative paragraph 
7); S/RES/1153 (20 February 1998), operative paragraph 11 (requesting the Secretary-General to 
report on improving the electricity sector in Iraq and on essential humanitarian needs in Iraq); 
SIRES/1175 (19 June 1998), operative paragraph 6 (requesting the Secretary-General to provide 
for the monitoring of parts and equipment imported to Iraq for the purposes of increasing the 
oil production necessary for the OFFP); SIRES/1281 (10 December 1999), operative paragraph 6 
(requesting the Secretary-General to report if Iraq were unable to export the full allotment of 
petroleum and petroleum products permissible under the OFFP); SIRES/1284 (17 December 
1999), operative paragraph 28 (requesting the Secretary-General to report on progress made in 
meeting the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people and on the revenues necessary to meet 
those needs); SIRES/1330 (5 December 2000), operative paragraph 18 (requesting the Secretary-
General to report with proposals for the use of additional export routes for petroleum and 
petroleum products for the OFFP); SIRES/1360 (3 July 2001), operative paragraph 11 
(requesting the Secretary-General to report on the extent to which the Iraqi Government was 
ensuring equitable distribution of humanitarian supplies provided under the Oil-for-Food 
Programme. That request was repeated in: SIRES/1447 (4 December 2002), operative paragraph 
4); S/RES/1409 (14 May 2002), operative paragraph 8 (requesting the Secretary-General to 
report on the implementation of the Goods Review List, including recommendations for the List 
and the procedures for its implementation. That request was reiterated in: SIRES/1447 (4 
December 2002), operative paragraph 5); S/RES/1472 (28 March 2003), operative paragraph 9 
(requesting the Secretary-General to update the 661 Committee on steps taken to implement the 
temporary measures authorized to use contracts previously approved under the OFFP to 
provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people); SIRES/1472 (28 March 2003), operative 
paragraph 11 (requesting the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation 
of those temporary measures). 
32 	In connection with the Iraq sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1051 (27 March 1996), operative 
paragraph 16 (requesting the Secretary-General to submit, in cooperation with the Director-
General of the IAEA, six-monthly progress reports on the monitoring of the sanctions against 
arms and weapons of mass destruction). 
In connection with the sanctions regime against Somalia, see: SIRES/1425 (22 July 2002), 
operative paragraph 14 (requesting the Secretary-General to report on the technical assistance 
and cooperation provided in order to enhance administrative and judicial capacities throughout 
Somalia to monitor and give effect to the embargo). 
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extent to which a target had complied with the objectives of a sanctions regime; 34 legitimate 
trade conducted in accordance with approved exemptions from a sanctions regime; 35 the 
humanitarian implications of sanctions; 36 and strungthening sanctions enforcement. 37 
33 	In connection with the Haiti sanctions regime, see: S/RES/841 (16 June 1993), operative 
paragraph 15 (requesting the Secretary-General to report on progress achieved in the efforts 
jointly undertaken by him and the OAS Secretary-General with a view to reaching apolitical 
solution to the crisis in Haiti). 
In connection with the Sudan sanctions regime, the Council made a good offices request of the 
Secretary-General prior to the imposition of sanctions. The sanctions were applied soon 
thereafter. See: SIRES/1044 (31 January 1996), operative paragraph 7 (requesting the Secretary-
General to report on the results of his efforts to seek the cooperation of the Government of 
Sudan with the Council's requests to extradite the three suspects alleged to have been 
involved in the assassination attempt against President Mubarak and to refrain from 
supporting terrorist activities). 
34 	In connection with the UNITA sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1127 (28 August 1997), operative 
paragraph 8 (requesting the Secretary-General to report at regular intervals on UNITA's 
compliance with its obligation to implement the Lusaka Protocol). 
In connection with the Sudan sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1054 (26 April 1996), operative 
paragraph 8 (requesting the Secretary-General to report on whether the Government of Sudan 
had complied with the Council's demands to extradite the three suspects and to desist from 
assisting, supporting and facilitating terrorist activities and from giving shelter to terrorist 
elements). The Council repeated that request in: SIRES/l070 (16 August 1996), operative 
paragraph 5. 
In connection with the Sierra Leone sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), 
operative paragraph 16 (requesting the Secretary-General to report on the compliance of the 
military junta with the requirements of the sanctions regime); SIRES/1171 (5 June 1998), 
operative paragraph 8 (requesting the Secretary-General to report on progress towards the re-
establishment of Government control throughout Sierra Leone and the disarmament and 
demobilization of all non-government forces). 
In connection with the Ethiopia and Eritrea sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1298 (17 May 2000), 
operative paragraph 15 (requesting the Secretary-General to report on the steps taken by 
Ethiopia and Eritrea to comply with the objectives of the sanctions regime). 
35 	In connection with the Rwanda sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1011 (16 August 1995), operative 
paragraph 12 (requesting the Secretary-General to report on the legitimate export of arms to 
Rwanda in accordance with approved exemptions. The following reports were thus submitted 
by the Secretary-General: S/1996/202 (15 March 1996); S/1996/6631Rev.1 & Add.1 (15 and 30 
August 1996)). 
In connection with the Sierra Leone sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1171 (5 June 1998), operative 
paragraph 8 (requesting the Secretary-General to report on exports of arms and related materiel 
to Sierra Leone). 
16 	In connection with the Afghanistan/Taliban/AI Qaida sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1333 (19 
December 2000), operative paragraph 15(d) (requesting the Secretary-General to report on the 
humanitarian implications of the sanctions). The Secretary-General submitted four reports to 
the Council in 2001 on the humanitarian implications of the sanctions: S/2001/241 (20 March 
2001): Report of the Secretary-General on the humanitarian implications of the measures 
imposed by Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000) on Afghanistan; 
S/2001/695 (13 July 2001): Report of the Secretary-General on humanitarian implications of 
the measures imposed by Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000) on 
Afghanistan; S/2001/1086 (19 November 2001): Report of the Secretary-General on the 
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10.1.4 Implementation 
Among the Secretary-General's responsibilities for taking action to improve the 
implementation of sanctions and sanctions-related programmes, he has been requested, 
invited or directed to undertake the following tasks: to use his good offices to facilitate the 
delivery of humanitarian supplies to a State target, 38 to use his good offices to seek the 
compliance of a target with the objectives of a sanctions regime; 39 to take various actions 
connected with the implementation of humanitarian programmes designed to minimize the 
humanitarian implications of the measures imposed by Security Council resolutions 1267 
(1999) and 1333 (2000) on Afghanistan; S/2001/1215 (18 December 2001): Report of the 
Secretary-General on the humanitarian implications of the measures imposed by Security 
Council resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000) on Afghanistan. It should be noted that 
the report of November 2001 (S/2001/1086) consisted of a short statement that it had not been 
possible to undertake the task of reporting on humanitarian implications due to the "precarious 
security situation in Afghanistan". In his December report the Secretary-General also noted 
that due to developments in Afghanistan he was not in a position to report on the 
humanitarian implications of the sanctions. He did, however, outline some observations 
relating to the experience of monitoring the humanitarian implications of sanctions. 
In connection with the sanctions regime against Liberia (in the second instance), see: 
S/RES11343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 13(a) (requesting the Secretary-General to 
report with a preliminary assessment of the potential economic, humanitarian and social impact 
on the Liberian population of possible follow-up action by the Council in relation to the 
recommendations to be made by the Liberia Panel of Experts); S/RES/1478 (6 May 2003), 
operative paragraph 19 (requesting the Secretary-General to report on the possible 
humanitarian or socio-economic impact of the logging sanctions). 
37 	In connection with the Afghanistan/Taliban/A1 Qaida sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1333 (19 
December 2000), operative paragraph 15(c) (requesting the Secretary-General to report on the 
implementation of sanctions, assessing problems in sanctions enforcement, making 
recommendations for strengthening sanctions enforcement, and evaluating the actions taken 
by the Taliban to comply with the aims of the sanctions). 
38 	In connection with the Iraq sanctions regime, see: S/RES/666 (13 September 1990), operative 
paragraph 7 (requesting the Secretary-General to use his good offices to facilitate the delivery 
and distribution of foodstuffs to Iraq and Kuwait). 
39 	In connection with the Libya sanctions regime, see: SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), operative 
paragraph 12 (inviting the Secretary-General to continue his role of seeking the cooperation of 
the Libyan Government). The Council had requested that the Secretary-General play such a 
role two months earlier, when it had first urged Libya to cooperate with investigations into the 
bombings of Pan Am flight 103 and UTA flight 772: S/RES/731 (21 January 1992), operative 
paragraph 4. It subsequently repeated its invitation to the Secretary-General in SIRES/883 (11 
November 1993), operative paragraph 14. In connection with the Sudan sanctions regime, the 
Secretary-General was requested prior to the application of sanctions to seek, in consultation 
with the Organization of African Unity, the cooperation of the Government of Sudan with the 
requests to extradite the three suspects alleged to have been involved in the assassination 
attempt against President Mubarak and to refrain from supporting terrorist activities. See: 
SIRES/I044 (31 January 1996), operative paragraph 7. 
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humanitarian consequences of sanctions; 4° to take action to support the implementation of 
sanctions from within a target; 41 to take action with the aim of improving the implementation 
40 	For requests related to the general implementation of the Oil-for-Food Programme, see: 
SIRES/7 12 (19 September 1991), operative paragraph 10 (requesting the Secretary-General to 
implement the first attempt at an Oil-for-Food Programme); SIRES/986 (14 April 1995), operative 
paragraph 13 (requesting the Secretary-General to take the necessary actions to ensure the 
implementation of the OFFP, authorizing him to enter into the necessary arrangements or 
agreements, and requesting him to report on steps taken in that respect). Those requests were 
repeated in: SIRES/1153 (20 February 1998), operative paragraph 4; SIRES/1210 (4 November 
1998), operative paragraph 4; SIRES/l242 (21 May 1999), operative paragraph 3; SIRES/1281 (10 
December 1999), operative paragraph 3; S/RES/1330 (5 December 2000), operative paragraph 3; 
S/RES/1360 (3 July 2001), operative paragraph 3. 
For requests related to more specific responsibilities connected with the implementation of the 
Oil-for-Food Programme, see: S/RES/I284 (17 December 1999), operative paragraphs 21 
(requesting the Secretary-General to maximize the effectiveness of the OFFP), 22 (requesting 
the Secretary-General to minimize the cost of U.N. activities associated with the implementation 
of the OFFP), 24 (requesting the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements to 
allow the purchase of Iraqi-produced goods under the Oil-for-Food Programme. That request 
was repeated in: SIRES/l330 (5 December 2000), operative paragraph 15), 26 (requesting the 
Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements to provide for reasonable expenses 
related to the Hajj to be met by funds in the escrow account); S/RES/1330 (5 December 2000), 
operative paragraphs 9 (requesting the Secretary-General to redirect excess funds in an 
account for the inspection and auditing of the OFFP so that they could be used for 
humanitarian purchases. That request was repeated in S/RES/1360 (3 July 2001), operative 
paragraph 8), 11 (requesting the Secretary-General to expand the lists of humanitarian items for 
which simple notification to the 661 Committee, rather than the Committee's approval, was 
required prior to being exported to Iraq under the OFFP); SIRES/1360 (3 July 2001), operative 
paragraph 9 (requesting the Secretary-General to redirect a percentage of the funds from the 
account for the Compensation Fund to the account for humanitarian projects and requesting 
the Secretary-General to report on the use of those funds); S/RES/I454 (30 December 2002), 
operative paragraph 3 (directing the Secretary-General to develop within 60 days consumption 
rates and levels for medicines and medicinal chemicals under paragraph 20 of the procedures 
for the implementation of the Goods Review List); SIRES/1472 (28 March 2003), operative 
paragraph 4 (requesting the Secretary-General to undertake, after the outbreak of the second 
Gulf War, temporary measures to provide for the implementation of contracts that had been 
approved under the OFFP prior to the outbreak of that war. 'lose measures included: 
(a) establishing alternative locations for the delivery of humanitarian supplies; (b) reviewing 
approved contracts to determine priority humanitarian contracts to be fulfilled in the authorized 
period; (c) contacting suppliers to determine action to be taken in accordance with those 
priorities; (d) negotiating necessary adjustments to contracts; (e) negotiating new contracts for 
essential medical items; (f) transferring, on an exceptional and reimbursable basis as necessary 
to ensure the delivery of essential humanitarian supplies to the Iraqi people, unencumbered 
funds between the accounts created under the OFFP for humanitarian assistance to Iraq in 
general, and for complementary humanitarian assistance to three northern Iraqi govemorates; 
(g) using funds in those accounts, as necessary and appropriate, to compensate suppliers and 
shippers for extra costs incurred as a result of diverting and delaying shipments; (h) meeting 
additional operational and administrative costs by using the fund created under the OFFP for 
the payment of independent inspection activities; and (i) using where possible locally 
produced goods and services); S/RES/1483 (22 May 2003), operative paragraph 16 (requesting 
the Secretary-General to terminate the OFFP over a period of six months). 
41 	In connection with the Somalia sanctions regime, see: SIRES/814 (26 March 1993), operative 
paragraph 10 (requesting the Secretary-General to support from within Somalia the 
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of sanctions by States in genera1; 42 to take action to improve sanctions monitoring within a 
target;43 to take action to improve sanctions monitoring in States neighbouring a target" and 
to organize the provision of financial, technical and material assistance to States seeking 
special economic assistance to offset difficulties experienced as a result of implementing 
sanctions.45 
10.2 States 
In addition to the actions that States are required to take to implement sanctions, in 
accordance with their obligations under the United Nations Charter, States have also been 
called upon by the Security Council to take various actions to strengthen the implementation, 
implementation of the arms embargo, utilizing as available and appropriate the forces of 
UNOSOM II). 
42 	In connection with the Afghanistan/Taliban/A1 Qaida sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1333 (19 
December 2000), operative paragraph 15(b) (requesting the Secretary-General to consult with 
relevant Member States to put into effect the Afghanistan/Taliban/A1 Qaida sanctions). 
43 	In connection with the Somalia sanctions regime, see: S/RES/1407 (3 May 2002), operative 
paragraph 7 (requesting the Secretary-General to work with various parties in Somalia to 
enhance the administrative and judicial capacities throughout Somalia to contribute to the 
monitoring and enforcement of the embargo). 
44 	In connection with the Rwanda sanctions regime, see: S/RES/997 (9 June 1995), operative 
paragraph 6 (requesting the Secretary-General to consult with Governments of countries 
neighbouring Rwanda with respect to the possibility of deploying observers to monitor the 
implementation of the Rwandan sanctions); SIRES/1011 (16 August 1995), operative paragraph 
4 (encouraging the Secretary-General to continue consultations with Governments of 
neighbouring States concerning the deployment of United Nations military observers at 
airfields and transportation points in and around border crossings); S/RES/1053 (23 April 1996), 
operative paragraph 7 (requesting the Secretary-General to consult with States neighbouring 
Rwanda, and in particular Zaire, on appropriate measures for better implementing the arms 
embargo and deterring shipments of arms to former Rwandan government forces, including 
through the deployment of United Nations observers). 
45 	In connection with the Southern Rhodesia sanctions regime, see: S/RES/386 (17 March 1976), 
operative paragraph 6 (requesting "the Secretary-General, in collaboration with the appropriate 
organizations of the United Nations system, to organize, with immediate effect, all forms of 
financial, technical and material assistance to Mozambique to enable it to overcome the 
economic difficulties arising from its application of economic sanctions against the racist 
regime in Southern Rhodesia"). In the same resolution the Council also requested States and 
the United Nations in general to provide assistance to Mozambique. See: ibid, operative 
paragraphs 4, 5. 
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monitoring and enforcement of sanctions." The Council has requested States to take such 
additional action in relation to almost every sanctions regime established to date. Additional 
action has been requested of States in general, and of particular groups of States, including: 
States Members of the United Nations, States non-members of the United Nations, and 
various other groupings of States, including States neighbouring or located in the region, of a 
sanctions target. 
10.2.1 States in general 
In its oversight of U.N. sanctions regimes, the Council has called upon, requested, 
invited, or required States in general to undertake a range of activities related to the 
implementation, monitoring and enforcement of sanctions. The Council has thus called upon 
or requested States: to implement sanctions fully; 47 to take effective measures domestically 
46 
	
Analysis here does not consider additional action requested by the Council that does not 
constitute action to strengthen the implementation, monitoring or enforcement of sanctions. 
Thus, for example, calls for States to impose additional voluntary sanctions [see, e.g., in 
connection with the sanctions regime against Southern Rhodesia: S/RES/232 (16 December 
1966), operative paragraph 5 (calling upon all States "not to render financial or other economic 
aid to the illegal racist regime in Southern Rhodesia")] are not included in this section, as those 
actions did not have as their aim strengthening the implementation, monitoring and 
enforcement of the existing mandatory sanctions. 
47 	In connection with the sanctions regime against Southern Rhodesia, see: S/RES/314 (28 
February 1972), operative paragraph 2 (urging all States to implement fully the sanctions, in 
accordance with their obligations under Article 25 and Article 2(6) the Charter); SIRES/320 (29 
September 1972), operative paragraph 2 (calling upon all States to implement fully the 
sanctions, in accordance with Article 25 and Article 2(6) of the Charter). 
In connection with the South Africa sanctions regime, see: SIRES/418 (4 November 1977), 
operative paragraph 5 (calling upon all States, including States non-members of the United 
Nations, to act strictly in accordance with the sanctions); SIRES/591 (28 November 1986), 
operative paragraph 5 (requesting all States to implement strictly the sanctions and to refrain 
from any cooperation in the nuclear field with South Africa). 
In connection with the Iraq sanctions regime, see: SIRES/670 (25 September 1990), operative 
paragraphs 1 (calling upon States to carry out their obligations to ensure strict and complete 
compliance with the sanctions), 7 (calling upon States to cooperate in taking such measures as 
necessary, consistent with international law, to ensure the effective implementation of the 
sanctions). 
In connection with the Somalia sanctions regime, see, the following decisions reaffirming or 
stressing the obligation of States to implement the embargo: S/RES/814 (26 March 1993), 
operative paragraph 11; S/RES/886 (18 November 1993), operative paragraph 11; S/RES/897 (4 
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to prevent the violation of sanctions by their nationals or in their territories; 48 and to take 
international action in order to prevent the violation of sanctions.' The Council has also 
February 1994), operative paragraph 9; SIRES/923 (31 May 1994), operative paragraph 6; 
S/PRST/1995/15 (6 April 1995): Presidential Statement of 6 April 1995; S/PRST/1996/4 (24 
January 1996): Presidential Statement of 24 January 1996; S/PRST/1997/8 (27 February 1997): 
Presidential Statement of 27 February 1997; S/PRST/1997/57 (23 December 1997): 
Presidential Statement of 23 December 1997; S/PRST/1999/16 (27 May 1999): Presidential 
Statement of 27 May 1999; S/PRST/2000/22 (29 June 2000): Presidential Statement of 29 June 
2000; S/PRST/2001/1 (11 January 2001): Presidential Statement of 11 January 2001; 
S/RES/1356 (19 June 2001), operative paragraph 1; SIRES/1474 (8 April 2003), operative 
paragraph 1. Also in connection with the Somalia sanctions regime, see: S/PRST/1999/31 (12 
November 1999): Presidential Statement of 12 November 1999 (strongly calling upon all 
States to observe and improve the effectiveness of the embargo). 
In connection with the sanctions regime against Liberia (in the first instance), see: S/RES/813 
(26 March 1993), operative paragraph 9 (calling upon States to comply with and implement the 
arms embargo). The Council reaffirmed this call in: SIRES/950 (21 October 1994), operative 
paragraph 6; S/RES/972 (13 January 1995), operative paragraph 6; SIRES/985 (13 April 1995), 
operative paragraph 4 (urging all States, and in particular neighbouring States, to comply fully 
with the embargo); SIRES/100i (30 June 1995), operative paragraph 10; SIRES/1014 (15 
September 1995), operative paragraph 11; SIRES/1020 (10 November 1995), operative paragraph 
11; S/RES/1041 (29 January 1996), operative paragraph 14; S/PRST/1996/16: Presidential 
statement of 9 April 1996; S/PRST/1996/22: Presidential statement of 6 May 1996; SIRES/1059 
(31 May 1996), operative paragraph 11; SIRES/1071 (30 August 1996), operative paragraph 12; 
S/RES/1083 (27 November 1996), operative paragraph 10; SIRES/1l00 (27 March 1997), 
operative paragraph 9; SIRES/1116 (27 June 1997), operative paragraph 7. 
In connection with the UNITA sanctions regime, see: SIRES/890 (15 December 1993), operative 
paragraph 13 (reaffirming the obligation of all States to implement fully the sanctions). The 
Council repeated that reaffirmation or called upon States to implement the sanctions strictly in: 
SIRES/903 (16 March 1994), operative paragraph 9; SIRES/922 (31 May 1994), operative 
paragraph 8; SIRES/932 (30 June 1994), operative paragraph 8; S/RES/945 (29 September 1994), 
operative paragraph 13; SIRES/952 (27 October 1994), preambular paragraph 9; S/RES/966 (8 
December 1994), preambular paragraph 10; S/RES/976 (8 February 1995), operative paragraph 
12; S/PRST/1995/11 (10 March 1995): Presidential statement of 10 March 1995; 
S/PRST/1995/18 (13 April 1995): Presidential statement of 13 April 1995; S/RES/1045 (8 
February 1996), operative paragraph 19; S/PRST/1996/19 (24 April 1996): Presidential 
statement of 24 April 1996; SIRES/1055 (8 May 1996), operative paragraph 19; ; SIRES/1064 (11 
July 1996), operative paragraph 18; SIRES/1075 (11 October 1996), operative paragraph 17; 
SIRES/1087 (11 December 1996), operative paragraph 15; SIRES/1173 (12 June 1998), operative 
paragraph 18; SIRES/1195 (15 September 1998), operative paragraph 5; SIRES/1202 (15 October 
1998), operative paragraph 13. 
In connection with the Sierra Leone sanctions regime, see: S/PRST/1997/52 (14 November 
1997): Presidential statement of 14 November 1997 (reminding States of their obligation to 
comply strictly with the sanctions). The Council reaffirmed that obligation in: SIRES/1181 (13 
July 1998), operative paragraph 13; S/PRST/1999/1 (7 January 1999): Presidential statement of 
7 January 1999; SIRES/1231 (11 March 1999), operative paragraph 7; S/PRST/1999/13 (15 May 
1999): Presidential statement of 15 May 1999. 
In connection with the Kosovo sanctions regime, see: S/RES/1199 (23 September 1998), 
operative paragraph 7 (recalling the obligations of all States to implement fully the sanctions). 
48 For the Southern Rhodesia sanctions regime, see: S/RES/314 (28 February 1972), operative 
paragraph 5 (calling upon all States to take more effective measures to ensure full 
implementation of the sanctions); S/RES/3 18 (28 July 1972), operative paragraph 9 (urging all 
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States to review the adequacy of legislation and practices followed so far in relation to matters 
relating to the sanctions and to take more effective measures to ensure their full 
implementation); SIRES/328 (10 March 1973), operative paragraph 7 (requesting all 
Governments to take stringent measures to enforce and ensure full compliance by all 
individuals and organizations under their jurisdiction with the sanctions); SIRES/333 (22 May 
1973), operative paragraphs 3 (requesting States to repeal immediately any legislation 
permitting importation of minerals and other products from Southern Rhodesia), 4 (calling upon 
States to enact and enforce legislation providing for the imposition of severe penalties on 
persons natural or juridical that evaded or breached sanctions). 
For the South Africa sanctions regime, see: SIRES/591 (28 November 1986), operative 
paragraphs 2 (calling upon States to prohibit the export of spare parts for embargoed aircraft 
and other military equipment belonging to South Africa and any official involvement in the 
maintenance and service of such equipment), 3, (urging all States to prohibit the export to 
South Africa of items destined for the military or police forces in South Africa, or which had a 
military capacity and were intended for military purposes, such as aircraft and parts thereof, 
electronic and telecommunication equipment, computers and 4-wheel drive vehicles) and 10 
(requesting all States to ensure that their national legislation and policy directives contained 
penalties to deter violations of the sanctions). 
For the Iraq sanctions regime, see: S/RES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 27 (requesting 
all States to maintain such national controls and procedures and to take such other actions 
consistent with guidelines to be established for the full implementation of the arms sanctions 
against Iraq). The Council reiterated that call in: S/RES/700 (17 June 1991), operative paragraph 
3. Also in connection with the Iraq sanctions regime, see: S/RES/1051 (27 March 1996), 
operative paragraph 13 (calling upon all States to adopt as soon as possible such measures as 
necessary under their national procedures to comply with the export/import monitoring 
mechanism for Iraq). 
For the former Yugoslavia sanctions regime, see: SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative 
paragraph 19 (calling upon States to bring proceedings against persons and entities violating 
the embargo and to impose appropriate penalties). 
For the Somalia sanctions regime, see: S/PRST/2000/22 (29 June 2000): Presidential Statement 
of 29 June 2000 ( urging all States to take all necessary steps to ensure full implementation and 
enforcement of the embargo). The Council against urged States to take the necessary steps to 
ensure full implementation and enforcement of the embargo in: SIRES/1356 (19 June 2001), 
operative paragraph 1; S/PRST/2001/1 (11 January 2001): Presidential Statement of 11 January 
2001. 
For the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), see: 
S/RES/787 (16 November 1992), operative paragraph 11 (calling upon all States to take all 
necessary steps to ensure that none of their exports were diverted to the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) in violation of the sanctions); SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), 
operative paragraphs 13 (requiring States to take steps to prevent the diversion to the territory 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) of commodities and products said 
to be destined for other areas), 19 (calling upon States to bring proceedings against persons 
and entities violating the sanctions and to impose appropriate penalties). 
For the Bosnian Serb sanctions regime, see: SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 19 
(calling upon States to bring proceedings against persons and entities violating the sanctions 
and to impose appropriate penalties); S/RES/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 18 
(requiring States to take steps to prevent the diversion of benefits to areas the control of 
Bosnian Serb forces from other places, and in particular from the United Nations Protected 
Areas in Croatia). 
For the Haiti sanctions regime, see: S/RES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 12 (calling 
upon States to bring proceedings against persons and entities violating the sanctions and to 
impose appropriate penalties). 
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For the UNITA sanctions regime, see: SIRES/864 (15 September 1993), operative paragraph 21 
(calling upon States to bring proceedings against persons and entities violating the sanctions 
and imposing appropriate penalties); S/RES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraphs 8 
(encouraging all States to exercise due diligence, in order to prevent the diversion or trans-
shipment of weapons to unauthorized end-users or unauthorized destinations where such 
diversion or trans-shipment risked resulting in the violation of sanctions, including by 
requiring end-use documentation or equivalent measures before exports from their territories 
were allowed), 15 (calling upon all States to enforce strictly safety and control regulations 
relating to the transportation by air of fuel and other hazardous commodities, in particular in 
the area around Angola, urging States to develop such regulations where they did not yet 
exist, and requesting States to provide relevant information to the IATA, the ICAO and the 864 
Committee), 21 (calling upon all States to work with financial institutions on their territory to 
develop procedures to facilitate the identification of funds and financial assets that might be 
subject to the sanctions and to facilitate the freezing of such assets), 22 (inviting States to 
review the status of officials and representatives of UNITA designated by the 864 Committee 
and believed to be residing on their territory, with a view to suspending or cancelling their 
travel documents, visas and residence permits in conformity with the sanctions), 23 (calling 
upon States that had issued passports to officials of UNITA and adult members of their 
families designated by the 864 Committee to cancel those passports in confonnity with the 
sanctions and to report to the 864 Committee the status of their efforts in that regard), 27 
(urging all States, including those geographically close to Angola, to take immediate steps to 
enforce, strengthen or enact legislation making it a criminal offence under domestic law for their 
nationals or other individuals operating on their territory to violate the sanctions, where they 
had not done so, and to inform the 864 Committee of the adoption of such measures, and 
inviting States to report the results of all related investigations or prosecutions to the 864 
Committee), and 28 (encouraging States to inform relevant professional associations and 
certification bodies about the sanctions, to seek action by those bodies where those measures 
were violated, and to consult with such bodies with a view to improving the implementation of 
the sanctions). 
For the Rwanda sanctions regime, see: SIRES/l053 (23 April 1996), operative paragraphs 5 
(urging all States, and in particular those in the region, to intensify efforts to prevent military 
training and the sale or supply of weapons to militia groups or former Rwandan government 
forces, and to take the steps necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the arms 
embargo, including by creating all necessary national mechanisms for implementation), 9 
(calling States, and in particular those whose nationals had been implicated by the 
Commission's report, to investigate the apparent complicity of their officials or private citizens 
in the purchase of arms from Seychelles, in June 1994, and in other suspected violations of the 
relevant Council resolutions). 
For the Sierra Leone sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 17 
(calling upon States to enforce, strengthen or enact legislation making it a criminal offence 
under domestic law for their nationals or other persons operating on their territory to act in 
violation of the arms sanctions against Sierra Leone, and to report to the 1132 Committee on 
the implementation of those sanctions). 
For the Kosovo sanctions regime, see: S/RES/1199 (23 September 1998), operative paragraph 11 
(requesting States to pursue all means consistent with their domestic legislation and relevant 
international law to prevent funds collected on their territory being used to contravene the 
sanctions). 
For the Afghanistan/Taliban/A1 Qaida sanctions regime, see: SIRES/l267 (15 October 1999), 
operative paragraph 8 (calling upon States to bring proceedings against persons and entities 
within their jurisdiction that violated the sanctions and to impose appropriate penalties); 
S/RES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraphs 14 (urging States to take steps to restrict 
the entry into or transit through their territory of senior Taliban officials, ex urging States to 
take steps to restrict the entry into or transit through their territory of senior Taliban official, 
except where travel was for humanitarian purposes, including religious obligations such as the 
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called upon or requested States: to cooperate with sanctions-related subsidiary bodies, 
including the Sanctions Committees, 5° the bodies of experts,51 Commissions,52 and 
performance of the Hajj, or where it promoted the peaceful resolution of the conflict in 
Afghanistan or compliance with the objectives of the sanctions regime), 18 (calling again upon 
States to bring proceedings against persons and entities within their jurisdiction that violated 
the sanctions and to impose appropriate penalties); and S/RES11363 (30 July 2001), operative 
paragraph 8 (urging all States to take immediate steps to enforce and strengthen, through 
legislative enactments or administrative measures, the measures imposed under their domestic 
laws or regulations against their nationals and other individuals or entities operating on their 
territory, to prevent and punish violations of the sanctions and to inform the 1267 Committee of 
the adoption of such measures, and invited States to report the results of all related 
investigations or enforcement actions to the Committee). The Council reiterated its latter 
"urging" in SIRES/1390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraph 8; SIRES/1455 (17 January 
2003), operative paragraph 5. 
For the Liberia II sanctions regime, see: SIRES/l343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 21 
(calling upon States to take appropriate measures to ensure that individuals and companies in 
their jurisdiction acted in conformity with United Nations sanctions and to take the necessary 
judicial and administrative actions to end illegal activities by those individuals and companies). 
The Council repeated that call in: S/RES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 18; 
S/RES/I478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 27. Also in connection with the Liberia 
sanctions regime (in the second instance), see: SIRES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 
19 (requesting all States, and in particular arms exporting countries, to exercise the highest 
degree of responsibility in weapons transactions to prevent the illegal diversion and re-export 
of those weapons). 
49 For the Southern Rhodesian sanctions regime, see: SIRES/333 (22 May 1973), operative 
paragraph 5 (requesting States engaged in trade relations with South Africa and Portugal, 
which had continued to trade with Southern Rhodesia in violation of the sanctions, to ensure 
that purchase contracts stipulated the prohibition of dealing in goods of Southern Rhodesian 
origin and that sales contracts included a prohibition of resale or re-export of goods to 
Southern Rhodesia). 
For the UNITA sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1127 (28 August 1997), operative paragraph 6 
(urging all States to stop travel by their officials and official delegations to UNITA 
headquarters, except for the purposes of travel to promote the peace process and humanitarian 
assistance); SIRES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraphs 9 (inviting States to convene one 
or more conferences of representatives of countries that were manufacturers and, in particular, 
exporters of weapons for the purpose of developing proposals to stem the illicit flow of arms 
into Angola), 20 (encouraging States to convene a conference of experts to explore 
possibilities to strengthen the implementation of the financial sanctions against UNITA). 
For the Afghanistan/Taliban/A1 Qaida sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1267 (15 October 1999), 
operative paragraph 5 (urging all States to cooperate with efforts to ensure that Usama Bin 
Laden was turned over to authorities in a country where he had been indicted, or to a country 
where he would be brought to justice); S/RES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 7 
(urging all States maintaining diplomatic relations with the Taliban to reduce significantly the 
number and level of the staff at Taliban missions and posts and to restrict or control the 
movement within their territory of all remaining staff). 
50 	For the Southern Rhodesian sanctions regime, see: SIRES/333 (22 May 1973), operative 
paragraph 8 (calling upon all States to inform the 253 Committee of their present sources of 
supply and quantities of chrome, asbestos, nickel, pig iron, tobacco, meat and sugar, together 
with the quantities of those goods they had originally obtained from Southern Rhodesia prior 
to the application of sanctions). 
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For the South Africa sanctions regime, see: SIRES/421 (9 December 1977), operative paragraph 
2 (calling upon all States to cooperate fully with the 421 Committee in the effective 
implementation of the sanctions, including by supplying information sought by that 
Committee). 
For the Iraq sanctions regime, see: SIRES/661 (6 August 1990), operative paragraph 7 (calling 
upon States to cooperate fully with the 661 Committee in the fulfilment of its tasks, including 
by supplying such information as the Committee might seek). The Council reaffirmed this call in 
subsequent resolutions connected with the sanctions regime. See: S/RES/670 (25 September 
1990), operative paragraph 10; S/RES/I 051 (27 March 1996), operative paragraph 12. 
For the former Yugoslavia sanctions regime, see: S/RES/724 (15 December 1991), operative 
paragraph 5(c) (calling upon all States to cooperate fully with the 724 Committee in the 
fulfilment of its tasks concerning the effective implementation of the arms embargo). The 
Council reiterated that call in a number of subsequent resolutions. See: S/RES/740 (7 February 
1992), operative paragraph 8; SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 14. 
For the Libya sanctions regime, see: SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 10 
(calling upon States to cooperate fully with the 748 Committee, including supplying such 
information as it may seek). 
For the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), see: 
S/RES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 14 (calling upon all States to cooperate fully 
with the 724 Committee). 
For the Bosnian Serb sanctions regime, see: S/RES/942 (23 September 1994), operative 
paragraph 17 (requiring States from which commodities or products were to be shipped to areas 
under the control of the Bosnian Serbs in accordance with the permitted exemptions from the 
sanctions, to report the source of funds from which payment was to be made to the 724 
Committee). 
For the Haiti sanctions regime, see: SIRES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 11 (calling 
upon all States 13 cooperate fully with the 841 Committee, including by supplying such 
information as it sought). 
For the UNITA sanctions regime, see: SIRES/864 (15 September 1993), operative paragraph 23 
(calling upon all States to cooperate fully with the 864 Committee, including by supplying such 
information as it sought). 
For the Rwanda sanctions regime, see: S/PRST/1995/22 (27 April 1995): Presidential statement 
of 27 April 1995 (inviting States with information on the transport of arms into countries 
neighbouring Rwanda for the purpose of their use in Rwanda in contravention of the 
sanctions, to pass that information on to the 918 Committee); S/RES/1011 (16 August 1995), 
operative paragraph 11 (requiring States to notify the 918 Committee of all exports of arms and 
related materiel being made to Rwanda, in accordance with the exemption from the sanctions 
regime of arms and related materiel exported to the Government of Rwanda through named 
points of entry). 
For the Sierra Leone sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1171 (5 June 1998), operative paragraph 4 
(requiring all States to notify the 1132 Committee of all exports from their territories to Sierra 
Leone of arms or related materiel). 
For the Afghanistan/Taliban/A1 Qaida sanctions regime, see: SIRES/l267 (15 October 1999), 
operative paragraph 9 (calling upon all States to cooperate fully with the 1267 Committee, 
including by supplying information it sought). That call was reiterated in; SIRES/1333 (19 
December 2000), operative paragraph 19; SIRES/I390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraph 7; 
SIRES/1455 (17 January 2003), operative paragraph 7. 
For the Liberia II sanctions regime, see: S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 24 
(urging all States to cooperate fully with the 1343 Committee). The Council repeated that call in: 
SIRES/l408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 21; SIRES/1458 (28 January 2003), operative 
paragraph 7; S/RES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 33. 
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monitoring mechanisms.53 States have been called upon or requested by the Council: to 
implement sanctions notwithstanding the existence of any conflicting legal obligation; 54 to 
51 	In connection with the Somalia sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1425 (22 July 2002), operative 
paragraph 6 (requesting all States to cooperate fully with the Somalia Panel of Experts); 
SIRES/1407 (3 May 2002), operative paragraph 4 (calling on all States to cooperate fully with 
the Chairman of the 751 Committee in a planned visit to Somalia and the region). 
In connection with the UNITA sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1237 (7 May 1999), operative 
paragraphs 8 (calling upon all States to cooperate fully with the expert panels on UNITA), 9 
(calling upon the Governments of the States in which the expert panels on UNITA would carry 
out their mandate to cooperate fully with the panels, including by adopting measures to ensure 
the freedom of movement, independence and security of the panels and their members). 
In connection with the Sierra Leone sanctions regime, see: SIRES/l306 (5 July 2000), operative 
paragraph 21 (urging all States to cooperate with the Sierra Leone Panel of Experts in the 
discharge of its mandate). 
In connection with the sanctions regime against Liberia (in the second instance), see: 
SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 24 (urging all States to cooperate fully with 
the Liberia Panel of Experts). The Council repeated that call in: S/RES/1395 (27 February 2002), 
operative paragraph 6; SIRES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 21; S/RES/1458 (28 
January 2003), operative paragraph 7; SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 33. 
52 	In connection with the Iraq sanctions regime, see: S/RES/1051 (27 March 1996), operative 
paragraph 12 (calling upon all States to cooperate fully with UNSCOM in the fulfilment of its 
tasks in connection with the export/import monitoring mechanism for Iraq); SIRES/l441 (8 
November 2002), operative paragraph 10 (requesting all Member States to give full support to 
UNMOVIC and the IAEA in the discharge of their mandates, including by providing any 
information related to prohibited programmes or other aspects of their mandates, including on 
Iraqi attempts since 1998 to acquire prohibited items, and by recommending sites to be 
inspected, persons to be interviewed, conditions of such interviews, and data to be collected, 
the results of which were to be reported to the Council by UNMOVIC and the IAEA). 
In connection with the Rwanda sanctions regime, the Council called upon States: to make 
available to the International Commission of Inquiry any information in their possession 
relating to the Commission's mandate [S/RES/1013 (7 September 1995), operative paragraph 3; 
S/RES/1053 (23 April 1996), operative paragraph 10; SIRES/1161 (9 April 1998), operative 
paragraph 2]; to cooperate fully with the Commission [S/RES/1013 (7 September 1995), 
operative paragraphs 5,7; S/RES/1029 (12 December 1995), operative paragraph 12; S/RES/1053 
(23 April 1996), operative paragraphs 8, 10; SIRES/1161 (9 April 1998), operative paragraph 3]; 
and to investigate fully reports of their officials and nationals suspected of having violated the 
sanctions [S/RES/1053 (23 April 1996), operative paragraph 8]. 
53 	In connection with the Iraq sanctions regime, see: S/RES/1051 (27 March 1996), operative 
paragraph 5 (requiring all States to notify the export/import monitoring mechanism for Iraq of 
the planned sale or supply to Iraq from their territories of any items or technologies that might 
have dual-use potential). 
In connection with the UNITA sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative 
paragraph 4 (calling upon all States to cooperate with the UNITA monitoring mechanism in the 
discharge of its mandate). The Council repeated that request in: SIRES/I336 (23 January 2001), 
operative paragraph 7; SIRES/1348 (19 April 2001), operative paragraph 7; SIRES/l374 (19 
October 2001), operative paragraph 9; SIRES/1404 (18 April 2002), operative paragraph 8; 
S/RES/1439 (18 October 2002), operative paragraph 7. 
In connection with the Afghanistaraaliban/A1 Qaida sanctions regime, see: SIRES/l363 (30 
July 2001), operative paragraph 7 (calling upon all States to cooperate with the 
Afghanistan/Taliban/AI Qaida monitoring mechanism); S/RES/1390 (16 January 2002), 
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operative paragraph 7 (urging all States to cooperate fully with the Monitoring Group). The 
Council repeated that call in SIRES/1455 (17 January 2003), operative paragraph 7. 
54 	In connection with the South Africa sanctions regime, see: S/RES/418 (4 November 1977), 
operative paragraph 3 palling upon all States to review contractual arrangements with and 
licences granted to South Africa relating to the manufacture and maintenance of arms, 
ammunition of all types and military equipment and vehicles, with a view to terminating them). 
In connection with the Iraq sanctions regime, see: SIRES/661 (6 August 1990), operative 
paragraph 5 (calling upon all States, including States non-members of the United Nations, to 
act strictly in accordance with the sanctions, notwithstanding any contract entered into or 
licence granted before the date the sanctions entered into force). That call was reiterated in: 
SIRES/670 (25 September 1990), operative paragraph 3; SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative 
paragraph 25. Also in connection with the Iraq sanctions regime, see: S/RES/687 (3 April 1991), 
operative paragraph 29 (requiring all States to take the necessary measures to ensure that no 
claim lay at the instance of the Government of Iraq, or of Iraqi nationals and entities, in 
connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance had been affected by 
the sanctions). 
In connection with the Libya sanctions regime, see: S/RES/748 (31 March 1992), operative 
paragraph 7 (calling upon all States, including States not members of the U.N., to act strictly in 
accordance with the sanctions, notwithstanding the existence of any conflicting legal rights or 
obligations). That call was repeated in S/RES1883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraph 12. 
In connection with the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro), see: SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph II (calling upon all States, 
including States not members of the United Nations, to act strictly in accordance with the 
sanctions, notwithstanding the existence of any conflicting legal rights or obligations). 
In connection with the Haiti sanctions regime, see: SIRES/84l (16 June 1993), operative 
paragraph 9 (calling upon all States to act strictly in accordance with the sanctions, 
notwithstanding the existence of any conflicting legal rights or obligations). The Council 
subsequently reiterated such a call when it strengthened the sanctions in May 1994. See: 
SIRES/9 17 (6 May 1994), operative paragraphs 11, 12. 
In connection with the LTNITA sanctions regime, see: SIRES/864 (15 September 1993), operative 
paragraph 20 (calling upon all States to act strictly in accordance with the sanctions, 
notwithstanding the existence of any conflicting legal rights or obligations). The Council 
repeated that call in SIRES/1127 (28 August 1997), operative paragraph 10. 
In connection with the Rwanda sanctions regime, see: S/RES/918 (17 May 1994), operative 
paragraph 15 (calling upon all States to act in accordance with the sanctions, notwithstanding 
the existence of any conflicting legal rights or obligations). 
In connection with the Sudan sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1054 (26 April 1996), operative 
paragraph 5 (calling upon all States, including States not members of the United Nations, to act 
strictly in conformity with the sanctions, notwithstanding the existence of any conflicting legal 
rights or obligations). 
In connection with the Sierra Leone sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), 
operative paragraph 11 (calling upon all States to act strictly in conformity with the sanctions, 
notwithstanding the existence of any conflicting legal rights or obligations). The Council 
repeated that call in SIRES/l306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 9. 
In connection with the Kosovo sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative 
paragraph 10 (calling upon all States to act in accordance with the sanctions, notwithstanding 
the existence of any conflicting legal rights or obligations). 
In connection with the Afghanistan/Taliban/A1 Qaida sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1267 (15 
October 1999), operative paragraph 7 (calling upon all States to act in accordance with the 
sanctions, notwithstanding the existence of any conflicting legal rights or obligations). The 
Council repeated that call in S/RES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 17. 
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undertake effective monitoring of compliance with sanctions; 55 to provide assistance to 
States undertaking authorized action to enforce sanctions; 56 and to take action to enforce 
In connection with the Ethiopia and Eritrea sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1298 (17 May 2000), 
operative paragraph 9 (calling upon all States to act strictly in conformity with the sanctions, 
notwithstanding the existence of any conflicting legal rights or obligations). 
In connection with the sanctions regime against Liberia (in the second instance), see: 
SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 22 (calling upon all States to act strictly in 
accordance with the sanctions notwithstanding the existence of any conflicting legal rights or 
obligations). 
55 	In connection with the South Africa sanctions regime, see: S/RES/591 (28 November 1986), 
operative paragraph 11 (requesting all States to adopt measures to investigate past and to 
prevent future violations of sanctions, as well as to strengthen machinery for the 
implementation of sanctions, with a view to the effective monitoring and verification of 
transfers of arms and other equipment in violation of the sanctions). 
In connection with the Somalia sanctions regime, see, e.g., SIRES/767 (27 July 1992), operative 
paragraph 10 (stressing the need for the observance and strict monitoring of the embargo). The 
Council against stressed such a need in: S/RES/775 (28 August 1992), operative paragraph 12; 
SIRES/954 (4 November 1994), operative paragraph 12. 
In connection with the sanctions regime against the Bosnian Serbs, see: SIRES/942 (23 
September 1994), operative paragraph 16 (requiring States to prevent shipments of commodities 
and products destined for those areas under the control of Bosnian Serb forces from violating 
the sanctions by ensuring that they were physically inspected by the Sanctions Assistance 
Missions or by competent national authorities at loading to verify and seal their contents or 
that the contents could be easily verified). 
In connection with the UNITA sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative 
paragraph 8 (encouraging all States to ensure effective monitoring and regulation in the export 
of weapons, including by private arms brokers). 
In connection with the Kosovo sanctions regime, see: S/RES/1199 (23 September 1998), 
operative paragraph 9 (urging States represented in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to make 
available personnel to fulfil the responsibility of carrying out effective and continuous 
international monitoring in Kosovo until the objectives of the sanctions regime had been 
achieved); S/RES/1203 (24 October 1998), operative paragraph 7 (urging States to make 
personnel available to the Verification Mission in Kosovo). 
56 	In connection with the Iraq sanctions regime, see: S/RES/665 (25 August 1990), operative 
paragraph 3 (requesting all States to provide, in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, such assistance as might be required by the States cooperating with the Government 
of Kuwait). 
In connection with the former Yugoslavia sanctions regime, see: SIRES/787 (16 November 
1992), operative paragraph 15 (requesting States to provide, in accordance with the Charter, 
such assistance as might be required by States acting in pursuance of the authority to use 
necessary measures to implement the embargo); S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 
17 (reiterating the request to all States to provide such assistance as was required by riparian 
States to ensure that shipping on the Danube did not violate the embargo). 
In connection with the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro), see: SIRES/787 (16 November 1992), operative paragraph 15 (requesting States to 
provide, in accordance with the Charter, such assistance as might be required by States acting 
in pursuance of its authority to use necessary measures to implement the sanctions); 
SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 17 (reiterating the request to all States to 
provide such assistance as was required by riparian States to ensure that shipping on the 
Danube did not violate the sanctions). 
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sanctions. 57 The Council has called upon or requested States: to report on measures taken 
to implement sanctions to the Secretary-Genera1 58 or to the relevant Sanctions Committee; 59 
In connection with the sanctions regime against the Bosnian Serbs, see: SIRES/820 (17 April 
1993), operative paragraph 17 (requesting all States to provide such assistance as was required 
by riparian States to ensure that shipping on the Danube did not violate the sanctions). 
57 	In connection with the Iraq sanctions regime, see: S/RES/670 (25 September 1990), operative 
paragraph 8 (calling upon States to detain or deny entry to Iraqi ships which were being or had 
been used in violation of the sanctions). As a result of that authorisation, a multinational 
interception force was stationed off the coast of Iraq for more than a decade. The force's 
operations were focussed in the Red Sea from 1991-1994, after which they shifted to the Persian 
Gulf. For information relating to the force's activities, see: S/19961700 (26 August 1996), annex: 
Report of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning 
the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, paragraphs 80-85. The force routinely intercepted 
vessels going to and from Iraq, in order to inspect cargo and verify that the vessels were not 
violating the Iraq sanctions regime. 
In connection with the former Yugoslavia sanctions regime, see: SIRES/787 (16 November 
1992), operative paragraph 12 (invoking Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter and calling upon 
States, acting nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements, to use the necessary 
measures to halt outward and inward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify that 
cargo did not violate the arms embargo). This call was reaffirmed in SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), 
operative paragraph 29. Also in connection with the former Yugoslavia sanctions regime, see: 
SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 25 (requiring States to detain vessels, freight 
vehicles, rolling stock, aircraft and cargoes suspected of having violated the sanctions). 
In connection with the Somalia sanctions regime, see: SIRES/794 (3 December 1992), operative 
paragraph 16 (invoking Chapters VII and VIII in calling upon States, acting nationally or 
through regional agencies or arrangements, to use such measures as might be necessary to 
ensure the strict implementation of the arms embargo). 
In connection with the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro), see: S/RES/787 (16 November 1992), operative paragraph 12 (invoking Chapters 
VII and VIII of the Charter in calling upon States, acting nationally or through regional 
agencies or arrangements, to use such measures as necessary to halt outward and inward 
maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify that cargo did not violate the sanctions). That 
call was reaffirmed in SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 29. Also in connection 
with the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), 
see: SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraphs 24 (requiring States to impound all 
vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft in their territories if owned or possessed by 
an individual or entity from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro)), 25 
(requiring States to detain vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock, aircraft and cargoes 
suspected of having violated the sanctions). 
In connection with the sanctions regime against the Bosnian Serbs, see: SIRES/820 (17 April 
1993), operative paragraph 25 (requiring States in general to detain vessels, freight vehicles, 
rolling stock, aircraft and cargoes suspected of having violated the sanctions). 
58 	In connection with the Iraq sanctions regime, see: SIRES/700 (17 June 1991), operative 
paragraph 4 (requesting all States to report to the Secretary-General on the measures they had 
instituted for meeting the obligations to implement the arms sanctions). 
In connection with the Libya sanctions regime, see: SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), operative 
paragraph 8 (requesting all States to report to the Secretary-General on measures taken to 
implement the sanctions). That request was repeated in SIRES/883 (11 November 1993), 
operative paragraph 13. 
298 
10. Sanctions monitoring and enforcement: bestowing responsibility upon other international actors 
to take action to implement humanitarian programmes established to minimize the 
In connection with the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro), see: SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 12 (requesting all States to 
report to the Secretary-General on measures taken to implement the sanctions). 
In connection with the Haiti sanctions regime, see: S/RES/841 (16 June 1993), operative 
paragraph 13 (requesting all States to report to the Secretary-General on the measures taken to 
implement the sanctions). The Council repeated that call in SIRES/917 (6 May 1994), operative 
paragraph 13. 
In connection with the UNITA sanctions regime, see: SIRES/864 (15 September 1993), operative 
paragraph 24 (requesting all States to report to the Secretary-General on measures adopted to 
meet their obligations under the sanctions regime). That request was repeated in: SIRES/1127 
(28 August 1997), operative paragraph 13; SIRES/1135 (29 October 1997), operative paragraph 
8. 
In connection with the Sudan sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1054 (26 April 1996), operative 
paragraph 6 (requesting States to report to the Secretary-General on steps taken to implement 
the sanctions). The Council repeated that request in SIRES/1070 (16 August 1996), operative 
paragraph 2. 
In connection with the Sierra Leone sanctions regime, see: S/RES/1132 (8 October 1997), 
operative paragraph 13 (requesting States to report to the Secretary-General on steps taken to 
give effect to the sanctions). 
In connection with the Ethiopia and Eritrea sanctions regime, see: S/RES/1298 (17 May 2000), 
operative paragraph 11 (requesting States to report to the Secretary-General on steps taken to 
give effect to the sanctions). 
59 In connection with the Somalia sanctions regime, see: S/RES/1407 (3 May 2002), operative 
paragraph 8 (requesting all States to report to the 751 Committee on measures they had taken 
to ensure the full implementation of the arms embargo). 
In connection with the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro), see: S/RE51820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 21 (calling upon States to 
report to the 724 Committee on actions taken to freeze funds belonging to or controlled by the 
authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or commercial, 
industrial or public undertakings from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro)). 
In connection with the Sierra Leone sanctions regime, see: S/RES/I306 (5 July 2000), operative 
paragraph 8 (requesting all States to report to the 1132 Committee on actions taken to 
implement the diamond sanctions). 
In connection with the Kosovo sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative 
paragraph 12 (requesting States to report to the 1160 Committee on steps taken to implement 
the sanctions). 
In connection with the Afghanistan/Taliban/AI Qaida sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1267 (15 
October 1999), operative paragraph 10 (requesting all States to report to the 1267 Committee on 
steps taken to implement the sanctions). The Council repeated that call in: S/RES/1333 (19 
December 2000), operative paragraph 20; SIRES/1390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraph 6. 
In January 2003, the Council made a more detailed request, calling on all States to submit an 
updated report to the 1267 Committee on steps taken to implement the sanctions and on all 
related investigations and enforcement action, including a comprehensive summary of frozen 
assets of listed individuals and entities within Member State territories: S/RES/1455 (17 January 
2003), operative paragraph 6. 
In connection with the sanctions regime against Liberia (in the second instance), see: 
SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 18 (requesting all States to report to the 1343 
Committee on steps taken to implement the sanctions). The Council repeated that call in: 
S/RES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 15. 
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humanitarian consequences of sanctions;6° to report information concerning violations of 
sanctions to the relevant Sanctions Committee; 61 to report on measures taken in accordance 
60 	The Council authorized or called upon States to take a range of action in connection with the 
Iraq Oil-for-Food Programme. The Council first authorized States to permit the import of 
petroleum and petroleum products to finance the Programme in August 1991. See: S/RES/706 
(15 August 1991), operative paragraph 1. After a number of years in which Iraq refused to 
comply with the scheme, the Council again attempted to implement the Programme in 1995, with 
more success. See: SIRES/986 (14 April 1995), operative paragraph 1. For extensions of that 
initial authorisation, see: S/RES/1111 (4 June 1997), operative paragraph 1; S/RES/1143 (4 
December 1997), operative paragraph 1; SIRES/1153 (20 February 1998), operative paragraph 1; 
SIRES/1158 (25 March 1998), operative paragraph 1; SIRES/1210 (24 November 1998), operative 
paragraph 1; S/RES/1242 (21 May 1999), operative paragraph 1; S/RES/1281 (10 December 
1999), operative paragraph 1; SIRES/1284 (17 December 1999), operative paragraph 15; 
S/RES/1302 (8 June 2000), operative paragraph 1; S/RES/1330 (5 December 2000), operative 
paragraph 1; SIRES/1352 (1 June 2001), operative paragraph 1; S/RES/1360 (3 July 2001), 
operative paragraph 1; SIRES/1382 (29 November 2001), operative paragraph 1; S/RES/1409 (14 
May 2002), operative paragraph 1; SIRES/1443 (25 November 2002), operative paragraph 1; 
SIRES/1447 (4 December 2002), operative paragraph 1; S/RES/1454 (30 December 2002), 
operative paragraph 1; S/RES/1472 (28 March 2003). 
In other requests or authorizations connected with the Oil-for-Food Programme, the Council: 
(a)called upon States to cooperate fully in the implementation of the Programme [see: 
S/RES/712 (19 September 1991), operative paragraph 11; S/RES/1153 (20 February 1998), 
operative paragraph 6; S/RES/1210 (24 November 1998), operative paragraph 11; SIRES/1242 
(21 May 1999), operative paragraph 11; S/RES/1281 (10 December 1999), operative paragraph 
11; SIRES/I302 (8 June 2000), operative paragraph 15; S/RES/1330 (5 December 2000), operative 
paragraph 16; S/RES/1360 (3 July 2001), operative paragraph 10]; (b) authorized States to permit 
the export to Iraq, subject to the approval of the 661 Committee, of parts and equipment for the 
safe operation of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline system [S/RES/986 (14 April 1995), operative 
paragraph 9(a)]; (c) authorized States to permit activities necessary for the exports authorized 
under the Programme, including financial transactions related thereto [SIRES/986 (14 April 
1995), operative paragraph 9(b)]; (d) appealed to all States to cooperate in the timely provision 
to Iraq of lymanitarian supplies permitted under the Programme [SIRES/I153 (20 February 
1998), operative paragraph 7; SIRES/i210 (24 November 1998), operative paragraph 12; 
SIRES/i242 (21 May 1999), operative paragraph 12; SIRES/i281 (10 December 1999), operative 
paragraph 12; SIRES/1302 (8 June 2000), operative paragraph 16; SIRES/1330 (5 December 
2000), operative paragraph 21; S/RES/1360 (3 July 2001), operative paragraph 13; SIRES/1382 
(29 November 2001), operative paragraph 5]; (e) authorized States to permit the export to Iraq of 
the necessary parts and equipment to enable Iraq to increase the export of petroleum and 
petroleum products to the amount permitted under the Programme [SIRES/1i75 (19 June 1998), 
operative paragraph 1]; (f) urged all States to take steps to minimize delays in processing 
applications under the OFFP identified in paragraphs 128-134 of: S/2000/1132 (29 November 
2000): Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 1302 (2000)][ 
S/RES/1330 (5 December 2000), operative paragraph 14]; and (g) authorized States to permit the 
sale or supply to Iraq of any commodities and products other than military commodities and 
products and military-related commodities and products covered by the Goods Review List 
[SIRES/i409 (14 May 2002), operative paragraph 3. The Goods Review List was adopted by 
operative paragraph 3 of the same resolution, and was circulated as: S/2002/515 (3 May 2002), 
annex: Goods Review List. 
61 	In connection with the former Yugoslavia sanctions regime, see: SIRES/740 (7 February 1992), 
operative paragraph 8 (calling upon all States to report to the 724 Committee any information 
brought to their attention concerning violations of the arms embargo). 
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with an authorisation or request to enforce sanctions; 62 to cooperate with an initiative to 
achieve the objectives of a sanctions regime;63 to provide assistance to regional bodies 
engaged in sanctions-monitoring activities; 64 to provide financial assistance to facilitate the 
In connection with the Somalia sanctions regime, see: S/PRST/2000/22 (29 June 2000): 
Presidential Statement of 29 June 2000 (urging all States to report to the 751 Committee any 
information on possible violations of the arms embargo). The Council repeated that call in: 
S/PRST/2001/I (11 January 2001): Presidential Statement of 11 January 2001; S/PRST/2002/8 
(28 March 2002): Presidential Statement of 28 March 2002; SIRES/1407 (3 May 2002), 
operative paragraph 9; S/RES/1425 (22 July 2002), operative paragraph 7; SIRES/1474 (8 April 
2003), operative paragraph 9. 
In connection with the sanctions regime against Liberia (in the first instance), see: SIRES/1001 
(30 June 1995), operative paragraph 10 (reminding all States of their obligation to report any 
violations of the embargo to the 985 Sanctions Committee). The Council again reminded States 
of that obligation in: SIRES/l014 (15 September 1995), operative paragraph 11; SIRES/1020 (10 
November 1995), operative paragraph 11; S/RES/1041 (29 January 1996), operative paragraph 
14; S/PRST/1996/16: Presidential statement of 9 April 1996; SIRES/1059 (31 May 1996), 
operative paragraph 11; S/RES/1071 (30 August 1996), operative paragraph 12; S/RES/1083 (27 
November 1996), operative paragraph 10; SIRES/1100 (27 March 1997), operative paragraph 9; 
S/RES/1116 (27 June 1997), operative paragraph 7. 
In connection with the Sierra Leone sanctions regime, see: S/RES/1181 (13 July 1998), operative 
paragraph 13 (reaffirming the obligation of all States to bring all instances of violations of the 
arms sanctions before the 1132 Committee); SIRES/l306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraphs 16 
(urging all States to report to the 1132 Committee on possible violations of the diamond 
sanctions), 18 (urging all States to report to the 1132 Committee information on possible 
violations of the arms sanctions). 
In connection with the Ethiopia and Eritrea sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1298 (17 May 2000), 
operative paragraph 12 (requesting all States to report information on possible violations of the 
sanctions to the 1298 Committee). 
In connection with the sanctions regime against Liberia (in the second instance), see: 
S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 24 (urging all States to cooperate fully with 
the 1343 Committee and the Liberia Panel of Experts, including by supplying information on 
possible violations of the sanctions). The Council repeated that call in: S/RES/1408 (6 May 
2002), operative paragraph 21; SIRES/1458 (28 January 2003), operative paragraph 7; 
SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 33. 
62 	In connection with the former Yugoslavia Kinctions regime, see: SIRES/787 (16 November 
1992), operative paragraph 14 (requesting States to report, in coordination with the Secretary-
General, to the Security Council on any measures taken to ensure that maritime or riparian 
shipping did not violate the arms embargo). 
In connection with the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro), see: SIRES/787 (16 November 1992), operative paragraph 14 (requesting States to 
report, in coordination with the Secretary-General, to the Security Council on any measures 
taken to ensure that maritime or riparian shipping did not violate the sanctions). 
63 	In connection with the Libya sanctions regime, see: S/RES/I 192 (27 August 1998), operative 
paragraph 4 (requiring all States to cooperate with initiative for the trial of two persons charged 
with the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 before a Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands). 
64 	In connection with the UNITA sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative 
paragraph 32 (urging States to consider the provision of financial and technical assistance to 
SADC). 
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work of sanction-related subsidiary bodies;65 to cooperate with the efforts of a regional 
organization to implement sanctions; 66 to provide assistance to a legitimate Government in its 
efforts to implement sanctions against a target located within its territories; 67 and to provide 
assistance to States in the region surrounding a target in implementing sanctions. 68 
10.2.2 Particular types of States 
In its oversight of U.N. sanctions regimes, the Council has also addressed its 
requests specifically to a State or group of States considered to be in a position to exercise 
influence over the activities of a target. It has directed such requests at States Members of 
the United Nations, at States non-members of the United Nations, at the administering 
Power of a target, at States neighbouring or located in the same region as the target, at 
legitimate Governments in whose territories a target is located, a States alleged to have 
65 	In connection with the Rwanda sanctions regime, see: SIRES/l013 (7 September 1995), 
operative paragraph 8 (encouraging States to make contributions to the Trust Fund for 
Rwanda, to supplement the financing for the work of the Commission, and to contribute 
equipment and services to the Commission). That call was repeated in S/RES/1053 (23 April 
1996), operative paragraph 11. 
66 	In connection with the Sierra Leone sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), 
operative paragraphs 8 (calling upon all States to cooperate with ECOWAS to ensure the strict 
implementation of the sanctions), 18 (urging all States to provide technical and logistical 
support to assist ECOWAS in carrying out its responsibilities in relation to the implementation 
of the sanctions). 
67 	In connection with the Sierra Leone sanctions regime, see: S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative 
paragraphs 3 (requesting States to offer assistance to the Government of Sierra Leone to 
facilitate the operation of a certificate-of-origin regime), 11 (inviting States to offer assistance to 
the Government of Sierra Leone to develop a well-structured and well-regulated diamond 
industry providing for the identification of the provenance of rough diamonds). 
68 	In connection with the sanctions regime against Liberia (in the second instance), see: 
S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 16 (calling upon States and relevant 
international organizations to offer assistance to diamond-exporting West African States 
seeking to establish Certificate of Origin schemes). The Council reiterated that call in: 
SIRES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 9; SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative 
paragraph 15. Also in connection with the sanctions regime against Liberia (in the second 
instance), see: SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 17 (calling upon the 
international community to provide the necessary assistance to prevent the proliferation and 
illicit trafficking of ight weapons in West Africa, and thus to facilitate the implementation of 
the ECO WAS moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and 
Light Weapons in West Africa). 
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been violating sanctions, at States playing a particular role connected with achieving a 
sanctions regime's objectives, at States engaging in relations that are exempt from sanctions, 
and at States engaging in a particular type of trade activity. 
i. 	States Members of the United Nations 
In its oversight of sanctions regimes, the Council has called upon Member States to 
undertake a range of activities related to the implementation, monitoring and enforcement, 
including: implementing sanctions;69 reporting on measures taken to implement sanctions to 
the Secretary-General" or to the relevant Sanctions Committee; 71 implementing sanctions 
notwithstanding the existence of any conflicting legal obligation; 72 taking effective measures 
69 	In connection with the sanctions regime against Southern Rhodesia, see: SIRES/232 (16 
December 1966), operative paragraph 6 (calling upon all States Members of the United Nations 
to implement the sanctions in accordance with Article 25 of the United Nations Charter); 
SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraph 11 (calling upon all States Members of the 
United Nations to carry out its decisions in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter). The 
Council also addressed such a call towards the permanent members of the Council. See: 
SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraph 16 (calling upon States Members of the United 
Nations, and particularly those with primary responsibility under the Charter for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, to assist effectively in the implementation of 
the sanctions). The Council reaffirmed that call in SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), operative 
paragraph 17. 
In connection with the UNITA sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1157 (20 March 1998), operative 
paragraph 4 (calling upon all Member States to implement the sanctions fully). That call was 
repeated in: SIRES/1164 (29 April 1998), operative paragraph 14; SIRES/1221 (12 January 1999), 
operative paragraph 7; S/PRST/1999/3 (21 January 1999): Presidential statement of 21 January 
1999; SIRES/1229 (26 February 1999), operative paragraph 8; SIRES/1237 (7 May 1999), 
operative paragraph 5; SIRES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph I. 
70 	In connection with the sanctions regime against Southern Rhodesia, see: S/RES/232 (16 
December 1966), operative paragraph 8. The Council reaffirmed that call in subsequent 
resolution connected with the sanctions regime. See: SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), operative 
paragraph 18; S/RES/277 (18 March 1970), operative paragraph 19. 
71 	In connection with the UNITA sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1173 (12 June 1998), operative 
paragraph 21 (requesting Member States to provide the 864 Committee with information on 
measures taken to implement the sanctions). That request was repeated in: SIRES/1176 (24 June 
1998), operative paragraph 4. 
72 	In connection with the sanctions regime against Southern Rhodesia, see: S/RES/253 (29 May 
1968), operative paragraph 7 (requiring all States Members of the United Nations to give effect 
to the sanctions, notwithstanding any contract entered into or licence granted). 
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domestically to prevent the violation of sanctions by their nationals or in their territories; 73 
taking further action against a target under Article 41; 74 extending assistance to States 
confronted by special economic problems as a result of implementing sanctions; 75 
cooperating with the relevant Sanctions Committee; 76 taking action to ensure that regional 
organizations, international organizations and the specialized agencies acted in conformity 
with sanctions;77 taking action internationally to enforce sanctions; 78 taking action 
73 	In connection with the sanctions regime against Southern Rhodesia, see: SIRES/253 (29 May 
1968), operative paragraph 8 (calling upon all States Members of the United Nations or of the 
specialized agencies to take all possible measures to prevent activities by their nationals and 
persons in their territories promoting, assisting or encouraging emigration to Southern 
Rhodesia, with a view to stopping such emigration); S/RES/277 (18 March 1970), operative 
paragraphs 3 (calling upon Member States to take measures at the national level to ensure that 
any act performed by officials and institutions of the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia were 
not accorded any recognition by the competent organs of their State) 8 (calling upon Member 
States to take more stringent measures to prevent circumvention of the sanctions by their 
nationals, organizations, companies and other institutions). 
74 	In connection with the sanctions regime against Southern Rhodesia, see: S/RES/253 (29 May 
1968), operative paragraph 9 (requesting all States Members of the United Nations or of the 
specialized agencies to take all possible further action under Article 41 of the Charter to deal 
with the situation in Southern Rhodesia). 
75 	In connection with the sanctions regime against Southern Rhodesia, see: SIRES/253 (29 May 
1968), operative paragraph 15 (requesting States Members of the United Nations, the United 
Nations Organization, the specialized agencies and other international organizations in the 
United Nations system to extend assistance to Zambia as a matter of priority with a view to 
helping it solve such special economic problems as it might be confronted with from carrying 
out the sanctions). The Council requested the same actors to increase such assistance in 
S/RES/277 (18 March 1970), operative paragraph 16. 
76 	In connection with the sanctions regime against Southern Rhodesia, see: SIRES/253 (29 May 
1968), operative paragraph 22 (calling upon States Members of the United Nations [and 
members of the specialized agencies, as well as the agencies themselves] to supply to the 253 
Committee such information as it may seek). The Council reaffirmed that call in subsequent 
resolutions connected with the sanctions regime. See: SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), operative 
paragraph 23. 
77 	In connection with the sanctions regime against Southern Rhodesia, see: SIRES/277 (18 March 
1970), operative paragraphs 12 (calling upon Member States to take appropriate action to 
suspend any membership or associate membership that the illegal regime had in the specialized 
agencies of the United Nations), 13 (urging Member States of any international or regional 
organizations to suspend the membership of the illegal regime from their respective 
organizations and to refuse any applications by that regime for membership). 
78 	In connection with the Iraq sanctions regime, see: S/RES/665 (25 August 1990), operative 
paragraph 1 (calling upon Member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait and 
which were deploying maritime forces to the area to use such measures commensurate with the 
specific circumstances as may be necessary, under the Council's authority, to halt all inward 
and outward maritime shipping, in order to inspect and verify that it was not violating the 
sanctions). 
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internationally to ensure compliance with sanctions; 79 reporting to the relevant Sanctions 
Committee regarding action taken to enforce sanctions; 8° taking action to implement 
humanitarian programmes established to minimize the humanitarian consequences of 
sanctions.," reporting information concerning violations of sanctions to the relevant Sanctions 
Committee;82  encouraging the Libyan Government to encourage a target to comply with the 
objectives of a sanctions regime;" and providing assistance for sanctions monitoring." 
States non-members of the United Nations 
In connection with the Haiti sanctions regime, see: SIRES/875 (16 October 1993), operative 
paragraph 1 (calling upon Member States, acting nationally or through regional agencies or 
arrangements, and cooperating with the legitimate Government of Haiti, to use such measures 
as necessary under its authority to ensure the strict implementation of the sanctions, including 
halting inbound maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify that their cargoes did not 
violate the sanctions). The Council repeated that call in S/RES/917 (6 May 1994), operative 
paragraph 10. 
79 	In connection with the Iraq sanctions regime, see: SIRES/665 (25 August 1990), operative 
paragraph 2 (inviting Member States to use political and diplomatic measures to ensure 
compliance with the sanctions). 
80 	In connection with the Iraq sanctions regime, see: SIRES/665 (25 August 1990), operative 
paragraph 4 (requesting States acting pursuant to the authority to halt inward and outward 
maritime shipping to submit reports to the Council and the 661 Committee concerning the 
situation between Iraq and Kuwait). 
81 	In connection with the Iraq Oil-for-Food Programme, see: S/RES/1284 (17 December 1999), 
operative paragraph 19 (encouraging Member States to provide Iraq with supplementary 
humanitarian and published material of an educational character. 
82 	In connection with the Somalia sanctions regime, see: S/PRST/1999/31 (12 November 1999): 
Presidential Statement of 12 November 1999 (urging Member States with information about 
violations of the embargo to provide that information to the 751 Committee). 
In connection with the UNITA sanctions regime, see: S/RES/1127 (28 August 1997), operative 
paragraph 12 (requesting Member States to provide to the 864 Committee any information 
relating to violations of sanctions). That request was repeated in: SIRES/1157 (20 March 1998), 
operative paragraph 4; SIRES/1164 (29 April 1998), operative paragraph 14; SIRES/1173 (12 
June 1998), operative paragraph 22; SIRES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 26. 
83 	In connection with the Libya sanctions regime, see: SIRES/883 (11 November 1993), operative 
paragraph 15 (calling upon Member States to encourage the Libyan Government to respond 
fully to the requests and decisions in connection with which the sanctions were imposed). 
In connection with the sanctions regimes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro) and the Bosnian Serbs, see: SIRES/988 (21 April 1995), operative paragraph 6 
(requesting Member States to make available the necessary resources to strengthen the ICFY 
Mission's capacity to carry out its tasks). The ICFY Mission was established to monitor and 
certify that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) was adhering to its 
commitment to close its border with the areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of 
the Bosnian Serbs to all but foodstuffs and medical and humanitarian supplies. 
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The Council specifically addressed States not Members of the United Nations in 
connection with the Southern Rhodesian sanctions regime, urging them to act in accordance 
with the sanctions." The practice of specifically addressing States non-members has not 
been followed since, although the Council has often clarified that requests addressed to "all 
States" or to "States" include States non-members." 
An administering Power 
In the case of the sanctions regime against Southern Rhodesia, the Council 
requested the United Kingdom, as the administering Power over Southern Rhodesia, to 
undertake a number of tasks related to the administration, implementation and monitoring of 
sanctions. Prior to the application of mandatory sanctions, but after the Council had called 
upon States to apply voluntary sanctions, including diplomatic, arms and oil sanctions, 87 the 
Council called upon the United Kingdom to take enforcement action to prevent the arrival at 
the port of Beira in Mozambique of vessels believed to be carrying oil destined for Southern 
85 	In connection with the sanctions regime against Southern Rhodesia, see: S/RES1232 (16 
December 1966), operative paragraph 7. In a number of subsequent decisions connected to the 
Southern Rhodesian sanctions regime, the Council again referred to Article 2(6) of the Charter 
and urged all States not Members of the United Nations to act in accordance with the 
sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. See, e.g.: S/RES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraph 
14; SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), operative paragraph 18; S/RES/388 (6 April 1976), operative 
paragraph 3; SIRES/409 (27 May 1977), operative paragraph 2. 
86 	As noted in section 4.1, above, the Council has often called upon "all States, including States 
non-members of the United Nations" to act strictly in accordance with sanctions, 
notwithstanding the existence of any prior legal obligation. In connection with the sanctions 
regime against Iraq, see: S/RES/661 (6 August 1991), operative paragraph 5. In connection with 
the sanctions regime against Libya, see: S/RES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 7; 
SIRES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraph 12. In connection with the sanctions 
regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), see: S/RES/757 (30 
May 1992), operative paragraph 11. In connection with the sanctions regime against Haiti, see: 
SIRES/841 (15 June 1993), operative paragraph 9; S/RES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 
12. In connection with the Sudan sanctions regime, see: S/RES/1054 (26 April 1996), operative 
paragraph 5. 
87 	See: SIRES/217 (20 November 1965), operative paragraphs 6 (calling upon all States not to 
recognize the illegal regime nor entertain diplomatic relation with it), 8 (calling upon all States to 
desist from providing the illegal regime with arms, equipment and military material, and to break 
off economic relations, including by imposing an embargo on oil and petroleum products). 
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Rhodesia, and empowered it to detain a tanker then docked at that port, in the event that it 
were to discharge its oil cargo there. 88 After the mandatory sanctions had been imposed, the 
Council also called upon the United Kingdom to undertake the following tasks: to give 
maximum assistance to the 253 Committee, providing it with any information received in 
order to make the sanctions fully effective; 89 and to rescind or withdraw any agreements on 
the basis of which foreign consular, trade and other representation might be maintained in or 
with Southern Rhodesia.9° 
iv. 	States neighbouring or in the same region as the target 
The Security Council has requested, called upon, or required States neighbouring or 
located in the region surrounding a target to take a range of additional action in connection 
with the implementation, monitoring or enforcement of sanctions. It has thus: authorized a 
neighbour State to take action to facilitate the implementation of a humanitarian programme 
designed to address the humanitarian consequences of sanctions; 9 ' authorized riparian States 
to take action to enforce sanctions against a riparian target; 92 requested riparian States to 
88 	S/RES/221 (9 April 1966), operative paragraph 5. 
89 	In connection with the sanctions regime against Southern Rhodesia, see: S/RES1253 (29 May 
1968), operative paragraph 21. The Council reaffirmed that call in subsequent resolutions 
connected with the sanctions regime. See: SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), operative paragraph 22. 
90 	In connection with the sanctions regime against Southern Rhodesia, see: SIRES/277 (18 March 
1970), operative paragraph 10. 
91 In connection with the Iraq Oil-for-Food Programme, see: S/RES/986 (14 April 1995), operative 
paragraph 2 (authorizing Turkey to permit the import of petroleum and petroleum products from 
Iraq sufficient to meet the pipeline tariff charges for the transport of Iraqi petroleum and 
petroleum products through the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline). 
92 In connection with the former Yu goslavia sanctions regime, see: S/RES/787 (16 November 
1992), operative paragraph 13 (reaffirming the responsibility of riparian States to take the 
measures necessary to ensure that shipping along the Danube did not violate the embargo, 
including taking action to halt shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and 
destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the embargo). The Council again reaffirmed 
that responsibility in SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 17. 
In connection with the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro), see: SIRES/787 (16 November 1992), operative paragraph 13 (reaffirming the 
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monitor compliance by a riparian target with sanctions; 93 requested riparian States to take 
action domestically to ensure compliance with sanctions against a riparian target; 94 invited 
responsibility of riparian States to take the measures necessary to ensure that shipping along 
the Danube did not violate the sanctions, including taking action to halt shipping in order to 
inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the 
sanctions). That responsibility was again reaffirmed in SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative 
paragraph 17. 
In connection with the sanctions regime against the Bosnian Serbs, see: SIRES/820 (17 April 
1993), operative paragraph 17 (reaffirming the responsibility of riparian States to take the 
measures necessary to ensure that shipping on the Danube did not violate the sanctions, 
including taking action to halt shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and 
destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the sanctions). 
93 	In connection with the former Yugoslavia sanctions regime, see: S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), 
operative paragraph 16 (calling upon riparian States to ensure that cabotage traffic along the 
Danube river between Vidin/Calafat and Mohacs was adequately monitored so that no vessels 
suspected of having violated the embargo were permitted to pass); S/RES/992 (11 May 1995), 
operative paragraph 3 (requesting the Government of Romania, with the assistance of the 
EU/OSCE Sanctions Assistance Missions, to monitor the use of Romanian locks while repairs 
were being carried out to locks on the Serbian side of the river, including if necessary by 
inspections of the vessels and their cargo, in order to ensure that no goods were loaded or 
unloaded during the passage by the vessels through the locks of the Iron Gates I system). 
In connection with the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro), see: SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 16 (calling upon riparian 
States to ensure that cabotage traffic along the Danube iiver between Vidin/Calafat and 
Mohacs was adequately monitored so that no vessels suspected of having violated the 
sanctions were permitted to pass); S/RES1992 (11 May 1995), operative paragraph 3 (requesting 
the Government of Romania, with the assistance of the EU/OSCE Sanctions Assistance 
Missions, to monitor the use of Romanian locks while repairs were being carried out to locks 
on the Serbian side of the river, including if necessary by inspections of the vessels and their 
cargo, in order to ensure that no goods were loaded or unloaded during the passage by the 
vessels through the locks of the Iron Gates I system). 
In connection with the sanctions regime against the Bosnian Serbs, see: S/RE51820 (17 April 
1993), operative paragraph 16 (calling upon riparian States to ensure that cabotage traffic along 
the Danube river between Vidin/Calafat and Mohacs was adequately monitored so that no 
vessels suspected of having violated the sanctions were permitted to pass); S/RES/992 (11 
May 1995), operative paragraph 3 (requesting the Government of Romania, with the assistance 
of the EU/OSCE Sanctions Assistance Missions, to monitor the use of Romanian locks while 
repairs were being carried out to locks on the Serbian side of the river, including if necessary 
by inspections of the vessels and their cargo, in order to ensure that no goods were loaded or 
unloaded during the passage by the vessels through the locks of the Iron Gates I system). 
94 	In connection with the former Yugoslavia sanctions regime, see: SIRES/992 (11 May 1995), 
operative paragraph 4 (requesting Romania to deny passage through the locks on its bank of 
the Danube to any vessel suspected to have violated relevant Council resolutions, thus 
encompassing violations of the embargo). 
In connection with the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro), see: SIRES/992 (11 May 1995), operative paragraph 4 (requesting Romania to 
deny passage through the locks on its bank of the Danube to any vessel suspected to have 
violated sanctions). 
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States neighbouring a target to report to the relevant Sanctions Committee regarding efforts 
to implement sanctions; 95 called upon States neighbouring a target to take action 
domestically to enforce the sanctions; 96 urged States neighbouring a target to report to the 
relevant Sanctions Committee regarding alleged violations of sanctions; 97 called upon States 
neighbouring a target to cooperate with sanctions-related subsidiary bodies;98 called upon 
States neighbouring a target to assist sanctions-monitoring activities;99 urged States in the 
region surrounding a target to take action domestically to enforce sanctions; m° called upon 
In connection with the sanctions regime against the Bosnian Serbs, see: SIRES/992 (11 May 
1995), operative paragraph 4 (requesting Romania to deny passage through the locks on its 
bank of the Danube to any vessel suspected to have violated sanctions). 
95 In connection with the Somalia sanctions regime, see: S/RES/1474 (8 April 2003), operative 
paragraph 10 (inviting States neighbouring Somalia to report to the 751 Committee on a 
quarterly basis regarding their efforts to implement the embargo). 
96 In connection with the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro), see: S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 23 (requiring each State 
neighbouring the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) to prevent the passage 
of all freight vehicles and rolling stock into or out of that country, except at a strictly limited 
number of road and rail crossing points, the locations of which would be notified to the 724 
Committee). 
In connection with the UNITA sanctions regime, see: S/RES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative 
paragraph 27 (urging all States, including those geographically close to Angola, to take 
immediate steps to enforce, strengthen or enact legislation making it a criminal offence under 
domestic law for their nationals or other individuals operating on their territory to violate the 
sanctions, where they had not done so, and to inform the 864 Committee of the adoption of 
such measures, and inviting States to report the results of all related investigations or 
prosecutions to the 864 Committee). 
In connection with the Rwanda sanctions regime, see: SIRES/997 (9 June 1995), operative 
paragraph 5 (calling upon States neighbouring Rwanda to take steps to ensure that arms and 
materiel were not transferred to Rwandan camps within their territories). 
97 In connection with the UNITA sanctions regime, see: S/RES/932 (30 June 1994), operative 
paragraph 8 (urging two States neighbouring Angola which had failed to respond 
substantively to requests from the 864 Committee for information regarding alleged sanctions 
violations to do so promptly). 
98 In connection with the Rwanda sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1011 (16 August 1995), operative 
paragraph 3 (calling upon the Governments of Rwanda and neighbouring States to cooperate 
with the investigations of the soon to be established International Commission of Inquiry). 
99 In connection with the Rwanda sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1011 (16 August 1995), operative 
paragraph 4 (calling upon neighbouring States to cooperate and assist with observers to be 
deployed at airfields and border crossing points to ensure that arms and related materiel were 
not transferred to Rwandan camps within their territories). 
ioo In connection with the Rwanda sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1053 (23 April 1996), operative 
paragraph 5 (urging all States, and in particular those in the region, to intensify efforts to 
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States in the region surrounding a tnrget to take action internationally to implement 
sanctions; I01 and called on Member States of a regional organization to cooperate fully with 
a sanctions-related subsidiary body. 1 02 
v. 	Legitimate Governments in whose territories a target is located 
The Council has made additional requests of legitimate Governments in whose 
territories a target is located in connection with the sanctions regimes against UNTTA, 
Rwanda and Sierra Leone. It has thus: called upon a legitimate Government to take effective 
domestic measures to ensure the implementation of sanctions; 103 required a legitimate 
Government to notify the relevant Sanctions Committee of imports made by it in accordance 
prevent military training and the sale or supply of weapons to militia groups or former Rwandan 
government forces, and to take the steps necessary to ensure the effective implementation of 
the arms embargo, including by creating all necessary national mechanisms for 
implementation). 
In connection with the sanctions regime against Liberia (in the second instance), see: 
S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 4 (demanding that all States in the region take 
action to prevent armed individuals and groups from using their territory to launch attacks 
upon neighbouring countries). The Council reiterated that demand in: SIRES/1408 (6 May 
2002), operative paragraph 4; S/RES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 9. 
101 	In connection with the sanctions regime against Liberia (in the second instance), see: 
SIRES/l408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 4 (demanding that all States in the region cease 
providing military support to armed groups in neighbouring countries). The Council reiterated 
that demand in SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 9. Also in connection with the 
sanctions regime against Liberia (in the second instance), see: SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), 
operative paragraph 16 (urging all diamond exporting countries in West Africa to establish 
Certificate of Origin regimes for the trade in rough diamonds); S/RES/1478 (6 May 2003), 
operative paragraphs 4 (calling upon all States in the region, and in particular Liberia, to 
participate actively in all regional peace initiatives, particularly those of ECOWAS, the 
International Contact Group, the Mano River Union and the Rabat Process), 22 (calling upon 
States of the subregion to strengthen the measures they had taken to combat the spread of 
small arms and light weapons and mercenary activities and to improve the effectiveness of the 
ECOWAS Moratorium). 
102 In connection with the sanctions regime against Liberia (in the second instance), see: 
SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 30 (calling on the Member States of ECO WAS 
to cooperate fully with the Panel of Experts on Liberia). 
103 	In connection with the UNITA sanctions regime, see: S/RES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative 
paragraphs 14 (calling upon the Government of Angola to implement additional internal and 
inspection procedures with respect to the distribution of petroleum and petroleum products, 
for the purpose of enhancing the effectiveness of the sanctions, and inviting the Angolan 
Government to inform the 864 Committee of steps taken in that regard). 
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with permitted exemptions from sanctions;'" and requested a legitimate Government to 
ensure that an effective certificate-of-origin regime for trade in diamonds was in operation in 
its territories, as well as to inform the relevant Sanctions Committee once such a regime was 
fully in operation.'" 
vi. States alleged to have been violating sanctions 
In connection with the Southern Rhodesian sanctions regime, the Council addressed 
particular requests to the United States, urging it to cooperate fully in the effective 
implementation of the sanctions,'" considering that its decision to allow entry into its 
territories of Ian Smith and other members of the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia was in 
contravention of the sanctions and thus of obligations under Article 25 of the Charter, w7 and 
calling upon it to observe the sanctions scrupulously. 108 
vii. States playing a role connected with the objectives of a sanctions regime 
In connection with the Libya sanctions regime, the Council called upon the 
Governments of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to take the necessary steps to 
implement the initiative for the trial of two persons charged with the bombing of Pan Am 
104 	In connection with the Rwanda sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1011 (16 August 1995), operative 
paragraph 11 (requiring the Government of Rwanda to mark and register and notify the 
Committee of all imports made by it of arms and related materiel). 
105 	In connection with the Sierra Leone sanctions regime, see: S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative 
paragraphs 2 (requesting the Government of Sierra Leone to ensure that an effective certificate-
of-origin regime for trade in diamonds was in operation in Sierra Leone), 4 (requesting the 
Government of Sierra Leone to notify the 1132 Committee once an effective certificate-of-origin 
regime for trade in diamonds was fully in operation). 
106 In connection with the sanctions regime 
September 1972), operative paragraph 3. 
107 In connection with the sanctions regime 
October 1978), operative paragraph 2. 
108 In connection with the sanctions regime 
October 1978), operative paragraph 3. 
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flight 103 before a Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands,m9 required Libya to ensure the 
appearance of the two accused and to ensure that any evidence or witnesses were made 
available at the court, 110 and required the Netherlands, upon the arrival of the two accused, 
to detain them pending their transfer for the purpose of the trial." 
viii. States engaging in relations that are exempt from sanctions 
In connection with the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia-Montenegro), the Council requested States from which flights or ferry services were 
permitted to travel to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) to report to 
the 724 Committee on the controls adopted by them to ensure that the sanctions regime was 
not violated.' 12 
ix. States engaging in a particular type of trade activity 
In connection with the UNITA sanctions regime, the Council called upon Belgium to 
continue to cooperate with the 864 Committee to devise practical measures to limit access 
by UNITA to the legitimate diamond market, whilst also calling upon other States hosting 
diamond markets and States closely involved with the diamond industry to cooperate in the 
same manner with the 864 Committee. 113 The Council also called upon "relevant States" to 
cooperate with the diamond industry to develop and implement more effective arrangements 
109 	In connection with the Libya sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1192 (27 August 1998), operative 
paragraph 3. 
lio 	In connection with the Libya sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1192 (27 August 1998), operative 
paragraph 4. 
III 	In connection with the Libya sanctions regime, see: S/RES/1192 (27 August 1998), operative 
paragraph 7. 
112 In connection with the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro), see: S/RES/988 (21 April 1995), operative paragraph 4. 
113 In connection with the UNITA sanctions regime, see: SIRES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative 
paragraph 17. 
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to ensure that members of the diamond industry worldwide abided by the diamond 
sanctions, and to inform the 864 Committee of progress in that regard. 114 
10.2.3 Regional organizations 
The Security Council has called upon regional organizations to play a role in the 
implementation, enforcement or monitoring of sanctions in respect of the sanctions regimes 
against the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro), the Bosnian Serbs, Haiti and Liberia (in the second instance). 115 
In the case of the sanctions regimes against the former Yugoslavia, the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) and the Bosnian Serbs, a number of regional 
arrangements or agencies played a part in the implement, monitoring and enforcement of 
sanctions." 6 In November 1992, the Council invoked Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter 
in calling upon States, acting nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements, to use 
such measures as necessary to halt outward and inward maritime shipping in order to inspect 
and verify that cargo did not violate the arms embargo against the former Yugoslavia and the 
sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro)." 7 In April 
1993, when the Council strengthened the sanctions against the Federal Republic of 
114 	In connection with the UNITA sanctions regime, see: S/RES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative 
paragraph 19. 
115 	Although the Council welcomed the efforts being undertaken by the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) and its Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to bring 
about peace in Liberia at the time that the first sanctions regime against Liberia was in place, it 
did not request either ECOWAS or ECOMOG to play a specific role in relation to the 
implementation, monitoring or enforcement of the sanctions. 
116 	For good summaries of the activities undertaken by regional organizations and other regional 
entities to implement and enforce the sanctions, see: S/1996/946 (15 November 1996), annex: 
Final Report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 
(1991) concerning Yugoslavia, paragraph 79; S/1996/776 (24 September 1996), annex: Report 
of the Copenhagen Round Table on United Nations Sanctions in the Case of the Former 
Yugoslavia, paragraphs 25-60. 
117 	SIRES/787 (16 November 1992), operative paragraph 12. 
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Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) and imposed sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs, it 
reaffirmed that the authority to States to take such action, acting nationally or through 
regional agencies or arrangements, applied also to action to enforce the strengthened 
sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) and the 
sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs.' 18 
Acting under that delegated authority of the Council, a number of organizations took 
action to implement, monitor or enforce the sanctions regimes against the former Yugoslavia, 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) and the Bosnian Serbs. Among 
those organizations were: the European Community and its successor the European Union 
(the EC/EU); n9 the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its successor 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (the CSCE/OSCE);120 the 
Western European Union (WEU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 121 
118 	SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 29. 
119 	The EC/EU played a major role in the implementation of sanctions by establishing a number of 
entities to facilitate such implementation. The details relating to these entities appear later in 
this paragraph and accompanying footnotes. 
120 	Like the EC/EU, the CSCE/OSCE also played a major role in the implementation of sanctions by 
establishing a number of entities to facilitate such implementation. The details relating to these 
entities also appear later in this paragraph and accompanying footnotes. 
121 	The WEU and NATO patrolled the Adriatic Sea froth July 1992 to June 1993 in order to ensure 
compliance by maritime traffic with the resolutions of the Security Council. From June 1993 the 
two organizations combined their efforts to form an operation entitled "Sharp Guard". By the 
time WEU and NATO concluded their activities to enforce the sanctions, in June 1996, the 
organizations had challenged over 70,000 vessels and inspected almost 6,000 at sea. For further 
details relating to these activities of the WEU and NATO, see: Final Report of the 724 
Committee, above note 116, paragraph 79(b); Report of the Copenhagen Round Table, above 
note 116, paragraphs 48-50. For discussion of the extent to which WEU and NATO action in 
this regard could be viewed as having been authorized by the Security Council prior to the 
adoption of resolution 787 (1992) in November 1992, see the case-study on the former 
Yugoslavia sanctions regime in the Appendices. 
In addition to its activities in the Adriatic Sea, the WEU also established a "Danube Mission", 
which commenced operations in June 1993, assisting Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania in their 
efforts to prevent violations of sanctions and ensure that shipping on the Danube was in 
accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council. For further details relating to the 
activities of the WEU Danube Mission, see: Final Report of the 724 Committee, above note 
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A number of those regional organizations also created subsidiary entities to facilitate 
resolution of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia in general or the implementation of 
sanctions in particular. The major entity established to address the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia in general was the Conference on Yugoslavia (CY), which subsequently became 
the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY). 122 Among the entities 
established with particular responsibilities for facilitating the implementation of sanctions 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) were: the 
EC/EU/CSCE/OSCE Sanctions Assistance Missions (SAMs); 123 the EC/EU/CSCE/OSCE 
Sanctions Coordinator, I24 and the European Commission/CSCE/OSCE Sanctions 
116, paragraph 79(c); Report of the Copenhagen Round Table, above note 116, paragraphs 41- 
42. 
122 The CY was established by the EC. In July 1992 the Security Council invited the EC, in 
cooperation with the Secretary-General, to examine the possibility of broadening the CY to 
provide it with "new momentum" in the search for a resolution to the conflict: S/24346 (24 July 
1992): Presidential Statement of 24 July 1992. As a result, the ICFY was convened in London 
from 26 to 28 August 1992. The Conference adopted a Statement of Principles for a negotiated 
settlement of the problems of the former Yugoslavia. Subsequently, the ICFY was a key actor in 
facilitating the conclusion of the Vance-Owen peace plan and the Dayton Peace Agreement. 
For a summary of the CY/ICFY process, see Report of the Copenhagen Round Table, above 
note 116, paragraphs 25-27. 
123 The SAMs consisted largely of customs officers, who were deployed in States neighbouring 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) to help prevent violation of the 
sanctions. In April 1993, when it first established the sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs, the 
Council welcomed the role of the SAMs in support of the implementation of the sanctions and 
invited it to work in close cooperation with the 724 Committee: S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), 
operative paragraph 20. In September 1994, when it strengthened the sanctions, the Council 
further acknowledged the role being played by the SAMs in the implementation of the 
sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs by requiring States to prevent shipments of commodities 
and products destined for those areas under the control of Bosnian Serb forces from violating 
the sanctions by ensuring that they were physically inspected by the Sanctions Assistance 
Missions or by competent national authorities to verify and seal their contents: S/RES/942 (23 
September 1994), operative paragraph 16. For further details relating to the work of the SAMs, 
see: Final Report of the 724 Committee, above note 116, paragraph 79(a); Report of the 
Copenhagen Round Table, above note 116, paragraphs 32-35. 
124 	The position of the Sanctions Coordinator was established by the EC and the then CSCE in 
February 1993. The Sanctions Coordinator's mandate included: assessing sanctions 
implementation, as well as the effects of the sanctions; advising States on customs and legal 
matters; bringing violations to the attention of the CSCE/OSCE, the 724 Committee and 
concerned Governments; and consulting with Governments on the investigation and 
prosecution of alleged violations of the sanctions: S/25272 (10 February 1993) [containing the 
full mandate of the Sanctions Coordinator]. The Security Council welcomed the appointment of 
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Assistance Missions Communications Centre (SAMCOMM). 125 The ICFY also established 
a Mission charged with responsibility for monitoring the extent to which the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) was complying with its obligation to close its 
border with Bosnia and Herzegovina.' 26 
When the Security Council suspended the sanctions against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), it paid tribute to neighbouring States, the mission of the 
ICFY, the EU/OSCE Sanctions Coordinator, SAMCOMM, the SAMs, the WEU 
Operation on the Danube and the NATO/WEU Sharp Guard Operation on the Adriatic 
Sea, for their "significant contribution to the achievement of a negotiated peace. 127 In its 
Final Report, the 724 Committee also noted that an important factor in the effectiveness of 
the sanctions regimes against the former Yugoslavia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro) and the Bosnian Serbs, had been the role played by regional 
the Sanctions Coordinator and invited him to work in close cooperation with the 724 Committee 
in S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 20. For summaries of the Sanctions 
Coordinator's activities, see: Final Report of the 724 Committee, above note 116, paragraph 
79(a); Report of the Copenhagen Round Table, above note 116, paragraphs 36-38. 
125 SAMCOMM was established by the European Commission when it created the SAMs, in order 
to serve as a focal point for the exchange of information between the SAMs and the authorities 
of their host States. For summaries of SAMCOMM's activities, see: Final Report of the 724 
Committee, above note 116, paragraph 79(a); Report of the Copenhagen Round Table, above 
note 116, paragraphs 33-35. 
126 	See, e.g., 5/1994/1074 (19 September 1994), 1075 (19 September 1994) and 1076 (20 September 
1994). The idea of establishing an observer mission along the border between the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) and Bosnia and Herzegovina had been raised 
sometime earlier in a letter dated 7 July 1993 from the President of the Security Council to the 
Secretary-General, in which the President of the Security Council invited the Secretary-General 
to contact Member States in order to establish whether they were prepared, individually or 
through regional organizations or arrangements to make personnel available to act as 
observers along the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina: 8/26049 (7 July 1993): Letter dated 7 
July 1993 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General. 
127 	SIRES/1022 (22 November 1995), operative paragraph 9. 
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organizations in assisting national authorities and the Committee itself to monitor and enforce 
the sanctions. 128 
In the case of the sanctions regime against Somalia, the Council called upon regional 
organizations, and in particular the African Union (AU) and the League of Arab States 
(LAS), to assist the Somali parties and States in the region to implement the arms embargo 
fully. 129 
In connection with the Haiti sanctions regime, in October 1993 the Security Council 
invoked both Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, 13° and called 
upon Member States, acting nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements, and 
cooperating with the legitimate Government of Haiti, to use such measures as necessary 
under its authority to ensure the strict implementation of the sanctions, including halting 
inbound maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify that their cargoes did not violate the 
sanctions.' 31 In May 1994 the Council strengthened that authorisation by calling upon those 
same actors to use such measures as necessary to ensure the strict implementation of the 
sanctions and in particular to halt outward as well as inward maritime shipping in order to 
inspect and verify their cargoes and destination to ensure that they were not in violation of 
the sanctions. 132 
In connection with the sanctions regime against Liberia (in the second instance), the 
Security Council has invited ECOWAS to report regularly to the 1343 Committee on 
128 Final Report of the 724 Committee, above note 116, paragraph 79. 
129 S/RES/1474 (8 April 2003), operative paragraph 11. 
130 S/RES1875 (16 October 1993), preambular paragraph 8. 
131 SIRES/875 (16 October 1993), operative paragraph 1. 
132 SIRES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 10. 
317 
JO. Sanctions monitoring and enforcement: bestowing responsibility upon other international actors 
activities taken by its members to implement the sanctions 133 and to implement the 
ECOWAS Moratorium on small arms and light weapons. 134 The Council has also called 
upon States of the subregion to improve the effectiveness of the ECO WAS Moratorium, 135 
and called on the Member States of ECO WAS to cooperate fully with the Panel of Experts 
on Liberia.' 36 
133 	SIRES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 12; S/RES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative 
paragraph 21. 
134 	S/RES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 21. 
135 	SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 22. 
136 	SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 30. 
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PART IV: STRENGTHENING THE RULE OF LAW: A 
CONSTRUCTIVE CRITIQUE OF U.N. SANCTIONS 
Part IV applies the theoretical framework developed in Part I to the U.N. sanctions 
system described in Parts II and III. Chapter 11 scrutinises the relationship between the 
U.N. sanctions system and the rule of law, critically evaluating the extent to which sanctions 
have strengthened the rule of law. It concludes that the U.N. sanctions system exhibits 
shortcomings in respect of each of the key elements of the rule of law and outlines 
recommendations designed to address those shortcomings. Chapter 12 contains concluding 
remarks and recapitulates the key policy proposals designed to ensure that U.N. sanctions 
respect, promote and reinforce the rule of law. 
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war? A critical analysis of U.N. sanctions 
This Chapter operationalises the theoretical framework constructed earlier, 
measuring the U.N. sanctions system's performance against the model of the rule of law 
developed in Chapter 2. Analysis is divided into five sections, each of which is devoted to 
one of the basic elements of that model: transparency, consistency, equality, due process 
and proportionality. Within each section, discussion critically evaluates the Council's track-
record, before proposing how the Council's practice might be improved so that it better 
strengthens the overall rule of law. 
11.1 Behind closed doors: U.N. sanctions and the problem of 
transparency 
As noted in Chapter 2, the principle of transparency requires that in the exercise of 
power, decision-making should be open and transparent. Thus the reasoning leading to a 
particular decision should be clear to those affected by the ultimate decision, as well as to 
the broader public. Moreover, it should be clear that the relevant power is being exercised 
in accordance with legitimate authority. In the context of U.N. sanctions, transparency 
requires that the Security Council's decision-making process is open and transparent. 
Ideally, the Council's deliberations leading to the adoption of sanctions-related decisions 
should be a matter of public record and it should be clear from the decisions themselves that 
they are taken in accordance with legitimate authority. 
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The Council's track-record in this area has been less than impressive. Despite some 
laudable initiatives to improve transparency,' key consultations leading to the adoption of 
sanctions-related decisions too often occur behind closed doors. Moreover, the decisions 
themselves rarely provide a transparent picture of the justification for a particular decision or 
a clear picture of its objectives. The discussion below is divided into four parts. The first part 
explores the question of transparency in the Security Council's decision-making process. 
The second part explores the question of transparency in the Council's decisions 
themselves. The third part considers the transparency of the decision-making process in the 
Council's Sanctions Committees. Finally, the fourth part provides suggestions for improving 
the transparency of the Council's decision-making process. 
11.1.1 Transparency in the Security Council's decision-making process 
In the Security Council's early days it was not uncommon for delegates to engage in 
lengthy debates on the pros and cons of a proposed decision. 2 The official records of the 
Council's early formal meetings reveal many an extended discussion about draft resolutions, 
with deliberations sometimes ranging over multiple meetings as diplomats considered 
competing proposals for provisions within a particular draft resolution. Draft resolutions 
were sometimes debated so extensively that they would go through numerous incarnations 
before reaching their final form. While informal, behind the scenes negotiations would likely 
have been taking place at the same time, the substance of which was inaccessible to the 
See: Hulton, Susan C., 'Council Working Methods and Procedure', in Malone, David M. (ed.), 
The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21' Century (2004) Lynne Rienner, 
Boulder, CO, 237-51, especially 245-7. 
For examples of such debates, see: Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 
Supplement for 1946-51, Chapter VIII. 
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public, it is illuminating to read the considered arguments put forth by various delegations in 
relation to proposed Council action. 
At a certain point in time, it appears that Security Council members began to feel 
constrained by the responsibility of having to negotiate in the public eye. Increasingly, 
substantive discussions began to occur in private. There were good reasons for this 
development, as in theory diplomats would be at greater leisure to discuss the political 
motivations underpinning their positions and thus to debate more honestly and openly how to 
achieve a consensus or compromise approach. In time this informal approach to decision-
making was institutionalised, as the Security Council introduced the practice of holding 
"informal consultations". In 1978 a purpose-built room was constructed to house such 
consultations.3 
Informal consultations have since become an integral part of Security Council life, 
with the bulk of the Council's business conducted in the consultations room rather than in the 
formal Security Council chamber. The consultations have remained a private affair, with no 
official records kept and attendance tightly controlled. Despite the impressive ability of 
U.N.-accredited journalists to report on developments rumoured to have happened in 
consultations, such discussions unfold beyond the public eye. Since the introduction of 
consultations, much of the contentious discussion relating to draft resolutions, which might 
otherwise have featured in the Council's formal meetings, has instead taken place behind 
closed doors. A comparison of the records of the Council's early formal meetings and those 
in recent years reveals that the practice of publicly debating the pros and cons of draft 
Bailey, Sydney D. & Daws, Sam, The Procedure of the UN Security Council (3 1d ed. 1998) 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 62. 
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resolutions and their provisions has become virtually extinct. Instead, draft resolutions are 
rarely tabled for discussion in formal meetings until the members of the Council are prepared 
to vote on them, thus meaning that the outcome of the voting is practically pre-determined. 
There may be a brief recapitulation of national positions with respect to the draft resolution 
about to be put to the vote, but the public records of contemporary Council meetings 
provide precious little evidence to indicate how the Council's decision-making process 
unfolds. The Council sometimes adopts decisions with no discussion at all, thus leaving no 
public record of the discussions leading to or the reasoning underlying those decisions. The 
Council's recent sanctions practice illustrates this point strikingly, as its decisions establishing 
the four most recent sanctions regimes were each adopted without any statement being 
made by any Council members. 4 
This is not to say that the Security Council does not discuss important issues 
publicly. A number of thematic issues have been inscribed on the Council's agenda, often at 
the prerogative of the President of the Security Council. Thematic debates have thus been 
held on issues related to the Security Council's work, such as: children and armed conflict; 5 
women, peace and security; 6 Africa's food crisis as a threat to peace and security; 7 and 
See: S/PV.4144 (17 May 2000) (when the Council adopted resolution 1298 (2000), imposing 
sanctions against Ethiopia and Eritrea, without any discussion at all); S/PV.4287 (7 March 2001) 
(when the Council established the second Liberia sanctions regime, again without any 
discussion); S/PV.4797 (28 July 2003) (when the Council established the DRC sanctions regime, 
with only the Secretary-General making a statement); S/PV.4890 (22 December 2003) (when the 
Council established the third Liberia sanctions regime, again without any discussion). 
See: S/PV.3896 (29 June 1998); S/PV.3897 (29 June 1998); S/PV.4037 (25 August 1999); 
S/PV.4167 (26 July 2000); S/PV.4185 (11 August 2000); S/PV.4422 (20 November 2001); 
S/PV.4423 (20 November 2001); S/PV.4528 (7 May 2002); S/PV.4684 (14 January 2003); 
S/PV.4695 (30 January 2003). 
See: S/PV.4208 (24 October 2000); S/PV.4213 (31 October 2000); S/PV.4402 (31 October 2001); 
S/PV.4635 (28 October 2002); S/PV.4641 (31 October 2002). 
See: S/PV.4652 (3 December 2002); S/PV.4736 (7 April 2003). 
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justice and the rule of law.' Such discussions have taken place in public meetings of the 
Council, often with the broad participation of the wider U.N. membership. Moreover, under 
Article 35 of the Charter and rule 3 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security 
Council, U.N. Member States can request that the Security Council be convened to discuss 
an urgent matter threatening international peace and security. 9 Such meetings usually take 
place in public too, generally with the participation of the broader U.N. membership.' ° 
These discussions on thematic agenda items and pressing events relating to the 
maintenance of peace and security provide a good opportunity to ascertain the views of the 
members of he Security Council, as well as those of the wider U.N. membership. By 
scrutinising the records of these meetings, useful insights can be gained into how the 
Council's members and the U.N.'s members at large view the Council's track-record in 
fulfilling its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
Nevertheless, frank and insightful public debate with respect to thematic agenda items and 
pressing issues of international peace and security can only go so far towards offsetting the 
transparency deficit caused by the absence of a meaningful public record of much of the 
Council's decision-making process. Until the Security Council's discussions on the potential 
implications of proposed decisions become a matter of public record, the Council will be 
vulnerable to the allegation that its decision-making process lacks transparency. 
8 
	
See: S/PV.4833 (24 September 2003); S/PV.4835 (30 September 2003). 
9 
	
Article 35, paragraph 1 reads: "Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or 
any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or 
of the Cbneral Assembly." Rule 3 of the Security Council's provisional rules of procedure 
reads: "The President shall call a meeting of the Security Council if a dispute or situation is 
brought to the attention of the Security Council under Article 35 ... of the Charter ...". 
io 	For a recent example of a meeting called in response to the request of a State not a member of 
the Security Council, see S/PV.4972 (19 May 2004). For the request itself, which was made by 
Yemen in connection with the Palestinian Question, see: S/2004/393 (17 May 2004). 
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It is sometimes necessary for the Security Council to conduct business in private. In 
certain situations the ability to discuss national positions franldy and honestly behind closed 
doors can facilitate a compromise or consensus outcome. In addition, the ability to function 
in private and at the ambassadorial or expert level can facilitate efficiency, thus making an 
increasingly burdened agenda more manageable." Nevertheless, where possible the 
Security Council should seek to ensure that the practice of shielding discussions from the 
public eye is the exception rather than the norm. Compromise and consensus are important, 
but they should not be achieved at the expense of transparency. An overburdened Security 
Council agenda requires creative management, but it is no justification for failing to provide 
full transparency. There is no intrinsic reason why the majority of the Council's proceedings 
should not be a matter of public record. Respecting the principle of transparency does not 
require the full participation of all U.N. Member States in the Security Council decision-
making process. However, as most Council decisions have profound and far-reaching 
consequences for U.N. Member States, due to the manner in which those States are legally 
bound under Article 25 of the Charter to observe such decisions, the broader U.N. 
membership should be entitled to expect that most of the Council's deliberations will either 
take place in open session or subsequently become a matter of public record. 
II 	Potential Security Council decisions are often threshed out at the level of experts rather than at 
the level of Ambassadors. The informal process for developing draft resolutions often 
proceeds through multiple stages of fluid negotiation. A draft is generally initiated by a 
sponsor or group of sponsors, before being opened up to discussion by the experts of all 
members of the Council. Once discussed at the expert level, the draft will be taken up by the 
Security Council itself during informal consultations. Finally, when the draft's sponsor is ready 
to put the draft to the vote, a formal meeting of the Council is called and a vote held. 
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11.1.2 Transparency in Security Council decisions 
The less than impressive transparency of the Security Council's decision-making 
process makes it all the more important that the decisions themselves should provide a clear 
roadmap of their underlying justification, rationale and objectives. In the context of U.N. 
sanctions, it should be evident from the Council's sanctions-related decisions that the 
Council is exercising its sanctions powers in accordance with legitimate authority. In order to 
demonstrate that its sanctions powers are being exercised in accordance with legitimate 
authority, as prescribed in the United Nations Charter, in its sanctions-related decisions the 
Council should make a determination under Article 39 of the Charter of the existence or 
continuance of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. It should also 
state clearly that it is acting upon its sanctions powers, as provided in Article 41 of the 
Charter, in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. Moreover, the 
Council should illustrate its commitment to acting faithfully in accordance with its legitimate 
powers by outlining clear, attainable and verifiable sanctions objectives, the achievement of 
which will resolve the threat, breach or act and thus maintain or restore peace and security. 
i. 	Transparency and the determination of threats to the peace 
As noted in Chapter 6, although the Security Council has generally determined the 
existence of a breach of or threat to the peace before applying sanctions, on two occasions 
it has applied sanctions without making the requisite determination of a threat to or breach of 
the peace or act of aggression: 2 While it is arguable that the Council's application of 
sanctions under Chapter VII in those instances suggested an implicit determination of a 
threat to the peace, the fact that no explicit determination was made casts doubt upon the 
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transparency of the Council's decision-making in those particular instances. Another 
troublesome aspect of the Council's practice with respect to determining the existence of 
threats to the peace is that the Council has not always stated clearly and precisely the 
character of the threat in a given situation. As noted in Chapter 6, the Council usually paints 
a background picture of a situation in its resolution's preambular paragraphs, before simply 
determining that a threat to the peace exists. Thus it is left to the reader to deduce from the 
various circumstances noted in the preambular paragraphs what might be said to constitute 
the requisite threat. This approach is particularly problematic from the perspective of 
transparency, as in theory it should be possible to identify from the Council's Etnctions-
related decisions which of the various background circumstances were critical in leading the 
Council to determine the existence of a threat. Once it is clear precisely where the threat lies, 
it should be apparent how the existing circumstances must change in order to eradicate the 
threat and maintain or restore international peace and security. 
But perhaps the most problematic aspect of the Council's practice from the point of 
view of transparency is the fact that the wide discretion accorded to the Council in 
determining the existence of threats to the peace renders the concept susceptible to multiple 
interpretations, increasing the potential for abuse. On occasion, the argument has been made 
that the Council's interpretation of a threat to the peace has served as a convenient pretext 
to take coercive action against an actor that serves primarily the self-serving political agenda 
of certain powerful members of the Council rather than constituting a sincere attempt to 
combat a genuine threat to international peace and security. The most prominent case in 
12' 
	
See Chapter 6, section 6.1.1. 
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point is that of the determination of a threat to the peace in the case of the sanctions regime 
imposed against Libya. 
As noted in Chapter 6, in the Libyan instance the Council affirmed that terrorism 
was a threat to international peace and security and determined that Libya's failure to 
cooperate adequately with investigations into the Pan Am and UTA terrorist bombings, 
which had implicated the involvement of Libyan officials, constituted a threat to the peace. I3 
In early 1992, the Security Council's determination that terrorism threatened the peace 
broke new ground. Nevertheless, the fact that such a determination was not disputed in the 
Council's discussions on Libya suggests both that it was not controversial and that the time 
was ripe for the Council to break such new ground." In that respect, the Council appeared 
to be acting transparently in accordance with its primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security by asserting that it could use its Chapter VII powers to 
address the threat of terrorism. More controversial, however, was the Council's 
characterisation that Libya's failure to cooperate fully with efforts to investigate terrorist acts 
amounted to a threat to the peace. 
On one hand, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and other States 
supporting the application of sanctions against Libya, stressed that terrorism constituted a 
threat to international peace and security and argued that the Council had a responsibility to 
13 	See Chapter 6, section 6.1.2. 
14 	For statements to the effect that terrorism constituted a threat to the peace made by countries 
advocating the application of sanctions against Libya, see note 15, below. Among the 
countries which did not subscribe to the view that the Council should employ Chapter VII 
action against Libya, there was nevertheless strong condemnation of terrorism. See, e.g.: 
S/PV.3033 (21 January 1992): statement by Libya, pp. 18-20; S/PV.3063 (31 March 1992), 
statements by: Libya, p. 12; Jordan, p. 28; Mauritania, p. 31 (on behalf of the States members of 
the Arab Maghreb Union — Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia); Iraq, p. 37; 
Uganda, pp. 39-40; Mr. Ansay, representative of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, p. 
42; Cape Verde, p.45; Zimbabwe, pp. 49-50; India, p. 56; and China, p. 59. 
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act against such a threat." They contended that, in order to deter States from sponsoring 
future acts of international terrorism, the Council must act firmly against any State whose 
officials were implicated in acts of international terrorism." The Council had provided Libya 
with an opportunity to cooperate with efforts to bring to justice those responsible for the 
terrorist bombings of the Pan Am and UTA flights, but Libya had failed to take advantage of 
that opportunity. 17 In that context, Libya's failure to comply fully with the Council's requests 
itself amounted to a threat to the peace, thus warranting the application of sanctions under 
Chapter VII of the Charter." This interpretation of the situation was essentially the one that 
carried the day, as illustrated by the Council's adoption of resolution 748 (1992), reflecting 
that position. 
By contrast, Libya and other countries advocating against Chapter VII action 
portrayed events in a completely different light. These countries, while acknowledging that 
terrorism posed a threat to international peace and security, I9 nevertheless argued that in the 
Libyan case there was no immediate threat justifying action under Chapter VII. Pointing to 
observations made by Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali, to the effect that there had 
15 	S/PV.3063 (31 March 1992), statements by: Ecuador, p. 48; the United Kingdom, p. 72; France, 
p. 73; Hungary, p. 76; Austria, p. 77; the Russian Federation, pp. 79-80; Belgium, p. 81; and 
Venezuela, p. 82. 
16 	S/PV.3063 (31 March 1992): the United Kingdom, p. 72 ("If terrorists gain the upper hand, the 
rule of law and international peace and security are directly endangered. By adopting this 
resolution the Security Council has acted in full conformity with its primary responsibility for 
the maintenance of international peace and security"). 
17 	S/PV.3063 (31 March 1992): the United Kingdom, p. 69 ("Regrettably, it now seems clear — from 
the reports of the Secretary-General, from the outcome of the Arab Ministers' missbn and from 
recent statements by the Libyan authorities — that, without further action by this Council, 
Libya has no intention of complying with resolution 731 (1992)"); Hungary, p. 76 ("we are 
compelled to note that, although over two months have passed since the adoption of Security 
Council resolution 731 (1992), Libya has yet to comply with its provisions"). 
18 S/PV.3063 (31 March 1992): the United States, p. 66 (observing that "the evidence revealing 
Libya's involvement in these acts of terrorism indicates a serious breach of international peace 
and security", thus fully justifying the adoption of Chapter VII measures). 
19 	See note 14, above. 
330 
11. Strengthening the rule of law or serving as a tool of war? A critical analysis of U.N. sanctions 
been an evolution in Libya's approach to the investigations, 20 they argued that Libya had 
taken significant steps to comply with the Council's requests to cooperate with investigations 
and to renounce terrorism. 21 Moreover, some of them maintained that the situation under 
consideration was essentially a legal dispute, consisting of a disagreement between Libya, on 
the one hand, and France, the United Kingdom and the United States, on the other, 
regarding how to proceed with investigations into the bombings and how to bring those 
responsible for the bombings to justice. 22 As the dispute was legal in nature, it should be 
resolved via legal means. The Security Council's proper role should therefore be to 
encourage the dispute's resolution via peaceful means under Chapter VI of the United 
Nations Charter, and in particular under Articles 33 and 36. 23 Libya had demonstrated its 
20 	The Secretary-General's comments were outlined in: S/23672 (3 March 1992): Report of the 
Secretary-General submitted pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 731 
(1992), paragraph 6 (noting that there had been "a certain evolution" in Libya's position and 
observing that the Council might wish to consider that fact in deciding its future course of 
action). For statements picking up on the Secretary-General's observation, see S/PV.3063 (31 
March 1992): Libya, pp. 17-18; Mauritania, p. 32; Iraq, p. 37; Zimbabwe, p. 51; India, pp. 56-7. 
21 	The representative of Libya outlined at length the steps which, in Libya's view, had 
demonstrated its cooperation with the investigations and the Council's requests made in 
resolution 731 (1992). See: S/PV.3033 (21 January 1992), pp. 8-11; S/PV.3063 (31 March 1992), 
pp. 5-6, 9-12. For other statements also arguing that Libya had endeavoured to comply with the 
Council's requests, see: S/PV.3063 (31 March 1992): Mauritania, p. 32; and Mr. Ansay, 
representative of the OIC, p. 43. 
22 S/PV.3033 (21 January 1992): Libya, p. 12 (arguing that the matter was "a legal issue" 
concerning a conflict of jurisdiction — "a dispute over the legal determination to be made in 
connection with a request for extradition"); S/PV.3063 (31 March 1992): Libya, pp. 6-7, 18-20; 
Mauritania, p. 32 (observing that the dispute was "basically juridical in nature"). 
23 	S/PV.3063 (31 March 1992): Libya, pp. 7, 18; Jordan, pp. 26-7; Morocco, p. 64. 
Article 33 of the Charter reads as follows: 
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance 
of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, 
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies 
or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. 
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their 
dispute by such means. 
Article 36 of the Charter reads as follows: 
I. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 
or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of 
adjustment. 
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willingness to resolve the dispute peacefully by referring it to the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ), in accordance with Article 14 of the 1971 Montreal Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation. 24 Thus, as the potential 
still existed to resolve the dispute peacefully, it was premature for the Council to proceed to 
take Chapter VII action. 25 Some countries warned against hasty action that might aggravate 
the situation. 26 Libya itself went so far as to imply that if there was a threat to the peace, then 
it was posed by those States that were pressing for Chapter VII action. 27 
The Libyan case illusti 	 tes how the Council's motives for determining a threat to the 
peace can easily be called into question. This can be attributed partly to the vague and 
2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of 
the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties. 
3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into 
consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the 
International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the 
Court. 
24 S/PV.3063 (31 March 1992): Libya, p. 13; Mauritania, p. 32; Iraq, p.37; Uganda, pp. 39-40; Cape 
Verde, p. 46. Article 14 of the Montreal Convention reads as follows: "Any dispute between 
two or more Contracting States concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention 
which cannot be settled through negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted 
to arbitration. If within six months from the date of the request for arbitration the Parties are 
unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those Parties may refer the 
dispute to the ICJ by request in conformity with the Statute of the Court". 
25 S/PV.3063 (31 March 1992): Jordan, pp. 29-30; Iraq, pp. 34-5; Cape Verde, pp. 46-7; Zimbabwe, 
p. 52; India, pp. 57-8; Morocco, p. 64. 
26 S/PV.3063 (31 March 1992): Mr. Ansay, representative of the OIC, p. 44 (warning that the 
imposition of sanctions would "unfortunately and uselessly increase tension among members 
of the international community"); Zimbabwe, p. 53 ("By taking the Chapter VII route while this 
case is still pending before the world Court, the Security Council is risking a major institutional 
crisis. Such a crisis, which is clearly avoidable, would not only undermine the prestige, 
credibility and integrity of the entire Organization but would also sap international confidence 
in the Security Council's capacity to execute, in a judicious and objective manner, its mandate 
as provided for in the Charter"); China, p. 61 (noting that in principle China did not support the 
Council imposing sanctions against Libya, because they would complicate the issue, 
aggravating regional tension and posing serious economic consequences for the countries in 
the region). 
27 S/PV.3033 (21 January 1992): Libya , p. 23 (arguing that it had never threatened any country 
and contending that it was in fact being threatened by "super-Powers"); S/PV.3063 (31 March 
1992): Libya, pp. 19-20 (arguing that it was being threatened and should invoke Chapter VII, 
not the United States, the United Kingdom or France, which had invoked that Chapter "merely 
because two people, who have yet to be proven guilty, have been indicted"). 
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general nature of the concept of a threat to the peace. In order to demonstrate that its 
actions are taken in accordance with legitimate authority, the Council should articulate 
clearly the precise conditions that amount to a threat to the peace in a given instance. In the 
Libyan case, the Council might have specified more precisely how the situation threatened 
the peace, thus compelling urgent coercive action against Libya. In the absence of a clear 
and transparent articulation of the requisite threat, questions will arise concerning the 
legitimacy of a Security Council decision to act under Chapter VII. The Libyan instance 
begs a number of such questions. Why was there such an urgent need to act when Libya did 
not appear to pose an immediate danger to other States or the international community? 
Given the Secretary-General's observation that there had been an evolution in Libya's 
cooperation, might the Council not have continued to pursue other avenues to elicit the 
cooperation it sought from Libya? Why did the Council not establish its own fact-finding 
team to verify the claims of the American, British and French investigating teams, before 
proceeding to employ coercive measures against a Member State? Why did the Council 
rush to impose Chapter VII measures rather than awaiting the outcome of the International 
Court of Justice's deliberations on the matter? 
The Council's failure to be completely transparent in determining a threat in the 
Libyan case raised doubts concerning its motives and undermined the contention made by 
those calling for Chapter VII measures that it was acting to reinforce the rule of law. 28 Thus 
28 	The representative of the United States argued that a firm response by the Council under 
Chapter VII was the surest guarantee that the Security Council, using its specific powers under 
the Charter, would preserve the rule of law and ensure the peaceful resolution of threats to 
international peace and security: S/PV.3063 (31 March 1992): p. 67. The representative of the 
United Kingdom argued that, if terrorists gained the upper hand, then the rule of law and 
international peace and security would be directly endangered. Thus by acting under Chapter 
VII to adopt resolution 748 (1992), the Council was acting in full conformity with its primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Moreover, Libya's 
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it unwittingly lent credibility to the claim that it was missing an opportunity to uphold the rule 
of law by failing to encourage the parties to the conflict to submit their dispute to resolution 
before the International Court of Justice. 29 While the need to deter future acts of terrorism is 
both genuine and pressing, that need must be carefully balanced against the potential damage 
that might be caused to the Council's credibility as the guardian of international peace and 
security if there is a perception that it has used its Chapter VII powers unnecessarily. In the 
Libyan case, it is hard to avoid the suspicion that, in the eyes of certain permanent members 
of the Security Council, the real threat to international peace and security lay in the 
possibility that the International Court of Justice might pass judgment on the matter in a way 
that would undermine the flexibility of the Security Council to act on the matter.3° By acting 
efforts to have the dispute referred to the ICJ effectively amounted to an attempt to subvert the 
rule of law by interfering with the Council's responsibility to maintain international peace and 
security: S/PV.3063 (31 March 1992): p. 72. The representative of France contended that, in the 
absence of any response from the Tripoli Government, the course chosen by France, the 
United Kingdom and the United States had been that based on the rule of law — namely to 
bring the dispute before the Security Council: S/PV.3063 (31 March 1992): p. 73. 
29 See, e.g., S/PV.3063 (31 March 1992), statements by: Libya, p. 22 (expressing the hope that the 
Council would ensure respect for the principles of the Charter and of international law, thus 
strengthening international peace and security and promoting justice and fairness); Zimbabwe, 
p. 53 (expressing the view that by taking the Chapter VII route while the case was still pending 
before the ICJ, the Council was risking a major institutional crisis which was avoidable and 
which would undermine the credibility of the United Nations, noting that it attached great 
importance to the rule of law in relations between States and believed that, as the body 
entrusted with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, 
the Security Council should attach due importance to international law, and concluding that 
the Council's deliberations could have benefited from the ICJ's pronouncement); India, p. 58 
(observing that the considered opinion of the ICJ on the legal aspects of the issues involved 
could only serve the interests of international law and peace, noting that a small delay would 
have thus merited positive consideration, and arguing that it should be feasible for those two 
principal organs of the United Nations to function in tandem so as to reinforce each other's 
efficacy and prestige in the cause of international peace and security). 
30 The statement by the representative of the United Kingdom appears to confirm this suspicion. 
See: S/PV.3063 (31 March 1992), pp. 68-9 ("[W]e believe that Libya's application, while 
purporting to enjoin action by the United Kingdom against Libya, is in fact directed at 
interfering with the exercise by the Security Council of its rightful prerogatives under the 
United Nations Charter. We consider that the Security Council is fully entitled to concern itself 
with issues of terrorism and the measures needed to address acts of terrorism in any particular 
case or to prevent it in the future. Any other view would undermine the primary responsibility 
for the maintenance of international peace and security conferred on the Council by Article 24 
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against Libya under Chapter VII, the Council was perhaps responding less to a genuine 
threat to peace and security than to a threat to its own discretion. 
Transparency and invoking the Charter basis for applying sanctions 
As noted in Chapter 6, the Security Council has routinely invoked Chapter VII 
when applying or modifying sanctions. 31 At the same time, it has rarely stipulated that it is 
acting under Article 41 of the Charter, which is the only specific basis within Chapter VII for 
the application of sanctions. 32 It is unclear why the Council has not invoked Article 41 on a 
more regular basis. In other situations, where for example the Council is seeking to exercise 
its powers to authorize the use of force in a manner that might not have been expressly 
envisaged by the U.N.'s founders, it is understandable that the Council might wish to locate 
the basis of such action in Chapter VII in general rather than in a specific Charter 
provision?' But with respect to decisions to apply or modify sanctions regimes, the 
of the Charter. It would thus seriously weaken the Council's ability to maintain peace and 
security in future circumstances which are unforeseen and unforeseeable"). 
31 See also Table B. 
32 	Explicit invocations of Article 41 have been few and far between, with the Council only 
referring to that provision as the basis for the application of sanctions on a handful of 
occasions. The Council did make rare explicit references to Article 41 in resolutions connected 
with the sanctions regimes against Southern Rhodesia and UNITA. In connection with the 
Southern Rhodesia sanctions regime, see: 51RE51232 (16 December 1966), preambular 
paragraph 4 ("Acting in accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter"); SIRES/253 (29 
May 1968), operative paragraph 9 (requesting all States Members of the United Nations or of 
the specialized agencies to take "all possible further action under Article 41 of the Charter" to 
deal with the situation in Southern Rhodesia); S/RES/277 (18 March 1970), operative 
paragraphs 9 (deciding to apply additional sanctions, "in accordance with Article 41 of the 
Charter") 11 (requesting all States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized 
agencies to take "all possible further action under Article 41 of the Charter" to deal with the 
situation in Southern Rhodesia); and S/RES/409 (27 May 1977), operative paragraph 3 
(deciding that the 253 Committee would report to the Council on the possible application of 
further measures under Article 41). In connection with the UNITA sanctions regime, see: 
S/RES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 6 (undertaking to consider by a certain date 
the application of additional measures against UNITA "under Article 41 of the Charter"). 
33 	See, for example, the Security Council's authorisation of the use of all necessary means in the 
case of Iraq: SIRES/678 (29 November 1990), operative paragraph 2 (authorizing Member States 
cooperating with the Government of Kuwait to use all necessary means to uphold resolution 
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constitutional basis is so clearly and uncontroversially located in Article 41 that a general 
reference to Chapter VII does not provide any meaningful additional flexibility or strengthen 
the Council's hand in terms of the implementation of sanctions. There is little reason for the 
Council to avoid invoking the Charter's sanctions provision in its sanctions-related decisions. 
Its failure to do so — for no readily apparent rationale — needlessly calls into question its 
desire to operate in a transparent manner. 
Transparency and the articulation of sanctions objectives 
Closely connected to the problem of a lack of clarity and transparency in the 
Council's determinations of threats to the peace is the inadequate articulation of the 
objectives for which sanctions are applied. The survey of the Council's practice in this area 
contained in Chapter 6 reveals both some good precedents for the articulation of specific, 
objectively verifiable goals, as well as some troubling examples of objectives that have been 
so general or vague that it is arguable that they could only elude objective verification. 
Among the positive precedents,34 the third Liberia sanctions regime illustrates elements of 
best-practice, as it incorporates goals that are both objectively verifiable and tied to 
particular components of the sanctions regime.35 Among the less positive examples, 
660 (1990) and subsequent related resolutions if Iraq did not fully implement those resolutions 
on or before 15 January 1991). 
34 	Relatively transparent objectives have been outlined in connection with the sanctions regimes 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), the Bosnian Serbs, Haiti, 
UNITA, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Liberia (on the second occasion), the DRC, 
and Liberia (on the third occasion). 
35 	As noted above in the overview of the Council's many and varied sanctions regimes, the 
Council imposed a mixture of arms, travel, diamond and timber sanctions against Liberia as part 
of the third Liberia sanctions regime. The objectives of the arms and travel sanctions were to 
ensure that: (a) the Liberian ceasefire was being fully respected and maintained; (b) the 
disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation and restructuring of the security sector 
had been completed; (c) the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement were being 
fully implemented; and (d) significant progress had been made in establishing and maintaining 
stability in Liberia and the subregion: S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraph 5. 
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however, the Security Council has on one occasion failed to identify any explicit objective at 
all. 36 On other occasions, the Council has articulated goals that are general, vague or difficult 
to verify or satisfy, such as: establishing peace and stability; securing the future, ongoing 
disarmament of a target; and ensuring that a target ceases supporting terrorism. 
(a) 	Establishing peace and stability 
The Council incorporated the general objective of establishing peace and stability as 
part of its sanctions regimes against the former Yugoslavia,37 Somalia,38 Liberia (in the first 
instance),39 and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (to address the situation in Kosovo).4° 
In the former Yugoslavia and Kosovo cases, this objective was augmented by more specific 
objectives. 4 ' In the Somalia and Liberia regimes, however, the Council simply noted that the 
The objective of the diamond sanctions was to secure the establishment of an effective 
Certificate of Origin regime for trade in Liberian diamonds: SIRES/1521 (22 December 2003), 
operative paragraph 8. Finally, the objectives of the timber sanctions were to ensure that: 
(a) the Transitional Government of Liberia gained full authority and control over Liberian timber 
producing areas; and (b) government revenues from the timber industry were being used not to 
fuel conflict or in violation of the Security Council's resolutions, but rather for legitimate 
purposes that benefited the Liberian people: SIRES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative 
paragraphs 11,12. 
36 	The Security Council did not articulate an explicit objective in connection with the Rwanda 
sanctions regime. Various provisions of the resolution establishing the sanctions suggest, 
however, that the main objectives of the arms embargo were the establishment of a cease-fire 
and the achievement of a peaceful settlement to the conflict, within the framework of the 
Arusha Peace Agreement. See, e.g., SIRES/918 (17 May 1994), preambular paragraph 6 
(stressing the importance of the Arusha agreement to the peaceful resolution of the conflict in 
Rwanda and the necessity for the parties to the conflict to implement that agreement), 
operative paragraph 1 (demanding that the parties to the conflict immediately cease hostilities, 
agree to a cease-fire, and bring an end to the violence in Rwanda), and operative paragraph 19 
(inviting the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, in coordination with the 
Organization of African Unity and countries in the region, to continue their efforts to achieve a 
political settlement in Rwanda within the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement). 
• 
37 SIRES/713 (25 September 1991), operative paragraph 6. 
38 
 
SIRES/733 (23 January 1992), operative paragraph 5. 
39 SIRES/788 (19 November 1992), operative paragraph 8. 
40 SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 8. 
41 In the regime against the former Yugoslavia, the Council subsequently decided that the arms 
sanctions would be terminated upon the signing of a proposed Peace Agreement, including the 
conclusion of a regional arms control agreement. See: SIRES/l021 (22 November 1995), 
operative paragraph 1. In the Kosovo sanctions regime, the Council outlined a range of 
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sanctions would remain in place until it decided otherwise.42 In the case of the first Liberia 
regime, it as notable that the Council did not terminate the arms embargo in July 1997, 
when it might have been claimed that peace and stability had been established as the Council 
itself had welcomed both the successful holding of presidential and legislative elections and 
the fact that the elections had been certified as "free and fair" by the Chairman of ECO WAS 
and the U.N. Secretary- Genera1. 43 
(b) 	Securing the future and ongoing verification of disarmament 
The Council established the general goal of achieving the complete, ongoing 
disarmament of a target as part of its sanctions regime against Iraq. That regime provides an 
example of a sanctions regime which has had both a particularly clear and verifiable goal, as 
well as objectives that are difficult to verify. The clear initial objective, of securing the 
withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the reinstatement of the Kuwaiti government," 
was achieved through the hostilities undertaken by coalition forces during the Gulf War of 
early 1991. When the Council decided to maintain the sanctions after the Gulf War, 45 that 
clear objective was replaced by the following goals: (a) establishing a compensation fund to 
cover the losses incurred by foreign governments, nationals and corporations; 46 (b) ensuring 
that Iraq agreed to on-site inspection of its armament facilities; 47 (c) ensuring that Iraq was 
detailed objectives at the same time that it set the overall objective of establishing peace and 
stability: SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 16(a)-(e). 
42 	For the Somalia sanctions regime, see SIRES/733 (23 January 1992), operative paragraph 5. For 
the Liberia sanctions regime, see: SIRES/788 (19 November 1992), operative paragraph 8. 
43 	S/PRST/1997/41: Presidential statement of 30 July 1997. The joint statement of certification that 
the elections had been free and fair was contained in: S/1997/581 (24 July 1997), annex. 
44 S/RES/661 (6 August 1990), operative paragraph 2. 
45 
 
SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraphs 20-24. 
46 
 
SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 19 and 22. 
47 
 
SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 9 and 22. 
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disarmed of its weapons of mass destruction and missiles with a range of greater than 150 
km and that it submitted to future and ongoing verification that it was not using, developing, 
constructing or acquiring such weapons; 48 and (d) ensuring that Iraq reaffum unconditionally 
its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 
1968.49 
Of the goals articulated in the post-Gulf War environment, objectives (a), (b) and 
(d) were achievable and objectively verifiable. By contrast, objective (c) was sufficiently 
general and difficult to satisfy that it is arguable that one could have legitimately claimed ad 
infinitum that it had not been satisfied. Was it possible for Iraq to demonstrate via objective 
criteria that it had complied with the requirement to submit to "future and ongoing 
verification"? At what point would consistent compliance with verification have been 
deemed sufficient? It is possible to debate the merits of a policy of total containment of a 
regime with an aggressive record — a policy which appears, with the benefit of hindsight, to 
have achieved the objective of depriving Iraq of any significant stockpiles of weapons of 
mass destruction. Nevertheless, the articulation of such a general and slippery objective 
provides the Security Council — and in particular its permanent members — with such broad 
discretion in determining when and even whether to lift the sanctions, that it renders the 
Council's decision-making process susceptible to arbitrary and non-transparent approaches. 
(c) 	Ensuring that a target stops supporting terrorism 
The Council has set the objective of ensuring that a target stops supporting terrorism 
as part of its sanctions regimes against Libya, the Sudan, and the Taliban and Al Qaida. In 
48 
	
SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraphs 8, 10, 12 and 22. 
49 
	
SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 11 and 22. 
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each of those cases, the Council has also outlined quite specific steps, the taking of which 
might lead to the suspension or termination of sanctions. Nevertheless, the requirement of 
ceasing to provide support to terrorists is sufficiently difficult to substantiate that it is arguable 
that in any of those instances the Council could have maintained sanctions for as long as it 
saw fit — potentially ad infinitum. 
In the case of Libya, the primary objective of the sanctions was initially to ensure 
Libya's cooperation with French, British and American investigations into the terrorist 
bombings of UTA flight 772 and Pan Am flight 103." Subsequently, that primary objective 
shifted to ensuring that Libyan authorities handed over for trial the suspects for the bombing 
of Pan Am flight 103 and satisfied French authorities with respect to the bombing of UTA 
flight 772. 5 ' It is notable, however, that although sanctions were suspended once Libya 
handed over suspects for trial by a Scottish Court sitting on neutral ground, 52 the ultimate 
termination of the sanctions regime did not take place until more than four years later, once 
U.K, U.S. and French officials had negotiated a compensation deal with the Libyan 
50 	S/RES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraphs 1, 3. 
51 	SIRES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraph 16 (providing for the possibility that the 
sanctions might be suspended if the Secretary-General were to report to it that the Libyan 
Government had ensured the appearance of those charged with the bombing of Pan Am flight 
103 before the appropriate United Kingdom or United States court and had satisfied that 
French judicial authorities with respect to the bombing of UTA flight 772); SIRES/1192 (27 
August 1998), operative paragraph 8 (deciding that the sanctions would be suspended 
immediately if the Secretary-General were to report to it that the suspects had arrived in the 
Netherlands for the purpose of being tried before a Scottish Court, or if they had appeared for 
trial before an appropriate court in the United Kingdom or the United States). 
52 	As mentioned in the summary of the Libya sanctions regime, above, the sanctions were 
suspended in April 1999, after Libya transferred two Lockerbie bon -bing suspects to the 
Netherlands for trial before a Scottish court. The Security Council provided for the possibility 
that the sanctions might be suspended on those grounds in SIRES/1192 (27 August 1998), 
operative paragraph 8. The sanctions were subsequently suspended when the Secretary-
General reported that the conditions for suspension had been satisfied: S/1999/378 (5 April 
1999): Letter Dated 5 April from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the 
Security Council; S/PRST/1998/10 (8 April 1999)Presidential Statement of 8 April 1999. 
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authorities." The requirement of compensation had not been mentioned in any of the 
Council's earlier resolutions relating to the Libya situation. 
It is possible to argue that the Security Council became convinced of Libya's 
sincerity to cease supporting terrorism once Libya agreed to provide such compensation to 
American and French families affected by the Pan Am and UTA bombings. It is equally 
possible, however, to draw the conclusion that the U.S. and France were able to use to their 
benefit the regime's vague objective of ensuring that Libya ceased supporting terrorism in 
order to prevent the termination of the sanctions until their own political objectives had been 
satisfied. 54 Regardless what conclusions one draws from the manner in which the sanctions 
were ultimately lifted, the Libya example does not provide a best-practice precedent of 
sanctions having been lifted as a result of the occurrence of objectively verifiable events. 
In the case of the Sudan, the major objective of the sanctions was to induce the 
extradition from the Sudan of three individuals suspected of having undertaken an 
53 	The Council terminated the sanctions in September 2003, after receiving a letter from the 
representative of Libya recounting steps taken by the Libyan Government to comply with its 
obligations connected with the sanctions regime. Those steps included accepting 
responsibility for the actions of Libyan officials, paying appropriate compensation, renouncing 
terrorism, and making a commitment to cooperate with further investigations. For the provision 
terminating the sanctions, see: SIRES/1506 (12 September 2003), operative paragraph 1. For the 
text of the Libyan letter, see: S/2003/818 (15 August 2003): Letter dated 15 August 2003 from 
the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya addressed to the President of the Security 
Council. 
54 	At the time that the sanctions were applied, a number of speakers expressed concern that the 
vagueness of the sanctions regime's objectives would make them difficult to satisfy: S/PV.3063 
(31 March 1992): Libya, p. 21 ("Operative paragraph 2 [of resolution 748 (1992)] contains 
unspecified demands: we do not know what criterion leads this Security Council to claim that 
Libya must commit itself definitively to cease all acts of aggression in which they allege my 
country to be implicated. We do not know when the Security Council will decide that the 
Jamahiriya has abided by the provisions of operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of the ... resolution 
so that the sanctions imposed under it may be lifted according to its terms"); Iraq, p. 36 
(querying whether the sanctions were commensurate with the aims and objectives of resolution 
748 (1992), or whether they were designed to "become sanctions for an unspecified period"); 
India, p. 57 (stating that an important aspect was the definition of the circumstances under 
which the sanctions either would not come into force at all or would be lifted and noting that, 
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assassination attempt in Ethiopia against President Mubarak of E 	. 5 Connected to that 
objective was the secondary goal of ensuring that Sudan desisted from assisting, supporting 
and facilitating terrorist activities and from giving shelter or sanctuary to terrorist elements. 56 
As with the case of Libya, the Sudan example demonstrates that it is difficult to verify 
precisely when a target has complied with an cbjective as general as ceasing providing 
support to terrorism. In June 2000, more than four years after the Sudan sanctions regime 
was first established, the Sudan's Minister for External Affairs sent a letter to the President 
of the Security Council, outlining the steps that the Sudan had taken to comply with its 
obligations under the sanctions regime and requesting that a meeting of the Council be 
convened in order to lift the sanctions. 57 Over the following days the President of the 
Security Council also received letters from the Foreign Ministers of Egypt and Ethiopia, as 
well as from the Chairmen of the Arab Group, the Non-Aligned Movement and the African 
Group, all supporting the Sudan's request that the sanctions be lifted. 58 
despite efforts to inject more precision into the relevant paragraphs, it had not been possible to 
remove "the vagueness"). 
55 	SIRES/1054 (26 April 1996), operative paragraph 1(a). 
56 	SIRES/1054 (26 April 1996), operative paragraph 1(b). 
57 S/2000/513 (1 June 2000): Letter dated 1 June 2000 from the representative of the Sudan 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, annex. In making the case that the Sudan 
had complied with its obligations connected to the sanctions regime, the Minister argued that 
the Sudan had: (a) done all it could to locate the individuals suspected of undertaking the 
assassination attempt against President Mubarak, but without success, cooperating fully with 
investigations carried out by the Governments of Egypt and Ethiopia; (b) taken a number of 
steps to demonstrate its commitment to curbing terrorism, including signing a number of 
international conventions designed to combat terrorism; (c) maintained good relations with all 
of its ten neighbours and was committed to the maintenance of international peace and 
security. 
58 	The letters from the Foreign Ministers of Egypt and Ethiopia were not circulated as official 
documents, but are noted in resolution 1372 (2001), by which the Council ultimately terminated 
the sanctions: see SIRES/1372 (28 September 2001), preambular paragraph 4. For the other 
letters mentioned, see: S/2000/517 (1 June 2000), S/20001521 and S/2000/533: letters dated 1, 2 
and 5 June 2000 from the representatives of Algeria (in his capacity as Chairman of the Arab 
Group), South Africa (in his capacity as Chairman of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-
Aligned Movement) and Gabon (in his capacity as Chairman of the African Group), 
respectively, addressed to the President of the Security Council. 
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Despite the requests received in June 2000 advocating the swift convening of a 
meeting to lift the sanctions, the Council did not consider the matter again for a further fifteen 
months. In late-September 2001, the Council noted the steps that had been taken by the 
Government of the Sudan to comply with its obligations under the sanctions regime," as well 
as a collection of correspondence it had received fifteen months earlier advocating the lifting 
of the sanctions against Sudan. 6° It then welcomed the accession of Sudan to various 
international conventions for the suppression of terrorism, 61 and decided to terminate the 
sanctions.62 
In the case of the Taliban/A1 Qaida sanctions, the Security Council has blended 
examples of both best- and worst- practice in its articulation of objectives. In its early 
decisions connected with the Taliban/A1 Qaida sanctions regime, the Council articulated 
clear and objectively verifiable criteria, the achievement of which would lead to the lifting of 
sanctions. The major initial objective of the sanctions was thus to ensure that the Taliban 
turned Usama Bin Laden over to authorities in a country where he had been indicted. ° In 
December 2000, the Council identified some additional requirements with which the Taliban 
must comply before the sanctions would be terminated, including: ceasing providing 
sanctuary and/or training for international terrorists; ensuring that its territory was not being 
59 SIRES/1372 (28 September 2001), preambular paragraph 2. 
so 	SIRES/1372 (28 September 2001), preambular paragraphs 3-5. 
61 S/RES/1372 (28 September 2001), preambular paragraph 6. 
62 S/RES/I 372 (28 September 2001), operative paragraph 1. 
61 S/RES/I267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraphs 2, 14. Although the Council also reaffirmed 
its earlier demand that the Taliban cease providing sanctuary and training for international 
terrorists [see preambular paragraph 8 and operative paragraph 1, reaffirming the demand made 
earlier by the Council in SIRES/1214 . (8 December 1998), operative paragraph 13], the fact that it 
noted in operative paragraph 14 that the sanctions would be terminated once the Taliban had 
handed over Bin Laden to authorities in a country where he had been indicted suggests that 
the most important objective of the sanctions regime was to ensure the capture of Bin Laden. 
343 
11. Strengthening the rule of law or serving as a tool of war? A critical analysis of U.N. sanctions 
used by terrorists or for the organization of terrorist acts against other States; cooperating 
with efforts to bring indicted terrorists to justice; and closing terrorist camps within its 
territory. 64 At the same time, the Council also attached a time-limit to the sanctions, deciding 
that they would terminate after twelve months unless it were to decide otherwise. 65 The 
incorporation of a time-limit in theory meant that as the time-limit approached, the Council 
would need to reconsider the situation, assessing whether the objectives had been met and, 
in the case of reapplication, either reaffirm or modify the objectives already outlined. 
In the post-September 11 environment, however, the Council appears to have lost 
its appetite for articulating clear objectives in connection with the Taliban/A1 Qaida regime. It 
has also eschewed time-limits. Instead, whenever modifying the sanctions or their 
application, the Council has noted that the sanctions would be reviewed after a certain 
period, at which point they would either be maintained in their current form or 
strengthened.66 This impulse to maintain unlimited sanctions against Al Qaida is 
understandable. There are few who would advocate that Al Qaida is not a legitimate 
sanctions target or that the Council should adopt a lenient approach to such terrorist 
organizations. Nevertheless, as a matter of principle, the legitimacy of the Council's overall 
sanctions system suffers when there is a lack of transparency in the articulation of sanctions 
objectives, no matter how easy it might be to rationalise or justify such a lack of 
64 S/RES/1333 (I 9 December 2000), operative paragraphs 1, 2, 3. Operative paragraphs 23 and 24 
of the same resolution also reinforce that these were the objectives of the regime. 
65 	SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 23. 
66 	S/RES/1390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraph 3 (noting that the sanctions would either be 
continued or improved after twelve months); SIRES/1455 (17 January 2003), operative 
paragraphs 1, 2 (noting again that the sanctions would be improved after twelve months); 
S/RES/1526 (30 January 2004), operative paragraph 3 (noting that the sanctions would be 
further improved in eighteen months, or sooner if necessary). 
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transparency. 67 If there is a legitimate reason for maintaining sanctions against a target — 
whether it be Somalia, Libya or Al Qaida — then it should not be a difficult matter to identify 
that reason transparently and to set transparent objectives, the achievement of which will 
lead to the termination of sanctions. Even if such objectives are unlikely ever to be fulfilled, 
as may be the case with Al Qaida, they should nevertheless be articulated. 
In practice, such specific objectives would likely focus on responding to terrorist 
events that have already taken place. Thus, for instance, a more objectively verifiable goal 
connected with the Taliban/A1 Qaida sanctions regime might be bringing about the capture 
and trial of specific individuals suspected of having been involved in Al Qaida-organized 
terrorist attacks. The Council could also provide for the possibility that sanctions against 
listed individuals and groups would be relaxed, suspended or lifted if those individuals were 
to cooperate with investigations into Al Qaida's activities or demonstrate through acts of 
good faith that they are no longer associated with Al Qaida. 
11.1.3 Transparency in the Sanctions Committees 
Traditionally the decision-making process in the Security Council's Sanctions 
Committees has been less than transparent. 68 The Committees have tended to meet in 
67 	The Interlaken and Bonn-Berlin processes both stressed the importance of articulating clearly 
the criteria to be fulfilled through the application of sanctions. See: Manual from the 
Interlaken Process, below note 89, 5 ("[W]ell defined goals articulated at the outset help to 
minimize conflicts within the Sanctions Committees and Security Council by establishing clear 
criteria for determining how the measures are to be imposed, their durations, and their 
effectiveness"); Results of the Bonn-Berlin Process, below note 89, 38 (Comment 45: "The 
resolution should make it clear under which conditions the embargo provisions would be 
lifted"). 
68 	See, e.g., Conlon, Paul, United Nations Sanctions Management: a Case Study of the Iraq 
Sanctions Committee (2000) Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, NY, 33 (stating that "non-
transparency was assiduously cultivated by the Iraq Sanctions Committee, which held all its 
meetings in closed session"), 36 (concluding that "Non-transparency's baneful influence 
affected many different aspects of the [Iraq] sanctions regime and contributed to its failure. Yet 
at no time was the principle itself questioned by anyone involved"). 
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closed sessions, with little public record of their proceedings.69 Prior to 1995 the 
transparency of the Committees reached a low-point, with a number of Sanctions 
Committees failing to report to the Council on a regular basis, despite the fact that their 
mandates required them to undertake such reporting." 
The main motivations for holding Sanctions Committee meetings behind closed 
doors and restricting public access to meeting records appear to be a concern regarding the 
sensitive, confidential nature of the issues discussed, as well as a desire to foster genuine, 
constructive debate rather than "grandstandine. 71 One commentator with first-hand 
experience of the inner workings of the 661 (Iraq) Sanctions Committee has contended, 
however, that discussion of sensitive, confidential matters accounted for a mere 2.5% of the 
661 Committee's meeting time, and that the closed meeting format in fact elicited little 
candour and frankness from Committee members.' But even more damning is the same 
commentator's conclusion that the lack of transparency in the proceedings of the 661 
Committee actually aided Iraq and sanctions evaders, as it shielded them from the public 
spotlight. 73 
69 	Nevertheless, there are some examples in the public domain of records from Sanctions 
Committee meetings. For an unauthorized collection of some of the early meetings of the Iraq 
Sanctions Committee, see: Bethlehem, Daniel L. & Lauterpacht, E., The Kuwait Crisis: 
Sanctions and their Economic Consequences (1991) Grotius Publications, Cambridge UK, Vol. 
2, Part II, 773-985. 
70 	Of the early Sanctions Committees only the initial Committee — the Southern Rhodesian 
Committee — consistently provided the Council with reports relating to its activities. Most 
Sanctions Committees did not submit regular written reports to the Council, however, with the 
Haiti Sanctions Committee failing to submit even one report during its sixteen-month existence. 
71 	Conlon, Paul, United Nations Sanctions Management: a Case Study of the Iraq Sanctions 
Committee (2000) Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, NY, 34. 
72 	Ibid. 
73 	Ibid, 151 ("Secrecy abetted the target state and its sanctions evaders. If the [Committee] had 
systematically published its waiver clearances, some of these patterns, the volumes involved, 
and the relevant names would have been put into the public domain. Moreover, if the 
[Committee] had published those waiver actions that failed to be authorized, sanctions evaders 
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Recognising that the Sanctions Committees were perceived to lack transparency, 
the President of the Security Council issued a note in March 1995, with the primary aim of 
improving transparency. 74 The note, which had the backing of all Council members, 
proposed the introduction of a number of measures designed to make the procedures of the 
Sanctions Committees more transparent. Those measures included the preparation of annual 
reports, with a concise summary of activities undertaken in the reporting period, as well as 
the expedited preparation of summary records of Committee meetings!' Four years later, in 
January 1999, the President of the Security Council issued another note regarding the work 
of the Sanctions Committees, outlining further proposals for improving transparency. 76 The 
statement suggested that transparency should be increased: by convening substantive and 
detailed briefings on the work of the committees, to be given by the Chairpersons of the 
committees;77 by making publicly available sumrnary records of formal meetings of the 
Sanctions Committee; 78 and by posting information on the work of the Sanctions 
Committees on the internet. 79 
The transparency of the Sanctions Committees has improved considerably in certain 
respects as a result of these Council initiatives. Sanctions Committees now report to the 
would have had to diversify their conduits and come up with more sophisticated tactics for fear 
of public scrutiny"). 
74 See: S11995/234 (29 March 1995): Note by the President of the Security Council (suggesting 
the introduction of improvements to make the procedures of the Sanctions Committees more 
transparent). 
75 	Ibid, paragraph I. 
76 S/1999/92 (29 January 1999): Note by the President of the Security Council: Work of the 
Sanctions Committees. 
77 	Ibid, paragraph 18. 
78 Ibid, paragraph 19. 
79 Ibid, paragraph 20. 
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Council on an annual basis, 8° information relating to each operating Committee is available 
via the intemet,81 the Security Council has begun including additional details of the work of 
the Committees in its annual reports to the General Assembly, 82 and a number of Committee 
Chairs have briefed the Council on their Committee's activities in both formal, open 
meetings and informal consultations." 
Nevertheless, despite these positive initiatives, there is still no public access either to 
Committee meetings themselves, or to the records of those meetings. Even in respect of the 
80 	For reference to the annual reports issued by the various Sanctions Committees, see Table E. 
81 	For links to the relevant information posted for each of the operating Sanctions Committees, 
see: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/INTRO.htm (last visited 30 June 2004). 
82 	Each year the Security Council submits a report on its work to the General Assembly, covering 
its activities from the middle of the previous year until the middle of the year in which the 
report is submitted. The report is usually the second official document issued for each General 
Assembly session, and the reporting period is presumably designed to ensure that the General 
Assembly receives information on the Council's most recent activities heading into each new 
session, beginning in September. Traditionally the Council's annual reports have included as 
an appendix a list of the meetings held during the reporting period by the Council's subsidiary 
organs, including Sanctions Committees. Since the report covering the period of 16 June 1997 - 
15 June 1998, however, the annual reports have also contained a section on "Work of the 
subsidiary organs of the Security Council". For the first report including such a section, see: 
AJ53/2 (1998): Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly: 16 June 1997 - 15 
June 1998, pp. 159-69. 
83 	For examples of oral briefings given by Sanctions Committee Chairs in formal Security Council 
meetings, see: S/PV.4027 (29 July 1999), pp. 2-5 (briefing by the Chairman of the 864 
Committee); S/PV.4090 (18 January 2000), pp. 410 (briefing by the Chairman of the 864 
Committee); S/PV.4113 (15 March 2000), pp. 2-7 (briefing by the Chairman of the 864 
Committee); S/PV.4325 (5 June 2001), pp. 3-4 (containing a statement by the Chairman of the 
1267 Committee on the activities of the Committee of Experts on Afghanistan); S/PV.4405 (5 
November 2001), pp. 2-5 (containing a statement by the Chairman of the 1343 Committee on the 
activities of the Panel of Experts on Liberia); S/PV.4673 (18 December 2002), in general 
(briefings by the Chairmen of the 661 Committee, the 864 Committee, the 1267 Committee and 
the 1343 Committee); S/PV.4798 (29 July 2003), pp. 2-6 (briefing by the Chairman of the 1267 
Committee); S/PV.4888 (22 December 2003), in general (briefings by the Chairmen of the 661, 
751, 918, and 1132 Committees); pp. 2-8 (briefing by the President of the Security Council, in his 
capacity as the Chairman of the 1267 Committee). 
Although no official written report is issued in connection with briefings given by Committee 
Chairmen in the informal consultations of the Council, the President of the Security Council 
sometimes issues a press statement after such consultations, providing a brief overview of the 
relevant Chairman's report. For examples of those statements, see: SC/7370 (22 April 2002) 
(noting that the members of the Council had just been briefed by the Chairman of the 1343 
Committee); SC/7518 (30 September 2002) (noting that the members of the Council had just 
been briefed by the Chairman of the 1267 Committee); SC/7730 (15 April 2003) (noting that the 
members of the Council had just been briefed by the Chairman of the 1267 Committee, as called 
for in resolution 1455 (2003)). 
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most positive example of transparency — the submission of reports — the record of Sanctions 
Committees has improved without becoming stellar. While Sanctions Committees routinely 
submit annual reports on their work, those reports tend to lack genuine substance, often 
conveying little valuable information on the manner in which the Committees have functioned 
and providing few substantive or meaningful recommendations." 
11.1.4 Recommendations for improving transparency 
Of the five elements of the rule of law analysed here, transparency is arguably the 
one that is the least observed yet the easiest to redress. Increasing transparency does not 
require the elaboration of sophisticated new strategies, nor necessitate the allocation of new 
resources. It does not require a constitutional change or a modification to the Council's rules 
of procedure. The Council can improve its transparency track-record simply by conducting 
its business in a more open and accountable manner. The recommendations outlined here 
flow from the analysis above. They are thus geared towards increasing transparency in the 
Security Council's decision-making process, in the decision-making process in the Sanctions 
Committees, and in the Council's decisions themselves. 
In order to improve the transparency of its decision-making process, the Security 
Council should hold discussions concerning the potential or actual application of sanctions in 
public. When the application of a new sanctions tegime is proposed, the Council should 
meet in open session to discuss the proposal, with members placing their views and 
84 	An exception was the final report of the 724 (former Yugoslavia) Committee, which contained 
significant information relating to the work of the Committee and providing useful 
recommendations in relation to the future management of U.N. sanctions regimes. See: 
5/1996/946 (15 November 1996), annex: Final Report of the Security Coun cil Committee 
established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia, (hereafter 'Final 
Report of the 724 Committee"). 
349 
11. Strengthening the rule of law or serving as a tool of war? A critical analysis of U.N. sanctions 
concerns on-the-record. Where possible, the views of the potential target should also be 
presented. Subsequently, if the Council moves to vote on a draft resolution that would 
impose sanctions, Security Council Member States should speak in explanation of their 
vote. The Security Council's use of its sanctions powers should be considered a sober, 
serious occasion. The logic and rationale for taking such a step should thus be made clear 
both to the global public, but also to the target against which sanctions are imposed. The 
practice that has become more and more prevalent, according to which the Council has 
imposed sanctions with little or no public discussion, whether by way of advance 
consideration of the potential step of imposing sanctions or of debate at the point of taking 
such a step, must end. When the Council imposes sanctions, it should be clear to all that it 
has considered seriously the pros and cons of taking such a grave step, as well as the 
different alternatives that might be employed. 
In order to improve the transparency of its sanctions-related decisions, the Security 
Council should clearly demonstrate that its actions are taken in accordance with legitimate 
authority. When applying sanctions the Council should invoke the Charter basis for taking 
action — i.e. Articles 39 and 41. As part of the requisite determination under Article 39 of a 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, the Council should identify in 
as much detail and as clearly as possible, the precise nature and cause of the threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. Where possible, this determination should 
be made in advance of the application of sanctions, in order to demonstrate that it is a 
considered decision rather than one of mere convenience in order to justify the application of 
sanctions. When the Council does indeed decide to apply sanctions, it should articulate 
specific objectives, the achievement of which will address the threat to the peace, breach of 
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the peace, or act of aggression and thus maintain or restore international peace and security. 
Objectives should thus be tied to objectively verifiable conditions, the satisfaction of which 
will trigger the easing or lifting of sanctions. If necessary, the Secretaiy-General could be 
tasked with reporting upon the satisfaction of those conditions." 
Similarly, the meetings of the Sanctions Committees should be held in open session, 
with transcripts or summary records being made publicly available as soon as possible after 
each meeting. 86 As noted, maintaining discussions and decision-making behind closed doors 
can actually deprive the Committees of a valuable tool for publicising the activities of 
sanctions-busters and thus promoting adherence to and implementation of sanctions. In 
instances when discussions touch upon issues that are considered highly sensitive or 
confidential, the Committees could move into informal consultations. Such discussions 
should be strictly circumscribed, however, to the minimum period necessary to debate such 
confidential matters. 
11.2 A less than constant practice: U.N. sanctions and the problem 
of consistency 
"The power at the disposal of the Security Council is the power 
commanded by the solidarity of nations opposed to the transgression of 
the Charter of the United Nations. It is first and foremost the power of 
principle. What makes the Council's task particularly onerous — and, I 
am sure, ultimately fruitful — is that principles must be consistently 
85 	As noted in Chapter 10, section 10.1.3, the Secretary-General had played this role in the past. 
The Bonn-Berlin process also advocated such a role for the Secretary-General. See: Results of 
the Bonn-Berlin Process, below note 89, 63 (Comment 31: "The Expert Working Group 
recommends that the Secretary-General be tasked with reporting whether the conditions have 
been met, as the Secretary-General can be perceived to be less "politically driven" than the 
Security Council"). 
86 	The Bonn-Berlin and Stockholm processes have advocated more transparency in the Sanctions 
Committees. See, e.g.: Results of the Bonn-Berlin Process, below note 89, 36 (Comment 36), 58 
(Comment 18), 60 (Comment 22), 78 (Comment 13) and 80 (Comment 17); Guidelines from the 
Stockholm Process, below note 89, 24-5 (paragraph 43) and 34 (paragraph 64). 
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applied and the Council's actions must be based on equity and perceived 
to be so." 
- U.N. Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar87 
As outlined in Chapter 2, the principle of consistency requires that power be 
exercised in a consistent manner. Decisions should thus be made in a predictable rather than 
an arbitrary manner. Consistency contributes to the rule of law by promoting consistent 
standards of behaviour. In the context of U.N. sanctions, the principle of consistency 
requires that once the Security Council has decided to impose sanctions, it should seek to 
ensure, to the extent possible, that its practice is consistent from one sanctions regime to 
another!' In particular, arbitrary decision-making should be avoided. 
The track-record of the Security Council with respect to consistency is mixed. 
While early sanctions regimes defined themselves largely by their difference from each other, 
a more consistent practice seems to be evolving — particularly with respect to similar types 
of sanctions, such as arms embargoes. Nevertheless, there is room for improvement. Some 
differentiation between sanctions regimes is unavoidable and is sometimes desirable, as each 
sanctions regime usually arises from particular circumstances and aims to achieve particular 
objectives. Where possible, however, the Council should seek to avoid the perception of 
arbitrariness and strive to ensure that its practice is as consistent as it can be. When it adopts 
87 	Statement by Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar, during a Security Council meeting at which 
the Council adopted resolution 670 (1990) to address the situation between Iraq and Kuwait: 
S/PV.2943 (25 September 1990), p. 7. 
88 	The question of consistency in the application of sanctions, in the sense of whether the 
Security Council consistently makes the decision to apply sanctions in comparable situations 
that pose a threat to the peace, is dealt with below, in the discussion on the element of 
equality. As noted, this section considers the consistency of the Council's approach once it 
has taken the decision to apply sanctions. 
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a novel approach, such an approach should arise from considered reflection and aim at 
improvement. 
The element of consistency can be broadly applied to the Council's sanctions-
related activities in general, as the Council should ideally approach every aspect of its 
decision-making in a consistent manner. Thus the Council should seek where possible to 
employ a uniform approach to the aspects of its sanctions practice identified in chapters 5 
through 10, above. With respect to each of those components of sanctions practice there is 
room for improvement in consistency. For the purposes of illustrating how the Council might 
improve its consistency of approach, analysis here focuses upon the Council's practice with 
respect to setting objectives connected with sanctions regimes, outlining the scope of 
sanctions, and using subsidiary bodies to administer and monitor sanctions. 
11.2.1 Consistency and the objectives of sanctions regimes 
The Council's practice with respect to outlining the objectives of sanctions regimes 
has already been explored above, under the heading of transparency. Just as the discussion 
there demonstrates that the Council's articulation of objectives has not always been 
transparent, it also illustrates a lack of consistency. While the Council has on occasion 
identified clear, objectively verifiable conditions the satisfaction of which will result in the 
suspension or termination of the sanctions, on other occasions it has articulated general or 
vague conditions, the satisfaction of which is extremely difficult to verify objectively. In the 
case of the Rwanda sanctions regime, the Council failed to stipulate any objective at all. 
The Council's approach to objectives has not only been subject to variation from 
one sanctions regime to another. As the discussion above of the Taliban and Al Qaida 
sanctions regime illustrates, the Council's strategy has at times been inconsistent with respect 
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to objectives connected with the same sanctions regime. In its oversight of that regime, the 
Council has modified its approach from one of embracing precise and specific objectives, as 
demonstrated in its early resolutions such as 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000), to articulating 
general or vague objectives, as in the case of resolution 1390 (2002), to neglecting to 
identify any explicit objective at all, as in the case of resolutions 1455 (2003) and 1526 
(2004). 
11.2.2 Consistency and the scope of sanctions 
One area in which the Security Council's practice has exhibited an increasing degree 
of consistency is that of setting the rope of its sanctions regimes. Improvements in this 
sphere owe a debt to the sanctions policy roundtables that have been sponsored in turn by 
the Swiss, German and Swedish Governments and have come to be known as the 
"Interlaken", "Bonn-Berlin" and "Stockholm" processes. 89 Largely as a result of those 
processes, the Council's approach to establishing the scope of similar types of sanctions 
appears to be following a more consistent pattern. It has thus employed similar language in 
delineating the scope of its various sanctions regimes incorporating arms embargoes and 
financial, travel and aviation sanctions. 
89 
	
The Interlaken process sought to hone the tool of targeted financial sanctions. The Bonn- 
Berlin process focused upon the design and implementation of arms embargoes and travel and 
aviation sanctions. The Stockholm process focused upon the question of making targeted 
sanctions effective. For the sanctions design manuals produced by those three processes as 
outcome documents, see: Targeted Financial Sanctions: A Manual for Design and 
Implementation. Contributions from the Interlaken Process (2001) Thomas J. Watson Jr. 
Institute for International Studies, Providence, RI (hereafter Manual from the Interlaken 
Process); Design and Implementation of Arms Embargo and Travel Sanctions and Aviation-
related Sanctions: Results of the Bonn-Berlin Process (2001) Bonn International Center for 
Conversion, Bonn (hereafter Results of the Bonn-Berlin Process); and Making Targeted 
Sanctions Effective: Guidelines for the Implementation of UN Policy Options: Results from the 
Stockholm Process on the Implementation of Targeted Sanctions (2003) Uppsala University, 
Uppsala (hereafter Guidelines from the Stockholm Process). 
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Nevertheless, there remains clear room for improvement in the consistency of 
approach to the articulation of exemptions from sanctions. This need is greatest with respect 
to comprehensive sanctions. Although he Council's four major comprehensive sanctions 
regimes — the Southern Rhodesia, Iraq, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro) and Haiti regimes — each possessed relatively uniform provisions outlining the 
sanctions themselves," there were significant differences with respect to the provisions 
outlining humanitarian exemptions. 
One category of commodities and products theoretically exempt from each of the 
• comprehensive sanctions regimes was medical supphes. 91  The operation of this exemption 
was complicated in the case of Iraq, however, by the introduction of the "dual-use" 
prohibition, according to which items with the potential for conversion or diversion for 
90 	The core elements of the comprehensive prohibitions were that States were required to prevent 
the import into their territories of all commodities and products originating from the target and 
the sale or supply to the target of any commodities or products by their nationals or from their 
territories. For the Southern Rhodesian sanctions regime, see: S/RES/253 (29 May 1968), 
operative paragraph 3(a) and (c). For the Iraq sanctions regime, see: S/RES/661 (6 August 
1990), operative paragraph 3(a) and (c). For the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), see: SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 4(a) 
and (c). For the Haiti sanctions regime, see: SIRES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraphs 6 
and 7. 
The only distinguishing features were that the Southern Rhodesia regime addressed the 
prohibition to States Members of the United Nations, whereas the other regimes required "all 
States" to apply the sanctions (as noted in Chapter 4, above), and that the three latter regimes 
added the additional qualifier that States must prevent the use of their flag vessels or aircraft 
for selling or supplying commodities or products to the target. The Iraq regime initially 
included the reference to flag vessels, with aircraft being added when the Council confirmed 
the continued application of the sanctions after the Gulf War. See: SIRES/661 (6 August 1990), 
operative paragraph 3(c); S/RES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraphs 20, 24. For the 
sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), see: 
SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 4(c). For the Haiti regime, see: S/RES/917 (6 May 
1994), operative paragraph 7. 
91 	For Southern Rhodesia, see: S/RES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraph 3(d). For Iraq prior 
to the Gulf War, see: SIRES/661 (6 August 1990), operative paragraphs 3(c). For Iraq after the 
conclusion of Gulf War hostilities, see: S/RES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 20. For 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), see: S/RES/757 (30 May 1992), 
operative paragraph 4(c). For the Haiti regime, see: SIRES/917 (6 May 1994), operative 
paragraph 7. 
355 
11. Strengthening the rule of law or serving as a tool of war? A critical analysis of U.N. sanctions 
military purposes could not be sold or supplied to Iraq. 92 Thus despite the fact that medical 
supplies in theory remained exempt from the Iraq sanctions regime, in practice the 661 
Committee did place holds upon the supply of medical items to Iraq, on the basis that they 
were potential dual-use items.93 
Another category of products that was exempt from each regime was foodstuffs. 
Again, however, the application of this exemption was not uniform. In the cases of Southern 
Rhodesia and Iraq, the Council permitted the sale or supply of foodstuffs "in humanitarian 
circumstances." In the case of Iraq, a fact-finding mission that was deployed to Iraq just 
after the conclusion of the Gulf War hostilities determined that humanitarian circumstances 
did indeed exist." The Council subsequently decided that foodstuffs would be exempt." In 
92 
	
See: SIRES/666 (13 September 1990), operative paragraph 8 (recalling that resolution 661 (1990) 
did not apply to supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, but recommending that 
medical supplies should be exported under the strict supervision of the Government of the 
exporting State or by appropriate humanitarian agencies); S/RES/687 (3 April 1991), operative 
paragraphs 8-13, 24, 25 and 27 (qualifying the arms and related sanctions against Iraq with the 
aim of preventing the Iraqi Government from developing nuclear, chemical or biological 
weapons or anti-ballistic missiles with a range of greater than 150 km); S/23036 (13 September 
1991) (containing the first report of the 661 Committee on the implementation of the arms and 
related sanctions against Iraq, which defined dual-use items as "items meant for civilian use 
but with potential for diversion or conversion to military use": see paragraph 7). Some years 
later, the Council simplified the review of potential dual-use items through the introduction of 
the "Goods Review List", which was designed both to provide a comprehensive list of items 
that were exempt, as well as to speed up the process for determining whether items could in 
fact be used to develop weapons of mass destruction. See: S/RES/1051 (27 March 1996), 
operative paragraph 5; SIRES/1284 (17 December 1999), operative paragraph 17; SIRES/1409 (14 
May 2002), SIRES/1447 (4 December 2002); SIRES/1454 (30 December 2002). 
93 
	
See: Center for Economic and Social Rights, (UN) Sanctioned Suffering: a Human Rights 
Assessment of United Nations Sanctions on Iraq (1996) Center for Economic and Social Rights, 
NY, 23 (documenting shortages in pharmaceutical supplies to Iraq and referring to an example 
in which the 661 Committee denied permission to export to Iraq the cytotoxic drug Mustine, on 
the basis that it contained mustard that might have had a military use as mustard gas). 
94 	After the conclusion of Gulf War hostilities, the Secretary-General commissioned a report to 
explore whether the "humanitarian circumstances" foreshadowed in resolution 661 (1990) did in 
fact exist, thus enabling the provision to Iraq of foodstuffs: 5/22366 (20 March 1991), annex: 
Report to the Secretary-General on humanitarian needs in Kuwait and Iraq in the immediate 
post-crisis environment by a mission to the area led by Mr. Martti Ahtisaari (the "Ahtisaari 
report"). The report concluded that humanitarian circumstances did exist, warning that the Iraqi 
people might soon face a "catastrophe", including "epidemic and famine" if "massive rife-
supporting needs" were not met: see paragraph 37 of the report. 
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two other instances, the Council outlined a general exemption for foodstuffs from the outset, 
thus suggesting that it was moving away from the practice of stipulating that "humanitarian 
circumstances" must exist in order for food to be exempt from sanctions. % 
Other items or categories of items were exempted from some regimes but not from 
others. The Council exempted educational equipment in the case of the Southern Rhodesian 
sanctions regime, 97 and news and informational materials in the case of Southern Rhodesia 
and Haiti. 98 In the case of Iraq it exempted "civilian and humanitarian supplies", 99 whereas in 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) and Haiti it exempted 
commodities and products for "essential hunanitarian need.'" ° In the case of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) it also permitted and then restricted 
9$ 	After considering the Ahtisaari report, the Iraq Sanctions Committee decided that humanitarian 
circumstances did in fact exist and thus permitted States to export foodstuffs to Iraq, as long as 
they notified the Committee of any such exports. See: S/22400 (22 March 1991): Note by the 
Secretary-General, annex (containing a letter dated 22 March 1991 from the President of the 
Security Council, informing the Secretary-General of a decision that the Iraq Sanctions 
Committee had taken that same day, during its 36 th meeting, with regard to the determination of 
humanitarian needs in Iraq). The Security Council, which had earlier empowered the Committee 
to make such a decision in SIRES/666 (13 September 1990), operative paragraphs I, 5, 
subsequently endorsed that decision after the conclusion of the Gulf War, in S/RES/687 (3 
April 1991), operative paragraph 20. 
For food, sale or supply could proceed upon simple notification to the 661 Committee, whereas 
the Committee's approval was required for civilian and humanitarian supplies: SIRES/687 (3 
April 1991), operative paragraph 20. 
96 	For the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), see: SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), 
operative paragraph 4(c). For Haiti, see: SIRES/9 17 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 7. 
97 	SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraph 3(d). 
98 	For Southern Rhodesia, see: S/RES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraph 3(d). For Haiti, see: 
SIRES/9 17 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 8. 
99 	SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 20. 
loo 	For the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), see: SIRES/760 (18 June 1992), 
sole operative paragraph. In its Final Report, the 724 Committee noted that an important part 
of its work had been determining the commodities and products that fell within the phrase 
"essential humanitarian need". It considered applications for exemptions under that category 
on a case-by-case basis: see Final Report of the 724 Committee, above note 84, paragraph 13. 
For Haiti, see: SIRES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 7(b). Such exemptions required the 
approval of the Haiti Sanctions Committee under the no-objection procedure. 
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transhipment of goods and commodities along the Danube,' ° ' exempted "clothing for 
essential humanitarian need", 102 permitted the supply of items that were essential to repairs 
being carried out on Serbian locks on the Danube, 1°3 and enabled the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) to export diphtheria serum temporarily, when global 
supplies were running dangerously low. 104 In the case of Haiti, the Council also exempted 
petroleum and petroleum products, including propane gas for cooking. 1°5 
The Security Council's inconsistency with respect to the elaboration of exemptions 
has not been confined to its comprehensive sanctions regimes. The Bonn-Berlin and 
Stockholm processes have recommended that the Council should also embrace standard 
exceptions from arms, financial and aviation sanctions. 1°6 There is thus general recognition 
101 	Transshipment was initially permitted with the approval of the 724 Committee: SIRES/757 (30 
May 1992), operative paragraph 6. The Council subsequently modified the application of the 
exemptions on a number of occasions, restricting and then prohibiting transshipment. At first 
the Council prohibited the transshipment of particular products and commodities, including 
crude oil, petroleum products, coal, energy-related equipment, iron, steel, other metals, 
chemicals, rubber, tyres, vehicles, aircraft and motors of all types: SIRES/787 (16 November 
1992), operative paragraph 9. It then prohibited transhipments in general, except for those 
specifically authorised by the 724 Committee, which would be subject to effective monitoring: 
S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 15. 
102 	The Council first articulated clothing as an exemption in SIRES/943 (23 September 1994), 
operative paragraph 3. It subsequently reaffirmed this innovation in S/RES/970 (12 January 
1995), operative paragraph 5, and SIRES/988 (21 April 1995), operative paragraphs 13, 15. 
103 	SIRES/992 (11 May 1995), operative paragraph 2. 
104 	SIRES/967 (14 December 1994), operative paragraph 1. This exemption was recommended by 
the 724 Committee: see Final Report of the 724 Committee, above note 84, paragraph 16(g). 
The Council permitted the export of the serum for a limited period of 30 days in order to address 
a shortfall of the serum in places other than the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro). In permitting the export of the serum the Council stipulated that payment for the 
serum could only be paid into frozen accounts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia 
and Montenegro): ibid, operative paragraph 2. 
105 	SIRES/9l7 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 7(c) and (d). The full list of such exemptions 
consisted of petroleum and petroleum products, including propane gas for cooking, authorized 
by the Haiti Sanctions Committee, and exemptions from the financial, petroleum and arms 
sanctions as requested by the President and Prime Minister of Haiti and approved by the Haiti 
Sanctions Committee. 
106 	See: Results of the Bonn-Berlin Process, above note 89, 32 (Comment 22 — encouraging the 
Security Council's Working Group on Sanctions to recommend the adoption of a standing list 
of exceptions from arms embargoes for non-lethal military equipment for humanitarian use) 
Guidelines from the Stockholm Process, above note 89, 112 (paragraph 347 - recommending 
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amongst intergovernmental sanctions practitioners of the desirability of improving 
consistency in the articulation of the parameters of the different types of sanctions at the 
Council's disposal. 
11.2.3 Consistency and the Security Council's use of subsidiary bodies 
As the discussion in Chapter 9 illustrates, the Council has established a range of 
subsidiary actors to facilitate the administration, monitoring and implementation of its 
sanctions regimes. The Council's use of subsidiary actors very much indicates an ad hoc, 
rather than a consistent approach. 
i. 	The establishment of Sanctions Committees 
The Council's use of the most standard type of sanctions-related subsidiary actor — 
Sanctions Committees — has not been entirely consistent. As noted in Chapter 8, the Council 
has sometimes established a new Committee when it has initiated a sanctions regime, whilst 
at other times it has created a new Committee some time later. On other occasions, the 
Council has entrusted responsibilities pertaining to a new sanctions regime to an existing 
Committee, or it has not established a Committee at all. This is one area where achieving 
consistency should be a simple matter. If Sanctions Committees are a good idea, then they 
should be established routinely at the time when sanctions are applied. While the mere 
existence of a Sanctions Con-nnittee does not guarantee that there will be effective 
administration, monitoring or implementation of a sanctions regime, in the absence of a 
Sanctions Committee a sanctions regime is likely to be neglected. 
that humanitarian exceptions be outlined from financial sanctions, including permitting States 
to allow exemptions from assets freezes for humanitarian purposes), and 120 (paragraph 374 — 
recommending that clear humanitarian exemptions be provided from aviation sanctions for 
emergencies, humanitarian need and religious obligation). 
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The Council's practice has also varied with respect to the elaboration of the 
responsibilities bestowed upon Sanctions Committees. As Chapter 9 demonstrates, although 
Sanctions Committees generally share a common set of core tasks, including receiving 
information from States regarding sanctions violations and reporting to the Council with 
observations and recommendations, there has also been considerable variation in Sanctions 
Committee mandates. Although some differentiation of mandate is likely to be required in 
order to tailor a particular Committee's activities to the appropriate sanctions regime, all 
Sanctions Committees should be performing the same basic duties with respect to 
administering, monitoring and reporting on sanctions implementation. 1°7 
Commissions of Inquiry, Bodies of Experts and Monitoring Mechanisms 
As noted in Chapter 9, the Council has created a range of subsidiary organs in 
addition to Sanctions Committees as part of its efforts to ensure that sanctions are effectively 
monitored and implemented. It is not always clear why the Council has decided in a 
particular instance to establish a "commission", as opposed to a "panel" or "group" of 
experts or a "monitoring mechanism". The responsibilities carried out by these entities are 
sometimes so similar that giving it a different name is effectively like putting a different saddle 
on the same horse. Experts seconded to these subsidiary entities perform similar core tasks, 
including investigating alleged sanctions violations, assessing how effective sanctions have 
been, and making recommendations regarding whether, and if so when and how, sanctions 
should be strengthened, loosened or lifted. In addition to using different names for what are 
107 	See: Guidelines from the Stockholm Process, above note 89,24 (paragraph 41: "[The Security 
Council should] consider establishing a standard framework and format to guide all Sanctions 
Committees, so as to facilitate their work and to ensure consistency and continuity among 
them"). 
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essentially identical bodies, the Council has also appointed varying numbers of experts, 
providing them with mandates of differing length. 
11.2.4 Recommendations for improving consistency 
In order to adhere to the element of consistency, the Council should seek to ensure 
that its approach to sanctions is more systematic than ad hoc. This should be true both in 
terms of the manner in which it formulates its decisions, but also in terms of the manner in 
which it bestows responsibility upon other actors for the administration, monitoring and 
enforcement of sanctions. This section outlines some steps that might be taken to improve 
the consistency of the Council's approach. 
One initiative that would strongly increase consistency would be to entrust a central 
body with responsibility for ensuring that new sanctions initiatives take into account the 
lessons of previous sanctions experience. A sanctions quality assurance unit could thus be 
created, with a mandate to verify that proposed sanctions-related draft resolutions were 
based upon best practice. Although the composition and sponsorship of draft resolutions 
remain the prerogative of Security Council Member States, the existence of such a body 
would help to ensure that sanctions best practice is not overlooked in the rush to take 
effective sanctions action. The sanctions quality assurance unit could consist of experts with 
considerable sanctions and legal drafting expertise, whose responsibility it would be to 
ensure that standard language and phrases are employed in the Council's resolutions which 
outline the contours of each sanctions regime. 
Bearing in mind the recommendations outlined above concerning transparency, the 
unit could also ensure that draft resolutions consistently acknowledge the basis in the U.N. 
Charter for sanctions-related action, identify the precise nature of the relevant threat to the 
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peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, and articulate the necessary objectives and 
conditions for easing and termination. It could also ensure a consistency of approach with 
respect to the scope of sanctions — both in terms of the prohibitions elaborated and any 
exemptions that are provided from those prohibitions. Moreover, it could also be tasked 
with ensuring a consistency of approach to the articulation of mandates for subsidiary actors. 
Another initiative that would serve the interests of consistency in relation to the 
activities undertaken by sanctions-related subsidiary actors, would be to streamline the 
responsibilities currently distributed among a significant number of ad hoc actors. Thus, for 
example, instead of having a proliferation of Sanctions Committees, Monitoring Mechanisms 
and Panels of Experts, central bodies focusing upon sanctions administration, monitoring and 
investigation could be established. Although a movement towards generalised bodies might 
lead to a decreased focus upon issues relating to specific sanctions regimes, this drawback 
could be alleviated by ensuring that the general bodies each possessed sufficient expertise 
relating to the geographic and technical dimensions of each sanctions regime. Moreover, the 
centralisation of such tasks would eliminate the need to provide new subsidiary bodies with 
teething periods in which to learn to ply their trade and the centralised bodies would develop 
institutional memory regarding sanctions best practice. 
The rationale for such centralisation is strongest with respect to Sanctions 
Committees and Monitoring Mechanisms. The tasks performed by the different Sanctions 
Committees and Monitoring Mechanisms are quite similar in nature, whereas it is arguable 
that establishing ad hoc Panels of Experts to undertake discrete investigative tasks might 
produce greater independence of findings. Although it has been alleged that the creation of a 
General Sanctions Committee might diminish the amount of attention paid to each individual 
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sanctions regime,'" in practice there is significant overlap of the membership of the different 
Committees in any case, due to the fact that the smaller delegations of the members of the 
Security Council often do not have separate specialists for each Committee. Moreover, a 
General Sanctions Committee that was tasked with reviewing all sanctions regimes might 
pay even greater attention to neglected sanctions regimes, as it would be meeting on a much 
more regular basis than a number of the individual Committees. 1°9 
11.3 First among equals: U.N. sanctions, the veto and the problem 
of equality 
"[T]he provisions of the Charter concerning collective security cannot 
become operational unless all countries fully respect international law 
and unless the principle of equality among States is made a reality. 7,n0  
"The success of the United Nations in the maintenance of international 
peace and security, within the framework of collective security, is 
dependent on the ability ... of the Council to act in upholding the rule of 
law on a non-selective basis." m 
As outlined in Chapter 2, the principle of equality requires that all parties over whom 
power is wielded are considered equal before that power and thus that decisions affecting 
the rights, entitlements and obligations of those parties are made in a consistent manner. In a 
legal context, equality requires that all parties should be considered equal before the law. 
108 	For an argument to this effect, see: Results of the Bonn-Berlin Process, above note 89, 115. 
109 	By way of quick comparison, the UNITA Sanctions Committee held twenty formal meetings 
between the beginning of 2000 and the end of 2001. During that same period, the Rwanda 
Sanctions Committee did not hold one formal meeting. See: Index to Proceedings of the Security 
Council for 2000 (2001) United Nations, New York, p. xvi; A156/2 (2001): Report of the Security 
Council: 16 June 2000-15 June 2001, pp. 444-445; A157/2 (2002): Report of the Security Council: 16 
June 2001-31 July 2002, pp. 53 -4. 
110 	King Hassan II of Morocco, speaking at the Council's Summit Meeting held at the level of 
Heads of State: S/PV.3046 (31 January 1992), p. 37. 
III 	Ambassador Redzuan of Malaysia, speaking during the Council's deliberations on the 
situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina: S/PV.3135 (13 November 1992), p. 35. 
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Thus the law should be equally applied and no one party should be considered to be above 
the law. In a political context, one method of achieving equality is to provide all parties with 
the opportunity to assume a position of power, through democratic representation. 
In the context of U.N. sanctions, equality requires that if sanctions are imposed 
against one State in a given set of circumstances, then they should be applied against other 
parties in a similar set of circumstances. It also requires that the Security Council itself be 
democratically representative of the broader U.N. membership and that all of its members 
have the opportunity to stand for election to the Council. Section 11.3.1 explores how the 
veto power has undermined equality in practice. Section 11.3.2 examines the extent to 
which the Council can be said to be democratically representative. Section 11.3.3 then 
explores whether it is possible to reform the United Nations, or alternatively the Council's 
approach to sanctions, in order to ensure greater equality in sanctions practice. 
11.3.1 Equality as equal treatment 
At the United Nations the principle of equality is theoretically enshrined in Article 
2(1) of the U.N. Charter, which provides that: "The Organization is based on the principle 
of the sovereign equality of all its Members." In practice, however, the aspiration of equality 
contained in Article 2(2) is considerably circumvented by Articles 23 and 27 of the Charter, 
which effectively enable some States to be more equal than others. Article 23(1) provides 
that any U.N. Member State can be elected to one of ten elected positions on the Security 
Council, but it also extends permanent Council membership to five countries — China, 
France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States. Article 27(1) 
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grants those permanent members the right of veto over all non-procedural matters." 2 Thus, 
although all States Members of the United Nations are equal in name and have the potential 
to sit on the Security Council, some are entitled not only to sit on the Council permanently, 
but also to prevent the Council from adopting a substantive decision. 
The existence of permanent Security Council membership with the power of the 
veto seriously undermines the capacity of the Security Council to ensure that all States are 
considered equal before the law. It effectively permits five States to stand above the law, by 
enabling them to prevent the Council from taking any action with which they disagree. With 
respect to sanctions, this means that in identical factual circumstances where the application 
of sanctions is warranted in order to address a threat to international peace and security, one 
State may find itself the target of a sanctions regime, whereas another would be able to 
avoid the application of sanctions due to the fact that it itself is a permanent member of the 
Council or because it has a permanent member as a close ally. 
In the Security Council's debates speakers have often remarked that the Council 
has not applied sanctions equally in its efforts to maintain peace and security. A commonly 
cited example is the Middle-East region, where the Council has applied sanctions against 
Iraq for its aggression against a neighbour, but not against Israel for actions that might also 
be argued to be in violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter." 3 In practice, there have been 
112 	Article 27(3) does not mention the word "veto", providing simply that: "Decisions on all [non- 
procedural] matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the 
concurring votes of the permanent members." For discussion of the San Francisco debates 
concerning the inclusion of the veto, see Chapter 4, note 14, above. 
113 	See, e.g., the statement by Ambassador Mumbengegwi of Zimbabwe, made when the Council 
adopted resolution 686 (1991), which endorsed the post-Gulf War cease-fire: S/PV.2978, pp. 38- 
40 ("History will have on record — and will, indeed, commend — the Council's actions in taking 
four days to impose economic sanctions and five months to take military measures against Iraq 
when it occupied Kuwait. But history will not forgive the Council for reneging on its 
responsibilities in other cases of occupation in the same region. ... The credibility and integrity 
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relatively few occasions when the actual use of the veto has prevented the Council from 
applying sanctions.' 14 But the threat of the use of the veto and even the mere knowledge that 
the veto might be utilised, have likely prevented sanctions from being proposed on many 
other occasions.' 15 
11.3.2 Equality as equal representation 
The principle of equality through democratic representation requires that the parties 
over whom power is exercised should be involved in the selection of those who exercise 
such power. Democratic representation encourages accountability, as those in elected 
positions of power must perform well in order to retain their power. In domestic political 
systems, democratic representation means that the people elect those in positions of power. 
In the context of UN sanctions, democratic representation requires that the broader 
membership of the UN, and potentially the broader public, should be involved in selecting 
which States sit on the Security Council. 
The process for filling the fifteen seats on the Council displays some of the 
characteristics of democratic representation. The broader U.N. membership elects ten of the 
fifteen members of the Security Council (the "elected ten" or "E10") on a rotating basis, with 
of the Council will be greatly damaged and international law undermined if the Council 
continues to be perceived as inconsistent"). 
114 	In the case of South Africa, prior to the eventual application of sanctions the veto was used 
twice to prevent the application of a mandatory arms embargo. A draft resolution which would 
have imposed economic sanctions against South Africa was also vetoed: see Repertoire of the 
Practice of the Security Council, Supplement for 1975-80 (1987) United Nations, New York, 
399. 
115 	The Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council documents a number of concrete 
examples in which a draft resolution which would have applied sanctions has not been put to 
the vote. One example occurred in August 1980, with respect to a draft resolution that would 
have called upon States to impose sanctions against Israel was not put to the vote: see 
Repertoire, Supplement for 1975-80, ibid, 400. It is probable, of course, that there have been 
many instances when, through the threat of a veto, a proposal to impose sanctions did not 
even proceed to the point of becoming a draft resolution. 
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five newly elected members joining the Council each year. The other five members — China, 
France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States — sit 
permanently on the Council (the "permanent five" or "P5") and possess the veto power. 
Although there are no specific rules regarding which States should sit on the Council as part 
of the E10, an informal system of regional representation has evolved, according to which 
regional blocs elect one or more representatives each year. 
There has been much discussion at the U.N. about the need to reform the Security 
Council so that it is more representative of the broader membership. When the U.N. was 
first established, the Security Council had eleven members, forming just less than one-fifth of 
the broader U.N. membership of 51 States." 6 In the late 1960s the Council's membership 
was expanded to fifteen, partly in response to the expansion of the broader membership as a 
result of the process of decolonization." 7 At the time that the Council grew to fifteen, the 
broader U.N. membership numbered 113. 118 Thus the ratio of the broader membership to 
Council members was just above seven: one. Nearly forty years after that first expansion of 
the Council, the membership of the Council ieinains at fifteen, while the broader membership 
has grown in excess of 190. In 2004 the ratio of the broader membership to Council 
members thus stands at over twelve: one. 
116 Simma, Bruno (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations: a Commentary (2002: I'd edition) 
Oxford UP, 176 (listing the 51 founding Member States of the United Nations). 
117 The expansion in Security Council membership was approved by the United Nations General 
Assembly on 17 December 1963 and entered into force on 31 August 1965, although as Simma 
notes, the additional four Member States did not in fact assume their places on the Council 
until the beginning of 1966. See: Simma, The Charter of the United Nations, ibid, 437. For the 
General Assembly resolution approving the expansion, see: A1RES/I991 A (XXVIII) (17 
December 1963). 
118 Simma, The Charter of the United Nations, above note 116, Vol. II, 1361. 
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Proposals for further expanding the Security Council's membership have been on 
the U.N. General Assembly's agenda since 1979. 119 Advanced discussions on the topic of 
Security Council reform have taken place since 1994 in the Open-ended Working Group on 
the Reform of the Security Council, which was established by the General Assembly at the 
end of 1993. 1 " The Working Group has considered various reform proposals, including 
expanding Council membership to as many as twenty-five. 121 Proposals have also been 
made to expand the permanent membership, but I is unlikely that additional permanent 
members would be accorded the veto. Any additional permanent members would thus 
perform a role that is qualitatively different from that of an original permanent member. 
While the reform proposals being discussed might bolster, to some extent, the 
democratic representativeness of the Council, certain other modifications could be made to 
the election process to bolster the potential of the Council membership to strengthen the rule 
of law. It has been the practice in some regional blocs to allow candidates to stand 
effectively unopposed. Some blocs operate largely according to a rotational process. While 
on the one hand such a rotational process encourages broad representation within that bloc, 
it can lead to problematic outcomes, such as occurred recently in the African bloc when, 
according to the planned African rotation, Libya was to be nominated as the African 
representative at the next Council elections. Ultimately Libya withdrew its candidacy, thus 
preventing a potentially embarrassing situation from materialising, whereby a State that had 
119 Ibid. 
120 The Open-ended Working Group was established by AIRES/48/26 (3 December 1993). 
121 For a concise summary of the various proposals, see: Simma, The Charter of the United 
Nations, above note 116, Vol. II, 1361-3. 
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until recently been subject to significant coercive Council action under Chapter VII would 
itself have become a Security Council member. 122 
In order to ensure that Security Council members are capable of contributing to the 
maintenance of international peace and security and strengthening the rule of law, certain 
standards should be applied in the election of new members. Libya is not the only recent 
example of a potential Council member with a problematic recent history in the resolution of 
international disputes. At least two other States, which have actually held Security Council 
seats in recent years, had dubious records in the maintenance of international peace and 
security at the time the became members of the Council. Prior to its election to the Security 
Council for the period 2002-3, Bulgaria had failed to regulate adequately the export of arms 
from its jurisdiction. It had featured in a number of reports of Panels of Experts concerning 
the origins of arms found to have been imported to States targets in violation of arms 
embargoes, thus demonstrating that Bulgaria had failed to fulfil its duty to comply with 
sanctions. 123 Guinea, which also sat on the Council from 2002-3, was itself accused by 
122 	Barringer, Felicity, 'U.S. Blocks Libya's Attempt to Gain Security Council Seat' (11 July 2003) 
New York Times A7. 
123 	See, for example, the reports of the Panels of Experts on UNITA and Somalia: S/2000/203 (10 
March 2000), enclosure: Report of the Panel of Experts on violations of Security Council 
sanctions against UNITA, paras 41-42 (documenting Bulgaria as the source of arms used to 
violate the UNITA sanctions) and 44 (documenting military training assistance provided in 
Bulgaria); S/2003/223 (25 March 2003), enclosure: Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia 
pursuant to Security Council resolution 1425 (2002), paras 80-85 (documenting a Bulgarian 
arms dealer who had violated the arms embargo against Somalia). It is notable that in the latter 
example the Panel "named and shamed" African countries (such as Yemen, Ethiopia, Eritrea 
and Djibouti) through which arms transited, without highlighting the countries in which the 
arms originated, which happened to include Bulgaria. The Chairman of the Somalia Sanctions 
Committee at the time —whose responsibility it was to forward the report to the Council — 
happened to be the Ambassador of Bulgaria. 
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Human Rights Watch of supplying arms to Liberian rebels whilst Liberia was subject to arms 
sanctions.' 24 
The ability of States with troublesome security records, such as Bulgaria and 
Guinea, to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security and efforts to 
strengthen the rule of law must be open to question. Indeed, much as the election to the 
U.N.'s Human Rights Commission of countries known to be persistent violators of human 
rights ultimately draws that body into disrepute, I25 the election of States with such 
troublesome security records can only undermine the Security Council's ability to serve as a 
positive force for the rule of law in international affairs. The Security Council's own 
subsidiary bodies have recommended that organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) should make compliance with U.N. 
sanctions a condition of gaining membership to their organizations. 126 It is thus no small irony 
that the body responsible for applying sanctions permits documented sanctions violators to 
join its own ranks. 
124 	See: Human Rights Watch, Back to the Brink: War Crimes by Liberian Government and 
Rebels (2002) HRW, New York, 11 (documenting Guinean support of the Liberian rebel group 
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)), 15 (calling on the Security 
Council to examine Guinea's role in fuelling the Liberian conflict). 
125 	A prime example of this was the election of Libya as the Chairman of the U.N. Human Rights 
Committee in January 2003. See: Waddington, Richard, 'Libya wins chair of U.N. human rights 
body despite record' (21 January 2003) The Independent 12. 
126 	S/1999/829 (28 July 1999) S/1999/829 (28 July 1999), annex: Report on the Chairman's visit to 
Europe and participation in the seventieth ordinary session of the Council of Ministers of the 
Organization of African Unity, July 1999, paras 14-15; S/2000/203 (10 March 2000), enclosure: 
Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions against UNITA, 
paragraph 56 (recommending that compliance with sanctions regimes should be among criteria 
considered by NATO and the EU when considering applications for membership). 
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11.3.3 Recommendations for Improving Equality 
The solution to the equality deficit in the United Nations sanctions system is as 
simple as it is improbable. In order to ensure actual equality in terms of the use of the 
Council's sanctions powers, the power of veto should be abolished, along with permanent 
membership. This is unlikely to happen, of course, because those who wield the veto would 
likely use it to prevent any such reform. Moreover, despite the manner in which the veto 
undermines the principle of equality, it is arguable that its existence has encouraged most 
major powers to remain within the United Nations framework most of the time. 
As it is extremely unlikely that the veto will be abolished, it is necessary to think of 
how to manage the veto so that it undermines to the minimum extent possible the potential of 
sanctions to reinforce and strengthen the rule of law. One strategy that might be employed 
would be to encourage restraint in the use of the veto. 127 A second strategy could be for the 
elected members to band together more regularly in a bloc, thus meaning that they could 
effectively wield a veto. 128 While this strategy would not ensure that all players were treated 
equally before the law, it would mean that all members of the Security Council effectively 
had the potential to wield a veto, thus creating a greater sense of equality on the Council. 
127 	At San Francisco the permanent members in fact issued a declaration concerning voting 
procedure in the Security Council, in which they suggested that they would use the veto with 
restraint. See: Documents of the UNCIO, Vol XI, 710-14: Statement by the Delegations of the 
four Sponsoring Governments on Voting Procedure in the Security Council, paragraphs 8 ("it 
is not to be assumed, however, that the permanent members, any more than the non-permanent 
members, would use their "veto" power willfully to obstruct the operation of the Council"). 
128 	In fact, the permanent members implied in their declaration on voting procedure that the non- 
permanent members would in effect possess a collective veto, as no decision could be made by 
the permanent members alone. See: ibid, paragraph 8 ("It should also be remembered that 
under the Yalta formula the five major powers could not act by themselves, since even under 
the unanimity requirement any decisions of the Council would have to include the concurring 
votes of at least two of the non-permanent members. In other words, it would be possible for 
five non-permanent members as a group to exercise a "veto'"). 
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Unfortunately, however, such a strategy might also have the effect of tying the Council's 
hands on a more frequent basis, thus risking a return to the days of Cold War paralysis. 
One area in which the effects of the veto upon sanctions practice could be mitigated 
through the judicious use of cooperation between the elected ten is in the employment of 
time-limits. When sanctions are imposed for an unspecified period, any permanent member 
can veto the decision to terminate sanctions. In order to limit the ability of the permanent 
members to dictate when, and indeed if, sanctions will be terminated, the elected ten could 
band together to ensure that sanctions are always imposed with a time-limit. Such time-limits 
should be set for no longer than two years, as within two years a completely different set of 
elected ten members sit on the Council. If it is necessary to maintain the sanctions, then it 
should be a relatively simple matter for the Security Council to adopt a resolution extending 
the sanctions. If it is not possible to obtain sufficient votes to maintain sanctions, then it is 
highly unlikely that the necessary political will to implement the sanctions would exist in any 
case. 
With respect to democratic representation, it seems clear that there should be some 
expansion in the membership of the Security Council. If and when such an expansion takes 
place, permanent membership without the right of veto is likely to be extended to a handful 
of Member States. This development would have the disadvantage of creating yet another 
layer of inequality, making the new "permanent members" more equal than most, but still not 
as equal as some. It would have the advantage, however, of ensuring that there would be 
some non-veto-wielding members with consistent institutional memory of the Council's 
practice and procedures, thus perhaps offsetting the decided advantage that currently works 
in favour of the current P5 vis-à-vis the inexperienced E10. In terms of equality, however, 
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the expansion of the membership of the Security Council — however great it may be and 
however many additional benefits are accorded to the new "permanent members" — may 
ultimately amount to no more than placing extra chairs on the deck of the Titanic. 
Even if it is possible to tame the veto through a combination of fostering restraint and 
encouraging creative cooperative techniques among the E10, the lack of genuine equality in 
sanctions practice will remain a sore thumb from the perspective of the rule of law. But to 
the extent that the Security Council's sanctions practice can be reformed so that it adheres 
to the other four principles of the rule of law — transparency, consistency, due process and 
proportionality — the argument might still be made that, although the principle of equality 
ultimately remains unsatisfied, at least in those instances when the Council gathers the 
necessary consensus to apply sanctions, it can do so in a manner that reinforces and 
strengthens the rule of law. Thus, if those other elements are consistently satisfied, the 
Council's sanctions practice should retain the potential to instil confidence in the sanctions 
system and to induce the widespread compliance of Member States with sanctions regimes. 
11.4 Guilty until proven innocent? U.N. sanctions and the problem 
of due process 
As outlined in Chapter 2, the principle of due process requires that parties against 
which coercive power is proposed to be exercised should be given a fair hearing and 
granted the opportunity to express their point of view regarding the potential decision. In the 
context of U.N. sanctions, the principle of due process requires that potential sanctions 
targets should be afforded the possibility to present their version of events. In other words, 
they should be presumed innocent until proven guilty. The Security Council's track-record 
with respect to due process is not strong. While States targets have been accorded some 
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measure of due process, by virtue of the fact that they have generally been granted the 
opportunity to present their point of view at formal meetings when the Council votes to 
apply sanctions, little due process has been extended to non-State actors and individuals. 
11.4.1 Due process and States targets 
Of the various targets of U.N. sanctions, only Member States have been accorded 
the opportunity to place their views regarding the proposed application of sanctions on the 
record in formal Security Council meetings. Representatives of Iraq, Yugoslavia (prior to 
dissolution), Libya, Liberia, Rwanda and the Sudan have thus outlined their Government's 
position regarding the actual or potential application of sanctions against their country: 29 
One other State target that was not a member of the United Nations — the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) — has also been granted the chance to express its 
129 	South Africa did not address the Security Council at the meeting at which sanctions were 
imposed, but it is not clear that it was prevented from so doing. For that meeting, see: 
S/PV.2046 (4 November 1977). For Iraq's view on the sanctions imposed against it, see: 
S/PV.2933 (6 August 1990), pp. 11-15 (when the Council adopted resolution 661 (1990), thus 
imposing sanctions); S/PV.2981 (3 April 1991), pp. 21-35 (when the Council adopted resolution 
687 (1991), confirming the ongoing application of sanctions beyond the conclusion of the Gulf 
War). For Yugoslavia's position, calling for the application of an arms embargo, see: S/PV.3009 
(25 September 1991), pp. 620. For Libya's view prior to the application of sanctions, see: 
S/PV.3033 (21 January 1992), 4-25 (two months prior to the application of sanctions, when the 
Council adopted resolution 731 (1992)); S/PV.3063 (31 March 1992), pp. 3-22 (just before the 
Council adopted resolution 748 (1992), imposing sanctions). For Rwanda's views on the 
proposed sanctions against it, see: S/PV.3377 (17 May 1994), pp. 2-6. For the views of the 
Sudan on the sanctions proposed against it, see: S/PV.3660 (26 April 1996), pp. 2-10. 
With respect to the Liberian sanctions regimes, a Liberian representative expressed the view of 
his Government prior to the application of the 788 sanctions regime. See: S/PV.3138, pp. 13-20 
(prior to the adoption of resolution 788 (1992), applying sanctions). The views of the Liberian 
Government were not expressed upon the application of the two subsequent sanctions 
regimes, however, which were each imposed without substantive discussion. See: S/PV.4287 (7 
March 2001) (imposing the 1343 sanctions regime); S/PV.4890 (22 December 2003) (imposing 
the 1521 sanctions regime). Nevertheless, prior to the most recent application of sanctions 
against Liberia the Chairman of the Liberian National Transitional Government, Mr. Charles 
Bryant, was granted the opportunity to present his views before the Council. See: S/PV.4981 (3 
June 2004), pp. 6-10. Despite Chairman Bryant's plea to lift the timber and diamond sanctions, 
two weeks later the Council adopted resolution 1549 (2004), extending the application of those 
sanctions. 
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opinion regarding proposed sanctions.'" From a due process perspective, it is positive that 
most States targets have been granted the opportunity to argue their case at the open 
meetings at which the Council imposed sanctions. Although the spectre of a rogue regime 
arguing its case before the global public may be unpalatable, 131 it is surely better to provide 
other States with the opportunity to refute such claims, than to sweep them under the carpet. 
11.4.2 Due process and non-State targets 
The question of providing due process to non-State actors, such as the illegal 
minority regime in Southern Rhodesia or the Angolan rebel group UNITA, is complicated, 
as issues of logistics and recognition would arise were it proposed that such actors should 
be entitled to appear before the Council to plead their case." 2 The proposition of according 
due process to a non-State actor such as Al Qaida raises even more thorny issues, as the 
Council would understandably be reluctant to take any action that might provide a forum for 
terrorists to justify their actions or suggest implicit Security Council recognition of that 
130 	The entity sometimes referred to as Serbia-Montenegro and sometimes as the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia was eventually admitted to United Nations membership on 1 November 2000, 
under the name "the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia". See: S/RES/1326 (31 October 2000) 
(recommending to the General Assembly that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia be admitted 
to membership); AIRES/55/12 (1 November 2000) (resolution of the General Assembly 
admitting the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a Member State. Although the views of the 
Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) were not expressed 
prior to the adoption of resolution 757 (1992), applying sanctions, a representative was 
permitted to air that Government's position when the Council adopted resolution 787 (1992), 
strengthening those sanctions. See: S/PV.3137 (16 November 1992), 67-77 (statement by 
"Foreign Minister Djukic"). When the Council imposed sanctions against the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia to address the situation in Kosovo, the target's position was expressed by Mr. 
Vladislav Jovanovic: S/PV.3868 (31 March 1998), 15-19 (upon the adoption of resolution 1160 
(1998), applying sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). 
131 	This occurred in the case of Rwanda, where the representative of Rwanda expressed the views 
of the regime which was at that very moment perpetrating genocide against its people. See: 
S/PV.3377 (17 May 1994), 2-6. A number of other delegates argued that the Rwandan 
intervention had been in poor taste. See, for example the same meeting at 11 (New Zealand) and 
12 (United Kingdom). 
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entity's legitimacy. Nevertheless, the principle of due process requires that an assumption of 
innocence be accorded even to those accused of the most heinous of crimes. A robust, rule 
of law-based sanctions framework would thus seek to extend due process in some form to 
any potential sanctions target. 
11.4.3 Due process and individuals 
The due process failings of the U.N. sanctions system are particularly pronounced 
with respect to targeted individuals. As part of a movement towards better targeted, "smart 
sanctions", the Security Council has increasingly applied sanctions against individuals, 
imposing travel and financial sanctions against leaders and officials deemed to share some 
responsibility in creating the circumstances necessitating the imposition of sanctions. This 
development is generally positive, as it aims to focus the coercive action upon decision- 
makers and specific targets associated with them in order to minimize the unintended impact 
upon innocent civilian populations. 
The imposition of individual travel sanctions has proven uncontroversial on the 
whole, as placing restrictions upon a target's ability to travel internationally is generally seen 
as posing a nuisance to the target individuals, rather than infringing upon their basic rights. 
The application of financial sanctions, on the other hand, has led to significant due process 
concerns. The impulse to freeze bank accounts is understandable, particularly where target 
leaders may be suspected of having embezzled substantial amounts of state-owned funds. 
Nevertheless, the act of freezing bank accounts entails a significant infringement upon 
individual rights and freedoms, potentially leaving targets without the means to support 
132 	Bailey & Daws note that in May 1966 the illegal Southern Rhodesian regime sought to address 
the Security Council, but its request was rejected: Bailey & Daws, The procedure of the UN 
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themselves financially. To date, targeted individuals have been granted little opportunity to 
dispute the asserted facts leading to the inclusion of their names on financial blacklists. The 
Taliban/A1 Qaida sanctions regime provides a case-in-point. 
Under the Taliban/A1 Qaida sanctions regime, States are required to freeze the 
assets of individuals and entities listed on a "blacklist" cf individuals and entities who are 
associated with Usama Bin Laden, the Taliban and Al Qaida. 133 The blacklist is compiled by 
the Afghanistan/Taliban/A1 Qaida Sanctions Committee (the "1267 Committee"), on the 
basis of suggestions submitted by Committee Member States. 134 When proposals are made 
to add individuals or entities to the list, Committee Member States have a period of 48 
hours in which to object to the proposals. If no Member State objects within that 48-hour 
window, then the proposed additions are included in the list. Once an individual or entity is 
placed on the list, they carmot be removed unless all fifteen Committee members agree to 
their removal. ' 35 
A number of individuals have sought to have their names removed from the list by 
appealing both to the Sanctions Committee itself and to the capitals of States Members of 
the Taliban/A1 Qaida Sanctions Committee (the "1267 Committee"). 136 Some individuals 
Security Council, above note 3, 156. 
133 S/RES/I390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraph 2(a); SIRES/1455 (17 January 2003), 
operative paragraph 2; SIRES/1526 (30 January 2004), operative paragraph 1(a). 
134 The process by which proposed individuals and entities are added to the list has been 
ascertained through off-the-record interviews with diplomats and members of the U.N. 
Secretariat. The Taliban/A1 Qaida black-list itself is posted on-line at the following address: 
http://www.un.org/Docs/secommittees/1267/1267ListEng.htm (last visited on 30 June 2004). 
135 The 1267 Committee's Guidelines note that decision-making is by consensus. See paragraph 9 
of the guidelines, posted at: htT://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267  guidelines.pdf 
(last visited on 30 June 2004). 
136 See, e.g., Duffy, Andrew, "Ottawa man "devastated" by charges of terror links: Accused 
wanted in U.S. for his role in money transfer firm has "no job, no income" (16 April 2002) The 
Ottawa Citizen; Rupert, Jake, "Canada fights to clear man's name: Liban Hussein on list of 
alleged financiers of al-Qaida" (13 June 2002) The Ottawa Citizen; Lynch, Colum, "U.S. Seeks 
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have also brought legal proceedings before the European Court of Justice, seeking to have 
the order freezing their assets overturned on the grounds that the order violated the right to a 
fair and equitable hearing. 137 The 1267 Committee itself has acknowledged the need to 
strike a balance between "respecting the human rights of those inscribed on the list" and "the 
need to take preventive measures in the struggle against terrorism."138 It has also noted that 
several States have "stressed the importance of adhering to the rule of law and due process 
standards while implementing the sanctions measures." 139 
In response to concerns regarding the process by which individuals are placed on 
the financial blacklist, the 1267 Committee has included in its guidelines an elaborate 
procedure by which individuals can be "delisted". 14° According to that procedure, listed 
individuals can petition their Government to request review of the case."' Their Government 
can then approach the Government that originally proposed that the individual be listed (the 
"designating Government"), requesting consultations on the individuals concerned. H2 If, after 
those consultations, their Government then wishes to pursue a "de-listing request", it can 
to Take 6 Names Off U.N. Sanctions List; Administration Was Criticized for Offering Little 
Proof That Individuals, Groups Aided Al Qaida" (22 August 2002) The Washington Post. 
137 	See, e.g., the following three cases brought before the European Court of Justice (Court of First 
Instance): Case T-306101, Abdirisiak Aden and others v. EU Council and EC Commission; 
Case T-315101, Yassin Abdullah Khadi v. Council and Commission; Case T-318/01, Omar 
Mohammed Othman v. Council and Commission. 
138 	S/2002/1423 (26 December 2002), annex: Report of the 1267 Committee for 2002, paragraph 12. 
See also paras 11, 47 of the same report. [latest: S12004/281 (8 April 2004): Report of the 1267 
Committee for 2003.] 
139 S/20041281 (8 April 2004): Report of the 1267 Committee for 2003, paragraph 45 (noting that 
several States had made such comments to the Chairman of the 1267 Committee, upon two 
visits he made to countries that were strategically important to the imp lementation of the 
Taliban/AI Qaida sanctions, including Afghanistan, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Pakistan and 
Saudi Arabia). 
140 	See: 1267 Committee Guidelines, above note 135, paragraph 7. 
141 Ibid, paragraph 7(a). 
142 	Ibid, paragraph 7(b). 
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seek to persuade the designating Government to submit a joint request for de-listing. I 43 The 
1267 Committee then has the final decision as to whether a de-listing will proceed.'" As 
noted in Chapter 9, Committee decisions are made by consensus, meaning that if one of the 
fifteen Committee members objects, a decision to de-list cannot proceed. 145 In such an 
instance, the Committee's guidelines provide that the matter can be submitted to the Security 
Council.'" It is highly unlikely, however, that in the absence of Committee consensus to de-
list, there would emerge a consensus to refer the matter to the Security Council. 
What is striking about the de-listing procedure is that listed individuals have no 
capacity to address the 1267 Committee directly to present their concerns and protest their 
innocence. They must rely upon a sponsor government, which — if it can be convinced to 
proceed with the case — must then effectively rely upon the goodwill of the State that 
originally suggested the individual be listed, in order for the matter to proceed to the 
Committee.' 47 In a domestic legal context, this is analogous to requiring agreement between 
the prosecution and the defence before even permitting the defendant's case to be heard. 
On a practical level, it is understandable that the Committee is reluctant to allow petitions to 
proceed unless they are likely to succeed, as it might otherwise be inundated with petitions 
that are unlikely to go anywhere. From a due process perspective, however, it would be 
preferable to permit such petitions to go ahead — whether or not they are sponsored by a 
143 Ibid, paragraph 7(d). 
144 	Ibid, paragraph 7(e). 
145 See Chapter 9, section 9.1.3. 
146 	Ibid. 
147 Technically a petitioning State can proceed with the matter without agreement from the 
designating State. See ibid, paragraph 7(d). In practice, however, it is most unlikely to do so. 
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Government: 48 Designating States should also be required to elaborate clear and compelling 
reasons why such individuals should remain on the list. 
While the 1267 Committee has responded to concerns regarding the legitimacy of 
the listing process by establishing a de-listing process, the Security Council has endeavoured 
to address such concerns by elaborating exemptions from the sanctions where the relevant 
funds, assets or resources were necessary for "basic" or "extraordinary" expenses: 49 It has 
also qualified that States can permit frozen accounts to earn interest and to receive 
outstanding payments owed under contracts, agreements or obligations that had arisen prior 
to the application of sanctions: 5° Despite these efforts to enable listed individuals to support 
themselves financially, the 1267 Committee's annual report for 2003 suggests that the 
exemptions process has not operated particularly effectively. During the course of 2003, the 
Committee received a mere two notifications from Member States regarding exemptions 
sought by individuals: 51 In an illuminating acknowledgement, the Committee noted that it 
was drafting procedures designed to streamline the processing and consideration of 
exemptions under resolution 1452 (2002), observing that those procedures should ensure 
that the exemptions were applied "in a transparent and effective way." 52 
148 	See also: Guidelines from the Stockholm Process, above note 89, P.  103 (paragraph 320: 
"Sanctions Committees should consider possible mechanisms or procedures to allow 
individuals listed as targets to submit information directly to the Chair of the Sanctions 
Committee in cases where the targeted individual is unable to petition his or her Government of 
residence and/or citizenship"). 
149 	SIRES/1452 (20 December 2002), operative paragraph 1. 
150 	SIRES/1452 (20 December 2002), operative paragraph 2. 
151 	S/2004/281 (8 April 2004): Report of the 1267 Committee for 2003, paras 22-24. 
152 	Ibid, paragraph 24. 
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11.4.4 Recommendations for strengthening due process 
Of all of the elements explored in this study, the one with perhaps the greatest 
resonance as a symbol of the rule of law is due process. As the discussion above illustrates, 
with the exception of States targets, which have generally been granted an opportunity to 
place their version of events on-record, the Council's adherence to the principle of due 
process has been somewhat piecemeal. The recommendations outlined below aim to 
improve the extent of due process accorded to potential and actual targets. Some of them 
apply to situations involving any of the three types of targets analysed above — States, non- 
State actors and individuals. Others apply specifically to the case of individuals who are 
targets. 
As a general principle, potential targets of sanctions should be afforded an 
opportunity to present their version of events, so that Council members can make a 
considered determination as to whether the application of sanctions is justified and 
necessary. In situations where it is not practical for potential targets to present their case 
directly before the Security Council, fact-finding missions could be tasked with the 
responsibility of presenting an objective assessment of the facts. In the Libyan example, for 
instance, due process might have been well-served by establishing a fact-finding mission to 
ascertain the facts and to determine conclusively whether Libya was obstructing 
investigations into the terrorist airline bombings to the extent that it posed a threat to the 
peace. Although it is likely that most cases involving a potential threat to the peace would 
require immediate action, the Libyan example does not appear to have been one of those 
cases. Some years had elapsed since the incidents at the heart of the dispute had taken 
place, and it is difficult to see how waiting a matter of a few more weeks or months to 
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receive the findings of an objective fact-finding mission would have led to an increased 
threat. 
There is a clear and pressing need for due process reform with respect to the 
application of financial sanctions against individuals. While the articulation of exemptions for 
basic and extraordinary expenses is a positive development, it does not offset the current 
due process deficit. Where individuals stand to be deprived of access to their own personal 
property and livelihood, they should be provided with maximum due process. The listing and 
de-listing process for individual sanctions currently operates in such a way that the 
presumption is of guilt rather than innocence, with individuals possessing no as-of-right 
opportunity to hear, let alone contest, the accusations levelled against them. Instead, they 
must rely upon the good will of their own govemment to bring their case before the relevant 
Sanctions Committee and then they must convince all Committee members, including the 
member responsible for listing them, that they should be de-listed. Is this the model of due 
process the Security Council has in mind when it speaks of the importance of establishing 
justice and the rule of law in post-conflict societies? 
The listing process likely evolved because of a concern that those who stand to have 
financial sanctions imposed against them would move their finances to a safe place if they 
knew that there was a possibility that they would be sanctioned. Thus the rush to sanction, 
without providing full due process, is understandable. Nevertheless, if Sanctions Committees 
fail to provide adequate due process, they risk a situation emerging whereby States might 
refuse to implement such sanctions, thus undermining both the effectiveness of the sanctions 
regime and the credibility of the Committees and the Council itself. 
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One method by which the Committees could afford greater due process to listed 
individuals would be to list them temporarily, pending a genuine consideration of the merits 
of the allegations levelled against them. Such a consideration could take place in the 
Committee itself or before a competent body established by the Security Council specifically 
for the purpose of hearing such due process appeals. Once a listed individual's situation had 
been closely considered in such a manner, the Committee would then decide to delist or 
relist the individual, based on the findings that emerge. 
A number of useful recommendations for improving due process have also arisen 
from the Stockholm process, including that the Security Council could: establish clear and 
transparent guidelines for determining which individuals are to be listed as targets; 153 create 
an independent body to monitor observance of the due process rights of targeted 
indivichials; 154 utilise the expertise of the U.N.'s Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights to ensure that the procedures for compiling lists of targets are in conformity with 
international human rights standards; 155 and introduce administrative or judicial processes 
that fulfil the ordinary expectations of due process: 56 
11.5 A disproportionate burden: the unintended consequences of 
U.N. sanctions upon innocent civilian populations and third 
States 
"Sanctions, as is generally recognized, are a blunt instrument. They raise 
the ethical question of whether suffering inflicted on vulnerable groups 
in the target country is a legitimate means of exerting pressure on 
political leaders whose behaviour is unlikely to be affected by the plight 
of their subjects. Sanctions also always have unintended or unwanted 
effects." 
153 Guidelines from the Stockholm Process, above note 89, 28 (paragraph 50). 
154 	Ibid, 28 (paragraph 50). 
155 	Ibid, 33 (paragraph 63). 
156 lbid, 97 (paragraph 284). 
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- U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali, 25 January 1995 157 
"One of the areas in which the Council can make a contribution to the 
rule of law and international justice is that of sanctions imposed 
pursuant to Chapter VII. It is necessary to reduce to a minimum the 
negative impact which economic sanctions can have on innocent civilian 
populations and to address the issue of the adverse impact of sanctions 
on third countries." 158 
- Mrs. Soledad Alvear Valenzuela, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile 
As outlined in Chapter 2, the principle of proportionality requires that the 
consequences of a decision affecting the rights, entitlements and obligations of other parties 
must be proportional to the harm caused by that party and consistent with the overall 
objectives for which the decision is being taken. In the context of sanctions, proportionality 
requires that the coercive consequences of the application of sanctions remain in proportion 
to the threat to the peace posed by the target against which sanctions are imposed. In 
particular, the effects of sanctions upon innocent civilian populations and third States should 
be minimised.'" 
157 	S1199511 (25 January 1995): Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the 
Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, 
paragraph 70. 
158 	Mrs. Soledad Alvear Valenzuela, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile: S/PV.4833 (24 September 
2003), p. 22. 
159 	The Heads of United Nations Member States recognized as much in the Millennium 
Declaration, by which they resolved: "to minimize the adverse effects of United Nations 
economic sanctions on innocent populations; to subject such sanctions regimes to regular 
reviews; and to eliminate the adverse effects of sanctions on third parties". See: A/RES/55/2 
(18 September 2000): United Nations Millennium Declaration, paragraph 9. 
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11.5.1 Proportionality and civilian populations: minimising the humanitarian impact 
of sanctions 
U.N. sanctions have been heavily criticised due to their potential to devastate 
innocent civilian populations. They have been referred to as "a silent holocaust", 160 as "the 
U.N.'s weapon of mass destruction", 161 as "modem siege warfare", 162 as a "genocidal 
tool"163 and as "state-sanctioned murder". '  An increasing number of studies have sought to 
document the negative humanitarian and human tights impact of sanctions upon civilian 
populations. 165 
160 	Arbuthnot, Felicity, 'Dying of shame' 298 New Internationalist (January/February 1998). This 
article can be found on-line at: http://www.newint.org/issue298/Iraq.html  (last visited 20 July 
2004). 
161 	See, e.g., Normand, Roger, "Sanctions against Iraq: new weapon of mass destruction" (1998) 64 
Covert Action 4-10; Halliday, Denis J., "Iraq and the UN's weapon of mass destruction" (1999) 
98 Current History 65-8; Mueller, John & Mueller, Karl, "Sanctions of mass destruction" (1999) 
Foreign Affairs, v. 78, n.3, 43-53; Chomslcy, Noam, Herman, Edward, Said, Edward, Zinn, 
Howard, et al., 'Sanctions are Weapons of Mass Destruction', in Amove, Anthony (ed.), Iraq 
Under Siege: the Deadly Impact of Sanctions and War (2002: updated edition) South End 
Press, Cambridge, MA, 217-19. 
162 	Gordon, Joy, 'Sanctions as siege warfare' The Nation, March 22 1999. This article can be found 
on-line at: http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/iraq1/iraq12.htm  (last visited 10 July 
2004. 
163 	Simons, Geoffrey L., Imposing economic sanctions: legal remedy or genocidal tool? (1999) 
Pluto Press, London. See also Bisharat, George E., 'Sanctions as Genocide' (2001) 11 
Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 379-425. 
164 	Chomsky, Noam, Herman, Edward, Said, Edward, Zinn, Howard, et al., 'Sanctions are Weapons 
of Mass Destruction', in Amove, Anthony (ed.), Iraq Under Siege: the Deadly Impact of 
Sanctions and War (2002: updated edition) South End Press, Cambridge, MA, 217-19, 218. 
165 	For a study of the humanitarian impact of economic sanctions in general, see: Weiss, Thomas 
G., Cortright, David, Lopez, Ctorge A., & Minear, Larry (eds.), Political Gain and Civilian 
Pain: humanitarian impacts of economic sanctions (1997) Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD, 
91-147; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Coping with the 
Humanitarian Impact of Sanctions: an OCHA Perspective (December 1998) UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, New York. 
For studies of the humanitarian impact of sanctions against Iraq, see: Center for Economic and 
Social Rights, (UN) Sanctioned Suffering: a Human Rights Assessment of United Nations 
Sanctions on Iraq (1996) Center for Economic and Social Rights, NY; UNICEF, Results of the 
1999 Iraq Child and Maternal Mortality Surveys (1999) UNICEF, New York; Hoskins, Eric, 
'The Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions and War in Iraq', in Weiss et al, Political 
Gain and Civilian Pain, 91-147; Pellett, Peter L., 'Sanctions, Food, Nutrition, and Health in 
Iraq', in Amove, Anthony (ed.), Iraq Under Siege: the Deadly Impact of Sanctions and War 
(2002: updated edition) South End Press, Cambridge, MA, 185-203. For studies of the sanctions 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), see: Devin, Julia & Dashti-
Gibson, Jaleh, 'Sanctions in the Former Yugoslavia: Convoluted Goals and Complicated 
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The most serious allegations regarding the humanitarian impact of sanctions have 
concerned the situation in Iraq. The Iraq sanctions have been accused of contributing to a 
"humanitarian catastrophe", 166 including effects such as a tenfold increase in typhoid 
incidences between 1990 and 1991, and a fivefold increase in the mortality rate of children 
under five years of age between 1990 and 1995. 167 Perhaps the most alarming finding, 
based on a detailed analysis of child mortality rates in Iraq between 1960 and 1998, is that 
there may have been as many as 500,000 excess deaths among children under the age of 
five between 1991 and 1998. 168 The sanctions regimes against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) and Haiti have also been accused of creating dire 
humanitarian consequences.' 69 
The question of precisely which consequences can be directly attributed to 
sanctions, as distinct from other potential contributing factors, is difficult to resolve with 
Consequences', in Weiss et al, Political Gain and Civilian Pain, 149-87. For studies of the 
Haiti regime, see: Gibbons, Elizabeth D., Sanctions in Haiti: human rights and democracy 
under assault (1999) Praeger, Westport, CT; Zaidi, Sarah, 'Humanitarian Effects of the Coup 
and Sanctions in Haiti', in Weiss et al, Political Gain and Civilian Pain, 189-212. 
166 	Minear, Larry, Cortright, David, Wagler, Julia, Lopez, George A., & Weiss, Thomas G., Toward 
More Humane and Effective Sanctions Management: Enhancing the Capacity of the United 
Nations System (1998) Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Providence, RI, 
167 	See: ibid; and Hoskins, 'The Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions and War in Iraq', 
above note 165, 120-1. 
168 	UNICEF press release, 'Iraq Survey Shows "Humanitarian Emergency" (12 August 1999). See 
also Pellett, 'Sanctions, Food, Nutrition, and Health in Iraq', above note 165, especially 195-7. 
169 	With respect to the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia- 
Montenegro), see: Devin, 172 (charging that sanctions contributed to a serious deterioration in 
health conditions). With respect to the Haiti sanctions, see Minear et al., Toward More 
Humane and Effective Sanctions Management, above note 165, lod-xxii (charging that 
sanctions caused malnutrition rates among under children five to rise from 50% to 61%); and 
Gibbons, Elizabeth D., Sanctions in Haiti: human rights and democracy under assault (1999) 
Praeger, Westport, CT, 23 (arguing that sanctions lifted the mortality rate of children between 1 
and 4 from 56 to 61 per thousand). 
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absolute certainty. 170 Moreover, even in cases where it is beyond dispute that sanctions have 
caused suffering, those supporting the use of sanctions would argue that such suffering is 
primarily the responsibility of target leaders and policy-makers whose actions have 
threatened the peace and therefore led to the application of sanctions. Thus in the case of 
the Iraq sanctions, the argument was often made that the suffering of the Iraqi people was 
caused by Saddam Hussein, rather than by the Security Council and its Member States."' 
As noted in Chapter 8, the Security Council has sought to address the negative 
impact of sanctions upon civilian populations through outlining exemptions, employing so-
called "smart" or "targeted" sanctions, and by calling for humanitarian impact 
assessments: 72 Each of these strategies has contributed to some extent to an overall 
decrease in the unintended consequences resulting from the application of sanctions. 
Nevertheless, there remains room for improvement. 
As outlined in the section above on consistency, the Council's approach has been 
quite inconsistent with respect to humanitarian exemptions. It has generally exempted 
medical supplies, although in the Iraq case such supplies were sometimes prevented from 
going ahead due to dual-use concerns. It has sometimes exempted foodstuffs completely, 
170 	Hoskins acknowledges the difficulty of isolating the effects of sanctions from those of war in 
the case of Iraq: Hoskins, 'The Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions and War in Iraq', 
above note 165, 135 ("That Iraq has suffered severe humanitarian consequences from the gulf 
crisis is undeniable. Much less clear is the relative weight to be given to war versus economic 
sanctions. It is extremely difficult to separate the effects of sanctions from those of the forty-
three-day bombing campaign and subsequent ground war"). Later, however, Hoskins 
concludes that with the passage of time, sanctions were increasingly responsible for 
sustaining the Iraqi emergency: at 137. 
171 	See, e.g., editorial, 'The Suffering of Children' (17 August 1999) Washington Post, Al4 
("Saddam Hussein is not the first to use the suffering of children as an instrument of war, but 
he is surely distinctive in his manipulation of his country's own children. His evident purpose 
in exploiting Iraq's most vulnerable citizens is to advance his campaign against the embargo 
imposed by the United Nations for his invasion of Kuwait nearly 10 years ago. In this way, he 
has sacrificed his nation's future in this grisly effort"). 
172 	See Chapter 8, section 8.4.1. 
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whilst at others doing so only in "humanitarian circumstances". At times it has also provided 
exemptions for items such as clothing, petroleum and petroleum products, and educational 
equipment. 
The Council increasing emphasis on "smart" or "targeted" sanctions is most 
welcome from the perspective of proportionality. Particularly positive has been its focus 
upon isolating components of a target's economy that are considered to fuel conflict. 
Nevertheless, sometimes the proceeds from those economic resources, in addition to being 
put to that negative use of fuelling conflict, also sustain the development and welfare of 
innocent individuals and societies living in the areas connected with the target. Thus, even 
though such targeted measures result in less negative consequences for innocent civilians 
than those that would flow from the application of comprehensive sanctions, creative 
possibilities could nonetheless be explored in such situations to ensure that sanctions are 
applied with even fewer negative consequences. 
With respect to humanitarian impact, the Council's increased emphasis upon 
analysis of the humanitarian and socio-economic consequences of sanctions is to be lauded. 
Even here, however, there remains room for improvement Such assessments are not yet 
called for as a matter of course, and when they are mandated, there is a lack of coherence 
and consistency. 173  This latter point is illustrated by the Council's oversight of the Liberia 11 
sanctions regime. In resolution 1478 (2003), the Security Council called upon two different 
actors — the Secretary-General and the Liberia II Panel of Experts — to undertake essentially 
the same task of providing humanitarian impact analysis of the sanctions imposed against 
173 	The Stockholm process recommended that the Security Council should include regular 
humanitarian and socio-economic impact assessment in its sanctions monitoring procedures, 
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Liberia: 74 The reports that were submitted accordingly both provided interesting insights 
into the potential humanitarian and socio-economic consequences of the sanctions.' 75 They 
differed substantially, however, employing different methodologies for assessment," 6 and 
provided diverging observations and recommendations.' 77 Humanitarian impact assessments 
should be mandated as a matter of standard practice and they should follow a consistent 
methodology. 
under established methodology: Guidelines from the Stockholm Process, above note 89, 27 
(paragraph 50). 
174 	S/RES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 19 (requesting the Secretary-General to submit 
to it by 7 August 2003 a report on the possible humanitarian or socio-economic impact of the 
timber sanctions); S/RES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 25(c) (requesting the Liberia 
II Panel of Experts to assess the possible humanitarian and socio-economic impact of the 
logging sanctions and to make recommendations for minimizing any such impact). 
175 See: S/2003/779 (7 August 2003), enclosure: Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to 
paragraph 25 of Security Council resolution 1478 (2003) concerning Liberia; S/2003/793 (5 
August 2003): Report of the Secretary-General in pursuance of paragraph 19 of resolution 
1478 (2003) concerning Liberia. 
176 	The methodology of the Panel of Experts focussed upon assessing the impact of the timber 
sanctions upon seven factors: (1) revenue and taxes; (2) employment; (3) indirect benefits; 
(4) social services; (5) human rights; (6) investment; and (7) environment. See: Report of the 
Panel, ibid, paragraphs 7-14. The Secretary-General's methodology, by contrast, concentrated 
upon indicators from the following sectors: (I) health; (2) food and nutrition; (3) education; 
(4) economic status; (5) governance; and (6) demography. See Report of the Secretary-
General, ibid, paragraph 6. 
177 	The Panel's observations included that the sanctions would: (a) deprive armed State and non- 
State actors of timber revenue; (b) result in decreased human rights violations associated with 
the timber industry; and (c) cause long-term consequences for the Liberia's redevelopment. 
See: Report of the Panel, ibid, paragraph 17. Its recommendations included that: (a) the 
Council should impose a moratorium on all commercial activities in the extractive industries; 
(b) increased emergency aid should be provided; (c) the Liberian timber sector should be 
reformed in order to achieve good governance; and (d)Member States, civil society and U.N. 
field presences should be encouraged to monitor and report sanctions violations. See: Report 
of the Panel, ibid, paragraph 17. 
The Secretary-General's observations included that: (a) the timber sanctions would have an 
impact upon humanitarian and socio-economic conditions only once the security environment 
did not already preclude timber export; (b) a reconstituted timber industry exhibiting 
transparency and accountability could be a driving force for economic growth and sustainable 
development; and (c) that alternative sources of economic revenue should be explored, 
including rubber production, in order to avoid a situation where limited resources were 
exploited to fuel conflict. See Report of the Secretary-General, ibid, paragraph 48. His 
recommendations included that: (a) an exemption procedure should be developed to enable 
legitimate timber exports; (b) in that connection external auditing could be also explored; and 
(c) humanitarian and development programmes should be developed to reintegrate former 
timber workers. See Report of the Secretary-General, ibid, paragraphs 49-51. 
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11.5.2 Proportionality and third States: minimising the impact of sanctions upon 
third States 
The impact of sanctions upon third States raises questions of proportionality not just 
with respect to the issue of the unintended consequences of sanctions, but also in terms of 
ensuring that the burden of sanctioning is distributed proportionally across the international 
community. The application of sanctions against a target State generally has a 
disproportionate effect upon the target's neighbour States and key trading partners. The 
sacrifice required of such States to implement sanctions is therefore significantly greater than 
that required of distant States with few ties to or relations with the target State. 
As noted in Chapter 8, the Council has tended to respond to requests for assistance 
under Article 50 by appealing to States, international organizations and international financial 
institutions to extend assistance to the States in need of special assistance." 8 The initiative of 
appealing to various international actors to extend assistance to specially-affected States, 
whilst arguably better than taking no action at all, is nevertheless a largely symbolic action. 
Although the Council may claim that by taking such steps it is assisting such States, in 
practice its appeals have done little to distribute the economic burden of implementing 
sanctions evenly across the international community. 
An expert group mandated by the Secretary-General to explore such possibilities 
recommended that an Article 50 trust fund be incorporated into the U.N.'s regular 
mandated budget, in the same manner as peacekeeping expenses." 9 The working group 
also proposed that, where significant requests for special assistance under Article 50 are 
178 	See Chapter 8, section 8.4.2. 
179 	A/53/312 (27 August 1998): Implementation of provisions of the Charter related to assistance to 
third States affected by the application of sanctions, paragraph 46. 
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received, the Secretary-General could appoint a Special Representative to investigate the 
matter and make appropriate recommendations. m In addition, the group suggested that 
sanctions impact assessments should also address the potential impact of sanctions upon 
third States.` 81 
The arguments in favour of more effective Council action b offset the burden are 
strong. First, the contention has been made that the Charter's recognition of a right to 
consult implies a corresponding obligation on the part of the Council to ensure that effective 
assistance is provided. Second, according to the principle of proportionality, the ability of 
sanctions to contribute to the rule of law is limited where they result in particularly 
disproportionate consequences for those who are expected to implement the law. Third, on 
a purely practical and pragmatic level, sanctions are unlikely to be effective where the costs 
of implementing sanctions are so prohibitive that it effectively becomes a matter of necessity 
to continue trading with a target. 
11.5.3 Recommendations for ensuring greater proportionality in the use of 
sanctions 
Of the five elements of the rule of law analysed here, the Security Council's track-
record has — somewhat surprisingly — been strongest with respect to proportionality. The 
Council appears to have made a genuine attempt to improve the &sign of its sanctions 
regimes, with the aim of increasing their ability to target decision-makers and decreasing the 
unintended fall-out for innocent civilian populations. Nevertheless, while the Council has 
180 	Ibid, paragraph 54. 
181 Ibid, paragraph 50. 
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learned that it should act proportionately, it could still do more to minimize the negative 
consequences upon civilian populations and third States. 
With respect to minimizing the impact of sanctions upon civilian populations, the 
Security Council could ensure that whenever it applies comprehensive sanctions it exempts a 
core group of items from the regime. Those goods should include, at a minimum, food, 
medical supplies, and educational equipment and supplies. As an alternative, the Council 
could embrace the Goods Review List model eventually employed in Iraq, according to 
which with all contraband items are explicitly noted on a list. Anything that does not feature 
on the Goods Review List could therefore be sold or supplied to the target. 
The Security Council should also institutionalise the practice of requiring 
humanitarian impact assessment of all of its sanctions regimes. These assessments should 
occur in advance of the application of sanctions and then at regular intervals once sanctions 
are applied. The Council should ensure that its members have such assessments before them 
whenever they are reviewing a sanctions regime. In order to improve both the standard and 
consistency of humanitarian impact assessment, a specialized unit should be established and 
tasked with the responsibility of undertaking such assessments. The ad hoc practice to date 
of calling on different actors to perform impact assessments, including the Secretary-
General, Sanctions Committees, Panels of Experts and Monitoring Mechanisms, is not 
conducive to obtaining a meaningful, sophisticated analysis of the negative consequences of 
sanctions. The question of causation is sufficiently complex that a consistent methodology 
should be employed to ascertain impact. Moreover, the body undertaking impact 
assessment should not be the same body that is tasked with improving sanctions 
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enforcement, as such a body is likely to focus upon how sanctions should be stiengthened, 
rather than upon the negative humanitarian consequences of sanctions. 
The Security Council could do considerably better at offsetting the negative 
consequences for third States and distributing the burden of implementation more evenly 
across the international community. The practice followed to date, of simply appealing to 
various international actors to provide assistance, does not amount to an effective remedy 
for specially-affected States. The end-result is that such States are faced with an unwelcome 
choice between implementing sanctions faithfully and thus bearing a burden that may cripple 
their economies, or turning a blind eye to sanctions violations. A creative solution must be 
found to this problem. At a minimum, the Security Council should undertake impact 
assessment of the potential special economic consequences of sanctions upon third States. It 
should also consider alternatives for ensuring an adequate funding base to compensate 
States experiencing significant economic difficulties as a result of complying with sanctions. 
393 
12. Concluding remarks and summary of practical recommendations 
12. Concluding remarks and summary of practical 
recommendations 
This thesis has explored the relationship between U.N. sanctions and the rule 
of law. In order to do so, it has traced the prehistory and development of the tool of 
U.N. sanctions, as well as the manner in which the U.N. sanctions system has evolved 
through the Security Council's creation and modification of U.N. sanctions regimes. It 
has proposed a basic, accountability-based model of the rule of law, consisting of five 
core elements which seek to prevent the abuse of power: transparency, consistency, 
equality, due process and proportionality. It has demonstrated how, the Security 
Council's sanctions practice has largely failed to respect and promote those core 
elements of the rule of law. Finally, it has suggested a number of policy 
recommendations designed to modify the Security Council's sanctions practice so that 
U.N. sanctions can better promote, reinforce and strengthen the rule of law. 
The Security Council has made a number of laudable innovations to its 
sanctions policy over the past decade, some of which have served to promote aspects 
of the rule of law. The general movement towards targeted rather than comprehensive 
sanctions is one example of these positive developments, resulting in an improved 
record with respect to the element of proportionality. But despite these positive 
developments, the U.N. sanctions system still exhibits substantial shortcomings with 
respect to each of the key elements of the rule of law. As the Council considers further 
reform to its sanctions policy, it should strive to improve its rule of law track-record. 
In the hope that the findings contained in this thesis might contribute to such a 
programme of reform, the key recommendations are reiterated below. 
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12.1 	Increasing transparency 
• Whenever possible the Security Council should hold its discussions 
concerning the potential or actual application of sanctions in public. 
• Sanctions Committees should also meet in open session when possible. All 
formal Committee meetings should also become a matter of public record, 
with verbatim transcripts and/or summary records being released for public 
distribution. The Security Council could ensure that this takes place by so 
stipulating in its decisions outlining Committee mandates. 
• When the Council votes on a draft resolution that seeks to impose or modify 
sanctions, Security Council Members should speak in explanation of their 
vote. The practice that has become prevalent, according to which the Council 
has imposed sanctions with little or no public discussion, should cease. 
• When determining the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or 
act of aggression, the Council should identify as clearly as possible the precise 
nature and cause of the threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of 
aggression. 
• Where possible, such determinations should occur some time before sanctions 
are applied, in order to demonstrate that they are not mere determinations of 
convenience, made in order to justify the application of sanctions. 
• Sanctions objectives should be linked to clear, objectively verifiable 
conditions, the occurrence of which will resolve the threat to the peace, breach 
of the peace or act of aggression and thus lead to the termination of sanctions. 
• A central quality assurance unit could be tasked with ensuring that draft 
resolutions acknowledge the basis in the U.N. Charter for sanctions-related 
action, identify the precise nature of the relevant threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace or act of aggression, and articulate clear goals and objectively 
verifiable conditions for sanctions termination. 
12.2 	Improving consistency 
• Standard phrases and terms should be employed in the Council's resolutions 
which outline the contours of each sanctions regime. The central quality 
assurance unit referred to above could be tasked with ensuring such 
consistency. It could also ensure consistency in the articulation of mandates for 
subsidiary actors. 
• Sanctions-related subsidiary bodies should be centralised and consolidated. 
Instead of having a proliferation of ad hoc Sanctions Committees, Panels of 
Experts and Monitoring Mechanisms, the Council could establish a permanent 
General Sanctions Committee, with responsibility for ensuring administration 
of the Council's various sanctions regimes, as well as a General Sanctions 
Monitoring Panel, with responsibility for monitoring the Council's various 
sanctions regimes. 
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12.3 	Promoting equality 
• Permanent Members should be encouraged to use the veto only when 
absolutely essential. 
• In order to minimise the veto's ability to undermine equality, closer alliances 
could be formed between the Elected 10. Such an alliance could be used in 
particular in order to ensure that sanctions are always imposed with a time-
limit. 
12.4 	Providing due process 
• Potential targets of sanctions should be afforded an opportunity to present their 
version of events. Where this is not possible, fact-finding missions should be 
tasked with the responsibility of presenting an objective assessment of the 
facts. 
• When individuals stand to be deprived of access to their own personal property 
and livelihood, they should be provided with maximum due process. 
• The Security Council should establish clear and transparent guidelines for 
determining which individuals are to be listed as targets. Such individuals 
should also be permitted to petition Sanctions Committees directly to protest 
their listing. 
• Individuals subject to financial sanctions should be listed temporarily, pending 
genuine consideration of their situation by the relevant Sanctions Committee. 
12.5. 	Ensuring proportionality 
• If comprehensive sanctions are employed again, a core group of items should 
always be exempt, including food, medical supplies, and educational 
equipment and supplies. Alternatively, the Council could embrace a Goods 
Review List approach, listing explicitly all contraband items. 
• Humanitarian impact assessments should be conducted for all sanctions 
regimes. These assessments should occur in advance of the application of 
sanctions and then at regular intervals once sanctions are applied. The Council 
should ensure that its members have such assessments before them whenever 
they are reviewing a sanctions regime. 
• The standard and consistency of humanitarian impact assessment should be 
improved. A specialized unit could be established and tasked with 
responsibility for undertaking such assessments. The unit should not be the 
same body tasked with improving sanctions enforcement. 
• The Security Council should also take effective action to offset the economic 
difficulties experienced by third States as a result of implementing sanctions. 
At a minimum it should mandate assessments of the potential impact of 
sanctions upon third States. 
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12. Concluding remarks and summary of practical recommendations 
In the post-Cold War era, the U.N. Security Council has been able to employ 
its sanctions tool with unprecedented frequency. Drawing upon its growing sanctions 
experience, the Security Council has made valuable innovations to its sanctions 
policy. But unless the Council continues to embrace sanctions reform, and in 
particular innovations designed to promote, reinforce and strengthen the rule of law, 
its sanctions tool will struggle to attract the levels of compliance necessary to serve as 
an effective instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security. The 
Council has recently emphasized the importance of strengthening the rule of law in 
societies threatened by conflict. By taking simple steps to reform its sanctions 
practice, such as acting upon the policy recommendations outlined above, the Council 
can demonstrate its commitment to strengthening the rule of law in international 
society. 
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A. 	Provisions establishing and terminating U.N. sanctions 
regimes 
Sanctions rigime Initiated Terminated 
Southern Rhodesia SIRES/232 (16 December 1966) S/RES/460 (21 December 1979) 
South Africa SIRES/418 (4 November 1977) S/RES/919 (25 May 1994) 
Iraq S/RES/661 (6 August 1991) Continuing 
Former Yugoslavia S/RES/713 (25 September 1991) [note verbale: SCA/96(4) (18 June 
1996)] 
Somalia SIRES/733 (23 January 1992) Continuing 
Libya S/RES/748 (31 March 1992) SIRES/1506 (12 September 2003) 
Serbia-Montenegro (due to 
the situation in Bosnia-
Herzegovina) 
SIRES/757 (30 May 1992) S/RES/1074 (1 October 1996) 
Liberia S/RES/788 (19 November 1992) S/RES/I343 (7 March 2001) 
The Bosnian Serbs SIRES/820 (17 April 1993) S/RES/1074 (1 October 1996) 
Haiti S/RES/841 (15 June 1993) S/RES/944 (16 October 1994) 
Angola (UNITA) SIRES/864 (15 September 1993) S/RES/1448 (9 December 2002) 
Rwanda S/RES/918 (17 May 1994) Continuing 
The Sudan S/RES/1054 (11 March 1996) S/RES/1372 (28 September 2001) 
Sierra Leone S/RES/1132 (8 October 1997) Continuing 
Serbia-Montenegro (due to 
the situation in Kosovo) 
S/RES/1160 (31 March 1998) S/RES/1367 (10 September 2001) 
Afghanistan/Taliban/A1 
Qaida 
S/RES/1267 (15 October 1999) Continuing 
Eritrea and Ethiopia S/RES/1298 (17 May 2000) S/PRST/2001/14 (15 May 2001) 
Liberia S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001) SIRES/1521 (22 December 2003) 
DRC S/RES/1493 (28 July 2003) Continuing 
Liberia SIRES/I521 (22 December 2003) Continuing 
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B. 	Provisions citing Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter as the basis for 
sanctions-related action 
Sanctions regime Provisions invoking Chapter VII 
Southern Rhodesia SIRES/232 (16 December 1966), preambular paragraph 4. 1 
SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), preambular paragraph 10. 
SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), preambular paragraph 7. 
SIRES/388 (6 April 1976), preambular paragraph 5. 
SIRES/409 (27 May 1977), preambular paragraph 5. 
South Africa SIRES/418 (4 November 1977), preambular paragraph 10. 
SIRES/9 19 (25 May 1994), operative paragraph 1. 
Iraq SIRES/661 (6 August 1990), preambular paragraph 7. 
S/RES/666 (13 September 1990), preambular paragraph 6. 
SIRES/670 (25 September 1990), preambular paragraph 13. 
S/RES/687 (3 April 1991), preambular paragraph 26. 
SIRES/986 (14 April 1995), preambular paragraph 6. 
S/RES/1137 (12 November 1997), preambular paragraph 12. 
S/RES/1409 (14 May 2002), preambular paragraph 6. 
S/RES/1483 (22 May 2003), preambular paragraph 18. 
S/RES/1518 (24 November 2003), preambular paragraph 5. 
SIRES/1546 (8 June 2004), preambular paragraph 21. 
All states that were part 
of the Former 
Yugoslavia 
S/RES/713 (25 September 1991), operative paragraph 6. 
S/RES/1021 (22 November 1995), preambular paragraph 6. 
S/RES/I 031 (15 December 1995), preambular paragraph 10. 
Somalia S/RES/733 (23 January 1992), operative paragraph 5. 
S/RES/1356 (19 June 2001), preambular paragraph 4. 
S/RES/1425 (22 July 2002), preambular paragraph 6. 
SIRES/1474 (8 April 2003), preambular paragraph 8. 
SIRES/1519 (16 December 2003), preambular paragraph 9. 
Libya SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), preambular paragraph 10. 
SIRES/883 (11 November 1993), preambular paragraph 10. 
SIRES/1192 (27 August 1998), preambular paragraph 5. 
SIRES/1506 (12 September 2003), preambular paragraph 5. 
Serbia-Montenegro (to 
address the situation in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina) 
S/RES/757 (30 May 1992), preambular paragraph 18. 
SIRES/760 (18 June 1992), preambular paragraph 2. 
SIRES/787 (16 November 1992), operative paragraphs 9-10. 
S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), section B, preambular paragraph 2. 
SIRES/943 (23 September 1994), preambular paragraph 10. 
SIRES/967 (14 December 1994), preambular paragraph 3. 
S/RES/992 (11 May 1995), preambular paragraph 6. 
SIRES/1074 (1 October 1996), preambular paragraph 9. 
Liberia S/RES/788 (19 November 1992), operative paragraph 8. 
S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), preambular paragraph 10. 
The Bosnian Serbs SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), section B, preambular paragraph 2. 
SIRES/942 (23 September 1994), preambular paragraph 8. 
S/RES/1074 (1 October 1996), preambular paragraph 9. 
Haiti SIRES/841 (15 June 1993), preambular paragraph 15. 
SIRES/86 1 (27 August 1993), preambular paragraph 7. 
SIRES/873 (13 October 1993), preambular paragraph 5. 
SIRES/917(6 May 1994), preambular paragraph 14. 
SIRES/944 (16 October 1994), operative paragraph 4. 
In the resolution initiating the Southern Rhodesian sanctions regime, the Council explicitly 
invoked Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, rather than the more general Chapter VII. 
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Angola (UNITA) S/RES/864 (15 September 1993), section B, preambular paragraph 5. 
SIRES/I127 (28 August 1997), section B, preambular paragraph 2. 
SIRES/1130 (29 September 1997), preambular paragraph 3. 
S/RES/1173 (12 June 1998), section B, preambular paragraph 3. 
SIRES/1176 (24 June 1998), preambular paragraph 4. 
S/RES/1412 (17 May 2002), preambular paragraph 9. 
SIRES/1432 (15 August 2002), preambular paragraph 8. 
SIRES/1439 (18 October 2002), preambular paragraph 8. 
SIRES/1448 (9 December 2002), preambular paragraph 5. 
Rwanda SIRES/9i8 (17 May 1994), section B, preambular paragraph 2. 
S/RES/1005 (17 July 1995), preambular paragraph 6. 
S/RES/1011 (16 August 1995), section B, sole preambular paragraph. 
The Sudan S/RES/1054 (11 March 1996), preambular paragraph 11. 
S/RES/1070 (16 August 1996), preambular paragraph 12. 
S/RES/1372 (28 September 2001), preambular paragraph 7. 
Sierra Leone S/RES/1132 (8 October 1997), preambular paragraph 10. 
SIRES/1156 (16 March 1998), preambular paragraph 3. 
S/RES/1171 (5 June 1998), preambular paragraph 4. 
SIRES/1299 (19 May 2000), operative paragraph 3. 
SIRES/I306 (5 July 2000), preambular paragraph 5. 
SIRES/i385 (19 December 2001), preambular paragraph 10. 
SIRES/1446 (4 December 2002), preambular paragraph 10. 
Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (to address 
the situation in Kosovo) 
SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), preambular paragraph 8. 
S/RES/1203 (24 October 1998), preambular paragraph 16. 
SIRES/I244(10 June 1999), preambular paragraph 13. 
SIRES/1367 (10 September 2001), preambular paragraph 5. 
Afghanistan/Taliban/Al 
Qaida 
SIRES/1267 (15 October 1999), preambular paragraph 10. 
SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), preambular paragraph 19. 
SIRES/1388 (15 January 2001), preambular paragraph 3. 
SIRES/1390 (16 January 2002), preambular paragraph 10. 
S/RES/1452 (20 December 2002), preambular paragraph 4. 
SIRES/1455 (17 January 2003), preambular paragraph 8. 
SIRES/1526 (30 January 2004), preambular paragraph 8. 
Eritrea and Ethiopia S/RES/1298 (17 May 2000), preambular paragraph 14. 
S/RES/1320 (15 September 2000), operative paragraph 5. 
Liberia 11 S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), preambular paragraph 10. 
S/RES/1408 (6 May 2002), preambular paragraph 12. 
SIRES/i478 (6 May 2003), preambular paragraph 14. 
S/RES/1509 (19 September 2003), preambular paragraph 22. 
S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003), preambular paragraph 9. 
DRC S/RES/1493 (28 July 2003), preambular paragraph 12. 
SIRES/1533 (12 March 2004), preambular paragraph 8. 
Liberia III S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003), preambular paragraph 9. 
S/RES/1532 (12 March 2004), preambular paragraph 6. 
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C. 	Provisions outlining the scope of sanctions 
Sanctions regime Provisions establishing or modifying the scope of sanctions 
Southern Rhodesia SIRES/232 (16 December 1966), operative paragraph 2. 
SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraphs 3-6. 
SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), operative paragraphs 2, 9. 
SIRES/388 (6 April 1976), operative paragraphs 1, 2. 
SIRES/409 (27 May 1977), operative paragraph 1. 
South Africa S/RES/418 (4 November 1977), operative paragraphs 2, 4. 
SIRES/919(25 May 1994), operative paragraph 1. 
Iraq S/RES/661 (6 August 1990), operative paragraphs 3-4. 
SIRES/666 (13 September 1990) operative paragraphs 1,5, 8. 
S/RES/670 (25 September 1990), operative paragraphs 3-6. 
S/RES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraphs 20, 23-4. 
SIRES/706 (15 August 1991), operative paragraphs 1-2. 
S/RES/778 (2 October 1992), operative paragraph 1. 
SIRES/986 (14 April 1995), operative paragraphs 1-2, 7-10. 
SIRES/1137 (12 November 1997), operative paragraph 4. 
SIRES/i409 (14 May 2002), operative paragraph 2. 
SIRES/1454 (30 December 2002), operative paragraph 1. 
SIRES/1483 (22 May 2003), operative paragraphs 10, 23. 
SIRES/1546 (8 June 2004), operative paragraph 21. 
All states that were part 
of the Former 
Yugoslavia 
S/RES/713 (25 September 1991), operative paragraph 6. 
S/RES/727 (8 January 1992), operative paragraph 6. 
S/RES/743 (21 February 1992), operative paragraph 11. 
SIRES/1031 (15 December 1995), operative paragraph 22. 
Somalia SIRES/733 (23 January 1992), operative paragraph 5. 
SIRES/1356 (19 June 2001), operative paragraphs 2-4. 
S/RES/1425 (22 July 2002), operative paragraphs 1-2. 
Libya S/RES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraphs 4-6. 
S/RES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraphs 3-6. 
S/RES/1192 (27 August 1998), operative paragraph 8. 
S/PRST/1998/10 (8 April 1999)Presidential Statement of 8 April 1999. 
S/RES/1506 (12 September 2003), operative paragraph 1. 
Serbia-Montenegro (to 
address the situation in 
Bosnia -Herzegovina) 
S/RES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraphs 4-8. 
S/RES/760 (18 June 1992), sole operative paragraph. 
SIRES/787 (16 November 1992), operative paragraph 9. 
SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraphs 15-16, 21, 23-5, 27-8. 
SIRES/943 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 1. 
S/RES/967 (14 December 1994), operative paragraph 1. 
S/RES/992 (11 May 1995), operative paragraph 1. 
SIRES/1074 (1 October 1996), operative paragraph 2. 
Liberia SIRES/788 (19 November 1992), operative paragraph 8. 
S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph I. 
The Bosnian Serbs SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 12. 
S/RES/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraphs 7, 11-15. 
SIRES/1022 (22 November 1995, operative paragraphs 2-3. 
S/RES/I 074 (1 October 1996), operative paragraph 2. 
Haiti S/RES/841 (15 June 1993), operative paragraphs 5, 7-8. 
S/RES/861 (27 August 1993), operative paragraph 1. 
SIRES/9i7 (6 May 1994), operative paragraphs 2-3, 6-8. 
SIRES/944 (29 September 1994), operative paragraph 4. 
SIRES/948 (15 October 1995), operative paragraphs 1, 10. 
Angola (UNITA) S/RES/864 (15 September 1993), operative paragraph 19. 
S/RES/1127 (28 August 1997), operative paragraphs 4-5. 
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S/RES/1130 (29 September 1997), operative paragraph 2. 
SIRES/1173 (12 June 1998), operative paragraphs 11-12. 	 - 
SIRES/1176 (24 June 1998), operative paragraph 2. 
SIRES/1412 (17 May 2002), operative paragraph 1. 
S/RES/1432 (15 August 2002), operative paragraph 1. 
S/RES/1439 (18 October 2002), operative paragraph 1. 
SIRES/1448 (9 December 2002), operative paragraph 2. 
Rwanda S/RES/918 (17 May 1994), operative paragraph 13. 
S/RES/1011 (16 August 1995), operative paragraphs 7-8,11. 
The Sudan 
. 
S/RES/1054 (11 March 1996), operative paragraph 3. 
S/RES/1070 (16 August 1996), operative paragraph 3. 
S/RES/1372 (28 September 2001), operative paragraph 1. 
Sierra Leone S/RES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraphs 5-6. 
S/RES/I156 (16 March 1998), operative paragraph 2. 
SIRES/1171 (5 June 1998), operative paragraphs 1-5. 
S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraphs I, 5-6. 
S/RES/1385 (19 December 2001), operative paragraph 3. 
S/RES/1446 (4 December 2002), operative paragraph 2. 
Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (to address 
the situation in Kosovo) 
S/RES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 8. 
S/RES/I203 (24 October 1998), operative paragraph 15. 
S/RES/I244 (10 June 1999), operative paragraph 16. 
S/RES/1367 (10 September 2001), operative paragraph 1. 
Afghanistan/Taliban/A1 
Qaida 
SIRES/1267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraph 4. 
S/RES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraphs 5, 8, 10-11. 
SIRES/1388 (15 January 2001), operative paragraphs 1-2. 
S/RES/1390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraphs 1-2. 
SIRES/i452 (20 December 2002), operative paragraphs 1-2. 
S/RES/1526 (30 January 2004), operative paragraph 1. 
Eritrea and Ethiopia S/RES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 6. 
S/RES/1312 (31 July 2000), operative paragraph 5. 
S/RES/I320 (15 September 2000), operative paragraph 10. 
S/PRST/2001/14 (15 May 2001): Presidential statement of 15 May 2001. 
Liberia II S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraphs 5-7. 
S/RES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 5. 
S/RES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 10, 17, 28. 
S/RES/1509 (19 September 2003), operative paragraph 12. 
S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraph 1. 
DRC S/RES/1493 (28 July 2003), operative paragraph 20. 
Liberia III S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraphs 2, 4, 6, 10. 
S/RES/1532 (12 March 2004), operative paragraphs 1-3. 
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D. 	Provisions outlining Sanctions Committee mandates 
Sanctions Committee Provisions establishing, modifying or dissolving the Committee's mandate 
253 Committee 
(Southern Rhodesia) 
Established S/RES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraph 20. 
Modified 	SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), operative paragraph 21. 
S/RES/314 (28 February 1972), operative paragraph 6. 
SIRES/320 (29 September 1972), operative paragraphs 4-5. 
SIRES/326 (2 February 1973), operative paragraph 8. 
SIRES/328 (10 March 1973), operative paragraph 6. 
S/RES/409 (27 May 1977), operative paragraph 3. 
SIRES/41 1 (30 June 1977), operative paragraph 12. 
SIRES/445 (8 March 1979), operative paragraph 8. 
Dissolved: SIRES/460 (21 December 1979), operative paragraph 3. 
421 Committee (South 
Africa) 
Established SIRES/42 1 (9 December 1977), operative paragraph 1. 
Modified 	S/RES/473 (13 June 1980), operative paragraph 11. 
SIRES/59 1 (28 November 1986), operative paragraph 13. 
Dissolved: S/RES/919 (25 May 1994), operative paragraph 3. 
661 Committee 
(Iraq) 
Established SIRES/661 (6 August 1990), operative paragraph 6. 
Modified S/RES/666 (13 September 1990), operative paragraphs 1, 5. 
S/RES/669 (24 September 1990), preambular paragraph 4. 
SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraphs 20, 23. 
S/RES/700 (17 June 1991), operative paragraph 5. 
SIRES/7l5 (11 October 1991), operative paragraph 7. 
SIRES/986 (14 April 1995), operative paragraphs 1, 6, 12. 
S/RES/1051 (27 March 1996), operative paragraph 10. 
S/RES/1111 (4 June 1997), operative paragraphs 4, 5. 
SIRES/1143 (4 December 1997), operative paragraphs 5, 9. 
SIRES/1153 (20 February 1998), operative paragraphs 3, 14, 15. 
SIRES/1175 (19 June 1998), operative paragraph 2. 
S/RES/1210 (4 November 1998), operative paragraphs 3, 10. 
S/RES/1242 (21 May 1999), operative paragraph 10. 
S/RES/1281 (10 December 1999), operative paragraph 10. 
SIRES/1284 (17 December 1999), operative paragraphs 17-18,25. 
SIRES/1302 (8 June 2000), operative paragraphs 6, 8. 
S/RES/1330 (5 December 2000), operative paragraphs 6, 10, 13. 
S/RES/1360 (3 July 2001), operative paragraph 6. 
SIRES/l409 (14 May 2002), operative paragraph 7. 
SIRES/1454 (30 December 2002), operative paragraph 2. 
SIRES/1472 (28 March 2003), operative paragraphs 4, 7, 9. 
Dissolved SIRES/1483 (22 May 2003), operative paragraph 29 ("terminated" 
effective six months from the date of adoption of that resolution). 
724 Committee 
(Former Yugoslavia, 
Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia- 
Montenegro), and 
Bosnian Serbs) 
Established SIRES/724(15 December 1991), operative paragraph 5(b). 
Responsibilities concerning the sanctions regime against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro): 
SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 13. 
S/RES/787 (16 November 1992), operative paragraph 9. 
S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraphs 18, 22, 27-8. 
S/RES/843 (18 June 1993), operative paragraph 2. 
SIRES/943 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 2. 
SIRES/970 (12 January 1995), operative paragraph 4. 
S/RES/988 (21 April 1995), operative paragraphs 11, 12. 
SIRES 1022 (22 November 1995), operative paragraph 8. 
Responsibilities concerning the Bosnian Serb sanctions regime: 
S/RES/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraphs 7, 13-15. 
Dissolved: S/RES/1074 (I October 1996), operative paragraph 6. 
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748 Committee 
(Libya) 
Established: SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 9. 
Modified: SIRES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraphs 9, 10. 
Dissolved: SIRES/1506 (12 September 2003), operative paragraph 2. 
751 Committee 
(Somalia) 
Established S/RES/751 (24 April 1992), operative paragraph 11. 
Modified 
	
	S/RES/954 (4 November 1994), operative paragraph 12. 
S/RES/1356 (19 June 2001), operative paragraph 4. 
S/RES/1407 (3 May 2002), operative paragraphs 2, 7. 
S/RES/1474 (8 April 2003), operative paragraph 8. 
SIRES/1519 (16 December 2003), operative paragraph 8. 
841 Committee 
(Haiti) 
Established SIRES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 10. 
Modified S/RES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 14. 
Dissolved SIRES/948 (15 October 1995), operative paragraph 10. 
864 Committee 
(UN! TA) 
Established S/RES/864 (15 September1993), operative paragraph 22. 
Modified 	SIRES/1127 (28 August 1997), operative paragraph 11. 
SIRES/1173 (12 June 1998), operative paragraphs 13, 20. 
SIRES/1221 (12 January 1999), operative paragraphs 8, 9. 
SIRES/1237 (7 May 1999), operative paragraph 7. 
SIRES/I295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 24. 
S/RES/1336 (23 January 2001), operative paragraph 6. 
SIRES/1348 (19 April 2001), operative paragraph 6. 
SIRES/1374 (19 October 2001), operative paragraphs 4, 8. 
SIRES/1404 (18 April 2002), operative paragraph 7. 
SIRES/1439 (18 October 2002), operative paragraph 6. 
Dissolved: SIRES/I448 (9 December 2002), operative paragraph 3. 
918 Committee 
(Rwanda) 
Established SIRES/918 (17 May 1994), operative paragraph 14. 
Modified S/PRST/1995/22 (27 April 1995): Presidential statement of 27 April 
1995. 
S/RES/1005 (17 July 1995), sole operative paragraph. 
S/RES/1011 (16 August 1995), operative paragraph 11. 
985 Committee 
(Liberia !) 
Established SIRES/985 (13 April 1995), operative paragraph 4. 
Modified S/PRST/1999/1 (7 January 1999): Presidential statement of 7 
January 1999. 
Dissolved: S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph I. 
1132 Committee 
(Sierra Leone) 
Established S/RES/I 132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraphs 9, 10. 
Modified 	S/RES/1171 (5 June 1998), operative paragraphs 4, 6. 
S/PRST/1999/1 (7 January 1999): Presidential statement of 7 
January 1999. 
SIRES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraphs 4-5,7, 12, 17, 22-3. 
SIRES/1446 (4 December 2002), operative paragraph 4. 
1160 Committee 
(Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia) 
Established: SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 9. 
Dissolved: SIRES/1367 (10 September 2001), operative paragraph 2. 
1267 Committee 
(Afghanistan/Taliban/ 
Al Qaida) 
Established S/RES/1267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraphs 6, 12. 
Modified 	S/RES/1333, operative paragraph 16. 
SIRES/1363 (30 July 2001), operative paragraphs 3, 6. 
SIRES/1390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraph 5. 
SIRES/1452 (20 December 2002), operative paragraphs 1, 3. 
SIRES/1455 (17 January 2003), operative paragraphs 4, 9, 11, 14-15. 
SIRES/1526 (30 January 2004), operative paragraphs 2, 7, 10-13, 21, 
23. 
1298 Committee 
(Eritrea and Ethiopia) 
Established S/RES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraphs 8, 13. 
Dissolwd: S/PRST/2001/14 (15 May 2001) Presidential statement of 15 May 
2001. 
1343 Committee 
(Liberia II) 
Established S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 14. 
Modified S/RES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraphs 13, 14. 
S/RES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraphs 24, 29. 
Dissolved: S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraph I. 
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1518 Committee 
(Iraq) 
Established SIRES/1518 (24 November 2003), operative paragraphs 1-3. 
1521 Committee 
(Liberia III) 
Established: S/RES/1521 (22 Decemb er 2003), operative paragraph 21. 
S/RES/1532 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 4. 
1533 Committee 
(DRC) 
Established: S/RES/I 533 (12 March 2004), operative paragraphs 8, 9. 
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E. 	Sanctions Committee annual reports' 
Sanctions Committee Annual and General Reports 
253 Committee S/8954 (30 December 1968): Report of the Security Council Committee 
(Southern Rhodesia) established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the 
question of Southern Rhodesia, SCOR, 23 rd year, Supplement for 
October, November and December 1968, pp. 181-295. 
S/9252 (12 and 13 June 1969): Second report of the Security Council 
Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) 
concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia, SCOR, 24th year, 
Supplement for April, May and June 1969, pp. 195-329. 
S/9844 and Corr.1-2 (15 June 1970): Third report of the Security Council 
Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) 
concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia, SCOR, 25th year, 
Special Supplement No. 3. 
S/10229 & Add.! (16 June & 13 July 1971): Fourth report of the Security 
Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 
(1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia, SCOR, 26th 
year, Special Supplements 2 & 2A. 
S/10852 & Add.1-2 (22 and 31 December 1972 & 2 February 1973): Fifth report 
of the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of 
resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern 
Rhodesia, SCOR, 27' year, Special Supplement No. 2. 
S/11178 and Rev. 1 (3 January 1974): Sixth report of the Security Council 
Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) 
concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia, SCOR, 29th year, 
Special Supplement Nos 2, 2A. 
S/11594 and Rev. 1 (9 and 10 January 1975): Seventh report of the Security 
Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 
(1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia: SCOR, 30th 
year, Special Supplement No. 2, Vols 1-H. 
S/11927 & Add.1 (8 January and 6 February 1976): Eighth report of the 
Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 
253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia: SCOR, 
31 year, Special Supplement No. 2, Vols I-II. 
5/12265 (21 December 1976): Ninth report of the Security Council Committee 
established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the 
question of Southern Rhodesia: SCOR,32" year, Special Supplement, 
No. 2, Vols. I-HI. 
S/12529 & Add.1 (I March 1978): Tenth report of the Security Council 
Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) 
concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia: SCOR, 33"1 year, 
Special Supplement No. 2, Vols. I, II. 
S/13000 (11 January 1979): Eleventh report of the Security Council Committee 
established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the 
question of Southern Rhodesia: SCOR, 34th year, Special Supplement 
No. 2, Vols. I-III. 
As noted in Chapter 9, the practice of issuing annual reports was introduced following the 
Note by the President of the Security Council dated 29 March 1995. See: S/19951234 (29 March 
1995): Note by the President of the Security Council (suggesting the introduction of 
improvements to make the procedures of the Sanctions Committees more transparent). The 
reports dating from prior to 1995 are therefore general reports submitted by the relevant 
Committee on its activities. 
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S/13750 (15 January 1980): Twelfth report of the Security Council Committee 
established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the 
question of Southern Rhodesia: SCOR, 35 th year, Special Supplement 
No. 2, Vols. I-Ill. 
421 Committee (South 
Africa) 
S/13708 (26 December 1979): Report of the Security Council Committee 
established pursuant to resolution 421 (1977) concerning South 
Africa on nuclear collaboration with South Africa. 
S/13721 (31 December 1979): Report of the Security Council Committee 
established pursuant to resolution 421 (1977) concerning South 
Africa, SCOR, 35 th year, supplement for July, August and September 
1980. 
S/14179 (19 September 1980): Report of the Security Council Committee 
established pursuant to resolution 421 (1977) concerning South 
Africa on ways and means of making the mandatory arms embargo 
against South Africa more effective. 
S/21015 (II December 1989) annex: Report of the Security Council Committee 
established pursuant to resolution 421 (1977) concerning South 
Africa (on the Committee's activities from 1980-1989). 
661 Committee 
(Iraq) 
S/1996/700 (26 August 1996), annex. 
S/1997/672 (28 August 1997), annex. 
S/1998/1239 (31 December 1998), annex. 
S/2000/133 (18 February 2000), annex. 
S/2001/738 (27 July 2001), annex. 
S/2002/647 (10 June 2002), annex. 
S/2003/300 (12 March 2003), annex. 
724 Committee2 
(Yugoslavia) 
S/23800 (13 April 1992). 
S/25027(30 December 1992). 
5/1996/946 (15 November 1996), annex. 
748 Committee 
(Libya) 
S/1996/2 (2 January 1996), annex. 
S/1996/1079 (31 December 1996), annex. 
S/1997/1030 (31 December 1997), annex. 
S/1998/1237 (31 December 1998), annex. 
S/1999/1299 (31 December 1999), annex. 
The 748 Committee issued no annual reports for 2000, 2001 or 2002 
751 Committee 
(Somalia) 
S/1996/17 (16 January 1996), annex. 
S/1997/16 (7 January 1997), annex. 
S/1998/1226 (28 December 1998), annex. 
S/1999/1283 (28 December 1999), annex. 
S/2000/1226 (21 December 2000), annex 
5/2001/1259 (26 December 2001), annex. 
5/2002/1430 (30 December 2002), annex. 
S/200311216 (31 December 2003), annex. 
841 Committee 
(Haiti) 
No reports issued. 
864 Committee 
(UNITA) 
5/1996/37 (17 January 1996), annex. 
5/1997/33 (14 January 1997), annex. 
S/1997/1027 (31 December 1997), annex. 
S/1998/1227 (28 December 1998), annex. 
S/2000/83 (3 February 2000), annex. 
S/2000/1255 (29 December 2000), annex. 
S/2002/243 (7 March 2002), annex. 
2 	The 724 Committee was granted responsibilities relating to the sanctions regimes against the 
former Yugoslavia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), and the Bosnian 
Serbs. 
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S/2002/1413 (24 December 2002), annex. 
918 Committee 
(Rwanda) 
S/1996/82 (2 February 1996), annex. 
S/1997115 (7 January 1997), annex. 
S/1997/1028 (31 December 1997), annex. 
S/1998/1219 (24 December 1998), annex. 
S/1999/1292 (30 December 1999), annex. 
S/2000/1227 (22 December 2000), annex. 
S/2002/49 (14 January 2002), annex 
S/2002/1406 (24 December 2002), annex. 
S/2004/134 (20 February 2004), annex. 
985 Committee 
(Liberia I) 
S/I996/72 (30 January 1996), annex. 
S/1996/1077 (31 December 1996), annex. 
S/1997/1026 (31 December 1997), annex. 
S/1998/1220 (24 December 1998), annex. 
S/1999/1301 (31 December 1999), annex. 
S/2000/I233 (22 December 2000), annex 
1132 Committee 
(Sierra Leone) 
S/1998/1236 (31 December 1998), annex. 
S/1999/1300 (31 December 1999), annex. 
S/2000/1238 (26 December 2000), annex. 
S/2002/50 (14 January 2002), annex. 
S/2002/1414 (24 December 2002), annex. 
S/2004/166 (27 February 2004), annex. 
1160 Committee 
(Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia) 
S/1999/216 (4 March 1999), annex. 
S/2000/633 (29 June 2000), annex. 
S/2001/102 (5 February 2001), annex. 
S/2001/931 (3 October 2001), annex. 
1267 Committee 
(Afghanistan/Taliban/ 
Al Qaida) 
S/2000/1254 (29 December 2000), annex. 
S/2002/10I (5 February 2002), annex. 
S/2002/1423 (26 December 2002), annex. 
1298 Committee 
(Eritrea and Ethiopia) 
S/2000/1259 (29 December 2000), annex. 
S/2001/503 (18 May 2001), annex. 
1343 Committee 
(Liberia II) 
S/2002/83 (18 January 2002), annex. 
S/2002/1394 (20 December 2002), annex. 
1518 Committee 
(Iraq) 
Yet to issue any annual reports. 
1521 Committee 
(Liberia III) 
S/2004/139 (25 February 2004), annex. 
1533 Committee 
(DRC) 
Yet to issue any annual reports. 
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F. 	Provisions outlining expert body mandates 
Expert Body Provisions establishing, modifying or re-establishing the Body's mandate 
Group of Experts on 
Iraqi oil 
Established: SIRES/1153 (20 February 1998), operative paragraph 12. 
Ad hoc panels of 
experts on the Iraq 
sanctions regime 
Established: S/19991100: Note by the President of the Security Council (30 
January 1999). 
The UNITA Panel of 
Experts 
Established: SIRES/1237 (7 May 1999), operative paragraph 6. 
The Sierra Leone Panel 
of Experts 
Established: S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 19. 
The Taliban & Al 
Qaida Committee of 
Experts 
Established: SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 15. 
The Liberia II Panel (s) 
of Experts 
Established: SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 19. 
Re-established: SIRES! 1395 (27 February 2002), operative paragraph 3. 
Established: SIRES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 16. 
Re-established: 51RES11458 (28 January 2003), operative paragraph 3. 
Established: SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 25. 
The Somalia Team of 
Experts 
Established: SIRES/1407 (3 May 2002), operative paragraph 1. 
The Somalia Panel of 
Experts 
Established: S/RES/1425 (22 July 2002), operative paragraph 3. 
Re-established: SIRES/1474 (8 April 2003), operative paragraph 3. 
The Liberia III Panel of 
Experts 
Established: SIRES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraph 22. 
Re-established: S/RES/1549 (17 June 2004), operative paragraph 1. 
The DRC Panel of 
Experts 
Established: SIRES/1533 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 10. 
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G. 	Reports by expert bodies 
Expert Body Reports 
Group of Experts on 
Iraqi oil 
S/1998/330 (15 April 1998), annex: Report of the group of experts established 
pursuant to paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1153 
(1998). 
Ad hoc panels of 
experts on the Iraq 
sanctions regime 
S/1999/356 (30 March 1999), Annex I: Report of the First Panel established 
pursuant to the note by the President of the Security Council of 30 
January 1999 (S/1999/100) concerning disarmament and current 
and future ongoing monitoring and verification issues. 
S/1999/356 (30 March 1999), Annex II: Report of the Second Panel established 
pursuant to the note by the President of the Security Council of 30 
January 1999 (S/1 999/I00) concerning the current humanitarian 
situation in Iraq. 
S/1999/356 (30 March 1999), Annex III: Report of the Third Panel established 
pursuant to the note by the President of the Security Council of 30 
January 1999 (S/1999/100) on prisoners of war and Kuwaiti 
property. 
UN! TA Panel of 
Experts 
S/1999/1016 (30 September 1999), annex: Interim report of the Expert Panel 
established by the Security Council in resolution 1237 (1999) of 7 
May 1999. 
S/2000/203 (10 March 2000), annex I, enclosure: Report of the Panel of Experts 
on Violations of Security Council Sanctions against UN! TA. 
The Sierra Leone Panel 
of Experts 
S/2000/1195 (20 December 2000), enclosure: Report of the Panel of Experts 
appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1306 (2000), 
paragraph 19, in relation to Sierra Leone. 
The Taliban & Al 
Qaida Committee of 
Experts 
S/2001/511 (22 May 2001), enclosure: Report of the Committee of Experts 
appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1333 (2000), 
paragraph 15 (a), regarding monitoring of the arms embargo 
against the Taliban and the closure of terrorist training camps in the 
Taliban-held areas ofAfghanistan. 
The Liberia II Panel(s) 
of Experts 
S/2001/1015 (26 October 2001), enclosure: Report of the Panel of Experts 
pursuant to Security Council resolution 1343 (2001), paragraph 19, 
concerning Liberia. 
S/2002/470 (19 April 2002), annex: Report of the Panel of Experts appointed 
pursuant to Security Council resolution 1395 (2002), paragraph 4, 
in relation to Liberia. 
S/2002/1115 (25 October 2002), annex: Report of the Panel of Experts 
appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1408 (2002), 
paragraph 16, concerning Liberia. 
S/20031498 (24 April 2003), annex: Report of the Panel of Experts appointed 
pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 1458 (2003), 
concerning Liberia. 
S/2003/779 (7 August 2003), annex: Report of the Panel of Experts established 
pursuant to paragraph 25 of resolution 1478 (2003) concerning 
Liberia. 
S/2003/937 (28 October 2003), annex: Report of the Panel of Experts 
established pursuant to paragraph 25 of resolution 1478 (2003) 
concerning Liberia. 
The Somalia Team of 
Experts 
S/2002/722 (3 July 2002), annex: Report of the team of experts appointed 
pursuant to Security Council resolution 1407 (2002), paragraph I, 
concerning Somalia. 
The Somalia Panel of 
Experts 
S/2003/223 (25 March 2003), enclosure: Report of the Panel of Experts on 
Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1425 (2002). 
S/2003/1035 (4 November 2003), enclosure: Report of the Panel of Experts on 
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Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1474 (2003). 
Liberia III Panel of 
Experts 
S120041396 (1 June 2004), annex: Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to 
paragraph 22 of Security Council resolution 1521 (2003) 
concerning Liberia. 
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H. 	Provisions outlining monitoring body mandates 
Monitoring Body Provisions establishing, modifying or re-establishing the Body's mandate 
Iraq export/import 
monitoring mechanism 
Established: SIRES/7 15 (11 October 1995), operative paragraph 7. 
UNITA monitoring 
mechanism 
Established: SIRES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 3. 
Extended 
SIRES/1336 (23 January 2001), operative paragraph 3. 
SIRES/1348 (19 April 2001), operative paragraph 3. 
S/RES/I374 (19 October 2001), operative paragraph 3. 
SIRES/1404 (18 April 2002), operative paragraph 3. 
SIRES/1439 (18 October 2002), operative paragraph 2. 
The Taliban and Al 
Qaida Monitoring 
Group 
Established: SIRES/1363 (30 July 2001), operative paragraph 3. 
Extended 
SIRES/1390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraphs 9, 10. 
SIRES/1455 (17 January 2003), operative paragraphs 8, 12, 13. 
The Somalia 
Monitoring Group 
Established: S/RES/1519 (16 December 2003), operative paragraph 2. 
The Taliban/Al Qaida 
Monitoring Team 
Established: S/RES/1526 (30 January 2004), operative paragraph 6. 
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I. 	Reports by monitoring bodies 
Monitoring Body Reports 
UNITA monitoring 
mechanism 
S/2000/1225 (21 December 2000), enclosure: Final Report of the Monitoring 
Mechanism on Angola Sanctions. 
S/2001/363 (18 April 2001), enclosure: Addendum to the final report of the 
Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA. 
S/2001/966 (12 October 2001), enclosure: Supplementary report of the 
Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UN/TA. 
S/2002/486 (26 April 2002), annex: Additional report of the Monitoring 
Mechanism on Sanctions against UN/TA. 
S/2002/1119 (16 October 2002), annex: Additional report of the Monitoring 
Mechanism on Sanctions against UN/TA. 
S/2002/1339 (10 December 2002), annex: Final report of the Monitoring 
Mechanism on Sanctions against UN/TA. 
The Taliban/A1 Qaida 
Monitoring Group 
S/2002/65 (15 January 2002), annex: First Report of the Monitoring Group on 
Afghanistan Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 
1363 (2001). 
S/2002/54I (15 May 2002), enclosure: Report of the Monitoring Group 
pursuant to Resolution 1390 (2002). 
S/200211050 (17 December 2002), enclosure: Second report of the Monitoring 
Group Pursuant to Resolution 1390 (2002). 
S/2002/1338 (17 December 2002), enclosure: Third report of the Monitoring 
Group Pursuant to Resolution 1390 (2002). 
S/2003/669 (8 July 2003), enclosure: Report of the Monitoring Group 
established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1363 (2001) 
and extended by resolutions 1390 (2002) and 1455 (2003). 
S/2003/1070 (2 December 2003), enclosure: Second Report of the Monitoring 
Group established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1363 
(2001) and extended by resolutions 1390 (2002) and 1455 (2003). 
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Appendices 
The following appendices contain narrative summaries of the Security Council's 
decisions outlining the contours of each of its sanctions regimes. The summaries were written 
in order to compile the overview of the U.N. sanctions system contained in Part III, above. 
It was decided to include these summaries as appendices rather than incorporating them in 
the body of the thesis, so that the thesis is not too lengthy and so that there is not an 
imbalance between the sections devoted to theoretical and practical analysis. 
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1. The Southern Rhodesia sanctions regime' 
The Security Council established its first mandatory non-military sanctions regime in 
December 1966, imposing a range of measures against the white minority regime that had 
taken control of Southern Rhodesia in November 1965. 2 The major objectives of the 
sanctions regime were to end the reign of the minority regime and to enable the self-
determination and independence of the Southern Rhodesian people. The sanctions regime 
initially consisted of a range of targeted trade sanctions, but it was subsequently expanded to 
incorporate a blend of comprehensive trade sanctions, as well as financial, diplomatic, and 
aviation sanctions. In December 1979, shortly after the minority regime relinquished control 
of Southern Rhodesia, the Security Council terminated the sanctions regime. 3  It had been 
applied for a total of thirteen years. 
1.1 The constitutional basis for imposing sanctions against 
Southern Rhodesia 
The Security Council first characterised the situation in Southern Rhodesia as a 
potential threat to international peace and security in November 1965, shortly after the white 
For detailed analyses of Southern Rhodesian sanctions, see: Kuyper, Pieter Jan, The 
Implementation of International Sanctions; the Netherlands and Rhodesia (1978) Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff, Alphen aan den Rijn; Gowlland-Debbas, Vera, Collective responses to illegal acts 
in international law : United Nations action in the question of Southern Rhodesia (1990) 
Martinus Nijhoff, Boston, MA; Galtung, Johan, 'On the Effects of Economic Sanctions: With 
Examples from the Case of Rhodesia' in Nincic, Miroslav & Wallensteen, Peter, Dilemmas of 
Economic Coercion (1983) Prager, New York, 17-60. 
S/RES/232 (16 December 1966). A year earlier the Council had imposed voluntary sanctions 
upon Southern Rhodesia, calling upon all States to impose diplomatic, arms and oil sanctions 
against the illegal regime. See: SIRES/217 (20 November 1965), operative paragraphs 6 (calling 
upon all States not to recognize the illegal regime nor entertain diplomatic relation with it), 8 
(calling upon all States to desist from providing the illegal regime with arms, equipment and 
military material, and to break off economic relations, including by imposing an embargo on oil 
and petroleum products). 
The sanctions regime against Southern Rhodesia was terminated by SIRES/460 (21 December 
1979). 
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minority regime of Ian Smith declared "independence". On 12 November 1965 the Council 
condemned that unilateral declaration, calling upon all States not to recognize the regime, 
which it described as "illegal" and "racisf '. 4 Eight days later the Council determined that the 
situation resulting from the proclamation of independence by the illegal authorities was 
extremely grave and that its continuance in time constituted a threat to international peace 
and security. 5 
In April 1966, the Council expressed grave concern at reports that oil may reach 
Southern Rhodesia,6 considered that such supplies would enable the illegal regime to remain 
in power longer,' and determined that the resulting situation constituted a threat to the 
S/RES/216 (12 November 1965), operative paragraphs 1, 2. 
SIRES/217 (20 November 1965), operative paragraph 1. In resolution 217 (1965) the Council also 
called upon States to undertake a range of measures against the minority regime, including: not 
recognizing the illegal regime's claim to power nor entertaining diplomatic relations with it; 
refraining from providing arms to the illegal regime; and breaking all economic relations with 
the illegal regime, including through placing an embargo on the provision of oil and petroleum 
products to that regime: see operative paragraphs 6, 8. The Council also called upon the 
Government of the United Kingdom to take certain steps to secure the demise of the illegal 
minority regime: see operative paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 9. Although a literal reading of the text of the 
resolution might suggest that the Council was applying sanctions under Article 41 as, in 
accordance with the text of Article 41 of the United Nations Charter, the Council had 
determined the existence of a threat to international peace and security and it was calling upon 
States to take certain measures to address that threat to international peace and security, the 
prevailing view in the Council was that the measures adopted did not possess the necessary 
character to constitute Article 41 sanctions. Rather, the sanctions were "voluntary" in nature, 
due to the fact that the Council had identified a situation the continuance of which would 
constitute a threat, rather than identifying a threat already in existence, as well as to the fact 
that the Council invoked neither Chapter VII of the Charter nor Article 41 whilst articulating the 
measures it was calling upon States to implement. See, e.g., S/PV.1265: paragraphs 18-38 [the 
representative of the Ivory Coast, arguing that the situation had warranted action under 
Chapter VII and Article 41 and regretting that it had been necessary to put a compromise draft 
resolution to the vote instead of the draft resolution originally proposed by his delegation]; 
paragraphs 61-69, paragraph 64 [the representative of the United Kingdom, stating that his 
delegation did not regard the resolution just adopted as falling under Chapter VII of the 
Charter]. More than a year later, however, the Council did apply mandatory measures against 
Southern Rhodesia, adopting resolution 232 (1966), in which it explicitly invoked Articles 39 
and 41 before imposing sanctions. 
S/RES/221 (9 April 1966), preambular paragraph 2. 
SIRES/22l (9 April 1966), preambular paragraph 3. 
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peace. 8 In December 1966, before outlining the mandatory sanctions to be applied against 
the illegal minority regime in Southern Rhodesia, the Security Council noted that it was acting 
in accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of the United Nations Charter and determined that 
the situation in Southern Rhodesia constituted a threat to international peace and security. 9 In 
all of its subsequent resolutions modifying the scope of the sanctions regime, the Council 
both reaffirmed the ongoing nature of the threat posed to international peace and security by 
the illegal minority regime in Southern Rhodesia '° and invoked Chapter VII of the United 
Nations Charter." In one of those resolutions, the Council also stated explicitly that it was 
acting in accordance with Article 41 of the Charter: 2 
1.2 The objective of the Southern Rhodesia sanctions regime 
The objectives of the sanctions regime against Southern Rhodesia were to bring the 
rebellion in Southern Rhodesia to an end" and to enable the self-determination and 
independence of the Southern Rhodesian people: 4 
8 	 S/RES/221 (9 April 1966), operative paragraph 1. 
9 	 SIRES/232 (16 December 1966), preambular paragraph 4, operative paragraph 1. 
10 	See, e.g., S/RES1253 (29 May 1968), preambular paragraph 9; S/RES1277 (18 March 1970), 
preambular paragraph 6; SIRES/388 (6 April 1976), preambular paragraph 4; S/RES/409 (27 May 
1977), preambular paragraph 4; SIRES/445 (8 March 1979), preambular paragraph 7; and 
SIRES/455 (23 November 1979), preambular paragraph 8. 
See, e.g., SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), preambular paragraph 10; S/RES/277 (18 March 1970), 
preambular paragraph 7; SIRES/388 (6 April 1976), preambular paragraph 5; SIRES/409 (27 May 
1977), preambular paragraph 5. 
12 	See SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), operative paragraph 9. 
13 	See, e.g., SIRES/232 (16 December 1966), preambular paragraph 2; S/RES/253 (29 May 1968), 
preambular paragraph 3 and operative paragraph 3; SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), operative 
paragraph 9; S/RES/288 (17 November 1970), operative paragraph 2; SIRES/326 (2 February), 
operative paragraph 4; SIRES/423 (14 March 1978), in general. 
14 	See, e.g., SIRES/232 (16 December 1966), operative paragraph 4; S/RES/253 (29 May 1968), 
preambular paragraphs 7, 8, operative paragraph 2; SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), preambular 
paragraph 5, operative paragraph 4; S/RES/288 (17 November 1970), preambular paragraph 4, 
operative paragraph 2; SIRES/318 (28 July 1972), operative paragraphs 1, 2; SIRES/326 (2 
February), preambular paragraph 3; S/RES/328 (10 March 1973), preambular paragraph 7, 
operative paragraph 3; SIRES/386 (17 March 1976), preambular paragraph 4; S/RES/403 (14 
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1.3 The scope of the Southern Rhodesia sanctions regime 
The Southern Rhodesian sanctions regime initially consisted of a mixture of targeted 
economic sanctions, but it was subsequently expanded to include a comprehensive blend of 
economic, financial, travel, aviation and diplomatic sanctions. When it initiated the sanctions 
regime, the Security Council required all Member States of the United Nations to prevent 
the import of a number of Southern Rhodesia's major export products," and the export to 
Southern Rhodesia of arms and arms-related material;" aircraft and motor vehicles and 
associated parts;" and oil and oil products: 8 The Council also called upon all States to 
refrain from providing financial or economic aid to the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia: 9 
In May 1968, eighteen months after the sanctions were first imposed against 
Southern Rhodesia, the Security Council expanded the sanctions regime by requiring 
Member States to prevent: (a) The ingress to and egress from Southern Rhodesia of all 
commodities and products;2° (b) The transfer of economic or financial resources to Southern 
January 1977), preambular paragraph 3; SIRES/424 (17 March 1978), preambular paragraph 4; 
SIRES/445 (8 March 1979), preambular paragraph 8; S/RES/448 (30 April 1979), preambular 
paragraph 7; SIRES/460 (21 December 1979), operative paragraph 1; SIRES/463 (2 February 
1980), operative paragraph 1. 
15 	SIRES/232 (16 December 1966), operative paragraph 2 (a-c). These targeted exports included 
asbestos, iron-ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat and meat products and 
hides, skins and leather. 
16 	SIRES/232 (16 December 1966), operative paragraph 2 (d) (using the phrase: "Decides that all 
States Members of the United Nations shall prevent: ... the sale or shipment to Southern 
Rhodesia of arms, ammunition of all types, military aircraft, military vehicles, and equipment 
and of arms and ammunition"). 
17 	SIRES/232 (16 December 1966), operative paragraph 2 (e). 
18 	S/RES/232 (16 December 1966), operative paragraph 2 (1). 
19 
 
SIRES/232 (16 December 1966), operative paragraph 5. 
20 	51RE51253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraph 3. The Council did make provision, however, for 
exemptions to be granted from the sanctions against the supply to Southern Rhodesia of 
commodities or products regime for medical supplies, educational equipment, news materials, 
and foodstuffs - in special humanitarian circumstances: see operative paragraph 3(d). 
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Rhodesia;21 (c) Southern Rhodesian citizens and residents fom entering their territories; 22 
and (d) Airline companies linked to their territories or nationals from flying to or from 
Southern Rhodesia and from linking up with Southern Rhodesian airlines. 23 At the same 
time, the Council also emphasized the need for the withdrawal of all consular and trade 
representation in Southern Rhodesia. 24 
In March 1970 the Council further tightened the sanctions by requiring Member 
States: (a) To refrain from recognizing the illegal regime or rendering any assistance to it; 25 
(b) To sever diplomatic and other relations with the illegal regime; 26 and (c) To interrupt all 
transportation to and from Southern Rhodesia. 27 In April 1976 the Council again 
strengthened the sanctions regime, requiring Member States: (a) To prevent their nationals 
and people in their territories from insuring commodities and products exported from or 
imported to Southern Rhodesia; 28 and (b) To prevent their nationals and people in their 
territories from granting any commercial, industrial or public entity in Southern Rhodesia the 
right to use trade names.29 In May 1977 the Council further required Member States to 
21 	S/RES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraph 4. The Council did make provision for 
exemptions for payments exclusively for pensions or for medical, humanitarian, or educational 
purposes and for foodstuffs - in special humanitarian circumstances. 
22 	S/RES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraph 5. The Council provided, however, that 
exemptions might be provided from the travel sanctions "on exceptional humanitarian 
grounds". 
23 	SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraph 6. 
24 	S/RES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraph 10. 
25 	SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), operative paragraph 2. 
26 	SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), operative paragraph 9(a). 
27 	SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), operative paragraph 9(b). 
28 SIRES/388 (6 April 1976), operative paragraph 1. 
29 	SIRES/388 (6 April 1976), operative paragraph 2. 
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prohibit the use or transfer of funds in their territories by the illegal South Rhodesian 
regime.3° 
1.4 The administration, monitoring and enforcement of the 
Southern Rhodesia sanctions regime 
The Security Council bestowed responsibilities relating to the administration, 
implementation and enforcement of the Southern Rhodesia sanctions regime upon the 
Secretary-General and the Sanctions Committee it established in resolution 253 (1968). 
1.4.1 The role of the Secretary-General 
When the Council first applied the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, it requested 
States Members of the United Nations to report to the Secretary-General any measures 
taken to inplement the sanctions. 31 At the same time, the Council also requested the 
Secretary-General, in turn, to report to it within ten weeks on progress made in 
implementing the sanctions.32 When the Council subsequently modified the scope of the 
sanctions, it again requested States Members of the United Nations to report to the 
Secretary-General on measures taken to implement the sanctions and requested the 
Secretary-General, in turn, to report to it on the progress of the implementation of the 
sanctions.33 The other explicit request made of the Secretary-General by the Council was to 
provide all appropriate assistance to the 253 Committee in the discharge of its tasks. 34 
30 SIRES/409 (27 May 1977), operative paragraph I. 
31 
 
SIRES/232 (16 December 1966), operative paragraph 8. 
32 	SIRES/232 (16 December 1966), operative paragraph 9. 
33 	See, e.g., SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraphs 18, 19 [requesting the Secretary- 
General to report to it within three months]; SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), operative paragraphs 
19, 20 [requesting the Secretary-General to report to it in three months]. 
34 
 
SIRES/314 (28 February 1972), operative paragraph 7; SIRES/318 (28 July 1972), operative 
paragraph 10. 
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Also in connection with the Southern Rhodesia sanctions regime, the Council 
requested the Secretary-General to organize the provision of financial, technical and material 
assistance to Mozambique in order to help it to overcome the difficulties it was experiencing 
as a result of implementing the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia?' 
1.4.2 The Southern Rhodesia Sanctions Committee 
In May 1968, eighteen months after the Southern Rhodesian sanctions regime was 
established, the Security Council decided to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its 
provisional rules of procedure, a Committee to oversee the implementation of the sanctions 
(the "Southern Rhodesia Committee" or the "253 Committee"). 36 The Committee's initial 
mandate was to examine the reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of 
comprehensive sanctions 37 and to seek information from U.N. Member States regarding 
activity that might constitute a breach of the sanctions. 38 In subsequent resolutions, the 
Council reaffirmed those tasks of the Committee, 39 and it also decided that the Committee 
would undertake the following additional tasks: (a) To make recommendations to the 
Council on how Member States could carry out more effectively Council decisions 
regarding the sanctions and to; 4° (b) To consider how the implementation of sanctions might 
be ensured and to report to the Council with recommendations concerning its terms of 
SIRES/386 (17 March 1976), operative paragraph 6 (requesting "the Secretary-General, in 
collaboration with the appropriate organizations of the United Nations system, to organize, 
with immediate effect, all forms of financial, technical and material assistance to Mozambique to 
enable it to overcome the economic difficulties arising from its application of economic 
sanctions against the racist regime in Southern Rhodesia"). In the same resolution the Council 
also requested States and the United Nations in general to provide assistance to Mozambique. 
See: ibid, operative paragraphs 4, 5. 
36 	SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraph 20. 
17 SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraph 20(a). 
38 	SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraph 20(b). 
39 	See, e.g., SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), operative paragraphs 21(a) and (b); . 
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reference and other measures designed to ensure the effectiveness of its work; 41 (c) To 
report to the Council on the type of action which could be taken to address the refusal of 
South Africa and Portugal to implement the sanctions, as well as on proposals made at the 
1663rd to 1666th meetings of the Council for extending the scope and effectiveness of the 
sanctions;42 (d) To report to the Council on the possible application of further measures 
under Article 41;43 and (e) To submit proposals regarding measures for strengthening and 
widening the sanctions. 44 
During its twelve-year existence the 253 Committee was very active, holding a total 
of 352 formal meetings,45 and submitting to the Security Council twelve general reports on 
its activities,46 five interim reports on its activities,'" and eleven special reports on matters not 
40 	SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), operative paragraph 21(c). 
41 	SIRES/314 (28 February 1972), operative paragraph 6. 
42 	SIRES/320 (29 September 1972), operative paragraphs 4 and 5. The Council requested that the 
Committee submit this report no later than 31 January 1973. The Committee was late in 
submitting the report, however, as the Council's subsequent requests to it to expedite its 
preparation of that report attest: see, e.g., S/RES/326 (2 February 1973), operative paragraph 8; 
S/RES/328 (10 March 1973), operative paragraph 6. 
43 
 
SIRES/409 (27 May 1977), operative paragraph 3. 
44 
 
SIRES/445 (8 March 1979), operative paragraph 8. 
43 Index to Proceedings of the Security Council for 1979 (1980) United Nations, New York, p. 2 
[listing the meetings held by the Committee during the period leading up to its dissolution]. 
46 	S/8954 (30 December 1968): Report of the Security Council Committee established in 
pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia, SCOR, 
23' year, Supplement for October, November and December 1968, pp. 181-295; S/9252 (12 and 
13 June 1969): Second report of the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of 
resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia, SCOR, 24 m year, 
Supplement for April, May and June 1969, pp. 195-329; S/9844 and Corr.1-2 (15 June 1970): 
Third report of the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 
(1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia, SCOR, 25 m year, Special Supplement 
No. 3; S/10229 & Add.1 (16 June & 13 July 1971): Fourth report of the Security Council 
Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of 
Southern Rhodesia, SCOR, 26 th year, Special Supplements 2 & 2A; S/10852 & Add.1-2 (22 and 
31 December 1972 & 2 February 1973): Fifth report of the Security Council Committee 
established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern 
Rhodesia, SCOR, 27 th  year, Special Supplement No. 2; S/11178 and Rev. 1 (3 January 1974): 
Sixth report of the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 
(1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia, SCOR, 29 th  year, Special Supplement 
Nos 2, 2A; S/11594 and Rev. 1 (9 and 10 January 1975): Seventh report of the Security Council 
Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of 
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related to its regular activities. 48 The Committee's reports were often extensive, containing 
detailed analysis of exports from and imports to Southern Rhodesia during the reporting 
Southern Rhodesia: SCOR, 30 1" year, Special Supplement No. 2, Vols I-11; S/11927 & Add.1 (8 
January and 6 February 1976): Eighth report of the Security Council Committee established in 
pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia: SCOR, 
31' year, Special Supplement No. 2, Vols I-11; S/12265 (21 December 1976): Ninth report of the 
Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning 
the question of Southern Rhodesia: SCOR, 32"d year, Special Supplement, No. 2, Vols. 
S/12529 & Add.1 (I March 1978): Tenth report of the Security Council Committee established 
in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia: SCOR, 
33rd year Special Supplement No. 2, Vols. I, II; S/13000 (11 January 1979): Eleventh report of 
the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) 
concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia: SCOR, 34" year, Special Supplement No. 2, 
Vols. 1111; S/13750 (15 January 1980): Twelfth report of the Security Council Committee 
established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern 
Rhodesia: SCOR, 35 1" year, Special Supplement No. 2, Vols. I-111. 
47 S/10408 (3 December 1971): Interim report of the Security Council Committee established in 
pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia; S/10580 
(29 March 1972): Second interim report of the Security Council Committee established in 
pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia; S/10593 
(10 April 1972): Third interim report of the Security Council Committee established in 
pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia; 5/12450 
(18 November 1977): Interim report of the Security Council Committee established in 
pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia on the 
implementation of Security Council resolutions 409 (1977) and 411 (1977); 5/13191 (23 
March 1979): Interim report of the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of 
resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia. 
48 	S/10632 (9 May 1972): Special report of the Security Council Committee established in 
pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia; S/I0920 
and Corr. 1 (15 April 1973): Second special report of the Security Council Committee 
established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern 
Rhodesia; S/11597 (15 January 1975): Special report of the Security Council Committee 
established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern 
Rhodesia on external participation in the expansion of the Rhodesian Iron and Steel 
Company, Limited: SCOR, 30' year, Special Supplement No. 3; S/11913 (15 December 1975): 
Special report of the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 
(1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia on the expansion of sanctions against 
Southern Rhodesia; S/12296 (31 December 1976): Second special report of the Security 
Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the 
question of Southern Rhodesia on the expansion of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia; 
S/13296 (4 May 1979): Report of the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of 
resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia on the implementation 
of resolutions 409 (1977), 411 (1977) and 445 (1979). 
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period, as well as transcripts of some of the Committee's meetings. 49 The Committee also 
made recommendations and suggestions to the Council, some of which were acted upon." 
1.4.3 States 
States were called upon to undertake a number of additional actions to strengthen 
the implementation, enforcement and monitoring of the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. 
Interestingly, the first requests to States to take action in relation to Southern Rhodesia 
occurred prior to the actual application of mandatory sanctions. In November 1965, the 
Council had called upon States to impose voluntary diplomatic, arms and oil sanctions. In 
April 1966, the Council recalled the resolution calling for the application of voluntary 
sanctions," expressed grave concern at reports that oil was soon to reach the illegal 
regime,52 considered that such supplies would enable the illegal regime to remain in power 
longer," and determined that the resulting situation constituted a threat to the peace. 54 The 
Council then called upon Portugal not to permit oil to be pumped to Southern Rhodesia via 
a pipeline in Mozambique, over which Portugal retained administering powers," and not to 
receive oil destined for Southern Rhodesia at the port of Beira, in Mozambique. 56 At the 
same time, the Council also called upon all States to ensure that none of their vessels carried 
For detailed analysis of the Committee's reports, see: Gowlland-Debbas, Collective responses, 
above note 1. 
50 	Examples of this include the Security Council's approval of recommendations and suggestions 
in section III of the Committee's special report [SIRES/318 (28 July 1972), operative paragraph 
4], as well as of the recommendations and suggestions in paragraphs 10 to 22 of the second 
special report of the 253 Committee [SIRES/333 (22 May 1973), operative paragraph 1]. 
51 	S/RES/221 (9 April 1966), preambular paragraph I. 
52 	SIRES/22 1 (9 April 1966), preambular paragraph 2. 
53 	S/RES/221 (9 April 1966), preambular paragraph 3. 
54 
 
SIRES/221 (9 April 1966), operative paragraph I. 
55 	S/RES/221 (9 April 1966), operative paragraph 2. 
56 SIRES/221 (9 April 1966), operative paragraph 3. 
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oil to Beira,57 called upon the United Kingdom to prevent, by the use of force if necessary, 
the arrival at Beira of vessels believed to be carrying oil destined for Southern Rhodesia,' 
and empowered the United Kingdom to detain the tanker known as Joanna V upon its 
departure from Beira, in the event that it had discharged oil. 59 
When the Council first imposed the mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, 
it called upon all States Members of the United Nations to implement the sanctions in 
accordance with Article 25 of the United Nations Charter, 6° urged States not Members of 
the United Nations to act in accordance with the sanctions,61 and called upon Rates 
Members of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies to report to the 
Secretary-General the measures they had taken to implement the sanctions.62 
In May 1968, the Council required all States Members of the United Nations to 
give effect to the sanctions, notwithstanding any contract entered into or licence granted,63 
called upon all States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies to take 
all possible measures to prevent activities by their nationals and persons in their territories 
promoting, assisting or encouraging emigration to Southern Rhodesia, with a view to 
stopping such emigration, 64 and requested all States Members of the United Nations or of 
the specialized agencies to take all possible further action under Article 41 of the Charter to 
57 	SIRES/22 1 (9 April 1966), operative paragraph 4. 
58 	S/RES/221 (9 April 1966), operative paragraph 5. 
59 
 
SIRES/221 (9 April 1966), operative paragraph 5. 
60 	SIRES/232 (16 December 1966), operative paragraph 6. 
61 	SIRES/232 (16 December 1966), operative paragraph 7. 
62 	SIRES/232 (16 December 1966), operative paragraph 8. The Council reaffirmed that call in 
subsequent resolution connected with the sanctions regime. See: SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), 
operative paragraph 18; SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), operative paragraph 19. 
63 	SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraph 7. 
64 	SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraph 8. 
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deal with the situation in Southern Rhodesia. 65 The Council also called upon all States 
Members of the United Nations to carry out its decisions in accordance with Article 25 of 
the Charter,66 referred to Article 2(6) of the Charter in urging all States not Members of the 
United Nations to act in accordance with the sanctions, 67 and requested States Members of 
the United Nations, the United Nations Organization, the specialized agencies and other 
international organizations in the United Nations system to extend assistance to Zambia as a 
matter of priority with a view to helping it solve such special economic problems as it might 
be confronted with from carrying out the sanctions. 68 The Council also called upon States 
Members of the United Nations, and particularly those with primary responsibility under the 
Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, to assist effectively in the 
implementation of the sanctions, 69 and called upon States Members of the United Nations 
and members of the specialized agencies, as well as the agencies themselves, to supply to 
the 253 Committee such information as it may seek. 7° The Council also requested the 
United Kingdom, as the administering Power over Southern Rhodesia, to give maximum 
65 	S/RES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraph 9. 
66 	SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraph 11. 
67 	SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraph 14; SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), operative 
paragraph 18; S/RES/388 (6 April 1976), operative paragraph 3; SIRES/409 (27 May 1977), 
operative paragraph 2. 
68 	SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraph 15. The Council requested the same actors to 
increase such assistance in SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), operative paragraph 16. 
69 	S/RES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraph 16. The Council reaffirmed that call in 
subsequent resolutions connected with the sanctions regime. See: S/RES/277 (18 March 1970), 
operative paragraph 17. 
70 	SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraph 22. The Council reaffirmed that call in 
subsequent resolutions connected with the sanctions regime. See: S/RES/277 (18 March 1970), 
operative paragraph 23. 
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assistance to the 253 Committee, providing it with any information received in order to 
make the sanctions fully effective!' 
In March 1970, when the Council applied diplomatic sanctions against the illegal 
regime in Southern Rhodesia, it called upon States to take a range of additional action. It 
thus called upon Member States: to take measures at the national level to ensure that any act 
performed by officials and institutions of the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia were not 
accorded any recognition by the competent organs of their State .,72 to take more stringent 
measures to prevent circumvention of the sanctions by their nationals, organizations, 
companies and other institutions; 73  and to take appropriate action to suspend any 
membership or associate membership that the illegal regime had in the specialized agencies 
of the United Nations. 74 The Council further urged Member States of any international or 
regional organizations to suspend the membership of the illegal regime from their respective 
organizations and to refuse any applications by that regime for membership!' Finally, the 
Council requested the Government of the United Kingdom, as the administering power, to 
take rescind or withdraw any existing agreements on the basis of which foreign consular, 
trade and other representation might be maintained in or with Southern Rhodesia. 76 
In February 1972, the Council urged all States to implement fully the sanctions, in 
accordance with their obligations under Article 25 and Article 2(6) the Charter, 77 and called 
SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraph 21. The Council reaffirmed that call in 
subsequent resolutions connected with the sanctions regime. See: SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), 
operative paragraph 22. 
72 	SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), operative paragraph 3. 
73 STRES/277 (18 March 1970), operative paragraph 8. 
74 	S/RES/277 (18 March 1970), operative paragraph 12. 
75 
 
SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), operative paragraph 13. 
76 	SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), operative paragraph 10. 
77 	SIRES/314 (28 February 1972), operative paragraph 2. 
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upon all States to take more effective measures to ensure full implementation of the 
sanctions.78 In July 1972, the Council urged all States to review the adequacy of legislation 
and practices followed so far in relation to matters relating to the sanctions and to take more 
effective measures to ensure their full implementation. 79 In September 1972, the Council 
called upon all States to implement fully the sanctions, in accordance with Article 25 and 
Article 2(6) of the Charter,8° and it urged the United States to cooperate fully in the effective 
implementation of the sanctions. 81 In March 1973, the Council requested all Governments to 
take stringent measures to enforce and ensure full compliance by all individuals and 
organizations under their jurisdiction with the sanctions. 82 
In May 1973, the Council requested that States take a range of additional actions 
aimed at strengthening the implementation of the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. The 
Council thus requested States to repeal immediately any legislation permitting importation of 
minerals and other products from Southern Rhodesia." It also called upon States to enact 
and enforce legislation providing for the imposition of severe penalties on persons natural or 
juridical that evaded or breached sanctions." Seeking to address the actions of South Africa 
and Portugal, which had continued to trade with Southern Rhodesia in violation of the 
sanctions, the Council requested States which engaged in trade relations with those two 
countries to ensure that purchase contracts with those countries stipulated the prohibition of 
dealing in goods of Southern Rhodesian origin and that sales contracts with those countries 
78 	SIRES/314 (28 February 1972), operative paragraph 5. 
79 
 
SIRES/318 (28 July 1972), operative paragraph 9. 
80 	S/RES/320 (29 September 1972), operative paragraph 2. 
81 S/RES/320 (29 September 1972), operative paragraph 3. 
82 	SIRES/328 (10 March 1973), operative paragraph 7. 
83 	S/RES/333 (22 May 1973), operative paragraph 3. 
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included a prohibition of resale or re-export of goods to Southern Rhodesia. 85 Finally, the 
Council called upon all States to inform the 253 Committee of their present sources of 
supply and quantities of chrome, asbestos, nickel, pig iron, tobacco, meat and sugar, 
together with the quantities of those goods they had originally obtained from Southern 
Rhodesia prior to the application of sanctions. 86 
In October 1978, the Council noted with regret and concern the decision of the 
United States to allow entry into its territories of Ian Smith and other members of the illegal 
regime in Southern Rhodesia." The Council considered that that decision was in 
contravention of the sanctions and thus of obligations under Article 25 of the Charter, 88 and 
it called upon the United States to observe scrupulously the sanctions. 89 
1.5 Termination of the Southern Rhodesia sanctions regime 
The sanctions against Southern Rhodesia were ultimately terminated in December 
1979, once it had become apparent that there would be a transition from minority to 
democratic rule. Upon the signing of an agreement on the Constitution for a free and 
independent Zimbabwe providing for genuine majority rule, the Council adopted resolution 
448 (1979), terminating the sanctions regime and dissolving the 253 Sanctions Committee. 9° 
Commentators differ as to the extent to which the sanctions contributed to the demise of the 
minority regime. During the thirteen-year period in which sanctions were applied, a number 
84 	SIRES/333 (22 May 1973), operative paragraph 4. 
85 S/RES1333 (22 May 1973), operative paragraph 5. 
86 	SIRES/333 (22 May 1973), operative paragraph 8. 
87 	SIRES/437 (10 October 1978), operative paragraph 1. 
88 	SIRES/437 (10 October 1978), operative paragraph 2. 
89 
 
SIRES/437 (10 October 1978), operative paragraph 3. 
90 	S/RES/460 (21 December 1979), operative paragraphs 2 and 3. 
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of States continued to engage in relations with the minority regime in contravention of 
sanctions. 91 Furthermore, the regime itself maintained an aggressive foreign policy which 
included engaging in military activities against Zambia,92 Botswana,93 Angola" and 
Mozambique.95 
1.6 Notable aspects of the Southern Rhodesia sanctions regime 
As the Southern Rhodesia sanctions regime was the first to be established by the 
Security Council, almost everything about it was "notable". With the benefit of hindsight, 
however, it is possible to identify particular characteristics of the regime that distinguish it 
from later regimes. 
First, the Security Council nrnde a number of explicit references to provisions of the 
United Nations Charter in its resolutions related to the Southern Rhodesia sanctions regime. 
The Council made such references both in order to identify the constitutional basis for the 
actions taken, as with references to Articles 39, 41, 49 and 50, 9' and so as to demonstrate 
the manner in which . legal consequences flowed from its actions, as with its references to 
91 	Among the States identified as contravening the sanctions were Portugal and South Africa 
which continued to provide Southern Rhodesia with assistance [see SIRES/277 (18 March 
1970), preambular paragraph 4(c)] and the U.S., which allowed Ian Smith and other members of 
the minority regime to enter the U.S. in contravention of resolution 253 (1968), operative 
paragraph 5 [see SIRES/437(l0 October 1978), operative paragraphs 1-4]. 
92 	See, e.g.: SIRES/326 (2 February 1973); S/RES/327 (2 February 1973); SIRES/328 (10 March 
1973); SIRES/424 (17 March 1978). 
93 	See SIRES/403 (14 January 1977); S/RES/406 (25 May 1977). 
94 	See SIRES/445 (8 March 1979). 
95 	See SIRES/445 (8 March 1979). 
96 	For reference to Articles 39 and 41 as the explicit constitutional basis for action, see: SIRES/232 
(16 December 1966), preambular paragraph 4. For general references to Article 41 see: 
SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraph 9; SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), operative 
paragraphs 9 and 11; S/RES/409 (27 May 1977), operative paragraph 3. For explicit reference to 
Articles 49 and 50 as the constitutional basis for action, see: SIRES/386 (17 March 1976), 
preambular paragraph 10. 
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Articles 2, 2(6) and 25. 97 In its resolutions relating to subsequent sanctions regimes, the 
Council has tended to be less explicit, using language which can be interpreted as implicit 
references to provisions of the Charter. In general, the Council will thus identify a threat to 
the peace without invoking Article 39 and note that it is acting uider Chapter VII without 
invoking Article 41. 
Second, the Council drew a distinction between the obligations of States Members 
of the United Nations and States non-members. When the Council defined and modified the 
scope of the sanctions regime, it required "all States Members of the United Nations" to 
impose the sanctions." In many instances it also made explicit reference to the obligation of 
States Members of the United Nations to implement the sanctions in accordance with 
Article 25 of the Charter. 99 At the same time, however, the Council also reminded States 
97 	For reference to Article 25 as the basis of the legal obligation upon Member States, see: 
S/RES/232 (16 December 1966), operative paragraphs 3,6; SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), preambular 
paragraph 5, operative paragraphs 11, 12; S/RE51277 (18 March 1970), preambular paragraph 
4(b); SIRES/288 (17 November 1970), preambular paragraph 3, operative paragraph 4; SIRES/3 14 
(28 February 1972), preambular paragraph 3, operative paragraph 2; SIRES/318 (28 July 1972), 
preambular paragraph 5; SIRES/320 (29 September 1972), preambular paragraph 3, operative 
paragraph 2; SIRES/333 (22 May 1973), preambular paragraph 3; SIRES/437 (10 October 1978), 
operative paragraph 2; S/RES/460 (21 December 1979), operative paragraph 4. For reference to 
Article 2 in general in connection with an appeal to States not Members of the United Nations 
to act in accordance with the sanctions, see: S/RES/232 (16 December 1966), operative 
paragraph 7; SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), operative paragraph 14; S/RES/277 (18 March 1970), 
operative paragraph 18; S/RES/388 (6 April 1976), operative paragraph 3. For reference to 
Article 2(6) in the same connection, see: S/RES/314 (28 February 1972), operative paragraph 2; 
S/RES/320 (29 September 1972), operative paragraph 2; SIRES/409 (27 May 1977), operative 
paragraph 2. 
98 	See, e.g., SIRES/232 (16 December 1966), operative paragraph 2; S/RES/253 (29 May 1968), 
operative paragraphs 3-6; SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), operative paragraphs 2, 9; S/RES/388 (6 
April 1976), operative paragraphs 1, 2 [using the phrase "all Member States" rather than the 
longer "all States Members of the United Nations"]; SIRES/409 (27 May 1977), operative 
paragraph 1 [again using the phrase "all Member States"]. 
99 	See, e.g., S/RES/232 (16 December 1966), operative paragraphs 3, 6; SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), 
preambular paragraph 5, operative paragraphs 11, 12; SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), preambular 
paragraph 4(b); SIRES/288 (17 November 1970), preambular paragraph 3, operative paragraph 4; 
SIRES/314 (28 February 1972), preambular paragraph 3, operative paragraph 2; SIRES/318 (28 
July 1972), preambular paragraph 5; SIRES/320 (29 September 1972), preambular paragraph 3, 
operative paragraph 2; SIRES/333 (22 May 1973), preambular paragraph 3; SIRES/437 (10 
October 1978), operative paragraph 2; SIRES/460 (21 December 1979), operative paragraph 4. 
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non-members of the United Nations of the provisions of Article 2 of the Charter in 
general,' °° or of Article 2(6) in particular,' ° ' thus alluding to a potential basis for legally 
obligating even those States that were not Members of the United Nations. 
Third, by creating the 253 Committee the Council established its first Sanctions 
Committee. Perhaps because it was the very first Sanctions Committee, the 253 Committee 
was considerably more active than most of its fourteen younger cousins. The 253 
Committee remains the Committee which held the most meetings, circulated the highest 
number of substantive reports, m2 and made the most substantive recommendations to the 
Security Council regarding potential modifications to a sanctions regime. 
Fourth, in some of its resolutions related to the Southern Rhodesian sanctions 
regime, the Council called upon States that were not implementing the sanctions to comply 
with their obligations to do so.' °3 Finally, in its oversight of the Southern Rhodesian sanctions 
regime, the Security Council also invoked the provisions of Article 50 for the first time in 
100 	See, e.g., S/RES/232 (16 December 1966), operative paragraph 7; SIRES/253 (29 May 1968), 
operative paragraph 14; S/RES/277 (18 March 1970), operative paragraph 18; SIRES/388 (6 April 
1976), operative paragraph 3. 
Jo' 	See, e.g., S/RES/314 (28 February 1972), operative paragraph 2; S/RES/320 (29 September 1972), 
operative paragraph 2; SIRES/409 (27 May 1977), operative paragraph 2. 
102 	Although the 661 Committee has submitted a greater number of reports to the Council, many of 
them were pro forma reports with little or no new substantive information. For discussion of 
such reports, see Appendix 3. 
103 	See, e.g.: SIRES/277 (18 March 1970), operative paragraph 6 (condemning the policies of South 
Africa and Portugal, which were continuing to maintain political, economic, military and other 
relations with the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia); S/RES/320 (29 September 1972), 
preambular paragraphs 5 (expressing deep concern at reports that the United States had 
authorized the import of chrome ore and other minerals from Southern Rhodesia), 6 
(condemning the refusal of South Africa and Portugal to implement sanctions against Southern 
Rhodesia), operative paragraphs 3 (urging the United States to implement the sanctions), 4 
(requesting the 253 Committee to consider what action could be taken in view of the open and 
persistent refusal by South Africa and Portugal to implement the sanctions); S/RES1333 (22 
May 1973), preambular paragraphs 4 (condemning the persistent refusal by South Africa and 
Portugal to implement the sanctions); SIRES/437 (10 October 1978), operative paragraphs 1-3 
(expressing concern at the decision of the United States to grant entry to its territories to Ian 
Smith and other members of the illegal regime, noting that that decision contravened the 
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relation to a sanctions regime, 1°4 recommending that States and international organizations 
and agencies provide special assistance to Zambia and Mozambique.1°5 
obligations of the United States under Article 25, and calling upon the United States to 
observe scrupulously the provisions of Security Council resolutions concerning sanctions). 
104 	Article 50 provides: "If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the 
Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds 
itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those 
measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those 
problems". 
105 	The Council made such recommendations in relation to Zambia in: S/RES/327 (2 February 1973), 
preambular paragraph 5, operative paragraph 2; SIRES/329 (10 March 1973), operative 
paragraphs 2-6. It made recommendations relating to Mozambique, invoking both Articles 49 
and 50, in: SIRES/386 (17 March 1976), preambular paragraph 10, operative paragraphs 3-6. The 
Council also made recommendations relating to the provision of special economic assistance to 
Botswana, although it is unclear whether that was aimed at alleviating the consequences of the 
sanctions regime or of the aggression perpetrated against that country by Southern Rhodesia: 
S/RES/403 (14 January 1977), operative paragraphs 5-8; SIRES/406 (25 May 1977), operative 
paragraphs 5-7. 
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2. The South Africa sanctions regime' 
The Security Council applied mandatory sanctions against South Africa in 
November 1977, with the aims of restricting the South African Government's potential to 
threaten international peace and security, eliminating the policy of apartheid and ensuring 
the enjoyment of equal rights by all South African citizens. The mandatory sanctions regime, 
which consisted of an arms embargo, 2 was eventually terminated in May 1994, after the 
inauguration of Nelson Mandela's Government 
2.1 The constitutional basis for imposing sanctions against South 
Africa 
In late-1977, almost fourteen years after it had begun to experiment with a policy of 
a "voluntary" arms embargo against South Africa,' the Security Council adopted two 
For detailed analyses of the sanctions against South Africa, see: Crawford, Neta C. & Klotz, 
Audie (eds), How Sanctions Work; Lessons from South Africa (1999) St. Martin's Press, NY; 
Hermele, Kenneth, & °den, Bertil, Sanctions Dilemmas: some implications of sanctions 
against South Africa (1988) Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala; Hoffman, 
John, 'Legitimate Intervention and Illegitimate States: sanctions against South Africa' in 
Forbes, Ian & Hoffman, John (eds), Political Theory, International Relations, and the Ethics 
of Intervention (1993) St. Martin's Press, New York, 157-66. 
In addition to the mandatory arms embargo, the Council also called upon States to impose a 
range of voluntary sanctions. For further details, see section 2.3, below. 
In August 1963, the Council had characterised the South African Government's continuation 
of the policy of apartheid and its actions to increase its weapons stockpile as "seriously 
disturbing international peace and security" [SIRES/181 (7 August 1963), preambular paragraph 
8] and had "solemnly" called upon States to cease selling and shipping arms, ammunition of all 
types and military vehicles to South Africa [S/RES/181 (7 August 1963), operative paragraph 3]. 
The status of this embargo as "voluntary" appears clear with the benefit of hindsight: see, e.g., 
SIRES/4 18 (4 November 1977), preambular paragraph 8 ["Recalling ... resolution 181 ... and 
other resolutions concerning a voluntary arms embargo against South Africa" (emphasis 
added)]. At the time the resolution was adopted, however, the Council's call upon States to 
halt sales and shipments of arms and related equipment to South Africa could conceivably 
have been interpreted to fall within the scope of Article 41. Some Council members made a 
point, however, of clarifying that as far as they were concerned the embargo was not 
mandatory and did not constitute action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations. See, e.g., the statements of the United States and the United Kingdom: S/PV.1056 (7 
August 1963), paragraphs 23-30 [statement by the representative of the United States, noting 
in paragraph 26 that "a number of Council members [were] not prepared to agree that the 
situation in South Africa [was] one which [called] for the kind of action appropriate in cases of 
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resolutions addressing the situation in that country. On 31 October 1977, the Security 
Council recalled its earlier calls to the South African regime to end violence against its 
people and to take urgent steps to eliminate apartheid and racial discrimination, 4 and noted 
that it was convinced that the violence and repression by the South African racist regime had 
greatly aggravated the situation in South Africa and would lead to violent conflict and racial 
conflagration with serious international repercussions.' At the same time, the Council also 
reaffirmed the legitimacy of the struggle of the South African people for the elimination of 
apartheid and racial discrimination, 6 and affirmed the right to the exercise self-determination 
by all the people of South Africa, irrespective of race, colour or creed.' The Council then 
strongly condemned the South African regime for its repression of its black people and of 
other opponents of apartheid, 8 expressed support for and solidarity with those people 
threats to the peace or breaches of the peace under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter", 
and observing in paragraphs 27 and 28 that the fact that operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of the 
resolution called upon Member States to take certain action did not give those paragraphs a 
"mandatory character" and that the words "call upon" do not carry "mandatory force"], 
paragraphs 33-38 [statement by the representative of the United Kingdom, agreeing with the 
representative of the United States that the resolution just adopted and the measures which it 
called upon all States to take "should not be regarded as being a resolution within Chapter VII 
of the Charter"]. It is noteworthy, however, that subsequent Council decisions suggested that 
the embargo carried legal implications beyond those of a mere "voluntary" measure [see, e.g., 
SIRES/282 (23 July 1970), operative paragraph 3: "Condemns the violations of the arms 
embargo called for in resolutions 181, 182 and 191"]. The embargo was also reaffirmed and 
strengthened in a number of subsequent resolutions [see: SIRES/182 (4 December 1963), 
operative paragraph 5; SIRES/191 (18 June 1964), operative paragraph 12; SIRES/282 (23 July 
1970), operative paragraphs 2, 4]. Furthermore, the Council authorised the establishment of 
both an expert panel [SIRES/182 (4 December 1963), operative paragraph 6] and an expert 
committee [see SIRES/191 (18 June 1964), operative paragraph 8] to look into measures that 
might help to address the situation in South Africa. Ultimately, however, as mentioned above, 
the Council used hindsight to characterise the earlier embargo as "voluntary" when it imposed 
the subsequent, "mandatory" embargo: see SIRES/418 (4 November 1977), preambular 
paragraphs 8, 9. 
SIRES/417 (31 October 1977), preambular paragraph I. 
SIRES/41 7 (31 October 1977), preambular paragraph 4. 
SIRES/417 (31 October 1977), preambular paragraph 5. 
SIRES/4 17 (31 October 1977), preambular paragraph 6. 
SIRES/417 (31 October 1977), operative paragraph I. 
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struggling for the elimination of apartheid,9 and made certain demands of the South African 
regime. ' o 
Five days later, on 4 November 1977, the Security Council again called upon the 
South African Government to end violence against its people and to take urgent steps to 
eliminate apartheid and racial discrimination." The Council then recognized that the military 
build-up by South Africa and its persistent acts of aggression against neighbouring States 
seriously disturbed the security of those States, 12 further recognized that it was necessary to 
strengthen the existing voluntary arms embargo in order to prevent a further aggravation of 
the grave situation in South Africa," and strongly condemned the Government of South 
Africa for its acts of repression, its continuance of the system of apartheid and its attacks 
against neighbouring States. 14 The Council then noted that it was acting under Chapter VII 
of the Charter of the United Nations," determined that, having regard to the policies and 
acts of the South African Government, the acquisition by South Africa of arms and related 
SIRES/4 17 (31 October 1977), operative paragraph 2. 
io 	SIRES/417 (31 October 1977), operative paragraph 3. Those demands included that the racist 
regime of South Africa: (a) End violence and repression against black people and opponents of 
apartheid; (b) Release all persons imprisoned under arbitrary security laws and all those 
detained for their opposition to apartheid; (c) Cease indiscriminate violence against peaceful 
demonstrators against apartheid, murders in detention and torture of political prisoners; 
(d) Abrogate bans on organizations and the news media opposed to apartheid; (e) Abolish the 
"Bantu education" system and all other measures of apartheid and racial discrimination; and 
(I) Abolish the policy of bantustanization, abandon the policy of apartheid and ensure 
majority rule based on justice and equality. 
S/RES/418 (4 November 1977), preambular paragraph I. 
12 	SIRES/4 18 (4 November 1977), preambular paragraph 2. 
13 	SIRES/4 18 (4 November 1977), preambular paragraph 3. 
14 SIRES/4 18 (4 November 1977), preambular paragraph 6. 
15 
 
SIRES/41 8 (4 November 1977), preambular paragraph 10. 
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materiel constituted a threat to international peace and security, I6 and applied mandatory 
sanctions against South Africa." 
2.2 The objective of the South Africa sanctions regime 
The explicit objective of the sanctions regime was to prevent South Africa from 
acquiring arms, so as to diminish the South African Government's capacity to pose a threat 
to international peace and security. 18 A number of other objectives were also implicit in the 
Council's decisions in relation to the situation in South Africa, however, including: eliminating 
the policy of apartheid; 19 the establishment of a democratic society., 2° and the enjoyment of 
equal rights by all South African citizens. 21 
2.3 The scope of the South Africa sanctions regime 
The scope of the mandatory sanctions regime imposed against South Africa 
remained consistent throughout the sixteen and a half years from the time of its establishment 
to its termination. Under the sanctions regime, the Security Council required all States to 
SIRES/418 (4 November 1977), operative paragraph 1. The Council reaffirmed its determination 
of this threat in resolution 421 (1977): SIRES/42 1 (9 December 1977), preambular paragraph 1. In 
resolution 473 (1980) the Council also characterised apartheid as seriously disturbing 
international peace and security: S/RES1473 (13 June 1980), operative paragraph 3. 
17 	SIRES/418 (4 November 1977), operative paragraph 2. 
18 	SIRES/41 8 (4 November 1977), operative paragraphs 1 and 2; SIRES/558 (13 December 1984), 
preambular paragraphs 4, 5. 
19 SIRES/41 8 (4 November 1977), preambular paragraph 1; SIRES/473 (13 June 1980), preambular 
paragraph 7, operative paragraph 4, 7; SIRES/569 (26 July 1985), operative paragraph 5; 
SIRES/591 (28 November 1986), preambular paragraph 7; S/RES/765 (16 July 1992), operative 
paragraph 7. 
20 	See, e.g., SIRES/473 (13 June 1980), preambular paragraph 7, operative paragraph 4; SIRES/569 
(26 July 1985), preambular paragraph 5, operative paragraph 5; SIRES/591 (28 November 1986), 
preambular paragraph 7. 
21 	See, e.g., SIRES/473 (13 June 1980), preambular paragraph 7, operative paragraphs 4 and 7; 
SIRES/569 (26 July 1985), preambular paragraph 5; SIRES/591 (28 November 1986), preambular 
paragraph 7. 
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stop providing South Africa with arms and related materiel of all types,' and to refrain 
from helping South Africa to develop nuclear weapons. 23 Although the United Nations 
General Assembly adopted annual resolutions urging the Security Council to strengthen the 
mandatory sanctions regime,24 the Council could not achieve the necessary agreement to 
take such action. A number of draft resolutions were put to the vote which would have 
22 	SIRES/418 (4 November 1977), operative paragraph 2. In that provision the Council noted that 
the phrase "arms and related materiel" included weapons, ammunition, military vehicles and 
equipment, paramilitary police equipment, and spare parts for all of those articles. The Council 
subsequently clarified that the phrase also included nuclear, strategic and conventional 
weapons, all military, paramilitary police vehicles and equipment, as well as spare parts for all of 
those items: see SIRES/59 1 (28 November 1986), operative paragraph 4. 
23 	S/RES/418 (4 November 1977), operative paragraph 4. 
24 	See, e.g., AIRES/32/105 (14 December 1977): Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South 
Africa, Section G: Economic Collaboration with South Africa, operative paragraph 1; 
A/RES/33/183 (24 January 1979): Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa, 
Section E: Oil Embargo against South Africa; AIRES/34/93 (12 December 1979): Policies of 
Apartheid of the Government of South Africa, Section C: International Conference on 
Sanctions against South Africa, Section D: Arms embargo against South Africa, Section F: Oil 
Embargo against South Africa; A/RES/35/206 (16 December 1980): Policies of Apartheid of the 
Government of South Africa, Section C: Comprehensive sanctions against South Africa; 
A/RES/36/172 (17 December 1981): Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa, 
Section B: International Year of Mobilization for sanctions against South Africa, Section D: 
Comprehensive sanctions against South Africa; AIRES/37/69 (9 December 1982): Policies of 
Apartheid of the South African Government, Section C: Comprehensive and mandatory 
sanctions against South Africa; A/RES/38/39: Policies of Apartheid of the South African 
Government (5 December 1983), Section D: Sanctions against South Africa; AIRES/39/72: 
Policies of Apartheid of the South African Government (13 December 1984), Section A: 
Comprehensive sanctions against the apartheid regime and support to the liberation struggle in 
South Africa; A/RES/40/64: Policies of Apartheid of the South African Government (10 
December 1985), Section A: Comprehensive sanctions against the racist regime of South 
Africa; A/RES/41/35: Policies of Apartheid of the South African Government (10 November 
1986), Section B: Comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against the racist regime of South 
Africa; AIRES/42/23 (20 November 1987): Policies of Apartheid of the South African 
Government, Section C: Comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against the racist regime of 
South Africa; AIRES/43/50 (5 December 1988): Policies of Apartheid of the South African 
Government, Section C: Comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against the racist regime of 
South Africa; AIRES/44/27 (22 November 1989): Policies of Apartheid of the South African 
Government, Section C: Comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against the racist regime of 
South Africa; AIRES/45/176 (19 December 1990): Policies of Apartheid of the South African 
Government, Section B: Concerted and effective measures aimed at eradicating apartheid, 
Section F: Oil Embargo against South Africa; AIRES/46/79 (13 December 1991): Policies of 
Apartheid of the South African Government, Section E: Oil Embargo against South Africa; 
AIRES/47/1 16 (18 December 1992): Policies of Apartheid of the South African Government, 
Section D: Oil Embargo against South Africa. The General Assembly's calls upon the Security 
Council to strengthen the sanctions regime ceased in 1993, when the General Assembly 
adopted a resolution welcoming the process of transition to democracy that had begun in 
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expanded the scope of the South Africa sanctions, but none of them were adopted due 
either to the failure to gain the requisite votes or to the exercise of the veto by a permanent 
member of the Counci1. 25 Nevertheless, despite the fact that the Council did not strengthen 
the scope of the mmdatory sanctions, it did adopt decisions calling upon, requesting or 
urging States to implement a broad range of additional voluntary measures, including arms- 
South Africa and lifting the sanctions which it had called upon Member States to apply against 
the Government of South Africa: see A/RES/4811 (8 October 1993). 
25 	See, e.g., S/18705: draft resolution on mandatory sanctions against South Africa, sponsored by 
Argentina, Congo, Ghana, United Arab Emirates and Zambia. In the vote on that draft 
resolution, held during the 2738 th meeting of the Council on 20 February 1987, there were ten 
votes in favour to three against (including the United Kingdom and the United States) with two 
abstentions [under the draft resolution, the Council would have required States to apply 
additional mandatory sanctions against South Africa in accordance with Article 41, including 
targeted economic and financial sanctions such as a prohibition upon the importation from 
South Africa of South Africa currency, military articles, uranium and coal, and a prohibition 
upon the export to South Africa of computers, oil and petroleum products, as well as upon the 
provision of loans to the South African Government]; S/19585: draft resolution on sanctions 
against South Africa, sponsored by Algeria, Argentina, Nepal, Senegal, Yugoslavia and 
Zambia. In the vote on that draft resolution, held during the 2797 th meeting of the Council on 8 
March 1988, there were ten votes in favour to two against, (the United Kingdom and the United 
States) with three abstentions [under the draft resolution, the Council would have required 
States to apply additional mandatory sanctions against South Africa in accordance with Article 
41, including targeted economic and financial sanctions such as a prohibition upon investment 
in South Africa, upon all forms of military, police or intelligence cooperation, including the sale 
of computer equipment, and upon the export to South Africa of oil]. 
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related sanctions,26 financial sanctions," sporting and cultural sanctions, 28 and economic 
sanctions." 
2.4 The administration, monitoring and enforcement of the South 
Africa sanctions regime 
During the course of its application of sanctions against South Africa, the Security 
Council bestowed responsibility for the administration, implementation and enforcement of 
sanctions upon the Secretary-General and the South Africa Sanctions Committee. 
2.4.1 The Role of the Secretary-General 
During the course of the South Africa sanctions regime the Security Council 
requested the Secretary-General to report to it on the implementation of its resolutions 
relating to the sanctions, including resolutions 418 (1977), 473 (1980), 558 (1984), 569 
(1985), 591 (1986).3° 
26 	The Security Council requested States to apply the following measures related to South 
Africa's military activities: (a)to prohibit the import from South Africa of arms and related 
materiel [S/RE51558 (13 December 1984), operative paragraph 2]; (b) to prohibit the conclusion 
of contracts in the nuclear field with South Africa [S/RES/569 (26 July 1985), operative 
paragraph 6(e)]; (c) to prohibit the export of spare parts for embargoed aircraft and other 
military equipment belonging to South Africa [SIRES/591 (28 November 1986), operative 
paragraph 2]; and (d) to prohibit the import of South African armaments for display in 
international fairs and exhibitions [SIRES/591 (28 November 1986), operative paragraph 7]. 
27 	The Security Council urged States to apply the following measures related to South Africa's 
financial activities: (a) to suspend investment in South Africa [SIRES/569 (26 July 1985), 
operative paragraph 6(a)]; (b) to prohibit the sale of currency originating in South Africa 
[S/RES/569 (26 July 1985), operative paragraph 6(b)]; and (c) to suspend guaranteed export 
loans to South Africa [SIRES/569 (26 July 1985), operative paragraph 6(d)]. 
28 	In resolution 569 (1985) the Council urged States to restrict sporting and cultural relations with 
South Africa: SIRES/569 (26 July 1985), operative paragraph 6(c). 
29 	The Council urged States to apply the following economic sanctions against South Africa: 
(a) to prohibit the sale to South Africa of computer equipment that might be used by the army 
and the police [SIRES/569 (26 July 1985), operative paragraph 6(0]; and (b) to prohibit the 
export to South Africa of items destined for the military and police forces of South Africa 
[SIRES/591 (28 November 1986), operative paragraph 3]. 
30 	SIRES/4l8 (4 November 1977), operative paragraph 6; SIRES/473 (13 June 1980), operative 
paragraph 12; SIRES/558 (13 December 1984), operative paragraph 4 [in this case requesting the 
Secretary-General to report to the South Africa Sanctions Committee, rather than directly to the 
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2.4.2 The South Africa Sanctions Committee 
A month after it imposed the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, the 
Security Council decided to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of 
procedure, a Committee to oversee the implementation of the sanctions against South Africa 
(the "South Africa Sanctions Committee" or the "421 Committee"). 31 The Committee was 
asked to report to the Council on its work and with its observations and recommendations 
and to undertake the following tasks: a) To examine the reports of the Secretary-General 
report on the implementation of the sanctions; 32 b) To make recommendations on how the 
arms embargo might be made more effective;33 and c) To seek information from States 
regarding steps taken by them to implement the sanctions. 34 In subsequent resolutions the 
committee was also asked: d) To redouble its efforts to ensure the strict implementation of 
the sanctions by recommending measures to close any "loop-holes". 35 
The 421 Committee remains the longest serving Sanctions Committee, having 
existed for seventeen years. Despite its longevity, however, the 421 Committee was 
considerably less active than the Southern Rhodesia Committee. During its tenure the 
Committee held 113 formal meetings, 36 issued four reports,37 and made a handful of 
Council, on the implementation of resolution 558 (1984)]; SIRES/569 (26 July 1985), operative 
paragraph 8; SIRES/591 (28 November 1986), operative paragraph 14. 
31 
	
SIRES/421 (9 December 1977), operative paragraph 1. 
32 
	
Ibid, operative paragraph 1(a). 
33 	'bid, operative paragraph 1(b). 
34 
	
Ibid, operative paragraph 1(c). 
35 
	
See, e.g., SIRES/473 (13 June 1980), operative paragraph 11; SIRES/591 (28 November 1986), 
operative paragraph 13. 
36 	Index to Proceedings of the Security Council for 1994 (1995) United Nations, New York, p. xii 
[containing a list of the meetings held by the 421 Committee in 1994— the year in which it was 
dissolved]. 
37 	S/13708 (26 December 1979) [Report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant 
to resolution 421 (1977) concerning South Africa on nuclear collaboration with South 
Africa]; S/13721 (31 December 1979) [Report of the Security Council Committee established 
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recommendations to the Council regarding potential action in relation to the sanctions 
regime, a number of which were incorporated into subsequent Security Council 
resolutions." 
2.4.3 States 
The Security Council called upon States to take a number of actions to strengthen 
the implementation, monitoring and enforcement of the sanctions regime against South 
Africa. When the sanctions were applied, the Council called upon all States to review 
contractual arrangements with and licences granted to South Africa relating to the 
manufacture and maintenance of arms, ammunition of all types and military equipment and 
vehicles, with a view to terminating them." The Council also called upon all States, including 
States non-members of the United Nations, to act strictly in accordance with the sanctions. 4° 
In December 1977, the Council called upon all States to cooperate fully with the 
421 Committee in the effective implementation of the sanctions, including by supplying 
pursuant to resolution 421 (1977) concerning South Africa, SCOR, 35 th year, supplement for 
July, August and September 1980: S/14179 (19 September 1980): Report of the Security 
Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 421 (1977) concerning South Africa 
on ways and means of making the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa more 
effective]; S/21015 (11 December 1989) annex: Report of the Security Council Committee 
established pursuant to resolution 421 (1977) concerning South Africa [containing a report 
of the activities of the Committee from 1980-1989]. 
38 
	
S/16680 (13 December 1984): Letter dated 13 December 1984 from the Chairman of the 
Security Council Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) concerning the question of 
South Africa [transmitting a recommendation adopted at the 63" meeting of the Committee]; 
S/18474 (24 November 1986): Letter dated 24 November 1986 from the Chairman of the 
Security Council Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) concerning the question of 
South Africa [transmitting a draft resolution on the arms embargo against South Africa 
adopted by the Committee at its 75 th meeting]; S/19396 (30 December 1987): Letter dated 30 
December 1987 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established by 
resolution 421 (1977) concerning the question of South Africa [transmitting a statement 
concerning the question of South Africa]. 
39 SIRES/418 (4 November 1977), operative paragraph 3. 
40 	SIRES/418 (4 November 1977), operative paragraph 5. 
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information sought by that Committee.41 In November 1986, the Council called upon States 
to prohibit the export of spare parts for embargoed aircraft and other military equipment 
belonging to South Africa and any official involvement in the maintenance and service of 
such equipment.42 The Council further urged all States to prohibit the export to South Africa 
of items destined br the military or police forces in South Africa, or which had a military 
capacity and were intended for military purposes, such as aircraft and parts thereof, 
electronic and telecommunication equipment, computers and 4-wheel drive vehicles. 43 The 
Council also requested all States to implement strictly the sanctions and to refrain from any 
cooperation in the nuclear field with South Africa,'" to ensure that their national legislation 
and policy directives contained penalties to deter violations of the sanctions, 45 and to adopt 
measures to investigate past and prevent future violations of sanctions, as well as to 
strengthen machinery for the implementation of sanctions, with a view to the effective 
monitoring and verification of transfers of aims and other equipment in violation of the 
sanctions.46 
2.5 Termination of the South Africa sanctions regime 
The sanctions against South Africa were ultimately terminated in May 1994, when 
the Council welcomed the first all-race multiparty election in South Africa and the 
inauguration of a united, democratic, non-racial government of South Africa.47 At the same 
S/RES/421 (9 December 1977), operative paragraph 2. 
42 SIRES/59 1 (28 November 1986), operative paragraph 2. 
43 
 
SIRES/591 (28 November 1986), operative paragraph 3. 
44 SIRES/591 (28 November 1986), operative paragraph 5. 
45 	SIRES/591 (28 November 1986), operative paragraph O. 
46 
 
SIRES/59 1 (28 November 1986), operative paragraph 11. 
47 S/RES/919 (26 May 1994), operative paragraph I. 
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time the Council also dissolved the South Africa Sanctions Committee." A month later the 
Security Council removed 'The question of South Africa" from the list of matters of which it 
was seized. 49 
2.6 Notable aspects of the South Africa sanctions regime 
The South Africa sanctions regime is notable largely for the perception that it played 
a role in bringing about the demise of apartheid.5° It is unclear, however, to what extent the 
U.N.'s arms embargo was a critical factor in bringing about change. The embargo without 
doubt restricted the South African government's ability to gain easy access to arms which 
48 	Mid, operative paragraph 3. 
49 SIRES/930 (27 June 1994), operative paragraph 4. 
50 	For examples of the view that the sanctions regime played a part in the ultimate demise of 
apartheid, see the following statements from the 3379 th meeting of the Security Council, during 
which the Council adopted resolution 919 (1994), terminating the sanctions and dissolving the 
South Africa Sanctions Committee: S/PV.3379, p. 3 ["We would ... like to take this opportunity 
to extend our sincere thanks to the Security Council, to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations ... and the United Nations as a whole for the outstanding contribution this 
Organization has made in bringing South Africa to the happy situation in which it is today": 
Mr. Thabo Mbeki, Deputy President of South Africa], p. 4 ["Sanctions have played an effective 
supportive role in the struggle against apartheid": Ambassador Legwaila, Botswana], p. 13 
["[F]or years the international community had worked tirelessly, persistently and intelligently 
to bring an end to the formidable power of apartheid. This time, at least, our sanctions yielded 
unambiguous and incontrovertible results": Ambassador Snoussi, Morocco], p.14 ["The 
Security Council played a significant role in hastening the pace of change in South Africa. The 
arms embargo was symbolic of the Council's abhorrence of apartheid as well as other crimes 
perpetrated against the black majority in South Africa ... Today, the Council can take pride in 
the fact that it has contributed substantially to the elimination of apartheid": Ambassador 
Ansari, India], p. 17 ["Despite the loopholes and weakness h the implementation of the 
embargo, and various violations, we believe that the arms embargo against apartheid played a 
significant role in bringing about change and reducing the level of violence and human 
suffering in southern Africa": Mr. Abdul Minty, Director of the World Campaign against 
Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa], p. 24 ["The past initiatives of this main 
organ of the United Nations against the former Government of South Africa, which we are now 
scratching from the books, contributed to paving the way to the new South Africa": 
Ambassador Sardenberg, Brazil], p. 26 ["The United Nations arms embargoes and related 
restrictions imposed by this body against South Africa contributed significantly to the demise 
of apartheid": Ambassador Gnehm, the United States of America], p.27 ["[W]e, the family of 
nations, played our own modest role in ostracizing the regime of apartheid and imposing 
sanctions on it, thereby driving it into an isolated corner reserved for pariahs of the world 
community": Ambassador Kovanda, the Czech Republic], p. 28 ["It is not often that the 
Security Council decides to lift a sanctions regime. It is always a source of gratification, 
because it demonstrates that the objectives sought by the international community in imposing 
these special measures have at last been attained": Ambassador Yaiiez Bamuevo, Spain]. 
453 
Appendix 2. The South Africa sanctions regime 
would have assisted it to oppress further the South African people and to take additional 
aggressive action against other States.' It is probable, however, that other forms of 
sanctions against South Africa, including the stronger sanctions called for by the General 
Assembly, as well as other forms of non-forceful action employed by States, organisations 
and groups of individuals, played at least as significant a role in bringing about the ultimate 
demise of apartheid as the Security Council's mandatory arms embargo. 
The South Africa sanctions regime contributed to the evolution of the United 
Nations sanctions system in a number of ways. First, it represented the first sanctions regime 
to be imposed against a State Member of the United Nations. Second, when the Council 
outlined the scope of the South Africa sanctions regime it introduced a formulation that has 
become standard in subsequent sanctions regimes - the phrase: 'Decides that all States 
shall". Third, the Council's calls to States to apply a mixture of "voluntary" sanctions in 
addition to the mandatory arms embargo created a web of "sanctions" whose legal 
implications appeared to differ substantially. 52 
51 	Throughout the period during which the mandatory sanctions regime was applied the South 
African Government continued to engage in military aggression, against a number of African 
States, including Namibia, Angola, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Mozambique. 
52 	Although the Council had also adopted voluntary and mandatory sanctions against the illegal 
minority regime in Southern Rhodesia, most of the voluntary sanctions preceded the 
application of mandatory sanctions. In its actions relating to South Africa, however, the 
Council adopted a range of voluntary sanctions both before and after it imposed the 
mandatory sanctions. 
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3. The Iraq sanctions regime 
The Security Council imposed sanctions against Iraq on 6 August 1990, four days 
after Saddam Hussein had ordered his troops to invade Kuwait. The sanctions regime 
consisted of a complex mixture of comprehensive economic and financial sanctions, with the 
objective of bringing about Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait and the reinstatement of the 
Kuwaiti Government. After the Gulf War, which led to the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from 
Kuwait, the sanctions were retained. The new objectives of the sanctions regime were to 
bring about the establishment of a Compensation Commission to administer reparations 
claims arising from the Gulf War and to disarm Iraq of nuclear, chemical and biological 
weapons, as well as of its anti-ballistic missiles with a range of greater than 150 km. 
The Iraq sanctions regime continued to be applied without major modification for a 
period of twelve years. Although the Security Council expanded the scope of the initial 
exemptions from the sanctions and established the Oil-for-Food Programme, with the aim of 
enabling Iraq to export a limited quantity of oil in order to finance the purchase of 
humanitarian goods, it was rot until April 2003 that the sanctions were altered significantly. 
At that time, shortly after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime by a coalition 
consisting largely of United States and British forces, the bulk of the sanctions were 
terminated, with cnly the arms sanctions continuing. At the same time, the Council also 
introduced new financial sanctions, with the aim of gaining access to funds belonging to the 
former Iraqi regime. The Security Council also foreshadowed the termination of the Iraq 
Sanctions Committee, and six months later that Committee was replaced by a new 
Committee, which was tasked with a smaller range of oversight responsibilities relating to the 
new financial sanctions. 
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3.1 The constitutional basis for imposing sanctions against Iraq 
When Iraq invaded Kuwait, on 2 August 1990, the Security Council immediately 
adopted resolution 660 (1990).' In that resolution, the Council determined that Iraq's 
invasion of Kuwait constituted a breach of international peace and security, 2 noted that it 
was acting in accordance with Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter of the United Nations, 3 and 
demanded the immediate, unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwaiti territory. 4 
Four days later, when Iraq had not withdrawn from Kuwait, the Council adopted resolution 
661 (1990), in which it noted that it was acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, 5 
determined that Iraq had failed to comply with the demands outlined in resolution 660 
(1990),6 and imposed sanctions.' In subsequent decisions clarifying or modifying the scope 
of the sanctions, adopted prior to the outbreak of Gulf War hostilities, the Council again 
invoked Chapter VII of the Charter.' 
After the conclusion of Gulf War hostilities, the constitutional basis for the continued 
application of sanctions under Chapter VII appeared to shift subtly. In resolution 687 
(1991), the Council referred to the threat posed to peace and security in the area by 
weapons of mass destruction, as well as to the need to establish a zone free of such 
weapons in the Middle East. 9 It then noted that it was acting under Chapter VII of the 
S/RES/660 (2 August 1990). 
2 
	
SIRES/660 (2 August 1990), preambular paragraph 2. 
3 
	
SIRES/660 (2 August 1990), preambular paragraph 3. 
4 
	
SIRES/660 (2 August 1990), operative paragraph 1. 
5 
	
SIRES/661 (6 August 1990), preambular paragraph 7. 
6 
	
SIRES/66 1 (6 August 1990), operative paragraph 1 
7 
	
SIRES/661 (6 August 1990), operative paragraphs 2-4. 
See, e.g., SIRES/666 (13 September 1990), preambular paragraph 6; S/RES/670 (25 September 
1990), preambular paragraph 13. 
9 
	
SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), preambular paragraph 17. This rerence to a threat to international 
peace and security raises the question of whether the cessation of Gulf War hostilities also 
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Charter, before reaffirming the continued application of the sanctions." In subsequent 
resolutions clarifying or modifying the scope and application of sanctions, the Council has 
continued to follow the practice of invoking Chapter VLF of the Charter. 12 In one of the 
resolutions expanding the scope of the sanctions, the Council also determined that the 
situation continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security. 13 
In April 2003, shortly after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime, the Council 
reaffirmed the importance of the disarmament of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and of 
eventual confirmation of the disarmament of Iraq. 14 It then determined that the situation in 
Iraq, although improved, continued to constitute a threat to international peace and 
security, 15 and noted that it was acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, 16 before 
proceeding to modify the Iraq sanctions regime. In November 2003, when the Council 
established a new Sanctions Committee to succeed the 661 Committee, it again determined 
signified the effective dissipation of the breach of international peace and security that the 
Council had identified in resolution 660 (1990). If so, then it was necessary for the Council to 
identify an alternative threat to or breach of international peace and security to which the 
continued application of sanctions would respond. It is also possible, however, that the 
Council's affirmation of the thirteen prior resolutions on the situation [SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), 
operative paragraph 1] was meant to signify that the breach of international peace and security 
was continuing. According to such a reading of the situation, the breach of international peace 
and security would not fully dissipate until Iraq complied with its obligations under resolution 
687 (1991). 
it) 	SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), preambular paragraph 26. 
SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraphs 20-24. 
12 	See, e.g., SIRES/986 (14 April 1995), preambular paragraph 6; S/RES/1051 (27 March 1996), 
preambular paragraph 6; SIRES/1137 (12 November 1997), preambular paragraph 12; SIRES/1284 
(17 December 1999), preambular paragraph 11; SIRES/1409 (14 May 2002), preambular 
paragraph 6; SIRES/1454 (30 December 2002), preambular paragraph 6. 
13 	SIRES/1137 (12 November 1997), preambular paragraph 11. 
14 
 
SIRES/1483 (22 May 2003), preambular paragraph 3. 
15 
 
SIRES/1483 (22 May 2003), preambular paragraph 17. 
16 	SIRES/l483 (22 May 2003), preambular paragraph 18. 
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that the situation in Iraq continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security, 17 
and again noted that it was acting under Chapter VII of the Charter. 18 
3.2 The objectives of the Iraq sanctions regime 
The initial objective of the Iraq sanctions regime was to ensure the withdrawal of 
Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the reinstatement of the Kuwaiti government: 9 After the Gulf 
War, the objectives of the sanctions regime were modified to include: i) the establishment of 
a compensation fund to cover the losses incurred by foreign governments, nationals and 
corporations;2° and the complete disarmament of Iraq. 21 In order to comply with its 
obligation to disarm completely, Iraq was required to undertake the following measures: 
(a) To accept unconditionally the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of all chemical 
and biological weapons 22 and all ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and 
fifty kilometres;23 (b) To agree to on-site inspection of its armament facilities; 24 (c) To refrain 
from the use, development, construction or acquisition of chemical and biological 
weapons,25 ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometres,26 and 
nuclear weapons; 27 and (d) To submit to future, ongoing monitoring and verification of its 
17 	S/RES/1518 (24 November 2003), preambular paragraph 4. 
18 	SIRES/1518 (24 November 2003), preambular paragraph 5. 
19 
 
SIRES/661 (6 August 1990), operative paragraph 2. 
20 	S/RES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 22. 
21 	SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 12, 22. 
22 	SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 8(a). 
23 	SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 8(b). 
24 	SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 9(a). 
25 	SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 10. 
26 	SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 10. 
27 SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 12. 
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compliance with the obligation to refrain from using, developing, constructing or acquiring 
those weapons. 28 
In late-1997, when it imposed additional targeted travel sanctions against particular 
Iraqi officials, the Council made it clear that the objective of those sanctions was to ensure 
that Iraq cooperated unconditionally with the United Nations Special Commission 
(UNSCOM), whose task it was to monitor and verify Iraq's compliance with its 
disarmament obligations under the sanctions regime. 29 In late-1999, when the Council 
created the United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission 
(UNMOVIC) to replace UNSCOM, it provided that if Iraq were to cooperate with 
UNMOVIC and the IAEA and if they were both to report to the Council that the system of 
ongoing monitoring and verification was fully operational, then the elements of the sanctions 
regime not connected to arms and related materiel would be suspended for a renewable 
period of 120 days. 3° By providing for this possibility, the Council signalled that the major 
objective of the components of the sanctions regime that were not directed at arms and 
related materiel was to ensure that the system of monitoring and verification was fully 
operational. 
28 	SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraphs 10, 12. 
29 	SIRES/1137 (12 November 1997), operative paragraph 6 [deciding that the targeted travel 
sanctions would terminate one day after the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM reported to the 
Council that Iraq was cooperating unconditionally with UNSCOM]. For further details relating 
to UNSCOM, see section 3.4, below. 
30 	SIRES/1284 (17 December 1999), operative paragraph 33. The elements of the sanctions regime 
which would not be suspended were those relating to the prohibition of arms, arms -related 
material and materials which might be used in the development of chemical and biological 
weapons, ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometres and 
nuclear weapons. In resolution 687 (1991) the Council had reserved the right to maintain these 
sanctions until such time as it made a further decision. For firther details relating to 
UNMOVIC, see section 3.4, below. 
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The Security Council did not articulate explicit objectives connected to the arms 
sanctions that were maintained against Iraq following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. It 
did reaffirm, however, that Iraq must meet its disarmament obligations.31 The newly imposed 
financial sanctions seemed to have the objective of facilitating Iraq's development in the 
post-war environment, as funds and assets frozen in accordance with the sanctions were to 
be transferred to the Development Fund for Iraq. 32 
3.3 The scope of the Iraq sanctions regime 
The Iraq sanctions regime consists of a complex blend of comprehensive economic 
and financial sanctions. Although the Council has tinkered relatively little with the broad 
contours of the Iraq sanctions regime, both the Council and the Iraq Sanctions Committee 
have taken steps that have resulted in subtle modifications to the types of products and 
commodities that are exempt from the sanctions, as well as to the procedures for 
determining whether particular products and commodities are exempt. Each modification to 
the list of exemptions or the exemptions process has resulted in a subtle modification of the 
scope of the sanctions regime. 
Modifications to the overall scope of the Iraq sanctions regime 
In resolution 661 (1990), the Council required all States to prevent: (a) The import 
of all goods and commodities originating in Iraq;33 (b) Activities designed to promote export 
31 	SIRES/1483 (22 May 2003), operative paragraph 11. See also preambular paragraph 3 
(reaffirming the importance of the disarmament of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and of 
eventual confirmation of the disarmament of Iraq). 
32 	SIRES/1483 (22 May 2003), operative paragraph 23 (noting, however, that funds or assets 
subject to prior judicial, administrative, or arbitral lien or judgment would not be so transferred). 
33 	S/RES/661 (6 August 1990), operative paragraph 3(a). 
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from Iraq of any goods or commodities .,34 (c) The export b Iraq of any goods and 
commodities, with the exception of certain exemptions; 35 and (d) The provision to the 
Government of Iraq, to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in Iraq or 
Kuwait, or to persons or bodies within Iraq or Kuwait, of any finds or other financial or 
economic resources. 36 A month later, the Council clarified that the sanctions regime required 
all States to prevent aircraft destined for Iraq or Kuwait from departing from or over-flying 
their territory. 37 
In April 1991, after the Gulf War hostilities had ended, the Council narrowed slightly 
the scope of the sanctions regime. In resolution 687 (1991), the Council decided to continue 
the sanctions against the sale or supply to Iraq of commodities or products and against 
financial transactions related to the sale or supply of commodities or products. 38 In that same 
34 
	
SIRES/66 1 (6 August 1990), operative paragraph 3(b). 
35 	SIRES/661 (6 August 1990), operative paragraph 3(c). The Council exempted from the sanctions 
"supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian circumstances, 
foodstuffs". The question of whether and when such "humanitarian circumstances" existed 
became the subject of subsequent enquiry after the conclusion of the Gulf War. For further 
details, see notes 54 to 57, below. 
36 	SIRES/661 (6 August 1990), operative paragraph 4. The Council provided, however, that these 
prohibitions would not apply to payments exclusively for strictly medical or humanitarian 
purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs: see also operative paragraph 4. 
37 	S/RES/670 (25 September 1990), operative paragraphs 3-6. The Council provided, however, for 
exemptions from those sanctions in the following circumstances: (a) if the aircraft was carrying 
food in humanitarian circumstances and was authorized by the 661 Committee in accordance 
with resolution 666 (1990) [S/RES/670 (25 September 1990),operative paragraph 3]; (b) if the 
aircraft was carrying supplies intended strictly for medical purposes or solely for the United 
Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group [SIRES/670 (25 September 1990),operative paragraph 
3]; (c) if the aircraft was landing in order to permit inspection to ensure that it was not carrying 
cargo in violation of the sanctions [SIRES/670 (25 September 1990),operative paragraph 4(a)]; 
(d) if the flight had been approved by the 661 Committee [SIRES/670 (25 September 
1990),operative paragraph 4(b)]; (e) if the flight was certified by the United Nations as solely 
for the purpose of the Military Observer Group [SIRES/670 (25 September 1990),operative 
paragraph 4(c)]. 
38 	Interestingly, the Council's continuation of the sanctions was implicit rather than explicit. Its 
endorsement of the continuation of these measures can be deduced from the following factors: 
(a) the Council's affirmation of the thirteen resolutions it had adopted to date on the situation 
between Iraq and Kuwait, which included resolutions 661 (1990) and 670 (1990) [S/RES/687 (3 
April 1991), operative paragraph 1]; and (b) the Council's decision that upon approval by the 
Council of the programme for the establishment and operation of the Compensation 
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resolution, however, the Council clarified that the following would be exempted from the 
sanctions: (a) Medicine and health supplies; 39 (b) Foodstuffs notified to the Iraq Sanctions 
Committee;4° (c) Materials and supplies for essential civilian needs,'" and (d) Exports from 
Iraq of commodities or products approved by the Iraq Sanctions Committee in order to 
assure adequate financial resources to purchase medicine and health supplies, foodstuffs and 
materials and supplies for essential civilian needs. 42 
At the same time the Council also clarified that, in order to ensure that Iraq did not 
increase its capacity to re-arm, States were required to continue to prevent the sale, supply 
or provision to Iraq of: (a) Arms and related materie1;43 (b) Items relating to chemical and 
biological weapons, ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty 
kilometres, and nuclear weapons ;44 (c) Technology relating to arms and related material, 
chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred 
and fifty kilometres, and nuclear weapons;45 and (d) Personnel or training or technical 
support services relating to arms and related material, chemical and biological weapons, 
ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometres, and nuclear 
weapons.46 
Commission and upon Council agreement that Iraq had complied with all of its disarmament 
obligations, the sanctions would have no further effect [S/RES/687 (3 April 1991), operative 
paragraph 221 
39 	SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 20. 
ao Ibid. 
41 	Ibid. Such materials and supplies were exempted subject to the proviso that they would be 
approved by the Iraq Sanctions Committee under the no-objection procedure. 
42 SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 23. 
43 	S/RES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 24(a). 
44 SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 24(b). 
45 S1RES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 24(c). 
46 S/RES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 24(d). 
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In October 1992, the Council applied a form of temporary additional financial 
sanctions, requiring all States in whose jurisdiction there were funds from the sale of Iraqi 
petroleum or petroleum products, belonging to the Government of Iraq or of its State 
bodies, corporations, or agencies and paid for since the date sanctions were imposed, to 
transfer those funds to the escrow account established under the initial attempt at the Oil-
for-Food Programme. 47 At the same time the Council also required all States in which there 
were petroleum or petroleum products belonging to the Government of Iraq or of its State 
bodies, corporations, or agencies, to purchase or arrange for the sale of such petroleum or 
petroleum products and transfer the proceeds from that purchase or sale to the escrow 
account established under the initial attempt at the Oil-for-Food Programme.48 
In late-1997 the Council strengthened the scope of the sanctions in response to 
certain actions taken by Iraq to interfere with the work of UNSCOM. 49 In an effort to 
induce Iraqi compliance with UNSCOM's work the Council applied targeted travel 
sanctions against all Iraqi officials and members of the Iraqi armed forces who were 
responsible for or had participated in those instances of interference. 50 
47 
	
SIRES/778 (2 October 1992), operative paragraph 1. By operative paragraph 6 of the same 
resolution, however, the Council provided that such measures would be suspended in the 
event that the Iraq sanctions were lifted or that an effective Oil-for-Food Programme were to 
enter into operation, in either of which cases the funds transferred should be reimbursed. 
48 	SIRES/778 (2 October 1992), operative paragraph 2. As noted in the previous note, however, 
operative paragraph 6 of the same resolution provided that in the event that the Iraq sanctions 
were lifted or that an effective Oil-for-Food Programme were to enter into operation, the funds 
transferred should be reimbursed. 
49 	The Iraqi government had sought to impose conditions upon its cooperation with UNSCOM, 
and its officials had denied two UNSCOM officials the right to enter Iraq on the grounds of 
their nationality, had prevented other UNSCOM inspectors from entering certain inspection 
sites, and had tampered with surveillance equipment belonging to UNSCOM: see SIRES/1137 
(12 November 1997), preambular paragraphs 1,2, operative paragraph 1. 
50 	S/RES/I 137 (12 November 1997), operative paragraph 4. Under operative paragraph 5 of 
resolution 1137 (1997) the Council also decided to designate in consultation with UNSCOM a 
list of those to whom the travel sanctions would apply. The Iraq Sanctions Committee would 
then develop guidelines and procedures for the implementation of the sanctions. It is 
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Modifications to exemptions and to the exemptions process 
When the Council first imposed sanctions against Iraq, it exempted supplies that 
were "intended strictly for medical purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, 
foodstuffs". 51 It also exempted payments relating to the supply of such exempted supplies. 52 
Almost two months later, when the Council applied aircraft sanctions, it clarified that those 
sanctions did not apply to flights undertaken for the purpose of transporting supplies 
exempted from the sanctions regime." 
After the conclusion of Gulf War hostilities, the Secretary-General commissioned a 
report to explore whether the "humanitarian circumstances" foreshadowed in resolution 661 
(1990) did in fact exist, thus enabling the provision to Iraq of foodstuffs. 54 The report 
concluded that humanitarian circumstances did exist, warning that the Iraqi people might 
soon face a "catastrophe", including "epidemic and famine" if "massive life-supporting 
noteworthy that the Council threatened twice to employ additional measures before eventually 
applying the targeted travel sanctions: see SIRES/1115 (21 June 1997), operative paragraph 6; 
SIRES/1134 (23 October 1997), operative paragraph 6. 
51 	SIRES/661 (6 August 1990), operative paragraph 3(c). Note the following path to review 
of/restrictions upon medical supplies: SIRES/666 (13 September 1990), operative paragraph 8 
[recalling that resolution 661 (1990) did not apply to supplies intended strictly for medical 
purposes, but recommending that medical supplies should be exported under the strict 
supervision of the Government of the exporting State or by appropriate humanitarian 
agencies]; S/RES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraphs 813, 24, 25 and 27 [qualifying the 
arms and related sanctions against Iraq with the aim of preventing the Iraqi Government from 
developing nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or anti-ballistic missiles with a range of 
greater than 150 km]; S/23036 (13 September 1991) [first report of the 661 Committee on the 
implementation of the arms and related sanctions against Iraq, defining dual-use items as 
"items meant for civilian use but with potential for diversion or conversion to military use": see 
paragraph 7 of the report]; SIRES/I051 (27 March 1996), operative paragraph 5; SIRES/1284 (17 
December 1999), operative paragraph 17; SIRES/1409 (14 May 2002), SIRES/1447 (4 December 
2002); SIRES/1454 (30 December 2002). 
52 	S/RES/661 (6 August 1990), operative paragraph 4. 
53 	S/RES/670 (25 September 1990), operative paragraphs 3, 4. 
54 S/22366 (20 March 1991), annex: Report to the Secretary-General on humanitarian needs in 
Kuwait and Iraq in the immediate post-crisis environment by a mission to the area led by Mr. 
Martti Ahtisaari (the "Ahtisaari report"). 
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needs" were not met. 55 After considering the report, the Iraq Sanctions Committee decided 
that humanitarian circumstances did in fact exist and thus permitted States to export 
foodstuffs to Iraq, as long as they notified the Committee of any such exports. 56 The 
Committee also decided that States could export to Iraq "civilian and humanitarian 
supplies", upon approval by it under the "no-objection procedure". 57 This decision of the 
Committee was endorsed by the Security Council in April 1991, in resolution 687 (1991).58 
The Oil-for-Food Programme 
The Council first attempted to implement an Oil-for-Food Programme in August 
1991, when it authorized all States, subject to certain conditions, b permit the import of 
petroleum and petroleum products in order to finance the purchase of foodstuffs, medicines 
and materials and supplies for essential civilian needs. 59 The proceeds from the exports from 
Iraq of petroleum and petroleum products were to be placed in an escrow account, which 
would be administered by the Secretary-General and would finance, in addition to the 
purchase of the items mentioned above, the payment of Iraq's various liabilities under the 
Compensation Fund scheme elaborated by the Council in resolution 687 (1994 60 One 
The Ahtisaari report, ibid, paragraph 37. 
56 S122400 (22 March 1991): Note by the Secretary-General, annex [containing a letter dated 22 
March 1991 from the President of the Security Council, informing the Secretary-General of a 
decision that the Iraq Sanctions Committee had taken that same day, during its 36`" meeting, 
with regard to the determination of humanitarian needs in Iraq]. The Security Council had 
empowered the Committee to make such a decision in SIRES/666 (13 September 1990), operative 
paragraphs 1, 5. 
57 	Ibid. 
58 	SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 20. 
59 
 
SIRES/706 (15 August 1991), operative paragraphs 1, 2. 
60 	SIRES/706 (15 August 1991), operative paragraphs 1-4. 
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month later, the Council approved recommendations made by the Secretary-General for a 
scheme to implement such an Oil-for-Food Programme. 61 
Ultimately, however, the Iraqi Government refused to cooperate with the proposed 
scheme, and the Council resorted to an interim arrangement to finance the programme, 
according to which States were required to transfer to the escrow account any funds in their 
jurisdiction which represented the proceeds of sales of Iraqi petroleum products that had 
taken place since the application of sanctions. 62 At the same time, States in which Iraqi 
petroleum or petroleum products were present were also required to purchase or arrange 
for the sale of those items and to transfer the proceeds to the escrow account. 63 
In April 1995, the Council made another, more successful attempt to implement an 
"Oil-for-Food Programme" (OFFP). Under the OFFP, Iraq was permitted to export a 
limited amount of oil in order to finance the purchase of items exempted from the sanctions 
regime, as well as the activities of entities entrusted with overseeing Iraq's compliance with 
the provisions of resolution 687 (1991). 64 The Council adopted numerous resolutions 
61 	SIRES/712 (19 September 1991), operative paragraph 3. 
62 	SIRES/778 (2 October 1992), operative paragraph 1. 
63 	SIRES/778 (2 October 1992), operative paragraph 2. 
se 	SIRES/986 (14 April 1995), operative paragraphs 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10. In addition to financing the 
purchase by the Iraqi Government of medicine, health supplies, foodstuffs and supplies for 
essential civilian needs [SIRES/986 (14 April 1995), operative paragraph 8(a)], the proceeds 
from the sale of oil would fund: (a) the distribution of humanitarian relief to the three northern 
governorates not under the complete control of the Iraqi Government [SIRES/986 (14 April 
1995), operative paragraph 8(b)]; (b) the Compensation Fund established to address claims for 
Iraqi reparations arising from the Gulf War [SIRES/986 (14 April 1995), operative paragraph 
8(c)]; (c) the costs of on-the-ground inspection and auditing of the implementation in Iraq of 
the OFFP [S/RES/986 (14 April 1995), operative paragraph 8(d)]; (d) the operating costs of 
UNSCOM [SIRES/986 (14 April 1995), operative paragraph 8(e)]; (e) reasonable expenses 
incurred in order to export the permitted oil from Iraq [S/RES/986 (14 April 1995), operative 
paragraph 8(0]; and (f) to replenish the accounts of frozen Iraqi assets from which funds had 
been transferred to the escrow account established under resolution 687 (1991) in order to 
cover the costs of the Compensation Commission and UNSCOM under resolution 778 (1992) 
[SIRES/986 (14 April 1995), operative paragraph 8(g)]. 
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extending the OF FP and honing the procedures for its implementation. ° The modifications 
to the procedures for the implementation of the 01.1.P resulted in subtle modifications of the 
scope of the sanctions regime, as they clarified the products and commodities to which the 
sanctions did not apply and they improved and simplified the process by which decisions 
were made regarding whether potential "dual-use" items were subject to or exempt from the 
sanctions. The major innovation to the process for implementing the OFFP was the 
establishment of the Goods Review List ("GRL,") and the adoption of procedures for its 
application. 66 The GRL contained an exhaustive list of potential "dual-use" items, the supply 
to Iraq of which first had to be approved via a process which involved careful consideration 
of the items by UNMOVIC and the IAEA, which then recommended the approval or 
refusal of the application by the 661 Committee. ° Anything not on the list was considered to 
be exempt from the sanctions, thus requiring simple notification to the Committee. After the 
The Security Council had attempted to establish an earlier version of the OFFP in 1991 [see 
S/RES/706 (15 August 1991); SIRES/712 (19 September 1991)], but it had not been possible to 
implement the programme in the absence of cooperation from the Iraqi Government. In order to 
ensure an alternative source of funding for the activities of the Compensation Commission and 
UNSCOM, the Council adopted resolution 778 (1992), requiring States in which funds 
belonging to Iraq had been frozen in accordance with the sanctions regime to transfer those 
funds temporarily to the escrow account established to fund, inter alio, the activities of the 
Commissions: see resolution 778 (1992) (2 October 1992). 
65 	See, e.g., SIRES/1111 (4 June 1997); SIRES/1143 (4 December 1997); SIRES/1153 (20 February 
1998); SIRES/1210 (24 November 1998); SIRES/l242 (21 May 1999); S/RES/1281 (10 December 
1999); S/RES/1284 (17 December 1999); SIRES/1302 (8 June 2000); SIRES/1330 (5 December 
2000); SIRES/1352 (1 June 2001); S/RES/1360 (3 July 2001); S/RES/1382 (29 November 2001); 
S/RES/1409 (14 May 2002); S/RES/1447 (4 December 2002); S/RES/1454 (30 December 2002); 
S/RES/1472 (28 March 2003). 
66 	The GRL was foreshadowed in: S/RES/1352 (1 June 2001), operative paragraph 2(a); and 
S/RES/1382 (29 November 2001), operative paragraph 2. It was adopted in SIRES/1409 (14 May 
2002), operative paragraph 2, and was refined in SIRES/1454 (30 December 2002), operative 
paragraph 1. 
67 	For the GRL itself, see: S/2002/515 [as adopted by SIRES/1409 (14 May 2002)1; and SIRES/1454 
(30 December 2002), Annex A. For the procedures relating to the application of the GRL, see: 
SIRES/l409 (14 May 2002), attachment; SIRES/1454 (30 December 2002), Annex B. 
467 
Appendix 3. The Iraq sanctions regime 
introduction of the GRL process, the flow of exempt goods and commodities to Iraq under 
the OFFP increased substantially." 
In May 2003, after the formal completion of the second Gulf War hostilities, the 
Council decided to terminate the sanctions against Iraq, with the exception of sanctions 
against arms and related materie1. 69 At the same time, the Council imposed new financial 
sanctions in connection with the situation in Iraq, requiring all Member States to freeze any 
funds or other financial assets of economic resources in their jurisdiction belonging to the 
former Government of Iraq and its various entities, as well as those removed from Iraq by 
Saddam Hussein and other senior officials of the former Iraqi regime and their immediate 
family members." Member States were also required to transfer those frozen funds, 
financial assets and economic resources to the Development Fund for Iraq!' 
3.4 The administration, monitoring and enforcement of the Iraq 
sanctions regime 
During the course of the Iraq sanctions regime, the Security Council has bestowed 
responsibility for the administration, implementation and enforcement of sanctions upon a 
wide range of actors. These actors have included the Secretary-General and States, as well 
as a number of subsidiary entities, such as the Iraq Sanctions Committee, the United Nations 
Special Commission (UNSCOM) and its successor the United Nations Monitoring, 
Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), the Office of the Iraq Programme 
68 	For details of the improvements resulting from the introduction of the GRL, see the report of 
the Secretary-General dated 12 November 2002: S/2002/1239 (12 November 2002). 
69 	SIRES/1483 (22 May 2003), operative paragraph 10. By the same provision, the Council 
provided an exemption from the arms sanctions for arms and related materiel required by the 
Coalition Authority. 
70 	SIRES/1483 (22 May 2003), operative paragraph 23. 
71 	Ibid. 
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(01P), which has responsibility for ensuring the efficient implementation of the Oil-for-Food 
Programme (OFFP), and a monitoring mechanism. The Council has also established ad hoc 
panels of experts to explore particular questions relating to the implementation of the 
sanctions. 
3.4.1 The Iraq Sanctions Committees 
Since sanctions were first applied against Iraq in August 1990, the Security Council 
has established two Sanctions Committees to oversee their administration. The first 
Sanctions Committee — the 661 Committee — was created at the same time as the Iraq 
sanctions regime and undertook a diverse collection of oversight responsibilities until it was 
dissolved in November 2003, following the termination of all but the arms sanctions and the 
application of new financial sanctions. The second Sanctions Committee, the 1518 
Committee, was established in November 2003 in order to oversee the administration of the 
new financial sanctions. 
i. 	The 661 Committee 
When the Security Council imposed sanctions against Iraq it also decided to 
establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee to 
oversee the implementation of the sanctions.72 The Committee (the "Iraq Sanctions 
Committee" or the "661 Committee") was to report to the Council on its work and with its 
observations and recommendations, and would undertake the following tasks: (a) To 
examine the reports of the Secretary-General report on the implementation of the 
72 	SIRES/661 (6 August 1990), operative paragraph 6. The Committee adopted guideline for the 
conduct of its work at its I d meeting, on 17 August 1990. For a copy of the guidelines, see: 
S/1996/700 (26 August 1996), annex: Report of the Security Council Committee established by 
resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, p.31 (Annex I). 
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sanctions;73 and (b) To seek from all States information regarding action taken by them to 
implement the sanctions. 74 
Between its establishment in August 1990 and its dissolution in November 2003, the 
661 Committee was tasked with a vast array of additional responsibilities, including the 
following: (a) Determining whether humanitarian circumstances had arisen requiring 
exemptions for food- stuffs; 75 (b) Considering reports by the Secretary-General on 
humanitarian circumstances in Iraq and making appropriate recommendations to the Security 
Council for meeting humanitarian needs; 76 (c) Examining requests by States for special 
assistance under Article 50 of the United Nations Charter and making appropriate 
recommendations to the Security Counci1; 77 (d) Considering applications for exemptions 
from the prohibition upon the export to Iraq of products and commodities;78 (e) Considering 
applications for exceptions to the prohibition upon the import from Iraq of products and 
commodities;79 (f) Monitoring the implementation of the prohibition upon the provision to 
Iraq of arms and related materie1;80 (g) Developing, in cooperation with UNSCOM and the 
IAEA, a mechanism for monitoring the sale or supply to Iraq of items that might be used for 
armament ("dual use items");" (h) Monitoring the sale and supply of oil from Iraq to Turkey 
73 
 
SIRES/66 1 (6 August 1990), operative paragraph 6(a). 
74 	S/RES/661 (6 August 1990), operative paragraph 6(b). 
75 	S/RES/666 (13 September 1990), operative paragraph 1. 
76 	S/RES/666 (13 September 1990), operative paragraph 5. 
77 S/RES/669 (24 September 1990), preambular paragraph 4. 
78 	SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 20. 
79 	SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 23. 
80 	SIRES/700 (17 June 1991), operative paragraph 5. 
81 	SIRES/715 (11 October 1991), operative paragraph 7. That mechanism was eventually 
established by the Council in resolution 1051 (1996): SIRES/1051 (27 March 1997), operative 
paragraph 1. For further details on the mechanism, see section 3.4., below. 
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under the Oil-for-Food Programme (OFFP);82 (i) Developing "expedited procedures" for 
the implementation of the OFFP;83 (j) Approving transactions under the OFFP for, inter 
alia, the sale of oil and the purchase of permitted goods; (k) Assisting the monitoring 
mechanism as required;" (1) Reporting on the implementation of each renewed phase of the 
OFFP;86 (m) Processing expeditiously applications under the OFFP scheme; 87 
(n) Authorizing reasonable expenses related to the Hajj pilgrimage, to be met by funds in 
escrow account" (o) Approving contracts for parts and equipment to enable Iraq to meet 
its permitted ceiling of oil exports; 89 (p) Approving lists of humanitarian items (including 
foodstuffs, pharmaceutical and medical supplies, as well as basic or standard medical and 
agricultural equipment and basic or standard educational items) which did not need to be 
submitted for approval and which could simply be notified to the Secretary-General and 
82 	SIRES/986 (14 April 1995), operative paragraph 6. 
83 	SIRES/986 (14 April 1995), operative paragraph 12 [the procedures were outlined in S/1996/636, 
S/1997/417]; SIRES/1143 (4 December 1997), operative paragraph 9 [the procedures were 
outlined in S/1998/92 (January 30 1998)]; and SIRES/1153 (20 February 1998), operative 
paragraph 15 [requesting the Committee to implement those procedures]. 
84 
	
SIRES/986 (14 April 1995), operative paragraph 1(a). 
85 	S/RES/1051 (27 March 1996), operative paragraph 10. See also S/1995/1017 (December 17 1995). 
86 	The Committee was requested to report on the implementation of each phase of the OFFP until 
the Phase that began on 5 December 2002 [interestingly, the Council did not request that the 
Committee report on the implementation of that phase, which it approved in SIRES/1447 (4 
December 2002)]. See, e.g., S/RES/1111 (4 June 1997), operative paragraph 4; S/RES/1143 (4 
December 1997), operative paragraph 5; S/RES/1153 (20 February 1998), operative paragraph 
14; S/RES/1210 (4 November 1998), operative paragraph 10; S/RES/I242 (21 May 1999), 
operative paragraph 10; S/RES/1281 (10 December 1999), operative paragraph 10; S/RES/1302 (8 
June 2000), operative paragraph 6; SIRES/1330 (5 December 2000), operative paragraph 6; 
SIRES/1360 (3 July 2001), operative paragraph 6; S/RES/1409 (14 May 2002), operative 
paragraph 7. The Committee's reports on the implementation of the OFFP are listed in note 105, 
below. 
87 	S/RES/1111 (4 June 1997), operative paragraph 5. 
88 	S/RES/I 153 (20 February 1998), operative paragraph 3; SIRES/1210 (24 November 1998), 
operative paragraph 3. 
89 	S/RES/I 175 (19 June 1998), operative paragraph 2. 
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financed under resolution 986 (1995);9° (q) Appointing a group of experts to approve 
contracts for parts and equipment necessary in order to increase Iraq's exports of petroleum 
and petroleum products; 91 (r) Deciding upon all applications in respect of humanitarian and 
civilian needs within two working days of receiving them through the Secretary-Genera1; 92 
(s) Approving, on the basis of proposals from the Secretary-General, lists of basic water 
and sanitation supplies that did not need to be submitted to it for approval; 93 (t) Approving, 
also on the basis of proposals from the Secretary-General, lists of basic electricity and 
housing supplies that did not need to be submitted to it for approval; 94 (u) Reviewing 
applications in an expeditious manner, in order to decrease the level of applications on hold, 
and continuing to improve the approval process;" (v) Reviewing the "Goods Review List" 
and the procedures for its implementation and recommending modifications thereto;96 
(w) Determining procedures to facilitate the temporary use of funds from the OFFP to 
provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people whilst conflict prevented the Iraqi 
Government from implementing the OFFP;97 (x) Reviewing, under a 24-hour no-objection 
procedure, applications outside the Oil-for-Food Programme by United Nations agencies, 
programmes and funds, other international organizations and NGOs for exporting to Iraq 
90 	SIRES/1284 (17 acember 1999), operative paragraph 17. Applications to export to Iraq items 
which were potentially dual-use items could not, however, be processed via this simple 
notification procedure. 
91 	S/RES/I 284 (17 December 1999), operative paragraph 18. 
92 	S/RES/1284 (17 December 1999), operative paragraph 25. 
93 	SIRES/1302 (8 June 2000), operative paragraph 8. Applications to export to Iraq items which 
were potentially dual-use items could not, however, be processed via this simple notification 
procedure. 
94 SIRES/1330 (5 December 2000), operative paragraph 10. Applications to export to Iraq items 
which were potentially dual-use items could not, however, be processed via this simple 
notification procedure. 
95 
 
SIRES/1330 (5 December 2000), operative paragraph 13. 
96 SIRES/l454 (30 December 2002), operative paragraph 2. 
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emergency humanitarian supplies and equipment, other than medicines, health supplies and 
foodstuffs;98 (y) Monitoring the implementation of the temporary plans for enabling the funds 
under the OFFP to be mobilized to address the humanitarian situation in Iraq for a period of 
45 days during the 2003 invasion of Iraq by United States and coalition forces;99 and 
(z) Identifying individuals and entities whose funds, financial assets and economic resources 
should be frozen and transferred to the Development Fund for Iraq, in accordance with the 
financial sanctions imposed by resolution 1483 (2003). 1® 
In May 2003, shortly after the conclusion of the second Gulf War, when the 
Security Council terminated the majority of the sanctions against Iraq, it also decided that 
the 661 Committee would be terminated in six months.' ° ' The Committee was thus 
terminated and dissolved on 21 November 2003. During its tenure, the 661 Committee held 
more than 230 meetings 1°2 and issued seven annual reports. 1°3 It also issued more than forty 
97 	S/RES/1472 (28 March 2003), operative paragraph 4(g). 
98 	S/RES/1472 (28 March 2003), operative paragraph 7. 
99 	S/RES/1472 (28 March 2003), operative paragraph 9. 
loo 	S/RES/1483 (22 May 2003), operative paragraph 19. As noted above, the additional financial 
sanctions were imposed by operative paragraph 23 of the same resolution. See section 3.3, 
above. 
loi 	S/RES/1483 (22 May 2003), operative paragraph 18. The reason for delaying the dissolution of 
the Committee for six months was likely to enable it to continue undertaking responsibilities in 
connection with the Oil-for-Food Programme, which itself was to be phased out over a six-
month period. See: 
102 	The Committee had held 236 formal meetings to the end of July 2002: see A/57/2 (2002): Report 
of the Security Council: 16 June 2001-31 July 2002, p. 52. 
103 	Pursuant to the note by the President of the Security Council of 29 March 1995 (S/1995/234) on 
the need for greater transparency in the work of the Council's Sanctions Committees, the 661 
Committee began submitting "annual" reports in 1996. Strictly speaking, the 661 Committee's 
reports have not been truly annual, as all but the most recent report cover periods of longer 
than a year. For the reports, see: S/1996/700 (26 August 1996), annex: Report of the Security 
Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between 
Iraq and Kuwait, containing a factual summary of the Committee's activities since its 
establishment, but with a focus on activities in 1995 and early-1996 (hereafter "Report of the 
661 Committee for 1990-1996"); S/1997/672 (28 August 1997), annex: Report of the Security 
Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between 
Iraq and Kuwait, containing a summary of the Committee's activities from August 1996 to July 
1997 (hereafter 'Report of the 661 Committee for 1996-1997"); S/1998/1239 (31 December 
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reports on the implementation of the arms and related sanctions against Iraq, 1°4 more than 
twenty reports on the implementation of the Oil-for-Food Programme (OFFP), 1°5 and 
1998), annex: Report of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) 
concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, containing a summary of the Committee's 
activities from August 1997 to July 1998 (hereafter "Report of the 661 Committee for 1997- 
1998"); S/2000/133 (18 February 2000), annex: Report of the Security Council Committee 
established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, 
containing a summary of the Committee's activities from 1 August 1998 to 20 November 1999 
(hereafter "Report of the 661 Committee for I998-1999"); S120011738 (27 July 2001), annex: 
Report of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning 
the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, containing a summary of the Committee's activities 
from 21 November 1999 to 30 November 2000 (hereafter "Report of the 661 Committee for 
1999-2000"); S/2002/647 (10 June 2002), annex: Report of the Security Council Committee 
established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, 
containing a factual summary of the Coninittee's activities from 1 December 2000 to 31 
December 2001 (hereafter 'Report of the 661 Committee for 2000-2001"); S/2003/300 (12 
March 2003), annex: Annual report of the Security Council Committee established by 
resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, containing a 
factual summary of the Committee's activities from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2002 
(hereafter "Annual report of the 661 Committee for 2002"). 
104 	These reports have been issued at ninety day intervals since the Council adopted resolution 
687 (1991). As with annual reports, these reports are forwarded to the President of the Security 
Council by the Chairman of the Committee, before being circulated as annexes to official 
documents of the Security Council. The document numbers and dates on which the reports 
were issued as official Council documents are as follows: S/23036 (13 September 1991); 5/23279 
(11 December 1991); 5/23708 (12 March 1992); 5/24083 (11 June 1992); 5/24545 (10 September 
1992); 5/24912 (4 December 1992); S/25442 (19 March 1993); S/25930 (7 June 1993); S/26430 (7 
September 1993); S/26874 (14 December 1993); S/1994/274 (8 March 1994); 5/1994/695 (10 June 
1994); S/199411027 (4 September 1994); S/1994/1367 (1 December 1994); S/1995/169 (I March 
1995); 5/1995/442 (30 May 1995); S/19951744 (28 August 1995); S/1995/992 (28 November 1995); 
S/19961127 (23 February 1996); S/1996/361 (21 May 1996); S/19961676 (20 August 1996); 
S11996/950 (17 November 1996); 5/1997/141 (19 February 1997); S/1997/374 (16 May 1997); 
S/1997/637 (12 August 1997); S/1997/949 (3 December 1997); S/1998/108 (9 February 1998); 
S/19981387 (12 May 1998); S/1998/729 (7 August 1998); S/199811055 (7 November 1998); 
S/1999/110 (3 February 1999); S/I999/519 (4 May 1999); S/I999/848 (4 August 1999); 
S/199911113 (1 November 1999); S/2000172 (1 February 2000); S12000/365 (1 May 2000); 
S/20001748 (28 July 2000); S/200011033 (26 October 2000); S/2001/72 (23 January 2001); 
S/20011400 (24 April 2001); S/20011721 (23 July 2001); S/2001/1003 (24 October 2001); S/2002184 
(18 January 2002); S/20021476 (23 April 2002); S/2002/802 (22 July 2002); S/2002/1167 (18 
October 2002); 5/2003/61 (17 January 2003); S/2003/507 (29 April 2003). 
105 	As with the annual reports and the reports on the implementation of the arms sanctions, these 
reports have been circulated as annexes to official documents of the Security Council. The 
relevant document numbers and dates are as follows: S/1997/213 (11 March 1997), annex 
[containing the 661 Committee's 90-day report on the implementation of the OFFP]; 5/1997/417 
(30 May 1997), annex [containing the 661 Committee's 180-day report on the implementation of 
the OFFP]; 5/1997/692 (8 September 1997), annex [containing the 661 Committee's 90-day report 
on the implementation of Phase I of the OFFP]; 5/1997/942 (2 December 1997), annex 
[containing the 661 Committee's 180-day report on the implementation of Phase 11 of the 
OFFP]; S/1998/187 (3 March 1998), annex [containing the 90-day report of the 661 Committee on 
the implementation of Phase III of the OFFP]; S/1998/469 (4 June 1998), annex [containing the 
180-day report of the 661 Committee on the implementation of Phase III of the OFFP]; 
S/1998/813 (27 August 1998), annex [containing the 90-day report of the 661 Committee on the 
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several other reports on improvements made to its working procedures to expedite the 
approval process for sending humanitarian supplies to Iraq. 106 
The 661 Committee summarised its most significant activities in its annual reports. Its 
first report, issued in August 1996, provides a detailed picture of the Committee's work 
between 1990 and 1996.' °7 In its first report the Committee: summarised its major 
activities; m8 reported steps taken by other actors to monitor and enforce the implementation 
of sanctions; m9 noted alleged violations of the sanctions;" ° and outlined the process that had 
implementation of Phase IV of the OFFP]; S/1998/1104 (20 November 1998), annex [containing 
the 180-day report of the 661 Committee on the implementation of Phase IV of the OFFP]; 
S/1999/279 (16 March 1999), annex [containing the 90-day report of the 661 Committee on the 
implementation of Phase V of the OFFP]; S/1999/582 (19 May 1999), annex [containing the 180- 
day report of the 661 Committee on the implementation of Phase V of the OFFP]; S/1999/907 (24 
August 1999), annex [containing the 90-day report of the 661 Committee on the implementation 
of Phase VI of the OFFP]; S/1999/1177 (17 November 1999), annex [containing the 180-day 
report of the 661 Committee on the implementation of Phase VI of the OFFP]; S/2000/242 (23 
March 2000), annex [containing the 90-day report of the 661 Committee on the implementation 
of Phase VII of the OFFP]; S/2000/536 (5 June 2000), annex [containing the 180-day report of 
the 661 Committee on the implementation of Phase VII of the OFFP]. After June 2000 the 
Council requested the 661 Committee to report to it just once before the end of the each phase 
of implementation: S/RES/1302 (8 June 2000), operative paragraph 6; SIRES/1330 (5 December 
2000), operative paragraph 6; S/RES/1360 (3 July 2001), operative paragraph 6; SIRES/1382 (29 
November 2001), operative paragraph 1; SIRES/1409 (14 May 2002), operative paragraph 7. 
With the exception of the report for Phase X, which covered a 150-day period, the reports for 
Phases VIII-XII therefore covered 180 days. The Committee thus issued the following reports 
on Phases VIII-XII: S/2001/321 (3 April 2001), annex [containing the 180-day report of the 661 
Committee on the implementation of Phase VIII of the OFFP]; S/2001/842 (5 September 2001), 
annex [containing the 180-day report of the 661 Committee on the implementation of Phase IX 
of the OFFP]; S/2001/1341 (31 December 2001), annex [containing the 150-day report of the 661 
Committee on the implementation of Phase X of the OFFP]; S/2002/1261 (18 November 2002), 
annex [containing the 180-day report of the 661 Committee on the implementation of Phase XI 
of the OFFP]; S/2003/331 (18 March 2003), annex [containing the 180-day report of the 661 
Committee on the implementation of Phase XII of the OFFP]. 
106 	See, e.g., S/1998/92 (30 January 1998), annex [containing the Report of the 661 Committee 
pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 1143 (1997) on refining and clarifying its working 
procedures]; S/1998/336 (20 April 1998), annex [containing the report of the 661 Committee 
pursuant to paragraph 15 of resolution 1153 (1998) on measures taken to implement refinements 
of its working procedures]. 
107 	Report of the 661 Committee for 1990-1996, above note 103. 
108 	lbid, paragraphs 25-77. 
109 	'bid, paragraphs 78-92. 
110 	!bid, paragraphs 93-100. 
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been put in place to consider applications under Article 50 of the Charter." The 
Committee's observations and recommendations were few, however. It stated that close 
cooperation with Member States was essential to enhance the effective implementation of 
the sanctions, and it observed that, as the responsibility for enforcing the sanctions regime 
lay with States, the Committee's role was primarily to provide assistance to States in 
enforcing the sanctions." 2 In subsequent reports the Committee continued to rcord its 
activities and provide short observations and recommendations. Its observations and 
recommendations included the following: that close cooperation and interaction with 
Member States was particularly important;" 3 and that the Committee would work closely 
with relevant actors, including the Secretary-General, the Office of the Iraq Programme and 
the Government of Iraq, to implement the 01.1, 1' in order to improve the humanitarian 
situation in Iraq. I 14 
The 1518 Committee 
In November 2003 the Security Council decided to establish a new Committee, in 
accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, to oversee the administration 
of the continuing sanctions against Iraq." 5 The 1518 Committee was to continue the task 
that had been performed by the 661 Committee, of identifying individuals and entities whose 
Ibid, paragraphs 101-110. 
112 	Ibid, paragraphs 111-114. 
113 	Report of the 661 Committee for 1996-1997, above note 103, paragraph 51; Report of the 661 
Committee for 1997-1998, above note 103, paragraph 76. 
114 	Report of the 661 Committee for 1997-1998, above note 103, paragraph 77; Report of the 661 
Committee for 1998-1999, above note 103, paragraph 62; Report of the 661 Committee for 
1999-2000, above note 103, paragraph 48; Report of the 661 Committee for 2000-2001, above 
note 103, paragraph 62; Annual report of the 661 Committee for 2002, above note 103, 
paragraph 71. 
115 SIRES/1518 (24 November 2003), operative paragraph 1. 
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funds, financial assets and economic resources should be frozen and transferred to the 
Development Fund for Iraq, in accordance with the financial sanctions imposed by 
resolution 1483 (2003). The new Committee was also to report to the Council on its work, 
and it would use as a basis for beginning its work the guidelines and definitions that had been 
employed by the 661 Committee. In addition, the Security Council foreshadowed the 
possibility that the 1518 Committee might be tasked with observing compliance with the 
ongoing arms sanctions against Iraq. 
3.4.2 Actors involved in the implementation and administration of disarmament 
objectives: the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United 
Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the United Nations 
Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) 
Under resolution 687 (1991), the task of monitoring and overseeing Iraq's 
compliance with its disarmament obligations was to be assumed by a Special Commission, 
which would be established according to the recommendations of the Secretary-General." 6 
That Commission would cooperate in the implementation of its tasks with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which would monitor and verify Iraq's compliance with its 
obligation not to posses, develop or acquire nuclear weapons."' The United Nations 
Special Commission (UNSCOM) was duly established"' and oversaw the monitoring of 
the Iraq disarmament program until it was replaced by the United Nations Monitoring, 
116 	S/RES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 9(b)(i). 
117 	SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 13. 
118 	The Secretary-General's recommendations, contained in a report of 17 May 1991 pursuant to 
paragraph 9(b) of resolution 687, were approved by the Council in SIRES/699 (June 17 1991), 
operative paragraph 1. 
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Verification and Inspection Commission, "UNMOVIC", in late-1999." 9 UNSCOM's 
mandate was to carry out immediate on-site inspections based on Iraq's declarations 
regarding its weapons holdings and programmes, to undertake the destruction, removal or 
rendering harmless of all nuclear, biological or chemical weapons and anti-ballistic missiles 
with a range of greater than 150 k.m., or components for the manufacture or development 
thereof, and to develop a plan for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's 
compliance with its disarmament obligations under resolution 687 (1991). 129 
UNSCOM was able to play a relatively constructive role in monitoring Iraq's 
compliance with its disarmament obligations under the sanctions regime. 121 Ultimately, 
however, UNSCOM confronted major difficulties in undertaking its mandated activities, due 
to Iraq's refusal to allow it to resume operations after UNSCOM inspectors were 
withdrawn from Iraq in late-1998. 122 In December 1999 the Council decided to replace 
119 	The Security Council replaced UNSCOM by UNMOVIC in SIRES/1284 (December 17 1999), 
operative paragraph I. For further details relating to both UNSCOM and UNMOVIC, see 
discussion below in the Iraq case-study. 
120 	A detailed examination of the activities of UNSCOM is beyond the scope of this thesis. For 
details regarding UNSCOM's mandate, see: SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraphs 8- 
13. For a concise summary of UNSCOM's activities, see: Report of the first Panel established 
pursuant to the note by the President of the Security Council on 30 January 1999, 
concerning disarmament and current and future ongoing monitoring and verification issues, 
below note 145. For a personal account of UNSCOM's operations, see: Butler, Richard, The 
Greatest Threat: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Crisis of Global Security (2000) 
Public Affairs, NY. 
121 	For an overview of UNSCOM's achievements, as well as the questions remaining in relation to 
the extent to which Iraq had complied fully with its obligations, see: Report of the first Panel 
established pursuant to the note by the President of the Security Council on 30 January 
1999, concerning disarmament and current and future ongoing monitoring and verification 
issues, below note 145, paragraphs 12-30. 
122 	The Security Council established a number of reporting requirements for UNSCOM. UNSCOM 
thus submitted the following reports: one report pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) on its 
activities [S/23165 (25 October 1991)]; nine half-yearly reports pursuant to resolution 699 (1991) 
on its activities [S/23268 (4 December 1991); S/24108/Corr.1 (16 April 1992); S/24984 (17 
December 1992); S/25977 (21 June 1993); S/26910 (21 December 1993); S/1994/750 (24 June 
1994); S/1994/1422 (15 December 1994); S/1995/494 (20 June 1995); and S/1995/1038 (17 
December 1995)]; eight half-yearly reports pursuant to resolution 715 (1991) on the 
implementation of its plan to ensure ongoing monitoring and Verification of Iraq's disarmament 
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UNSCOM with UNMOVIC. Drawing upon the recommendations made by a panel that 
was established to explore the disarmament, monitoring and verification issues arising from 
the implementation of the Iraq sanctions, u3 UNMOVIC was created with the aim of 
establishing a reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance 
with its disarmament obligations. 124 UNMOVIC did not have an auspicious beginning, as it 
was unable to establish operations in Iraq for almost three years. It was not until the Council 
adopted resolution 1441 (2002), in November 2002, that Iraq finally agreed to 
UNMOVIC's deployment on its territory. During the subsequent three months, 
UNMOVIC's role became quite prominent, as the intemational community scrutinised the 
extent to which Iraq was complying with its disarmament obligations, as required by 
resolution 1441 (2002) and previous resolutions. 125 
activities [S/23801 (10 April 1992); S/24661 (19 October 1992); S/25620 (19 April 1993); S/26684 
(5 November 1993); S/19941489 (22 April 1994); 5/1994/1138 (7 October 1994); S/19951284 (10 
April 1995); and S/19951864 (11 October 1995)1; and eight half-yearly reports pursuant to 
resolution 1051 (1996) - which sought to consolidate UNSCOM's multiple reporting 
requirements - on its activities in general [S/1996/258 (11 April 1996); S/I996/848 (11 October 
1996); 5/1997/301 (11 April 1997); S/1997/774 (6 October 1997); S/1998/332 (16 April 1998); 
S/1998/920 (6 October 1998); S/1999/401 (9 April 1999); and 5/1999/1037 (8 October 1999)1 
123 For further details relating to this panel, see below. 
124 	SIRES/1284 (17 December 1999), operative paragraphs 1, 2. 
125 	For UNMOVIC's quarterly reports, which have been submitted in accordance with paragraph 
12 of resolution 1284 (1999), in the form of annexes to notes by the Secretary-General, see: 
S/2000/516 (1 June 2000), annex: First quarterly report of the Executive-Chairman of 
UNMOVIC under paragraph 12 of resolution 1284 (1999); S/2000/835 (28 August 2000), 
annex: Second quarterly report of the Executive-Chairman of UNMOVIC under paragraph 12 
of resolution 1284 (1999); S/2000/1134 (1 December 2000), annex: Third quarterly report of 
the Executive-Chairman of UNMOVIC under paragraph 12 of resolution 1284 (1999); 
S/2001/177 (27 February 2001), annex: Fourth quarterly report of the Executive-Chairman of 
UNMOVIC under paragraph 12 of resolution 1284 (1999); S/2001/515 (24 May 2001), annex: 
Fifth quarterly report of the Executive-Chairman of UNMOV1C under paragraph 12 of 
resolution 1284 (1999); S/2001/833 (30 August 2001) annex: Sixth quarterly report of the 
Executive-Chairman of UNMOVIC under paragraph 12 of resolution 1284 (1999); 
S/2001/1126 (29 November 2001), annex: Seventh quarterly report of the Executive-Chairman 
of UNMOVIC under paragraph 12 of resolution 1284 (1999); 5/2002/195 (26 February 2002), 
annex: Eighth quarterly report of the Executive-Chairman of UNMOVIC under paragraph 12 
of resolution 1284 (1999); S/2002/606 (31 May 2002), annex: Ninth quarterly report of the 
Executive-Chairman of UNMOV1C under paragraph 12 of resolution 1284 (1999); 
S/2002/981 (3 September 2002) annex: Tenth quarterly report of the Executive-Chairman of 
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3.4.3 The Oil-for-Food Programme (OFFP) and the Office of the Iraq Programme 
(Orp) 
As noted above in section 5.3.3, the Oil-for-Food Programme was established in 
order to enable Iraq to sell limited quantities of oil in order to finance the purchase of 
humanitarian goods and the obligations of the Iraqi Government in relation to compensation 
arising from the Gulf War. The Office of the Iraq Programme (0IP) was established by the 
United Nations Secretariat in order to administer the Oil-for-Food Programme: 26 The 
Executive Director of the OIP has been responsible for the overall management and 
coordination of all United Nations humanitarian activities in Iraq, in which nine United 
Nations agencies and organizations have been involved. 127 
3.4.4 The Iraq export/import monitoring mechanism 
In October 1991 the Security Council requested the 661 Committee to develop, in 
cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA, a mechanism to monitor sales or supplies to 
Iraq of items that could be used for the production or acquisition of weapons, in 
contravention of the arms and related sanctions: 28 In July 1995 the 661 Committee 
approved a joint-proposal for that mechanism submitted by UNSCOM and the IAEA. 129 
The proposal for the mechanism was then submitted to the Security Council for its 
UNMOVIC under paragraph 12 of resolution 1284 (1999); S/2002/1303 (27 November 2002), 
annex: Eleventh quarterly report of the Executive-Chairman of UNMOVIC under paragraph 
12 of resolution 1284 (1999); S/2003/232 (28 February 2003), annex: Twelfth quarterly report 
of the Executive-Chairman of UNMOVIC under paragraph 12 of resolution 1284 (1999). 
126 	For information relating to the OIP and the OFFP, see: http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/index.html.  
127 	See: http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/index.html.  
128 S/RES/715 (11 October 1995), operative paragraph 7. 
129 S/1996/700 (26 August 1996), annex: Report of the Security Council Committee established by 
resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, annex, paragraph 
32 (page 8). 
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consideration, and in March 1996 the Council decided to establish the mechanism. 13° The 
monitoring mechanism consisted of a Joint Export/Import Monitoring Unit established by 
UNSCOM and the IAEA. Under resolution 1051 (1996), by which the Council established 
the mechanism, all States were required to notify the mechanism if their nationals planned to 
export to Iraq any items or technologies that might have "dual-use" potential."' Iraq was 
also required to inform the mechanism of any plans to receive potential "dual-use" items or 
technologies.' 32 
When the Security Council established UNMOVIC, it requested the Executive 
Chairman of LJNMOVIC and the Director-General of the IAEA to establish a unit which 
would assume the monitoring mechanism's responsibilities and to resume the revision and 
updating of the lists of items and technology to which the mechanism applied and thus the 
export to Iraq of which must be notified to the unit.' 33 The updated list, which was circulated 
by the Executive-Chairman of UNMOVIC in June 2001, 134 came into effect on 13 July 
2001. 135 In its quarterly reports to the Council, UNMOVIC generally summarized the unit's 
activities during the reporting period. On the whole those activities consisted of reviewing 
notifications sent to it by States. The Unit also reviewed the distribution plans for the Oil-for-
Food programme to ensure that they contained no "prohibited" items.' 36 After the adoption 
130 S/RES/1051 (27 March 1996), operative paragraph I. 
131 	SIRES/1051 (27 March 1996), operative paragraph 5. 
132 	S/RES/1051 (27 March 1996), operative paragraph 6. 
133 	SIRES/I284 (17 December 1999), operative paragraph 8. 
134 S/2001/560 (15 October MO: Letter dated I June 2001 from the Executive Chairman of 
UNMOVIC addressed to the President of the Security Council. 
135 S/2001/833 (30 August 2001), annex: Sixth quarterly report of the Executive-Chairman of 
UNMOVIC, paragraph 7. 
136 See, e.g., S/2002/195 (26 February 2002), annex: Eighth quarterly report of the Executive-
Chairman of UNMOVIC, paragraph 13. 
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of the Goods Review List (GRL) by the Council in May 2002, 13 ' the unit's work increased 
substantially as it was involved in the process of reviewing applications to export 
humanitarian supplies to Iraq under the Oil-for-Food programme to ensure that the items or • 
technologies proposed to be supplied to Iraq did not feature on the GRL. 138 
3.4.5 The group of experts on the Iraq Sanctions Regime 
In June 1998, the Council requested the Secretary-General to establish a group of 
experts to determine, in consultation with the Government of Iraq, whether Iraq was able to 
export the amount of petroleum and petroleum products permissible under the Oil-for-Food 
Programme. 139 The group was also to report on Iraqi production and transportation 
capacity. 140 The group submitted its report within two months, m1 recommending that 
concluding that without rapid and adequate investment in spare parts and repair of 
production wells, plus the development of a number of smaller fields, oil production would 
continue to decline, and recommending that an investment of US$1.2 billion was required to 
provide capacity to meet production goals. 
137 	The GRL was adopted by the Council in resolution 1409 (2002): SIRES/1409 (14 May 2002), 
operative paragraphs 2-3. 
138 	See, e.g., S/2002/606 (31 May 2002), annex: Ninth quarterly report of the Executive-Chairman 
of UNMOVIC, paragraphs 20-21; S/2002/981 (3 September 2002), annex: Tenth quarterly report 
of the Executive-Chairman of UNMOVIC, paragraph 28. 
139 	SIRES/1153 (20 February 1998), operative paragraph 12. 
140 	Ibid. 
141 	See: S/1998/330 (15 April 1998), annex: Report of the group of experts established pursuant to 
resolution 1153 (1998). 
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3.4.6 Ad Hoc Panels on the Iraq Sanctions Regime 
In January 1999, when Iraq was refusing to allow UNSCOM to resume its activities 
on Iraqi territory," 2 the Security Council decided to establish three separate ad hoc 
panels.' 43  The panels were established with the following objectives: a) Panel I would make 
recommendations on how to re-establish an effective disarmament monitoring and 
verification regime in Iraq; b) Panel II would address the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi 
people; and c) Panel III would consider outstanding issues relating to prisoners of war and 
Kuwaiti property. 144 The work of the first two panels was directly related to the 
administration, implementation and enforcement of sanctions. The panels submitted their 
reports within two months." 5 The recommendations of the first two panels were clearly 
taken into account by the Council,"6 as demonstrated by the actions it subsequently took to 
replace UNSCOM with UNMOVIC and to reinvigorate the OFFP." 7 
142 	The UNSCOM inspectors had been withdrawn from Iraq on 16 December 1998, due to security 
concerns arising from the impending bombardment of Baghdad by US and British warplanes. 
143 	See: S/1999/100: Note by the President of the Security Council (30 January 1999). 
144 	Ibid. 
145 	For the reports of the panels, see: S11999/356 (30 March 1999): Letters dated 27 and 30 March 
1999, respectively, from the Chairman of the Panels established pursuant to the note by the 
President of the Security Council of 30 January 1999 (S/I999/100) addressed to the President of 
the Security Council, Annex I [containing the Report of the First Panel established pursuant 
to the note by the President of the Security Council of 30 January 1999 (5/1 999/100) 
concerning disarmament and current and future ongoing monitoring and verification issues], 
Annex II [containing the Report of the Second Panel established pursuant to the note by the 
President of the Security Council of 30 January 1999 (S/1999/100) concerning the current 
humanitarian situation in Iraq], Annex III [containing the Report of the Third Panel 
established pursuant to the note by the President of the Security Council of 30 January 1999 
(S/1999/I 00) on prisoners of war and Kuwaiti property]. 
146 	For the major recommendations of the First Panel, see Report of the First Panel, ibid, 
paragraphs 61-68. For the major recommendations of the Second Panel, see Report of the 
Second Panel, ibid, paragraphs 43-57. 
147 	See, in particular, SIRES/1284 (17 December 1999). 
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3.4.7 The role of the Secretary-General 
During the course of the Iraq sanctions regime, the Security Council requested, 
invited or directed the Secretary-General to undertake a vast collection of responsibilities 
connected to the administration, monitoring and implementation of the Iraq sanctions regime. 
The range of the Secretary-General's tasks was so broad due to the number of subsidiary 
bodies and programmes established in connection with the sanctions regime, including 
UNSCOM, the UNCC, UNMOVIC and the Oil-for-Food Programme. The tasks 
bestowed upon the Secretary-General included: reporting on the implementation of initiatives 
related to the sanctions regime; planning for the establishment of new subsidiary bodies and 
programmes; establishing those subsidiary bodies and programmes; submitting 
recommendations for improved implementation and monitoring; taking action to improve 
implementation and monitoring; providing administrative assistance and support to the 
Council's subsidiary bodies. 
i. 	Reporting 
Among the Secretary-General's reporting responsibilities in connection with the Iraq 
sanctions regime, he was requested, invited or directed to undertake the following tasks: 
reporting on the implementation of the sanctions; 148 reporting on the humanitarian situation in 
fraq;149 reporting on the implementation of the Oil-for-Food Programme 90 and 180 days 
after the initiation of each phase of the Programme; 15° submitting, in cooperation with the 
148 	SIRES/661 (6 August 1990), operative paragraph 10 (requesting the Secretary-General to report 
to it within thirty days on the implementation of resolution 661 (1990)). 
149 SIRES/666 (13 September 1990), operative paragraphs 3-5 (requesting the Secretary-General to 
seek information on the availability of food in Iraq and Kuwait and to report such information 
to the 661 Committee). 
150 SIRES/986 (14 April 1995), operative paragraph 11; 5/RES/1111 (4 June 1997), operative 
paragraph 3; SIRES/1143 (4 December 1997), operative paragraph 4; SIRES/1153 (20 February 
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Director-Genera1 of the IAEA, six-monthly progress reports on the monitoring of the 
sanctions against arms and weapons of mass destruction; 151 reporting on the implementation 
of the distribution plan for the OFFP;152 reporting on improving the electricity sector in Iraq 
and on essential humanitarian needs in Iraq; 153 reporting if Iraq were unable to export the full 
allotment of petroleum and petroleum products permissible under the OFFP .,154 reporting on 
the progress made in meeting the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people and on the revenues 
necessary to meet those needs; 155 reporting on the implementation of resolution 1284 
(1999), by which the Council established UNMOVIC and modified the OFFP; 156 reporting 
with proposals for the use of additional export routes for petroleum and petroleum products 
for the OFFP; 157 reporting on the extent to which the Iraqi Government was ensuring 
equitable distribution of humanitarian supplies provided under the OFFP., 158 reporting on the 
implementation of the Goods Review List, including recommendations for the List and the 
procedures for its implementation; 159 updating the 661 Committee on steps taken to 
implement the temporary measures authorized after the outbreak of the second Gulf War to 
1998), operative paragraph 10; SIRES/1210 (4 November 1998), operative paragraph 6; 
SIRES/I242 (21 May 1999), operative paragraph 6; S/RES/I 281 (10 December 1999), operative 
paragraph 5; SIRES/1302 (8 June 2000), operative paragraph 5; S/RES/I330 (5 December 2000), 
operative paragraph 5; SIRES/1360 (3 July 2001), operative paragraph 5 (requesting on that 
occasion that the Secretary-General report within 90 and 150 days on the implementation of the 
OFFP); S/RES/I 409 (14 May 2002), operative paragraph 7 (requesting on that occasion that the 
Secretary-General report on the implementation of the OFFP within 180 days). 
151 	SIRES/1051 (27 March 1996), operative paragraph 16. 
152 SIRES/I153 (20 February 1998), operative paragraph 5; SIRES/1210 (4 November 1998), 
operative paragraph 7; SIRES/1242 (21 May 1999), operative paragraph 7. 
153 	S/RES/I153 (20 February 1998), operative paragraph 11. 
154 	S/RES/I 281 (10 December 1999), operative paragraph 6. 
155 	S/RES/1284 (17 December 1999), operative paragraph 28. 
156 	S/RES/I 284 (17 December 1999), operative paragraph 32. 
157 	S/RES/1330 (5 December 2000), operative paragraph 18. 
158 SIRES/1360 (3 July 2001), operative paragraph Ii; SIRES/1447 (4 December 2002), operative 
paragraph 4. 
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use contracts previously approved under the OFFP to provide for the humanitarian needs of 
the Iraqi people; 16° and reporting to the Council on the implementation of those temporary 
measures. 161 
Planning 
Among the Secretary-General's planning responsibilities in connection with the Iraq 
sanctions regime, he was requested, invited or directed to undertake the following tasks: 
developing a plan for the formation of UNSCOM; 162 developing, in cooperation with 
UNSCOM, a plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with its 
obligation not to use, develop, construct or acquire weapons of mass destruction; 163 
developing recommendations for the establishment of the Iraq Compensation Fund; 164 
developing guidelines for the full implementation of the sanctions against arms and weapons 
of mass destruction and their development or servicing; ' 65 submitting a plan for implementing 
the Council's first attempt at an Oil-for-Food Programme; 166 and undertaking planning for 
the phasing out of the Oil-for-Food Programme. 167 
Establishing new subsidiary bodies or programmes 
159 	S/RES/I 409 (14 May 2002), operative paragraph 8; SIRES/1447 (4 December 2002), operative 
paragraph 5. 
160 	SIRES/1472 (28 March 2003), operative paragraph 9. 
161 	SIRES/1472 (28 March 2003), operative paragraph II. 
162 	SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 9 (deciding that the Secretary-General would 
develop a plan for the formation of UNSCOM). 
163 	SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 10. 
164 	SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 19 (directing the Secretary-General to develop 
recommendations for the establishment of a compensation fund to cover Iraq's liabilities for 
loss, damage or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations as a result of its 
invasion and occupation of Kuwait). 
165 	SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 26. 
166 	SIRES/706 (15 August 1991), operative paragraph 5. 
167 	SIRES/1483 (22 May 2003), operative paragraph 16. 
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Among the Secretary-General's responsibilities for establishing new subsidiary 
bodies or programmes in connection with the Iraq sanctions regime, he was requested, 
invited or directed to undertake the following tasks: establishing the United Nations 
Compensation Commission (UNCC); 168 reporting every six months on the work of 
UNSCOM; 169 establishing an escrow account for the purposes of the Oil-for-Food 
Programme; 170 establishing a group of experts to determine whether Iraq was able to export 
the permitted amount of oil under the OFFP; 171 appointing an Executive-Chairman of 
UNMOVIC, as well as a "College of Commissioners"; 172 establishing a group of experts, 
including oil industry experts, to report on Iraq's petroleum production and export capacity 
and to make recommendations for increasing that capacity; 173 appointing overseers to 
approve petroleum and petroleum product exports under the OFFP;174 appointing 
independent experts to prepare a comprehensive report on the humanitarian situation h 
Iraq.'" 
iv. 	Submitting recommendations for improving implementation and 
monitoring 
Among the Secretary-General's responsibilities for submitting recommendations to 
improve implementation and monitoring in connection with the Iraq sanctions regime, he was 
requested, invited or directed to undertake the following tasks: submitting recommendations 
168 	SIRES/692 (20 May 1991), operative paragraph 4. 
169 	S/RES/699, operative paragraph 3. 
170 	SIRES/986 (14 April 1995), operative paragraphs 7-8. 
171 SIRES/1153 (20 February 1998), operative paragraph 12. 
172 	SIRES/1284 (17 December 1999), operative paragraph 5. 
173 	S/RES/1284 (17 December 1999), operative paragraph 30. 
174 	SIRES/1302 (8 June 2000), operative paragraph 7. 
175 
 
SIRES/1302 (8 June 2000), operative paragraph 18. 
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for ensuring that Iraq met its obligation to cover the costs of UNSCOM's operations; 176 
compiling a detailed list of the parts and equipment necessary to enable the full level of 
production of petroleum and petroleum products permissible under the terms of the 
OFFP; 177 making recommendations for the expenditure of sums expected to be available; 178 
submitting recommendations to the 661 Committee for minimizing the delay in paying the full 
amount of each purchase of Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products under the OFFP; 179 
submitting to the 661 Committee recommendations for utilizing excess funds in an account 
for the inspection and auditing of the 01.1,P for the humanitarian components of the 
Programme.' 8°  
v. 	Taking action to improve implementation and monitoring 
Among the Secretary-General's responsibilities for taking action to improve 
implementation and monitoring in connection with the Iraq sanctions regime, he was 
requested, invited, authorized or directed to undertake the following tasks: using his good 
offices to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian supplies to Iraq and Kuwait; 181 implementing 
the first attempt at an Oil-for-Food Programme; 182 taking the necessary actions to ensure 
the implementation of the OFFP; 183 monitoring parts and equipment imported to Iraq for the 
176 	S/RES/699, operative paragraph 4. 
177 	SIRES/1210 (4 November 1998), operative paragraph 9; SIRES/1242 (21 May 1999), operative 
paragraph 9; SIRES/1281 (10 December 1999), operative paragraph 9. 
178 	SIRES/1281 (10 December 1999), operative paragraph 6. 
179 	S/RES/1302 (8 June 2000), operative paragraph 13. 
180 	SIRES/1302 (8 June 2000), operative paragraph 14. 
181 SIRES/666 (13 September 1990), operative paragraph 7 (requesting the Secretary-General to use 
his good offices to facilitate the delivery and distribution of foodstuffs to Iraq and Kuwait). 
182 	SIRES/712 (19 September 1991), operative paragraph 10. 
183 	S/RES/986 (14 April 1995), operative paragraph 13 (requesting the Secretary-General to take the 
necessary actions to ensure the implementation of the OFFP, authorizing him to enter into the 
necessary arrangements or agreements, and requesting him to report on steps taken in that 
respect); SIRES/1153 (20 February 1998), operative paragraph 4; SIRES/1210 (4 November 
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purposes of increasing the oil production necessary for the OFFP; 184 maximizing the 
effectiveness of the OFFP; 185 minimizing the cost of U.N. activities associated with the 
implementation of the OFFP; 186 making the necessary arrangements to allow the purchase of 
Iraqi-produced goods under the OFFP; 187 making the necessary arrangements to provide 
for reasonable expenses related to the Hajj to be met by funds in the escrow account; 188 
redirecting excess funds in an account for the inspection and auditing of the OFFP so that 
they could be used for humanitarian purchases; 189 expanding the lists of humanitarian items 
for which simple notification to the 661 Committee, rather than the Committee's approval, 
was required prior to being exported to Iraq under the OFFP; 19° redirecting a percentage of 
the funds from the account for the Compensation Fund to the account for humanitarian 
projects and requesting the Secretary-General to report on the use of those funds; 191 
developing consumption rates and levels for medicines and medicinal chemicals which could 
be exported to Iraq under the Goods Review List procedures; 192 undertaking, after the 
outbreak of the second Gulf War, temporary measures to provide for the implementation of 
1998), operative paragraph 4; S/RES/1242 (21 May 1999), operative paragraph 3; SIRES/1281 (10 
December 1999), operative paragraph 3; S/RES/1330 (5 December 2000), operative paragraph 3; 
S/RES/1360 (3 July 2001), operative paragraph 3. 
184 	SIRES/1175 (19 June 1998), operative paragraph 6. 
185 	S/RES/1284 (17 December 1999), operative paragraph 21. 
186 	SIRES/1284 (17 December 1999), operative paragraph 22. 
187 	SIRES/1284 (17 December 1999), operative paragraph 24; SIRES/1330 (5 December 2000), 
operative paragraph 15. 
188 	S/RES/1284 (17 December 1999), operative paragraph 26. 
189 	SIRES/l330 (5 December 2000), operative paragraph 9; S/RES/1360 (3 July 2001), operative 
paragraph 8. 
190 	SIRES/1330 (5 December 2000), operative paragraph 11. 
191 
 
SIRES/I360 (3 July 2001), operative paragraph 9. 
192 	S/RES/1454 (30 December 2002), operative paragraph 3 (directing the Secretary-General to 
develop within 60 days consumption rates and levels for medicines and medicinal chemicals 
under paragraph 20 of the procedures for the implementation of the Goods Review List). 
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contracts that had been approved under the OFFP prior to the outbreak of that war; 193 and 
terminating the OFFP over a period of six months: 94 
vi. 	Providing administrative assistance and support 
Among the Secretary-General's responsibilities for providing administiative 
assistance and support to the Council's subsidiary bodies in connection with the Iraq 
sanctions regime, he was requested, invited or directed to undertake the following tasks: 
providing all necessary assistance to the 661 Committee; 195 providing Iraq and the 661 
Committee with a daily statement of the status of the escrow account established under the 
OFFP. 196 
5.4.8 States 
States were called upon to undertake a number of additional actions to strengthen 
the implementation, enforcement and monitoring of the sanctions against Iraq. When the 
sanctions were imposed, the Council called upon all States, including States non-members 
of the United Nations, to act strictly in accordance with the sanctions, notwithstanding any 
193 	S/RES/1472 (28 March 2003), operative paragraph 4. Those measures included: (a) establishing 
alternative locations for the delivery of humanitarian supplies; (b)reviewing approved 
contracts to determine priority humanitarian contracts to be fulfilled in the authorized period; 
(c) contacting suppliers to determine action to be taken in accordance with those priorities; 
(d) negotiating necessary adjustments to contracts; (e) negotiating new contracts for essential 
medical items; (f) transferring, on an exceptional and reimbursable basis as necessary to ensure 
the delivery of essential humanitarian supplies to the Iraqi people, unencumbered funds 
between the accounts created under the OFFP for humanitarian assistance to Iraq in general, 
and for complementary humanitarian assistance to three northern Iraqi governorates; (g)using 
funds in those accounts, as necessary and appropriate, to compensate suppliers and shippers 
for extra costs incurred as a result of diverting and delaying shipments; (h) meeting additional 
operational and administrative costs by using the fund created under the OFFP for the 
payment of independent inspection activities; and (i) using where possible locally produced 
goods and services. 
194 S/RES/1483 (22 May 2003), operative paragraph 16. 
195 	S/RES/661 (6 August 1990), operative paragraph 8. 
196 	S/RES/1284 (17 December 1999), operative paragraph 23. 
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contract entered into or licence granted before the date the sanctions entered into force, 197 
and it called upon States to cooperate fully with the 661 Committee in the fulfilment of its 
tasks, including by supplying such information as the Committee might seek.'" Two weeks 
after the sanctions were imposed, the Council called upon Member States cooperating with 
the Government of Kuwait and which were deploying maritime forces to the area to use 
such measures commensurate with the specific circumstances as may be necessary, under 
the Council's authority, to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping, in order to inspect 
and verify that it was not violating the sanctions.' 99 At the same time, the Council also invited 
Member States to use political and diplomatic measures to ensure compliance with the 
sanctions,20° requested all States to provide, in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, such assistance as might be required by the States cooperating with the 
Government of Kuwait, 201 and requested States acting pursuant to the authority to halt 
inward and outward maritime shipping to submit reports to the Council and the 661 
Committee concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait. 202 
In September 1990, when the Council applied aircraft sanctions against Iraq, it 
called upon States: to carry out their obligations to ensure strict and complete compliance 
with the sanctions;203 to cooperate in taking such measures as necessary, consistent with 
197 
 
SIRES/661 (6 August 1990), operative paragraph 5; SIRES/670 (25 September 1990), operative 
paragraph 3. 
198 	SIRES/661 (6 August 1990), operative paragraph 7. The Council reaffirmed this call in 
subsequent resolutions connected with the sanctions regime. See: SIRES/670 (25 September 
1990), operative paragraph 10. 
199 
 
SIRES/665 (25 August 1990), operative paragraph I. 
200 	SIRES/665 (25 August 1990), operative paragraph 2. 
201 	SfRES/665 (25 August 1990), operative paragraph 3. 
202 	SIRES/665 (25 August 1990), operative paragraph 4. 
203 	SIRES/670 (25 September 1990), operative paragraph 1. 
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international law, to ensure the effective implementation of the sanctions; 204 and to detain or 
deny entry to Iraqi ships which were being or had been used in violation of the sanctions. 205 
As a result of that authorisation, a multinational interception force was stationed off the coast 
of Iraq for more than a decade.206 The force routinely intercepted vessels going to and from 
Iraq, in order to inspect cargo and verify that the vessels were not violating the Iraq 
sanctions regime. 
In November 1990 the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, 207 
demanded that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 (1990) and decided to allow it one final 
opportunity to do so. 208 The Council then authorized Member States cooperating with the 
Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq were to comply fully with its obligations under Security 
Council csolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 
(1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and 
security, 209  and it requested all States to provide appropriate support for such actions. 21° 
The Council also requested the States concerned to keep it regularly informed of actions so 
undertaken. 211 Whilst this action did not strictly constitute action to implement the sanctions, 
it had the objective of enforcing Iraqi compliance with the objectives for which the sanctions 
had been imposed. 
204 	SIRES/670 (25 September 1990), operative paragraph 7. 
205 	S/RES/670 (25 September 1990), operative paragraph 8. 
206 	The force's operations were focussed in the Red Sea from 1991-1994, after which they shifted 
to the Persian Gulf: see Report of the 661 Committee for 1990-1996, above note 103, 
paragraphs 80-85. 
207 	S/RE51678 (November 29 1990), preambular paragraph 5. 
208 	S/RES/678 (November 29 1990), operative paragraph 1. 
209 	SIRES/678 (November 29 1990), operative paragraph 2. 
210 	S/RES/678 (November 29 1990), operative paragraph 3. 
211 	SIRES/678 (November 29 1990), operative paragraph 4. 
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In April 1991, when the Council adopted resolution 687 (1991), thus reaffirming the 
continuing application of sanctions, it called upon all States to act strictly in accordance with 
the sanctions, notwithstanding the existence of any conflicting legal rights or obligations, 212 
and requested all States to maintain such national controls and procedures and to take such 
other actions consistent with the guidelines to be established by it for the full implementation 
of the arms sanctions against Iraq.213 At the same time, the Council also required all States 
to take the necessary measures to ensure that no claim lay at the instance of the Government 
of Iraq, or of Iraqi nationals and entities, in connection with any contract or other transaction 
where its performance had been affected by the sanctions. 2 " In June 1991, when the 
Council approved those guidelines, it requested all States to report to the Secretary-General 
on the measures they had instituted for meeting the obligations to implement the arms 
sanctions.215 
In March 1996, when the Council approved arrangements for the establishment of 
the export/import monitoring mechanism for Iraq, 216 it required all States to notify the 
mechanism of the planned sale or supply to Iraq from their territories of any items or 
technologies that might have dual-use potentia1. 217 Iraq was also required to inform the 
212 
 
SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 25. 
213 SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 27. the Council reiterated that call in resolution 
700 (1991): SIRES/700 (17 June 1991), operative paragraph 3. 
214 	SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 29.. 
215 	S/RES/700 (17 June 1991), operative paragraph 4. 
216 	For discussion of the mechanism, see section 3.4, above. 
217 	SIRES/1051 (27 March 1996), operative paragraph 5. The items and technologies that might 
have dual-use potential were elaborated in the provisions for the establishment of the 
mechanism, which were elaborated by the 661 Committee. See: S/1995/1017 (7 December 1995), 
annex I: Provisions for the mechanism for export/import monitoring under paragraph 7 of 
resolution 715 (1991): Report prepared by the 661 Committee, UNSCOM and the IAEA, 
paragraphs 9, 11, 13, 24, 25, 27 and 28. 
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mechanism of any plans to receive potential "dual-use" items or technologies. 218 At the same 
time, the Council also: called upon all States to cooperate fully with the 661 Committee, 
UNSCOM and the Director-General of the IAEA in the fulfilment of their tasks in 
connection with the monitoring mechanism, including by supplying such information as the 
Committee sought;219 and called upon all States to adopt as soon as possible such measures 
as necessary under their national procedures to implement the mechanism. 22° 
In November 2002, when the Security Council decided that Iraq was in material 
breach of its obligations under Security Council resolutions, 221 it also requested all Member 
States to give full support to UNMOVIC and the IAEA in the discharge of their mandates, 
including by providing any information related to prohibited programmes or other aspects of 
their mandates, including on Iraqi attempts since 1998 to acquire prohibited items, and by 
recommending sites to be inspected, persons to be interviewed, conditions of such 
interviews, and data to be collected, the results of which were to be reported to the Council 
by UNMOVIC and the IAEA. 222 
As part of the implementation of the Oil-for-Food Programme, the Council 
authorized States, subject to certain conditions, to permit the import of petroleum and 
petroleum products. 223 That initial authorisation was extended on multiple occasions. 224 In 
218 	S/RES/1051 (27 March 1996), operative paragraph 6. 
219 	S/RES/1051 (27 March 1996), operative paragraph 12. 
220 	S/RES/1051 (27 March 1996), operative paragraph 13. 
221 	S/RES/1441 (8 November 2002), operative paragraph 1. 
222 	S/RES/1441 (8 November 2002), operative paragraph 10. 
223 	The Council first foreshadowed such an authorisation in August 1991. See: S/RES/706 (15 
August 1991), operative paragraph 1. After a number of years in which Iraq refused to comply 
with the scheme, the Council again attempted to implement an Oil-for-Food Programme in 1995, 
this time with more success: SIRES/986 (14 April 1995), operative paragraph I. 
224 	See, e.g., S/RES/111 I (4 June 1997), operative paragraph 1; SIRES/1143 (4 December 1997), 
operative paragraph 1; SIRES/1153 (20 February 1998), operative paragraph 1; SIRES/1158 (25 
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addition to extending that authorisation, the Council also: called upon States to cooperate 
fully in the implementation of the Oil-for-Food Programme; 225 authorized Turkey to permit 
the import of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq sufficient to meet the pipeline 
tariff charges for the transport of Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products through the 
Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline; 226 authorized States to permit the export to Iraq, subject to the 
approval of the 661 Committee, of parts and equipment for the safe operation of the 
Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline system; 227 authorized States to permit activities necessary for 
the exports authorized under the Oil-for-Food Programme, including financial transactions 
related thereto;228 appealed to all States to cooperate in the timely provision to Iraq of 
humanitarian supplies permitted under the OFFP,229 authorized States to permit the export 
March 1998), operative paragraph I; SIRES/1210 (24 November 1998), operative paragraph 1; 
SIRES/1242 (21 May 1999), operative paragraph 1; S/RES/1281 (10 December 1999), operative 
paragraph 1; S/RES11284 (17 December 1999), operative paragraph 15; SIRES/1302 (8 June 
2000), operative paragraph 1; SIRES/1330 (5 December 2000), operative paragraph 1; 
S/RES/1352 (1 June 2001), operative paragraph 1; S/RES/1360 (3 July 2001), operative paragraph 
1; SIRES/1382 (29 November 2001), operative paragraph I; S/RES/1409 (14 May 2002), operative 
paragraph 1; SIRES/1443 (25 November 2002), operative paragraph 1; S/RES/1447 (4 December 
2002), operative paragraph 1; S/RES/I454 (30 December 2002), operative paragraph 1; 
S/RES/1472 (28 March 2003 
225 In connection with the first attempt at an Oil-for-Food Programme, see: SIRES/712 (19 
September 1991), operative paragraph 11. In connection with the actual Oil-for-Food 
Programme, see: S/RES/1153 (20 February 1998), operative paragraph 6 (urging all States and, in 
particular, Iraq, to provide full cooperation in the effective implementation of the OFFP); 
S/RES/1210 (24 November 1998), operative paragraph 11 (urging all States and, in particular, 
Iraq, to provide full cooperation in the effective implementation of the OFFP); S/RES/1242 (21 
May 1999), operative paragraph 11 (urging all States and, in particular, Iraq, to provide full 
cooperation in the effective implementation of the OFFP); S/RES/1281 (10 December 1999), 
operative paragraph 11 (urging all States and, in particular, Iraq, to provide full cooperation in 
the effective implementation of the OFFP); S/RES/I 302 (8 June 2000), operative paragraph 15 
(urging all States and, in particular, Iraq, to provide full cooperation in the effective 
implementation of the OFFP); SIRES/1330 (5 December 2000), operative paragraph 16 (urging all 
States and, in particular, Iraq, to provide full cooperation in the effective implementation of the 
OFFP); S/RES/1360 (3 July 2001), operative paragraph 10 (urging all States and, in particular, 
Iraq, to provide full cooperation in the effective implementation of the OFFP). 
226 	SIRES/986 (14 April 1995), operative paragraph 2. 
227 	S/RES/986 (14 April 1995), operative paragraph 9(a). 
228 	S/RES/986 (14 April 1995), operative paragraph 9(b). 
229 S/RES/1153 (20 February 1998), operative paragraph 7; SIRES/l210 (24 November 1998), 
operative paragraph 12; S/RES/1242 (21 May 1999), operative paragraph 12; SIRES/1281 (10 
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to Iraq of the necessary parts and equipment to enable Iraq to increase the export of 
petroleum and petroleum products to the amount permitted under the OFFP;23° encouraged 
Member States to provide Iraq with supplementary humanitarian and published material of 
an educational character; 23I urged all States submitting applications to provide supplies to 
Iraq under the OFFP to take steps to minimize delays; 232 and authorized States to permit the 
sale or supply to Iraq of any commodities and products other than military commodities and 
products and military-related commodities and products covered by the Goods Review 
List.233 
5.4.9 International organizations 
In September 1990, the Council affirmed that the United Nations, the specialized 
agencies and other international organizations in the United Nations system were required to 
take such measures as might be necessary to give effect to the sanctions. 234 In April 1991, 
the Council called upon international organizations to act strictly in accordance with the 
sanctions, notwithstanding the existence of any conflicting legal rights or obligations, 235 and 
to take all appropriate steps to assist in ensuring full compliance with the sanctions. 236 
December 1999), operative paragraph 12; SIRES/1302 (8 June 2000), operative paragraph 16; 
S/RES/1330 (5 December 2000), operative paragraph 21; SIRES/1360 (3 July 2001), operative 
paragraph 13; SIRES/1382 (29 November 2001), operative paragraph 5. 
230 	S/RES/1175 (19 June 1998), operative paragraph I. 
231 	S/RES/1284 (17 December 1999), operative paragraph 19. 
232 	S/RES/1330 (5 December 2000), operative paragraph 14. 
233 	S/RES/1409 (14 May 2002), operative paragraph 3. The Goods Review List was adopted by 
operative paragraph 3 of the same resolution, and was circulated as document S/2002/515 (3 
May 2002), annex: Goods Review List. 
234 	S/RES/670 (25 September 1990), operative paragraph 11. 
235 	SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 25. 
236 	SIRES/687 (3 April 1991), operative paragraph 27. the Council reiterated that call in resolution 
700 (1991): SIRES/700 (17 June 1991), operative paragraph 3. 
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3.5 Notable aspects of the Iraq sanctions regime 
The Iraq sanctions regime is notable for many reasons. First, it was perhaps the 
most far-reaching and long-lasting comprehensive U.N. sanctions regime. 237 Second, it has 
spawned a complex web of subsidiary actors, working in concert with a range of other 
international actors, in order to ensure both that the sanctions are effectively implemented 
and that their humanitarian consequences upon the Iraqi civilian population are minimised. 
Third, the Iraq sanctions regime was maintained, and its objectives modified, beyond the 
point when its original objectives were achieved. 
Many aspects of the regime invite closer inspection, such as the extent to which it 
was used as a justification for the application of subsequent military sanctions, the manner in 
which the sanctions were modified in order to impose a post-conflict settlement upon a 
vanquished Iraq, and the manner in which the effective implementation of a comprehensive 
sanctions regime requires the employment of considerable resources and the participation of 
a broad range of actors. The Sanctions against Iraq have also been notable for the fact that 
they have caused significant hardship for the Iraqi civilian population, without in themselves 
appearing to have caused any significant change in the personnel, posturing or ambitions of 
the Iraqi leadership. 
237 	In terms of duration, the Iraq sanctions regime outlasted the most comprehensive of the 
Southern Rhodesia sanctions by less than a year. It is arguable, however, that the 
implementation of the Iraq sanctions regime was more effective than the Southern Rhodesian 
sanctions, due to the fact that a few key States were not entirely scrupulous in their 
implementation of the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. 
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4. The former Yugoslavia sanctions regime' 
The Council first imposed sanctions against Yugoslavia in September 1991, in an 
effort to address the conflict that soon led to the dissolution of that State. The sanctions 
regime consisted of an arms embargo. It was maintained after Yugoslavia dissolved, 
becoming an embargo against the provision of weapons and military equipment to all the 
successor States of the former Yugoslavia. The embargo was eventually terminated in June 
Although this sanctions regime was initially applied against Yugoslavia, upon the dissolution 
of that State it was maintained against all Yugoslavia's successor States. It is therefore referred 
to here as the former Yugoslavia sanctions regime. The conflict in the former Yugoslavia has so 
far led the Security Council to initiate four distinct Article 41 sanctions regimes, against: i) all 
States of the former Yugoslavia [this sanctions regime is addressed in this section]; ii) the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to address the situation in Bosnia-
Herzegovina [for details on that sanctions regime, see Appendix 7, below]; iii) the Bosnian 
Serbs [for details relating to that sanctions regime, see Appendix 9, below]; and iv) against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to address the situation in Kosovo 
[for details relating to that sanctions regime, see Appendix 15, below]. 
In addition to the above four sanctions regimes, the Council also took other forms of non-
military action to address the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, including: a) establishing an 
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Prosecution of 
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in 
the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 ("the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia"); and b) imposing a general ban upon flights in the airspace of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. These actions are not included in analysis here because they were not employed, 
implemented or enforced in such a way that they might be characterised as sanctions regimes. 
It would be possible, however, to construct an argument that the implicit basis for the 
application of those measures was Article 41 of the Charter, as they amount to Council-
mandated non-military action to address a threat to international peace and security. For the 
resolutions establishing the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, see: SIRES/808 
(22 February 1993) [deciding that a tribunal will be established and requesting the Secretary-
General to submit specific proposals on the creation of such a tribunal]; S/RES/827 (25 May 
1993) [approving the subsequent report of the Secretary-General and deciding to establish the 
tribunal in accordance with the Secretary-General's proposals]. For the resolutions relating to 
the ban upon flights in Bosnia and Herzegovinan airspace, see: S/RES/781 (9 October 1992) 
[imposing an initial ban on all military flights in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina]; S/RES/786 
(10 November 1992) [clarifying that the ban applies to rotary as well as fixed-wing military 
flights]; SIRES/816 (31 March 1993) [expanding the ban to include all flights in the airspace of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina]. Although the Council neither determined the existence of a breach of or 
threat to peace and security, nor referred to Chapter VII, when it established the flight ban in 
resolution 781 (1992), it subsequently determined in resolution 816 (1993) that the situation in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security 
and noted that it was acting under chapter VII [see SIRES/816 (31 March 1993), preambular 
paragraphs 7, 8]. 
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1996, after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement and the entry into force of a regional 
arms control agreement. 
4.1 The constitutional basis for imposing sanctions against the 
former Yugoslavia 
In September 1991 the Security Council adopted resolution 713 (1991), in which it 
expressed concern that the continuation of the situation in Yugoslavia constituted a threat to 
international peace and security, 2 noted its primary responsibility under the U.N. Charter for 
" the maintenance of international peace and security, 3 and invoked Chapter VII of the 
Charter before imposing an embargo upon the delivery of weapons and military equipment 
to Yugoslavia.' In subsequent resolutions relating to the application of the arms embargo, the 
2 	S/RES/713 (25 September 1991), preambular paragraph 4. In preambular paragraph 3, the 
Council had stated that it was deeply concerned by the fighting in Yugoslavia, which was 
"causing a heavy loss of human life and material damage," and by "the consequences for the 
countries of the region". The threat to international peace and security can therefore be 
interpreted to be the fighting in Yugoslavia and its consequences for the countries of the 
region. 
3 	S/RES/713 (25 September 1991), preambular paragraph 5. 
4 	The invocation of Chapter VII appeared in the same operative paragraph by which the Council 
imposed the embargo: see S/RES/713 (25 September 1991), operative paragraph 6. When the 
embargo was first imposed, the international community had not yet acknowledged the break-
up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). In resolution 713 (1991), the Council 
therefore applied the arms embargo against the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 
general. It was not until resolution 752 (1992) that Council resolutions began to refer to "the 
former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia": see, e.g.: S/RES/752 (15 May 1992), 
preambular paragraph 3, operative paragraph 6; SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), preambular 
paragraphs 2, 10, 17. Upon the break-up of Yugoslavia the embargo remained in place, 
subsequently applying to all the States of the former Yugoslavia: see SIRES/727 (8 January 
1992), operative paragraph 6 [reaffirming that the embargo applied to all the States of the former 
Yugoslavia, in accordance with the interpretation provided by the Secretary-General in his 
further report pursuant to Security Council resolution 721 (1991). For the relevant part of that 
report, see: S/23363 and Add. 1 (5 and 7 January 1992), paragraph 331 
The Council's decision to apply sanctions against the SFRY might be interpreted as a 
movement away from the traditional approach to the operation of Chapter VII, likely held by the 
framers of the Charter, which viewed conventional State versus State conflict as the type of 
breach of or threat to peace and security that would require the application of Article 41 or 
Article 42 measures. Although the Council identified the potential threat posed to other States 
in the region by the conflict in the SFRY, the application of sanctions against the SFRY 
implicitly acknowledged that conflicts traditionally viewed as "internal" and therefore beyond 
the scope of Chapter VII intervention could in fact pose a threat to international peace and 
security. 
500 
Appendix 4. The former Yugoslavia sanctions regime 
Council reaffirmed that the situation in the former Yugoslavia continued to constitute a threat 
to international peace and security,' and again invoked Chapter VII. 6 
4.2 The objective of the former Yugoslavia sanctions regime 
The objective of the former Yugoslavia sanctions regime was the establishment of 
peace and stability in Yugoslavia.' Initially the Council did not set particular conditions for 
the suspension or termination of the sanctions, stating that the embargo would remain in 
place until it "decide[d] otherwise following consultation between the Secretary-General and 
the Government of Yugoslavia". 8 Three years later, however, the Council established the 
concrete requirement for the termination of the arms embargo of the signing of a proposed 
Peace Agreement, including the conclusion of a regional arms control agreement, by the 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). 9 
4.3 The scope of the former Yugoslavia sanctions regime 
Under the sanctions regime, the Security Council required all States to implement 
immediately a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military 
equipment to Yugoslavia.' 0 It was maintained after Yugoslavia dissolved, becoming an 
embargo against the provision of weapons and military equipment to all the successor States 
5 See, e.g., SIRES/721 (27 November 1991), preambular paragraph 4; S/RES/743 (21 February 
1992), preambular paragraph 5; S/RES/1021 (22 November 1995), preambular paragraph 5. 
6 See, e.g., SIRES/724 (15 December 1991), operative paragraph 5; S/RES/1021 (22 November 
1995), preambular paragraph 6. 
7 SIRES/7 13 (25 September 1991), operative paragraph 6. 
8 	S/RES/713 (25 September 1991), operative paragraph 6. 
9 	S/RES/1021 (22 November 1995), operative paragraph 1. 
io 
 
SIRES/7i3 (25 September 1991), operative paragraph 6. 
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of the former Yugoslavia." The Council initially elaborated no exceptions to the embargo, 
however exemptions were in time provided for weapons and military equipment being 
imported into the territories of the former Yugoslavia for the use of United Nations forces 
such as the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), I2 its successor the 
Multinational Implementation Force (IFOR), 13 and international police forces. 14 
4.4 The administration, monitoring and enforcement of the 
former Yugoslavia sanctions regime 
During the course of the sanctions against the former Yugoslavia, the Security 
Council bestowed responsibility for the administration, implementation and enforcement of 
the sanctions upon a range of actors, including a Sanctions Committee, the Secretary-
General, States and regional organizations, as well as to entities established by these regional 
organizations with specific monitoring and verification responsibilities in relation to the 
II 	By resolution 727 (1992), of 8 January 1992, adopted after the disintegration of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Council had reaffirmed the embargo and decided that it 
would apply in accordance with paragraph 33 of the further report of the Secretary-General 
pursuant to resolution 721 (1991), such that it would continue to apply to "all areas that have 
been part of Yugoslavia, any decisions on the question of the recognition of the independence 
of certain republics notwithstanding." See: S/RES/727 (8 January 1992), operative paragraph 6; 
S/23363 and Add.1 (5 and 7 January 1992): Further report of the Secretary-General pursuant 
to resolution 721 (1991), paragraph 33. 
12 	The Council established UNPROFOR in SIRES/743 (21 February 1992), operative paragraph 2, 
providing in operative paragraph 11 of the same resolution for an exemption to the embargo for 
weapons and military equipment destined for the sole use of UNPROFOR. 
13 	The Council authorised the establishment of IFOR in S/RES/1031 (15 December 1995), operative 
paragraph 14. It provided for an exemption to the embargo for weapons and military equipment 
destined for the sole use of the Member States participating in the force in operative paragraph 
22 of the same resolution. 
14 	The Council decided to exempt international police forces from the embargo in SIRES/1031 (15 
December 1995), operative paragraph 22. This was in anticipation of the establishment of the 
U.N. Civilian Police Force, which the Council foreshadowed in operative paragraph 30 of the 
same resolution. 
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implementation of the arms embargo and other sanctions regimes applied to address the 
situation in the former Yugoslavia.' 5 
4.4.1 The former Yugoslavia Sanctions Committee 
Almost three months after initiating the former Yugoslavia sanctions regime, the 
Council established a Sanctions Committee to oversee the embargo's implementation. 16 The 
Committee (the "former Yugoslavia Sanctions Committee" or the "724 Committee") was to 
report to the Council on its work and with its observations and recommendations, and to 
undertake the following tasks: a) To examine reports submitted by States regarding action 
taken to implement the embargo;" b) To seek further information from States regarding 
action taken to implement the embargo; 18 c) To consider information concerning violations 
of the embargo and to make recommendations to increase its effectiveness; 19 and d) To 
recommend appropriate measures in response to violations of the embargo and to provide 
information to the Secretary-General for distribution to Member States.2° Although the 
Committee's mandate in respect of the arms embargo was not subsequently modified, the 
Committee did assume a vast array of responsibilities relating to the administtation, 
implementation and enforcement of the two other sanctions regimes that were imposed 
For information on the responsibilities of those entities in relation to monitoring and 
verification of the other regimes, see sections 7.4 [on the administration, implementation and 
enforcement of the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) 
to address the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina] and 9.4 [on the administration, 
implementation and enforcement of the sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs], below. 
16 	SIRES/724 (15 December 1991), operative paragraph 5(b). 
17 
 
SIRES/724 (15 December 1991), operative paragraph 5(b)(i). 
18 
 
SIRES/724 (15 December 1991), operative paragraph 5(b)(ii). 
19 	S/RES/724 (15 December 1991), operative paragraph 5(b)(iii). 
20 	SIRES/724 (15 December 1991), operative paragraph 5(b)(iv). 
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during its tenure to address the situation in the former Yugoslavia. 21 The Committee was 
ultimately dissolved in November 1996, after the termination of the three sanctions regimes 
in connection with which it had assumed responsibilities.22 
By the time of its dissolution, the 724 Committee had held 142 formal meetings,23 
submitting three reports to the Security Council on its activities. 24 In its first report, the 
Committee noted that it had received a limited amount of information on violations of the 
embargo and that it was still searching for additional information. 25 It appealed to parties 
with any information relating to actual or suspected violations of the ams embargo to 
provide it with such information. 26 In observations published in its second report, the 
Committee expressed disappointment at the lack of information it had received about 
alleged violations of sanctions, whilst the international media had been "replete" with reports 
indicating that the arms embargo was been breached "in a blatant marmer". 27 The 
21 
	
For details relating to the 724 Committee's responsibilities under those sanctions regimes, see 
sections 7.4 [on the administration, implementation and enforcement of the sanctions against 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) to address the situation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina] and 9.4 [on the administration, implementation and enforcement of the sanctions 
against the Bosnian Serbs], below. 
22 The Security Council provided for the subsequent dissolution of the Committee in SIRES/1074 
(1 October 1996), operative paragraph 6. In accordance with that operative paragraph, the 
Committee was actually dissolved upon the publication of its final report, on 15 November 
1996: see Final Report of the 724 Committee, below note 24, paragraph 87. 
23 A/52/2 (1997): Report of the Security Council: 16 June 1996-15 June 1997, p. 273. 
24 
	
See: S/23800 (13 April 1992): Report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant 
to resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia (hereafter "First Report of the 724 
Committee") [containing a report of the Committee's activities from its establishment on 15 
December 1991 until 9 April 1992]; S/25027 (30 December 1992): Second Report of the Security 
Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia 
(hereafter "Second Report of the 724 Committee") [containing a report of the Committee's 
activities from 9 April until 29 December 1992]; S/1996/946 (15 November 1996), annex: Final 
Report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) 
concerning Yugoslavia, (hereafter "Final Report of the 724 Committee") [containing a 
summary of the Committee's activities from January 1993 until the termination of the sanctions 
regime on 1 October 1996]. 
25 First Report of the 724 Committee, ibid, paragraph 12. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Second Report of the 724 Committee, above note 24, paragraph 24. 
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Committee also observed that the lack of an independent monitoring mechanism had 
inhibited its ability to obtain original information and to follow-up on alleged violations. 28 In 
that respect, however, it was grateful for information received from sources such as the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU) 
monitoring teams in the Adriatic Sea, and it looked forward to working in cooperation with 
the EC/CSCE/OSCE Sanctions Assistance Missions (SAMs). 29 In observations published 
in its final report relating to the implementation of the arms embargo, the Committee noted 
that the embargo would have been significantly more effective if there had been a system to 
monitor air and land freight traffic, akin to the maritime monitoring that was effected in the 
Adriatic Sea by NATO and the WEU and to the monitoring conducted by the Sanctions 
Assistance Missions (SAMs) of land and Danube traffic. 3° 
4.4.2 The Secretary-General 
The Secretary-General was not requested to undertake many responsibilities with 
respect to the implementation of the arms embargo. In December 1991 the Secretary-
General was requested to provide all necessary sistance to the 724 Committee and to 
make the necessary arrangements in the Secretariat for that purpose. 31 In November 1992, 
the Council requested that the Secretary-General coordinate the submission by States and 
regional agencies or arrangements of reports outlining action taken to halt maritime and 
riparian traffic to verify that cargo was not being transported in violation of the arms 
28 	Ibid, paragraph 25. 
29 	Ibid. For information relating to the activities of the WEU, NATO and the SAMs, see below. 
30 	See the Final Report of the 724 Committee, above note 24, paragraph 85. For further information 
relating to the roles of these actors, see below. 
31 	S/RES/724 (15 December 1991), operative paragraph 5(d). 
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embargo.32 At the same time the Council also requested that the Secretary-General submit 
to it recommendations for facilitating the implementation of its resolutions by deploying 
observers on the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina.33 In November 1995, the Secretary-
General was also requested to play a reporting role leading to the termination of the 
sanctions.34 
4.4.3 States 
In addition to the general obligation flowing from the application of the arms 
embargo to do everything in their power to implement the arms embargo within their own 
jurisdictions, States were also requested, authorized or required by the Security Council to 
take various actions to implement, monitor or enforce the embargo. The Council sometimes 
addressed its requests or demands to States in general, and sometimes to particular States, 
such as riparian States and States in the region. 
i. 	States in general 
In December 1991 the Council called upon all States to cooperate fully with the 724 
Committee in the fulfilment of its tasks concerning the effective implementation of the antis 
embargo.35 In February 1992, the Council further called upon all States to report to the 724 
32 S/RES/787 (16 November 1992), operative paragraph 14. The Council had authorized States to 
take such action in the same resolution— see below. 
33 
 
SIRES/787 (16 November 1992), operative paragraph 16. 
34 
 
SIRES/1021 (22 November 1995), operative paragraphs 1, 2. For details relating to the Secretary-
General's role in the termination of the sanctions, see note 56, below. 
35 	S/RES/724 (15 December 1991), operative paragraph 5(c). The Council reiterated that call in a 
number of subsequent resolutions. See: SIRES/740 (7 February 1992), operative paragraph 8; 
SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 14. 
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Committee any information brought to their attention concerning violations of the arms 
embargo.36 
In November 1992, the Council invoked Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter in 
calling upon States, acting nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements, to use the 
necessary measures to halt outward and inward maritime shipping in order to inspect and 
verify that cargo did not violate the arms embargo?' At the same time the Council also 
requested States to report, in coordination with the Secretary-General, to the Security 
Council on any measures taken to ensure that maritime or riparian shipping did not violate 
the arms embargo,38 and to provide, in accordance with the Charter, such assistance as 
might be required by States acting in pursuance of the authority to use necessary measures 
to implement the embargo." 
In April 1993, the Council required States in general to take the following action: to 
detain vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock, aircraft and cargoes suspected of having 
violated the sanctions.4° At the same time, the Council also requested or called upon States 
in general: to bring proceedings against persons and entities violating the embargo and to 
36 	SIRES/740 (7 February 1992), operative paragraph 8. 
37 	S/RES/787 (16 November 1992), operative paragraph 12. This call was reaffirmed in S/RES/820 
(17 April 1993), operative paragraph 29. 
38 
 
SIRES/787 (16 November 1992), operative paragraph 14. 
39 
 
SIRES/787 (16 November 1992), operative paragraph 15. It is unclear exactly which provision or 
provisions of the Charter the Council had in mind when it requested that assistance be 
provided "in accordance with the Charter". It is likely, however, that the Council was implicitly 
invoking Article 2(5), which provides: "All Members shall give the United Nations every 
assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from 
giving any assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or 
enforcement action". 
40 	S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 25. In the same operative paragraph the Council 
noted that detained vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock, aircraft and cargoes might be 
subject to forfeit to the detaining State. 
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impose appropriate penalties; 41 and to provide such assistance as was required by riparian 
States to ensure that shipping on the Danube did not violate the embargo. 42 
Riparian and Neighbour States 
The Security Council first outlined tasks required specifically of States neighbouring 
or located in the region surrounding the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro) in November 1992. At that time it reaffirmed the responsibility of riparian 
States to take the measures necessary to ensure that shipping along the Danube did not 
violate the embargo, including taking action to halt shipping in order to inspect and verify 
their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the embargo. 43 
In April 1993, the Council called upon riparian States to ensure that cabotage traffic 
along the Danube river between Vidin/Calafat and Mohacs was adequately monitored so 
that no vessels suspected of having violated the embargo were permitted to pass, 44 and 
reaffirmed the responsibility of riparian States to take the necessary measures to ensure that 
shipping on the Danube did not violate the embargo. 45 
In May 1995 the Council requested the Government of Romania, with the 
assistance of the EU/OSCE Sanctions Assistance Missions, to monitor the use of Romanian 
locks while repairs were being carried out to locks on the Serbian side of the river, including 
if necessary by inspections of the vessels and their cargo, in order to ensure that no goods 
were loaded or unloaded during the passage by the vessels through the locks of the Iron 
41 
 
SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 19. 
42 SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 17. 
43 	SIRES/787 (16 November 1992), operative paragraph 13. This responsibility was again 
reaffirmed by the Council in SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 17. 
44 	SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 16. 
45 	S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 17. 
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Gates I systern. 46 The Council also requested Romania to deny passage through the locks 
on its bank of the Danube to any vessel suspected to have violated relevant Council 
resolutions, thus encompassing violations of the embargo. 47 
4.4.4 Regional organizations and other regional entities involved in the 
implementation, monitoring and enforcement of the sanctions 48 
Among the regional organizations that played a role in the implementation and 
enforcement of the arms embargo were: the European Community and its successor the 
European Union (the EC/EU); 49 the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and 
its successor the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (the 
CSCE/OSCE);" the Western European Union (WEU) and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). 51 A number of these regional organizations also created subsidiary 
46 	S/RES/992 (11 May 1995), operative paragraph 3. 
47 S/RES/992 (II May 1995), operative paragraph 4. 
48 	For good summaries of the activities undertaken by regional organizations and other regional 
entities to implement and enforce the sanctions, see: Final Report of the 724 Committee, 
above note 24, paragraph 79; S/1996/776 (24 September 1996), annex: Report of the 
Copenhagen Round Table on United Nations Sanctions in the Case of the Former 
Yugoslavia (hereafter "Report of the Copenhagen Round Table"), paragraphs 25-60. 
49 	The EC/EU played a major role in the implementation of sanctions by establishing a number of 
entities to facilitate such implementation. The details relating to these entities appear later in 
this paragraph and accompanying footnotes. 
50 	Like the EC/EU, the CSCE/OSCE also played a major role in the implementation of sanctions by 
establishing a number of entities to facilitate such implementation. The details relating to these 
entities also appear later in this paragraph and accompanying footnotes. 
51 	The WEU and NATO patrolled the Adriatic Sea from July 1992 to June 1993 in order to ensure 
compliance by maritime traffic with the resolutions of the Security Council. From June 1993 the 
two organizations combined their efforts to form an operation entitled "Sharp Guard". By the 
time WEU and NATO concluded their activities to enforce the sanctions, in June 1996, the 
organizations had challenged over 70,000 vessels and inspected almost 6,000 at sea. For further 
details relating to these activities of the WEU and NATO, see: Final Report of the 724 
Committee, above note 24, paragraph 79(b); Report of the Copenhagen Round Table, above 
note 48, paragraphs 48-50. 
In addition to its activities in the Adriatic Sea, the WEU also established a "Danube Mission", 
which commenced operations in June 1993, assisting Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania in their 
efforts to prevent violations of sanctions and ensure that shipping on the Danube was in 
accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council. For further details relating to the 
activities of the WEU Danube Mission, see: Final Report of the 724 Committee, above note 
24, paragraph 79(c); Report of the Copenhagen Round Table, above note 48, paragraphs 41-42. 
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entities to facilitate resolution of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia in general or the 
implementation of sanctions in particular. The major entity established to address the conflict 
in the former Yugoslavia in general was the Conference on Yugoslavia (CY), which 
subsequently became the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY). 52 
Among the entities established with particular responsibilities for facilitating the 
implementation of sanctions were: the EC/EU/CSCE/OSCE Sanctions Assistance Missions 
(SAMs); 53 the EC/EU/CSCE/OSCE Sanctions Coordinator; 54 and the European 
Commission/CSCE/OSCE Sanctions Assistance Missions Communications Centre 
(SAMC OMM) . 
52 	The CY was established by the EC. In July 1992 the Security Council invited the EC, in 
cooperation with the Secretary-General, to examine the possibility of broadening the CY to 
provide it with "new momentum" in the search for a resolution to the conflict: S/24346 (24 July 
1992): Presidential Statement of 24 July 1992. As a result, the ICFY was convened in London 
from 26 to 28 August 1992. The Conference adopted a Statement of Principles for a negotiated 
settlement of the problems of the former Yugoslavia. Subsequently, the ICFY was a key actor in 
facilitating the conclusion of the Vance-Owen peace plan and the Dayton Peace Agreement. 
For a summary of the CY/ICFY process, see Report of the Copenhagen Round Table, above 
note 48, paragraphs 25-27. 
53 	The SAMs consisted largely of customs officers, who were deployed in States neighbouring 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) to help prevent the violation of the 
arms embargo. The Council welcomed the role of the SAMs in support of the implementation of 
the arms embargo and invited it to work in close cooperation with the 724 Committee in 
SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 20. For further details relating to the work of the 
SAMs, see: Final Report of the 724 Committee, above note 24, paragraph 79(a); Report of the 
Copenhagen Round Table, above note 48, paragraphs 32-35. 
54 	The position of the Sanctions Coordinator was established by the EC and the then CSCE in 
February 1993. The Sanctions Coordinator's mandate included: assessing sanctions 
implementation, as well as the effects of the sanctions; advising States on customs and legal 
matters; bringing violations to the attention of the CSCE/OSCE, the 724 Committee and 
concerned Governments; and consulting with Governments on the investigation and 
prosecution of alleged violations of the sanctions: S/25272 (10 February 1993) [containing the 
full mandate of the Sanctions Coordinator]. The Security Council welcomed the appointment of 
the Sanctions Coordinator and invited him to work in close cooperation with the 724 Committee 
in S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 20. For summaries of the Sanctions 
Coordinator's activities, see: Final Report of the 724 Committee, above note 24, paragraph 
79(a); Report of the Copenhagen Round Table, above note 48, paragraphs 36-38. 
55 	SAMCOMM was established by the European Commission when it created the SAMs, in order 
to serve as a focal point for the exchange of information between the SAMs and the authorities 
of their host States. For summaries of SAMCOMM's activities, see: Final Report of the 724 
Committee, above note 24, paragraph 79(a); Report of the Copenhagen Round Table, above 
note 48, paragraphs 33-35. 
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4.5 Termination of the former Yugoslavia sanctions regime 
The arms embargo remained in place for almost five years, before being terminated 
in June 1996. In November 1995 the Council decided that the embargo would be 
terminated in a staggered manner once the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) had 
all signed the Dayton Peace Agreement. 56 Ultimately, the arms embargo was terminated 
completely on 18 June 1996, by a note verbale from the Chairman of the 724 Committee 
to all States. 57 
4.6 Notable aspects of the former Yugoslavia sanctions regime 
The sanctions regime against the former Yugoslavia was notable for a number of 
reasons. First, it was the first sanctions regime to be applied against a target State that 
subsequently dissolved. Its continued application against the successor States of the former 
Yugoslavia also made it the first sanctions regime to be maintained against targets that were 
different from the target against which it had originally been applied. Second, an 
unprecedented number of regional actors were involved in the implementation and 
56 	SIRES/1021 (22 November 1995), operative paragraph 1. The staggered termination of the arms 
embargo was to work thus: after the Secretary-General had reported that the parties had signed 
the Peace Agreement, the arms embargo would continue to be applied in its entirety for a 
period of ninety days [operative paragraph 1(a)]. During the following period of ninety days, 
most of the embargo would cease to apply, with the exception of heavy weapons, military 
aircraft and helicopters, which would continue to be banned until a regional arms control 
agreement, comprising part of the Peace Agreement, had taken effect [operative paragraph 
1(b)]. Ninety days later, upon the submission of a report by the Secretary-General that the 
regional arms control agreement had been implemented, the remaining aspects of the arms 
embargo would be terminated [operative paragraph 1(c)]. 
57 	SCA/8/96(4) (18 June 1996): Note verbale from the Chairman of the 724 Committee to all 
States. The Secretary-General had earlier submitted the reports required by operative paragraph 
1 of resolution 1021 (1995) in the following sequence: 5/1995/1034 (14 December 1995) 
[reporting that the parties had formally signed the Peace Agreement that day in Paris]; 
S/1996/433 (13 June 1996) and S/1996/442 (17 June 1996) [reporting that the regional arms 
control agreement had been implemented]. For further details relating to this sequence of 
events, see: Final Report of the 724 Committee, above note 24, paragraph 4(f). 
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enforcement of the embargo." Finally, the embargo was also notable for the prominent 
debate that raged concerning whether it in fact facilitated or undermined the goal of re-
establishing peace and stability. It was alleged that the continued application of the arms 
embargo fuelled the conflict by strengthening the hand of those who were able to circumvent 
it, such as the Bosnian Serbs, at the expense of others who were not able to acquire arms as 
readily, such as the Bosnian Government. The argument was frequently made before the 
Security Council that the continued application of the arms embargo was preventing Bosnia 
and Herzegovina from exercising its inherent right to self-defence under Article 51 of the 
Charter of the United Nations. 59 Moreover, those arguing for the lifting of the embargo as it 
applied to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina also contended that if the Bosnian 
58 	When the Security Council provided for the suspension aid ultimate termination of the 
sanctions regimes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) to address 
the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and against the Bosnian Serbs, it paid tribute to the 
significant contributions played by those various actors to the achievement of a negotiated 
peace: see SIRES/1022 (22 November 1995), operative paragraph 9. Although that tribute was 
extended in the context of a decision related to the other two sanctions regimes applied to 
address the situation in the former Yugoslavia, it can nevertheless be considered to extend to 
the role played by those actors in relation to the arms embargo, as the actors undertook actions 
to facilitate the implementation of the arms embargo at the same time that they were facilitating 
the implementation of the other sanctions regimes. The Copenhagen Round-Table opined that 
the "unprecedented formula of a coordinated, inter-institutional, international cooperative 
effort" to assist States in the observance of sanctions might have been a "decisive factor" in 
making the sanctions a "valuable and effective policy instrument": Report of the Copenhagen 
Round Table, above note 48, paragraph 5. 
59 	For examples of this position, see S/PV.3370 (27 April 1994), pp. 3-5 (Pakistan), pp. 6-7 (Turkey), 
pp. 8-11 (Malaysia), pp. 11-13 (Islamic Republic of Iran), pp. 14-16 (Saudi Arabia), pp. 16-17 
(Tunisia), pp. 17-20 (Egypt), pp. 20-22 (Mr. Algabid), pp. 22-23 (Bosnia and Herzegovina), pp. 
24-25 (Oman), pp. 27-28 (Djibouti), pp. 34-36 (Croatia), pp. 36-37 (Sudan), pp. 37-38 
(Bangladesh). 
The Bosnian Government initially raised a similar argument before the International Court of 
Justice as part of multiple claims against the Government of Serbia-Montenegro, principally 
under the Genocide Convention: see Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugo. (Serbia and 
Montenegro )), Provisional Measures, 1993 ICJ Rep. 3 (Order of Apr. 8); Application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Yugo. (Serbia and Montenegro )), Provisional Measures, 1993 ICJ Rep. 325 
(Order of Sept. 13). For a summary of the legal arguments for terminating the arms embargo 
against Bosnia and Herzegovina, see: Scott, Craig, Quresho, Abid, Michell, Paul, Kalajdzic, 
Jasminka, Copeland, Peter, Chang, Francis, 'A Memorial for Bosnia: Framework of Legal 
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Government were able to gain more ready access to arms, then the Bosnian Serbs might be 
deterred from pursuing a policy of aggression and thus induced to return to the negotiating 
table. Although the counter-argument was also made, to the effect that an increase in the 
flow of arms into Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would likely have resulted from the lifting 
of the embargo against the Bosnian Government, could only have exacerbated the conflict° 
the example of the former Yugoslavia arms embargo raises the question of whether it suits 
the interests of the maintenance of international peace and security to apply an arms 
embargo against multiple parties where the impact of the embargo might result in a significant 
imbalance in relative defensive capacity between the parties to a conflict. 
Arguments Concerning the Lawfulness of the Maintenance of the United Nations Security 
Council's Arms Embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina' (1994) 16 Mich. JIL 1-134. 
60 	For examples of this position, see S/PV.3370 (27 April 1994), pp. 25-27 (Russian Federation), pp. 
28-29 (New Zealand), pp. 29-30 (Canada), pp. 31-32 (Sweden), pp. 32-33 (Mr. Djolcic),pp. 33-34 
(Norway). 
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5. The Somalia sanctions regime 
The Security Council imposed sanctions against Somalia in January 1992. The 
Somalia sanctions regime consists of an arms embargo, which has been applied for more 
than a decade without any significant modifications. In the late-1990s the Somalia embargo 
gained a reputation as a sanctions regime that was honoured more in the breach than the 
observation, as reports of its violation were commonplace. Recently, however, the Somalia 
embargo has received increased attention, with the Council establishing a Panel of Experts in 
order to recommend ways to strengthen the implementation and enforcement of the 
embargo. 
5.1 The constitutional basis for imposing sanctions against 
Somalia 
In January 1992 the Security Council adopted resolution 733 (1992), in Mich it 
expressed alarm at the rapid deterioration of the situation in Somalia and the heavy loss of 
human life and widespread material damage resulting from conflict, and noted its awareness 
of the potential consequences of the conflict for stability and peace in the region.' The 
Council further expressed concern that the continuation of the situation constituted a threat 
to international peace and security, 2 recalled its primary responsibility under the U.N. 
Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, 3 and invoked Chapter VII 
of the Charter before imposing an arms embargo against Somalia.4 In subsequent resolutions 
SIRES/733 (23 January 1992), preambular paragraph 3. 
SIRES/733 (23 January 1992), preambular paragraph 4. 
S/RES1733 (23 January 1992), preambular paragraph 5. 
The invocation of Chapter VII appeared in the same operative paragraph by which the Council 
imposed the embargo: see SIRES/733 (23 January 1992), operative paragraph 5. 
515 
Appendix 5. The Somalia sanctions regime 
related to the arms embargo, the Council has reaffirmed that the situation in Somalia 
continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security,' noted with concern that 
the continued flow of weapons to Somalia undermines peace and security, 6 and invoked 
Chapter VII.7 On numerous occasions the Council has also reaffirmed the obligation of 
States to implement the arms embargo, 8 and expressed deep concern at reports of the illicit 
delivery of weapons and military equipment to Somalia in violation of the arms embargo.9 
5.2 The objective of the Somalia sanctions regime 
The objective of the sanctions regime is to establish peace and stability in Somalia.' ° 
The Council has not set any explicit requirements for the termination of the sanctions, stating 
that the embargo would remain in place until it decided otherwise." 
5 	 See, e.g., S/RES/751 (24 April 1992), preambular paragraph 6; S/RES/767 (27 July 1992), 
preambular paragraph 7; SIRES/775 (28 August 1992), preambular paragraph 6; S/RES/794 (3 
December 1992), preambular paragraph 3; SIRES/954 (4 November 1994), preambular paragraph 
21; SIRES/1474 (8 April 2003), preambular paragraph 7 [determining that the situation in Somalia 
constituted a threat to international peace and security in the region]. 
6 	 See, e.g., SIRES/1407 (3 May 2002), preambular paragraph 3; SIRES/1425 (22 July 2002), 
preambular paragraph 2; S/RES/1474 (8 April 2003), preambular paragraph 5. 
7 	 See, e.g., SIRES/954 (4 November 1994), preambular paragraph 21; SIRES/1407 (3 May 2002), 
preambular paragraph 5; S/RES/1425 (22 July 2002), preambular paragraph 6; SIRES/1474 (8 
April 2003), preambular paragraph 8. 
See, e.g., SIRES/767 (27 July 1992), operative paragraph 10; SIRES/775 (28 August 1992), 
operative paragraph 12; SIRES/814 (26 March 1993), operative paragraph 11; S/RES/886 (18 
November 1993), operative paragraph 11; SIRES/897 (4 February 1994), operative paragraph 9; 
SIRES/923 (31 May 1994), operative paragraph 6; SIRES/954 (4 November 1994), operative 
paragraph 12; S/PRST/1995/15: Presidential Statement of 6 April 1995 (6 April 1995); 
S/PRST/1996/4: Presidential Statement of 24 January 1996 (24 January 1996); S/PRST/1997/8: 
Presidential Statement of 27 February 1997 (27 February 1997); S/PRST/1997/57: Presidential 
Statement of 23 December 1997 (23 December 1997); S/PRST/1999/16: Presidential Statement 
of 27 May 1999 (27 May 1999); S/PRST/1999/31: Presidential Statement of 12 November 1999 
(12 November 1999); S/PRST/2000/22: Presidential Statement of 29 June 2000 (29 June 2000); 
SIRES/1356 (19 June 2001), operative paragraph 1; S/PRST/2001/1: Presidential Statement of 
11 January 2001 (11 January 2001); S/PRST/2001/30: Presidential Statement of 31 October 
2001 (31 October 2001); S/PRST/2002/8 (28 March 2002); SIRES/1474 (8 April 2003), operative 
paragraph 1. 
See, e.g., S/PRST/1999/16: Presidential Statement of 27 May 1999 (27 May 1999); 
SIRES/733 (23 January 1992), operative paragraph 5. 
S/RES/733 (23 January 1992), operative paragraph 5. 
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5.3 The scope of the Somalia sanctions regime 
When it established the sanctions regime, the Security Council required all States to 
implement immediately a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and 
military equipment to Somalia: 2 The Council initially elaborated no explicit exemptions from 
the embargo. It is likely, however, that the Council's authorization of the establishment of the 
United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and its successor the United Nations 
Operation in Somalia H (UNOSOM II), as well as of the United Task Force (UNITAF), 
each of which comprised significant military components and were endowed with a mandate 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, amounted to an implicit exemption 
from the embargo for those entities and their activities.' 3 
The Security Council has subsequently authorized explicit exemptions from the arms 
embargo for protective clothing exported to Somalia for the personal use of United Nations 
personnel, representatives of the media and humanitarian and development workers," and 
for supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective 
use. 15 In July 2002, responding to recommendations made by the preparatory team of 
experts on the Somalia embargo, the Security Council clarified that the embargo prohibited 
SIRES/733 (23 January 1992), operative paragraph 5. 
13 	For the establishment of UNOSOM and its successor UNOSOM II, as well as of UNITAF, see 
section 5.4, below. For the purposes of identifying an implicit exemption from the arms embargo 
for UNOSOM and UNITAF, the provisions of resolution 794 (1992) are significant. It is 
noteworthy that the endowment of those operations with a Chapter VII mandate to use 
necessary measures to establish a secure environment for humanitarian activities [see, e.g., 
SIRES/794 (3 December 1992), operative paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15] is located in the 
same resolution in which the Council calls upon States, acting nationally or through regional 
agencies or arrangements, to use such measures as may be necessary to ensure the strict 
implementation of the arms embargo [see S/RES/794 (3 December 1992), operative paragraph 
16]. 
14 SIRES/l356 (19 June 2001), operative paragraph 2. 
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the financing of all acquisitions and deliveries of weapons and military equipment. 16 At the 
same time it also decided that the embargo prohibited the direct or indirect supply to 
Somalia of technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military 
activities.' 7 
5.4 The administration, monitoring and enforcement of the 
Somalia sanctions regime 
The Security Council has called upon a number of actors to perform roles in the 
administration, implementation and enforcement of the Somalia sanctions regime, including a 
Sanctions Committee, the Secretary-General, States, regional organizations, United Nations 
operations established to address the situation in Somalia, and a team and a Panel of experts 
tasked with making recommendations for strengthening the embargo and making it more 
effective. 
5.4.1 The Somalia Sanctions Committee 
Three months after it established the Somalia aims embargo, the Council established 
a Sanctions Committee (the "Somalia Sanctions Committee" or the "751 Committee") to 
report to the Council with its observations and recommendations and to undertake the 
following tasks: (a) To seek from all States information regarding action taken to implement 
the arms embargo; 18 (b) To consider any information concerning violations of the embargo 
and make recommendations to the Council on how to increase the effectiveness of the 
15 	S/RES/1356 (19 June 2001), operative paragraph 3. The exemption for non-lethal military 
equipment was not absolute, however - it required prior approval by the 751 Committee: 
SIRES/1356 (19 June 2001), operative paragraph 4. 
16 	SIRES/1425 (22 July 2002), operative paragraph I. 
17 	SIRES/1425 (22 July 2002), operative paragraph 2. 
18 	 SIRES/751 (24 April 1992), operative paragraph 11(a). 
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embargo; 19 and (c) To recommend appropriate measures in response to violations of the 
embargo and to provide information on a regular basis to the Secretary-General for general 
distribution to Member States. 2° The Security Council has subsequently bestowed the 
following additional responsibilities upon the Committee: (d) To seek the cooperation of 
States neighbouring Somalia in the effective implementation of the embargo; 21 (e) To decide 
upon requests for exemptions for non-lethal military equipment intended solely for 
humanitarian or protective use; 22 (I) To forward to the Council the report of the team of 
experts;23 (g) To notify the Council of any lack of cooperation with it or the team of 
experts;24 and (h) To send a mission, led by the Chairman of the Committee, to the region at 
the earliest possible stage, in order to demonstrate the Security Council's determination to 
give full effect to the arms embargo. 25 
Since its establishment, the Somalia Sanctions Committee has issued eight annual 
reports. 26 The Committee has not been among the more active of the Sanctions Committees, 
19 
 
SIRES/75 1 (24 April 1992), operative paragraph 11(b). 
20 	SIRES/751 (24 April 1992), operative paragraph 11(c). 
21 	SIRES/954 (4 November 1994), operative paragraph 12. 
22 SIRES/1356 (19 June 2001), operative paragraph 4. 
23 	S/RES/1407 (3 May 2002), operative paragraph 2. 
24 	SIRES/1407 (3 May 2002), operative paragraph 7. 
25 	S/RES/1474 (8 April 2003), operative paragraph 8. The Council had been encouraging the 
Chairman of the 751 Committee to undertake such a mission for some time. It made reference to 
the fact that the Chairman was scheduled to undertake a mission to the region in October 2002: 
S/RES/1425 (22 July 2002), operative paragraph 10 [requesting the Panel of Experts to brief the 
Chairman prior to his mission, which was then scheduled to take place in October 2002]. At the 
time of writing this mission has still not taken place. 
26 As with the annual reports of other Sanctions Committees, the annual reports of the 751 
Committee have been circulated as official Security Council documents, in the form of an annex 
to a letter from the Chairman of the 751 Committee addressed to the President of the Security 
Council. The official document numbers and dates of circulation for the letters to which the 
reports are annexed are as follows: S/1996/17 (16 January 1996), annex: Report of the Security 
Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia 
(hereafter "First report of the 751 Committee") [outlining the activities of the Committee from 
its establishment in 1992 until the end of December 1995]; S/1997/16 (7 January 1997), annex: 
Report of the 751 Committee for 1996; S/1997/1029 (31 December 1997), annex: Report of the 
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meeting on average less than two times per year during its first eleven years.27 In fact, the 
number of meetings held by the 751 Committee over its first decade amounted to less than 
the total held by the Iraq Sanctions Committee in its first five months. 28 The 751 
Committee's annual reports have tended to be brief, with few substantive recommendations 
or observations. The Committee has consistently noted that its ability to monitor the 
sanctions effectively is dependent upon the cooperation of States and organizations in a 
position to provide it with pertinent information. 29 In its most recent annual report, the 
Committee noted that it had increased its level of activity markedly during 2002, as a result 
of a renewed focus upon the Somalia arms embargo by the Council and due to the 
Council's decision to establish a Panel of Experts on Somalia. 30 The Committee noted that it 
expected that the work of the Panel and the planned mission to the region by the Chairman 
of the Committee would increase the visibility and effectiveness of the embargo.31 It again 
751 Committee for 1997; S/I998/1226 (28 December 1998), annex: Report of the 751 Committee 
for 1998; S/1999/1283 (28 December 1999), annex: Report of the 751 Committee for 1999; 
5/2000/1226 (21 December 2000), annex: Report of the 751 Committee for 2000; S/2001/1259 (26 
December 2001), annex: Report of the 751 Committee for 2001; S/2002/1430 (30 December 
2002), annex: Report of the 751 Committee for 2002. 
27 	The Committee had only met on nineteen occasions from the time of its establishment in April 
1992 to the end of July 2002: A/57/2 (2002): Report of the Security Council: 16 June 2001-31 
July 2002, p. 53. 
28 	From its establishment in April 1992 until the end of 2001 the Somalia Sanctions Committee had 
held a total of eighteen meetings: Index to Proceedings of the Security Council for 2001 (2002) 
United Nations, New York, p. xiii. In contrast, the Iraq Sanctions Committee held 22 meetings 
between August and December 1990: Index to Proceedings of the Security Council for 1990 
(1991) United Nations, New York, p. xii. 
29 See, e.g., First report of the 751 Committee, above note 26, paragraph 19; Report of the 751 
Committee for 1996, above note 26, paragraph 4; Report of the 751 Committee for 1998, 
above note 26, paragraph 4; Report of the 751 Committee for 1999, above note 26, paragraph 
8. 
30 Report of the 751 Committee for 2002, above note 26, paragraph 20. 
31 	Ibid. 
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noted, however, that it continued to rely on the cooperation of States to provide information 
relating to violations of the embargo.32 
5.4.2 The Secretary -General 
When the Council adopted resolution 733 (1992), establishing the Somalia 
sanctions regime, it requested the Secretary-General to report on the overall implementation 
of that resolution. 33 In March 1993, the Council requested the Secretary-General to support 
from within Somalia the implementation of the arms embargo, utilizing as available and 
appropriate the forces of UNOSOM II and to report on the subject with recommendations 
regarding more effective measures if necessary. 34 Since early 2002, the Security Council has 
increased the Secretary-General's responsibilities in relation to the administration, 
implementation and enforcement of the Somalia sanctions. Among the tasks requested of the 
Secretary-General have been the following: a) Establishing a preparatory team of experts on 
the Somalia embargo;35 b) Working actively with various parties who had the capacity to 
contribute to the monitoring and enforcement of the embargo; 36 c) Establishing the Panel of 
Experts on the Somalia embargo; 37 d) Reporting on the technical assistance and cooperation 
provided in order to enhance administrative and judicial capacities throughout Somalia to 
monitor and give effect to the embargo, and reporting on the measures taken by States to 
32 	Ibid. 
33 	SIRES/733 (23 January 1992), operative paragraph. 10. 
34 
 
SIRES/8 14 (26 March 1993), operative paragraph 10. 
35 	The Council requested the Secretary-General to establish the preparatory team in SIRES/1407 (3 
May 2002), operative paragraph 1. For the Secretary-General's letter detailing the appointments 
made, see S12002/575 (23 May 2002). 
36 	SIRES/1407 (3 May 2002), operative paragraph 7. 
37 SIRES/1425 (22 July 2002), operative paragraphs 3, 4. For the Secretary-General's letter detailing 
the appointments made, see S/20021951 (4 September 2002). 
521 
42 
Appendix 5. The Somalia sanctions regime 
ensure the effective implementation of the embargo; 38 e) Implementing the Council's decision 
to re-establish the Panel of Experts;39 and 0 Establishing the Somalia Monitoring Group and 
making the necessary financial arrangements to support its work. 4° 
5.4.3 States 
Since establishing the Somalia sanctions regime, the Security Council has regularly 
stressed the need for the observance and strict monitoring of the embargo,41 and reaffirmed 
or stressed the obligation of States to implement the embargo. 42 In addition, the Council has: 
invoked Chapters VII and VIII in calling upon States, acting nationally or through regional 
agencies or arrangements, to use such measures as might be necessary to ensure the strict 
implementation of the arms embargo;43 strongly called upon all States to observe and 
improve the effectiveness of the embargo; 44 urged Member States with information about 
violations of the embargo to provide that information to the 751 Committee; 45 urged all 
38 
 
SIRES/1425 (22 July 2002), operative paragraph 14. 
39 
 
SIRES/1474 (8 April 2003), operative paragraphs 4-5. 
40 SIRES/1519 (16 December 2003), operative paragraphs 2 and 3. 
41 See, e.g., SIRES/767 (27 July 1992), operative paragraph 10; SIRES/775 (28 August 1992), 
operative paragraph 12; SIRES/954 (4 November 1994), operative paragraph 12. 
See, e.g., SIRES/814 (26 March 1993), operative paragraph 11; SIRES/886 (18 November 1993), 
operative paragraph 11; SIRE S/897 (4 February 1994), operative paragraph 9; S/RES/923 (31 
May 1994), operative paragraph 6; S/PRST/1995/15 (6 April 1995): Presidential Statement of 6 
April 1995; S/PRST/1996/4 (24 January 1996): Presidential Statement of 24 January 1996; 
S/PRST/1997/8 (27 February 1997): Presidential Statement of 27 February 1997; 
S/PRST/1997/57 (23 December 1997): Presidential Statement of 23 December 1997; 
S/PRST/1999/16 (27 May 1999): Presidential Statement of 27 May 1999; S/PRST/2000/22 (29 
June 2000): Presidential Statement of 29 June 2000; S/PRST/2001/1 (11 January 2001): 
Presidential Statement of 11 January 2001; S/RES/1356 (19 June 2001), operative paragraph 1; 
SIRES/1474 (8 April 2003), operative paragraph 1. 
43 
 
SIRES/794 (3 December 1992), operative paragraph 16. 
44 	S/PRST/1999/31 (12 November 1999): Presidential Statement of 12 November 1999. 
45 S/PRST/1999/31 (12 November 1999): Presidential Statement of 12 November 1999. The 
Council again urged or called upon States to report in such a manner to the 751 Committee in: 
S/PRST/2000/22 (29 June 2000): Presidential Statement of 29 June 2000; S/PRST/2001/1 (11 
January 2001): Presidential Statement of 11 January 2001; S/PRST/2002/8 (28 March 2002): 
Presidential Statement of 28 March 2002; SIRES/1407 (3 May 2002), operative paragraph 9; 
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States to take all necessary steps to ensure full implementation and enforcement of the 
embargo;46 called on all States to cooperate fully with the Chairman of the 751 Committee 
in a planned visit to Somalia and the region, 47 requested all States to report to the 751 
Committee on measures they had taken to ensure the full implementation of the aims 
embargo;48 and requested all States to cooperate fully with the Somalia Panel of Experts. 49 
In April 2003 the Council addressed a request specifically to the States neighbouring 
Somalia, inviting them to report to the 751 Committee on a quarterly basis regarding their 
efforts to implement the embargo. 5° 
In December 2003 the Council: called on all States in the region to establish focal 
points to enhance cooperation with the Somalia Monitoring Group and to facilitate 
information exchange; 51 called on neighbouring States to report to the 751 Committee 
quarterly on efforts to implement the arms embargo .," and encouraged Member States from 
the region to continue their efforts in enacting legislation or regulations necessary to ensure 
the effective implementation of the arms embargo." 
SIRES/1425 (22 July 2002), operative paragraph 7; SIRES/1474 (8 April 2003), operative 
paragraph 9. 
46 	S/PRST/2000/22 (29 June 2000): Presidential Statement of 29 June 2000. The Council against 
urged States to take the necessary steps to ensure full implementation and enforcement of the 
embargo in: S/RES/1356 (19 June 2001), operative paragraph 1; S/PRST/2001/1 (11 January 
2001): Presidential Statement of 11 January 2001. 
47 
 
SIRES/1407 (3 May 2002), operative paragraph 4. 
48 	S/RES/1407 (3 May 2002), operative paragraph 8. 
49 
 
SIRES/1425 (22 July 2002), operative paragraph 6. 
50 	SIRES/1474 (8 April 2003), operative paragraph 10. 
51 
 
SIRES/l519 (16 December 2003), operative paragraph 5. 
52 	S/RES/1519 (16 December 2003), operative paragraph 8. 
53 SIRES/1519 (16 December 2003), operative paragraph 10. 
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5.4.4 Regional organizations 
In April 2003, the Council called upon regional organizations, and in particular the 
African Union (AU) and the League of Arab States (LAS), to assist the Somali parties and 
States in the region to implement the arms embargo fully. 54 In December 2003 the Council 
called on regional organizations, in particular the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD), the African Union (AU) and the League of Arab States (LAS), to 
establish focal points to enhance cooperation with the Somalia Monitoring Group and to 
facilitate information exchange. 55 
5.4.5 The United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM and UNOSOM II) 
In April 1992 the Council decided to establish a United Nations Operation in 
Somalia (UNOSOM), in order to facilitate an immediate cessation of hostilities and the 
maintenance of a cease-fire throughout Somalia and promote reconciliation aid political 
settlement, as well as to provide urgent humanitarian assistance. 56 Although no specific role 
was bestowed upon UNOSOM in respect of the arms embargo, it nevertheless represented 
a United Nations presence on the ground that could monitor the extent to which the arms 
embargo was being observed. In December 1992 the Council determined that the 
magnitude of the human tragedy in Somalia, exacerbated by the obstacles preventing the 
distribution of humanitarian assistance, constituted a threat to international peace and 
security. 57 Acting under Chapter VII, it then authorized the Secretary-General and Member 
54 	S/RES/1474 (8 April 2003), operative paragraph 11. 
55 	SIRES/1519 (16 December 2003), operative paragraph 5. 
56 SIRES/751 (24 April 1992), operative paragraphs 2, 7. Six months later the number of personnel 
serving in UNOSOM was expanded in accordance with recommendations made by the 
Secretary-General: SIRES/775 (28 August 1992), operative paragraph 3. 
57 	S/RES/794 (3 December 1992), preambular paragraph 3. 
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States cooperating with him to use all necessary means to establish a secure environment for 
humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. 58 As a result of that decision, two peace-
enforcement operations were established — the United Task Force (UNITAF), led by the 
United States, and an expanded and strengthened United Nations Operation in Somalia 
(UNOSOM 11). 59 As part of its broader mandate of establishing a secure environment for 
humanitarian relief operations, UNOSOM 11 was to engage in activities to bring about the 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration into civil society of the Somali factions. ° 
When the Council established UNOSOM H it also rquested the Secretary-General to 
support from within Somalia the implementation of the arms embargo established by 
resolution 733 (1992), utilizing as available and appropriate the forces of UNOSOM 11. 61 
Although the Secretary-General did not subsequently report exclusively or explicitly on the 
actions taken by UNOSOM II to implement the embargo, he nevertheless referred 
consistently to actions taken by the Operation to bring about the disarmament of the various 
factions within Somalia — activities which were undoubtedly linked to the overall objectives 
58 	S/RES/794 (3 December 1992), operative paragraph 10. 
59 	The Council established UNOSOM II in March 1993: SIRES/814 (26 March 1993), operative 
paragraphs 5, 6. For discussion relating to the establishment of UNITAF, see above. 
60 	For the full mandate of UNOSOM II, see: S/25354 and Add. 1 and 2 (3, 11 and 22 March 1993): 
Further report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraphs 18 and 19 of resolution 794 
(1992) on the situation in Somalia, paragraphs 56-88 [proposing a detailed mandate for 
UNOSOM H, which was subsequently endorsed by the Council in paragraph 5 of resolution 
814 (1993)]. 
61 S/RES/814 (26 March 1993), operative paragraph 10. 
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of the arms embargo.62 Ultimately, however, the activities of UNOSOM II were 
unsuccessful and it was phased out, with its mandate terminating on 31 March 1995.63 
5.4.6 The Team and Panel of Experts on Somalia 
In March 2002 the Security Council expressed its intention to establish a mechanism 
to generate independent information on violations of the aims embargo and to improve the 
embargo's enforcement." In May 2002 the Council requested the Secretary-General to 
establish a team of two experts to prepare for the establishment of a Panel of Experts on the 
implementation of the Somalia arms embargo. 65 The preparatory team's mandate included 
the following: a) Investigating violations of the embargo; b) Detailing information on 
violations and the enforcement of the embargo; c) Undertaking field research in Somalia, 
States neighbouring Somalia and other States; d) Assessing the capacity of States in the 
region to implement the embargo fully; and e) Providing recommendations on practical steps 
for stiengthening the enforcement of the embargo. 66 The preparatory team submitted its 
report in early July 2002. 67 In its report the team noted that there had been a common 
perception that the embargo had not been enforced effectively since it had been 
62 	See, e.g., S/26317 (17 August 1993): Further report of the Secretary-General submitted in 
pursuance of paragraph 18 of resolution 814 (1993), paragraphs 14-18; 5/26738 (12 
November 1993): Further report of the Secretary-General submitted in pursuance of 
paragraph 19 of resolution 814 (1993) and paragraph A 5 of resolution 865 (1993), 
paragraphs 38-40, 83-84. 
63 	The Council authorized the final extension of UNOSOM II's mandate up to 31 March 1995 in 
resolution 954 (1994): SIRES/954 (4 November 1994), operative paragraph 1. In a presidential 
statement of 6 April 1995 the Security Council took note of the successful withdrawal of 
UNOSOM II. It stated that UNOSOM II had helped to save lives and mitigate suffering, but 
that ultimately the lack of cooperation from Somali parties over security issues had undermined 
UNOSOM II's objectives and prevented its continuation: S/PRST/1995115 (6 April 1995): 
Presidential statement of 6 April 1995. 
64 	S/PRST/2002/8 (28 March 2002): Presidential statement of 28 March 2002. 
65 	SIRES/1407 (3 May 2002), operative paragraph 1. 
66 	Ibid. 
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established. 68 It suggested that, in order to improve the enforcement of the embargo, the 
Council could take the following steps: a) Clarify the scope of the embargo, making it clear 
that the provision of financing and services that support military activities in Somalia were a 
violation of the embargo; 69 b) Enhance end-user verification; 70 c) establish a Panel of 
Experts in the region; 7I and d) Promote transparency and accountability over financial 
institutions in Somalia. 72 
In late-July 2002, shortly after the publication of the preparatory team's report, the 
Security Council requested the Secretary-General to establish a Panel of Experts on the 
Somalia embargo,. consisting of three members, for a period of six months.73 The Panel, 
which was to be based in Nairobi, was endowed with a mandate that was practically 
identical to that of the preparatory team." In addition to performing the same tasks as the 
team of experts, the Panel was requested: a) To take into account the recommendations of 
the warn of experts relating to its methodology; 75 b) To notify the Council, through the 751 
Committee, of any lack of cooperation it experienced; 76 c) To brief the Chairman of the 751 
67 	S/2002/722 (3 July 2002), annex: Report of the team of experts appointed pursuant to Security 
Council resolution 1407 (2002), paragraph 1, concerning Somalia. 
68 	Ibid, paragraph 27. 
69 	Ibid, paragraphs 63-68. 
70 	Ibid, paragraphs 69-71. 
71 	Ibid, paragraphs 72-79. 
72 	Ibid, paragraphs 80-81. 
73 	SIRES/1425 (22 July 2002), operative paragraph 3. 
74 	For the Panel's basic mandate, see: ibid. 
75 	S/RES/1425 (22 July 2002), operative paragraph 5. 
76 	SIRES/1425 (22 July 2002), operative paragraph 9. 
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Committee prior to his scheduled mission to the region; 77 and d) To provide an oral briefing 
to the Council, through the Committee, in November 2002; 78  
In April 2003 the Security Council decided to re-establish the Panel of Experts for a 
further period of six months. 79 In addition to the responsibilities already outlined, the Council 
bestowed the following tasks upon the Panel: a) Focussing on ongoing violations of the 
embargo, including transfers of ammunition, single use weapons and small arms; 
b) Identifying those who continued to violate the embargo inside and outside Somalia, as 
well as their active supporters, and to provide the 751 Committee with a draft list for 
possible future actions; c) Exploring the possibility of establishing a monitoring mechanism 
for the implementation of the embargo, with partners inside and outside Somalia, in 
cooperation with regional and international organizations, including the AU; d) Refining the 
recommendations provided in the Panel's first report; 8° and e) Providing a briefing, through 
the 751 Committee, to the Council on its work in the middle of its term and submitting a 
report, again through the Committee, at the end of its mandated period. 81 
The Panel of Experts on Somalia submitted two reports. 82 In its first report, the 
Panel concluded that, as the arms embargo had been consistently violated since its 
77 
 
SIRES/1425 (22 July 2002), operative paragraph 10. 
78 	Ibid. The Panel provided such a briefing on 14 November 2002: see S/PRST/2002/35 (12 
December 2002): Presidential statement of 12 December 2002 [expressing the Council's 
appreciation for the Panel's oral briefing]. 
79 	S/RES/I474 (8 April 2003), operative paragraph 3. The Council requested the Secretary-General 
to appoint up to four exp erts in operative paragraph 4 of the same resolution. The Secretary-
General circulated a letter on 30 April 2003 detailing the appointments made: see S/2003/515 (1 
May 2003). 
80 	S/RES/1474 (8 April 2003), operative paragraph 3. 
81 	SIRES/1474 (8 April 2003), operative paragraph 7. 
82 	S/2003/223 (25 March 2003), enclosure: Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia pursuant to 
Security Council resolution 1425 (2002); S/20031I035 (4 November 2003), enclosure: Report 
of the Panel of Experts on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1474 (2003). 
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imposition, it had no normative value and the Security Council and the 751 Committee 
should therefore send a clear signal that in future the embargo would be enforced vigorously 
and violators penalised." The Panel also made a number of concrete recommendations, 
including that: a) A system should be created to prevent the forging and abuse of end-user 
certificates for arms sales;84 b) The 751 Committee should draw up a list of individuals 
deemed to be in violation of the arms embargo, against whom financial sanctions might be 
implemented;" c) Targeted travel sanctions might be implemented against those individuals 
who had been violating the embargo and against whom financial sanctions either had not 
been effective or would be unlikely to be effective;" d) Where individuals who 
systematically violated the embargo were closely affiliated with political institutions, their 
representative privileges could be revoked;" and e) The Panel's mandate should be 
extended for six months in order to investigate further violations of the embargo and to 
organize a Somali-based effort to identify and impede embargo violators. 88 
In its second and final report, the Panel noted that, although it had not detected any 
major shipments of weapons to the factions in Somalia over the previous six months, there 
had continued to be a "microflow" of arms into Somalia from neighbouring countries. 89 The 
situation in Somalia was complex, requiring a comprehensive and integrated approach to 
83 	Ibid, paragraphs 172-175. 
84 	Ibid, paragraph 187. 
85 	Ibid, paragraph 188. 
86 	Ibid, paragraph 189. 
87 	Ibid, paragraph 190. 
88 	Ibid, paragraph 191. 
89 	S/2003/1035 (4 November 2003), enclosure: Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia 
pursuant to Security Council resolution 1474 (2003), paragraph 173. 
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monitoring the implementation of the arms embargo." The Panel therefore recommended 
that a monitoring mechanism be established to improve the embargo's effectiveness. 91 It also 
urged that improved cooperation was needed between international, regional and sub-
regional organizations, as well as with Member States and non-State actors involved in 
disarmament, demobilization, ceasefire monitoring and anti-criminal and counter-terrorism 
activities, in order to ensure the effective enforcement of sanctions. 92 It further recommended 
that a list be compiled of iidividuals or groups engaged in sanctions violators and that 
Member States should ensure that their nationals and residents convicted of sanctions 
violations be held accountable. 93 
5.4.7 The Somalia Monitoring Group 
In December 2003, the Council requested the Secretary-General to establish a 
Monitoring Group connected with the Somalia sanctions regime for a period of 6 months. 94 
The Somalia Monitoring Group's mandate included: (a) investigating violations of the arms 
embargo;95 (b) making recommendations for strengthening the implementation of the arms 
embargo;96 (c) carrying out field investigations in Somalia, neighbouring States and other 
appropriate States;97 (d) assessing progress made by States in the region in implementing the 
arms embargo, including through a review of national customs and border control regimes;98 
90 	Ibid. 
91 	Ibid, paragraph 174. 
92 	Ibid, paragraph 176 
93 	Ibid, paragraph 190. 
94 SIRES/1519 (16 December 2003), operative paragraph 2. 
95 SIRES/1519 (16 December 2003), operative paragraph 2(a). 
96 	SIRES/1519 (16 December 2003), operative paragraph 2(b). 
97 SIRES/1519 (16 December 2003), operative paragraph 2(c). 
98 S/RES/1519 (16 December 2003), operative paragraph 2(d). 
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(e) reporting with a draft list of those who continued to violate the arms embargo inside and 
outside Somalia, for possible future measures by the Counci1; 99 and (f) making 
recommendations based on its investigations and the previous reports of the Somalia Panel 
of Experts.' °° The Somalia Monitoring Group was due to report in July 2004. 
5.5 Notable aspects of the Somalia sanctions regime 
The Somalia sanctions regime is notable mostly for the fact that it appears to have 
had little or no effect upon the situation in Somalia. Until recently, it was also one of the 
more neglected of the United Nations sanctions regimes. As mentioned above, the 
Committee had met on average less than twice a year in its first decade. On a more positive 
note, the regime has given rise to the first example of the Council establishing a preliminary 
team of experts to pave the way for a Panel of Experts. In establishing the team and 
subsequent Panel of Experts on the Somalia arms embargo, the Council therefore appears 
to have drawn lessons from its experiences with Panels of Experts established in relation to 
other sanctions regimes, such as the Angola (UNITA) regime, the AfghanistanTraliban/A1 
Qaeda regime and the 1343 Liberia regime. 
99 	SIRES/1519 (16 December 2003), operative paragraph 2(e). 
loo 	S/RES/1519 (16 December 2003), operative paragraph 2(f). 
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6. The Libya sanctions regime 
The Council applied sanctions against Libya in March 1992, as part of an attempt to 
bring to justice those allegedly responsible for the bombings of the American airline Pan 
Am's flight 103, over Lockerbie, Scotland, and of the French Airline UTA's flight 772, over 
Niger.' The governments of the UK and the US had been investigating the fate of Pan Am 
flight 103 and the French government had been investigating the fate of UTA flight 772, and 
their investigations had led them to suspect that Libyan citizens had been involved in the 
bombings.2 The Libya sanctions regime initially consisted of an arms embargo and aviation, 
travel and diplomatic sanctions. The sanctions were expanded in November 1993, to 
incorporate financial and aviation sanctions, as well as sanctions against particular items used 
in the refinement and export of oil. The sanctions were suspended in April 1999, after the 
Secretary-General had reported that the two Libyan nationals suspected of having been 
involved in the Lockerbie bombing had been transferred to the Netherlands, where they 
were to stand trial before a Scottish Court. They were eventually terminated in September 
2003, after the Libyan Government sent a letter to the President of the Security Council 
recounting the steps taken to comply with its obligations under the relevant resolutions. 
Pan Am flight 103 was destroyed above Lockerbie in Scotland in December 1988, resulting in 
270 deaths. UTA flight 772 was destroyed on 19 September 1989, resulting in 171 deaths. For 
further details relating to these events, see: S/19991726 (30 June 1999): Report of the Secretary-
General Submitted Pursuant to Paragraph 16 of Security Council Resolution 883 (1993) 
and Paragraph 8 of Resolution 1192 (1998), paragraphs 15, 16. 
See, e.g., S/23306 (31 December 1991), annex [containing a communique from the Presidency of 
the French Republic and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stating that the judicial enquiry 
conducted into the attack on flight UTA 772 placed "heavy presumptions of guilt" on Libyan 
nationals] and S/23308 (31 December 1991), annex [containing a Statement issued by the United 
States Government and a Joint Declaration of the United States and the United Kingdom, 
demanding that the Libyan Government surrender for trial those charged with the bombing of 
Pan Am 103 and pay appropriate compensation]. 
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6.1 The constitutional basis for imposing sanctions against Libya 
In January 1992 the Council adopted resolution 731, in which it characterised acts 
of terrorism as a threat to international peace and security, 3 expressed deep concern that 
investigations into the Pan Am and UTA bombings had implicated officials of the Libyan 
government,4 deplored the fact that the Libyan government had not yet cooperated with 
attempts to establish responsibility for the bombings, 5 and urged the Libyan government to 
cooperate with international investigations. 6 Four months later, after Libya had failed to 
respond to the requests of resolution 731, the Council imposed sanctions. 
The Council imposed sanctions on March 311992, in resolution 748 (1992). 7 In 
that resolution the Council stated that the suppression of acts of terrorism was "essential for 
the maintenance of international peace and security."' The Council also reaffirmed that, in 
accordance with Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, every State had the duty 
to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another 
State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the 
commission of such acts, when such acts involved a threat or use of force. 9 The Council then 
determined that the Libyan Government's failure to demonstrate by concrete steps its 
renunciation of terrorism and its failure to respond fully and effectively to the requests of 
SIRES/73 1 (21 January 1992), preambular paragraph 2. This characterisation was implicit in the 
statement of the Council affirming "the right of all States ... to protect their nationals from acts 
of international terrorism that constitute threats to international peace and security." 
SIRES/73 1 (21 January 1992), preambular paragraph 6. 
S/RES/731 (21 January 1992), operative paragraph 2. 
SIRES/73 1 (21 January 1992), operative paragraph 3. 
SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraphs 3-6. 
S/RES/748 (31 March 1992), preambular paragraph 4. 
SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), preambular paragraph 6. 
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resolution 731 (1992) constituted a threat to international peace and security, 10 and invoked 
Chapter VII of the Charter," before applying sanctions.12 In November 1993, when the 
Council strengthened the sanctions, it determined that the Libyan Government's continued 
failure to demonstrate by concrete steps its renunciation of terrorism and to respond fully 
and effectively to the requests of resolution 731 (1992), constituted a threat to international 
peace and security," and it again invoked Chapter WI of the Charter." 
6.2 The objective of the Libya sanctions regime 
The objectives of the Libya sanctions regime were to ensure that the Libyan 
Government: (a) Cooperated with investigations into the bombings of the French, British and 
American governments; 15 and (b) Committed itself definitively to ceasing all forms of 
terrorism and all assistance to terrorist groups and to demonstrating by concrete actions its 
renunciation of terrorism. 16 The Security Council made it clear that the sanctions would 
terminate once it was satisfied that the Libyan Government had complied with those aims." 
In November 1993 the Security Council reaffirmed those objectives, whilst providing for the 
possibility that the sanctions might be suspended if the Secretary-General were to report to 
it that the Libyan Government had ensured the appearance of those charged with the 
bombing of Pan Am flight 103 before the appropriate United Kingdom or United States 
io 
 
SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), preambular paragraph 7. 
1 SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), preambular paragraph 10. 
12 The sanctions were outlined in: S/RES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraphs 3-6. 
13 See, e.g., S/RES/883 (11 November 1993), preambular paragraph 6 [characterising the threat to 
international peace and security in the same manner as preambular paragraph 7 of resolution 
748 (1992)1. 
14 See, e.g., SIRES/883 (11 November 1993), preambular paragraph 10. 
15 
 
SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph I. 
16 	SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 2. 
17 	S/RES/748 (3 I March 1992), operative paragraph 3. 
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court and had satisfied that French judicial authorities with respect to the bombing of UTA 
flight 772.' 8 
In August 1998, after negotiations had led to the proposal that two individuals 
suspected of having been involved in the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 be tried before a 
Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands, I9 the Council decided that the sanctions would be 
suspended immediately if the Secretary-General were to report to it that the suspects had 
arrived in the Netherlands for the purpose of being tried before the Scottish Court, or if they 
had appeared for trial before an appropriate court in the United Kingdom or the United 
States.2° 
6.3 The scope of the Libya sanctions regime 
The sanctions regime initially consisted of a range of measures, including diplomatic 
sanctions, an arms embargo, aviation sanctions, and travel sanctions targeting the movement 
of Libyan nationals suspected of having been involved in terrorist activities. On the 
diplomatic front, the Council required all States to significantly reduce the number and level 
of staff at Libyan diplomatic missions and consulates and to restrict or control the movement 
of staff who remained within their territory. 21 The arms embargo required States to prevent 
the provision to Libya by their nationals and from their territories of: aims and related 
18 
 
SIRES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraph 16. 
19 See: S/1998/795 (24 August 1998): Letter dated 24 August 1998 from the Representatives of the 
United Kingdom and the United States addressed to the Secretary-General. 
20 	S/RES/1192 (27 August 1998), operative paragraph 8. 
21 S/RES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 6(a). These diplomatic sanctions were 
reaffirmed in S/RES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraph 7, which also clarified that the 
diplomatic sanctions were to apply to missions and consulates established subsequent to 
resolution 748. 
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materie1;22 and technical advice, assistance or training related to the provision, manufacture, 
maintenance or use of arms and related materie1. 23 The Council further required States to 
withdraw any officials or agents present in Libya to advise the Libyan authorities on military 
matters.24 The Council imposed an extensive range of measures targeting air travel to and 
from Libya. These measures required States: to deny permission to any aircraft to take off 
from, land in, or overfly their tenitory if it was destined to land in or had taken off from the 
territory of Libya; 25 to prohibit the supply by their nationals or from their territories of any 
aircraft or aircraft components to Libya, and the provision of aircraft engineering or servicing 
of, or airworthiness certification or aircraft insurance to, Libyan aircraft; 26 and to prevent the 
operation of all Libyan Arab Airlines offices!' The travel sanctions against Libyan terrorists 
required States to take steps to deny entry to or expel Libyan nationals who had been 
denied entry to or expelled from other States because of their involvement in terrorist 
activities.28 
In November 1993, the Council tightened the sanctions, imposing financial 
sanctions, prohibiting the export to Libya of particular goods used in the refinement and 
export of oil, and strengthening the measures aimed at air trave1. 29 The financial sanctions 
required States in which there were funds or other financial resources owned or controlled 
22 	SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 5(a). 
23 	SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 5(b). 
24 	SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 5(c). 
25 	S/RES1748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 4(a). The Council did provide, however, for 
the possibility that exemptions might be granted to this prohibition where a particular flight had 
been approved on grounds of significant humanitarian need by the sanctions committee: ibid. 
26 	SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 4(b). 
27 	SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 6(b). 
28 	SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 6(c). 
29 	SIRES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraphs 3-7. 
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by the Government or public authorities of Libya or any Libyan undertaking, 3° to freeze 
those funds and resources and to ensure that neither they nor any other funds and financial 
resources were made available by their nationals or by any persons within their territory to 
or for the benefit of the Government or public authorities of Libya or any Libyan 
undertaking. 31 The prohibition upon particular goods used in the refinement and export of oil 
required States to prevent the export to Libya of goods such as pumps, boilers, furnaces, 
and prepared catalysts. 32 The strengthened air sanctions required States: to ensure the 
immediate closure of all Libyan Arab Airlines offices within their territories; 33 to prohibit any 
commercial transactions with Libyan Arab Airlines by their nationals or from their territory, 
including the honouring or endorsement of any tickets or other documents issued by that 
airline;34 to prohibit, by their nationals or from their territory of the provision for operation 
within Libya of any aircraft, aircraft components, or engineering or servicing of aircraft and 
aircraft components;35 to prohibit by their nationals and from their territory the supply of any 
materials destined for the construction, improvement or maintenance of Libyan airfields, or 
30 	The Council defines a Libyan undertaking as any commercial, industrial or public utility 
undertaking which is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by: (i) the Government or 
public authorities of Libya; (ii) any entity, wherever located or organized, owned or controlled 
by the Government or public authorities of Libya; and (iii) any agent of (i) or (ii): SIRES/883 (11 
November 1993), operative paragraph 3. 
31 	SIRES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraph 3. The Council provided for exemptions 
from these financial sanctions, however, when the funds or other financial resources were 
derived from the sale or supply of any petroleum or petroleum products, including natural gas 
and natural gas products, or agricultural products or commodities, originating in Libya: 
SIRES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraph 4. 
32 	SIRES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraph 5. For a full list of the items see the annex 
attached to resolution 883: S/RES/883 (11 November 1993), annex. 
SIRES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraph 6(a). 
34 	S/RES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraph 6(b). 
35 	SIRES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraph 6(c). 
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of engineering or other services for the maintenance of Libyan airfields;36 to prohibit, by their 
nationals or from their territory, any provision of advice, assistance, or training to Libyan 
pilots, flight engineers, or aircraft and ground maintenance personnel associated with the 
operation of aircraft and airfields within Libya;37 and to prohibit, by their nationals or from 
their ten-itory, any renewal of any direct insurance for Libyan aircraft. 38 The Council also 
introduced a couple of exemptions to the air sanctions, in order to permit U.N. aircraft to fly 
to Libya to carry a reconnaissance team exploring the option of the deployment of a team of 
U.N. observers to monitor the withdrawal of Libya from the Aouzou strip, 39 and then to 
carry the observer group subsequently established for that purpose. ° 
6.4 The administration, monitoring and enforcement of the Libya 
sanctions regime 
As with its other sanctions regimes, the Security Council bestowed responsibilities 
for the administration, implementation and enforcement of the sanctions against Libya upon a 
range of actors, including a Sanctions Committee, the Secretary-General and States. 
6.4.1 The Libya Sanctions Committee 
The Council established a Sanctions Committee in March 1992, in the same 
resolution by which it initiated the Libya sanctions regime.41 The Committee ("the Libya 
36 	S/RES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraph 6(d). The Council provided an emmption 
to this prohibition for emergency equipment and equipment and services directly related to 
civilian air traffic control: ibid. 
37 	S/RES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraph 6(e). 
38 	S/RES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraph 6(f). 
39 	SIRES/910 (14 April 1994), operative paragraph 1. 
40 	SIRES/915 (4 May 1994), operative paragraph 4. The observer group, the United Nations 
Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG), was established in operative paragraph 2 of the 
same resolution. 
41 	S/RES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 9. 
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Sanctions Committee" or "the 748 Committee"), which was established in accordance with 
rule 28 of the Security Council's provisional rules of procedure, was to report to the Council 
on its work and with its observations and recommendations and to undertake the following 
tasks: (a) Examining the reports of States on the measures they have taken to implement the 
sanctions;42 (b) Seeking further information from all States regarding action taken to 
implement the sanctions;43 (c) Considering any information brought to its attention by States 
concerning violations of the sanctions and making recommendations to the Council on ways 
to increase their effectiveness;44 (d) Recommending appropriate measures in response to the 
violations of sanctions;45 (e) Providing information on a regular basis to the Secretary-
General for general distribution to Member States;" (f) Considering and deciding 
expeditiously upon any application by States for the approval of flights on grounds of 
significant humanitarian need;47 and (g) Giving special attention to any communications in 
accordance with Article 50 from any state with special economic problems that might arise 
from the carrying out of the sanctions against Libya." 
In November 1993 the Council added to the committee's responsibilities, requiring 
it to undertake the following additional tasks: (h) Modifying the guidelines for the 
implementation of the sanctions to reflect the additional measures imposed at that time; 49 and 
(i) Examining requests for assistance under Article 50 and make recommendations to the 
42 	SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 9(a). 
43 	SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 9(b). 
44 SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 9(c). 
45 S/RES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 9(d). 
46 	Ibid. 
47 	SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 9(e). 
48 	S/RES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 9(1). 
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President of the Security Council for appropriate action. 5° In April 1996, the Council 
requested the 748 Committee to draw to the attention of Member States their obligations 
under the sanctions regime in the event that Libyan-registered aircraft were to land in their 
territory. 51 In January 1997, the Council requested the 748 Committee to follow up reports 
that a Libyan-registered aircraft had flown from Tripoli to Accra, in apparent violation of the 
sanctions." In May 1997, the Council again requested the 748 Committee to follow up 
reports that a Libyan-registered aircraft had violated the sanctions, on that occasion flying 
from Libya to Niger, before returning to Libya from Nigeria." 
The 748 Committee was eventually dissolved in September 2003, when the 
sanctions were terminated, although it had not been active since the suspension of the 
sanctions in 1999. 54 During its tenure, the Libya Sanctions Committee issued four annual 
reports. 55  its reports, the 748 Committee, like other Sanctions Committees, noted that the 
49 	 SIRES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraph 9. For the details relating to the additional 
measures, see section 6.3, above. 
50 	 S/RES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraph 10. 
51 	 S/PRST/1996/18 (18 April 1996): Presidential statement of 18 April 1996. A year later the 
Council reiterated that it had made that request of the 748 Committee: S/PRST/1997/18 (4 April 
1997): Presidential statement of 4 April 1997. 
52 	S/PRST/I 997/2 (29 January 1997): Presidential statement of 17 January 1997. 
53 	 S/PRST/1997/27 (20 May 1997): Presidential statement of 20 May 1997. 
54 	 The Committee was dissolved by: SIRES/1506 (12 September 2003), operative paragraph 2. It 
held its 91' and last meeting in 1999: Index to Proceedings of the Security Council for 1999 
(2000) United Nations, New York, p. xiii. 
55 	As with the annual reports of other Sanctions Committees, the annual reports of the 748 
Committee have been circulated as official Security Council documents, in the form of an annex 
to a letter from the Chairman of the 748 Committee addressed to the President of the Security 
Council. The official document numbers and dates of circulation for the letters to which the 
reports are annexed are as follows: S/I996/2 (2 January 1996), annex: Report of the Security 
Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 748 (1992) concerning the Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya, (hereafter "First ,port of the 748 Committee") [outlining the activities of 
the Committee from its establishment until the end of 1995]; S/1996/1079 (31 December 1996), 
annex: Report of the 748 Committee for 1996; S/1997/1030 (31 December 1997), annex: Report 
of the 748 Committee for 1997; S/1998/1237 (31 December 1998), annex: Report of the 748 
Committee for 1998; S/1999/1299 (31 December 1999), annex: Report of the 748 Committee for 
1999. The 748 Committee issued no annual reports for 2000, 2001 or 2002. 
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full responsibility for the implementation of the sanctions rested upon States. 56 It also 
outlined some of the exemptions which it had provided from the air sanctions, including for 
medical evacuation purposes and for flights carrying people undertaking the Hajj 
pilgrimage." Finally, the Committee also made reference in its reports to alleged and 
reported violations of the sanctions.58 The Security Council also referred to some of these 
violations, which were almost exclusively related to the air sanctions," in a number of 
presidential statements. 6° 
6.4.2 The Secretary-General 
When the Security Council established the sanctions regime against Libya, it invited 
the Secretary-General to continue his role of seeking the cooperation of the Libyan 
Govemment.61 The Secretary-General was also requested: to receive reports submitted by 
56 	See, e.g., First report of the 748 Committee, above note 55, paragraph 6. 
57 	See, e.g., First report of the 748 Committee, above note 55, paragraphs 21-30; Report of the 
748 Committee for 1996, above note 55, paragraphs 5-9; Report of the 748 Committee for 
1997, above note 55, paragraphs 3-7; Report of the 748 Committee for 1998, above note 55, 
paragraphs 3-7; Report of the 748 Committee for 1999, above note 55, paragraphs 3-6. 
58 	See, e.g., First report of the 748 Committee, above note 55, paragraphs 31-32; Report of the 
748 Committee for 1996, above note 55, paragraphs 10-14; Report of the 748 Committee for 
1997, above note 55, paragraphs 8-10; Report of the 748 Committee for 1998, above note 55, 
paragraphs 8-14; Report of the 748 Committee for 1999, above note 55, paragraph 7. 
59 	See, e.g., First report of the 748 Committee, above note 55, paragraphs 31-32; Report of the 
748 Committee for 1996, above note 55, paragraphs 10-14; Report of the 748 Committee for 
1997, above note 55, paragraphs 8-10; Report of the 748 Committee for 1998, above note 55, 
paragraphs 8-14; Report of the 748 Committee for 1999, above note 55, paragraph 7. In its 
report for 1998 the Committee noted, in accordance with operative paragraph 3 of resolution 
1196 (1998), that it did not have any information to report on the implementation, strengthening 
and violations of the arms embargo component of the sanctions regime against Libya: Report 
of the 748 Committee for 1998, above note 55, paragraph 16. 
60 	S/PRST/1996/18: Presidential Statement of 18 April 1996; S/PRST/1997/2: Presidential 
Statement of 29 January 1997; S/PRST/1997/18: Presidential Statement of 4 April 1997; 
S/PRST/1997/27: Presidential Statement of 20 May 1997. 
61 	SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 12. The Council had requested that the 
Secretary-General play such a role two months earlier, when it had first urged Libya to 
cooperate with investigations into the bombings of Pan Am flight 103 and UTA flight 772: 
SIRES/73 1 (21 January 1992), operative paragraph 4. 
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States on measures taken to implement the sanctions;62 and to provide all necessary 
assistance to the 748 Committee and to make the necessary arrangements in the Secretariat 
for that purpose.63 In subsequent decisions the Council again invited the Secretary-General 
to continue his role of seeking the cooperation of the Libyan Government, 64 and implicitly 
requested him to receive the reports submitted by States on steps taken to implement the 
sanctions.65 
In November 1993, the Council requested the Secretary-General to play a 
reporting role in relation to the possible scenario according to which the sanctions might be 
suspended and terminated if the Libyan Government were to comply with the objectives of 
the sanctions regime. The Council thus requested the Secretary-General: (a) To report to it 
in the event that Libya had ensured the appearance of those charged with the bombing of 
Pan Am flight 103 before the appropriate United Kingdom or United States court and had 
satisfied that French judicial authorities with respect to the bombing of UTA flight 772, in 
which case the sanctions would be suspended;66 and (b) In the event that sanctions were 
suspended following that initial report, to report to the Council again within ninety days on 
Libya's compliance with the remaining objectives of the sanctions regime. In the event of 
non-compliance, the suspension of the sanctions would be terminated.° 
62 	S/RES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 8. The Secretary-General accordingly issued 
the following reports: S/23992 (22 May 1992) & Add.! (8 June 1992) & Add.2 (19 August 1992); 
S/1996/611 (31 July 1996). 
63 S/RES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 11. 
64 
	
S/RES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraph 14. 
65 
	
SIRES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraph 13. The Secretary-General accordingly 
issued the following reports: S/1994/99 (28 January 1994) & Add.! (8 March 1994) & Add.2 (24 
May 1994); S/1996/612 (31 July 1996). 
66 
	
S/RES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraph 16. 
67 
	
Ibid. 
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In August 1998, the Council requested the Secretary-General to assist the Libyan 
Government with the physical arrangements for the safe transfer of the two accused from 
Libya to the Netherlands. 68 At the same time, the Council also invited the Secretary-General 
to nominate international observers to attend the tria1, 69 and reaffirmed its earlier reporting 
requests of the Secretary-General, providing for the possibility that the sanctions might be 
suspended upon a report from the Secretary-General that the suspects had arrived in the 
Netherlands for trial before a Scottish court." 
6.4.3 States 
The Security Council called upon States to take a number of actions in relation to 
the administration and implementation of the Libya sanctions regime. The Council thus: 
called upon all States, including States not members of the U.N., to act strictly in 
accordance with the sanctions, notwithstanding the existence of any conflicting legal rights or 
obligations;71 requested all States to report to the Secretary-General on measures taken to 
implement the sanctions,72 called upon States to cooperate fully with the 748 Committee, 
including supplying such information as it may seelc;73 and called upon Member States to 
encourage the Libyan Government to respond fully to the requests and decisions in 
connection with which the sanctions were imposed. 74 
68 	SIRES/1192 (27 August 1998), operative paragraph 5. 
69 	SIRES/1192 (27 August 1998), operative paragraph 6. 
70 	SIRES/1192 (27 August 1998), operative paragraph 8. 
71 	S/RES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 7; S/RES/883 (11 November 1993), operative 
paragraph 12. 
72 	S/RES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 8; SIRES/883 (11 November 1993), operative 
paragraph 13. 
73 SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 10. 
74 SIRES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraph 15. 
544 
Appendix 6. The Libya sanctions regime 
In August 1998, when the Security Council welcomed the initiative for the trial of 
two persons charged with the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 before a Scottish court sitting 
in the Netherlands, it made a number of requests of States. It called upon the Governments 
of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to take the necessary steps to implement the 
initiative,75 required all States to cooperate to that end,76 required Libya to ensure fie 
appearance of the two accused and to ensure that any evidence or witnesses were made 
available at the court,' and required the Netherlands, upon the arrival of the two accused, 
to detain them pending their transfer for the purpose of the tria1. 78 
6.5 Suspension and termination of the Libya sanctions regime 
The Security Council first provided for the possibility that the sanctions against Libya 
might be suspended in November 1993, when it made such suspension conditional upon the 
appearance of those charged with the bombing of Pan Am 103 before an appropriate UK 
or US court and upon the French judicial authorities being satisfied with steps taken by the 
Libyan Government to implement the sentences of those found guilty in absentia of the 
bombing of UTA 772. 79 The Council subsequently modified the conditions for suspension of 
the sanctions so that they would be suspended once the Secretary-General reported to the 
Council that the two accused of the bombing of Pan Am 103 had arrived in the Netherlands 
for the purpose of being tried before a Scottish court and that the Libyan Government had 
75 	SIRES/1192 (27 August 1998), operative paragraph 3. 
76 	SIRES/1192 (27 August 1998), operative paragraph 4. 
77 	SIRES/1192 (27 August 1998), operative paragraph 4. 
78 	SIRES/1192 (27 August 1998), operative paragraph 7. 
79 S/RES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraph 16. 
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satisfied the French judicial authorities with regard to the bombing of UTA 772. 80 The 
sanctions were in fact suspended on April 5 1999, after the Secretary-General reported that 
the conditions for suspension had been satisfied. 81 
The ultimate termination of the sanctions was complicated by the question of 
whether Libya had fully complied with demands of the Council constituting the objectives of 
the sanctions regime. In June 1999 the Secretary-General submitted a report to the Council, 
as requested by resolutions 883 (1993) and 1192 (1998), on whether Libya had complied 
with the remaining objectives of the sanctions regime, in which he suggested that the Libyan 
Government had largely demonstrated compliance with the remaining objectives of the 
sanctions. 82 More than four years later, in September 2003, the Security Council welcomed 
a letter from the representative of Libya which recounted steps taken by the Libyan 
Government to comply with its obligations connected with the sanctions regime. 83  Those 
steps included accepting responsibility for the actions of Libyan officials, paying appropriate 
compensation, renouncing terrorism, and making a commitment to cooperate with further 
813 	 SIRES/1192 (27 August 1998), operative paragraph 8. 
81 	The Secretary-General reported this event to the Council via a letter to the President: 
S/1999/378 (5 April 1999): Letter Dated 5 April from the Secretary-General Addressed to the 
President of the Security Council. The Security Council immediately suspended the sanctions, 
as noted by both a statement of the President of the Security Council to the press dated 5 April 
1999 (SC/6662) and by a presidential statement of 8 April 1999: S/PRST/1998/10 (8 April 1999) 
Presidential Statement of 8 April 1999. 
82 	S/1999/726 (30 June 1999): Report of the Secretary-General Submitted Pursuant to Paragraph 
16 of Security Council Resolution 883 (1993) and Paragraph 8 of Resolution 1192 (1998), 
Section IV, paragraphs 18-36. 
83 	S/RES/1506 (12 September 2003), preambular paragraph 3. For the text of the letter itself, see: 
S/2003/818 (15 August 2003): Letter dated 15 August 2003 from the representative of the 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya addressed to the President of the Security Council. 
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investigations. The Council proceeded to lift the sanctions, 84 and to dissolve the 748 
Committee. 85 
6.6 Notable aspects of the Libya sanctions regime 
The Libyan sanctions regime contributed to the evolution of sanctions practice in a 
number of ways. First, i represented the first occasion on which the Security Council had 
imposed sanctions in connection with an act of terrorism. 86 Second, it was the first sanctions 
regime to consist of more than a simple arms embargo and less than comprehensive 
sanctions. 87 Third, it gave rise to the first instance of sanctioning in which the application of 
the sanctions was not immediate, meaning that the sanctions would enter into force after a 
short delay. 88 Fourth, the Council made a rare reference to Article 2(4) of the United 
Nations Charter, 89 and a less than common reference to Article 50, recalling the right of 
States to consult the Security Council where they were confronted with special economic 
84 SIRES/1506 (12 September 2003), operative paragraph I. 
85 
 
SIRES/1506 (12 September 2003), operative paragraph 2. 
86 	As noted in section 6.1, above, in the process of imposing and modifying the Libya sanctions 
regime the Council expressed conviction that the suppression of acts of international terrorism 
was essential for the maintenance of international peace and security [see, e.g., S/RES/731 (21 
January 1992), preambular paragraph 2; SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), preambular paragraph 4; 
SIRES/883 (11 November 1993), preambular paragraph 5] and characterized as a threat to 
international peace and security the Libyan Government's failure to renounce terrorism and to 
take steps to bring those suspected of having committed terrorist acts [see, e.g., SIRES/748 (31 
March 1992), preambular paragraph 7; SIRES/883 (11 November 1993), preambular paragraph 6]. 
87 	Although the sanctions regime against Southern Rhodesia began its existence as a targeted 
sanctions regime, it was soon expanded to a comprehensive regime. 
88 See, e.g., SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), operative paragraph 3 [providing that the sanctions 
would enter into force on 15 April 1992]; SIRES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraph 2 
[providing that the additional sanctions would enter into force on 1 December 1993]. In the first 
of these instances, the Council did not explicitly provide that the sanctions would not come 
into force if Libya were to comply with the objectives of the sanctions regime before the date 
stipulated. In the second instance, however, it provided for the possibility that the additional 
sanctions might not enter into force if the Secretary-General were to report before the date of 
entry into force that Libya had complied with the requirements of the sanctions regime: see 
SIRES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraphs 2, 16. 
89 	S/RES/748 (31 March 1992), preambular paragraph 6. 
547 
Appendix 6. The Libya sanctions regime 
problems arising from the carrying out of preventive or enforcement measures. 9° Fourth, the 
Council adopted the stiategy of inducing compliance by articulating particular objectives, the 
realisation of which would result in the sanctions being suspended and terminated. 91 Finally, 
the Libya sanctions regime possesses the dubious honour of being the sanctions regime 
which has been suspended for the longest period. 92 
In political terms, it is noteworthy that the resolutions applying or modifying the 
sanctions against Libya received less than unanimous support. 93 Whilst that fact did not 
affect the legal consequences flowing from the application of the Libya sanctions, given that 
the relevant resolutions received the necessary support to be adopted, it nevertheless 
demonstrated that the decisions related to the application of sanctions against Libya did not 
attract the same degree of support as most other sanctions regimes. In legal terms the Libya 
sanctions regime was also notable because the events in response to which the sanctions 
were applied gave rise to international legal action, with the Libyan Government bringing a 
case before the International Court of Justice alleging that the US and UK's demand that it 
extradite terrorist suspects violated its rights under the 1971 Montreal Convention on Air 
90 	SIRES/748 (31 March 1992), preambular paragraph 9; SIRES/883 (11 November 1993), 
preambular paragraph 9. 
91 
 
SIRES/883 (11 November 1993), operative paragraph 16 [expressing readiness to suspend the 
sanctions if the Secretary-General were to report that the Libyan Government had ensured the 
appearance of the Lockerbie suspects before the appropriate UK or US court and had satisfied 
the French authorities with respect to the bombing of flight UTA 772, and to terminate the 
sanctions when the Secretary-General reported that Libya had complied with its remaining 
obligations under the sanctions regime]. 
92 	As noted in section 6.5, above, the Libya sanctions regime remains in a potentially permanent 
state of suspended animation. 
93 	Resolution 748 (1992), initiating the sanctions regime, received ten votes in favour, none 
against and five abstentions. The Member States abstaining included Cape Verde, China, India, 
Morocco and Zimbabwe: see S/PV.3063, p. 65. Resolution 883 (1993), strengthening the 
sanctions, received eleven votes in favour, none against and four abstentions. The Member 
States abstaining included China, Djibouti, Morocco and Pakistan: S/PV.3312, p.39. Resolution 
1192 (1998), providing for the suspension of the sanctions in the event that the Secretary- 
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Safety, 94 and with the ultimate trial of two Lockerbie suspects before a Scottish Court 
temporarily located in the Hague.' 
General reports that the suspects had arrived in the Netherlands for trial by a Scottish Court, 
was adopted unanimously, however: S/PV.3920, pp. 13-14. 
94 See: Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal 
Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. 
US/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. UK). Provisional Measures, I.C.J. Rep. 1992 (orders of 14 Apr. 
1992). For further discussion of this case and of the question of judicial review of the decisions 
of the Security Council, see: Gowlland-Debbas, Vera, 'The Relationship Between the 
International Court of Justice and the Security Council in Light of the Lockerbie Case' (1994) 
88 AJIL 643-77; Alvarez, Jose E., 'Judging the Security Council' (1996) 90 AJIL 1-39. 
95 	For the Opinion of the Scottish Court in that case, see: S/2001/1994 (31 January 2001), annex. 
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7. The sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 
In May 1992 the Security Council imposed sanctions against the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), in order to induce it to cease engaging in acts of 
interference in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The sanctions regime consisted of a comprehensive 
blend of measures, the concrete objectives of which evolved in response to developments 
on the ground. The sanctions were suspended gradually over a period of twelve months, 
beginning in September 1994. Ultimately the sanctions regime was terminated in October 
1996, after free and fair elections had been held in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
7.1 The constitutional basis for imposing sanctions against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) 
On 15 May 1992, the Security Council expressed deep concern about the serious 
situation in certain parts of the former Socialist Federal IL-public of Yugoslavia and in 
particular about the rapid and violent deterioration of the situation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.' The Council then made a number of demands, including: that all parties and 
others concerned in Bosnia and Herzegovina stop fighting immediately; 2 that all forms of 
interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina cease immediately; 3 that Bosnia and 
Herzegovina's neighbours take swift action to end all interference in and respect the 
territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina; 4 that the Yugoslav People's Army be 
SIRES/752 (15 May 1992), preambular paragraph 3. 
S/RES/752 (15 May 1992), operative paragraph 1. 
SIRES/752 (15 May 1992), operative paragraph 3. 
SIRES/752 (15 May 1992), operative paragraph 3. 
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disbanded and disarmed; 5 and that all irregular forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina also be 
disbanded and disarmed. 6 Two weeks later, on 30 May 1992, the Security Council 
deplored the fact that its demands had not been complied with,' recalled its primary 
responsibility under the U.N. Charter for the maintenance of international peace and 
security,' determined that the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and other parts of the 
former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia constituted a threat to international peace 
and security, 9 and invoked Chapter VII of the Charter, m before proceeding to impose 
comprehensive sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro)." In subsequent decisions related to the sanctions regime, the Council 
reaffirmed the continued existence of a threat to international peace and security, 12 and again 
invoked Chapter VII of the Charter.' 3 
5 	SIRES/752 (15 May 1992), operative paragraph 4. 
6 	SIRES/752 (15 May 1992), operative paragraph 5. 
7 SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), preambular paragraph 4. 
8 	S/RES/757 (30 May 1992), preambular paragraph 12. 
9 	S/RES/757 (30 May 1992), preambular paragraph 17. 
lo 	S/RES/757 (30 May 1992), preambular paragraph 18. 
11 	SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraphs 3-8. 
12 	See, e.g., S/RES/787 (16 November 1992), preambular paragraph 2; SIRES/1022 (22 November 
1995), preambular paragraph. In other sanctions-related resolutions the Council invoked 
Chapter VII without explicitly determining the existence of a threat to international peace and 
security, which might be interpreted either as referring back to the above determinations of a 
threat to peace and security or as amounting to an implicit determination of a threat to 
international peace and security. For those resolutions invoking Chapter VII, see the following 
note. 
13 	See, e.g., SIRES/760 (18 June 1992), preambular paragraph 2; SIRES/787 (16 November 1992), 
operative paragraphs 9, 10, 12; SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), Section B, preambular paragraph 2, 
operative paragraph 19; S/RES/943 (23 September 1994), preambular paragraph 10; SIRES/967 
(14 December 1994), preambular paragraph 3; S/RES/970 (12 January 1995), preambular 
paragraph 5; SIRES/988 (21 April 1995), preambular paragraph 7; S/RES/992 (11 May 1995), 
preambular paragraph 6; SIRES/1003 (5 July 1995), preambular paragraph 8; SIRES/1015 (15 
September 1995), preambular paragraph 6; SIRES/1022 (22 November 1995), preambular 
paragraph 11; SIRES/1074 (1 October 1996), preambular paragraph 9. 
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7.2 The objective of the FRY sanctions regime 
The objective of the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia-Montenegro) was the compliance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia 
and Montenegro) with demands that had been outlined by the Council two weeks earlier, 
including: adherence to a cease-fire; cooperation with the peace process being initiated by 
the EC; and the effective withdrawal, disbandment or disarmament of all military forces 
operating in the area, with the exception of UNPROFOR and the forces of the government 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 14 When it established the sanctions regime, the Security Council 
explicitly stated that the sanctions would be terminated once authorities in the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) had taken effective measures to comply 
with those demands. I5 
As the sanctions regime evolved, the Council modified subtly the concrete 
requirements that needed to be satisfied by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro) before the sanctions could be suspended or terminated. In April 1993, the 
Council expressed is readiness to review the sanctions with a view to lifting them gradually 
after all three Bosnian parties had accepted the Bosnian peace plan and if the Secretary-
General were to verify that the Bosnian Serb party was cooperating in good faith in the 
14 	 These demands had been outlined in S/RES/752 (15 May 1992), operative paragraphs 1-5. 
Specifically, the Council had demanded: (a) That all parties involved in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina stop fighting immediately, respect the cease-fire of 12 April and cooperate with 
the efforts of the EC to bring about a negotiated settlement [operative paragraphs 1, 2]; 
(b) That all forms of interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina cease immediately and 
that Bosnia and Herzegovina's neighbours take swift action to end all such interference 
[operative paragraph 3]; (c)That those units of the former Yugoslav People's Army and 
elements of the Croatian Army then in Bosnia and Herzegovina be withdrawn, or become 
subject to the authority of the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or be disbanded and 
disarmed with their weapons placed under effective international monitoring [operative 
paragraph 4]; and (e) That all irregular forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina be disbanded and 
disarmed [operative paragraph 5]. 
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implementation of the plan. 16 In September 1994 the Council suspended certain aspects of 
the aviation and maritime sanctions, as well as the sporting and cultural sanctions," 
contingent upon the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) 
ensuring the effective closure of the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia-Montenegro) and Bosnia and Herzegovina with respect to all goods except 
foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing for essential humanitarian need." The Council 
confirmed that the objective of the suspensions was to ensure the border remained closed 
by requesting the Secretary-General to submit periodical reports on whether the border-
closure was being implemented effectively and providing that if the Secretary-General were 
to report that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) 
were not effectively implementing the closure then the suspensions would terminate. ° In 
November 1995, the Council decided that it would terminate the sanctions on the tenth day 
following the occurrence of free and fair elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, provided that 
the Bosnian Serbs were continuing to respect the implementation of the Bosnian Peace 
Agreement.2° 
15 SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 3. 
16 	SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraphs 10, 31. 
17 
 
SIRES/943 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 1. The particular sanctions suspended 
were: (a)The prohibitions upon flights carrying passengers and their personal effects to and 
from Belgrade; (b) The prohibitions upon the ferry service carrying passengers and their 
personal effects between Bar in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) and 
Bari in Italy; and (c)The prohibitions upon participation in sporting events and cultural 
exchanges. 
18 SIRES/943 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph I. 
19 	S/RES/943 (23 September 1994), operative paragraphs 3, 4 
20 	S/RES 1022 (22 November 1995), operative paragraph 4. 
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7.3 The scope of the FRY sanctions regime 
The sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) initially consisted of a range of measures spanning practically the full gamut of 
possibilities envisaged in Article 41, including economic, financial, aviation, diplomatic, 
sporting and cultural sanctions. The Council subsequently modified the sanctions regime on a 
number of occasions. The modifications generally had the effect of strengthening the 
sanctions, but occasionally they broadened the category of exemptions permitted under the 
regime. 
When the Security Council first established the sanctions regime, it imposed a 
complex blend of economic, financial, diplomatic, sporting and cultural sanctions. On the 
economic front, States were required to prevent: (a) The inport into their territories of all 
commodities and products originating in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro); 2 ' (b) Activities with the aim of promoting the export of commodities or 
products originating in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); 22 and 
(c) The export of any commodities or products to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro). 23 The financial sanctions required States to refrain from providing 
21 	SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 4(a). 
22 	SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 4(b). 
23 S/RES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 4(c). The economic sanctions did not apply, 
however, to: (a) medical supplies and foodstuffs [S/RES1757 (30 May 1992), operative 
paragraph 4(c). The Council subsequently expanded these exemptions to incorporate 
commodities and products for essential humanitarian need, as approved by the sanctions 
committee: S/RES/760 (18 June 1992), sole operative paragraph. In its Final Report, the 724 
Committee noted that an important part of its work had been determining the commodities and 
products that fell within the phrase "essential humanitarian need". It considered applications 
for exemptions under that category on a case-by-case basis: Final Report of the 724 
Committee, below note 67, paragraph 13]; (b) the trans-shipment through the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of commodities and products, with the approval of the 
724 Committee [SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 6. As noted in section 7.4, 
below, rather than establishing a new Sanctions Committee to oversee the administration, 
implementation and enforcement of the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of 
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any funds or other financial or economic resources to any commercial, industrial or public 
utility operating in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and to 
prevent the removal of funds or resources from their territories to the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). 24 The aviation sanctions required States to deny 
pennission to any aircraft to take off from, land in, or overfly their territories if it was 
destined for or had departed from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) and to prohibit the provision of maintenance services and parts in support of 
aircraft registered in that country. 25 On the diplomatic front, the Council required States to 
reduce the level of staff at diplomatic missions and consular posts of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). 26 On the sporting front, States were required to 
prevent the participation in sporting events on their territory of persons or groups 
representing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). 27 On the cultural 
front, States were required to suspend scientific and technical cooperation and cultural 
Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), the Security Council bestowed oversight responsibilities 
upon the Committee already established to oversee the sanctions regime against the former 
Yugoslavia — the 724 Committee. For details relating to the establishment of the 724 Committee, 
see section 4.4, above]; and (c) the activities of UNPROFOR, the CY and the EC Monitoring 
Mission [SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 10. The Council reaffirmed the 
ongoing exemption of these entities in subsequent resolutions: see, e.g., S/RES/820 (17 April 
1993), operative paragraph 30]. 
24 	SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 5. The financial sanctions would not apply, 
however, to payments for food, medicine or humanitarian purposes [SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), 
operative paragraph 5], nor to the activities of UNPROFOR, the CY and the EC Monitoring 
Mission [SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 10. The Council reaffirmed the 
ongoing exemption of these entities in subsequent resolutions: see, e.g., S/RES/820 (17 April 
1993), operative paragraph 30]. 
25 	SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 7(a) and (b). The aviation sanctions would not 
apply to flights made for humanitarian or other purposes consistent with the sanctions regime, 
when approved by the 724 Committee [SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 7(a)], nor 
to the activities of UNPROFOR, the CY and the EC Monitoring Mission [SIRES/757 (30 May 
1992), operative paragraph 10. The Council reaffirmed the ongoing exemption of these entities 
in subsequent resolutions: see, e.g., SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 30]. 
26 	SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 8(a). 
27 SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 8(b). 
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exchanges and visits involving persons or groups officially sponsored by or representing the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). 28 
In June 1992, the Council contracted the scope of the sanctions slightly, by clarifying 
that exemptions would be permitted from the sanctions for the provision of commodities and 
products for essential humanitarian need, 29 and for the provision of financial resources for 
the purchase of such products and commodities.3° 
In November 1992, the Security Council strengthened the sanctions, prohibiting the 
transshipment through the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of 
particular products and commodities, including crude oil, petroleum products, coal, energy-
related equipment, iron, steel, other metals, chemicals, rubber, tyres, vehicles, aircraft and 
motors of all types?' 
In April 1993, the Council strengthened considerably the application of the existing 
economic and financial sanctions. In connection with the economic sanctions, the Council 
required States: (a) to prevent all transhipments through the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro); 32 (b) to prevent the passage through its territories of vessels 
registered in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), owned by a 
person or undertaking from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or 
28 SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 8(c). 
29 SIRES/760 (18 June 1992), sole operative paragraph. 
30 Ibid. 
31 S/RES1787 (16 November 1992), operative paragraph 9. Exemptions from these prohibitions 
were only permitted when authorised on a case-by-case basis by the 724 Committee: ibid. 
32 S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 15. The Council provided that an exemption 
from these prohibitions would only permitted when specifically authorised by the 724 
Committee: ibid. Such exemptions would further be subject to effective monitoring as they 
passed along the Danube between the border points of Vidin/Calafat and Mohacs: ibid. 
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suspected of having violated the sanctions; 33 (c) to prohibit the transport of any commodities 
or products across the land borders, or to the ports, of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro);34 (d) to impound all means of transport owned or operated from 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or suspected of having 
violated the arms embargo or sanctions;35 (e) to detain any other means of transport 
suspected of having violated the embargo or the sanctions; 36 and (f) to prohibit commercial 
maritime traffic from entering the territorial sea of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegjo). 37 At the same time, the Council also required States neighbouring 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) to prevent the passage into or out 
of that country of all freight vehicles and rolling stock, except at a limited number of road 
and rail crossings to be notified to the 724 Committee. 38 
In connection with the fmancial sanctions, the Council required States: (a) to freeze 
funds in their territories belonging to or controlled by the authorities of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or commercial, industrial or public undertakings 
from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); 39 and (b) to prevent the 
33 	SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 16(a), (b) and (c). 
34 	SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 22. Exemptions were made from this prohibition 
for: medical supplies and foodstuffs; other essential humanitarian supplies when approved on 
a case-by-case basis by the 724 Committee; and limited transhipments when authorised on an 
exceptional basis by the committee: ibid. 
35 	S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 24. 
36 	S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 25. 
37 	S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 28. The Council provided that exceptions 
would be permitted from this prohibition when authorised on a case-by-case basis by the 724 
Committee and in the case offorce majeure: ibid. 
38 SIRES/820(17 April 1993), operative paragraph 23. 
39 SIRES/820(17 April 1993), operative paragraph 21. 
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provision of services, financial or otherwise, to any person or body for the purposes of any 
business carried on in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). 4° 
In September 1994, the Security Council contracted the scope of the sanctions 
slightly, by stipulating that the sanctions would not apply to "clothing for essential 
humanitarian need", 41 and by suspending aspects of the sanctions. The suspended aspects 
included the prohibitions against: (a) Civilian, non-cargo carrying aircraft; (b) Passenger, 
non-cargo carrying ferries between Bar in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) and Bari in Italy; and (c) Participation in sporting events and cultural 
exchanges.42 . 
In December 1994, the Council contracted the scope of the sanctions temporarily 
by provided a temporary exemption for the export of diphtheria anti- serum. 43 In May 1995, 
it again provided temporary exemptions from the sanctions, this time for (a) The use of 
Rumanian river locks by vessels registered in or owned by a person or entity from the 
SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 27. The Council stipulated that the only 
exceptions to this prohibition were telecommunications, postal services, legal services 
consistent with the sanctions, and, as approved on a case-by-case basis, services whose 
supply may be necessary for humanitarian or other exceptional purposes: ibid. 
4 The Council first articulated clothing as an exemption in SIRES/943 (23 September 1994), 
operative paragraph 3. It subsequently reaffirmed this innovation in S/RES/970 (12 January 
1995), operative paragraph 5, and S/RES/988 (21 April 1995), operative paragraphs 13, 15. 
42 S/RE51943 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 1(i), (ii) and (iii). The suspension of those 
aspects of the sanctions was temporary, but subject to extension upon certification that the 
border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was being closed to commodities and products prohibited under the sanctions 
regime against the Bosnian Serbs. The suspension of the sanctions was renewed on a number 
of occasions, meaning that by the time the sanctions regime as a whole was suspended, the 
initially suspended aspects of the sanctions had not been reimposed. For further discussion of 
these suspensions and the process of certification upon which their renewals relied, see 
section 7.5, below. 
43 
 
SIRES/967 (14 December 1994), operative paragraph 1. This exemption was recommended by 
the 724 Committee: see Final Report of the 724 Committee, below note 67, paragraph 16(g). 
The Council permitted the export of the serum for a limited period of 30 days in order to address 
a shortfall of the serum in places other than the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro). In permitting the export of the serum the Council stipulated that payment for the 
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Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) while locks on the Serbian bank 
of the Danube were undergoing repair; 44 and (b) The provision of supplies essential to those 
repairs!' 
7.4 The administration, monitoring and enforcement of the FRY 
sanctions regime 
The Council bestowed primary responsibility for oversight of the sanctions upon the 
Committee already established to oversee the arms embargo imposed upon all States of the 
former Yugoslavia." As with the embargo, a number of other actors were involved in the 
administration, implementation, and enforcement of the sanctions, including the Secretary-
General, States, regional organisations, and entities created for the specific purpose of 
resolving the conflict in the territory of the former Yugoslavia or of facilitating the effective 
implementation of the sanctions. 47 
7.4.1 The 724 Sanctions Committee 
When it established the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia-Montenegro), the Security Council bestowed responsibilities upon the Sanctions 
Committee which had been established in order to oversee the administration of the arms 
embargo against the States of the former Yugoslavia." It thus decided that the 724 
Committee would assume the following tasks in relation to the sanctions regime against the 
serum could only be paid into frozen accounts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia 
and Montenegro): ibid, operative paragraph 2. 
44 SIRES/992 (11 May 1995), operative paragraph I. This exemption was recommended by the 724 
Committee: see Final Report of the 724 Committee, below note 67, paragraph 16(h). 
45 51RES1992 (11 May 1995), operative paragraph 2. 
46 SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 13. 
47 	These were the same actors and entities involved in the implementation of the arms embargo 
imposed against all the States of the former Yugoslavia: see section 4.4, above. 
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Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro): (a) Examining reports submitted by 
States on steps taken to implement the sanctions; 49 (b) Seeking further information from 
States regarding action taken to implement the sanctions; 5° (c) Considering information 
concerning violations and making recommendations to the Council on how to increase the 
effectiveness of the sanctions;51 (d) Recommending appropriate measures in response to 
violations and providing information on a regular basis to the Secretary-General for general 
distribution to Member States; 52 (e) Considering and approving guidelines for the trans-
shipment through the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) of exempted 
items;" and (f) Considering and deciding expeditiously upon applications for exemptions 
from the aviation sanctions.54 
In November 1992 the Council required the 724 Committee to undertake the 
following additional responsibility in relation to the oversight of the sanctions against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro): (g) Considering, on a case-by-case 
basis, applications for exemptions to the ban on transshipment of particular goods under 
787." 
In April 1993, the Council outlined the following further responsibilities: (h) Making 
periodic reports to the Security Council on information submitted to it regarding alleged 
violations of the relevant resolutions, identifying where possible persons or entities, including 
48 	For information relating to the establishment of the 724 Committee, see section 4.4, above. 
49 
 
SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph I3(a). 
50 	SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 13(b). 
51 SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 13(c). 
52 S/RES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph I3(d). 
53 	S/RES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 13(e) 
54 	S/RES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 13(1). 
55 S/RES/787 (16 November 1992), operative paragraph 9. 
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vessels, reported to be engaging in such violations;56 (i) Drawing up rules for monitoring 
sanctions, including provisions relating to the monitoring of exemptions; 57 (j) Considering, on 
a case-by-case basis under the no-objection procedure, applications for exemptions from 
the sanctions for the importation of essential humanitarian supplies that were not medical 
supplies or foodstuffs;58 (k) Authorizing limited transhipments through the territory of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); 59 (1) Considering, on a case-by-
case basis, applications for exemptions fom the financial sanctions for the provision of 
services for humanitarian or other exceptional purposes; 69 and (m) Considering, on a case-
by-case basis, applications for exemptions from the prohibition on commercial maritime 
traffic entering the territorial sea of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro). 61 
In June 1993 the Council also invited the 724 Committee: (n) To make 
recommendations to the President of the Council regarding requests made for assistance 
under Article 50 of the Charter. 62 In September 1994, the Council requested that the 724 
Committee adopt appropriate streamlined procedures for expediting its consideration of 
applications for exemptions from the sanctions for legitimate humanitarian assistance, in 
particular for applications from UNHCR and the ICRC.63 In November 1995, when the 
56 
	
S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 18. 
57 
	
SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 22(a). 
58 
	
SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 22(b). 
59 
	
SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 22(c). 
60 	SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 27. 
61 	SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 28. 
62 	SIRES/843 (18 June 1993), operative paragraph 2. 
63 	SIRES/943 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 2. In April 1995 the Council again urged 
the Committee to conclude its elaboration of streamlined procedures and invited the Chairman 
of the 724 Committee to report to it on the matter as soon as possible: SIRES/988 (21 April 
1995), operative paragraph 11. The Council also reaffirmed on multiple occasions its request 
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Council suspended the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro), it further requested that the Committee review and amend its guidelines in the 
light of the fact that the sanctions had been suspended. 64 
As noted above in the overview of the sanctions regime against the former 
Yugoslavia,65 the 724 Committee held 142 formal meetings during its tenure. 66 Two of its 
three annual reports — the Second Report of the 724 Committee and the Final Report of the 
724 Committee - were issued after the establishment of the sanctions regime against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro). 67 In the reports the Committee 
outlined action taken in relation to processing applications for exemptions from the 
sanctions,68 as well as its consideration of actual or suspected violations of the sanctions. 69 It 
also made some recommendations that were subsequently acted upon by the Council, 
including authorizing temporary exemptions from the sanctions for the export of diphtheria 
serum and for vessels of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) to use 
that the ICRC, UNHCR and other organizations in the U.N. system be granted priority in the 
processing of applications for exemptions from the sanctions for the provision of humanitarian 
assistance. See, e.g.: S/RES/970 (12 January 1995), operative paragraph 4; S/RES/988 (21 April 
1995), operative paragraph 12. 
64 
 
SIRES 1022 (22 November 1995), operative paragraph 8. 
65 	See section 4.4, above. 
66 The 142'd and last meeting of the Committee took place on 19 September 1996: Index to 
Proceedings of the Security Council for 1996 (1997) United Nations, New York, p. xiii. 
67 5/25027 (30 December 1992): Second Report of the Security Council Committee established 
pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia (hereafter "Second Report of the 
724 Committee") [containing a report of the Committee's activities from 9 April until 29 
December 1992]; S/1996/946 (15 November 1996), annex: Final Report of the Security Council 
Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia, (hereafter 
"Final Report of the 724 Committee") [containing a summary of the Committee's activities 
from January 1993 until the termination of the sanctions regime on 1 October 1996]. 
68 See: Second Report of the 724 Committee, ibid, paragraphs 16-18; Final Report of the 724 
Committee, above note 67, paragraphs 6-7, 12-13, 34-38, 43-61, 64-67. 
69 See: Second Report of the 724 Committee, above note 67, paragraphs 19-22; Final Report of 
the 724 Committee, above note 67, paragraphs 18-28. 
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the locks on the Romanian side of the Danube while repairs were being carried out to the 
locks on the Serbian side of the river." 
In observations and conclusions outlined in its Second Report, the 724 Committee 
emphasised noted that the application of the sanctions was the responsibility of States and 
that its role was to offer assistance to the States in undertaking that responsibility. 71 It also 
observed that the task of monitoring the sanctions had been complicated by the fact that the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) was located at the hub of intense 
economic and cultural activity in the south-eastern region of Europe. 72 At the same time, the 
implementation of the sanctions had had an adverse impact on the economies of a number of 
countries, including in particular the States neighbouring the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia-Montenegro).73 
The Committee also noted that it had been disappointed by the lack of information it 
had received on violations of the sanctions, whilst the international media had been "replete" 
with reports of such violations, and observed that the success of the sanctions depended 
upon the active cooperation of all States.74 It further observed that the lack of an 
independent monitoring mechanism had inhibited its ability to obtain original information and 
to follow-up on alleged violations!' In that respect, however, it was grateful for information 
received from sources such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 
70 
	
See: Final Report of the 724 Committee, above note 67, paragraphs 16(g) and 16(h). The 
exemptions were authorized by the Council in SIRES/967 (14 December 1994), operative 
paragraph 1 [for the diphtheria serum] and SIRES/992 (11 May 1995), operative paragraph 1 [for 
the repairs to the Serbian side of the Danube]. 
71 	See: Second Report of the 724 Committee, above note 67, paragraph 25. 
72 
	
See: Second Report of the 724 Committee, above note 67, paragraph 23. 
73 	See: Second Report of the 724 Committee, above note 67, paragraph 23. 
74 	See: Second Report of the 724 Committee, above note 67, paragraph 24. 
75 	Second Report of the 724 Committee, above note 67, paragraph 25. 
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Western European Union (WEU) monitoring teams in the Adriatic Sea, and it looked 
forward to working in cooperation with the EC/CSCE/OSCE Sanctions Assistance 
Missions (SAMs).76 
The Committee's Final Report contained a detailed summary of its activities in 
relation to the administration, implementation and enforcement of the sanctions, as well as 
some substantive observations and recommendations. The Committee observed that the 
sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) had 
demonstrated that sanctions, if properly applied, administered and implemented, could 
promote international peace and security.” Based on its experience, the Committee 
recommended that in the implementation of future sanctions regimes, practical arrangements 
should be considered for alleviating adverse humanitarian effects of sanctions. 78 An example 
of such arrangements would be giving international humanitarian agencies clearly defined 
preferential treatment, provided that adequate monitoring and control mechanisms were in 
place. 79 The Committee also considered it to be essential that the U.N. Secretariat establish 
an adequate capacity for analysis and assessment of the effectiveness of sanctions and their 
76 	Ibid. For information relating to the activities of the WEU, NATO and the SAMs, see below. 
77 	Final Report of the 724 Committee, above note 67, paragraph 86. The Committee noted that a 
major reason for the effectiveness of the sanctions was the role played by regional 
organizations in monitoring and enforcing the sanctions: see Final Report of the 724 
Committee, above note 67, paragraph 79. For discussion of the activities of regional 
organizations in relation to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 
sanctions regime, see below. 
78 	Final Report of the 724 Committee, above note 67, paragraph 82. The Committee also included 
in its Final Report a sections entitled "Humanitarian impact and cooperation with humanitarian 
relief organizations": Final Report of the 724 Committee, above note 67, paragraphs 68-78. 
79 
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humanitarian impacts° Another serious issue in relation to the implementation of sanctions 
was the need to mitigate the adverse economic effects of sanctions upon third countries. 81 
7.4.2 The Secretary-General 
During the course of the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to 
undertake the following tasks: (a) Receive reports from States on measures taken to 
implement the sanctions;82 (b) Co-ordinate the submission by States and regional agencies 
or arrangements regarding action taken to halt maritime and riparian traffic to verify that 
cargo was not being transported in violation of the sancfions; 83 (c) Submit recommendations 
for facilitating the implementation of its resolutions by deploying observers on the borders of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina; 84 (d) Reporting to the Council if within nine days of the adoption of 
resolution 820 (1993) the Bosnian Serbs had signed and begun to implement the peace 
plan, in which case the sanctions would not be imposed; 85 (e) In the event that the Bosnian 
Serbs did sign and begin to implement the peace process, thus meaning that the sanctions 
were not in fact imposed, to report to the Council if the Bosnian Serbs had renewed military 
attacks or failed to comply with the peace plan, in which case the sanctions would 
80 Final Report of the 724 Committee, above note 67, paragraph 83. 
81 Final Report of the 724 Committee, above note 67, paragraph 84. 
82 	SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 12 [this request was implicit, as the paragraph 
requested States to report to the Secretary-General on measures taken to implement the 
sanctions]. 
83 SIRES/787 (16 November 1992), operative paragraph 14. The Council had authorized States to 
take such action in the same resolution— see below. 
84 S/RES/787 (16 November 1992), operative paragraph 16. The Secretary-General was 
subsequently requested to submit an additional report on this subject: S/RES/838 (10 June 
1993), operative paragraph 1. 
85 SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 10. 
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immediately come into effect" and (f) Once the sanctions had been imposed, to report to 
the Council if the Bosnian Serbs had signed the peace plan and was implementing its 
obligations in good faith, in which case the Council would review the sanctions with a view 
to lifting them gradually;" (g) To contact Member States, nationally or through regional 
organizations or arrangements, to ensure the availability of any relevant material derived from 
aerial surveillance and to report thereon to the Security Council;" and (h) To submit to it 
every 30 days a report on whether the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the 
ICFY had certified that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) were effectively implementing their decision to close the border between the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to goods and products prohibited under the sanctions regime and to report 
immediately if there was evidence that those authorities are not effectively implementing their 
decision to close the border." 
Once the sanctions had been suspended, the Secretary-General was requested to 
report to the Council if the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had failed to sign the Peace 
Agreement,9° or if it was failing to meet its obligations under the Peace Agreement. 91 In 
either instance, the suspension of the sanctions would lapse after five days. 92 
86 	S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 11. 
87 	SfRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 31. 
88 SIRES/838 (10 June 1993), operative paragraph 2. 
89 SIRES/943 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 3; S/RES/970 (12 January 1995), operative 
paragraph 5; SfRES/988 (21 April 1995), operative paragraph 13; SfRES/1003 (5 July 1995), 
operative paragraph 2; S/RES/1015 (15 September 1995), operative paragraph 2. 
90 S/RES/1022 (22 November 1995), operative paragraph 1. 
91 S/RES/1022 (22 November 1995), operative paragraph 3. 
92 	S/RES/1022 (22 November 1995), operative paragraphs 1, 3. 
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7.4.3 States 
In addition to the general obligation flowing from the establishment of the sanctions 
regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) for States to do 
everything in their power to implement the sanctions within their own jurisdictions, States 
were also requested or authorized by the Security Council to take various actions to 
implement, monitor and enforce the sanctions. The Council's additional requests were 
sometimes addressed to States in general and sometimes directed at States either 
neighbouring or located in the region surrounding the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia-Montenegro). 
i. 	States in general 
When the sanctions were first established against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), the Council called upon all States, including States not 
members of the United Nations, to act strictly in accordance with the sanctions, 
notwithstanding the existence of any conflicting legal rights or obligations, 93 requested all 
States to report to the Secretary-General on measures taken to implement the sanctions," 
and called upon them to cooperate fully with the 724 Committee. 95 In November 1992, the 
Council called upon all States to take all necessary steps to ensure that none of their exports 
were diverted to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) in violation of the 
sanctions.96 The Council also invoked Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter in calling upon 
States, acting nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements, to use such measures 
93 
 
SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 11. 
94 SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 12. 
95 SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 14. 
96 	SIRES/787 (16 November 1992), operative paragraph 11. 
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as necessary to halt outward and inward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify that 
cargo did not violate the sanctions. 97 At the same time, the Council requested States to 
report, in coordination with the Secretary-General, to the Security Council on any measures 
taken to ensure that maritime or riparian shipping did not violate the sanctions, 98 and to 
provide, in accordance with the Charter, such assistance as might be required by States 
acting in pursuance of its authority to use necessary measures to implement the sanctions.99 
In April 1993, the Council required States in general to take the following action: to 
take steps to prevent the diversion to the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia-Montenegro) of commodities and products said to be destined for other areas;' °° to 
impound all vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft in their territories if owned or 
possessed by an individual or entity from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro);' ° ' and to detain vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock, aircraft and cargoes 
• 	1 suspected of having violated the sanctions. 02  At the same time, the Council also requested 
or called upon States in general: to bring proceedings against persons and entities violating 
S/RES/787 (16 November 1992), operative paragraph 12. This call was reaffirmed in SIRES/820 
(17 April 1993), operative paragraph 29. 
98 
 
SIRES/787 (16 November 1992), operative paragraph 14. 
99 S/RES/787 (16 November 1992), operative paragraph 15. It is unclear exactly which provision or 
provisions of the Charter the Council had in mind when it requested that assistance be 
provided "in accordance with the Charter". It is likely, however, that the Council was implicitly 
invoking Article 2(5), which provides: "All Members shall give the United Nations every 
assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from 
giving any assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or 
enforcement action". 
100 	SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 13. 
101 	S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 24. The Council further provided in that same 
operative paragraph that upon a determination that those vessels, freight vehicles, rolling 
stock and aircraft might be forfeited to the seizing State upon a determination that they had 
been used in violation of the sanctions. 
102 	S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 25. In the same operative paragraph the Council 
noted that detained vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock, aircraft and cargoes might be 
subject to forfeit to the detaining State. 
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the sanctions and to impose appropriate penalties; I°3 to report to the 724 Committee on 
actions taken to freeze funds belonging to or controlled by the authorities of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or commercial, industrial or public 
undertakings from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); 104 and to 
provide such assistance as was required by riparian States to ensure that shipping on the 
Danube did not violate the sanctions. 1°5 
Two }ears later, in April 1995, the Council requested Member States to make 
available the necessary resources to strengthen the ICFY Mission's capacity to carry out its 
tasks. ' °6 
Riparian and Neighbour States 
The Security Council first outlined tasks required specifically of States neighbouring 
or located in the region surrounding the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro) in November 1992. At that time it reaffirmed the responsibility of riparian 
States to take the measures necessary to ensure that shipping along the Danube did not 
violate the sanctions, including taking action to halt shipping in order to inspect and verify 
their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the sanctions. 1°7 
In April 1993, the Council also required each State neighbouring the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) to prevent the passage of all freight vehicles 
103 	SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 19. 
104 S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 21. 
105 	SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 17. 
106 SIRES/988 (21 April 1995), operative paragraph 6. The ICFY Mission was established to 
monitor and certify that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) was adhering 
to its commitment to close its border with the areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the 
control of the Bosnian Serbs to all but foodstuffs and medical and humanitarian supplies. For 
discussion of the Mission's activities, see sections 7.4 and 9.4, below. 
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and rolling stock into or out of that country, except at a strictly limited number of road and 
rail crossing points, the locations of which would be notified to the 724 Committee.'" At the 
same time, the Council also At the same time, the Council also called upon riparian States to 
ensure that cabotage traffic along the Danube river between Vidin/Calafat and Mohacs was 
adequately monitored so that no vessels suspected of having violated the sanctions were 
permitted to pass, 1°9 and reaffirmed the responsibility of riparian States to take the 
necessary measures to ensure that shipping on the Danube did not violate the sanctions." ° 
In April 1995 States from which flights or ferry services were permitted to travel to 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) were requested to report to the 
Committee on the controls adopted by them to ensure that the sanctions regime was not 
violated.' " In May 1995 the Council requested the Government of Romania, with the 
assistance of the EU/OSCE Sanctions Assistance Missions, to monitor the use of Romanian 
locks while repairs were being carried out to locks on the Serbian side of the river, including 
if necessary by inspections of the vessels and their cargo, in order to ensure that no goods 
were loaded or unloaded during the passage by the vessels through the locks of the Iron 
Gates I system. " 2 The Council also requested Romania to deny passage through the locks 
on its bank of the Danube to any vessel suspected to have violated sanctions. 113 
International organizations 
107 	SIRES/787 (16 November 1992), operative paragraph 13. This responsibility was again 
reaffirmed by the Council in SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 17. 
108 	S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 23. 
109 	SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 16. 
S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 17. 
n 	S/RES/988 (21 April 1995), operative paragraph 4. 
112 	SIRES/992 (11 May 1995), operative paragraph 3. 
113 	S/RES/992 (11 May 1995), operative paragraph 4. 
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When the Council established the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), it called won all international organizations to act strictly 
in accordance with the sanctions, notwithstanding the existence of any conflicting legal rights 
or obligations.' 14 
7.4.4 Regional organizations and other regional entities involved in the 
implementation and enforcement of the sanctions 115 
As with the implementation of the arms embargo against the former Yugoslavia, 
regional organizations played a significant role in the implementation of the sanctions against 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro). Among those regional 
organizations were: the European Community and its successor the European Union (the 
EC/EU); 116 the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its successor the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (the CSCF/OSCE); 117 the Western 
European Union (WEU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 118 A number 
114 	SIRES/757 (30 May 1992), operative paragraph 11. 
115 	For good summaries of the activities undertaken by regional organizations and other regional 
entities to implement and enforce the sanctions, see: Final Report of the 724 Committee, 
above note 67, paragraph 79; S/19961776 (24 September 1996), annex: Report of the 
Copenhagen Round Table on United Nations Sanctions in the Case of the Former 
Yugoslavia (hereafter "Report of the Copenhagen Round Table"), paragraphs 25-60. 
116 	The EC/EU played a major role in the implementation of sanctions by establishing a number of 
entities to facilitate such implementation. The details relating to these entities appear later in 
this paragraph and accompanying footnotes. 
117 	Like the EC/EU, the CSCE/OSCE also played a major role in the implementation of sanctions by 
establishing a number of entities to facilitate such implementation. The details relating to these 
entities also appear later in this paragraph and accompanying footnotes. 
118 	The WEU and NATO patrolled the Adriatic Sea from July 1992 to June 1993 in order to ensure 
compliance by maritime traffic with the resolutions of the Security Council. From June 1993 the 
two organizations combined their efforts to form an operation entitled "Sharp Guard". By the 
time WEU and NATO concluded their activities to enforce the sanctions, in June 1996, the 
organizations had challenged over 70,000 vessels and inspected almost 6,000 at sea. For further 
details relating to these activities of the WEU and NATO, see: Final Report of the 724 
Committee, above note 67, paragraph 79(b); Report of the Copenhagen Round Table, above 
note 115, paragraphs 48-50. For discussion of the extent to which WEU and NATO action in 
this regard could be viewed as having been authorized by the Security Council prior to the 
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of these regional organizations also created subsidiary entities to facilitate resolution of the 
conflict in the former Yugoslavia in general or the implementation of sanctions in particular. 
The major entity established to address the conflict in the former Yugoslavia in general was 
the Conference on Yugoslavia (CY), which subsequently became the International 
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY). 119 Among the entities established with 
particular responsibilities for facilitating the implementation of sanctions against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) were: the EC/EU/CSCE/OSCE Sanctions 
Assistance Missions (SAMs); 12° the EC/EU/CSCE/OSCE Sanctions Coordinator; 121 and 
adoption of resolution 787 (1992) in November 1992, see the case-study on the former 
Yugoslavia in chapter 8, below. 
In addition to its activities in the Adriatic Sea, the WEU also established a "Danube Mission", 
which commenced operations in June 1993, assisting Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania in their 
efforts to prevent violations of sanctions and ensure that shipping on the Danube was in 
accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council. For further details relating to the 
activities of the WEU Danube Mission, see: Final Report of the 724 Committee, above note 
67, paragraph 79(c); Report of the Copenhagen Round Table, above note 115, paragraphs 41- 
42. 
119 	The CY was established by the EC. In July 1992 the Security Council iwited the EC, in 
cooperation with the Secretary-General, to examine the possibility of broadening the CY to 
provide it with "new momentum" in the search for a resolution to the conflict: S124346 (24 July 
1992): Presidential Statement of 24 July 1992. As a result, the ICFY was convened in London 
from 26 to 28 August 1992. The Conference adopted a Statement of Principles for a negotiated 
settlement of the problems of the former Yugoslavia. Subsequently, the ICFY was a key actor in 
facilitating the conclusion of the Vance-Owen peace plan and the Dayton Peace Agreement. 
For a summary of the CY/ICFY process, see Report of the Copenhagen Round Table, above 
note 115, paragraphs 25-27. 
120 	The SAMs consisted largely of customs officers, who were deployed in States neighbouring 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) to help prevent violation of the 
sanctions. The Council welcomed the role of the SAMs in support of the implementation of the 
sanctions and invited it to work in close cooperation with the 724 Committee in SIRES/820 (17 
April 1993), operative paragraph 20. For further details relating to the work of the SAMs, see: 
Final Report of the 724 Committee, above note 67, paragraph 79(a); Report of the 
Copenhagen Round Table, above note 115, paragraphs 32-35. 
121 	The position of the Sanctions Coordinator was established by the EC and the then CSCE in 
February 1993. The Sanctions Coordinator's mandate included: assessing sanctions 
implementation, as well as the effects of the sanctions; advising States on customs and legal 
matters; bringing violations to the attention of the CSCE/OSCE, the 724 Committee and 
concerned Governments; and consulting with Governments on the investigation and 
prosecution of alleged violations of the sanctions: S/25272 (10 February 1993) [containing the 
full mandate of the Sanctions Coordinator]. The Security Council welcomed the appointment of 
the Sanctions Coordinator and invited him to work in close cooperation with the 724 Committee 
in S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 20. For summaries of the Sanctions 
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the European Commission/CSCE/OSCE Sanctions Assistance Missions Communications 
Centre (SAMCOMM). 122 The ICFY also established a Mission with the responsibility for 
monitoring the extent to which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) 
was complying with its obligation to close its border with Bosnia and Herzegovina. 123 Whilst 
the ICFY Mission was not strictly monitoring the implementation of the sanctions against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), its activities were directly intertwined 
with the sanctions, as the suspension of certain aspects of the sanctions was contingent upon 
the Mission certifying that that border was indeed closed. 124 
When the Security Council suspended the sanctions against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), it paid tribute to neighbouring States, the mission of the 
ICFY, the EU/OSCE Sanctions Coordinator, SAMCOMM, the SAMs, the WEU 
Operation on the Danube and the NATO/WEU Sharp Guard Operation on the Adriatic 
Sea, for their "significant contribution to the achievement of a negotiated peace. 125 In its 
Final Report, the 724 Committee also noted that an important factor in the effectiveness of 
the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 
Coordinator's activities, see: Final Report of the 724 Committee, above note 67, paragraph 
79(a); Report of the Copenhagen Round Table, above note 115, paragraphs 36-38. 
122 	SAMCOMM was established by the European Commission when it created the SAMs, in order 
to serve as a focal point for the exchange of information between the SAMs and the authorities 
of their host States. For summaries of SAMCOMM's activities, see: Final Report of the 724 
Committee, above note 67, paragraph 79(a); Report of the Copenhagen Round Table, above 
note 115, paragraphs 33-35. 
123 	See, e.g., S/1994/1074 (19 September 1994), annex: Report of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering 
Committee of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia (ICFY) on the 
establishment and commencement of operations of an ICFY Mission to the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro). 
124 For further discussion of the manner in which the suspension of aspects of the sanctions 
regime was conditional upon the ongoing certification by the ICFY Mission that the border 
was being effectively closed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), see 
section 7.5, below. 
125 	SIRES/1022 (22 November 1995), operative paragraph 9. 
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had been the role played by regional organizations in assisting national authorities and the 
Committee itself to monitor and enforce the sanctions: 26 
7.5 Suspension and Termination of the FRY sanctions regime 
The Council first began to suspend aspects of the sanctions against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in September 1994, when it 
foreshadowed the potential suspension of restrictions against: (a) Civilian, non-cargo 
carrying aircraft; 127 (b) Passenger, non-cargo carrying ferries between Bar in the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Bari in Italy; ' 28 and (c) Participation in 
sporting events and cultural exchanges: 29 The suspensions were to come into effect upon 
certification by the ICFY Co-Chainnen that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) had effectively closed the border between it and the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to all goods except foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing for essential 
humanitarian needs: 3° They were to apply for an extendable period of 100 days, and they 
were conditional upon the ongoing verification by the Secretary-General that the border 
remained closee The suspensions subsequently came into effect and were extended on 
multiple occasions: 32 as a result of the continuing certification by the Co-Chairmen of the 
ICFY that the border remained closed: 33 
126 Final Report of the 724 Committee, above note 67, paragraph 79. 
127 S/RES/943 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 1(i). 
128 S/RES/943 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 1(ii). 
129 S/RES/943 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 1(iii). 
130 S/RES/943 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 1. 
131 SIRES/943 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 4. 
132 See: S/RES/970 (12 January 1995), operative paragraph 1 [extending the suspensions for 100 
days]; S/RES/988 (21 April 1995), operative paragraph 1 [extending the suspensions for 75 
days]; STRES/1003 (5 July 1995), operative paragraph 1 [extending the suspensions for 75 
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In November 1995, in resolution 1022, the Council suspended all of the remaining 
sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 134 and 
foreshadowed their ultimate termination. 135 Both the suspension and the termination of the 
sanctions were conditional, however. The sanctions would be reapplied if the Secretary-
General were to report that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 
had failed to sign the Peace Agreement prior to the date stipulated by the Contact Group of 
the ICFY, 136 or if subsequent to the signing of the agreement the Secretary-General were to 
report that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) was "failing 
significantly to meet their obligations under the Peace Agreement." 137 Furthermore, the 
sanctions would not be terminated until ten days after the occurrence of free and fair 
elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina."8 Ultimately, in October 1996, once free and fair 
elections had been held in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Council formally terminated the 
days]; SIRES/1015 (15 September 1995), operative paragraph 1 [extending the suspensions for 
six months]. 
133 The certifications by the Co-Chairmen, which were transmitted to the Council by the Secretary-
General, were based upon the observations of the ICFY Mission: see S/1995/6 (4 January 1995), 
annex; S/1995/302 (13 April 1995), annex; S/1995/510 (25 June 1995), annex; S/1995/768 (6 
September 1995), annex. The certifications were treated sceptically by the representative of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and others, who consistently argued that the border had not been 
effectively closed and that fuel forms of military assistance were transiting the border: see, e.g., 
S/PV.3612 (21 December 1995), pp.. 2-4 [arguing that a report of the Secretary-General dated 27 
November 1995 on violations of international humanitarian law and human rights in Srebrenica 
and other towns had indicated that the certifications provided by the Co-Chairman of the ICFY 
had been based on inaccurate information, confirming that paramilitary forces, war materiel, 
special police forces, vehicles and other prohibited items had in fact been delivered from the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) to the Bosnian Serbs during the period in 
which the border was supposed to have been closed]. 
134 SIRES 1022 (22 November 1995), operative paragraph 1. 
135 
 
SIRES 1022 (22 November 1995), operative paragraph 4. 
136 	SIRES 1022 (22 November 1995), operative paragraph I. 
137 SIRES 1022 (22 November 1995), operative paragraph 3. 
138 SIRES 1022 (22 November 1995), operative paragraph 4. 
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sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and 
dissolved the Yugoslavia Sanctions Committee.'" 
7.6 Notable aspects of the FRY sanctions regime 
The FRY sanctions regime was notable mainly due to its complexity, both in terms 
of the breadth of scope of the measures to be applied and the practical challenges of 
implementing sanctions against a country with many neighbours and located in the heart of a 
riparian economic community heavily reliant upon the ability to transport commodities and 
goods via an international river."° As with the implementation and enforcement of the arms 
embargo against the former Yugoslavia in general, an unprecedented number of regional 
actors was involved in ensuring the effective implementation of the sanctions against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro). 141 In connection with that action, the 
Council invoked Chapter VIII of the Charter on a number of occasions.' 42 
The FRY sanctions regime contributed to the evolution of U.N. sanctions practice in 
a number of ways. First, it witnessed the first application of sanctions targeting sport, 
scientific and technological cooperation and cultural exchanges. Second, it provided the first 
139 	SIRES/1074 (1 October 1996). The sanctions were terminated with immediate effect: operative 
paragraph 2. The dissolution of the 724 Committee was to take place once the Committee had 
finalized its report: operative paragraph 6. 
140 	For discussion of the issues peculiar to a riparian target which is part of a multinational 
community, see: Final Report of the 724 Committee, above note 67, paragraphs 33-40. 
141 	When the Security Council provided for the suspension and ultimate termination of the 
sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) to address 
the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it paid tribute to the significant contributions played 
by those various actors to the achievement of a negotiated peace: see S/RES/1022 (22 
November 1995), operative paragraph 9. The Copenhagen Round-Table also opined that the 
"unprecedented formula of a coordinated, inter-institutional, international cooperative effort" 
to assist States in the observance of sanctions might have been a "decisive factor" in making 
the sanctions a "valuable and effective policy instrument": Report of the Copenhagen Round 
Table, above note 115, paragraph 5. 
142 	See, e.g., SIRES/757, preambular paragraph 13; SIRES/787 (16 November 1992), operative 
paragraph 12; SIRES/820, preambular paragraph 10. 
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instance of the Council using a time-delay in order to provide the target with a window of 
time in which they could avoid falling subject to the additional sanctions. 143 Third, it gave rise 
to the first occasion on which the Council decided upon a time-delay in relation to the entry 
into operation of specific suspensions to a sanctions regime Fourth, it was the first time 
that the Council had bestowed responsibilities pertaining to a new sanctions regime upon a 
143 	The Council first utilised a time-delay in April 1993, when it strengthened the sanctions: see 
S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraphs 10, 11, providing that the additional sanctions 
to be applied against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) would come into 
effect 9 days later, unless the Secretary-General were to report that the Bosnian Serb party had 
signed the peace plan and ceased its military attacks. Although, as noted above in section 6.6, 
the Council had earlier adopted sanctions that did not come into effect immediately as part of 
the Libya sanctions regime, on that occasion the Council had not explicitly provided for the 
possibility that the target could avoid the application of sanctions: see SIRES/748 (31 March 
1992), operative paragraph 3. 
144 	See SIRES/943 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 1 [providing that the sanctions 
against civilian travel by aircraft and ferry, and those against sports, scientific cooperation and 
cultural exchanges, would be suspended upon the receipt of certification that the border 
between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
was indeed closed to sanctioned items]. 
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pre-existing Sanctions Committee that had been established to oversee another sanctions 
regime. Fifth, it provided another example, in addition to those evident in the sanctions 
regimes against Haiti and Libya, of the Council adopting a strategy of employing suspensions 
of sanctions to induce additional compliance on the part of the target.' 45 Sixth, it provided a 
rare endorsement of a recommendation relating to action in accordance with Article 50 of 
the Charter. 146 
145 	For details relating to the manner in which the suspension of sanctions was utilised in the Haiti 
sanctions regime, see Appendix 10, below. 
146 	See, e.g., S/RES/757, preambular paragraph 16; SIRES/843 (18 June 1993), preambular 
paragraphs 2, 3, operative paragraph 1. The Council endorsed the 724 Committee's 
recommendations with respect to the requests for special assistance submitted by 8 States and 
requested the Secretary-General to pursue their implementation. See: S/26056, 26282 and 26905: 
(6 July, 9 August and 20 December 1993): Letters dated 6 July, 9 August and 20 December 1993 
from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General, endorsing the 
recommendations of the 724 Committee concerning the applications for special assistance of 
Albania, Bulgaria, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, 
Uganda and Ukraine. 
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8. 	The first Liberia sanctions regime ("Liberia I") 
The Security Council imposed sanctions against Liberia in late-1992, in an attempt 
to pressure the parties to a conflict within Liberia to implement a peace agreement. The 
sanctions consisted of an arms embargo, which was applied for almost a decade before 
being terminated in March 2001. The termination of the Liberian arms embargo did not 
represent the end of the Council's sanctioning efforts against Liberia, however, as at the 
same time it terminated the embargo it also imposed a new sanctions regime in order to 
address the support being provided by the Liberian Government to rebels in Sierra Leone.' 
8.1 The constitutional basis for imposing sanctions against 
Liberia 
In November 1992 the Security Council reaffirmed its belief that the Yamoussoukro 
IV Agreement, of 30 October 1991, offered the best framework for a peaceful resolution of 
the Liberian conflict, 2 regretted that the parties to the conflict had not respected or 
implemented that agreement,' and determined that the deterioration of the situation in Liberia 
constituted a threat to international peace and security. 4 The Council then invoked Chapter 
VII of the U.N. Charter and imposed sanctions against Liberia. 5 In subsequent resolutions 
related to the Liberia sanctions regime, the Council again determined a threat to international 
peace and security, 6 and invoked Chapter VII. 7 
For the details relating to that sanctions regime, see Appendix 18, below. 
2 	SIRES/788 (19 November 1992), preambular paragraph 2. The Yamoussoukro IV Accord had 
endeavoured to create the conditions necessary for the holding of free and fair elections. For 
details, see: S/24815 (17 November 1992), annex. 
SIRES/788 (19 November 1992), preambular paragraph 4. 
S/RES/788 (19 November 1992), preambular paragraph 5. 
SIRES/788 (19 November 1992), operative paragraph 8. 
SIRES/813 (26 March 1993), preambular paragraph 11. 
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8.2 The objective of the Liberia sanctions regime 
The objective of the sanctions was to establish peace and stability in Liberia, 8 and 
the Council set no explicit requirements for termination of the sanctions, stating that they 
would remain in place until it (the Council) decided otherwise.9 In fact, it was notable that 
the Council did not terminate the arms embargo in July 1997, after welcoming both the 
successful holding of presidential and legislative elections and the fact that the elections had 
been certified as "free and fair" by the Chairman of ECOWAS and the U.N. Secretary-
General. '° 
8.3 The scope of the Liberia sanctions regime 
The sanctions consisted of a general and complete embargo upon all deliveries of 
weapons and military equipment to Liberia." Exempt from the embargo, however, were 
weapons and military equipment destined for the sole use of the peace-keeping forces of the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). 12 Although the Security Council 
did not subsequently modify the scope of the Liberia sanctions regime, it frequently called 
upon States to comply with and implement the arms embargo," and to report any violations 
of the embargo to the Liberia Sanctions Committee." 
See, e.g., SIRES/813 (26 March 1993), operative paragraph 9; SIRES/985(13 April 1995), 
preambular paragraph 2. 
S/RES/788 (19 November 1992), operative paragraph 8. 
9 SIRES/788 (19 November 1992), operative paragraph 8. 
10 	S/PRST/1997/41: Presidential statement of 30 July 1997. The joint statement of certification that 
the elections had been free and fair was contained in: S/1997/581 (24 July 1997), annex. 
11 	SIRES/788 (19 November 1992), operative paragraph 8. 
12 	SIRES/788 (19 November 1992), operative paragraph 9. This exemption was subsequently 
reaffirmed in SIRES/813 (26 March 1993), operative paragraph 13. 
13 SIRES/813 (26 March 1993), operative paragraph 9. The Council reaffirmed this call in: 
S/RES/950 (21 October 1994), operative paragraph 6; S/RES/972 (13 January 1995), operative 
paragraph 6; SIRES/1001 (30 June 1995), operative paragraph 10; SIRES/1014 (15 September 
1995), operative paragraph 11; S/RES/1020 (10 November 1995), operative paragraph 11; 
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8.4 The administration, monitoring and enforcement of the 
Liberia sanctions regime 
During the course of the sanctions regime against Liberia, the Security Council 
bestowed responsibilities for the implementation, administunion and enforcement of the 
sanctions upon a number of actors. At first the Council chose not to establish a Sanctions 
Committee at first, bestowing responsibilities instead upon ECOWAS. Subsequently it also 
bestowed responsibilities upon the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). 
The Council eventually established a Sanctions Committee in April 1995, which 
subsequently assumed the major responsibility for oversight of the Liberia sanctions regime. 
8.4.1 Regional organizations 
Although the Security Council did not bestow explicit responsibilities upon regional 
organizations for the administration, implementation or enforcement of the arms embargo 
against Liberia, on multiple occasions it welcomed the contributions made by such 
organizations to resolve the situation in Liberia. The main organization to become involved in 
Liberia was ECOWAS, which sent a peace-keeping force — the ECOWAS Military 
Observer Group (ECOMOG) — to Liberia with a mandate to help implement the 
Yamoussoukro IV Agreement. On a number of occasions the Security Council commended 
SIRES/1041 (29 January 1996), operative paragraph 14; S/PRST/1996/16: Presidential statement 
of 9 April 1996; S/PRST/1996/22: Presidential statement of 6 May 1996; SIRES/1059 (31 May 
1996), operative paragraph 11; SIRES/1071 (30 August 1996), operative paragraph 12; 
SIRES/I083 (27 November 1996), operative paragraph 10; S/RES/1100 (27 March 1997), 
operative paragraph 9; S/RES/1116 (27 June 1997), operative paragraph 7. 
14 S/RES/1001 (30 June 1995), operative paragraph 10; S/RES/1014 (15 September 1995), operative 
paragraph 11; S/RES/1020 (10 November 1995), operative paragraph 11; SIRES/1041 (29 January 
1996), operative paragraph 14; S/PRST/1996/16: Presidential statement of 9 April 1996; 
S/RES/1059 (31 May 1996), operative paragraph 11; SIRES/1071 (30 August 1996), operative 
paragraph 12; SIRES/1083 (27 November 1996), operative paragraph 10; SIRES/I100 (27 March 
1997), operative paragraph 9; S/RES/I116 (27 June 1997), operative paragraph 7. 
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the efforts of ECOWAS, I 5 and encouraged it to continue with its endeavours to help resolve 
the situation.' 6 The Council also demanded that all parties in Liberia cooperate fully with 
ECOWAS, with a view to ensure the full and prompt implementation of the Yamoussoukro 
IV Agreement." The Security Council also welcomed the role being played by the OAU in 
relation to the Liberian conflict. 18 In June 1995, it urged the OAU to continue its 
collaboration with ECOWAS in promoting the cause of peace in Liberia. I9 
8.4.2 The United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) 
In September 1993 the Council established the United Nations Observer Mission in 
Liberia (UNOMIL). 2° The purpose of UNOMIL was to observe the extent to which parties 
See, e.g., SIRES/788 (19 November 1992), preambular paragraph 8, operative paragraph 1; 
SIRES/8 13 (26 March 1993), preambular paragraph 8, operative paragraph 2; S/RES1856 (10 
August 1993), operative paragraph 6; S/RES1866 (22 September 1993), preambular paragraph 7; 
S/PRST/1994/9: Presidential statement of 25 February 1994; S/RES/911 (21 April 1994), 
preambular paragraph 5; S/PRST/1994/33: Presidential statement of 13 July 1994; S/RES1972 
(13 January 1995), preambular paragraph 4; 5/RES/1001 (30 June 1995), preambular paragraph 4; 
SIRES/1014 (15 September 1995), preambular paragraph 5; SIRES/1020 (10 November 1995), 
preambular paragraph 3; SIRES/1041 (29 January 1996), preambular paragraph 3; SIRES/1059 (31 
May 1996), preambular paragraph 6; SIRES/1071 (30 August 1996), preambular paragraph 6; 
S/RES/I083 (27 November 1996), preambular paragraph 6; SIRES/1100 (27 March 1997), 
preambular paragraph 6; S/RES/1116 (27 June 1997), preambular paragraph 7. 
16 	SIRES/8 13 (26 March 1993), operative paragraph 4; SIRES/9 11 (21 April 1994), preambular 
paragraph 5. 
17 SIRES/8 13 (26 March 1993), operative paragraph 10. 
18 	See, e.g., SIRES/788 (19 November 1992), preambular paragraph 9; SIRES/813 (26 March 1993), 
preambular paragraph 9, operative paragraph 3; SIRES/856 (10 August 1993), operative 
paragraph 7; S/RES/866 (22 September 1993), preambular paragraph 8; S/PRST/1994/9: 
Presidential statement of 25 February 1994;. 
19 	SIRES/1001 (30 June 1995), operative paragraph 15; SIRES/1014 (15 September 1995), operative 
paragraph 15. 
20 	SIRES/866 (22 September 1993), operative paragraph 2. UNOMIL's mandate was extended or 
adjusted on multiple occasions: see, e.g., [SIRES/911 (21 April 1994), operative paragraph 2; 
SIRES/950 (21 October 1994), operative paragraph 2; S/RES/972 (13 January 1995), operative 
paragraph 2; SIRES/985 (13 April 1995), operative paragraph 1; SIRES/I001 (3o June 1995), 
operative paragraph 3 [the Council also expressed its intent on that occasion, however, not to 
extend the mandate beyond September 1995 unless certain requirements- outlined in operative 
paragraph 4 - were complied with: operative paragraph 5]; SIRES/1014 (15 September 1995), 
operative paragraph 2; SIRES/1020 (10 November 1995), operative paragraph 2 [adjusting the 
mandate slightly]; SIRES/1041 (29 January 1996), operative paragraph 2; SIRES/1059 (31 May 
1996), operative paragraph 2; SIRES/1071 (30 August 1996), operative paragraph 2; S/RES/1083 
(27 November 1996), operative paragraph 4; SIRES/1100 (27 March 1997), operative paragraph 
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to the Liberian conflict were complying with a new Peace Agreement for Liberia — the 
"Cotonou Agreement". 21 In addition to general responsibilities in relation to verifying the 
implementation of the Cotonou Agreement, however, Council also entrusted UNOMIL with 
the responsibility for assisting in monitoring compliance with the arms embargo. 22 In 
November 1995, when the Council adjusted UNOM1L's mandate, it again requested the 
Operation to monitor compliance with the arms embargo and to verify its impartial 
application. 23 
8.4.3 The Liberia Sanctions Committee 
In January 1995 the Security Council expressed concern at reports of the continuing 
flow of arms into Liberia in violation of the arms embargo against Liberia. 24 In April 1995, 
noting its deep concern that arms continued to be imported into Liberia in violation of the 
embargo,25 the Council decided to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional 
rules of procedure, a Sanctions Committee in order to oversee the administration and 
implementation of the embargo. 26 The Sanctions Committee (the "Liberia Sanctions 
Committee" or the "985 Committee") was to report on its work to the Council with its 
1; S/RES/I 116 (27 June 1997), operative paragraph I. Ultimately UNOMIL was terminated on 30 
September 1997, foreshadowed on the last occasion on which its mandate was extended: 
S/RES/1116 (27 June 1997), operative paragraph I. 
21 	See, in general, SIRES/866 (22 September 1993), operative paragraph 3. For the text of the 
Cotonou Agreement, see: S/26272 (9 August 1993), annex. A number of other agreements were 
subsequently concluded, each with the aim of consolidating the previous Liberian peace 
agreements. See, e.g.: the Akosombo Agreement [S11994/1174 (16 October 1994), annex]; the 
Accra Agreement of 21 December 1994 [S/1995/7 (5 January 1995), annexes 1,11]; and the Abuja 
Agreement [S/1995/742 (28 August 1995), annex]. 
22 	S/RES/866 (22 September 1993), operative paragraph 3(b). 
23 	S/RES/1020 (10 November 1995), operative paragraph 2(c). 
24 	S/RES/972 (13 January 1995), preambular paragraph 7; SIRES/985 (13 April 1995), preambular 
paragraph 5. 
25 	S/RES/985 (13 April 1995), preambular paragraph 5. 
26 SIRES/985 (13 April 1995), operative paragraph 4. 
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observations and recommendations, 27 and to undertake the following tasks: (a) To seek 
from all States information regarding the action taken by them concerning the effective 
implementation of the embargo; 28 (b) To consider any information brought to its attention by 
States concerning violations of the embargo, and in that context to make recommendations 
to the Council on ways of increasing the effectiveness of the embargo;29 and (c) To 
recommend appropriate measures in response to violations of the embargo and provide 
information on a regular basis to the Secretary-General for general distribution to Member 
States.3° In January 1999, the Council expressed grave concern at reports that military 
support was being provided to rebels in Sierra Leone from the territory of Liberia, and it 
urged the 985 Committee to investigate violations of the arms embargo and to report to it 
with recommendations. 31 
The 985 Committee was dissolved in March 2001, when the Council terminated the 
Liberia sanctions regime and established a new sanctions regime to address the Liberian 
Government's support of rebels in Sierra Leone. In its six years of operation the 985 
Committee held six formal meetings 32 — an average of one meeting per year — and issued six 
annual reports.33 The annual reports generally contained very few substantive observations 
27 	SIRES/985 (13 April 1995), operative paragraph 4. 
28 	SIRES/985 (13 April 1995), operative paragraph 4(a). 
29 	SIRES/985 (13 April 1995), operative paragraph 4(b). 
30 	S/RES/985 (13 April 1995), operative paragraph 4(c). 
31 S/PRST/1999/I (7 January 1999): Presidential statement of 7 January 1999. 
32 	This was the number of formal meetings held until by end of 1998, which was the last year in 
which there was an official record of the Committee having held meetings: Index to 
Proceedings of the Security Council for 1998 (1999) United Nations, New York, p. XV. 
33 As with the amual reports of other Sanctions Committees, the annual reports of the 985 
Committee have been circulated as official Security Council documents, in the form of an annex 
to a letter from the Chairman of the 985 Committee addressed to the President of the Security 
Council. The official document numbers and dates of circulation for the letters to which the 
reports are annexed are as follows: S/1996172 (30 January 1996), annex: Report of the Security 
Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 985 (1995) concerning Liberia 
586 
Appendix 8. The Liberia I sanctions regime 
or recommendations. Like a number of other Sanctions Committees, the 985 Committee 
noted that it did not possess an independent mechanism to monitor the embargo and 
therefore relied solely upon the cooperation of States and Organizations to provide it with 
pertinent infomiation? 4 On one occasion the Committee took note of resolution 1196 
(1998), in which the Council had reiterated the obligation of all States to implement their 
obligations relating to arms embargoes and encouraged Member States to adopt legislation 
making the violation of arms embargoes a criminal offence?' The Committee also expressed 
its intention to consider appropriate steps to improve the monitoring of the arms embargo, 
including communicating with relevant regional and subregional organizations? 6 
8.4.4 The Secretary-General 
In July 1994 the Council requested the Secretary-General to ensure that all 
information on violations of the arms embargo was made promptly available to it and 
publicised more widely?' 
8.4.5 States 
The Security Council did not call upon States to undertake significant tasks related 
to the implementation or monitoring of sanctions. Nevertheless, it frequently called upon 
(hereafter "First report of the 985 Committee") [containing a summary of the activities of the 
Committee from its establishment in 1993 until 31 December 1995]; S/1996/1077 (31 December 
1996), annex: Report of the 985 Committee for 1996; S/1997/1026 (31 December 1997), annex: 
Report of the 985 Committee for 1997; S/1998/1220 (24 December 1998), annex: Report of the 
985 Committee for 1998; S/1999/1301 (31 December 1999), annex: Report of the 985 Committee 
for 1999; S/2000/1233 (22 December 2000), annex: Report of the 985 Committee for 2000. 
34 See, e.g.: Report of the 985 Committee for 1996, ibid, paragraph 8; Report of the 985 
Committee for 1998, ibid, paragraph 4; Report of the 985 Committee for 1999, ibid, paragraph 
12; Report of the 985 Committee for 2000, ibid, paragraph 7. 
35 Report of the 985 Committee for 1998, above note 33, paragraph 4. 
36 Report of the 985 Committee for 1998, above note 33, paragraph 5. 
37 S/PRST/1994/33: Presidential statement of 13 July 1994. 
587 
Appendix 8. The Liberia I sanctions regime 
States to comply with and implement the arms embargo,38 to report any violations of the 
embargo to the Liberia Sanctions Committee, 39 and to take all actions necessary to ensure 
strict implementation of the embargo. 4° 
8.5 Termination of the Liberia sanctions regime 
In December 2000, after a period of more than three years in which it did not adopt 
any resolutions or presidential statements in relation to the situation in Liberia, the Security 
Council condemned incursions that had been carried out into Guinea by rebel groups 
emanating from Sierra Leone and Liberia and called upon all States, and in particular 
Liberia, to refrain from providing military support or taking any other action that might 
further destabilize the situation on the border between Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. 4 ' 
Then, in March 2001, the Council took action to address the Liberian Government's 
support of rebels in Sierra Leone, which somewhat paradoxically resulted in the termination 
38 	SIRES/813 (26 March 1993), operative paragraph 9. The Council reaffirmed this call in: 
SIRES/950 (21 October 1994), operative paragraph 6; SIRES/972 (13 January 1995), operative 
paragraph 6; SIRES/985 (13 April 1995), operative paragraph 4 (urging all States, and in 
particular neighbouring States, to comply fully with the embargo); SIRES/1001 (30 June 1995), 
operative paragraph 10; SIRES/1014 (15 September 1995), operative paragraph 11; SIRES/1020 
(10 November 1995), operative paragraph 11; S/RES/1041 (29 January 1996), operative 
paragraph 14; S/PRST/1996/16: Presidential statement of 9 April 1996; S/PRST/1996/22: 
Presidential statement of 6 May 1996; SIRES/1059 (31 May 1996), operative paragraph 11; 
SIRES/I071 (30 August 1996), operative paragraph 12; S/RES/1083 (27 November 1996), 
operative paragraph 10; SIRES/1100 (27 March 1997), operative paragraph 9; S/RES/1116 (27 
June 1997), operative paragraph 7. 
39 	SIRES/1001 (30 June 1995), operative paragraph 10; SIRES/1014 (15 September 1995), operative 
paragraph 11; SIRES/1020(10 November 1995), operative paragraph 11; SIRES/l041 (29 January 
1996), operative paragraph 14; S/PRST/1996/16: Presidential statement of 9 April 1996; 
S/RES/1059 (31 May 1996), operative paragraph 11; SIRES/1071 (30 August 1996), operative 
paragraph 12; SIRES/1083 (27 November 1996), operative paragraph 10; SIRES/1100 (27 March 
1997), operative paragraph 9; S/RES/1116 (27 June 1997), operative paragraph 7. 
40 	S/RES/1071 (30 August 1996), operative paragraph 12; S/RES/1083 (27 November 1996), 
operative paragraph 10; SIRES/1100 (27 March 1997), operative paragraph 9; SIRES/1116 (27 
June 1997), operative paragraph 7. 
41 	S/PRST/2000/41: Presidential statement of 21 December 2000. 
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of the arms embargo against Liberia. 42 In resolution 1343 the Council noted that the conflict 
in Liberia had been resolved, that national elections had taken place within the framework of 
the Yamoussoukro IV Agreement, and that the Final Communiqué of the informal 
consultative group meeting of the ECOWAS Committee of Five on Liberia had been 
implemented.43 The Council then decided to terminate the embargo and dissolve the Liberia 
Sanctions Committee. 44 Resolution 1343 did not represent the end of Council action in 
relation to Liberia, however. The Council also used resolution 1343 to impose a new 
sanctions regime against Liberia in order to address its support of the Rebel United Front in 
Sierra Leone in violation of the sanctions regime against Sierra Leone. 45 
8.6 Notable aspects of the Liberia sanctions regime 
On the whole the Liberian sanctions regime was not particularly noteworthy. 
Although the Council's cractice in relation to the situation in Liberia witnessed the first 
instance in which there was major cooperation in peace-keeping between a regional 
organization and the United Nations, the Liberian sanctions regime itself contributed little to 
the evolution of sanctions practice. Its main contribution occurred upon termination, when it 
became the first sanctions regime to be terminated in the same Security Council resolution 
that applied a new sanctions regime against the same target. It did, however, provide the 
longest delay — three and a half years — between the establishment of a sanctions regime and 
the creation of a Sanctions Committee to oversee that regime's administration. The Liberia 
42 
 
SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001). 
43 	SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), section A, preambular paragraph 2. 
44 SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), section A, operative paragraph 1. 
43 For an overview of the subsequent sanctions regime against Liberia, see Appendix 18, below. 
For discussion of the sanctions regime against Sierra Leone, see Appendix 4, below. 
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Sanctions Committee, once created, subsequently distinguished iself largely on account of 
its low level of activity, meeting six times in six years for an average of one meeting per. year. 
590 
9. The Bosnian Serb sanctions regime 
The Security Council applied sanctions against the Bosnian Serb party in April 
1993, in the aftermath of a series of attacks by Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces in eastern 
Bosnia, including against the town of Srebrenica. The sanctions regime consisted of 
comprehensive sanctions, with the aim of inducing the Bosnian Serbs to participate in the 
Bosnian peace plan. The sanctions were ultimately terminated in October 1996, when free 
and fair elections had been held in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
9.1 The constitutional basis for imposing sanctions against the 
Bosnian Serb party 
On 17 April 1993 the Security Council expressed grave concern at the refusal of the 
Bosnian Serb party to participate in the Bosnian peace plan, expressed determination to 
strengthen the implementation of its earlier relevant resolutions, 2 and noted that it was acting 
under Chapter VI1, 3 before imposing sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs.4 In subsequent 
SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 3. 
S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), Section B, preambular paragraph 1. 
S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), Section B, preambular paragraph 2. Interestingly the Council did not 
make an explicit determination of a threat to or breach of international peace and security 
before imposing sanctions. The reason for this oversight might be that the sanctions against 
the Bosnian Serbs were applied against the background of the strengthening of the sanctions 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro). As the Council had already 
identified a threat to international peace and security in relation to that sanctions regime, 
perhaps it did not consider it necessary to make another explicit determination. It is also 
possible that no explicit determination was made because the Council had long considered the 
situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina to represent a threat to international peace and security. 
Another possibility is that the Council considered the invocation of Chapter VII to be 
sufficient to imply the invocation of Article 39 and hence to amount to an implicit determination 
of a threat to international peace and security. For further discussion of this potential 
interpretation of the Council's decision-making process, see section 15.1, below [discussing 
the Council's failure to make an explicit determination of a threat to international peace and 
security before imposing sanctions against the Rderal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro) to address the situation in Kosovo]. In any event, the Council subsequently 
determined the existence of a threat to international peace and security in connection with the 
sanctions regime against the Bosnian Serbs: see S/RES/942 (23 September 1994), preambular 
paragraph 7. 
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resolutions related to the Bosnian Serb sanctions regime, the Council determined that the 
situation in the former Yugoslavia continued to constitute a threat to international peace and 
security' and invoked Chapter VII of the Charter. 6 
9.2 The objective of the Bosnian Serb sanctions regime 
When the Security Council initially established the Bosnian Serb sanctions regime, it 
tied the termination of the sanctions to the signing and implementation of the Bosnian peace 
plan, thus making it clear that that was the regime's objective.' In September 1994, when 
the sanctions were strengthened, the objective was modified subtly, becoming the 
unconditional acceptance by the Bosnian Serb party of the Bosnian territorial settlement s In 
November 1995 the Council again modified the explicit objective of the sanctions slightly, 
making the suspension of the sanctions contingent upon the withdrawal of Bosnian Serbs 
forces behind zones of separation established in the Bosnia Peace Agreement and tying the 
ultimate termination of the sanctions to the occurrence of free and fair elections in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. 9 
9.3 The scope of the Bosnian Serb sanctions regime 
The sanctions regime against the Bosnian Serbs was initially simple but 
comprehensive. The Council required States to prevent the import to, export from, and 
transshipment through areas under the control of the Bosnian Serb forces, of supplies other 
SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 12. 
SIRES/942 (23 September 1994), preambular paragraph 7; SIRES/1022 (22 November 1995), 
preambular paragraph 10. 
S/RES/942 (23 September 1994), preambular paragraph 8; S/RES/1022 (22 November 1995), 
preambular paragraph 11; SIRES/1074(1 October 1996), preambular paragraph 9. 
SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), section B, operative paragraphs 10, 31. 
SIRES/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraphs 3, 21. 
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than essential humanitarian supplies, including medical supplies and foodstuffs distributed by 
international humanitarian agencies.' ° 
In September 1994, the Council expanded the sanctions to incorporate a range of 
additional measures, including economic, financial and targeted travel sanctions." On the 
economic front, States were required to prevent economic activities from taking place in 
their territories if such activities would involve the participation of an entity that was owned, 
controlled or incorporated by a person or entity from those parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
under the control of Bosnian Serb forces or if those activities would involve the participation 
of an agent of such entities or people. 12 The Council also prohibited all commercial river 
traffic from entering the ports of those a-eas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
under the control of the Bosnian Serb forces." 
9 	SIRES/1022 (22 November 1995), operative paragraphs 2, 4. 
10 	S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 12. Interestingly, the Council did not explicitly 
articulate the items for which import to, export from and transshipment through the areas of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces would be prohibited — 
neglecting even to mention a word such as "commodities", "products", "goods" or "supplies". 
It is likely, however, given the context of the prohibition and considering the Council's past 
practice, that the intention was to prohibit the flow to and from the Bosnian Serbs of products 
and commodities. Another indicator that the sanctions were intended to be comprehensive was 
that the Council specified that exemptions would be permitted from the sanctions for "essential 
humanitarian supplies including medical supplies and foodstuffs distributed by humanitarian 
agencies", provided that such exemptions were authorised by the Government of the Republic 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina: see also operative paragraph 12. 
The Council also outlined voluntary diplomatic/representative sanctions, calling upon States 
to desist from talks with the leadership of the Bosnian Serb party until it had accepted the 
proposed settlement in full: S/RES/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 6. 
12 	S/RES/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 7. Exemptions could be made to these 
prohibitions where: i) the State in which the activities were taking place verified, on a case-by-
case basis, that the activities concerned would not result in the transfer of property to entities 
owned or controlled by persons or entities from, or constituted or incorporated in, those areas 
of the Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces; or ii) the activities 
involved the provision of medical supplies, foodstuffs, or products for essential humanitarian 
needs: ibid. 
13 	SIRES/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 15. Exemptions could be made to this 
prohibition when authorised on a case-by-case basis by the sanctions committee or by the 
Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or in the case of force majeure: ibid. 
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On the financial front., States were required to freeze any funds or other financial 
assets or resources held within their territories if they belonged to an entity that was owned, 
controlled or incorporated by a person or entity from those parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
under the control of Bosnian Serb forces, or to an agent of such entities or people." States 
were also required to ensure that any payments accruing in their territories for entities doing 
business in, or owned, controlled or incorporated by persons or entities from those areas of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the Bosnian Serb forces, would be paid only 
into frozen accounts: 5 Furthermore, the Council required States to prohibit the provision of 
services, both financial and non-financial, to any person or body for the purposes of 
business being carried on in those areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of 
Bosnian Serb forces.' 6 
The targeted travel sanctions applied by the Council required States to prevent the 
entry to their territories of: (a) Members of the authorities in those areas of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina under the control of the Bosnian Serb forces and those acting on behalf of such 
authorities; 17 (b) Officers of the Bosnian Serb military and paramilitary forces and those 
acting on behalf of such forces.," (c) Persons found to have provided financial, material, 
logistical, military or other tangible support to Bosnian Serb forces in violation of the 
sanctions .," and (d) Persons in or resident of those areas of the Republic of Bosnia and 
14 	SIRES/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 11. Exemptions could be made for 
payments that were being made in connection with the import of permitted exemptions, and for 
payments that were authorised by the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
see ibid. 
15 SIRES/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 12. 
16 	S/RES1942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 13. 
17 SIRES/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 14(a). 
18 SIRES/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 14(a). 
19 SIRES/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 14(b). 
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Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces who were found to have violated or 
contributed to the violation of the sanctions against the Bosnian Serb party. 2° The Council 
also provided, however, for the possibility that exemptions might be provided from the travel 
sanctions for purposes consistent with the peace process. 21 
9.4 The administration, monitoring and enforcement of the 
Bosnian Serb sanctions regime 
The Council bestowed responsibility for the administration, implementation and 
enforcement of the sanctions regime against the Bosnian Serb party upon a range of actors, 
including the 724 Sanctions Committee, the Secretary-General, States, the Sanctions 
Assistance Missions, and the ICFY and EC Monitoring Missions. 
9.4.1 The 724 Committee 
When the Security Council established the sanctions regime against the Bosnian 
Serbs, it bestowed responsibilities upon the 724 Committee, which had originally been 
established in order to oversee the administration of the arms embargo against the States of 
the former Yugoslavia. 22 The Council thus decided that the 724 Committee would assume 
the following tasks in relation to the sanctions regime against the Bosnian Serbs: (a) receiving 
notifications regarding the provision of supplies intended strictly for medical purposes and 
foodstuffs;23 (b) deciding upon applications for exemptions from the sanctions for the 
provision of commodities or products for essential humanitarian needs; 24 (c) receiving and 
processing on a case-by-case basis applications for exemptions from the sanctions for the 
20 	S/RES/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 14(c). 
21 S/RES/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 14. 
22 For information relating to the establishment of the 724 Committee, see section 4.4, above. 
23 	SIRES/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 7(ii)(b). 
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provision of services necessary for humanitarian or other exceptional purposes; 25 
(d) establishing and maintaining an updated list, based on information provided by States 
and competent regional organizations, of the persons to whom the targeted travel sanctions 
would apply; 26 and (e) receiving and processing, on a case-by-case basis, applications for 
exemptions from the prohibition upon the movement of commercial riverine traffic. 27 
As noted above in the overviews of the sanctions regimes against the former 
Yugoslavia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenego), 28 the 724 
Committee held 142 formal meetings during its tenure. 29 Only the Committee's Final 
Report was issued after the establishment of the sanctions regime against the Bosnian 
Serbs." In observations relevant to the Bosnian Serb sanctions regime in particular, the 
Committee noted that, in response to requests from a number of countries and UNESCO, it 
had clarified that educational, cultural and other activities in Bosnian Serb-controlled areas 
should be undertaken with the prior authorisation of the Government of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the Committee itself. 31 The Committee also noted that it had been unable 
to establish a list of individuals whose travel was prohibited.32 It had, nevertheless, received 
and approved requests from Canada and the United States to authorize entry into their 
24 	Ibid. 
25 	SIRES/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 13. 
26 	S/RES1942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 14. 
27 SIRES/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 15. 
28 	See sections 4.4 and 7.4, above. 
29 	The 142" and last meeting of the Committee took place on 19 September 1996: Index to 
Proceedings of the Security Council for 1996 (1997) United Nations, New York, p. xiii. 
30 S/1996/946 (15 November 1996), annex: Final Report of the Security Council Committee 
established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia, (hereafter 'Final 
Report of the 724 Committee") [containing a summary of the Committee's activities from 
January 1993 until the termination of the sanctions regime on 1 October 1996]. 
31 Final Report of the 724 Committee, ibid, paragraph 62. 
32 Final Report of the 724 Committee, above note 30, paragraph 63. 
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territories of certain individuals for participation in legal proceedings and the Dayton peace 
talks." 
9.4.2 The Secretary-General 
During the course of the sanctions regime against the Bosnian Serbs, the Security 
Council requested the Secretary-General to undertake a number of tasks with direct 
relevance to the Bosnian Serb sanctions. 34 Those tasks included the following: (a) Reporting 
to the Council if within nine days of the adoption of resolution 820 (1993) the Bosnian Serbs 
had signed and begun to implement the peace plan, in which case the sanctions would not be 
imposed .," (b) In the event that the Bosnian Serbs did sign and begin to implement the 
peace process, thus meaning that the sanctions were not in fact imposed, to report to the 
Council if the Bosnian Serbs had renewed military attacks or failed to comply with the peace 
plan, in which case the sanctions would immediately come into effect; 36 and (c) Once the 
sanctions had been imposed, to report to the Council if the Bosnian Serbs had signed the 
peace plan and as implementing its obligations in good faith, in which case the Council 
would review the sanctions with a view to lifting them gradually. 37 
9.4.3 States 
On top of the general obligation flowing from the establishment of the sanctions 
regime against the Bosnian Serbs to do everything in their power to implement the sanctions 
33 	Ibid. 
34 Due to the close relationship between the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) and the sanctions regime against the Bosnian Serbs, a 
number of these tasks are also listed above in section 7.4. 
35 S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 10. 
36 S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 11. 
37 	S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 31. 
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within their own jurisdictions, States were also requested, authorized or required by the 
Security Council to take various actions to implementation, monitor or enforce the sanctions. 
As with the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenego), the Council's additional requests in relation to the Bosnian Serb sanctions 
regime were sometimes addressed to States in general and sometimes directed at States 
either neighbouring or located in the region surrounding Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
i. 	States in general 
When the sanctions were first established against the Bosnian Serbs, the Council 
required States in general to detain vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock, aircraft and 
cargoes suspected of having violated the sanctions. 38 At the same time, the Council also 
requested or called upon States in general: to bring proceedings against persons and entities 
violating the sanctions and to impose appropriate penalties; 39 and to provide such assistance 
as was required by riparian States to ensure that shipping on the Danube did not violate the 
sanctions.4° 
In September 1994, when it strengthened the sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs, 
the Council required States to prevent shipments of commodities and products destined for 
those areas under the control of Bosnian Serb forces from violating the sanctions by ensuring 
that they were physically inspected by the Sanctions Assistance Missions or by competent 
national authorities at loading to verify and seal their contents or that the contents could be 
38 
 
SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 25. In the same operative paragraph the Council 
noted that detained vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock, aircraft and cargoes might be 
subject to forfeit to the detaining State. 
39 	SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 19. 
ao SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 17. 
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easily verified.4 ' At the same time the Council also required States from which commodities 
or products were to be shipped to areas under the control of the Bosnian Serbs in 
accordance with the permitted exemptions from the sanctions, to report the source of funds 
from which payment was to be made to the 724 Committee. 42 In addition, States were also 
required to take steps to prevent the diversion of benefits to areas the control of Bosnian 
Serb forces from other places, and in particular from the United Nations Protected Areas in 
Croatia. 43 
In April 1995, the Council requested Member States to make available the 
necessary resources to strengthen the ICFY Mission's capacity to carry out its tasks, which 
included certifying that the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro) and areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the Bosnian Serbs 
remained closed.44 
Riparian and Neighbour States 
When the sanctions were imposed against the Bosnian Serbs, the Security Council 
effectively requested the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina to play a monitoring role 
by providing that goods and commodities could be imported to, exported from, or 
transhipped through the areas under the control of the Bosnian Serbs when authorized by 
the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 45 At the same time, the Council also called 
41 SIRE S/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 16. 
42 SIRES/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 17. 
43 SIRES/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 18. 
44 SIRES/988 (21 April 1995), operative paragraph 6. The ICFY Mission was established to 
monitor and certify that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) was adhering 
to its commitment to close its border with the areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the 
control of the Bosnian Serbs to all but foodstuffs and medical and humanitarian supplies. For 
discussion of the Mission's activities, see sections 7.4 and 9.4, below. 
45 SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 12. 
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upon riparian States to ensure that cabotage traffic along the Danube river between 
Vidin/Calafat and Mohacs was adequately monitored so that no vessels suspected of having 
violated the sanctions were permitted to pass, 46 and reaffirmed the responsibility of riparian 
States to take the measures necessary to ensure that shipping on the Danube did not violate 
the sanctions, including taking action to halt shipping in order to inspect and verify their 
cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the sanctions. 47 
In May 1995 the Council requested the Government of Romania, with the 
assistance of the EU/OSCE Sanctions Assistance Missions, to monitor the use of Romanian 
locks while repairs were being carried out to locks on the Serbian side of the river, including 
if necessary by inspections of the vessels and their cargo, in order to ensure that no goods 
were loaded or unloaded during the passage by the vessels through the locks of the Iron 
Gates I system. 48 The Council also requested Romania to deny passage through the locks 
on its bank of the Danube to any vessel suspected to have violated sanctions. 49 
9.4.4 Regional organizations and other regional entities involved in the 
implementation and enforcement of the sanctions 5° 
As with the implementation of the sanctions regimes against the former Yugoslavia 
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), regional organizations played 
a significant role in the implementation of the sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs. When the 
46 	SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 16. 
47 	S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 17. 
48 	SIRES/992 (11 May 1995), operative paragraph 3. 
49 	SIRES/992 (11 May 1995), operative paragraph 4. 
50 	For good summaries of the activities undertaken by regional organizations and other regional 
entities to implement and enforce the sanctions, see: Final Report of the 724 Committee, 
above note 30, paragraph 79; S/1996/776 (24 September 1996), annex: Report of the 
Copenhagen Round Table on United Nations Sanctions in the Case of the Former 
Yugoslavia (hereafter "Report of the Copenhagen Round Table"), paragraphs 25-60. 
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Security Council imposed sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs, it reaffirmed that the 
authority granted to States, acting nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements, to 
use such measures as necessary to ensure that maritime and riparian shipping was not 
violating sanctions, applied also to the sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs. 51 
The main entities with particular responsibilities for facilitating the implementation of 
the sanctions were the EC/EU/CSCE/OSCE Sanctions Assistance Missions (SAMs) 52 and 
the Mission of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia established to monitor 
the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. 
The SAMs consisted largely of customs officers, who were deployed in States 
neighbouring the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) to help prevent the 
violation of the sanctions. In April 1993, when it first established the sanctions against the 
Bosnian Serbs, the Council welcomed the role of the SAMs in support of the 
implementation of the sanctions and invited it to work in close cooperation with the 724 
Committee. 53 In September 1994, when it strengthened the sanctions, the Council further 
acknowledged the role being played by the SAMs in the implementation of the sanctions 
against the Bosnian Serbs by requiring States to prevent shipments of commodities and 
products destined for those areas under the control of Bosnian Serb forces from violating 
51 	See: S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 29 (reaffirming the authority of States 
acting under paragraph 12 of resolution 787 (1992) to use such measures commensurate with 
the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to 
enforce resolution 820 (1993) itself). 
52 	The SAMs consisted largely of customs officers, who were deployed in States neighbouring 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) to help prevent the violation of the 
sanctions. The Council welcomed the role of the SAMs in support of the implementation of the 
sanctions and invited it to work in close cooperation with the 724 Committee in. 
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the sanctions by ensuring that they were physically inspected by the Sanctions Assistance 
Missions or by competent national authorities to verify and seal their contents. 54 
The ICFY Mission was established in late-1994, in order to verify that the border 
between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) and areas of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina under the control of the Bosnian Serbs was closed to all goods except those 
exempt from the sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs. 55 Although a major consequence of 
the Mission's activities was the effective implementation of the sanctions against the Bosnian 
Serbs, its actions were also directly connected with the implementation of the sanctions 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), for the suspension of 
aspects of the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) 
was contingent upon the Mission certifying that the border closure was being maintained. 56 
The ICFY Mission indeed submitted a number of reports certifying that the border closure 
was being maintained by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), on the 
basis of which the Council subsequently extended the suspensions. 57 Although the ICFY 
53 S/RES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraph 20. For further details relating to the work of the 
SAMs, see: Final Report of the 724 Committee, above note 30, paragraph 79(a); Report of the 
Copenhagen Round Table, above note 50, paragraphs 32-35. 
54 S/RES/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraph 16. 
55 	See, e.g., S/1994/1074 (19 September 1994), annex: Report of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering 
Committee of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia (ICFY) on the 
establishment and commencement of operations of an ICFY Mission to the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro). The idea of establishing an observer mis sion along the 
border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina had been raised sometime earlier in a letter dated 7 July 1993 from the President of 
the Security Council to the Secretary-General, in which the President of the Security Council 
invited the Secretary-General to contact Member States in order to establish whether they were 
prepared, individually or through regional organizations or arrangements to make personnel 
available to act as observers along the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina: S/26049 (7 July 
1993): Letter dated 7 July 1993 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the 
Secretary-General. 
56 	For further details, see section 7.4, above. 
57 	The certifications by the Co-Chairmen, which were transmitted to the Council by the Secretary- 
General, were based upon the observations of the ICFY Mission: see S/1995/6 (4 January 1995), 
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Mission's certifications that the border was being effectively closed were greeted with 
scepticism in some quarters, 58 the 724 Committee observed in its Final Report that the 
Mission had played an important role in monitoring the application of the sanctions against 
the Bosnian Serbs. 59 
9.5 Suspension and termination of the Bosnian Serb sanctions 
regime 
The Council provided for the possibility that the sanctions against the Bosnian Serb 
party might be suspended in resolution 1022 - the same resolution which suspended the 
sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). 6° But 
whereas the suspensions to the regime against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) were to apply with immediate effect,61 the suspensions to the regime against 
the Bosnian Serb party were conditional upon the withdrawal of Bosnian Serb forces behind 
the zones of separation established in the Peace Agjeement, 62 and upon the implementation 
by the Bosnian Serb forces of its obligations under the Peace Agreement. ° The condition 
for termination of the regime, which had begun as the signing of the Peace plan by the 
annex; S119951302 (13 April 1995), annex; S1I9951510 (25 June 1995), annex; S/19951768 (6 
September 1995), annex. 
58 	The certifications were treated sceptically by the Ambassador of Bosnia and Herzegovina to 
the United Nations, who consistently argued that the border had not been effectively closed 
and that fuel forms of military assistance were transiting the border: see, e.g., S/PV.3612 (21 
December 1995), pp.. 2-4 [arguing that a report of the Secretary-General dated 27 November 
1995 on violations of international humanitarian law and human rights in Srebrenica and other 
towns had indicated that the certifications provided by the Co-Chairman of the ICFY had been 
based on inaccurate information, confirming that paramilitary forces, war materiel, special police 
forces, vehicles and other prohibited items had in fact been delivered from the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) to the Bosnian Serbs during the period in which the border 
was supposed to have been closed]. 
59 	Final Report of the 724 Committee, above note 30, paragraph 79(d). 
so S/RES/IO22 (22 November 1995). 
61 	S/RES/1022 (22 November 1995), operative paragraph I. 
62 S/RES/1022 (22 November 1995), operative paragraph 2. 
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Bosnian Serb party, 64 and was then modified to the unconditional acceptance by the 
Bosnian Serb party of the territorial settlement, 65 became with resolution 1022 the 
occurrence of free and fair elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with the 
Peace Agyeement. 66 The sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs party were suspended on 27 
February 1996, after the Security Council was informed that the Bosnian Serb forces had 
withdrawn from the zones of separation established in the Peace Agfeement. 67 The sanctions 
were ultimately terminated on October 1 1996, after there had been free and fair elections." 
9.6 Notable aspects of the Bosnian Serb sanctions regime 
The most noteworthy aspect of the Bosnian Serb sanctions regime was that it 
constituted the first occasion in which the Security Council applied sanctions against a sub-
State entity. 69 Although the framework outlined in Chapter VII, and more particularly Article 
41, of the United Nations Charter did not exclude the possibility that sanctions might be 
applied against targets other than States, the application of sanctions against the Bosnian 
Serbs represented a novel development in sanctions practice. Since the Bosnian Serb 
sanctions regime was established, the Council has again applied sanctions against sub-State 
or non-State actors on multiple occasions, as part of the sanctions regimes against Angola 
63 	SIRES/1022 (22 November 1995, operative paragraph 3. 
SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraphs 10, 31: see note 7, above. 
65 	SIRES/942 (23 September 1994), operative paragraphs 3, 21. 
66 	SIRES/1022 (22 November 1995), operative paragraph 4. 
67 	Final Report of the 724 Committee, above note 30, paragraph 4(h) [referring to letteis that the 
724 Committee had sent to States and international organizations: SCA/8/96(2); SCA/8/96(2-1)]. 
68 	SIRES/1074 (1 October 1996), operative paragraph 2. 
69 Although it is arguable that the Southern Rhodesia sanctions regime was imposed against a 
sub-State entity, the target nevertheless was in de-facto control of the territories and 
government of a State, meaning that the sanctions were effectively, if not technically, imposed 
against a State-like entity. In the case of the Bosnian Serbs, however, the target was not in a 
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(UNITA), Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan/the Taliban/AI Qaeda." In other 
respects, the Bosnian Serb sanctions regime shared a number of noteworthy characteristics 
also evident in the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro), including providing the first instance of the Council using a time-delay in order 
to provide the target with a window of time in which they could avoid falling subject to the 
additional sanctions?' and providing another occasion on which the Council bestowed 
responsibilities pertaining to a new sanctions regime upon a pre-existing Sanctions 
Committee that had been established to oversee another sanctions regime. In addition, as 
with the implementation and enforcement of the arms embargo against the former Yugoslavia 
in general and the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro), a substantial number of regional actors was involved in ensuring the effective 
implementation of the sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs. 
position of de-facto control over the territories and government of a State. Rather, the Bosnian 
Serbs controlled certain pockets of territory within a State. 
70 	For further details relating to those sanctions regimes, see appendices 11, 12, 14 and 16, 
respectively, below. 
71 SIRES/820 (17 April 1993), operative paragraphs 10, 11, providing that the sanctions against the 
Bosnian Serbs, contained in operative paragraph 12, would come into effect 9 days later, unless 
the Secretary-General were to report that the Bosnian Serbs had signed the peace plan and 
ceased its military attacks. Interestingly, however, the Council did not employ a time-delay in 
September 1994, when it strengthened the Bosnian Serb sanctions regime: see SIRES/942 (23 
September 1994), operative paragraphs 6, 7, 11-15. 
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10. The Haiti sanctions regime 
The Security Council imposed sanctions against Haiti in June 1993 in order to bring 
about the reinstatement of the democratically elected government of President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide. The sanctions regime initially consisted of targeted petroleum, arms and 
financial sanctions. The sanctions were suspended for a short period, from 27 August to 13 
October 1993, when it appeared that the de facto authorities in Haiti were complying with 
the Council's demands in relation b the implementation of two peace agreements — "the 
Governor's Island Agreement" and "the New York pact". They were reimposed, however, 
once it became clear that the compliance of the de facto authorities had been only partial 
and temporary. In May 1994 the Council strengthened the sanctions considerably, imposing 
aviation, travel and economic sanctions to make the sanctions regime comprehensive. The 
sanctions were ultimately terminated on 15 October 1994, upon the return to Haiti of 
President Aristide. 
10.1 The constitutional basis for imposing sanctions against Haiti 
In June 1993 the Security Council received a letter from the representative of Haiti 
to the United Nations requesting that it make universal and mandatory the trade embargo 
against Haiti which had been recommended by the Organization of American States 
(OAS).' In response, the Council adopted resolution 841 (1993), in which it expressed its 
strong support for the efforts made by the U.N. Secretary-General, the OAS Secretary- 
S/25958 (16 June 1993): Letter dated 7 June 1993 from the Representative of Haiti addressed 
to the President of the Security Council. 
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General and the international community to reach a political solution to the crisis in Haiti, 2 
noted with concern the incidence of humanitarian crises, including mass displacements of 
population, becoming or aggravating threats to international peace and security, 3 and stated 
that it deplored the fact that the legitimate Government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide had not 
been reinstated.4 The Council then considered that the request from the representative of 
Haiti warranted "exceptional" measures by the Council in support of the efforts that had 
already been take to resolve the situation within the OAS framework,' and it determined 
that, in those unique and exceptional circumstances, the continuation of the situation in Haiti 
threatened international peace and security in the region. 6 The Council then noted that it was 
acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,' and imposed sanctions 
against the de facto authorities in Haiti.' The sanctions were to come into force one week 
after the resolution, unless the Secretary-General reported before that time that the 
imposition of the sanctions was not warranted. 9 In subsequent resolutions related to the Haiti 
sanctions regime, the Council again determined the existence of a threat to international 
peace and security, 10 and invoked Chapter VII." 
2 SIRES/841 (16 June 1993), preambular paragraph 6. 
3 SIRES/841 (16 June 1993), preambular paragraph 9. 
4 S/RES/841 (16 June 1993), preambular paragraph 10. 
5 	S/RES/841 (16 June 1993), preambular paragraph 13. 
6 	SIRES/841 (16 June 1993), preambular paragraph 14. 
7 	S/RES/841 (16 June 1993), preambular paragraph 15. 
SIRES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraphs 5,6 and 8. 
9 SIRES/84 1 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 3. 
tO 	On most occasions the Council characterised the threat as being the failure of the military 
authorities in Haiti to fulfil their obligations under the Governor's Island Agreement: see, e.g., 
SIRES/873 (13 October 1993), preambular paragraph 4; SIRES/875 (16 October 1993), preambular 
paragraph 7; SIRES/917 (6 May 1994), preambular paragraph 13. On one occasion, however, the 
Council simply characterised the situation in Haiti as the threat: SIRES/940 (31 July 1994), 
preambular paragraph 10. 
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10.2 The objective of the Haiti sanctions regime 
During the course of the Haiti sanctions regime, the major explicit objective of the 
sanctions was ensuring the reinstatement of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide's Government 
in Haiti. In the process of modifying the scope of the sanctions regime, however, the Council 
also modified subtly its explicit objectives. When the Council first imposed sanctions against 
Haiti, it expressed willingness to consider lifting the sanctions if the Secretary-General 
reported that the de facto authorities in Haiti had signed and begun implementing in good 
faith an agreement to reinstate the government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. 12 In 
August 1993, when the Council suspended the sanctions, it expressed readiness to terminate 
the sanctions if the Secretary-General, having regard to the views of the OAS Secretary-
General, were to conclude that the relevant provisions of the Governor's Island Agreement 
had been fully implemented. 13 In October 1993, when the Council reimposed the sanctions, 
it provided for the possibility that the sanctions might not be reimposed if the Secretary-
General were to report, having regard to the view of the OAS Secretary-General, that the 
authorities in Haiti were implementing in full the agreement to reinstate the legitimate 
Government of President Aristide and had established the necessary measures to enable the 
United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) to carry out its mandate." The objective of the 
II 	SIRES/86 1 (27 August 1993), preambular paragraph 7; S/RES/873 (13 October 1993),preambular 
paragraph 5; SIRES/875 (16 October 1993), preambular paragraph 8; S/RES/917 (6 May 1994), 
preambular paragraph 14; SIRES/940 (31 July 1994), operative paragraph 4. 
SIRES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 16. 
SIRES/861 (27 August 1993), operative paragraph 3. 
SIRES/873 (13 October 1993), operative paragraph 1. UNMIH was established by the Security 
Council in September 1993, in order to assist the Government of Haiti in the implementation of 
the Governor's Island Agreement, which had called for assistance for modernizing the armed 
forces of Haiti and establishing a new police force with the presence of United Nations 
personnel. For the establishment of UNMIH, see SIRES/867 (23 September 1993), operative 
paragraphs 1-4. UNMIH's mandate was extended on a number of occasions, ultimately expiring 
in late June 1996: see SIRES/905 (23 March 1994), operative paragraph 2; SIRES/933 (30 June 
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sanctions regime thus became the reinstatement of the legitimate Government of President 
Aristide and enabling UNMIH to pursue its mandate. 
In November 1993, the Council stressed that the sanctions would remain in force 
until the objectives of the Governor's Island Agreement were fulfilled, including the departure 
of the Commander-in-Chief of the Haitian armed forces, the creation of a new police force 
permitting the restoration of constitutional order, and the return of the democratically-elected 
President Aristide. 15 In May 1994, when it strengthened the sanctions, the Council 
reaffirmed that the goal of the international community remained the restoration of 
democracy in Haiti and the return of President Aristide. 16 The Council further stated 
explicitly that the sanctions would not te lifted until the following developments had taken 
place: (a) The retirement of the Commander-in-Chief of the Haiti Armed Forces and the 
resignation or departure from Haiti of the Chief of Police of Port-au-Prince and the Chief of 
Staff of the Haiti Aimed Forces;" (b) The change of leadership of the police and military 
high command in Haiti had changes, as required by the Governor's Island Agreement' s 
(c) The adoption of legislative actions called for in the Governor's Island Agreement and the 
creation of an environment in which free and fair elections could be organized;19 (d) The 
1994), operative paragraph 1; SIRES/940 (31 July 1994), operative paragraphs 9-11 [revising as 
well as extending UNMIH's mandate]; SIRES/975 (30 January 1995), operative paragraph 8; 
SIRES/1007 (31 July 1994), operative paragraph 9; SIRES/1048 (29 February 1996), operative 
paragraph 5. UNMIH was succeeded by the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti, which 
was established by SIRES/1063 (28 June 1996), operative paragraph 2, in order to facilitate the 
transition back to democracy in Haiti. 
15 S126747: Presidential statement of 15 November 1993. 
16 	S/RES/917 (6 May 1994), preambular paragraph 8. 
17 S/RES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 18(a). 
18 SIRES/91 7 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 18(b). 
19 	SIRES/9 17 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 18(c). 
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creation of the proper environment for the deployment of U1'4/11nm and (e) The return of 
the democratically elected President and the maintenance of constitutional order. 21 
In July 1994, when the Council strengthened the means for implementation of the 
sanctions even further, it again reaffirmed that the goal of the international community 
remained the restoration of democracy in Haiti and the prompt return of President Aristide, 22 
and noted that it would lift the sanctions following the return to Haiti of President Aristide. 23 
In September 1994 the Council decided that the Haiti sanctions regime would be terminated 
on the day after President Aristide had returned to Haiti. 24 
10.3 The scope of the Haiti sanctions regime 
The Haiti sanctions regime initially consisted of an embargo against petroleum and 
arms, and financial sanctions. The embargo required States to prevent the sale or supply to 
Haiti of petroleum and petroleum products, as well as arms and arms-related materie1. 25 
States were further required to prohibit air and sea traffic from entering the territory or 
territorial sea of Haiti if it was carrying petroleum or arms in breach of the sanctions. 26 The 
financial sanctions required States to freeze any funds belonging to or controlled by the 
20 	S/RES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 18(d). 
21 S/RES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 18(e). 
22 S/RES/940 (31 July 1994), preambular paragraph 8. 
23 	S/RES/940 (31 July 1994), operative paragraph 17. 
24 	SIRES/944 (29 September 1994), operative paragraph 4. 
25 	S/RES/84 I (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 5. The Council provided, however, that 
exemptions could be made to the embargo for the importation, in non-commercial quantities 
and only in barrels or bottles, of petroleum or petroleum products, including propane gas for 
cooking, for verified essential humanitarian needs, if the Haiti Sanctions Committee so 
authorized, on an exceptional, case-by-case basis under a no-objection procedure: see ibid, 
operative paragraph 7. The Council further stipulated that in the case of such exemptions, 
arrangements should be made for the effective monitoring of delivery and use of the exempted 
imports: ibid. 
26 	SIRES/84 1 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 6. 
611 
Appendix 10. The Haiti sanctions regime 
Government of Haiti or the de facto authorities in Haiti. 27 In addition to outlining the scope 
of the sanctions, the Council also took the step of prohibiting all traffic from entering the 
territory or territorial sea of Haiti if carrying products prohibited by the sanctions regime. 28 
The temporary suspension of the Haiti sanctions regime 
Two months after the sanctions were first imposed, the Secretary-General reported 
to the Council that the Prime Minister of Haiti had been confirmed and had assumed office in 
Haiti. 29 In response to that development the Council suspended the sanctions," noting 
however that the suspension of the sanctions would terminate if the Secretary-General were 
to report that the President of Haiti, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Haiti, 
or any other authorities in Haiti had not complied in good faith with the Governors Island 
Agreement.31 The Council further expressed its willingness to consider terminating the 
sanctions if the Secretary-General were to report that the provisions of the Governors Island 
Agreement had been fully implemented.32 
The reimposition of sanctions 
In October 1994, barely six weeks after the sanctions had been suspended, the 
Council reimposed them. On 11 October the Council expressed its deep concern with the 
situation in Haiti and deplored events that had taken place that day, in which organized 
armed civilian groups had threatened journalists and diplomats waiting to meet a contingent 
27 SIRES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 8. 
28 	SIRES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 6. 
29 S/26361 (26 August 1993), as noted by the Council in SIRES/861 (27 August 1993), preambular 
paragraph 6. 
30 	SIRES/861 (27 August 1993), operative paragraph 1. 
31 SIRES/86 1 (27 August 1993), operative paragraph 2. 
32 	S/RES/861 (27 August 1993), operative paragraph 3. 
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of UNM111. 33 It then requested the Secretary-General to report to it urgently on whether 
those incidents constituted non-compliance by the armed forces of Haiti with the Governor's 
Island Agreement, thus warranting the reimposition of sanctions. 34 On 13 October, the 
Secretary-General reported that the military authorities of Haiti had failed to comply in good 
faith with the Governor's Island Agreement, and that he therefore considered it necessary to 
terminate the suspension of the sanctions. 35 On the same day, the Security Council decided 
to terminate the suspension of the sanctions. 36 The sanctions were to be imposed as before, 
except that exemptions could now be provided from the financial sanctions upon the request 
of President Aristide or Prime Minister Malval of Haiti," and from the arms and petroleum 
sanctions if approved by the Haiti Sanctions Committee on a case-by-case basis under the 
no-objection procedure in response to a request by President Aristide or Prime Minister 
N4adwd." 
Strengthening of the sanctions 
In May 1994 the Security Council strengthened the sanctions regime considerably, 
applying aviation sanctions, targeted travel sanctions and economic sanctions, thus making 
the Haiti sanctions regime comprehensive. Under the aviation sanctions, States were 
required to deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory if 
33 	S/26567: Presidential statement of 11 October 1993. 
34 	Ibid. 
S/26573 (13 October 1993): Report of the Secretary-General on the question concerning Haiti, 
paragraphs 9, 10. 
36 	SIRES/873 (13 October 1993), operative paragraph 1. 
37 	S/RES/873 (13 October 1993), operative paragraph 2. 
38 	SIRES/873 (13 October 1993), operative paragraph 3. 
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it was destined for or had originated from Haiti. 39 Under the travel sanctions, States were 
required to prevent the entry into their territory of: (a) Officers of the Haitian military, 
including the police, and their families;" (b) The major participants in the 1991 coup d'etat 
and members of the illegal governments in power since the coup, as well as their immediate 
families;41 and (c) People employed by or acting on behalf of the Haitian military and their 
immediate families. 42 Under the economic sanctions, States were required to prevent the 
import to their territories from Haiti of all commodities and products," and the export to 
Haiti of any commodities or products," with the exception of (a) Supplies intended strictly 
for medical purposes, and foodstuffs;" (b) Commodities and products for essential 
humanitarian needs, as approved by the Haiti Sanctions Committee under the no-objection 
procedure;46 (c) Items previously exempted from the sanctions regime, such as petroleum 
and petroleum products, including propane gas for cooking, authorized by the Haiti 
Sanctions Committee, and exemptions from the financial, petroleum and aims sanctions as 
requested by the President and Prime Minister of Haiti and approved by the Haiti Sanctions 
Committee;47 (d) Trade in informational materials, including books and other publications, 
needed for the free flow of information;" and (e) Equipment belonging to joumalists. 49 
39 	SIRES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 2. The Council exempted from the aviation 
sanctions, however, regularly scheduled commercial passenger flights and flights approved for 
humanitarian purposes by the Haiti Sanctions Committee: also operative paragraph 2. 
ao 
 
SIRES/91 7 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 3(a). 
41 SIRES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 3(b). 
42 	SIRES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 3(c). 
43 SIRES/9 17 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 6. 
44 SIRES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 7. 
45 S/RES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 7(a). 
46 SIRES/9 17 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 7(b) 
47 SIRES/9 17 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 7(c) and (d). 
48 S/RES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 8. 
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10.4 The administration, monitoring and enforcement of the Haiti 
sanctions regime 
The Security Council bestowed responsibilities related to the administration, 
implementation and enforcement of the sanctions upon a number of actors, including a 
Sanctions Committee, the Secretary-General, States, and a regional organization — the 
Organization of American States (OAS). 
10.4.1 The Haiti Sanctions Committee 
The Council established a Sanctions Committee at the same time that it created the 
Haiti sanctions regime. 50 The Committee (the "Haiti Sanctions Committee" or the "841 
Committee") was to report to the Council with its observations and recommendations,51 and 
to undertake the following responsibilities: (a) To examine reports submitted by States 
regarding implementation of the sanctions;52 (b) To seek from all States further information 
regarding action taken to implement the sanctions;53 (c) To consider any information brought 
to its attention concerning violations of the sanctions and to recommend appropriate 
measures in response thereto;54 (d) To consider and decide expeditiously upon requests for 
the imports of petroleum and petroleum products for essential humanitarian needs; 55 (e) To 
make periodic reports to the Security Council on information regarding alleged violations of 
49 	Ibid. The Council provided in that same operative paragraph that the conditions and terms 
regulating the operation of this exemption would be determined by the Haiti Sanctions 
Committee. 
50 	S/RES/84 I (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 10. 
51 	SIRES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 10. 
52 
 
SIRES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 10(a). 
53 	SIRES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 10(b). 
54 	S/RES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 10(c). 
55 S/RES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 10(d). 
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the sanctions, identifying where possible those reported to be engaged in such violations; 56 
and (f) To promulgate guidelines to facilitate implementation of the sanctions. 57 
In May 1994, when the Council strengthened the sanctions regime, it further 
requested the Haiti Sanctions Committee to undertake the following responsibilities: (g) To 
examine reports submitted by States to the Secretary-General on measures taken to 
implement the strengthened sanctions; 58 (h) To seek from States further information 
regarding action taken to implement the sanctions;59 (i) To consider information concerning 
sanctions violations and to make recommendations on how to increase the effectiveness of 
the sanctions and how to respond to violations;60 (j) To provide information to the 
Secretary-General on a regular basis for distribution to Member States; 6I (k) To decide 
expeditiously upon applications by States for exemptions from the aviation sanctions; 62 
(1) To amend its guidelines to take into account its new responsibilities under the 
strengthened sanctions regime;63 and (m) To examine requests for assistance under the 
provisions of Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations and make recommendations to 
the President of the Security Council for appropriate action.' 
56 SIRES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 10(e). 
57 SIRES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 10(f). 
58 SIRES/9 17 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 14(a). 
59 S/RES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 14(b). 
60 SIRES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 14(c) and (d). 
61 SIRES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 14(d). 
62 SIRES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 14(e). 
63 SIRES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 14(1). 
64 SIRES/9 17 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 14(g). 
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The Haiti Sanctions Committee was dissolved on 16 October 1994, at the same 
time that the sanctions regime was tenninated. 65 During its sixteen-month tenure the 
Committee held eleven formal meetings. 66 It did not, however, issue any reports. 
10.4.2 The Secretary-General 
The Security Council requested the Secretary-General to undertake a number of 
tasks in relation to the Haiti sanctions regime. In June 1993, when it established the Haiti 
sanctions regime, it requested him to undertake the following responsibilities: (a) Reporting 
to the Council, having regard to the views of the OAS Secretary-General, if the imposition 
of sanctions was not warranted; 67 (b) Reporting to the Council if at any time he determined, 
having regard to the views of the OAS Secretary-General, that the de facto authorities in 
Haiti had failed to comply in good faith with their commitments, as a result of which the 
sanctions would come into force immediately; 68 (c) Receiving from States reports submitted 
regarding measures taken to implement the sanctions; 69 (d) Providing all necessary 
assistance to the Haiti Sanctions Committee and making the necessary arrangements in the 
Secretariat for that purpose; 79 (e) Reporting to the Council before 15 July 1993 on progress 
achieved in the efforts jointly undertaken by him and the OAS Secretary-General with a 
65 	The Council had foreshadowed the Committee's termination barely two weeks earlier, when it 
had decided that the Haiti sanctions regime would be terminated and the Committee dissolved 
on the day after President Aristide had returned to Haiti: SIRES/944 (29 September 1994), 
operative paragraphs 4, 5. President Aristide returned to Haiti on 15 October, at which time the 
Council noted that the sanctions regime would be terminated: SIRES/948 (15 October 1995), 
operative paragraph 10. 
66 
	
Index to Proceedings of the Security Council for 1994 (1995) United Nations, New York, p. xv. 
67 
	
S/RES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 3. 
68 	SIRES/84 1 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 4. 
69 	S/RES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 13. 
70 	S/RES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 14. the Council reaffirmed that rquest in: 
SIRES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 15. 
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view to reaching a political solution to the crisis in Haiti; 71 and (f) Reporting to the Council if, 
having regard to the views of the OAS Secretary-General, he determined that the de facto 
authorities in Haiti had signed and begun implementing in good faith an agreement to 
reinstate the legitimate Government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. 72 
In August 1993, when the Council suspended the sanctions, it requested the 
Secretary-General to undertake additional duties, including: (g) Reporting to the Council if, 
having regard to the views of the OAS Secretary-General, he concluded that the parties to 
the Governor's Island Agreement or any other authorities in Haiti had not complied in good 
faith with that Agreement, in which case the sanctions would be re-imposed immediately; 73 
and (h) Reporting to the Council if, having regard to the views of the OAS Secretary-
General, he were to conclude that the relevant provisions of the Governor's Island 
Agreement had been fully implemented, in which case the sanctions would be terminated 
completely. 74 
In September 1993, the Security Council deplored a recent upsurge in violence, 
including in particular the assassination of at least a dozen people during a church service. 75 
The Council warned that unless there was an immediate effort by security forces to put an 
end to the violence, it would have no alternative but to consider that the de facto in Haiti 
were not complying in good faith with their obligations under the Governor's Island 
Agreement.76 It then noted that if the Secretary-General were to report, having received the 
71 	SIRES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 15. 
72 	SIRES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 16. 
73 SIRES/861 (27 August 1993), operative paragraph 2. 
74 
 
SIRES/861 (27 August 1993), operative paragraph 3. 
75 S/26460: Presidential statement of 17 September 1993. 
76 Ibid. 
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views of the OAS Secretary-General, that there had been a serious and consistent non-
compliance with the Governor's Island Agreement, then the sanctions would be reinstated 
immediately. 77 On 11 October 1993, the Security Council expressed deep concern with the 
situation in Haiti and deplored events that had taken place that day, in which organized 
armed civilian groups had threatened journalists and diplomats waiting to meet a contingent 
of UNMIH. 78 It then requested the Secretary-General to report to it urgently on whether 
those incidents constituted non- compliance by the armed forces of Haiti with the Governor's 
Island Agreement, thus warranting the reimposition of sanctions. 79 
In May 1994, when the Security Council strengthened the sanctions, it requested the 
Secretary-General to report on a monthly basis, having regard to the views of the OAS 
Secretary-General, on the situation in Haiti, the implementation of the Governor's Island 
Agreement, legislative actions including preparations for legislative elections, the full 
restoration of democracy in Haiti, the humanitarian situation in Haiti and the effectiveness of 
the implementation of sanctions. 8° In July 1994 the Council requested the Secretary-General 
to report to it at sixty day intervals on the implementation of the resolution by which the 
Council authorized the establishment of the multinational force to strengthen the 
implementation of the sanctions. 81 
77 	Ibid. 
78 	S/26567: Presidential statement of 11 October 1993. 
79 	Ibid. 
80 	SIRES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 16. 
81 	SIRES/940 (31 July 1994), operative paragraph 14. For details relating to the establishment of 
the multinational force, see below. 
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10.4.3 States 
In addition to the general obligation flowing from the establishment of the sanctions 
regime against Haiti to do everything in their power to implement sanctions within their own 
jurisdictions, States were also authorized by the Security Council to take various additional 
actions to implement, monitor or enforce the sanctions. When the sanctions regime was first 
established, the Council called upon all States to act strictly in accordance with the 
sanctions, notwithstanding the existence of any conflicting legal rights or obligations." At the 
same time, the Council also: called upon all States to cooperate fully with the 841 
Committee, including by supplying such information as it sought;" called upon States to 
bring proceedings against persons and entities violating the sanctions and to impose 
appropriate penalties; 84 and requested all States to report to the Secretary-General on the 
measures taken to implement the sanctions." 
In October 1993, shortly after deciding to reimpose sanctions against Haiti, the 
Security Council invoked Chapters VII and VIII,86 and called upon Member States, acting 
nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements, and cooperating with the legitimate 
Government of Haiti, to use such measures as necessary under its authority to ensure the 
strict implementation of the sanctions, including halting inbound maritime shipping in order to 
inspect and verify that their cargoes did not violate the sanctions." 
82 SIRES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 9. The Council subsequently reiterated such a 
call when it strengthened the sanctions in May 1994. See: SIRES/917 (6 May 1994), operative 
paragraphs 11, 12. 
83 S/RES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 11. 
84 SIRES/84 1 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 12. 
85 SIRES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 13; SIRES/917 (6 May 1994), operative 
paragraph 13. 
86 51RES1875 (16 October 1993), preambular paragraph 8. 
87 SIRES/875 (16 October 1993), operative paragraph 1. 
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In May 1994 the Council strengthened the implementation of sanctions further by 
prohibiting maritime traffic from entering or leaving the territorial sea of Haiti, excepting 
regularly scheduled maritime shipping lines calling in Haiti with goods not prohibited under 
the sanctions regime." The Council also invoked Chapter VIII and called upon Member 
States cooperating with the legitimate Government of Haiti, acting nationally or through 
regional agencies or arrangements, to use such measures as necessary to ensure the strict 
implementation of the sanctions and in particular to halt outward as well as inward maritime 
shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destination to ensure that they were 
not in violation of the sanctions. 89 
In July 1994 the Security Council strengthened the implementation of the sanctions 
further, invoking Chapter VII and authorizing Member States to form a multinational force 
under unified command and control, which would use all necessary means to facilitate the 
departure from Haiti of the military leadership, the return of President Aristide, the 
restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti, and to establish and 
maintain a secure and stable environment permitting the implementation of the Governor's 
Island Agreement.9° The multinational force would terminate once a secure and stable 
environment had been established, at which point UNMIH would assume the full range of 
functions contained in its mandate.9I At the same time, the Council also invited all States, 
88 SiRES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 9. 
89 SIRES/9 17 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 10. 
90 	S/RES/940 (31 July 1994), operative paragraph 4. 
91 SIRES/940 (31 July 1994), operative paragraph 8. 
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and in particular those in the region, to provide sipport for the actions undertaken to 
implement the sanctions and their objectives.92 
The multinational force submitted two reports on its activities to the Counci1. 93 The 
reports illustrated that the force was able to undertake its responsibilities with little 
resistance, largely due to the successful negotiation of arrangements providing for the 
departure from power by certain key figures in the Haitian armed forces. The arrangements 
provided that those figures would step down when a general amnesty had been voted into 
law by the Haitian Parliament or on 15 October 1994 — whichever came first?' The force 
was able to secure the two key transportation facilities of the Port-au-Prince International 
Airport and port facility within its first day of operations. 95 Within three weeks it had brought 
more than 21,000 troops into Haiti to engage in activities such as taking control of the 
Heavy Weapons Company of the Haitian armed forces, initiating a weapons control 
programme, conducting police patrols and monitoring Haitian police activity, and 
coordinating civil operations such as water purification, improved sanitation and basic 
medical care.96 By 10 October, the multinational force reported that The Haiti Parliament 
had reopened and its Chamber of Deputies and Senate had passed a bill authorizing 
President Aristide to grant amnesty to those who had participated in the 1991 coup.97 
SIRES/940 (31 July 1994), operative paragraph 12. 
93 
	
S/1994/1107 (28 September 1994), annex: Report of the multinational force in Haiti to the 
Security Council, submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 940 (1994) [hereafter 
"First report of the multinational force in Haiti"]; S/199411148 (10 October 1994), annex: 
Second report of the multinational force in Haiti to the Security Council submitted pursuant 
to resolution 940 (1994) [hereafter "Second report of the multinational force in Haiti"]. 
94 	First report of the multinational force in Haiti, ibid, paragraph 4. 
95 	Ibid, paragraph 6. 
96 	Second report of the multinational force in Haiti, above note 94, pages 2-4. 
97 	Ibid, page 3. 
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In October 1994, when the Council terminated the Haiti sanctions regime, it 
recognized in particular the efforts that had been taken by the miltinational force and its 
contributing Member States on behalf of the international community, in creating the 
conditions necessary for the return of democracy. 98 
10.4.4 Regional and international organizations 
When the Council established the Haiti sanctions regime, it called upon international 
organizations to act strictly in accordance with the sanctions, notwithstanding the existence 
of any conflicting legal rights or obligations. 99 When the Council reimposed sanctions after 
having suspended them temporarily, it invoked Chapters VII and V111, 1°° and called upon 
Member States, acting nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements, and 
cooperating with the legitimate Government of Haiti, to use such measures as necessary 
under its authority to ensure the strict implementation of the sanctions, including halting 
inbound maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify that their cargoes did not violate the 
sanctions. ' °' 
In May 1994 the Council strengthened the implementation of sanctions further by 
prohibiting maritime traffic from entering or leaving the territorial sea of Haiti, excepting 
regularly scheduled maritime shipping lines calling in Haiti with goods not prohibited under 
the sanctions regime. 102 The Council also invoked Chapter VIII and called upon Member 
States cooperating with the legitimate Government of Haiti, acting nationally or through 
98 	S/RES/948 (15 October 1995), operative paragraph 5. 
99 	S/RES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraph 9. The Council subsequently reiterated such a 
call when it strengthened the sanctions in May 1994. See: SIRES/917 (6 May 1994), operative 
paragraph 12. 
100 	SIRES/875 (16 October 1993), preambular paragraph 8. 
S1RE51875 (16 October 1993), operative paragraph 1. 
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regional agencies or arrangements, to use such measures as necessary to ensure the strict 
implementation of the sanctions and in particular to halt outward as well as inward maritime 
shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destination to ensure that they were 
not in violation of the sanctions.'" 
10.5 Termination of the Haiti sanctions regime 
On 29 September 1994 the Security Council welcomed the fact that the initial units 
of the multinational force had been peacefully deployed in Haiti on 19 September,'" and 
decided that the Haiti sanctions regime would be terminated on the day after President 
Aristide had returned to Haiti.'" The Council also decided that the Haiti Sanctions 
Committee would be dissolved at the same time that the sanctions regime was tenninated. 106 
On 15 October 1994 the Secretary-General sent a letter to the President of the Security 
Council confirming that President Aristide had returned to Haiti. 1°7 On the same day the 
Council welcomed with great satisfaction President Aristide's return to Haiti and expressed 
its confidence that the people of Haiti could begin to rebuild their country and consolidate 
democracy in the spirit of national reconciliation.'" The Council also welcomed the fact that, 
given that President Aristide had returned to Haiti, the sanctions would be lifted.'" 
102 	SIRES/9 17 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 9. 
103 SIRES/9 17 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 10. 
104 	SIRES/944 (29 September 1994), preambular paragraph 4. 
105 SIRES/944 (29 September 1994), operative paragraph 4. 
106 S/RES/944 (29 September 1994), operative paragraph 5. 
107 S/1994/1169: Letter dated 15 October 1994 from the Secretary-General addressed to the 
President of the Security Council. 
108 SIRES/948 (15 October 1995), operative paragraph 1. 
109 SIRES/948 (15 October 1995), operative paragraph 10. 
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10.6 Notable aspects of the Haiti sanctions regime 
The Haiti sanctions regime was noteworthy for the marmer in which it followed the 
initial application of sanctions by a regional organization (the Organization of American 
States), and for the fact that its application was requested by a democratically elected Head 
of State who had been ousted from power by a military coup. In terms of its 
implementation, the Haiti sanctions regime represented another example, along with those of 
Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), 
in which the Council authorized States, largely acting in coordination with regional 
organizations or arrangements, to take the measures necessary to intercept maritime shipping 
that was not in compliance with the sanctions. 
In terms of its contribution to the evolution of sanctions practice, the Haiti sanctions 
regime provided an early example of the Council employing targeted travel sanctions against 
decision-makers and those connected with them, including family members. H° The Haiti 
sanctions regime was also notable for the manner in which the Security Council 
demonstrated flexibility in responding to improvements and deteriorations in the situation in 
Haiti. The Council again employed time-delays, as it had with sanctions against Libya, the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) and the Bosnian Serbs, in order to 
provide the de facto authorities in Haiti with an opportunity to avoid the sanctions by 
complying with its demands under the sanctions regime. In another example of flexibility, 
110 	See: SIRES/9 17 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 3. 
III 	See: S/RES/841 (16 June 1993), operative paragraphs 3, 4 [providing that the initial sanctions 
would come into force one week after the resolution, unless the Secretary-General reported 
before that time that the imposition of the sanctions was not warranted]; S1RE51873 (13 
October 1993), operative paragraph 1 [providing that the reimposition of sanctions would come 
into effect five days later, unless the Secretary-General were to report that the de facto 
authorities were implementing in full the agreement to reinstate the Government of President 
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however, when the Council strengthened the sanctions in May 1994, it employed a time-
delay in relation to the introduction of comprehensive sanctions, whilst applying the aviation 
and travel sanctions immediately. 112 The Council also identified concrete requirements for 
the suspension, re-imposition arid termination of the sanctions, thus meaning that 
modifications to the sanctions regime flowed directly from the extent to which the de facto 
authorities in Haiti complied with the requirements of the Council's resolutions. Partly as a 
result of the Council's flexible approach, the Haiti sanctions regime provided the only 
example to date in which a sanctions regime has been suspended in its entirety, then 
subsequently reapplied in its entirety. Finally, at the time of its termination, the Haiti sanctions 
regime became the shortest sanctions regime yet imposed by the Security Council.' 13 
Aristide and had established the necessary measures to enable UNMIH to carry out its 
mandate]; SIRES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraph 5 [providing that the comprehensive 
sanctions outlined in operative paragraphs 6-8 of that resolution would come into effect fifteen 
days later, unless the Secretary-General were to report that the Haitian military had taken the 
steps required of them under the Governor's Island Agreement]. 
112 	As stated in the previous note, the comprehensive sanctions were to come into effect fifteen 
days later. The aviation and travel sanctions, however, were to be applied "without delay": see 
SIRES/917 (6 May 1994), operative paragraphs 2, 3. 
113 The Haiti sanctions regime remains the sanctions regime with the second shortest duration, 
after the Ethiopia and Eritrea sanctions regime, which was imposed a period of twelve months. 
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The Security Council imposed sanctions against the Angolan rebel group the 
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in September 1993, with 
the aim of ensuring that it stopped fighting against the Angolan Government and adhered to 
its commitments under a set of peace accords entitled the "Acordos de Paz". The sanctions 
thgime initially consisted of an aims and petroleum embargo. It was subsequently expanded 
on two occasions: in August 1997, when travel, diplomatic and aviation sanctions were also 
applied; and in June 1998, when financial and diamond sanctions and further diplomatic 
sanctions were imposed. The sanctions regime was in place for a period of nine years before 
it was eventually terminated in December 2002. 
11.1 The constitutional basis for imposing sanctions against 
Angola/UNITA 
In September 1993 the Security Council expressed grave concern at the continuing 
deterioration of the political and military situation in Angola, 2 and strongly condemned 
UNITA for not having taken the necessary steps to comply with its previous demands. 3 It 
Angola had suffered a troubled, decades-long period, consisting of civil war, failed peace 
agreements and a contested election, in which UNITA had narrowly lost to the sitting Angolan 
Government. 
SIRES/864 (15 September 1993), preambular paragraph 3. 
S/RES/864 (15 September 1993), section B, preambular paragraph 1. Those demands included 
that UNITA respect the results of the election that had been held on 29 and 30 September 1992 
and that it cease its military actions. See, e.g.: SIRES/804 (29 January 1993), operative paragraph 
3 (demanding that the parties cease fire immediately and restore a meaningful dialogue on a 
clear timetable for the implementation of the Accords); S/RES/811 (12 March 1993), operative 
paragraph 2 (demanding that UNITA accept unreservedly the results of the elections and abide 
fully by the Acordos de Paz), operative paragraph 3 (strongly demanding an immediate cease-
fire throughout the country and the resumption of dialogue); SIRES/834 (1 June 1993), 
operative paragraph 3 (reiterating the demand that UNITA accept unreservedly the results of 
the election); SIRES/85 1, operative paragraph 4 (reiterating the demand that UNITA accept the 
results of the election), operative paragraph 5 (condemning UNITA for its continuing military 
actions and demanding that they cease). 
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then determined that, as a result of UNITA's military actions, the situation in Angola 
constituted a threat to international peace and security, 4 and noted that it was acting under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,' before imposing sanctions against 
UNITA. In subsequent decisions connected to the sanctions regime, the Council again 
characterised the situation in Angola as a threat to international peace and security, 6 and 
invoked Chapter VII. 7 
S/RES/864 (15 September 1993), section B, preambular paragraph 4. 
SIRES/864 (15 September 1993), section B, preambular paragraph 5. 
See, e.g.: SIRES/1127 (28 August 1997), section B, preambular paragraph 1; SIRES/1135 (29 
October 1997), section B, floating paragraph 1 (located between operative paragraphs 4 and 5); 
SIRES/1173 (12 June 1998), section B, preambular paragraph 2; SIRES/1176 (24 June 1998), 
preambular paragraph 3; SIRES/I237 (7 May 1999), section B, preambular paragraph 1; 
SIRES/1295 (18 April 2000), section A, preambular paragraph 1; SIRES/1336 (23 January 2001), 
preambular paragraph 4; SIRES/I348 (19 April 2001), preambular paragraph 5; SIRES/1374 (19 
October 2001), preambular paragraph 5; SIRES/1404 (18 April 2002), preambular paragraph 6. 
See, e.g.: SIRES/1127 (28 August 1997), section B, preambular paragraph 2; SIRES/1130 (29 
September 1997), preambular paragraph 3; SIRES/1135 (29 October 1997), section B, floating 
paragraph 2 (located between operative paragraphs 4 and 5); SIRES/1173 (12 June 1998), 
section B, preambular paragraph 3; SIRES/i176 (24 June 1998), preambular paragraph 4; 
SIRES/1237 (7 May 1999), section B, preambular paragraph 2; SIRES/1295 (18 April 2000), 
section A, preambular paragraph 2; SIRES/1336 (23 January 2001), preambular paragraph 5; 
S/RES/1348 (19 April 2001), preambular paragraph 6; SIRES/1374 (19 October 2001), preambular 
paragraph 6; SIRES/1404 (18 April 2002), preambular paragraph 8; S/RES/1412 (17 May 2002), 
preambular paragraph 9; S/RES/1432 (15 August 2002), preambular paragraph 8; SIRES/1439 (18 
October 2002), preambular paragraph 8; SIRES/1448 (9 December 2002), preambular paragraph 
5. 
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11.2 The objectives of the UNITA sanctions regime 8 
The initial objectives of the sanctions regime against UNITA were to ensure that the 
rebel group submitted to an effective cease-fire and that it agreed to implement the Acordos 
de Paz and relevant Security Council resolutions. 9 In August 1997, when the Council 
expanded the UNITA sanctions regime for the first time, it demanded that UNITA 
implement immediately its obligations under the Lusaka Protocol.") In June 1998, when the 
Council again strengthened the sanctions regime, it demanded that UNITA cooperate fully in 
the immediate extension of State administration throughout the national territory." In April 
8 	While the focus of this study is on the way in which the Council itself explicitly defined the 
objectives of the UNITA sanctions regime, in the case of the UNITA sanctions a number of 
statements relating to the purpose of the sanctions were also made by officials or entities upon 
whom the Council has bestowed responsibility for the administration or implementation Of the 
UNITA sanctions regime, such as the Chairman of the 864 Committee, the Panel of Experts on 
UNITA sanctions, and the monitoring mechanism on UNITA sanctions. See, e.g.: S/19991829, 
appendix 1: Statement by the Chairman of the Angola Sanctions Committee before the 
seventieth ordinary session of the Council of Ministers of the OA U, Algiers, 9 July 1999 
[stating that the sanctions were "intended to foster the conditions for a resumption of political 
dialogue to achieve a durable resolution of the conflict in Angola"]; S/2000/203, enclosure: 
Report of the Panel of Experts on violations of Security Council sanctions against UNITA, 
paragraph 2 [noting that "the [Security] Council has repeatedly emphasised that the purpose of 
the sanctions was ... to promote a political settlement to the long conflict in Angola by 
requiring UNITA to comply with the obligations which it undertook"]; S/20011966, enclosure: 
enclosure: Supplementary report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UN! TA 
paragraph 7 [commenting that "[t]he Security Council imposed sanctions against UNITA ... as 
a vehicle of peace, to persuade the rebels to resume good faith participation in the process of 
national reconciliation"]. 
9 	 SIRES/864 (15 September 1993), operative paragraph 17. The Council also provided for the 
possibility that UNITA might initially comply with these objectives, but subsequently renege 
upon them, by deciding that if at any time the Secretary-General were to report to the Council 
that UNITA had broken the cease-fire or ceased to participate constructively in the 
implementation of the Peace Accords and the relevant Council resolutions, then the sanctions 
would come into force immediately: ibid, operative paragraph 19. 
10 	SIRES/1127 (28 August 1997), operative paragraphs 2, 3. Those obligations included: 
demilitarizing its forces; transforming its radio station Vorgan into a non-partisan broadcasting 
facility; cooperating fully in the process of the normalization of State administration 
throughout Angola; immediately providing the Joint Commission, established under the 
Lusaka Protocol, with accurate and complete information on the strength of its armed 
personnel, so that verification, disarmament and demobilization could take place, in accordance 
with the Lusaka Protocol. 
II 	SIRES/1173 (12 June 1998), operative paragraph 2. This demand had been a requirement of both 
the Acordos de Paz and the Lusaka Protocol. As noted above, the implementation of both of 
those agreements was the primary objective of the UNITA sanctions regime. 
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2000, when it sought to improve the implementation of the sanctions (rather than to expand 
their scope), the Council noted that the sanctions against UNITA were intended to promote 
a political settlement to the conflict in Angola, by requiring UNITA to comply with the 
obligations which it had undertaken under the Acordos de Paz and the Lusaka Protocol, 
and by curtailing the ability of UNITA to pursue its objectives by military means.' 2 
In May 2002, when it decided to suspend temporarily the travel sanctions against 
UNITA officials and their families, the Council noted that, in determining whether to extend 
that suspension at the end of the temporary period, it would take into account the progress 
achieved in the process of national reconciliation. 13 In August 2002, when it in fact decided 
to extend the initial suspension of those travel sanctions for a further temporary period, the 
Council noted that, when the time came to review the suspended measures again, it would 
take into account information on the implementation of the peace accords, hence reaffirming 
that the implementation of the peace accords remained the major objective of the overall 
sanctions regime. 14 In December 2002, when the Council eventually terminated the UNITA 
sanctions regime, it welcomed the steps taken by the Angolan Government and UNITA 
toward the full implementation of the Acordos de Paz, the Lusaka Protocol, relevant 
Security Council resolutions and other recent initiatives aimed at achieving peace. 15 
12 SIRES/1295 (18 April 2000), preambular paragraph 5. 
13 S/RES/1412 (17 May 2002), operative paragraph 2. 
14 SIRES/1432 (15 August 2002), operative paragraph 2. 
15 SIRES/1448 (9 December 2002), preambular paragraph 3. The other recent initiatives included a 
Memorandum of Understanding dated 4 April 2002 [S12002/483 (26 April 2002), annex], a 
declaration on the peace process by the Angolan Government [S/2002/1337 (6 December 2002), 
annex], and the completion of the work of a Joint Commission. 
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11.3 The scope of the UNITA sanctions regime 
The sanctions initially imposed against UNITA under resolution 864 (1993) 
consisted of an arms and petroleum embargo. States were thus required to prevent the sale 
or supply to Angola, other than through points of entry to be designated by the Government 
of Angola, of arms and related materiel, military assistance, and petroleum and petroleum 
products. 16 In August 1997, after a period in which hostilities had resumed and UNITA had 
continued to refuse to implement the Acordos de Paz and its obligations under multiple 
Security Council resolutions, the Council strengthened the sanctions by imposing a 
combination of travel, representative, aircraft and aviation sanctions against UNITA." 
Under the travel sanctions, States were required to prevent the entry into or transit through 
their territories of senior UNITA officials and all adult members of their immediate families, 18 
and to suspend or cancel any travel documents issued to people in those categories. 19 Under 
the representative sanctions, the Council required all States to close all UNITA offices in 
their territories.20 Under the aircraft and aviation sanctions, States were required: to prevent 
aircraft from arriving in, departing from, or overflying their territories if they had originated 
from or were destined for places not on a list of places cleared by the Angolan 
16 	S/RES/864 (15 September 1993), operative paragraph 19. 
17 	The additional sanctions were laid out in detail in: S/RES/1127 (28 August 1997), operative 
paragraph 4. Although the Council decided in August that the measures would be imposed, 
their imposition was contingent upon UNITA failing to take certain measures. As a result of 
the need to delay the imposition of the measures until it had been determined that UNITA had 
failed to take those measures, the Council delayed the application of the additional sanctions 
until 30 October 1997: see SIRES/1130 (29 September 1997), operative paragraph 2. 
18 	SIRES/1127 (28 August 1997), operative paragraph 4(a). The Council provided, however, that 
nothing would oblige a State to refuse entry to its own nationals: see also SIRES/1127 (28 
August 1997), operative paragraph 4(a). 
19 	SIRES/1127 (28 August 1997), operative paragraph 4(b). 
20 	SIRES/1127 (28 August 1997), operative paragraph 4(c). 
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Govemment;2I to prohibit the provision of aircraft or aircraft parts to Angola, other than 
through points of entry designated by the Angolan Govemment; 22 and to prohibit the 
provision of engineering, servicing, certification or insurance for aircraft registered in Angola, 
other than those designated by the Angolan Govemment. 23 The Council outlined exemptions 
from the additional sanctions, however, for cases of medical emergency and for flights 
carrying food, medicine or supplies for essential humanitarian needs. 24 
In June 1998, the Council again expanded the sanctions, imposing a mixture of 
financial, representative and targeted economic sanctions, including diamond sanctions, 
against UNITA. 25 Under the financial sanctions, States were required to freeze funds in their 
territories belonging to UNITA as an organization or to senior UNITA officials and adult 
members of their immediate families. 26 Under the representative sanctions, States were 
required to prevent all official contacts with the UNITA leadership in areas of Angola to 
which State administration had not been extended. 27 Under the targeted economic sanctions, 
States were required: to prohibit the import from Angola of diamonds not controlled through 
the Certificate-of-Origin regime of the Angolan Government; 28 to prohibit the same or 
supply to areas of Angola to which State administration had not been extended, of mining 
21 	SIRES/1127 (28 August 1997), operative paragraph 4(d)(i). 
22 SIRES/I127 (28 August 1997), operative paragraph 4(d)(ii). 
23 	S/RES/I 127 (28 August 1997), operative paragraph 4(d)(iii). 
24 	SIRES/1127 (28 August 1997), operative paragraph 5. The exemptions were to be approved in 
advance by the UNITA Sanctions Committee. 
25 	The additional sanctions were outlined in resolution 1173 (1998), of 12 June 1998. The initial 
date for their application was to be 25 June: SIRES/1173 (12 June 1998), operative paragraph 14. 
They did not enter into force, however, until 1 July, in accordance with the extension outlined 
in resolution 1176(1998): S/RES/I 176 (24 June 1998), operative paragraph 2. 
26 	SIRES/1173 (12 June 1998), operative paragraph II. 
27 	SIRES/1173 (12 June 1998), operative paragraph 12(a). Exempt from these sanctions, however, 
were contacts by representatives of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation, the 
United Nations and observer States to the Lusaka Protocol. 
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equipment and services.,29 and to prohibit the sale or supply to those areas of vehicles, 
watercraft and spare parts for vehicles and wateiu 	aft.3° 
In April 2000, the Council adopted resolution 1295 (2000), introducing a range of 
voluntary measures that States might take to improve the implementation of sanctions. 
Although resolution 1295 (2000) was quite specific in outlining steps that could be taken to 
improve the implementation of the arms, petroleum, diamond, financial, travel and diplomatic 
sanctions, 31 the fact that the measures were voluntary rather than mandatory meant that the 
resolution did not modify the scope of the sanctions regime. 
In May 2002, after the death of the UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, and when it 
appeared that the decades-long conflict between UNITA and the Angolan Government was 
drawing to a close, the Council narrowed the scope of the sanctions by suspending the 
travel sanctions against UNITA officials and their families. 32 
11.4 The administration, monitoring and enforcement of the 
UNITA sanctions regime 
The Security Council has bestowed responsibilities relating to the administration, 
implement and enforcement of the sanctions upon a range of actors, including the Secretary-
General, the UNITA Sanctions Committee, a Panel of Experts and a monitoring mechanism. 
28 	SIRES/1173 (12 June 1998), operative paragraph 12(b). 
29 	SIRES/1173 (12 June 1998), operative paragraph 12(c). 
30 	S/RES/I 173 (12 June 1998), operative paragraph I2(d). 
31 	For further details of the recommendations made, see the discussion below, in section 11.4, of 
the manner in which the Council acted upon the recommendations of the UNITA Panel of 
Experts. 
32 	SIRES/ 1412 (17 May 2002), operative paragraph I. The suspension was for a period of ninety 
days. In August 2002, the Council extended the suspension of those for a further ninety days: 
SIRES/1432 (15 August 2002), operative paragraph I. 
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11.4.1 The Secretary-General 
When the Security Council established the sanctions regime, it requested the 
Secretary-General: to notify it if, before the date on which the sanctions were to come into 
force, an effective cease-fire had been established and agreement had been reached on the 
implementation of the Acordos de Paz and relevant Security Council resolutions, in which 
case the sanctions would not come into force; 33 and, in the event that the sanctions were not 
to come into force due to the establishment of a cease-fire and the achievement of an 
agreement upon the implementation of the Acordos de Paz and relevant Security Council 
resolutions, to report to the Council if UNITA subsequently broke the cease-fire or ceased 
participating constructively in the establishment of a cease-fire and the achievement of an 
agreement upon the implementation of the Acordos de Paz and relevant Security Council 
resolutions, in which case the sanctions would come into force immediately. 34 
In March 1994, the Council expressed its readiness to strengthen the sanctions 
against UNITA in the light, inter alia, of a recommendation by the Secretary-General either 
to impose additional sanctions or to review those in effect.35 In October 1996, the Council 
expressed its readiness to impose additional sanctions unless the Secretary-General were to 
report by 20 November 1996 that UNITA had made substantial and genuine progress in 
fulfilling its obligations under the peace process.36 In February 1997, the Council expressed 
SIRES/864 (15 September 1993), operative paragraph 17. The same operative paragraph 
provided that the sanctions would come into force ten days later, unless the Secretary-General 
were to provide such a notification. 
34 SIRES/864 (15 September 1993), operative paragraph 18. 
35 
 
SIRES/903 (16 March 1994), operative paragraph 10; SIRES/922 (31 May 1994), operative 
paragraph 7. In subsequent decisions the Council against expressed its readiness to consider 
further measures, in the light of recommendations by the Secretary-General. See: SIRES/1055 (8 
May 1996), operative paragraph 28; S/RES/1064 (11 July 1996), operative paragraph 28. 
36 SIRES/1075 (11 October 1996), operative paragraph 13. 
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its readiness to consider the imposition of additional sanctions in the light of a report to be 
submitted by the Secretary-General on the status of the formation of the Government of 
Unity and National Reconciliation. 37 In August 1997, when the Council strengthened the 
sanctions against UNITA, it requested the Secretary-General to undertake the following 
additional tasks: to report to it if, before the date on which the additional sanctions were to 
come into force, UNITA had taken concrete and irreversible steps to implement its 
obligations under the Lusaka Protocol, in which case the sanctions would not come into 
effect .,38 and to report to it on UNITA's compliance with its obligation to implement the 
Lusaka Protocol. 39 
In March 1998, the Council requested the Secretary-General to report on violations 
of the travel, diplomatic and aviation sanctions against UNITA." In June 1998, when the 
Security Council strengthened the sanctions further, it requested the Secretary-General to 
undertake the following additional duties: to report to it if two days before the date on 
which the additional sanctions were to come into force, UNITA had complied with its 
demand to cooperate without conditions in the extension of State administration throughout 
17 	SIRES/1098 (27 February 1997), operative paragraph 4. 
38 	SIRES/1127 (28 August 1997), operative paragraph 7. The same operative paragraph provided 
that the sanctions would come into force one month later, unless the Secretary-General were to 
report in such a manner. The Secretary-General did subsequently report that UNITA had taken 
certain steps to implement its obligations, thus prompting the Council to postpone the date on 
which the additional sanctions would come into force by a further month and to affirm its 
willingness to review further the application of the additional sanctions: S/RES/1130 (29 
September 1997), operative paragraphs 2, 3. 
39 	S/RES/1127 (28 August 1997), operative paragraph 8. The application of the sanctions was 
eventually delayed until 30 October 1997. The Council thus modified the timing of this request 
to the Secretary-General, asking him to report by 8 December 1997, and every ninety days 
thereafter, on the UNITA's compliance in implementing the Lusaka Protocol: S/RES/1135 (29 
October 1997), operative paragraph 7. 
4o 	SIRES/1157 (20 March 1998), operative paragraph 4. The Council again made such a request of 
the Secretary-General in: S/RES/1164 (29 April 1998), operative paragraph 14. 
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Angola, in which case the sanctions would not come into effect; 41 and to report to it 
subsequently if UNITA had complied with all its relevant obligations, in which case the 
additional sanctions imposed in August 1997 and June 1998 would be reviewed and 
terminated.42 In October 1998, the Council requested the Secretary-General to make 
recommendations for improving the implementation of the sanctions.43 
In May 1999, when the Security Council established expert panels to investigate 
reports of violations of the sanctions, it requested the Secretary-General to establish a Trust 
Fund to finance the activities of the expert panels." In April 2000, when the Council 
decided to establish the UNITA monitoring mechanism and outlined a range of voluntary 
measures that might be taken by States and regional and sub-regional organizations and 
arrangements, it requested the Secretary-General: to establish the monitoring mechanism; 45 
to strengthen collaboration between the United Nations and regional and international 
organizations, including Interpol, that might be involved in monitoring or enforcing the 
implementation of the sanctions;46 and to develop an information package and media 
campaign designed to educate the public at large on the sanctions. 47 
41 	SIRES/1173 (12 June 1998), operative paragraph 14 [stipulating that, unless such a report were 
received by 23 June 1998, the additional sanctions would come into effect on 25 June]. As a 
result of the subsequent postponement of the date on which the additional sanctions would 
come into force, the date for the submission of such a report was also postponed, from 23 June 
until 1 July 1998: S/RES/1176 (24 June 1998), operative paragraph 2. 
42 	S/RES/1173 (12 June 1998), operative paragraph 15. 
43 	S/RES/1202 (15 October 1998), operative paragraph 15. The request was reiterated in 
S/RES/1213 (3 December 1998), operative paragraph 13. 
44 	SIRES/1237 (7 May 1999), operative paragraph 11. For discussion of the establishment and 
activities of the expert panels, which ultimately decided to operate as a single Panel of Experts, 
see below. 
45 	S/RES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 3. 
46 	S/RES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 29. 
47 	S/RES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 30. 
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In January, April and October 2001, and April and December 2002, when the 
Council extended the mandate of the monitoring mechanism, it requested the Secretary- 
General to appoint the requisite number of experts to serve on the monitoring mechanism 
and to make the necessary financial arrangements to support the mechanism's work." In 
December 2002, upon the termination of the UNITA sanctions regime, the Council also 
requested the Secretary-General to close the Trust Fund established in May 1999 and to 
arrange for the remaining funds to be reimbursed to contributors." 
11.4.2 The UNITA Sanctions Committee 
The Security Council created the UNITA Sanctions Committee (also referred to as 
"the Angola Sanctions Committee" or "the 864 Committee") in resolution 864 (1993) and 
its responsibilities have expanded as the sanctions regime has evolved. Under resolution 864 
(1993), the UNITA Sanctions Committee was established, in accordance with rule 28 of 
the Council's provisional rules of procedure, with a mandate to report on its work to the 
Council with its observations and recommendations, 5° and to perform the following tasks: 
(a) To examine the reports submitted by States on the measures they had adopted to meet 
their obligations under the sanctions regime; 51 (b) To seek further information from States on 
48 SIRES/1336 (23 January 2001), operative paragraph 5 [requesting that the Secretary-General 
reappoint five experts to the monitoring mechanism]; SIRES/1348 (19 April 2001), operative 
paragraph 5 [requesting that the Secretary-General appoint five experts to the monitoring 
mechanism]; S/RES/1374 (19 October 2001), operative paragraph 7 [requesting that the 
Secretary-General appoint four experts to the monitoring mechanism]; S/RES/1404 (18 April 
2002), operative paragraph 6 [requesting that the Secretary-General appoint four experts to the 
monitoring mechanism]; SIRES/1439 (18 October 2002), operative paragraph 5 [requesting that 
the Secretary-General appoint two experts to the monitoring mechanism]. 
49 SIRES/l439 (18 October 2002), operative paragraph 4. 
50 	S/RES/864 (15 September 1993), operative paragraph 22. 
51 	S/RES/864 (15 September 1993), operative paragraph 22 (a). 
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the action taken by them to implement the sanctions .," (c) To consider information brought 
to its attention by States concerning violations of the sanctions and to recommend 
appropriate measures in response thereto;" (d) To make periodic reports to the Council on 
information submitted to it regarding alleged violations of the sanctions, identifying where 
possible persons or entities, including vessels, reported to be engaged in such violations; 54 
and (e) To promulgate guidelines that might be necessary to facilitate the implementation of 
the sanctions. 55 
In June 1994, the Council requested the Committee to report to it on compliance 
with the sanctions regime and in particular on possible violations by two neighbouring 
States. 56 In August 1997, when the scope of the UNITA sanctions regime was expanded to 
incorporate travel, representative and aircraft sanctions, the Security Council further 
requested the 864 Committee to assume the following responsibilities: (a) To draw up 
guidelines for the implementation of the additional sanctions, including the designation of 
UNITA officials and family members whose travel was to be prohibited;" (b) To decide 
upon and give favourable consideration to requests for the exemptions from the sanctions 
outlined in the resolution; 58 and (c) To report to the Council by 15 November regarding the 
actions taken by States to implement the additional sanctions. 59 
52 SIRES/864 (15 September 1993), operative paragraph 22 (b). 
53 SIRES/864 (15 September 1993), operative paragraph 22 (c). 
54 
 
SIRES/864 (15 September 1993), operative paragraph 22 (d). 
55 
 
SIRES/864 (15 September 1993), operative paragraph 22 (e). 
56 	SIRES/932 (30 June 1994), operative paragraph 8. 
57 	SIRES/1127 (28 August 1997), operative paragraph 11 (a). 
58 SIRES/1127 (28 August 1997), operative paragraph 11 (b). 
59 SIRES/1127 (28 August 1997), operative paragraph 11 (c). As a result of the subsequent 
postponement of the date on which the additional sanctions would come into force, the date 
for the submission of this report was also postponed, to 15 December 1997: S/RES/1135 (29 
October 1997), operative paragraph 9. 
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In June 1998, when the Council strengthened the sanctions regime further, it 
requested the Committee to assume the following additional duties: (a) To draw up 
guidelines for the implementation of the new sanctions and to consider ways of strengthening 
the effectiveness of all the sanctions now imposed against UNITA; 6° and (b) To report to 
the Council by 31 July 1998 on the actions taken by States to implement the new 
sanctions;6 ' and (c) To authorize, on a case-by-case basis and under the no-objection 
procedure, exemptions from the additional sanctions for verified medical and humanitarian 
purposes. 62 In October 1998, the Council requested the Chairman of the 864 Committee to 
investigate reports that the leader of UNITA had travelled outside Angola in violation of the 
sanctions, and that UNITA forces had received military training and assistance, as well as 
arms, also in violation of the sanctions. 63 
In January 1999, the Council requested the 864 Committee to prepare a report on 
steps that could be taken to prevent violations of the UNITA sanctions and to improve their 
implementation," and it encouraged the Chairman of the Committee to consult with the 
OAU and SADC on ways to strengthen the implementation of the sanctions. 65 In May 
1999, the Council requested the Chairman of the Committee to submit to it no later than 31 
60 
	
SIRES/I173 (12 June 1998), operative paragraph 20 (a). 
61 	S/RES/1173 (12 June 1998), operative paragraph 20 (b). As a result of the subsequent 
postponement of the date on which the additional sanctions would come into force, the date 
for the submission of this report was also postponed, until 7 August 1998: S/RES/1176 (24 June 
1998), operative paragraph 3. 
62 SIRES/1173 (12 June 1998), operative paragraph 13. 
63 	S/RES/1202 (15 October 1998), operative paragraph 14. 
64 
 
SIRES/1221 (12 January 1999), operative paragraph 8. The Council's request was implicit, as it 
expressed its readiness to pursue reports of sanctions violations, to take steps to reinforce the 
implementation of the sanctions, and to consider the imposition of additional measures, 
including in the area of telecommunications, on the basis of a report to be prepared by the 
Angola sanctions committee. 
65 S/RES/1221 (12 January 1999), operative paragraph 9. 
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July 1999 an interim report of the expert panels and to submit the final report of the panels 
within six months of their formation. 66 In April 2000, when the Council established the 
UNITA monitoring mechanism, it requested the UNITA Committee to update the list of 
UNITA officials and adult members of their immediate families who were subject to travel 
sanctions and to expand the information contained in that list to include date and place of 
birth and any known addresses. ° 
In January, April and October 2001, and April and October 2002, when the 
Council extended the mandate of the monitoring mechanism, it requested the Chairman of 
the Committee to submit to it prior to the expiration of each mandate, the relevant written 
report of the monitoring mechanism. 68 In October 2001, the Council also called upon the 
Committee to undertake, by 31 December 2001, a review of the final and supplementary 
reports of the monitoring mechanism, with a view to examining the recommendations of the 
reports and to offering guidance to the monitoring mechanism on its future work. 69 
The UNITA Sanctions Committee was eventually dissolved in December 2002, 
upon the termination of the UNITA sanctions regime itself " During its almost ten-year 
66 	SIRES/1237 (7 May 1999), operative paragraph 7. 
67 	SIRES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 24. 
68 
	
SIRES/1336 (23 January 2001), operative paragraph 6 [requesting that the written addendum to 
the monitoring mechanism's final report be submitted by 19 April 2001]; SIRES/1348 (19 April 
2001), operative paragraph 6 [requesting that the nechanism's supplementary report be 
submitted by 19 October 2001]; SIRES/1374 (19 October 2001), operative paragraph 8 
[requesting that the additional report of the mechanism be submitted by 19 April 2002]; 
SIRES/1404 (18 April 2002), operative paragraph 7 [requesting that the additional report of the 
monitoring mechanism be submitted by 19 October 2002]; SIRES/1439 (18 October 2002), 
operative paragraph 6 [requesting that the additional report of the monitoring mechanism be 
submitted by 19 December 2002]. 
69 S/RES/I 374 (I 9 October 2001), operative paragraph 4. 
70 SIRES/1448 (9 December 2002), operative paragraph 3. 
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tenure, the UNITA Committee held 43 formal meetings, and issued eight annual reports!' 
The Committee's annual reports generally summarised the activities undertaken by the 
Committee during the previous calendar year and outlined its observations. In its final report, 
the Committee made a number of substantive observations and recommendations. The 
Committee stated that, while the sanctions might not have played a direct role in the 
development of a promising peace process, it had generally been recognized that the 
sanctions had weakened UNITA's military potentia1. 72 It outlined some lessons that might be 
drawn from the UNITA sanctions experience, including that: the establishment of the Panel 
of Experts and the Monitoring Mechanism had significantly enhanced the effectiveness of the 
sanctions; States often required assistance in enacting the necessary legislation and technical 
assistance to implement sanctions at the national level; reporting by States on sanctions 
violations had been invaluable to the work of the Committee and the Monitoring 
Mechanism; missions by the Chairman of the Committee had been extremely useful; and the 
use of the internet had helped to maintain transparency in the Committee's work: 3 
71 	The following annual reports were issued in accordance with the note of the President of the 
Security Council of 29 March 1995 (S/1995/234): 5/1996/37 (17 January 1996), annex: Report of 
the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning 
the situation in Angola [containing a summary of the activities of the Committee from its 
establishment until 31 December 1995]; S11997133 (14 January 1997), annex: Report of the 864 
Committee for 1996; S/199711027 (31 December 1997), annex: Report of the 864 Committee for 
1997; S1199811227 (28 December 1998), annex: Report of the 864 Committee for 1998; 
S/2000183 (3 February 2000), annex: Report of the 864 Committee for 1999; S/2000/1255 (29 
December 2000), annex: Report of the 864 Committee for 2000; S/20021243 (7 March 2002), 
annex: Report of the 864 Committee for 2001; S/200211413 (24 December 2002), annex: Report 
of the 864 Committee for 2002 [containing a summary of the activities of the Committee from 1 
January to 9 December 2002, when the sanctions regime was terminated]. 
72 Report of the 864 Committee for 2002, ibid, paragraph 20. 
73 Report of the 864 Committee for 2002, above note 71, paragraph 21. 
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In addition to its annual reports, the Committee issued a number of ad hoc reports, 
in response to explicit or implicit requests from the Security Council: 74 The Chairman of the 
Committee also circulated ad hoc reports on the visits he conducted personally to various 
counties in May and June 1999, the purpose of which was to explore ways and means to 
improve the implementation of the UNITA sanctions?' In contrast to the annual reports, the 
ad hoc reports often contained concrete and detailed recommendations on steps that might 
be taken to facilitate the effective implementation of the sanctions. The major development 
to arise as a result of the ad hoc reports was the establishment of the Panel of Experts on 
UNITA sanctions. 
11.4.3 States 
The Security Council called upon States to take a range of action to strengthen the 
implementation and monitoring of the UNITA sanctions, including: calling upon all States to 
74 	See, e.g.: S/I994/825 (15 July 1994), annex: Report of the 864 Committee pursuant to 
paragraph 8 of resolution 932 (1994); S/1999/147 (12 February 1999), annex: Report of the 
864 Committee pursuant to paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 1221 (1999) 
[containing the Committee's endorsement of the Secretary-General's recommendations on 
improving the implementation of the UNITA sanctions (as outlined in his report of 17 January 
1999 on the situation in Angola: S/1999/49 (17 January 1999)), as well as extra recommendations 
made by the Committee itself with a view to improving the implementation of the UNITA 
sanctions. Those recommendations were subsequently acted upon by the Council in 
SIRES/1229 (26 February 1999), operative paragraph 8]; S/1999/509 (4 May 1999), annex 
[transmitting a conceptual framework for expert studies to be conducted to trace violations in 
the arms, diamond, oil and financial sanctions against UNITA. The framework was submitted in 
accordance with the recommendations the Committee had made earlier in S/1999/147. Those 
recommendations had been endorsed by the Council in resolution 1229 (1999), operative 
paragraph 8]; S/1999/837 (30 July 1999), annex: List of experts appointed to the expert panels 
established in accordance with paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1237 (1999). 
75 	S/1999/644 (4 June 1999), annex: Letter dated 4 June 1999 from the Chairman of the Security 
Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning the situation 
in Angola addressed to the President of the Security Council [transmitting as an annex a 
report on the Chairman's visit to Central and Southern Africa, May 1999]; S/1999/829 (28 July 
1999), annex: Letter dated 28 July 1999 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee 
established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning the situation in Angola addressed 
to the President of the Security Council [transmitting as an annex a report on the Chairman's 
visit to Europe and participation in the seventieth ordinary session of the Council of Ministers 
of the Organization of African Unity, July 1999]. 
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act strictly in accordance with the sanctions, notwithstanding the existence of any conflicting 
legal rights or obligations;76 calling upon States to bring proceedings against persons and 
entities violating the sanctions and imposing appropriate penalties; 77 calling upon all States to 
cooperate fully with the 864 Committee, including by supplying such information as it 
sought;78 requesting all States to report to the Secretary-General on measures adopted to 
meet their obligations under the sanctions regime; 79 reaffirming the obligation of all States to 
implement fully the sanctions;" urging two neighbouring States which had failed to respond 
substantively to requests from the 864 Committee for information regarding alleged 
sanctions violations to do so promptly; 81 calling upon all States to take the necessary actions 
to implement the sanctions vigorously and strictly;" urging all States to stop travel by their 
officials and official delegations to UNITA headquarters, except for the purposes of travel to 
promote the peace process and humanitarian assistance;" requesting Member States to 
SIRES/864 (15 September 1993), operative paragraph 20; S/RES/1127 (28 August 1997), 
operative paragraph 10. 
77 	S/RES/864 (15 September 1993), operative paragraph 21. 
78 
 
SIRES/864 (15 September 1993), operative paragraph 23. 
79 
 
SIRES/864 (15 September 1993), operative paragraph 24; SIRES/1127 (28 August 1997), 
operative paragraph 13; SIRES/I135 (29 October 1997), operative paragraph 8. 
80 
 
5/RES/890 (15 December 1993), operative paragraph 13; SIRES/903 (16 March 1994), operative 
paragraph 9; S/RES/922 (31 May 1994), operative paragraph 8; SIRES/932 (30 June 1994), 
operative paragraph 8; S/RES/945 (29 September 1994), operative paragraph 13; SIRES/952 (27 
October 1994), preambular paragraph 9; SIRES/966 (8 December 1994), preambular paragraph 
10; SIRES/976 (8 February 1995), operative paragraph 12; S/PRST/1995/11 (10 March 1995): 
Presidential statement of 10 March 1995; S/PRST/1995/18 (13 April 1995): Presidential 
statement of 13 April 1995; SIRES/1045 (8 February 1996), operative paragraph 19; 
S/PRST/1996/19 (24 April 1996): Presidential statement of 24 April 1996; S/RES/1055 (8 May 
1996), operative paragraph 19;; SIRES/1064 (11 July 1996), operative paragraph 18; SIRES/1075 
(11 October 1996), operative paragraph 17; SIRES/1087 (11 December 1996), operative 
paragraph 15. 
81 
 
SIRES/932 (30 June 1994), operative paragraph 8. 
82 	SIRES/1075 (11 October 1996), operative paragraph 17; S/RES/I087 (11 December 1996), 
operative paragraph 15. 
83 	SIRES/1127 (28 August 1997), operative paragraph 6. 
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provide to the 864 Committee any information relating to violations of sanctions; 84 calling 
upon Member States to implement fully and without delay the sanctions;" calling upon all 
States to implement strictly the sanctions;86 requesting Member States to provide the 864 
Committee with information on measures taken to implement the sanctions;87 stressing the 
obligation of Member States to comply with the sanctions;" calling upon Member States to 
support the peace process in Angola through the full and immediate implementation of the 
sanctions;89 calling upon all Member States to implement the sanctions fully; 90 calling upon all 
States to cooperate fully with the expert panels; 91 and calling upon the Governments of the 
States in which the expert panels would carry out their mandate to cooperate fully with the 
panels, including by taking a range of steps. 92 
In April 2000, the Council called upon States to take a range of actions to 
implement recommendations made by the Panel of Experts on the UNITA sanctions. The 
Council thus: called upon all States to cooperate with the monitoring mechanism in the 
SIRES/1127 (28 August 1997), operative paragraph 12; SIRES/1157 (20 March 1998), operative 
paragraph 4; SIRES/1164 (29 April 1998), operative paragraph 14; SIRES/1173 (12 June 1998), 
operative paragraph 22; SIRES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 26. 
85 SIRES/1157 (20 March 1998), operative paragraph 4; SIRES/1164 (29 April 1998), operative 
paragraph 14. 
86 SIRES/1173 (12 June 1998), operative paragraph 18; SIRES/1195 (15 September 1998), operative 
paragraph 5; SIRES/1202 (15 October 1998), operative paragraph 13. 
87 	SIRES/1173 (12 June 1998), operative paragraph 21; SIRES/1176 (24 June 1998), operative 
paragraph 4. 
88 	S/RES/1221 (12 January 1999), operative paragraph 7; SIRES/I237 (7 May 1999), operative 
paragraph 5; SIRES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph I. 
89 S/PRST/1999/3 (21 January 1999): Presidential statement of 21 January 1999. 
90 	SIRES/1229 (26 February 1999), operative paragraph 8. 
91 
 
SIRES/1237 (7 May 1999), operative paragraph 8. 
92 	SIRES/1237 (7 May 1999), operative paragraph 9. Those steps included adopting measures to 
ensure the freedom of movement, independence and security of the panels and their members. 
For details, see operative paragraphs 9(a)-(0. 
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discharge of its mandate; 93 encouraged all States to exercise due diligence, in order to 
prevent the diversion or trans-shipment of weapons to unauthorized end-users or 
unauthorized destinations where such diversion or trans-shipment risked resulting in the 
violation of sanctions, including by requiring end-use documentation or equivalent measures 
before exports from their territories were allowed;94 encouraged all States to ensure 
effective monitoring and regulation in the export of weapons, including by private arms 
brokers;95 invited States to convene one or more conferences of representatives of countries 
that were manufacturers and, in particular, exporters of weapons for the purpose of 
developing proposals to stem the illicit flow of arms into Angola; 96 urged that States 
members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) be invited to 
participate in any such conference or conferences;97 called upon all States to enforce strictly 
safety and control regulations relating to the transportation by air of fuel and other hazardous 
commodities, in particular in the area around Angola, urged States to develop such 
regulations where they did not yet exist, and requested States to provide relevant 
information to the IATA, the ICAO and the 864 Committee;98 encouraged States to 
convene a conference of experts to explore possibilities to stiengthen the implementation of 
the financial sanctions against UNITA;99 called upon all States to work with financial 
institutions on their territory to develop procedures to facilitate the identification of funds and 
93 	SIRES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 4; SIRES/1336 (23 January 2001), operative 
paragraph 7; SIRES/1348 (19 April 2001), operative paragraph 7; SIRES/1374 (19 October 2001), 
operative paragraph 9; SIRES/1404 (18 April 2002), operative paragraph 8; SIRES/1439 (18 
October 2002), operative paragraph 7. 
94 	S/RES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 8. 
95 
 
SIRES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 8. 
96 	S/RES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 9. 
97 
 
SIRES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 9. 
98 	S/RES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 15. 
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financial assets that might be subject to the sanctions and to facilitate the freezing of such 
assets; 10° invited States to review the status of officials and representatives of UNITA 
designated by the 864 Committee and believed to be residing on their territory, with a view 
to suspending or cancelling their travel documents, visas and residence permits in conformity 
with the sanctions;' ° ' called upon States that had issued passports to officials of UNITA and 
adult members of their families designated by the 864 Committee to cancel those passports 
in conformity with the sanctions and to report to the 864 Committee the status of their 
efforts in that regard; 1°2 encouraged States to inform the relevant professional associations 
and certification bodies of the sanctions, to seek action by those bodies where those 
measures were violated, and to consult with such bodies with a view to improving the 
implementation of the sanctions;m3 and strongly urged States to consider the provision of 
financial and technical assistance to SADC. 1°4 
The Council also called upon particular States to take action to implement or 
monitor the sanctions. It called upon Angola itself to implement additional internal and 
inspection procedures with respect to the distribution of petroleum and petroleum products, 
for the purpose of enhancing the effectiveness of the sanctions, and invited the Angolan 
Government to inform the 864 Committee of steps taken in that regard. 1°5 The Council also 
called upon Belgium to continue to cooperate with the 864 Committee to devise practical 
measures to limit access by UNITA to the legitimate diamond market, whilst also calling 
99 	SIRES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 20. 
loo SIRES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 21. 
S/RES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 22. 
102 	SIRES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 23. 
103 SIRES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 28. 
104 SIRES/I295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 32. 
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upon other States ho sting diamond markets and States closely involved with the diamond 
industry to cooperate in the same manner with the 864 Committee.' The Council also 
called upon "relevant States" to cooperate with the diamond industry to develop and 
implement more effective arrangements to ensure that members of the diamond industry 
worldwide abided by the diamond sanctions, and to inform the 864 Committee of progress 
in that regard. 1°7 The Council also urged all States, including those geographically close to 
Angola, to take immediate steps to enforce, strengthen or enact legislation making it a 
criminal offence under domestic law for their nationals or other individuals operating on their 
territory to violate the sanctions, where they had not done so, and to inform the 864 
Committee of the adoption of such measures, and invited States to report the results of all 
related investigations or prosecutions to the Committee.'" 
11.4.4 Regional and international organizations 
In August 1997, the Council urged regional organizations to stop travel by their 
officials and official delegations to UNITA headquarters, except for the purposes of travel to 
promote the peace process and humanitarian assistance. 1°9 At the same time, the Council 
also called upon international and regional organizations to act strictly in accordance with the 
sanctions, notwithstanding the existence of any conflicting legal rights or obligations.' l° 
In January 2000, the Council called upon the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) to take a range of actions with respect to the implementation and 
105 	SIRES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 14. 
106 	S/RES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 17. 
107 SIRES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 19. 
108 	SIRES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 27. 
109 	SIRES/1127 (28 August 1997), operative paragraph 6. 
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monitoring of the sanctions. It thus: encouraged the convening of a conference of experts to 
devise a regime for curbing the illegal supply of petroleum and petroleum products into areas 
controlled by UNITA, including ibysical inspection as well as the broader monitoring of 
petroleum supply in the area, and further encouraged any such conference to focus on the 
role of SADC in the implementation of such a regime;" invited SADC to consider the 
establishment of monitoring activities in the border areas adjacent to Angola for the purpose 
of reducing the opportunities for the smuggling of petroleum and petroleum products into 
areas under the control of UNITA, including through the monitoring of fuel supplies and 
transfers thereof; 112 invited SADC to take the lead in establishing an information-exchange 
mechanism involving petroleum companies and governments to facilitate the flow of 
information regarding possible illegal diversions of fuel to UNTTA; 113 also invited SADC to 
take the lead in carrying out chemical analysis of fuel samples obtained from petroleum 
suppliers in the region and using the results to create a database for the purpose of 
determining the sources of fuel obtained or captured from UNITA; n4 invited SADC to 
consider the introduction of measures to strengthen air traffic control systems in the 
subregion for the purpose of detecting illegal flight activities across national borders, and 
further invited it to liaise with the ICAO to consider the establishment of an air traffic regime 
for the control of regional air space; 115 and invited SADC to inform the 864 Committee 
110 	S/RES/1127 (28 August 1997), operative paragraph 10; SIRES/I173 (12 June 1998), operative 
paragraph 17. 
SIRES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 10. 
112 	SIRES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 11. 
113 SIRES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 12. 
114 SIRES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 13. 
115 SIRES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 14. 
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what assistance it required to implement the various requests addressed to it by the 
council . 116 
11.4.5 The Panel of Experts on UNITA sanctions 
In May 1999 he Council decided to endorse the idea, proposed by the 864 
Committee, of establishing expert panels to facilitate the effective implementation of the 
UNITA sanctions. In resolution 1237 (1999), the Council outlined the mandate of the 
panels, which included the following tasks: (a) To collect information relating to the violations 
of the aims, petroleum, diamond and financial sanctions; (b) To identify those committing or 
facilitating the violations of those sanctions; and (c) To recommend measures to end such 
violations and to improve the implementation of the sanctions." 
In late-July 1999, the 864 Committee appointed ten experts to the expert panels." 8 
The experts came from a variety of countries, possessing expertise in fields conducive to the 
investigation of violations of different aspects of the multi-faceted UNITA sanctions regime. 
The experts convened for the first time in late-August 1999, in New York, when they 
decided that, due to the interconnectedness of the areas to be examined, it would be best to 
act as one panel rather than two." 9 During the six-month period of operation, members of 
the Panel visited close to thirty countries and met with a wide range of people, including 
Government officials, diplomats, NG0s, police and intelligence sources, industry 
116 SIRES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 32. 
117 	S/RES/1237 (7 May 1999), operative paragraph 6. 
118 S/1999/837 (30 July 1999), annex: List of experts appointed to the expert panels established in 
accordance with paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1237 (1999). 
119 S/2000/203 (10 March 2000), enclosure: Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of 
Security Council Sanctions against UNITA, paragraph 8. 
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associations, corporations and journalists. 120 The Panel circulated a brief interim report on 
30 September 1999 and on 28 February 2000 it submitted its full report to the 864 
Committee. 121 The report contained the Panel's findings and conclusions 122 on violations of 
the aims, petroleum, diamond and financial sanctions against UNITA, as well as on 
violations of the diplomatic and travel sanctions against UNITA. 123 The Panel made thirty-
nine recommendations on how the sanctions violations might be addressed. 
11.4.6 The Monitoring Mechanism on UNITA sanctions 
In April 2000, the Security Council acted upon one of the recommendations put 
forth in the report of the Panel of Experts by requesting the Secretary-General to establish a 
monitoring mechanism on the UNITA sanctions. 124 The monitoring mechanism would 
continue the work of the Panel of Experts by collecting additional information on, and 
120 	Ibid. 
121 	S/1999/1016 (30 September 1999), annex: Interim report of the Expert Panel established by the 
Security Council in resolution 1237 (1999) of 7 May 1999; S/20001203 (10 March 2000), 
annex I, enclosure: Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions 
against UNITA. 
122 	The Panel noted that the evidentiary standard employed was such that the Panel would only 
use information that had been corroborated by more than one source in which the Panel had 
confidence: see Report of the Panel, ibid, paras 11-12. 
123 	Interestingly, the question of sanctions against UNITA representation and travel was not 
actually included in the mandate for the Panel as outlined by the Council in resolution 1237 
(1999). It is unclear how the Panel came to consider that these sanctions were within the scope 
of its mandate. In the first paragraph of the Panel's report it notes that resolution 1237 (1999) 
established it to investigate violations of Security Council sanctions against UNITA. It then 
lists the "sanctions at issue", among which it includes the travel and representation sanctions, 
despite the fact that the Council had not included those sanctions within the mandate explicitly 
outlined for the Panel of Experts in operative paragraph 6 of resolution 1237 (1999). 
124 	S/RES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 3. Resolution 1295 (2000) appears to amount to 
a general endorsement of the recommendations outlined by the Panel of Experts in its report. 
Interestingly, however, the language of resolution 1295 (2000) is not prescriptive or mandatory. 
The Council opted to use language such as "requests", "calls upon", and "encourages", 
instead of the more definitive "decides". The resolution therefore appears to be more a "wish-
list" of things that could be done to improve the implementation of the sanctions than a set of 
mandatory obligations that must be acted upon by States and non-State actors. 
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investigating relevant leads relating to, allegations of violations of the UNrfA sanctions. 125 It 
would consist of up to five experts and it would have a time-bound mandate of six 
months.' After its initial establishment, the maminte of the UNITA monitoring mechanism 
was extended five times, for one period of three months, three subsequent periods of six 
months, and a final period of two months.'" The size of the mechanism contracted over the 
course of its mandates, consisting of five experts for the second and third mandates, four 
experts for the fourth and fifth mandates, and two experts for the final mandate. 128 
During the course of its two-and-a-half-year tenure, the monitoring mechanism 
submitted a total of six reports. 129 In each of its reports, the mechanism has outlined the 
activities undertaken during the period of the most recent mandate, as well as various 
findings, conclusions and recommendations. Among the monitoring mechanism's major 
125 	S/RES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 3. 
126 	SIRES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 3. There was a subtle difference in the method 
of appointing experts for the monitoring mechanism, vis-d-vis the Panel of Experts. The experts 
for the Panel were appointed by the 864 Committee, whereas the Council requested the 
Secretary-General to appoint the experts for the monitoring mechanism. 
127 	See: S/RES/1336 (23 January 2001), operative paragraph 3 [extending the mechanism's mandate 
for three months]; SIRES/1348 (19 April 2001), operative paragraph 3 [extending the 
mechanism's mandate for six months]; SIRES/1374 (19 October 2001), operative paragraph 3 
[extending the mechanism's mandate for a further six months]; SIRES/1404 (18 April 2002), 
operative paragraph 3 [extending the mechanism's mandate for a further six months]; 
SIRES/1439 (18 October 2002), operative paragraph 2 [deciding to extend the mechanism's 
mandate for a further two months]. 
128 	See: SIRES/1336 (23 January 2001), operative paragraph 5 [requesting the Secretary-General to 
reappoint five experts to the monitoring mechanism]; SIRES/1348 (19 April 2001), operative 
paragraph 5 [requesting the Secretary-General to appoint five experts to the monitoring 
mechanism]; SIRES/1374 (19 October 2001), operative paragraph 7 [requesting the Secretary-
General to appoint four experts to the monitoring mechanism]; SIRES/1404 (18 April 2002), 
operative paragraph 6 [requesting the Secretary-General to appoint four experts to the 
monitoring mechanism]; SIRES/1439 (18 October 2002), operative paragraph 5 [requesting the 
Secretary-General to appoint two experts to the monitoring mechanism]. 
129 	S/2000/1225 (21 December 2000), enclosure: Final Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on 
Angola Sanctions; 5/2001/363 (18 April 2001), enclosure: Addendum to the final report of the 
Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA; S/2001/966 (12 October 2001), 
enclosure: Supplementary report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA; 
S/2002/486 (26 April 2002), annex: Additional report of the Monitoring Mechanism on 
Sanctions against UNITA; S/2002/1119 (16 October 2002), annex: Additional report of the 
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initiatives, it has: (a) Identified individuals and companies involved in activities that violate, or 
promote violation of, the UNITA sanctions; (b) Identified States that have been complicit in 
activities that violate, or promote violation of, the UNITA sanctions; (c) Commissioned a 
professional asset tracer to investigate the flow of UNITA's financial assets; and 
(d) Identified, and monitored the activities of, individuals and non-governmental 
organisations who appear to have been acting as foreign representatives of UNITA. 13° 
Among the major recommendations made by the monitoring mechanism have been that: 
(a) Better networks of regulatory bodies should be established in the spheres most relevant 
to the effective implementation of sanctions — for instance, the establishment of an effective 
international regulatory regime for diamonds, and the promotion of better cooperation 
among SADC Member States in the implementation, monitoring and enforcement of the 
UNITA sanctions; and (b) The Security Council should establish a permanent mechanism to 
monitor its sanctions.' 31 
11.5 The Suspension and Termination of the UNITA sanctions 
regime 
In May 2002, after the death of the UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, aid when it 
appeared that the decades-long conflict between UNITA and the Angolan Government was 
drawing to a close, the Security Council narrowed the scope of the sanctions by suspending 
Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA; S/2002/1339 (10 December 2002), annex: 
Final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA. 
130 	For further details of the monitoring mechanism's activities, see the chapter below containing a 
case-study on the UNITA sanctions regime. 
131 	For further details of the mechanism's recommendations, see the chapter below containing a 
case-study on the UNITA sanctions regime. 
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the travel sanctions against UNITA officials and their families. 132 In December 2002, the 
Council welcomed the steps taken by the Angolan Government and UNITA toward the full 
implementation of the Acordos de Paz, the Lusaka Protocol, relevant Security Council 
resolutions and other recent initiatives aimed at achieving peace.' 33 It then terminated the 
sanctions regime,' 34 and dissolved the 864 Committee.' 35 
11.6 Notable aspects of the UNITA sanctions regime 
The UNITA sanctions regime exhibited a number of noteworthy characteristics. 
First, as with the sanctions imposed against the Bosnian Serbs, the UNITA sanctions regime 
targeted a sub-state entity. Second, the Council applied diamond sanctions for the first time, 
prohibiting the export of diamonds from UNITA-controlled areas in an attempt to address 
the link between the diamond trade and the flow of illicit weapons. Third, in its resolutions 
outlining the contours of the UNITA sanctions regime, the Council continued the trend - 
initiated with the regime against Libya and utilised in the sanctions regimes against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), the Bosnian Serbs and Haiti - of 
using time-delays before the entry into force of the sanctions, thus providing the target with a 
"period of grace" in which to avoid the application of sanctions by complying with the 
Council's demands." 6 Fourth, the UNITA sanctions regime witnessed what appear to be 
132 
	
SIRES/1412 (17 May 2002), operative paragraph 1. The suspension was for a period of ninety 
days. In August 2002, the Council extended the suspension of those for a further ninety days: 
SIRES/1432 (15 August 2002), operative paragraph I. 
133 	SIRES/1448 (9 December 2002), preambular paragraph 3. The other recent initiatives included a 
Memorandum of Understanding dated 4 April 2002 [S/2002/483 (26 April 2002), annex], a 
declaration on the peace process by the Angolan Government [S/2002/1337 (6 December 2002), 
annex], and the completion of the work of a Joint Commission. 
134 	SIRES/1448 (9 December 2002), operative paragraph 2. 
135 
	
SIRES/1448 (9 December 2002), operative paragraph 3. 
136 	See, e.g.: SIRES/864 (15 September 1993), operative paragraph 17 [deciding that the sanctions 
would enter into force ten days later, unless the Secretary-General notified it that an effective 
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the first visits to the field of a Chairman of a Sanctions Committee. Fifth, in its efforts to 
improve the implementation of the 'UNITA sanctions regime, the Council established its first 
Panel of Experts to explore the violations of a sanctions regime. Sixth, the Council also 
established the first monitoring mechanism to explore violations of a sanctions regime. 
Seventh, as the sanctions were terminated ten days before the expiration of the final mandate 
of the monitoring mechanism, an interesting situation arose in which a Sanctions Committee, 
which is generally considered to be the conduit to the Council of the findings and reports of 
other subsidiary organs such as Panels of Experts and monitoring mechanisms, was in fact 
dissolved prior to the conclusion of the activities of its monitoring mechanism. Eighth, the 
Council considered the possibility of imposing communications sanctions against UNITA.' 37 
Finally, in one of its resolutions related to the UNITA sanctions regime, the Security Council 
cease-fire had been established and that agreement had been reached on the implementation of 
the Peace Accords and relevant Security Council resolutions]; SIRES/1127 (28 August 1997), 
operative paragraph 7 [deciding that the sanctions would enter into force thirty-three days 
later, unless it were to decide, on the basis of a report by the Secretary-General, that UNITA 
had taken concrete and irreversible steps to comply with the obligations enunciated in that 
resolution]; SIRES/1173 (12 June 1998), operative paragraph 14 [deciding that the sanctions 
would enter into force thirteen days later, unless it were to decide, on the basis of a report by 
the Secretary-General, that UNITA had fully complied by 23 June 1998 with all its obligations 
under that resolution]. 
It is noteworthy that, on two occasions, the Council extended the initial date for the application 
of sanctions, in response to what appeared to be positive developments on the ground. The 
date for the entry into force of the sanctions outlined in resolution 1127 (1997), initially set for 
30 September 1997 (SIRES/1127 (28 August 1997), operative paragraph 7), was delayed for a 
period of thirty days: SIRES/1130 (29 September 1997), operative paragraph 2 [delaying the 
entry into force until 30 October 1997]. The date for the entry into force of resolution 1173 
(1998), initially set for 25 June 1998, was also delayed, this time by six days: SIRES/1176 (24 
June 1998), operative paragraph. In both cases, the additional time seemed to be permitted in 
response to observations made by the Secretary-General relating to potential positive 
developments on the ground. 
137 	S/RES/1221 (12 January 1999), operative paragraph 8 [expressing its readiness to consider the 
imposition of telecommunications sanctions and requesting the 864 Committee to explore and 
report on that possibility]. 
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made a rare explicit reference to Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations — the legal 
and constitutional basis for the application of sanctions.' 38 
138 
	
S/RES/1295 (18 April 2000), operative paragraph 6. 
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12. The Rwanda sanctions r6gime 
The Security Council imposed sanctions against Rwanda in May 1994, in an attempt 
to address ongoing violence. The sanctions regime, which consists of an aims embargo, has 
remained in place for almost a decade. The scope of the regime has not changed, but the 
application of the arms embargo has been narrowed slightly, from an embargo against the 
sale or supply of arms and related materiel to the territory of Rwanda in general, to an 
embargo against the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to non-Government entities 
in Rwanda or entities in States neighbouring who might forward them to non-Government 
entities in Rwanda. 
12.1 The constitutional basis for imposing sanctions against 
Rwanda 
In May 1994, the Security Council strongly condemned the ongoing violence in 
Rwanda,' and expressed its deep concern that the consequences of the violence in Rwanda, 
including the internal displacement of a significant percentage of the Rwandan population and 
the massive exodus of refugees, constituted a humanitarian crisis of "enormous 
proportions". 2 Noting that it was deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering 
caused by the conflict and that it was concerned that the continuation of the situation in 
Rwanda constituted a threat to peace and security in the region, 3  the Council proceeded to 
determine that the situation in Rwanda did in fact constitute a threat to peace and security in 
SIRES/9 18 (17 May 1994), preambular paragraph 5. 
S/RES/918 (17 May 1994), preambular paragraph 8. 
SIRES/918 (17 May 1994), preambular paragraph 18. 
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the region,4 and to invoke Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,' before 
imposing sanctions against Rwanda.6 In subsequent decisions related to the Rwandan 
sanctions regime, the Council again invoked Chapter VII of the Charter, without explicitly 
determining the continuing existence of a threat to peace and security.' 
12.2 The objectives of the Rwanda sanctions regime 
The Security Council did not articulate an explicit objective in connection with the 
Rwanda sanctions regime. Various provisions of the resolution establishing the sanctions 
suggest, however, that the main objectives of the arms embargo were the establishment of a 
cease-fire and the achievement of a peaceful settlement to the conflict, within the framework 
of the Arusha Peace Agreement.' 
12.3 The scope of the Rwanda sanctions regime 
The sanctions regime against Rwanda initially consisted of a prohibition upon the 
sale or supply to Rwanda of arms and related materie1. 9 In June 1995, the Council affirmed 
that the Rwanda sanctions regime prevented the sale or supply of arms and related materiel 
4 	SIRES/918 (17 May 1994), section B, preambular paragraph I. 
5 
	
SIRES/918 (17 May 1994), section B, preambular paragraph 2. 
6 
	
SIRES/918 (17 May 1994), operative paragraph 13. 
7 
	
SIRES/1005 (17 July 1995), preambular paragraph 6; SIRES/1O1 1 (16 August 1995), section B, 
preambular paragraph 1. 
8 	See, e.g., SIRES/918 (17 May 1994), preambular paragraph 6 [stressing the importance of the 
Arusha agreement to the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Rwanda and the necessity for 
the parties to the conflict to implement that agreement], operative paragraph 1 [demanding that 
the parties to the conflict immediately cease hostilities, agree to a cease-fire, and bring an end 
to the violence in Rwanda], and operative paragraph 19 [inviting the Secretary-General and his 
Special Representative, in coordination with the Organization of African Unity and countries in 
the region, to continue their efforts to achieve a political settlement in Rwanda within the 
framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement]. 
9 	SIRES/918 (17 May 1994), operative paragraph 13. The Council outlined exemptions from the 
arms sanctions, however, for activities related to the United Nations Assistance Mission for 
Rwanda (UNAMIR) and the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNAMUR): 
SIRES/918 (17 May 1994), operative paragraph 16. 
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to persons in States neighbouring Rwanda, if such sale or supply was for eventual use in 
Rwanda.' ° 
In July 1995, the Council outlined an exemption from the sanctions regime, for 
explosives that were to be used for the purpose of demining, when authorized by the 
Rwanda Sanctions Committee." In August 1995, the Council narrowed the scope of the 
sanctions slightly, deciding that the sanctions regime would not apply to the sale or supply of 
arms and related materiel to the Government of Rwanda. 12 At the same time, the Council 
also decided that the Rwandan Government could not resell arms or related materiel to any 
neighbouring States or to any person not in its service. In addition, the Council also required 
States to notify the Rwanda Sanctions Committee of any exports of arms and related 
materiel to the Rwandan Government." 
12.4 The administration, monitoring and enforcement of the 
Rwanda sanctions regime 
The Security Council has established two subsidiary entities to facilitate the 
administiation and implementation of the Rwanda sanctions regime: the Rwanda Sanctions 
Committee (also referred to as the "918 Committee") and the Commission of Inquiry on 
Rwanda Sanctions. In addition, the Council has also called upon the Secretary-General and 
States to take additional steps to facilitate the implementation of the sanctions. 
to 	S/RES1997 (9 June 1995), operative paragraph 4. The Council reaffirmed this provision in 
SIRES/1O1 1 (16 August 1995), operative paragraph 9. 
It 	SIRES/1005 (17 July 1995), operative paragraph 1 (NB: the paragraph is not actually numbered, 
as it is the only operative paragraph in the resolution). 
12 	SIRES/1011 (16 August 1995), operative paragraphs 7 and 8. Operative paragraph 7 provided 
that the sale or supply of arms and related materiel could take place via specified entry points 
until 1 September 1996. Operative paragraph 8 provided that after 1 September 1996 the sale or 
supply of arms and related materiel could take place in general, unless the Security Council 
were to decide otherwise prior to that date. 
13 	S/RES/1011 (16 August 1995), operative paragraph 11. 
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12.4.1 The Rwanda Sanctions Committee 
When the Security Council established the Rwanda sanctions regime it also created 
a Sanctions Committee to oversee the adrninistiation of the sanctions regime itself. 14 The 
Committee was established, in accordance with rule 28 of the Council's provisional rules of 
procedure, with a mandate to report on its work to the Council with its observations and 
recommendations and to perform the following tasks: (a) To seek from all States information 
regarding action taken to implement the arms embargo; 15 (b) To consider information 
concerning violations of the embargo and to make recommendations to the Council on 
increasing the effectiveness of the embargo; 16 and (c) To recommend appropriate measures 
in response to violations of the embargo and to provide information on a regular basis to the 
Secretary-General, for general distribution to Member States: 7 
In April 1995, the Council requested that the Committee consider information 
provided by States and organizations on the transport of arms into countries neighbouring 
Rwanda for eventual use in Rwanda: 8 In July 1995, the Council created another task for 
the Committee, deciding that it would receive applications, and provide authorisation where 
appropriate, for exemptions from the arms embargo for explosives to be used in 
humanitarian demining programmes. 19 In August 1995, the Council decided that the Rwanda 
Committee would also assume the following duties: (a) To receive notifications from all 
States of all exports from their territories of arms or related materiel to Rwanda; (b) To 
14 SIRES/918 (17 May 1994), operative paragraph 14. 
15 S/RES/918 (17 May 1994), operative paragraph 14(a). 
SIRES/918 (17 May 1994), operative paragraph 14(b). 
17 SIRES/918 (17 May 1994), operative paragraph 14(c). 
18 S/PRST/1995/22 (27 April 1995): Presidential statement of 27 April 1995. 
19 SIRES/1005 (17 July 1995), sole operative paragraph. 
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receive notification from the Government of Rwanda of all imports it received of arms and 
related materiel; and (c) To report regularly to the Council on notifications so received. 20 In 
April 1998, when the Council requested the Secretary-General to reactivate the 
International Commission of Inquiry, it called upon relevant United Nations bodies, including 
the 918 Committee, to collate information in their possession relating to the mandate of the 
Commission of Inquiry, and to make that information available to the Commission as soon 
as possible. 21 
The Rwanda Sanctions Committee has not been among the more active of 
Sanctions Committees. Since its establishment almost a decade ago, the Committee has held 
seven formal meetings, 22 and issued eight annual reports. 23 The Committee's annual reports 
have tended to be brief, with few substantive recommendations or observations. The 
Committee has consistently noted that its ability to monitor the sanctions effectively is 
dependent upon the cooperation of States and organizations in a position to provide it with 
20 	S/RES/1011 (16 August 1995), operative paragraph 11. The Committee thus submitted the 
following reports: S/19961329 (2 May 1996) & Rev.1 (27 August 1996); S/19961396 (30 May 
1996) & Rev. 1 (27 August 1996); S/19961407 (5 June 1996) & Rev. 1 (27 August 1996); 
S/19961697 (27 August 1996). 
21 	SIRES/I161 (9 April 1998), operative paragraph 2. 
22 	The last official record of a meeting by the Rwanda Sanctions Committee is to be found in: 
Index to Proceedings of the Security Council for 1998 (1999) United Nations, New York, p. xiv. 
The seventh meeting took place on 6 January 1998. 
23 	As with the annual reports of other Sanctions Committees, the reports for the 918 Committee 
were all issued in accordance with the note of the President of the Security Council of 29 
March 1995 (S/1995/234): S/1996/82 (2 February 1996), annex: Report of the Security Council 
Committee established pursuant to resolution 918 (1994) concerning Rwanda, [hereafter 
"First Report of the 918 Committee", outlining the committee's activities from its 
establishment until 31 December 1995]; S/1997/15 (7 January 1997), annex: Report of the 918 
Committee for 1996; 5/1997/1028 (31 December 1997), annex: Report of the 918 Committee for 
1997; 5/1998/1219 (24 December 1998), annex: Report of the 918 Committee for 1998; 
S/1999/1292 (30 December 1999), annex: Report of the 918 Committee for 1999; S/2000/1227 (22 
December 2000), annex: Report of the 918 Committee for 2000; S/2002/49 (14 January 2002), 
annex: Report of the 918 Committee for 2001; 5/2002/1406 (24 December 2002), annex: Report 
of the 918 Committee for 2002. 
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pertinent inforrnation. 24 In its 1998 annual report, the Committee also endorsed operative 
paragraph 2 of resolution 1196 (1998), which was concerned with the implementation of 
arms embargoes in general, which encouraged Member States to consider, as a means of 
implementing obligations under arms embargoes, the adoption of legislation or other legal 
measures making the violation of Security Council arms embargoes a criminal offence. 25 The 
Committee also expressed its intention to consider appropriate steps to improve the 
monitoring of the arms embargo, including by establishing channels of communication with 
relevant regional organizations and subregional organizations. 26 
12.4.2 The Secretary-General 
When the Security Council established the Rwanda sanctions regime, it simply 
requested the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements in the Secretariat to 
provide assistance to the Rwanda Sanctions Committee. 27 In June 1995, the Security 
Council further requested the Secretary-General to consult the Governments of countries 
neighbouring Rwanda on the possibility of deploying observers to monitor the 
implementation of the Rwandan sanctions and to report back to the Council on the matter 
within a month. 28 In August 1995, the Council requested the Secretary-General to make 
recommendations on the establishment of a commission to investigate allegations of arms 
24 	See, e.g., Report of the 918 Committee for 1996, ibid, paragraph 10; Report of the 918 
Committee for 1997, ibid, paragraph 5; Report of the 918 Committee for 1998, ibid, paragraph 
5; Report of the 918 Committee for 1999, ibid, paragraph 5; Report of the 918 Committee for 
2000, ibid, paragraph 5; Report of the 918 Committee for 2001, ibid, paragraph 5; Report of 
the 918 Committee for 2002, ibid, paragraph 5. 
25 Report of the 918 Committee for 1998, above note 23, paragraph 5. 
26 	Ibid, paragraph 6. 
27 51RE51918 (17 May 1994), operative paragraph 17. 
28 	SIRES/997 (9 June 1995), operative paragraph 6. The Secretary-General submitted the requested 
report in July 1995: S/1995/552 (9 July 1995): Report of the Secretary-General on the 
implementation of paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 997 (1995) of 9 June 1995. 
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flows to former Rwandese Government Forces in the Great Lakes region, 29 and encouraged 
the Secretary-General to continue his consultations with Governments of neighbouring States 
concerning the deployment of United Nations military observers at airfields and 
transportation points in and around border crossings. 3° At the same time, the Council also 
requested the Secretary-General to notify Member States of the locations listed by the 
Government of Rwanda as points of entry through which arms exempt from the embargo 
might enter the country. 31 At the same time, the Council also requested the Secretary-
General to report to it in six months, and again in twelve months, on the legitimate export of 
arms to Rwanda in accordance with approved exemptions. 32 
In September 1995, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to 
establish an International Commission of Inquiry, which would investigate violations of the 
arms embargo and to make recommendations for improving the embargo's 
implementation. 33 The Council also requested the Secretary-General to report to it on the 
establishment of the Commission and to submit both an interim and a final report. 34 In April 
1996, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General: (a) To maintain the 
International Commission of Inquiry; 35 (b) To consult with States neighbouring Rwanda, and 
in particular Zaire, on appropriate measures for better implementing the arms embargo and 
29 	SIRES/I01 I (16 August 1995), operative paragraph 2. 
30 	S/RES/I011 (16 August 1995), operative paragraph 4. 
31 
 
SIRES/101 1 (16 August 1995), operative paragraph 7. 
32 	SIRES/I011 (16 August 1995), operative paragraph 12. The following reports were thus 
submitted by the Secretary-General: S/19961202 (15 March 1996); S/1996/663 (15 August 1996) 
& Rev.I/Add.1 (30 August 1996). 
33 	S/RES/I013 (7 September 1995), operative paragraph 1. For further details relating to the 
mandate and activities of the Commission, see below. 
34 	S/RES/1013 (7 September 1995), operative paragraph 4. The interim report was to be submitted 
three months after the establishment of the Commission and the final report was to be 
submitted as soon as possible thereafter. 
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deterring shipments of arms to former Rwandan government forces, including through the 
deployment of United Nations observers;36 and (c) To submit a report to it by 1 October 
1996 on the implementation of resolution 1053 (1996). 37 Two years later, in April 1998, the 
Council requested the Secretary-General to re-activate the International Commission of 
Inquiry, and to submit to it within three months an interim report by the Commission, and a 
final report of the Commission within six months. 39 
12.4.3 The Commission of Inquiry on Rwanda (ICIR) 
In September 1995, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to 
establish, as a matter of urgency, an International Commission of Inquiry. The Commission, 
which would consist of five to ten impartial and internationally respected persons, including 
legal, military and police experts, under the Chairmanship of an eminent person," was to 
have the following mandate: (a) Collecting information and investigate reports relating to the 
sale or supply of arms and related materiel to former Rwandan government forces in the 
Great Lakes region, in violation of Council resolutions 918 (1994), 997 (1995) and 
1011(1995); (b) Investigating allegations that such forces were receiving military training in 
order to destabilize Rwanda; (c) Identifying parties aiding and abetting the illegal acquisition 
35 
 
SIRES/1053 (23 April 1996), operative paragraph 2. 
36 	SIRES/1053 (23 April 1996), operative paragraph 7. 
37 
 
SIRES/1053 (23 April 1996), operative paragraph 12. 
38 SIRES/1161 (9 April 1998), operative paragraph 1. 
39 	SIRES/1161 (9 April 1998), operative paragraph 7. 
40 	SIRES/1013 (7 September 1995), operative paragraph 2. Six people were appointed to the 
Commission in mid-October 1995, and they began work shortly thereafter. The six people were: 
Ambassador Kassem, Egypt (Chairman); Inspector Hanssens, Canada; Colonel Almeling, 
Germany; Lt. Colonel Mijvogel, Netherlands; Brigadier Alam, Pakistan; and Colonel Mutanda, 
Zimbabwe: S/1995/879 (20 October 1995): Letter dated 16 October from the Secretary-General 
to the President of the Security Council. 
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of arms by former Rwandan government forces, in violation of the sanctions; and 
(d) Recommending measures to end the illegal flow of arms in the subregion.' 
The Commission's mandate was initially for a short-term period, 42 but it was 
subsequently maintained or re-activated by the Council on two occasions. In April 1996, the 
Security Council requested the Secretary-General to maintain the Commission, with a 
mandate to follow up its earlier investigations and to pursue any further allegations of 
violations of the arms embargo. 43 In April 1998, the Security Council requested the 
Secretary-General to re-activate the Commission, with a mandate to undertake the following 
tasks: (a) Collecting information and investigating reports relating to the sale, supply and 
shipment of arms and related materiel to former Rwandan government forces and militias in 
the Great Lakes region, in violation of the arms embargo;44 (b) Identifying parties aiding and 
abetting the acquisition of arms and related materiel by former Rwandan government 
forces, in violation of the arms embargo; 45 and (c) Making recommendations relating to the 
Illegal flow of arms in the Great Lakes region. 46 
During its tenure, the International Commission of Inquiry submitted a total of six 
reports to the Counci1. 47 In its reports the Commission outlined its activities and provided 
41 	SIRES/1013 (7 September 1995), operative paragraph 1. 
42 	SIRES/1013 (7 September 1995), operative paragraph 4. Interestingly, the Council did not 
specify a duration for the Commission's mandate, but it did request the Secretary-General to 
submit, within three months from the Commission's establishment, an interim report on the 
Commission's findings, and to submit a final report as soon as possible thereafter, thus 
implying that the mandate would not be much longer than three months. 
43 
 
SIRES/l053 (23 April 1996), operative paragraph 2. 
44 	SIRES/1161 (9 April 1998), operative paragraph 1(a). 
45 SIRES/1161 (9 April 1998), operative paragraph 1(b). 
46 	SIRES/1161 (9 April 1998), operative paragraph 1(c). 
47 S/I996/67 (29 January 1996), annex: Interim report of the International Commission of Inquiry 
on the Rwanda arms embargo" (hereafter "First Report of the ICIR"); S/1996/195 (14 March 
1996), annex: Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on the Rwanda arms 
embargo(hereafter "Second Report of the ICIR"); S/1997/1010 (24 December 1997), annex: 
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observations, conclusions and recommendations. In its first report, completed in January 
1996, the Commission noted that its activities to date had taken place mainly in Rwanda, 
Zaire and the region, whilst it had also approached a number of Governments whose 
nationals were alleged to have been involved in violations of the aims embargo, including 
Bulgaria, China, France, Seychelles, South Africa and Zaire. 48 In its conclusions, the 
Commission stated that, although it had gathered a lot of information in relation to alleged 
violations of the arms embargo, it was not in a position to confirm allegations that arms and 
related materiel had been sold or supplied to the former Rwandan government forces in 
violation of the sanctions.49 The Commission nevertheless believed that Rwandan men were 
in fact receiving military training to conduct destabilizing raids into Rwanda.5° It also noted 
that it had not yet been able to establish that specific Governments, companies or individuals 
had aided or abetted the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to the former Rwandan 
government forces in violation of the sanctions, but observed that it would report any further 
information that might be discovered in its final report. 5I 
Final report of the International Commission of Inquiry on the Rwanda arms embargo 
(hereafter 'Third Report of the ICIR". This report was originally annexed to a letter dated 1 
November 1996 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, but it was 
not circulated as an official document of the Council until more than a year later); S/1998/63 (26 
January 1998), annex: Addendum to the final report of the International Commission of 
Inquiry on the Rwanda arms embargo (hereafter "Fourth Report of the ICIR"); S/1998/777 (19 
August 1998), annex: Interim report of the International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda) 
(hereafter "F(th Report of the ICIR"); S/1998/1096 (18 November 1998), annex: Final report of 
the International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda) (hereafter "Sixth Report of the ICIR"). 
48 Interim report of the International Commission of Enquiry on the Rwandan arms embargo, 
ibid, paragraphs 14-54. 
49 	Ibid, paragraph 67(a). 
50 	'bid, paragraph 67(b). 
51 Ibid, paragraph 67(c). 
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In its second report, issued at the end of its first mandated period, the Commission 
summarised its activities," outlined a case-study of allegations that arms had been delivered 
to former Rwandan government forces in Zaire, via the Seychelles, in violation of the 
Rwandan arms embargo," and made a number of general recommendations that vere 
designed to facilitate the implementation of Security Council arms embargoes in general, as 
well as some detailed recommendations with the aim of improving the implementation of the 
Rwandan arms embargo in particular. The Commission's general recommendations included 
that: (a) Upon the imposition of an arms embargo against a State or a part thereof, the 
Security Council should consider urging neighbouring States to establish within their 
respective Governments an office to monitor, implement and enforce the embargo within its 
52 	See: Second report of the ICIR, above note 47, paragraphs 7-20, 40-51. The Commission had 
few additional findings, due to the fact that the cooperation of other Governments whose 
activities it had attempted to investigate had been less than ideal: Second report of the ICIR, 
above note 47, paragraphs 71-73. Among the States subject to investigation by the 
Commission were Bulgaria, Burundi, China, France, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda. 
53 	Ibid, paragraphs 21-39. The Commission's investigations centred upon allegations that had 
appeared in a Human Rights Watch report:Rearming with impunity: international support for 
the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide (1995) Washington, D.C., USA 1995, also available 
on-line at: http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/Rwanda  1 .htm (last visited 15 July 2004). In that 
report HRW reported that shipments of arms had found their way into the possession of the 
former-Rwandan Government military forces, via Zaire. The Commission concluded that the 
report was accurate and that two shipments of arms, originating in the Seychelles, had indeed 
made their way into the hands of Rwandan Government forces: ibid. paragraph 64. Authorities 
in the Seychelles had authorized the sale with the understanding that they intended for use in 
Zaire, as they had been provided with "end-user certificates", purportedly issued by the 
Government of Zaire. Once it became apparent that the shipments might have been delivered to 
a destination other than Zaire, the Seychelles cancelled subsequent additional scheduled 
shipments: ibid. paragraph 65. Ironically, the arms had originally been seized by the Seychelles 
from a ship named Malo because they were being transported to Somalia in violation of the 
United Nations sanctions regime against that country: ibid, paragraph 29. The Commission 
found that two individuals were instrumental in facilitating the shipments —Colonel Theoneste 
Bagora, a high-ranking officer of the former-Rwandan government forces, and Mr. William 
Ehlers, a South African National who was the director of a company called "Delta Aero". It 
further concluded that it was highly probable that a violation of the sanctions had taken place, 
involving the supply of more than 80 tons of rifles, grenades and ammunition in two 
consignments flown to Goma airport on 17 and 19 June 1994 and subsequently transferred to 
the Rwandan government forces, then in Gisenyi, Rwanda. It also concluded that the 
Government of Zaire, or elements thereof, had aided and abetted the violation. It also 
recommended that there should be further investigation into the role of Mr. Ehlers. 
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own territory and to gather information that might be used by investigating bodies dispatched 
by the Counci1; 54 (b) Where the States concerned could not staff and equip such offices 
within their existing resources, consideration be given to establishing a trust fund, within the 
context of Article 50 of the United Nations Charter, to provide such assistance; 55 (c) The 
Council consider expanding the functions of future sanctions committees, to include liaising 
with the offices in neighbouring States, as well as receiving, analysing and circulating to 
Member States reports submitted by those offices; 56 (d) The Governments of the Great 
Lakes region intensify their efforts: to ensure that their territory was not used for the 
recruitment or training of refugees, nor as a base from which to launch attacks against any 
other country; and to prevent military training and the sale or supply of weapons to militia 
groups or other groups among the refugees; 57 (e) Neighbouring States should be 
encouraged to participate in maintaining a register or data bank of movements and 
acquisitions of small arms, ammunition and materie1;58 (f) Countries supplying arms be 
requested not to transfer such arms to non-State entities or private businessmen." 
Among the more specific recommendations outlined by the Commission, and 
applicable to the sanctions regime against Rwanda, were that: (a) The Council should 
consider inviting the Government of South Africa to investigate the participation of Mr. 
William Ehlers in the negotiations that had led to the delivery of arms to former Rwandan 
54 
	
'bid, paragraph 77. 
55 
	
Ibid, paragraph 79. 
56 
	
Ibid, paragraph 80. 
57 
	
Ibid, paragraph 82. 
58 
	
Ibid, paragraph 84. 
59 
	
Ibid, paragraph 85. 
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armed forces in Goma, Zaire, in violation of the sanctions; 6° (b) The Council should consider 
calling upon the Government of Bulgaria to make available to the 918 Committee the 
findings of an internal investigation into allegations that a Bulgarian company had been willing 
to sell arms in violation of Security Council resolutions; 61 (c) The Council should call upon 
the Government of Zaire to investigate the apparent complicity of its own personnel and 
officials in the purchase of arms from the Seychelles; 62 (d) The Council should consider 
inviting the Government of Zaire to station United Nations observers on its territory to 
monitor the implementation of the sanctions against Rwanda and to deter future violations; 63 
(e) The Council should consider facilitating the establishment of a domestic group, within 
Zaire, to monitor the sanctions, perhaps in coordination with the OAU under Chapter VIII 
of the Charter; 64 and (f) The Council should consider retaining the Commission itself, or the 
creating another, similar body, in order to follow up the Commission's investigations and to 
report periodically to the Secretary-General on compliance with Security Council 
resolutions.° 
In its third report, completed in October 1996, 66 the Commission summarised its 
recent activities,67 and provided observations, conclusions and recornmendations. 68 Among 
60 	!bid, paragraph 86. 
61 	Ibid, paragraph 87. 
62 	!bid, paragraph 88. 
63 	Ibid, paragraph 91(a). 
64 Ibid, paragraph 91(b). 
65 	Ibid, paragraph 91(c). 
66 	See: Third report of the ICIR, above note 47. As noted above, this report was originally 
annexed to a letter dated 1 November 1996 from the Secretary-General to the President of the 
Security Council, but it was not circulated as an official document of the Council until more 
than a year later. 
67 Ibid, paragraphs 9-103. During the reporting period, the Commission expanded the range of 
States and organizations contacted, approaching the Governments of eighteen States, as well 
as the Rwanda Sanctions Committee, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 
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the Commission's recommendations were that: (a) Consideration should be given to 
requesting States producing arms and materiel to take any measures necessary under their 
domestic law to implement the provisions of the arms embargo, and in particular to 
prosecute their nationals involved in violations of the embargo; 69 (b) The Security Council 
should urgently call upon the Government of Zaire not to allow foreign groups to operate 
from its soil and to identify steps it could take to improve the situation, such as putting an 
end to the sale or supply of arms and related materiel and assistance or training to those 
groups;7° (c) United Nations observers should be deployed in order to deter or reduce the 
potential for arms shipments; 71 (d) The Security Council should consider expanding the 
sanctions to include a freeze on the assets of individuals and organizations involved in raising 
funds to finance the insurgency against Rwanda -,72 (e) The Security Council should 
encourage the Tanzanian authorities to liaise with UNHCR and to consult with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to see if legal grounds existed for 
detaining people accused of intimidating people in Rwandan refugee camps so that they 
participated in acts that violated the arms embargo;73 and (f) The Security Council should 
urge Rwanda to take all possible measures to create a climate conducive to the harmonious 
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch: for details, see paragraphs 37-75. 
68 	Ibid, paragraphs 104-119. 
69 	Ibid, paragraph 110. The Commission noted that some States had reported that they were 
unable to prosecute nationals accused of crimes in a third country. It therefore recommended 
that Member States be invited to introduce into their domestic legislation the capacity to 
prosecute such individuals. 
70 	Ibid, paragraph 112. 
71 Ibid, paragraph 113. 
72 Ibid, paragraph 114. 
73 	Ibid, paragraph 115. 
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reintegration of refugees, in order to encourage their return. 74 In its fourth report, circulated 
in January 1998, the Commission outlined additional responses received from the various 
Governments it had contacted,75 as well as a limited number of conclusions. 76 In those 
conclusions, the Commission suggested action it would take in future if it were to be 
maintained by the Security Council. 
12.4.4 States 
In addition to the steps States were obligated to take under the Rwanda sanctions 
regime,77 States were also requested by the Security Council to take certain additional extra 
measures to improve the regime's implementation, monitoring and enforcement. When the 
sanctions regime was established, the Council called upon all States to act in accordance 
with the sanctions, notwithstanding the existence of any conflicting legal rights or 
obligations. 78 In April 1995, the Council called upon all States, and especially those 
neighbouring Rwanda, to refrain from any action that would further exacerbate the security 
situation in that country, and it invited States with information on the transport of arms into 
countries neighbouring Rwanda for the purpose of their use in Rwanda in contravention of 
the sanctions, to pass that information on to the 918 Committee. 79 In June 1995, the Council 
called upon States neighbouring Rwanda to take steps to ensure that arms and materiel 
were not transferred to Rwandan camps within their territories. 80 
74 	Ibid, paragraph 118. 
75 	Fourth report of the 1CIR, above note 47, paragraphs 1-38. 
76 Mid, paragraphs 39-43. 
77 	The obligations upon States under the sanctions regime are outlined in section 12.3, above. 
78 	S/RES/918 (17 May 1994), operative paragraph 15. 
79 	S/PRST/1995/22 (27 April 1995): Presidential statement of 27 April 1995. 
80 	S/RES/997 (9 June 1995), operative paragraph 5. 
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In August 1995, the Council called upon the Governments of Rwanda and 
neighbouring States to cooperate with the investigations of the commission that was soon to 
be established,81 and called upon neighbouring States to cooperate and assist with observers 
to be deployed at airfields and border crossing points to ensure that arms and related 
materiel were not transferred to Rwandan camps within their territories. 82 At the same time 
the Council required States to notify the 918 Committee of all exports of arms and related 
materiel being made to Rwanda, in accordance with the exemption from the sanctions 
regime of arms and related materiel exported to the Government of Rwanda through named 
points of entry, and it required the Government of Rwanda to mark and register and notify 
the Committee of all imports made by it.83 
In September 1995, when the Council established the International Commission of 
Inquiry into the Rwanda arms embargo, the Council called upon States to make available to 
the Commission any information in their possession relating to the Commission's mandate,' 
and to cooperate fully with the Commission. 85 The Council also encouraged States to make 
contributions to the Trust Fund for Rwanda, to supplement the financing for the work of the 
Commission, and to contribute equipment and services to the Commission." 
In April 1996, after receiving the interim report and actual report by the International 
Commission of Inquiry, the Security Council requested States to take certain action to 
81 	SIRES/101 1 (16 August 1995), operative paragraph 3. 
82 	SIRES/1O1 1 (16 August 1995), operative paragraph 4. 
83 	SIRES/1O1 1 (16 August 1995), operative paragraph 11. 
84 
 
SIRES/1013 (7 September 1995), operative paragraph 3. 
85 	S/RES/1013 (7 September 1995), operative paragraph 5 [containing a detailed list of suggested 
action that States might take to cooperate with the Commission], operative paragraph 7; 
SIRES/1029 (12 December 1995), operative paragraph 12. 
86 SIRES/1013 (7 September 1995), operative paragraph 8; S/RES/1053 (23 April 1996), operative 
paragraph 11. 
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address the Commission's findings. Thus, the Council: (a) Called upon States in the Great 
Lakes region to ensure that their territory was not used as a base from which armed groups 
might launch attacks against any other State;" (b) Urged all States, and in particular those in 
the region, to intensify efforts to prevent military training and the sale or supply of weapons 
to militia groups or former Rwandan government forces, and to take the steps necessary to 
ensure the effective implementation of the arms embargo, including by creating all necessary 
national mechanisms for implementation; 88 (c) Called upon those States that had not yet 
done so to cooperate fully with the Commission and to investigate fully reports of their 
officials and nationals suspected of having violated the sanctions;" (d) States, and in 
particular those whose nationals had been implicated by the Commission's report, to 
investigate the apparent complicity of their officials or private citizens in the purchase of arms 
from Seychelles, in June 1994, and in other suspected violations of the relevant Council 
resolutions;9° and (e) Called upon States to make available to the Commission the results of 
their investigations, and to cooperate fully with the Commission, including by providing it 
access to airfields and witnesses, in private and without the presence of officials or 
representatives of the Govemment. 91 
In April 1998, after receiving the International Commission of Inquiry's third report 
and the addendum thereto, the Security Council again called upon all States to make 
available to the Commission any information in their possession relating to the Commission's 
87 	SIRES/1053 (23 April 1996), operative paragraph 4. 
88 	SIRES/1053 (23 April 1996), operative paragraph 5. 
89 	SIRES/1053 (23 April 1996), operative paragraph 8. 
90 	SIRES/1053 (23 April 1996), operative paragraph 9. 
91 
 
SIRES/1053 (23 April 1996), operative paragraph 10. 
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mandate,92 and to cooperate fully with the Commission. 93 At the same time, the Council also 
called upon all States in the Great Lakes region to ensure that their territory was not used as 
a base for armed groups to launch incursions into or attacks against any other State." 
12.5 The suspension of aspects of the Rwanda sanctions regime 
As noted above, in August 1995 the scope of the Rwanda sanctions regime was 
narrowed such that the embargo no longer applied to the sale or supply of arms and related 
materiel to the Rwandan Government, through designated entry points. On September 1 
1996, the requirement that such imports proceed to the Government via designated points 
lapsed, such that the general sale or supply of arms and related materiel to the Rwandan 
Government was permissible. 95 
12.6 Notable aspects of the Rwanda sanctions regime 
The Rwanda sanctions regime is noteworthy largely as a mixture of neglect and 
creative experimentation. The neglect is apparent in the fact that the Rwanda Sanctions 
Committee has met for a total of seven formal meetings in nine years, with its last meeting 
taking place over five years ago. The creative experimentation is demonstiated by the 
explicit statement on the part of the Council that the arms embargo required States to 
prevent the sale or supply of arms to persons in States neighbouring Rwanda if destined for 
use in Rwanda itself, and in particular by the establishment of the International Commission 
92 	SIRES/1161 (9 April 1998), operative paragraph 2. 
93 	SIRES/1161 (9 April 1998), operative paragraph 3. 
94 SIRES/1161 (9 April 1998), operative paragraph 4. 
95 	As noted above, this development was foreshadowed in resolution 1011 (1995), operative 
paragraph 8. It was confirmed by the then Chairman of the 918 Committee in a statement to the 
press on 11 September 1996: SC/6265 (Press Release): "Aims restrictions imposed on Rwanda 
Government ended, measures remain against non-governmental forces". 
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of Inquiry to explore violations of the arms embargo and to recommend measures to 
improve the embargo's implementation. The Commission represented the earliest attempt on 
the part of the Council to mandate an independent body of experts to explore the question 
of improving a sanctions regime. Unfortunately, however, despite the Commission's detailed 
reports, the Council did little to act upon its recommendations and suggestions. 
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13. The sanctions regime against the Sudan 
The Security Council imposed sanctions against Sudan in March 1996, in an attempt 
to induce the extradition of three people wanted in connection with the assassination attempt 
that had been made against President Mubarak, of Egypt, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 26 
June 1995. The sanctions regime initially consisted of diplomatic sanctions and targeted 
travel sanctions. The sanctions were strengthened slightly in August 1996, when the Council 
also imposed aviation sanctions against Sudan. The Sudan sanctions regime was eventually 
terminated in September 2001, when the Council determined that Sudan had taken steps to 
comply with its obligations under the sanctions regime. 
13.1 The constitutional basis for imposing sanctions against the 
Sudan 
In January 1996, the Security Council condemned the "terrorist assassination 
attempt" that had been made against President Mubarak, of Egypt, in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia, on 26 June 1995.' It then called upon the Government of Sudan to extradite the 
three suspects, who were sheltering in Sudan, to Ethiopia and to refrain from assisting, 
supporting or facilitating terrorist activities and from giving shelter or sanctuary to "terrorist 
elements". 2 In March 1996, after the Secretary-General had reported that Sudan had failed 
SIRES/1044 (31 January 1996), operative paragraph 1. For a detailed account of the 
assassination attempt and of the Ethiopian Government's efforts to achieve the extradition of 
the three suspects from Sudan, see: S/1996/10 (9 January 1996): Letter dated 9 January 1996 
from the Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the United Nations addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, annex III: Submission by Ethiopia to the United Nations 
Security Council on the assassination attempt on President Hosni Mubarak on 26 June 1995 
in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
SIRES/1044 (31 January 1996), operative paragraph 4. 
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to comply with the Security Council's requests, 3 the Council reaffirmed that the suppression 
of acts of international terrorism, including those in which States were involved, was essential 
for the maintenance of international peace and security. 4 The Council then determined that 
the Government of Sudan's non-compliance with its requests to extradite the three suspects 
to Ethiopia and to refrain from assisting, supporting or facilitating terrorist activities, and from 
giving shelter or sanctuary to terrorists, constituted a threat to international peace and 
security, 5 and noted that it was octing under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations,6 before imposing sanctions against Sudan.' In subsequent decisions related to the 
Sudan sanctions regime, the Council again reaffirmed that the suppression of acts of 
international terrorism was essential for the maintenance of international peace and security, 8 
determined that the non-compliance of the Government of Sudan constituted a threat to 
international peace and security, 9 and invoked Chapter VII of the Charter.' ° 
13.2 The objectives of the Sudan sanctions regime 
The major objective of the Sudan sanctions regime was to induce the extradition by 
Sudan of the three suspects wanted for the assassination attempt against President 
Mubarak. 11 A secondary objective was to ensure that Sudan desisted from assisting, 
See: S/1996/179 (11 March 1996): Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security 
Council resolution 1044 (1996), paragraph 31. 
S/RES/1054 (26 April 1996), preambular paragraph 9. 
S/RES/1054 (26 April 1996), preambular paragraph 10. 
S/RES/1054 (26 April 1996), preambular paragraph 11. 
SIRES/1054 (26 April 1996), operative paragraphs 3, 4. 
SIRES/I070 (16 August 1996), preambular paragraph 10. 
S/RES/1070 (16 August 1996), preambular paragraph 11. 
10 	S/RES/1070 (16 August 1996), preambular paragraph 12; SIRES/1372 (28 September 2001), 
preambular paragraph 7. 
II 	S/RES/1054 (26 April 1996), operative paragraph 1(a). 
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supporting and facilitating terrorist activities and from giving shelter or sanctuary to terrorist 
elements. 12 
13.3 The scope of the Sudan sanctions regime 
The Sudan sanctions regime initially consisted of a blend of mandatory diplomatic 
and travel sanctions." Under the diplomatic sanctions, States were required to reduce the 
number and level of staff at Sudanese diplomatic missions and consular posts, and to restrict 
or control the movement within their territory of all such staff who were to remain." The 
travel sanctions obligated States to restrict the entry into or transit through their territory of 
members of the Government of Sudan, officials of that Government, and members of the 
Sudanese armed forces. I5 
In August 1996, with the Government of Sudan yet to comply with the Security 
Council's demands, the Council imposed aviation sanctions. Under the additional sanctions, 
States were required to deny aircraft permission to take off from, land in or overfly their 
territories where those aircraft were owned by Sudan Airways or the Sudanese 
Government, or by an undertaking that was owned or controlled by Sudan Airways or the 
Sudanese Govemment. I6 
12 	SIRES/1054 (26 April 1996), operative paragraph 1(b). 
13 	S/RES/1054 (26 April 1996), operative paragraph 3. At the same time, the Council also outlined a 
form of voluntary, targeted economic sanctions, by calling upon international and regional 
organizations not to convene conferences in Sudan: SIRES/l054 (26 April 1996), operative 
paragraph 4. Those measures were qualitatively different from the other measures imposed, 
however, because they were directed at international organizations and regional organizations 
rather than at States, and because they were articulated in the form of a call rather than a 
decision (i.e. "calls upon" rather than "decides"). 
14 	S/RES/1054 (26 April 1996), operative paragraph 3(a). 
15 
 
SIRES/1054 (26 April 1996), operative paragraph 3(b). 
16 	S/RES/1070 (16 August 1996), operative paragraph 3. 
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13.4 The administration, monitoring and enforcement of the Sudan 
sanctions regime 
The Security Council broke with its general sanctions practice in the case of the 
Sudan sanctions regime, by not establishing a Sanctions Committee to oversee the 
administration and implementation of the sanctions: 7 Instead of calling upon a Sanctions 
Committee to undertake responsibilities for the administration and implementation of the 
Sudan sanctions regime, the Council requested the Secretary-General and States to perform 
various tasks related to the administration and implementation of sanctions. 
13.4.1 Secretary-General 
Prior to the application of the Sudan sanctions regime, the Council requested the 
Secretary-General, in consultation with the Organization of African Unity, to seek the 
cooperation of the Government of Sudan with the requests to extradite the three suspects 
alleged to have been involved in the assassination attempt against President Mubarak and to 
refrain from supporting terrorist activities: 8 The Council also requested that the Secretary-
General report to it on those efforts within sixty days. 19 When the Security Council 
established the Sudan sanctions regime, it requested the Secretary-General to report to it on 
information received from States on steps taken to implement the sanctions. 2° The 
Secretary-General was also requested to report on whether the Government of Sudan had 
complied with the Council's demands to extradite the three suspects and to desist from 
assisting, supporting and facilitating terrorist activities and from giving shelter to terrorist 
17 	 The Sudan sanctions regime remains the only regime for which administrative responsibility 
has not been bestowed upon a Sanctions Committee. 
18 	S/RES/1044 (31 January 1996), operative paragraph 7. 
19 	 SIRES/1044 (31 January 1996), operative paragraph 7. 
20 	SIRES/1054 (26 April 1996), operative paragraph 7. 
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elements.2 ' In August 1996, when the Council s 	ngthened the Sudan sanctions regime, it 
requested the Secretary-General to report to it if Sudan had complied with the objectives of 
the sanctions regime prior to the date on which the additional sanctions were to come into 
effect, in which case the sanctions might not enter into force. 22 The Council also requested 
that the Secretary-General report to it within three months, on the compliance of the 
Government of Sudan with the Council's demands to extradite the three suspects and to 
desist from assisting, supporting and facilitating terrorist activities and from giving shelter to 
terrorist elements. 23 
In July 1996, the Secretary-General reported that the Government of Sudan claimed 
that its investigations had produced no trace of two of the alleged suspects and that the 
identity of the third suspect was unknown. 24 He also reported that Sudan asserted that it 
condemned terrorism and did not condone terrorist activities. 25 In the same report, the 
Secretary-General also listed the forty replies that he had received from Member States 
outlining steps taken to implement the sanctions against Sudan. 26 
13.4.2 States 
When the Council established the Sudan sanctions regime, it called upon all States, 
including States not members of the United Nations, to act strictly in conformity with the 
21 	SIRES/1054 (26 April 1996), operative paragraph 8. The Council States requested to submit 
such reports in:'S/RES/1054 (26 April 1996), operative paragraph 6. 
22 	SIRES/1070 (16 August 1996), operative paragraph 4. 
23 	SIRES/1070 (16 August 1996), operative paragraph 5. 
24 	S/1996/541 (10 July 1996): Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council 
resolution 1054 (1996), paragraph 10(a). 
25 	Ibid, paragraph 10(b). 
26 	Ibid, annex. 
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sanctions, notwithstanding the existence of any conflicting legal rights or obligations. 27 At the 
same time, the Council also requested States to report to the Secretary-General on steps 
taken to implement the sanctions.28 
13.4.3 International organizations, regional organizations and specialized agencies 
When the Council established the Sudan sanctions regime, it also called upon all 
international and regional organizations not to convene any conference in the Sudan, 29 and 
called upon the specialized agencies to act strictly in conformity with the sanctions, 
notwithstanding the existence of any conflicting legal rights or obligations. 3° 
13.5 Termination of the Sudan sanctions regime 
In September 2001, the Security Council noted the steps that had been taken by the 
Government of the Sudan to comply with the Council's demands under the sanctions 
regime,31 as well as a collection of correspondence it had received advocating the lifting of 
the sanctions against Sudan. 32 The Council then welcomed the accession of Sudan to 
various international conventions for the suppression of terrorism, 33 and decided to terminate 
the sanctions.34 
27 	SIRES/1054 (26 April 1996), operative paragraph 5. 
28 	SIRES/1054 (26 April 1996), operative paragraph 6; SIRES/1070 (16 August 1996), operative 
paragraph 2. 
29 S/RES/1054 (26 April 1996), operative paragraph 4. 
30 S/RES/1054 (26 April 1996), operative paragraph 5. 
31 	S1RE511372 (28 September 2001), preambular paragraph 2. 
32 SIRES/1372 (28 September 2001), preambular paragraphs 3-5. 
33 SIRES/1372 (28 September 2001), preambular paragraph 6. 
34 SIRES/1372 (28 September 2001), operative paragraph 1. 
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13.6 Notable aspects of the Sudan sanctions regime 
As noted above, the most unusual aspect of the Sudan sanctions regime was that the 
Council did not establish a Sanctions Committee to oversee the administration of the 
sanctions. As with the sanctions regime against Libya, the main impetus for the application of 
the sanctions was to gain custody of suspects alleged to have perpetrated acts of 
international terrorism, with the Council stating on a number of occasions that the 
suppression of international terrorism was essential for the maintenance of international 
peace and security. 35 Another notable aspect was the Council's employment of time-delays 
when imposing sanctions. The initial sanctions, outlined in resolution 1054 (1996), did not 
enter into force until 10 May 1996 — two weeks after the adoption of the resolution. 36  The 
additional sanctions, outlined in resolution 1070 (1996), did not enter into force until more 
than ninety days after the adoption of resolution 1070 (1996). 37 
35 See, e.g.: SIRES/1044 (31 January 1996), preambular paragraph 5; SIRES/1054 (26 April 1996), 
preambular paragraph 9; S/RES/1372 (28 September 2001), preambular paragraph 7. 
36 	S/RES/1054 (26 April 1996), operative paragraph 2. 
37 
 
SIRES/1070(16 August 1996), operative paragraph 4. 
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14. The Sierra Leone sanctions regime 
The Security Council imposed sanctions against Sierra Leone in October 1997, in 
order to induce the military junta, which had come to power the previous May by means of 
a coup d'etat, to return control of the country to Sierra Leone's democratically-elected 
Government. The sanctions regime consisted of targeted travel sanctions, petroleum 
sanctions, and an arms embargo. In June 1998, after the democratically-elected 
Government had been returned to power, the initial sanctions were terminated. They were 
replaced immediately, however, by new sanctions targeting the former military junta and the 
leaders of the major rebel group in Sierra Leone — the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). 
Those sanctions consisted of an arms embargo, targeted travel sanctions and diamond 
sanctions. In June 2003, the diamond sanctions expired, meaning that the sanctions regime 
currently consists of an arms embargo and targeted travel sanctions. 
14.1 The constitutional basis for imposing sanctions against Sierra 
Leone 
In October 1997, the Security Council recalled its earlier statements condemning the 
military coup that had taken place in Sierra Leone on 25 May 1996,' and deplored the fact 
that the military junta had not taken steps to allow the restoration of the democratically-
elected Government and a return to constitutional order. 2 The Council then expressed its 
grave concern at the continued violence and loss of life in Sierra Leone following the military 
coup, at the deteriorating humanitarian conditions in that country, and at the consequences 
SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), preambular paragraph 1. Those statements had taken the form of 
three presidential statements: S/PRST/29 (27 May 1996): Presidential statement of 27 May 
1996; S/PRST/36 (11 July 1996): Presidential statement of 11 July 1996; and S/PRST/42 (6 
August 1997): Presidential statement of 6 August 1997. 
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for neighbouring counties. 3 The Council then determined that the situation in Sierra Leone 
constituted a threat to international peace and security in the region, 4 and invoked Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations before imposing sanctions. 5 In subsequent 
decisions related to the Sierra Leone sanctions regime, the Council has again determined 
that the situation in Sierra Leone continued to constitute a threat to international peace and 
security, 6 and it has again invoked Chapter VII of the Charter.' 
14.2 The objective of the Sierra Leone sanctions regime 
The objective of the initial sanctions was for the military junta to take immediate 
steps to relinquish power in Sierra Leone and to make way for the restoration of the 
democratically-elected Government and a return to constitutional order. 8 The objectives of 
the sanctions targeting the former military junta and the RUF were the re-establishment of 
Government control throughout the territory of Sierra Leone and the disarmament and 
demobilization of all non-governmental forces. 9 In its decisions imposing and extending the 
diamond sanctions, the Council noted that a key factor in determining whether to extend the 
diamond sanctions would be the extent of the Government's authority over the diamond- 
SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), preambular paragraph 7. 
SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), preambular paragraph 8. 
SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), preambular paragraph 9. 
S/RES/1132 (8 October 1997), preambular paragraph 10. 
S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000), preambular paragraph 4; SIRES/1385 (19 December 2001), preambular 
paragraph 9 [determining that the situation in Sierra Leone continued to constitute a threat to 
international peace aid security in the region]; SIRES/1446 (4 December 2002), preambular 
paragraph 9 [determining that the situation in Sierra Leone continued to constitute a threat to 
international peace and security in the region]. 
S/RES/1156 (16 March 1998), preambular paragraph 3; SIRES/1171 (5 June 1998), preambular 
paragraph 4; S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000), preambular paragraph 5; SIRES/1385 (19 December 
2001), preambular paragraph 10; SIRES/1446 (4 December 2002), preambular paragraph 10. 
SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraphs 1, 19. 
S/RES/1171 (5 June 1998), operative paragraph 7. 
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producing areas.' ° In its decisions extending the diamond sanctions, the Council also noted, 
however, that those measures would be terminated immediately if it were to determine that 
such a step was appropriate." 
14.3 The scope of the Sierra Leone sanctions regime 
The sanctions regime initially consisted of targeted travel sanctions, sanctions against 
petroleum and an arms embargo. The travel sanctions required States to prevent the entry 
into or transit through their territories of the military junta and adult members of their families, 
unless it was for verified humanitarian purposes or in crder to facilitate the return of the 
democratically-elected Government. 12 The petroleum sanctions required States to prevent 
the sale or supply to Sierra Leone of petroleum and petroleum products." The arms 
embargo required States to prevent the sale or supply to Sierra Leone of arms and related 
materiel of all types.' 4 
In March 1998, upon the return to Sierra Leone of its democratically-elected 
President, the Council terminated the petroleum sanctions. 15 In June 1998, the Council 
welcomed the efforts of the Government of Sierra Leone to re-establish effective 
10 	 SIRES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 6; S/RES/1385 (19 December 2001), operative 
paragraph 3; S/RES/1446 (4 December 2002), operative paragraph 2. 
S/RES/1385 (19 December 2001), operative paragraph 4; S/RES/1446 (4 December 2002), 
operative paragraph 3. 
12 	 SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 5. 
13 	 SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 6. The Council did provide for exemptions 
from the petroleum sanctions, however, enabling the Sierra Leone Sanctions Committee to 
authorize, on a case-by-case basis under a no-objection procedure, applications for exemptions 
from: the democratically-elected Government of Sierra Leone; other governments or United 
Nations agencies, where such applications were for verified humanitarian purposes; and for the 
needs of ECOMOG. See: S/RES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 7. For details 
relating to the establishment of the Sierra Leone Sanctions Committee, see below. 
14 	S/RES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 6. 
15 	SIRES/1156 (16 March 1998), operative paragraph 2. 
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administration and the democratic process, 16 and terminated the remaining sanctions 
imposed by resolution 1132 (1997) — the targeted travel sanctions and the arms embargo." 
In the same resolution, however, the Security Council imposed a new set of sanctions, 
consisting of an arms embargo and targeted travel sanctions, that aimed to stifle the ability of 
rebel groups in Sierra Leone to engage in armed conflict against the Government. The arms 
sanctions required States to prevent the supply of arms to Sierra Leone, apart from to the 
Government through named points of entry or for the use of the Military Observer Group of 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOMOG)." The targeted travel 
sanctions required States to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of 
leading members of the former military junta and of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). 19 
In May 2000, the Council outlined an additional exemption from the arms embargo against 
Sierra Leone, providing that the embargo would not apply to the sale or supply of arms and 
related materiel for the use in Sierra Leone of Member States cooperating with the United 
Nation Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and with the Government of Sierra 
Leone.2° 
In July 2000, the Security Council strengthened the sanctions against the rebel 
groups, imposing "diamond sanctions". The new measures required States to prevent the 
import to their territories, for a period of eighteen months, of rough diamonds originating 
16 	SIRES/1171 (5 June 1998), prearnbular paragraph 2. 
17 SIRES/1171 (5 June 1998), operative paragraph 1. 
18 SIRES/1171 (5 June 1998), operative paragraphs 2, 3. For further details on the role of 
ECOMOG, see the next section. 
19 SIRES/1171 (5 June 1998), operative paragraph 5. For the list of those banned from travel, see: 
http://www.un.or ocs/sc/committees/SierraLeone/1132 list.htm [last visited on 17 July 
2003]. 
20 S/RES/1299 (19 May 2000), operative paragraph 3. 
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from Sierra Leone?' Exempt from the sanctions, however, would be rough diamonds 
certified by the Government through a Certificate of Origin regirne.22 The Security Council 
extended the diamond sanctions on two occasions, for periods of eleven and six montlis. 23 
In June 2003, when the most recent period of extension expired, the members of the 
Council agreed not to renew the diamond sanctions, in light of the Government of Sierra 
Leone's increased efforts to manage its diamond industry and ensure proper control over 
diamond areas, and in light of its full participation in the Kimberley Process.24 
14.4 The administration, monitoring and enforcement of the Sierra 
Leone sanctions regime 
During the course of the Sierra Leone sanctions regime, the Security Council has 
created two subsidiary entities to facilitate the implementation of the Sierra Leone sanctions 
regime: the Sierra Leone Sanctions Committee and a Panel of Experts. The Council has also 
called upon a range of international actors to play a role in the implementation of the 
sanctions, including the Secretary-General, the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), and States in general. 
21 	 SIRES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraphs 1, 5, 6. 
22 	SIRES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 5. When resolution 1306 (2000) was adopted, 
there was no Certification of Origin regime. The Council therefore requested the Government of 
Sierra Leone to establish such a regime: ibid, operative paragraph 2. The Committee decided, at 
its 21' meeting on 21 March 2001, that the new Certificate of Origin regime for the trade in Sierra 
Leone diamonds was in effective operation: see S/2000/966 (6 October 2000): Letter dated 6 
October 2000 from the Chairman of the 1132 Committee to the President of the Security 
Council; S/2001/300 (30 March 2001): Letter dated 28 March 2001 from the Chairman of the 
1132 Committee to the President of the Security Council. See also: Report of the 1132 
Committee for 2001, below note 54, paragraph 11. 
23 	SIRES/1385 (19 December 2001), operative paragraph 3; S/RES/1446 (4 December 2002), 
operative paragraph 2. 
20 	 SC/7778 (5 June 2003): Press statement on the Sierra Leone Diamond Embargo by the 
President of the Security Council. 
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14.4.1 The Sierra Leone Sanctions Committee 
The Security Council established a Committee to oversee the administration of the 
sanctions regime in the same resolution that initially imposed the sanctions. 25 The new 
Committee ("the Sierra Leone Sanctions Committee" or the "1132 Committee"), was 
required to report to the Council with observations and recommendations and to undertake 
the following initial tasks: (a) To seek from all States further information regarding action 
taken to implement the sanctions; 26 (b) To consider information on violations of the sanctions 
and to recommend appropriate measures in response to those violations;27 (c) To make 
periodic reports to the Security Council on information regarding alleged violations of the 
sanctions, identifying where possible the actors reported to be engaged in such violations; 28 
(d) To promulgate guidelines to facilitate the implementation of the sanctions; 29 (e) To 
consider requests for exemptions from the petroleum sanctions;3° (f) To designate members 
of the military junta and adult members of their families, against whom the travel sanctions 
were to be applied; 31 (g) To examine reports from ECOWAS regarding action taken to 
ensure the strict implementation of the arms and petroleum sanctions, 32 as well as reports 
25 	S/RES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 10. 
26 	SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 10(a). 
27 	SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 10(b). 
28 	S/RES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 10(c). 
29 	SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 10(d). The guidelines were adopted by the 
Committee at its 2" meeting, on 31 October 1997: SC/6435 (31 October 1997): Press release. 
30 	SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 10(e). This exemption was outlined in 
operative paragraph 7 of resolution 1132 (1997), which also articulates the Committee's 
responsibility in this regard. 
31 	S/RES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 10(0. For the lists compiled by the 
Committee, see: SC/6472 (28 January 1998): Press release of the Chairperson of the 1132 
Committee. 
32 S/RES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 9. 
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submitted by States on steps taken to give effect to the sanctions; 33 and (h) To liaise with the 
ECO WAS Committee on the implementation of the sanctions.' 
In June 1998, when the Security Council terminated the initial sanctions and 
reimposed the arms and travel sanctions targeting the former military junta leaders and the 
leaders of the RUF, it realigned the responsibilities of the 1132 Committee. The 
Committee's tasks now included the following: (a) To report to the Security Council on the 
notifications received from the Government of Sierra Leone and from States relating to the 
registration of legitimate arms imports to Sierra Leone; 35 (b) To seek from all States further 
information regarding action taken to implement the new sanctions; 36 (c) To consider 
information concerning violations of the new sanctions and to recommend appropriate 
measures in response to those violations; 37 (d) To make periodic reports to the Security 
Council on information regarding alleged violations of the new sanctions, identifying where 
possible the actors reported to be engaged in such violations; 38 (e) To promulgate guidelines 
to facilitate the implementation of the new sanctions; 39 (f) To designate members of the 
military junta and leaders of the RUF and adult members of their families, against whom the 
new travel sanctions were to be applied; 40 and (g) To liaise with the ECU WAS Committee 
33 	SIRES/I132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 10(g). States were requested to submit such 
reports by operative paragraph 13 of resolution 1132 (1997). 
34 	S/RES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 10(h). 
35 	S/RES/1171 (5 June 1998), operative paragraph 4. The Committee thus submitted the following 
reports: S/1998/740(7 August 1998); S/1998/1170(15 December 1998). 
36 	SIRES/1171 (5 June 1998), operative paragraph 6. 
37 	S/RES/1171 (5 June 1998), operative paragraph 6. 
38 	S/RES/I 171 (5 June 1998), operative paragraph 6. 
39 	S/RES/1171 (5 June 1998), operative paragraph 6. The Committee adopted consolidated 
guidelines on 18 June 1998: SC/6532 (18 June 1998): Press release. 
4o 	S/RES/I 171 (5 June 1998), operative paragraph 6. 
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on the implementation of the new sanctions. 4 ' In January 1999, the Council expressed grave 
concern at reports that military support was being provided to rebels in Sierra Leone from 
the territory of Liberia, and it urged the Sierra Leone Sanctions Committee to investigate 
violations of the arms embargo and to report to it with recommendations. 42 
In July 2000, when the Council imposed diamond sanctions targeted against the 
rebel groups, it created the following further tasks: (a) To communicate with the Sierra 
Leone Government regarding the establishment of a certificate-of-origin regime for trading 
diamonds and to report to the Council when an effective regime is in operation;" (b) To 
seek from all States further information regarding action taken to implement the diamond 
sanctions;44 (c) To consider information concerning violations of the diamond sanctions, 
identifying where possible those involved in such violations; 45 (d) To make periodic reports 
to the Security Council on alleged violations of the diamond sanctions, identifying where 
possible those involved in such violations; 46 (e) To promulgate guidelines to facilitate the 
implementation of the diamond sanctions; 47 (f) To continue its cooperation with other 
41 	S/RES/1171 (5 June 1998), operative paragraph 6. 
42 S/PRST/1999/I (7 January 1999): Presidential statement of 7 January 1999. 
43 	S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraphs 4, 5. The Committee decided, at its 21' meeting 
on 21 March 2001, that the new Certificate of Origin regime for the trade in Sierra Leone 
diamonds was in effective operation: see- S/2000/966 (6 October 2000); S/2001/300 (30 March 
2001). See also: Report of the 1132 Committee for 2001, below note 54, paragraph 11. The 
Government of Sierra Leone submitted a number of reviews on the effectiveness of the 
Certificate of Origin regime: see: S/2001/127 (12 February 2001), annex [containing a 90-day 
review by the Sierra Leone Government of the Certificate of Origin regime]; S/2001/794 (13 
August 2001), annex [containing the second 90-day review by the Sierra Leone Government of 
the Certificate of Origin regime]; S/2002/38 (9 January 2002), annex [containing the third 90-day 
review by the Sierra Leone Government of the Certificate of Origin regime]; S/2002/826 (23 July 
2002), annex [containing the fourth 90-day review by the Sierra Leone Government of the 
Certificate of Origin regime]. 
44 	S/RFS/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 7(a). 
45 
 
SIRES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 7(b). 
46 	SIRES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 7(c). 
47 SIRES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 7(d). 
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relevant sanctions committees, and in particular with the 985/Liberia Sanctions Committee 
and the 864/UNITA Sanctions Committee; 48 (g) To hold an exploratory hearing in New 
York, no later than 31 July 2000, to assess the role of diamonds in the Sierra Leone conflict 
and the link between trade in Sierra Leone diamonds and trade in arms and related materiel 
in violation of the Sierra Leone sanctions, involving representatives of interested States and 
regional organizations, the diamond industry and other relevant experts, and to report to the 
Council on the hearing; 49 (h) To receive reports from States on measures taken to implement 
the arms and travel sanctions; 5° (i) To stieiigthen contacts with regional organizations, in 
particular ECOWAS and the Organization of African Unity, and relevant international 
organizations, including INTERPOL, with a view to identifying ways to improve effective 
implementation of the arms and travel sanctions .,51 and (j) To make relevant information 
publicly available through appropriate media, including through the improved use of 
information technology." In December 2002, when the Council extended the application of 
the diamond sanctions, it decided that the Committee should continue its consideration of the 
arms and travel sanctions and present its views to the Council" 
Since its establishment, the 1132 Committee has issued five annual reports. 54 It has 
also issued a number of other reports pursuant to its various responsibilities under the 
48 	SIRES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 7(e). 
49 S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 12. As noted below, the Committee ultimately 
circulated the following report on the hearing: S/200011150 (4 December 2000), annex: Summary 
report on the exploratory hearing on Sierra Leone diamonds (31 July and! August 2000). 
50 	S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 17. 
51 SIRES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 22. 
52 	SIRES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 23. 
53 
 
SIRES/1446 (4 December 2002), operative paragraph 4. 
54 	S/199811236 (31 December 1998), annex: Report of the Security Council Committee established 
pursuant to resolution 1132 (1997) concerning Sierra Leone [hereafter "First Report of the 
1132 Committee", containing a summary of the Committee's activities from its establishment in 
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sanctions regime, including on: measures taken by States to implement the original travel 
sanctions and arms and petroleum embargoes;55 measures taken by States to implement the 
subsequent arms embargo and notifications by the Government of Sierra Leone of imports 
of arms and related materie1;56 the exploratory hearing on the role of diamonds in the Sierra 
Leone conflicts' measures taken by States to implement the diamond sanctions; 58 and 
measures taken by States to enforce, sti engthen or enact legislation making it a criminal 
offence to act in violation of the sanctions. 59 
In its annual reports, the 1132 Committee has summarised the activities undertaken 
during the most recent reporting period, 60 noted alleged violations brought to its attention, 61 
and outlined its observations. 62 The annual reports illustrate the manner in which the 1132 
October 1997 and the end of 1998]; S/1999/1300 (31 December 1999), annex: Report of the 1132 
Committee for 1999; S/2000/1238 (26 December 2000), annex: Report of the 1132 Committee for 
2000; S/2002/50 (14 January 2002), annex: Report of the 1132 Committee for 2001; S/2002/1414 
(24 December 2002), annex: Report of the 1132 Committee for 2002. 
55 	S/1998/112 & Add.1 (10 February and 31 March 1998), annexes. 
56 
	
S/1998/740 (7 August 1998), annex; S/1998/1170 (15 December 1998), annex; S/1999/111 (3 
February 1999), annex; S/1999/174 (16 February 1999), annex; S/1999/350 (26 March 1999), 
annex; S/1999/381 (5 April 1999), annex; S/1999/1013 (29 September 1999), annex; S/1999/1026 (5 
October 1999), annex; S/2000/659 (7 July 2000), annex; S/2000/660 (21 July 2000), annex; 
S/2000/730 (26 July 2000), annex; S/2000/1127 (27 November 2000), annex; S/2001/105 (2 
February 2001), annex; S/2001/126 (12 February 2001), annex; S/2001/261 (22 March 2001), 
annex; S/2001/492 (10 May 2001), annex; S/2001/493 (10 May 2001), annex; S/2001/664 (2 July 
2001), annex; 5/2001/718, annex. 
57 	S/2000/1150 (4 December 2000), annex: Summary report on the exploratory hearing on Sierra 
Leone diamonds (31 July and 1 August 2000). 
58 	S/2000/862 & Add.1 (13 September and 4 December 2000); S/2001/771(7 August 2001). 
59 	S/2000/861 & Add.1 (13 September and 4 December 2000); S/2001/772 (8 August 2001). 
60 	See: First Report of the 1132 Committee, above note 54, paragraphs 5-15, 19-21; Report of the 
1132 Committee for 1999, above note 54, paragraphs 2-9; Report of the 1132 Committee for 
2000, above note 54, paragraphs 8-19, 23-25; Report of the 1132 Committee for 2001, above 
note 54, paragraphs 8-25, 18-19; Report of the 1132 Committee for 2002, above note 54, 
paragraphs 8-15, 20-23. 
61 	See: First Report of the 1132 Committee, above note 54, paragraphs 16-18; Report of the 1132 
Committee for 1999, above note 54, paragraphs 10-13; Report of the 1132 Committee for 2000, 
above note 54, paragraphs 20-22; Report of the 1132 Committee for 2001, above note 54, 
paragraphs 16-17; Report of the 1132 Committee for 2002, above note 54, paragraphs 16-19. 
62 	See: First Report of the 1132 Committee, above note 54, paragraphs 22-25; Report of the 1132 
Committee for 1999, above note 54, paragraph 14; Report of the 1132 Committee for 2000, 
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Committee has engaged in some relatively innovative activities, including: visits to the region 
and other relevant locations undertaken by the Chairman of the Committee to explore 
avenues for facilitating the implementation of the sanctions; 63 the convening of the 
exploratory hearing on Sierra Leone diamonds;' and the holding of joint informal meetings 
with other Sanctions Committees, including the 1343/Liberia Committee and the 
864/UNITA Committee.° In observations outlined in its first report, the Committee noted 
that non-governmental forces were continuing to launch armed attacks into Sierra Leone and 
that arms and ammunition were continuing to cross into Sierra Leone from neighbouring 
countries, including Liberia.66 The Committee noted that it would continue to explore 
measures to improve the implementation of the aims embargo and the travel sanctions, 
including: (a) Providing support for national or joint monitoring of the border between Sierra 
Leone and Liberia;67 (b) Identifying focal points within ECOMOG/ECOWAS, in order to 
facilitate closer liaison between the Committee and that regional organization; 68 (c) Frequent 
reporting from the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) to the 
above note 54, paragraphs 26-27; Report of the 1132 Committee for 2001, above note 54, 
paragraph 20; Report of the 1132 Committee for 2002, above note 54, paragraph 24. 
63 	Visits were undertaken to the region by the then Chairman in December 1997 and December 
1998: First Report of the 1132 Committee, above note 54, paragraphs 19-21. In June and July 
2002, the then Chairman visited both the region and other relevant locations, such as Brussels, 
Vienna and Lyon. See: Report of the 1132 Committee for 2002,   above note 54, paragraph 23. 
64 	Report of the 1132 Committee for 2000, above note 54, paragraphs 13-14. See also: Summary 
report on the exploratory hearing on Sierra Leone diamonds, above note 57. 
65 	Report of the 1132 Committee for 2002, above note 54, paragraph 20. 
66 	Ibid, paragraphs 23-24. 
67 	Mid, paragraph 25(a). 
68 	Ibid, paragraph 25(b). 
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Committee;69 and (d) Continuing to distribute, including through the United Nations 
presence in the region, an updated list of individuals subject to the travel sanctions." 
In its subsequent annual reports, the Committee's observations have been less 
extensive. In its report for 1999, the Committee observed that reports from ECOMOG and 
UNOMSIL could help to strengthen the effectiveness of the arms embargo!' In its more 
recent reports, the Committee has simply noted that it does not have any specific monitoring 
mechanism to ensure the effective implementation of the sanctions, and it has therefore urged 
Member States and organizations to provide it with information pertinent to effective 
implementation. 72 The Committee has also repeated that reports through ECOWAS and the 
United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) could strengthen the 
effectiveness of the arms embargo. 73 
14.4.2 The Secretary-General 
In October 1997, when the Council established the sanctions regime against Sierra 
Leone, it requested the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance to the 1132 
Committee,74 and to report to it on measures taken by States to implement the sanctions!' 
At the same time, the Council also requested the Secretary-General to report, within fifteen 
69 	'bid, paragraph 25(c). 
70 	Ibid, paragraph 25(d). 
71 	Report of the 1132 Committee for 1999, above note 54, paragraph 14. 
72 Report of the 1132 Committee for 2000, above note 54, paragraph 26; Report of the 1132 
Committee for 2001, above note 54, paragraph 20; Report of the 1132 Committee for 2002, 
above note 54, paragraph 24. 
73 	Report of the 1132 Committee for 2000, above note 54, paragraph 27; Report of the 1132 
Committee for 2001, above note 54, paragraph 20; Report of the 1132 Committee for 2002, 
above note 54, paragraph 24. 
74 SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 12. 
75 SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 13. The Secretary-General did so in the 
following reports: S/1998/112 & Add.1 (10 February and 31 March 1998). 
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days, on the compliance of the military junta with the requirements of the sanctions regime, 76 
and then again by 8 December 1997 on the implementation of resolution 1132 (1997)7 7 
In June 1998, when the Security Council terminated the sanctions against Sierra 
Leone in general and reimposed them against the RUF and the former military junta, it 
requested the Secretary-General to receive from the Government of Sierra Leone the list of 
points of entry through which arms and related materiel would be permitted to enter Sierra 
Leone.78 The Council also requested the Secretary-General to report to it within three 
months, and then again within six months, on the exports of arms and related materiel to 
Sierra Leone and on progress towards the re-establishment of Government control 
throughout Sierra Leone and the disarmament and demobilization of all non-government 
forces." 
In July 2000, when the Council strengthened the sanctions regime by imposing 
diamond sanctions, it requested the Secretary-General to establish the Sierra Leone Panel of 
Experts and to provide the necessary resources to support the Panel's work." At the same 
time, and on each occasion when the Council extended the diamond sanctions, the Council 
also requested the Secretary-General to publicize the provisions of the relevant resolution 
and the obligations it imposed.81 
76 	SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 16. 
77 	SIRES/I132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 16. 
78 	S/RES/1171 (5 June 1998), operative paragraph 2. 
79 	SIRES/1171 (5 June 1998), operative paragraph 8. 
80 	SIRES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 19. The Secretary-General notified the President 
of the Security Council that he had appointed five experts to serve on the Panel in August 
2000: S/2000/756 (2 August 2000): Letter dated 2 August 2000 from the Secretary-General 
addressed to the President of the Security Council. For details relating to the mandate and 
activities of the Panel, see below. 
81 SIRES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 24; SIRES/1385 (19 December 2001), operative 
paragraph 5; SIRES/1446 (4 December 2002), operative paragraph 5. 
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14.4.3 States 
When the Council established the Sierra Leone sanctions regime, it called upon all 
States to cooperate with ECOWAS to ensure the strict implementation of the sanctions!' 
At the same time, the Council also called upon all States to act strictly in conformity with the 
sanctions, notwithstanding the existence of any conflicting legal rights or obligations," 
requested States to report to the Secretary-General on steps taken to give effect to the 
sanctions," and urged all States to provide technical and logistical support to assist 
ECO WAS in canying out its responsibilities in relation to the implementation of the 
sanctions." In subsequent decisions, the Council has also: reminded States of their 
obligation to comply strictly with he sanctions; 86 required all States to notify the 1132 
Committee of all exports from their territories to Sierra Leone of arms or related materiel;" 
and reaffirmed the obligation of all States to comply strictly with the arms sanctions against 
Sierra Leone;88 reaffirmed the obligation of all States to bring all instances of violations of the 
arms sanctions before the 1132 Committee." 
In July 2000, when the Council imposed diamond sanctions against Sierra Leone 
and strengthened the implementation of the arms sanctions against Sierra Leone, it requested 
States to undertake a range of tasks related to the implementation, monitoring and 
enforcement of sanctions. Among such tasks, the Council: requested the Government of 
82 	SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 8. 
83 	SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 11. 
84 SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 13. 
85 	SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 18. 
86 	S/PRST/1997/52 (14 November 1997): Presidential statement of 14 November 1997. 
87 	SIRES/1171 (5 June 1998), operative paragraph 4. 
88 SIRES/1181 (13 July 1998), operative paragraph 13; S/PRST/1999/1 (7 January 1999): 
Presidential statement of 7 January 1999; SIRES/1231 (11 March 1999), operative paragraph 7; 
S/PRST/1999/13 (15 May 1999): Presidential statement of 15 May 1999. 
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Sierra Leone to ensure that an effective certificate-of-origin regime for trade in diamonds 
was in operation in Sierra Leone," and to notify the 1132 Committee once the regime was 
fully in operation; 91 requested States to offer assistance to the Government of Sierra Leone 
to facilitate the operation of a certificate-of-origin regirne;92 requested all States to report to 
the 1132 Committee on actions taken to implement the diamond sanctions; 93 called upon all 
States to act strictly in accordance with the sanctions, notwithstanding the existence of any 
conflicting legal rights or obligations; 94 invited States to offer assistance to the Government of 
Sierra Leone to develop a well-structured and well-regulated diamond industry providing for 
the identification of the provenance of rough diamonds; 95 urged all States to report to the 
1132 Committee on possible violations of the diamond sanctions; 96 called upon States to 
enforce, strengthen or enact legislation making it a criminal offence under domestic law for 
their nationals or other persons operating on their territory to act in violation of the arms 
sanctions against Sierra Leone, and to report to the 1132 Committee on the implementation 
of those sanctions; 97 urged all States to report to the 1132 Committee information on 
possible violations of the sanctions; 98 and urged all States to cooperate with the Sierra 
Leone Panel of Experts in the discharge of its mandate. 99 
89 	SIRES/1181 (13 July 1998), operative paragraph 13. 
90 	SIRES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 2. 
91 	SIRES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 4. 
92 	SIRES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 3. 
93 	S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 8. 
94 	S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 9. 
95 	SIRES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 11. 
96 	S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 16. 
97 	S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 17. 
98 	SIRES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 18. 
99 	S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 21. 
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14.4.4 Regional organizations 
When the Council established the Sierra Leone sanctions regime, it noted that it was 
acting under Chapter VIII, and authorized ECO WAS, cooperating with the democratically-
elected Government of Sierra Leone, to ensure the strict implementation of the petroleum 
and arms sanctions, including where necessary by halting inward maritime shipping in order 
to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations." ° At the same time, the Council also 
called upon regional organizations to act strictly in conformity with the sanctions, 
notwithstanding the existence of any conflicting legal rights or obligations.' ° ' When the 
Council imposed diamond sanctions against Sierra Leone, it called upon all relevant regional 
organizations to act strictly in accordance with the sanctions, notwithstanding the existence 
of any conflicting legal rights or obligations."2 
14.4.5 International organizations 
When the Council established the Sierra Leone sanctions regime, it called upon all 
international organizations to act strictly in conformity with the sanctions, notwithstanding the 
existence of any conflicting legal rights or obligations." 3 In July 2000, when the Council 
imposed diamond sanctions, it requested "relevant international organizations" to offer 
assistance to the Government of Sierra Leone to facilitate the operation of a certificate-of-
origin regime,104 called upon them to act strictly in accordance with the sanctions, 
notwithstanding the existence of any conflicting legal rights or obligations," 5 and invited them 
Ioo 	SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 8. 
101 	SIRES/1132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 11. 
102 	S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 9. 
103 	SIRES/l132 (8 October 1997), operative paragraph 11. 
104 	S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 3. 
105 	SIRES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 9. 
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to offer assistance to the Government of Sierra Leone to develop a well-structured and 
well-regulated diamond industry providing for the identification of the provenance of rough 
diamonds :06 
14.4.6 The Panel of Experts on the Sierra Leone sanctions regime 
In July 2000, when the Security Council strengthened the sanctions regime by 
imposing diamond sanctions, it also requested the Secretary-General to establish a Panel of 
Experts to investigate matters relating to the implementation of the Sierra Leone sanctions 
regime. 107 The Panel, which would consist of no more than five members and would operate 
for a period of four months, was to undertake the following tasks: (a) Collecting information 
on possible violations of the alms embargo against Sierra Leone and on the link between the 
trade in diamonds and the trade in arms and related materiel, including through visits to 
Sierra Leone and other States and through making appropriate contacts; 1°8 (b) Considering 
the adequacy of air traffic systems in the region for detecting flights suspected of violating the 
arms sanctions; 1°9 (c) Participating in an exploratory hearing in New York on the role of 
diamonds in the Sierra Leone conflict and the link between the trade in diamonds and the 
trade in arms in that country; 110 and (d) Reporting to the Council, through the 1132 
Committee and by 31 October 2000, with its observations and recommendations on 
strengthening the implementation of the arms and diamond sanctions." 
106 	SIRES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 11. 
107 	SIRES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 19. 
108 	SIRES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 19(a). 
109 	S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 19(b). 
110 	S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 19(c). For details relating to the exploratory 
hearing, see: Summary report on the exploratory hearing on Sierra Leone diamonds, above 
note 57. 
III 	S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000), operative paragraph 19(d). 
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The Panel of Experts submitted its WRITTEN report to the Council in December 
2000. 112 In its report, the Panel outlined findings on the illicit trade in Sierra Leone 
diamonds,' 13 on the flow of aims and related materiel and other forms of military assistance 
into Sierra Leone, 114 and on air traffic control systems in West Africa. 115 The Panel's report 
remains perhaps the most sophisticated analysis yet completed, by a body charged with the 
administration, implementation or enforcement of a United Nations sanctions regime, of the 
challenges that must be overcome in order to facilitate the effective implementation of a 
sanctions regime. The report contained a range of insightful observations and provided 
numerous concrete recommendations for action that might be taken to address violations of 
the Sierra Leone sanctions and United Nations sanctions in general. The Security Council 
has subsequently acted upon many of the Sierra Leone Panel's recommendations in 
addressing the situations in Sierra Leone, Liberia and West Africa in general, and in its 
oversight of other arms embargoes and diamond sanctions. 
In its findings on the diamond trade, the Panel noted that diamonds were perhaps 
the major source of income for the armed rebel group the Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF), providing more than enough finance to sustain the group's military operations. 116 It 
also noted that, while some RUF diamonds had been traded informally in Guinea, the vast 
majority had been traded via Liberia, in such a manner that it was inconceivable that the 
trade was being conducted without the permission and involvement of Liberian government 
112 	S/2000/1195 (20 December 2000), enclosure: Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant 
to Security Council resolution 1306 (2000), paragraph 19, in relation to Sierra Leone. 
113 	See in general: ibid, paragraphs 1-18, 65-150. 
114 	See in general: ibid, paragraphs 19-31, 167-273. 
115 	See in general: ibid, paragraphs 32-46, 274-315. 
116 	'bid, paragraph 1. 
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officials at the highest level."' The Panel also reviewed Sierra Leone's Certificate of Origin 
regime and noted that, while the regime was a positive development, it was unlikely to 
achieve the desired results in the absence of effective controls of the diamond trade in 
neighbouring countries and in the major global diamond trading centres." 8 
Based on its findings, the Panel made a number of detailed recommendations for 
improving the implementation of the diamond sanctions, including that: (a) A global 
certification scheme should be developed and should be endorsed by the Security 
council;119 (b) Until such a global certification scheme had been developed, all diamond 
exporting countries in West Africa, and in particular Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire, should be 
required to adopt certification schemes such as the one operating in Sierra Leone. If they 
had not adopted such schemes within six months, then the Security Council should impose 
sanctions upon the export of diamonds from those countries., 120 (c) Diamond sanctions 
should be imposed against Liberia until it had demonstrated that it was no longer involved in 
the trafficking of arms to, or diamonds from, Sierra Leone, and until it too had adopted a 
Certificate of Origin regime for the export of diamonds; 121 (d) The Security Council should 
place sanctions on so-called Gambian diamonds, until that country's diamond trade could be 
verified;122 (e) Invoices from certain diamond exporting countries should be checked 
thoroughly, and where there was doubt about provenance or origin, parcels should be 
seized until that doubt had been resolved. In addition, urgent consideration should be given 
117 	Ibid, paragraph 2. 
118 	Ibid, paragraphs 4-6. 
119 	Ibid, paragraphs 7, 155. 
120 	Ibid, paragraphs 8, 156. 
121 	Ibid, paragraphs 9, 157. 
122 	Ibid, paragraphs 10, 158. 
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to extending a Certificate of Origin regime to those countries as soon as possible; 123 
(f) Major diamond trading centres, including Belgium, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, 
South Africa, India, the United States and Israel, should reach a common agreement on a 
system for verifying the country of origin and provenance of diamonds; 124 (g) An annual 
statistical report should be prepared on global diamond production, by the World Diamond 
Council or the certification body that was expected to emerge from the Kimberley Process, 
distinguishing between the countries of origin and countries of provenance of the diamonds 
being produced each year; 125 (h) If diamonds were mixed and/or re-invoiced in a free trade 
zone, then the government of that country must take responsibility for verifying the bona 
fides of the diamonds before they were re-exported; 126 (i) The Security Council should 
possess an ongoing capacity to monitor the implementation of sanctions. 127 
In its findings on the flow of weapons and the manner in which lax air traffic control 
had led to increased violations of the sanctions, the Panel noted that the region was "awash 
with arms" and reported that it had found "unequivocal and overwhelming evidence" that 
Liberia had been actively supporting the RUF at all levels, by providing it with training, 
weapons and related materiel, logistical support, a staging ground for attacks and a safe 
haven for retreat, recuperation and public relations activities. 128 The Panel had also found 
conclusive evidence of weapons supply lines via Burkina Faso to Liberia and on to Sierra 
123 	'bid, paragraphs 11-12, 159-160. The countries mentioned were Uganda, Central African 
Republic, Ghana, Namibia, Congo (Brazzaville), Mail, Zambia and Burkina Faso. 
124 	Ibid, paragraphs 14, 162. 
125 	Ibid, paragraphs 15, 163. 
126 	'bid, paragraphs 16, 164. Switzerland and the United Arab Emirates were singled out in this 
regard, due to the large volume of diamonds flowing through those countries. 
127 	Ibid, paragraphs 17, 165. The Panel noted that three Panels of Experts had been established 
concurrently and that all three were investigating many of the same issues, thus leading to 
overlap and duplication. 
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Leone and contended that President Charles Taylor of Liberia was actively involved in 
fuelling violence in Sierra Leone."9 Referring to the role of arms merchants in the supply of 
aims throughout the region, the Panel noted that regional air surveillance was inadequate for 
detecting or deterring merchants from supplying weapons to Liberia and the RUF. 13° In 
addition, Liberia itself had lax maritime and aviation laws, thus providing owners of ships and 
aircraft with "maximum discretion and cover" to engage in sanctions violations.' 31 
Based on its findings, the Panel made a number of recommendations for improving 
the implementation of the arms sanctions and the effectiveness of air traffic control in the 
region, including that: (a) All planes operating with a Liberian registration, but not based in 
Liberia, should be grounded immediately; " 2 (b) All operators of aircraft on the Liberian 
register should be required to file their airworthiness and operating licences and their 
insurance documents with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the 
aircraft of any operators failing to comply with that requirement should be grounded 
permanently; " 3 (c) The Security Council should publicize the list of grounded Liberian 
aircraft;i34 (d) The Security Council should endorse Burkina Faso's proposal for a 
mechanism to monitor all arms imports into its territory; 135 (e) All imports of arms and 
related materiel into Burkina Faso over the previous five years should be investigated;" 6 
(f) The Security Council should encourage the reinforcement of the ECOWAS Programme 
128 !bid, paragraphs 19-20. 
129 	Ibid, paragraphs 21-23. 
130 	Ibid, paragraph 24. 
131 !bid, paragraph 25. 
132 	'bid, paragraphs 32, 255. 
133 Ibid, paragraphs 33, 256. 
134 Ibid, paragraphs 34, 257. 
135 	Ibid, paragraphs 35, 258. 
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for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED), with support 
from Interpol and the World Customs Organization, and with the aim of establishing a 
capacity to monitor compliance with arms embargoes; 137 (g) The Security Council should 
also encourage ECOWAS Member States to conclude binding bilateral agreements with 
neighbour States, on a system of control that would record, license, collect and destroy 
small arms and light weapons; n8 (h) A system of profiling should be developed for arms 
brokers and intermediaries supplying weapons to the RUF and for major cargo companies 
involved in such supply, 139 (i) The Security Council should consider placing an embargo on 
weapons exports from specific producer countries until internationally acceptable 
certification schemes had been developed for the trade of weapons; 14° (j) Firearms 
recovered from rebels should be investigated, in order to identify those involved in the 
supply of those weapons; 141 (k) Existing Security Council arms embargoes should be 
amended to include a ban on the provision of military and paramilitary training; 142 
(I) Consideration should be given to developing a training programme on sanctions 
monitoring for national law enforcement and security agencies, as well as for airport and 
customs officials in West Africa, as well as to developing a manual on the monitoring of 
sanctions at airports for worldwide use; 143 (m) Consideration should Fe given to placing 
136 	Ibid. 
137 	Ibid, paragraphs 36, 259. 
138 	Ibid, paragraphs 37, 260. 
139 	Ibid, paragraphs 38, 261. 
140 	Ibid, paragraphs 39, 262. 
141 	Ibid, paragraphs 40, 263. 
142 	Ibid, paragraphs 42, 265. 
143 	Ibid, paragraphs 44, 267. 
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United Nations monitors at major airports in the region;' and (n) The Security Council 
should consider ways to improve air traffic control and surveillance in West Africa, including 
by encouraging the installation of primary radar or "pseudo radar", by requiring the use in 
the region of a Global Positioning System, and by encouraging the ICAO and other 
interested agencies to assist States in reinforcing the financial autonomy of bodies established 
to manage air navigation services: 45 
In addition to its recommendations specific to the situation in Sierra Leone, the Panel 
also made recommendations on general matters affecting the implementation of the sanctions 
against Sierra Leone. The Panel recommended that, in light of the support being provided to 
the RUF by Liberia, the Security Council should consider applying travel sanctions against 
Liberian officials and diplomats, until Liberia had stopped supporting the RUF and ceased 
violating United Nations sanctions.'" The Panel also recommended that the Council 
consider placing a temporary embargo on Liberian timber exports, until Liberia had 
demonstrated convincingly that it was no longer involved in trafficking arms to, or diamonds 
from, Sierra Leone.' 47 The Panel further recommended that the Security Council should 
consider creating a capacity within the United Nations for the ongoing monitoring of Security 
Council sanctions and embargoes, observing that it was imperative to establish an "in-house" 
knowledge base on issues such as conflict diamonds and the illicit trade in weapons and 
related materiel.'" 
144 	!bid, paragraphs 45, 268. 
145 	Ibid, paragraphs 46, 269. 
146 	Ibid, paragraphs 48, 271. 
147 	Ibid, paragraphs 49, 272. 
148 	Ibid, paragraphs 50, 273. 
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14.5 Termination of aspects of the Sierra Leone sanctions regime 
As noted above in the section relating to the scope of the sanctions regime, aspects 
of the sanctions have been terminated at various stages during the course of the regime. The 
terminated aspects of the regime include the initial sanctions regime imposed against Sierra 
Leone in general, with the aim of securing the return to power of the democratically-elected 
Government of Sierra Leone,'" and the diamond sanctions: 5° At the time of writing, the 
arms and targeted travel sanctions remain in place. 
14.6 Notable aspects of the Sierra Leone sanctions regime 
The Sierra Leone sanctions regime has exhibited a number of noteworthy 
characteristics. First, the Council established its second Panel of Experts to investigate the 
implementation of a sanctions regime. Second, the Council again targeted the link between 
the diamond trade and the flow of illicit weapons by imposing sanctions against the export 
from Sierra Leone of uncertified diamonds. It thus applied diamond sanctions for the second 
time, after having first experimented with them against UNITA. Third, the Council utilized 
time-limits for only the second time, after its experimentation with such limits in the Ethiopia 
and Eritrea sanctions regime, by outlining time-limits for the diamond sanctions. Fourth, the 
sanctions again targeted a sub-State entity. Perhaps most notable, however, was the manner 
149 	The petroleum sanctions were terminated in March 1998, upon the return to Sierra Leone of its 
democratically-elected President: SIRES/1156 (16 March 1998), operative paragraph 2. The 
remaining initial sanctions — the arms embargo and the targeted travel sanctions — were 
terminated in June 1998, at the same time that the Council imposed sanctions targeting the 
activities of the military junta and the RUF: SIRES/1171 (5 June 1998), operative paragraph I. 
150 	In June 2003, when the most recent period of extension of the diamond sanctions expired, the 
members of the Council agreed not to renew the diamond sanctions, in light of the Government 
of Sierra Leone's increased efforts to manage its diamond industry and ensure proper control 
over diamond areas, and in light of its full participation in the Kimberley Process: SC/7778 (5 
June 2003): Press statement on the Sierra Leone Diamond Embargo by the President of the 
Security Council. 
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in which the findings of the Sierra Leone Panel of Experts led to the establishment of a new 
sanctions regime against another target — Liberia. 
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15. The sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (the "Kosovo sanctions regime") 1 
The Security Council imposed sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
to address the situation in Kosovo in March 1998, after a period of rising tension between 
Serbian authorities and the Kosovar Albanian community. The escalating tension had 
recently led to guerilla attacks on police attacks, to which Yugoslav security forces had 
responded with excessive force, resulting in at least 80 fatalities. The sanctions consisted of 
an aims embargo against the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including 
Kosovo. The embargo was eventually terminated in September 2001. 
15.1 The constitutional basis for imposing sanctions against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to address the situation in 
Kosovo 
When the Security Council established the Kosovo sanctions regime, it did not 
explicitly identify a threat to or breach of intemational peace and security. Moreover, 
although the Council had determined on numerous occasions that the situation in parts of the 
former Yugoslavia had constituted a threat to international peace and security, 2 it had not 
made a prior determination of a threat to or breach of the peace in relation to the situation in 
Kosovo. The Council did make it clear, however, that it was acting under Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations, 3 thus raising the question whether the Security Council's 
In its decisions relating to the situation in Kosovo, the Council consistently referred to the 
entity against which sanctions were imposed as the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia", rather 
than as the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)". 
See, for example, the threats identified in the resolutions pertaining to the other sanctions 
regimes imposed to address the situation in the former Yugoslavia, as noted above in sections 
4.2, 7.2 and 9.2. 
SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), preambular paragraph 8. 
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decision to authorize measures to maintain or restore international peace and security could 
be considered valid in the absence of a prior determination of a threat to or breach of the 
peace.4 
The Council's failure to make a determination of a threat to the peace can be 
attributed to the positions of two of its permanent members, as neither the Russian 
Federation nor China considered the situation in Kosovo to be a threat to international 
peace and sectuity. 5 The Russian and Chinese positions meant that, although a number of 
members of the Council explicitly characterised the situation in Kosovo as a threat to 
international peace and security, 6 it was not possible to include a determination of such a 
threat in the text of resolution 1160 (1998). The extent to which the Council's failure to 
make a prior determination of a threat to or breach of international peace and security might 
have affected the validity of its decision to apply sanctions is open to conjecture. Although 
the Russian and Chinese positions suggest that they did not consider resolution 1160 (1998) 
to contain a determination of a threat to or breach of international peace and security, 
another interpretation might be that the Council's adoption of resolution 1160 (1998) under 
Chapter VII amounted to an implicit determination of a threat to international peace and 
During the meeting at which the Council adopted resolution 1160 (1998), the representative of 
Egypt in fact noted that the resolution had been adopted under Chapter VII without a prior 
determination of a threat to international peace and security and argued that, although the 
Security Council was "the master of its own procedures", as a rule the constitutional 
requirements of the Charter should be followed scrupulously: see S/PV.3868 (31 March 1998), 
Provisional verbatim record of the 38686 meeting of the Security Council, 29. 
See S/PV.3868, p. 11. The representative of the Russian Federation stated that, "the situation in 
Kosovo, despite its complexity, does not constitute a threat to regional, much less international 
peace and security" and emphasised that it was "precisely [that] understanding that [was] 
reflected in the draft resolution". The representative of China stated that, "We do not think 
that the situation in Kosovo endangers regional peace and security". 
See, e.g., the positions of: Japan, ibid. p. 3; Costa Rica, ibid., p. 3; Sweden, ibid., p. 5; Slovenia, 
ibid., pp. 7-8; Portugal, ibid., p. 10; the United Kingdom, ibid., p. 12; and the United States, 
ibid., p. 13. 
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security.' In any case, however, the Council ultimately affirmed that the deterioration of the 
situation in Kosovo constituted a threat to peace and security in the region.' The Council 
also invoked Chapter VII in resolutions related to the sanctions. 9 
15.2 The objective of the Kosovo sanctions regime 
When it established the Kosovo sanctions regime, the Security Council articulated a 
number of objectives. The general objectives of the regime were to foster peace and stability 
in Kosovo '° and to bring about a political solution to the situation in Kosovo through 
dialogue." The regime's more particular objectives consisted of various steps that the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would have to take in order for the sanctions to be 
terminated. Those steps included: (a) Beginning a substantive dialogue on "political status 
issues"; 12 (b) Withdrawing its special police units and preventing action by its security forces 
7 	 The United Kingdom appeared to employ such an interpretation, arguing that: "In adopting 
this resolution, the Security Council sends an unmistakable message: that by acting under 
Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council considers that the situation in Kosovo constitutes a 
threat to international peace and security in the Balkans region": S/PV.3868, p. 12. 
See: SIRES/1199 (23 September 1998), preambular paragraph 14 ("Affirming that the 
deterioration of the situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, constitutes a threat to 
peace and security in the region"); SIRES/1203 (24 October 1998), preambular paragraph 15 
("Affirming that the unresolved situation in Kosovo constitutes a continuing threat to peace 
and security in the region); SIRES/1244 (10 June 1999), preambular paragraph 12 ("Determining 
that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and 
security"). 
9 	S/RES/1203 (24 October 1998), preambular paragraph 16; S/RES/1244 (10 June 1999), preambular 
paragraph 13; SIRES/1367 (10 September 2001), preambular paragraph 5. 
SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 8. 
SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 1. The Council also expressed its support for 
"an enhanced status for Kosovo which would include a substantially greater degree of 
autonomy and meaningful self-administration", thus suggesting that an implicit objective of 
the sanctions might have been to ensure that there was such autonomy and self-administration 
in Kosovo: see ibid., operative paragraph 5. The Council subsequently embraced this as an 
explicit objective of the sanctions regime: SIRES/1199 (23 September 1998), preambular 
paragraph 12; SIRES/1203 (24 October 1998), preambular paragraph 8; S/RES/1244 (10 June 
1999), preambular paragraph 11. 
12 	SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 16(a). 
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against the civilian population;" (c) Allowing access to Kosovo to humanitarian 
organizations, representatives of the Contact Group and other embassies;" (d) Accepting a 
mission by the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE for the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that would include a new and specific mandate for 
addressing the problems in Kosovo, as well as the return of the long-term missions of the 
()SCE .," and (e) Facilitating a mission to Kosovo by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. 16 
The Council subsequently articulated some additional objectives connected to the 
sanctions regime. In September 1998, it demanded that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: 
(a) Cease all action by security forces affecting the civilian population and withdraw the 
security units used for civilian repression; ' 7 (b) Enable effective and continuous international 
monitoring of the situation in Kosovo by the European Community Monitoring Mission and 
diplomatic missions;" (c) Facilitate, in agreement with the UNHCR and the ICRC, the safe 
return of refugees and displaced persons and free and unimpeded access to Kosovo for 
humanitarian organizations and supplies; 19 and (d) Agree with the Kosovo Albanian 
community on a timetable for implementing confidence-building measures and finding a 
political solution to the situation in Kosovo. 2° 
13 	SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 16(b). 
14 	SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 16(c). 
15 SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 16(d). 
16 SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 16(e). 
17 SIRES/1199 (23 September 1998), operative paragraph 4(a). 
18 S/RES/1199 (23 September 1998), operative paragraph 4(b). 
19 	S/RES/1199 (23 September 1998), operative paragraph 4(c). 
20 SIRES/1199 (23 September 1998), operative paragraph 4(d). 
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15.3 The scope of the Kosovo sanctions regime 
The Kosovo sanctions consisted of an arms embargo against the territory of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including Kosovo. More specifically, the Council decided 
that all States should prevent the sale of supply to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of 
arms and related materiel!' In a novel qualification of the meaning of the term "arms and 
related materiel", the Council noted that States were also required to prevent the arming 
and training of forces for terrorist activities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 22 Although 
the Council outlined some subsequent exemptions from the sanctions, 23 the basic scope of 
the measures remained unchanged throughout the duration of the sanctions regime. 
15.4 The administration, monitoring and enforcement of the 
Kosovo sanctions regime 
In its oversight of the Kosovo sanctions regime, the Council bestowed 
responsibilities for the administration, implementation and enforcement of the sanctions upon 
a Sanctions Committee, the Secretary-General, and the United Nations Preventive 
Deployment Force (UNPREDEP). 
15.4.1 The Kosovo Sanctions Committee 
As with the majority of its sanctions regimes, the Council bestowed primary 
responsibility for the administration of the Kosovo sanctions regime upon a Sanctions 
Committee, which was established in accordance with rule 28 of the provisional rules of 
21 	SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 8. 
22 Ibid. 
23 	See, e.g., S/RES/1203 (24 October 1998), operative paragraph 15 [exempting from the sanctions 
regime equipment for the use of the OSCE and NATO verification missions]; S/RES/1244 (10 
June 1999), operative paragraph 16 [exempting from the sanctions regime equipment for the use 
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procedure, when the sanctions were initially imposed!' The Council assigned to that 
committee ("the 1160 Committee" or the "Kosovo Committee") the same basic tasks it had 
assigned to other sanctions committees. Those tasks included reporting to the Council on its 
work and with its observations and recommendations, and: (a) Seeking from all States 
information regarding action taken by them to implement the sanctions; 25 (b) Considering 
information brought to its attention by any State concerning sanctions violations and 
recommending appropriate measures in response thereto!' (c) Making periodic reports to 
the Security Council on information submitted to it regarding alleged violations of the 
sanctions;27 (d) Promulgating guidelines to facilitate the implementation of the sanctions;28 
and (e) Examining the reports submitted to it by States. 29 
In the course of its activities, the Kosovo committee issued three annual reports and 
one final report.3° The main observation the Committee made was that its work was being 
affected by the absence of an effective, comprehensive monitoring mechanism to ensure the 
effective implementation of the sanctions!' Among the committee's major recommendations 
in relation to securing the effective implementation of the Kosovo sanctions were that: (a) An 
of the international civil and security presences — which subsequently evolved into UNMIK 
and KFOR]. 
24 	SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 9. 
25 	SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 9(a). 
26 	SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 9(b). 
27 	SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 9(c). 
28 	SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 9(d). 
29 	S/RES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 9(e). 
30 S/1999/216 (4 March 1999), annex: Report of the Security Council Committee Established 
pursuant to resolution 1160 (1998), [hereafter "First report of the 1160 Committee", 
containing a report on the activities of the Committee from April-December 1998]; S/2000/633 
(29 June 2000), annex: Report of the 1160 Committee for 1999; S/2001/102 (5 February 2001), 
annex: Report of the 1160 Committee for 2000; S/2001/931 (3 October 2001), annex: Final 
report of the 1160 Committee [containing a report on the activities of the Committee from 1 
January to 10 September 2001, when the Committee was dissolved]. 
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expert study should be conducted on the military potential of the parties targeted by the 
sanctions, including analysis of external funding; 32 (b) The Secretariat should develop more 
uniform reporting requirements to facilitate the collection of relevant information from 
States;33 and (c) Further steps should be taken to strengthen the envisaged monitoring 
arrangements;34 
15.4.2 The Secretary-General 
When the Council established the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia to address the situation in Kosovo, it requested the Secretary-General to 
undertake the following responsibilities: (a) providing all necessary assistance to the 1160 
Committee;35 (b) keeping the Council regularly informed and reporting on the situation in 
Kosovo and the implementation of resolution 1160 (1998) at thirty day intervals;36 and 
(c) reporting in the event that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had complied with the 
objectives of the sanctions regime, in which event the Council would take action to terminate 
them. 37 
15.4.3 States 
When the Council established the Kosovo sanctions regime, it called upon all States 
to act in accordance with the sanctions, notwithstanding the existence of any conflicting legal 
31 	Report of the 1160 Committee for 1999, ibid, paragraph 20; Report of the 1160 Committee for 
2000, ibid, paragraph 17. 
32 	First report of the 1160 Committee, above note 30, paragraph 21. 
33 	!bid, paragraph 23. 
34 	Report of the 1160 Committee for 1999, above note 30, paragraph 24. 
35 	SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 11. 
36 	SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 14. 
37 	SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 16. 
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rights or obligations.38 At the same time, it also requested States to report to the 1160 
Committee on steps taken to implement the sanctions. 39 In subsequent decisions, the 
Council: recalled the obligations of all States to implement fully the sanctions; 4° urged States 
represented in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to make available personnel to fulfil the 
responsibility of carrying out effective and continuous international monitoring in Kosovo 
until the objectives of the sanctions regime had been achieved; 41 requested States to pursue 
all means consistent with their domestic legislation and relevant international law to prevent 
funds collected on their territory being used to contravene the sanctions; 42 and urged States 
to make personnel available to the Verification Mission in Kosovo. 43 
15.4.4 International and regional organizations 
When the Council established the Kosovo sanctions regime, it called upon all 
international and regional organizations to act in accordance with the sanctions, 
notwithstanding the existence of any conflicting legal rights or obligations." At the same time, 
the Council also invited the OSCE to keep the Secretary-General informed on the situation 
in Kosovo and on the measures it had taken in that regard, 45 and requested the Secretary-
General to consult with regional organizations on recommendations for the establishment of a 
comprehensive regime to monitor the implementation of the sanctions. 46 
38 	SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 10. 
39 	SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 12. 
ao 	SIRES/1199 (23 September 1998), operative paragraph 7. 
41 	SIRES/1199 (23 September 1998), operative paragraph 9. 
42 	SIRES/1199 (23 September 1998), operative paragraph 11. 
43 	SIRES/1203 (24 October 1998), operative paragraph 7. 
44 SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 10. 
as 	S/RES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 13. 
46 	SIRES/1160 (31 March 1998), operative paragraph 15. 
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In September 1998, the Council urged international organizations repiesented in the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to make available personnel to fulfil the responsibility of 
carrying out effective and continuous international monitoring in Kosovo until the objectives 
of the sanctions regime had been achieved. 47 In October 1998, the Council endorsed the 
agreements reached between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the OSCE, and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and NATO, concerning the verification of compliance by 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with the requirements of resolution 1199 (1998), 48 and it 
urged international organizations to make personnel available to the Verification Mission in 
Kosovo.49 
15.4.5 The United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) 
In July 1998, the Council decided that the United Nations Preventive Deployment 
Force (UNPREDEP), which was based in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
would monitor and report on illicit arms flows and other activities prohibited by the Kosovo 
sanctions regime." 
15.4.6 The Security Council mission to Kosovo 
In April 2000, the Council decided to send a mission to Kosovo. 51 The purpose of 
the mission was to enhance support for the implementation of the Council's decisions 
addressing the situation in Kosovo, with one component being to review the ongoing 
47 	SIRES/1199 (23 September 1998), operative paragraph 9. 
48 S/RES/1203 (24 October 1998), operative paragraph 1. For the agreement between the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and the OSCE, see: S/1998/978 (20 October 1998), annex. For the 
agreement between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and NATO, see: S/1998/991 (23 October 
1998), annex. 
49 	S/RES/1203 (24 October 1998), operative paragraph 7. 
50 	SIRES/1186 (1998) (21 July 1998), operative paragraph 1. 
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implementation of the sanctions.52 In its report, the mission noted that it had discussed with 
KFOR the issue of strengthening of the implementation of the sanctions. 53 The KFOR 
Commander had reported to the mission that he was sending monthly reports to NATO 
regarding the implementation of the sanctions.54 As part of its findings, the mission expressed 
the view that detailed information on KFOR's activities in the implementation of the 
sanctions should be provided to the 1160 Committee. 55 
15.5 Termination of the Kosovo sanctions regime 
In early September 2001, the Secretary-General sent a letter to the President of the 
Security Council, stating that he believed that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had 
complied with the provisions of resolution 1160 (1998). 56 As part of his reasons for 
reaching such a conclusion, the Secretary-General noted that the new authorities of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were cooperating constructively with the international 
community in its efforts to bring peace and stability to the Balkan region." The Secretary-
General also referred to the Council's own presidential statement of 16 March 2001, by 
which the Council had welcomed the close contact between the Government of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMBC) 
and the international security forces in Kosovo (KFOR), and had stressed the importance of 
51 	S/2000/320 (14 April 2000): Letter dated 14 4oril 2000 from the President of the Security 
Council addressed to the Secretary-General. 
52 	Ibid, annex: Security Council mission on the implementation of resolution 1244 (1999) — 
Terms of reference, paragraph 2(d) 
53 S12000/363 (29 April 2000): Report of the Security Council mission on the implementation of 
Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), paragraph 15. 
54 	Ibid, paragraph 16. 
55 	Ibid, paragraph 34. 
56 S/2001/849 (6 September 2001): Letter dated 6 September 2001 from the Secretary-General 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, p. 2. 
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substantial dialogue between Kosovo political leaders and the Government of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. 58 On 10 September 2001, the Council adopted resolution 1367 
(2001), in which it noted with satisfaction that the conditions for lifting the sanctions had 
been satisfied," decided to terminate the Kosovo sanctions regime, 60 and dissolved the 
Kosovo sanctions committee. 61 
15.6 Notable aspects of the Kosovo sanctions regime 
The most notable aspect of the Kosovo sanctions regime was the manner in which 
the Security Council imposed sanctions without first determining the existence of a threat to 
the peace. As discussed above, this was problematic from a "constitutional" perspective, as 
the U.N. founders appear to have designed Chapter VII in the understanding that, in 
accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, the Security Council would first determine that 
there is a threat to or breach of the peace before acting to employ enforcement measures 
under Chapter VII. The Council has not repeated the practice in regard to subsequent 
sanctions regimes. This is not to say that it will not repeat the practice in future, but it does 
57 Ibid. 
58 	S/PRST/2001/8: Presidential statement dated 16 March 2001.   
59 S/RES1I367 (10 September 2001), preambular paragraph 2 [noting that the conditions contained 
in operative paragraphs 16(a)-(e) of resolution 1160 (1998) had been satisfied]. 
60 	S/RES/1367 (10 September 2001), operative paragraph 1. 
61 	S/RES/1367 (10 September 2001), operative paragraph 2. 
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suggest that, where possible, the Security Council will seek to identify a threat to or breach 
of the peace prior to imposing sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter. 
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16. The sanctions r6gime against Afghanistan/the 
TalibanIAI Qaida l 
The Security Council first imposed sanctions against the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan in October 1999, after the Taliban had failed to comply with its demands to 
stop providing sanctuary for international terrorists and to cooperate with efforts to bring 
indicted terrorists to justice. The sanctions initially consisted of a complex mixture of 
measures, including travel and aviation sanctions, with the aim of forcing the Taliban to hand 
over Usama Bin Laden to authorities in counties that had issued an indictment for him. The 
objectives, scope, target and geographical application of the sanctions regime have evolved 
considerably since the sanctions were first imposed. The focus of the sanctions regime is 
now upon the activities not just of the Taliban, but also of Al Qaida. Moreover, the 
sanctions are no longer concentrated predominantly upon activities taking place in 
Afghanistan. The Taliban/A1Qaida sanctions regime has therefore become the first regime to 
focus upon targets that have no specific geographical base. 2 
There has been some inconsistency in the spelling of the name "Al Qaida" in the decisions of 
the Security Council. The three most common forms have been "Al Qaeda", "Al Qa'ida" and 
"Al Qaida". The Council appears to have moved towards using the latter formulation, as it 
appears in most recent decisions. "Al Qaida" is thus the term that is used here. 
Although earlier sanctions regimes have sought to restrict the activities of targets outside the 
geographical base of that target, prior to the Taliban/AI Qaida regime, the targets of sanctions 
regimes had nevertheless maintained a particular geographical base, thus meaning that the 
primary focus of the sanctions regimes was upon restricting the target's ability to act freely 
beyond that geographical base. By abolishing the connection between the Taliban/AI Qaida 
regime and the territories of Afghanistan, the Security Council was therefore breaking new 
ground in connection with a traditional sanctions regime. 
The Council also broke new ground in September 2001 by adopting a resolution requiring 
States to take steps to counter terrorism in general, without stipulating the particular entities or 
individuals against which those steps must be taken, let alone linking those entities or 
individuals with a geographic base. Under resolution 1373 (2001), the Council required States 
to take a range of steps to counter terrorism and established a Committee of the Security 
Council - the Counter-terrorism Committee (CTC) - to monitor the implementation of those 
steps. Although the counter-terrorism regime shares some characteristics with sanctions 
regimes, such as the fict that it obligates States to take certain measures short of force to 
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16.1 The constitutional basis for imposing sanctions against the 
Taliban/A1 Qaida 
When the Security Council first imposed sanctions against the Taliban, it strongly 
condemned the continuing use of Afghan territory, especially areas controlled by the Taliban, 
for the sheltering and training of terrorists and planning of terrorist acts, and reaffirmed its 
conviction that the suppression of international terrorism was essential for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 3 The Council then determined that the failure of the Taliban 
to comply with a demand it had made in December 1998 to stop providing sanctuary and 
training for international terrorists and their organizations and to cooperate with efforts to 
bring indicted terrorists to justice,4 constituted a threat to international peace and security. 5 It 
also noted that it was acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, before proceeding to apply 
sanctions against the Taliban. 6 
In subsequent decisions related to the sanctions, the Council has consistently 	. 
invoked Chapter VII of the Charter.' There has been an evolution, however, in the 
Council's characterisation of the existence of a threat to international peace and security. 
While the Taliban regime retained power hi Afghanistan, the Council again determined - on 
address a threat to international peace and security, it is not treated as a sanctions regime in 
this study, due to the fact that it is not applied against a concrete, well-defined target. 
Although the counter-terrorism measures are to be taken against a class of organizations and 
people whose actions are connected with terrorism, it is left to each State to determine its own 
interpretation of what constitutes terrorism, a terrorist, a terrorist organization, terrorist acts, 
etc. Thus, although it is arguable that the counterterrorism regime amounts to a new form of 
sanctions regime, it is excluded from this study of traditional United Nations sanctions regimes. 
3 	SIRES/1267 (15 October 1999), preambular paragraph 5. 
4 	The Security Council had made this demand had been made in resolution 1214 (1998): 
SIRES/1214 (8 December 1998), operative paragraph 13. 
5 	S/RES/1267 (15 October 1999), preambular paragraph 8. 
6 	SIRES/1267 (15 October 1999), preatnbular paragraph 10. 
7 	SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), preambular paragraph 19; S/RES/1363 (30 July 2001), 
preambular paragraph 2; S/RES/1388 (15 January 2001), preambular paragraph 3; SIRES/1390 (16 
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two occasions - that the failure of the Taliban to comply with the requirements of the 
sanctions regime constituted a threat to international peace and security, 8 whilst also 
reaffirming that the suppression of international terrorism is essential for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 9 Since January 2002, however, the Council has reaffirmed 
that acts of international terrorism constitute a threat to international peace and security. l° 
16.2 The objectives of the Taliban/A1 Qaida sanctions regime 
The major initial objective of the Taliban/AI Qaida sanctions, as outlined by the 
Council in resolution 1267 (1999), was to ensure that the Taliban turned over Usama Bin 
Laden to authorities in a country where he had been indicted." In December 2000, the 
Council outlined some additional requirements with which the Taliban needed to comply 
before the sanctions would be terminated. Thus, as well as ensuring that Usama Bin Laden 
was turned over to authorities in a country where he had been indicted, the sanctions regime 
also aimed to ensure that the Taliban: ceased providing sanctuary training for international 
terrorists; took measures to ensure that its territory was not being used by terrorists or for 
January 2002), preambular paragraph 10; SIRES/1452 (20 December 2002), preambular paragraph 
4; S/RES/1455 (17 January 2003), preambular paragraph 8. 
S/RES/1333 (19 December 2000), preambular paragraph 14; S/RES/1363 (30 July 2001), 
preambular paragraph 2. 
S/PRST/2000/12: Presidential statement dated 7 April 2000; S/RES/1333 (19 December 2000), 
preambular paragraph 7. 
10 	S/RES/1390 (16 January 2002), preambular paragraph 9; SIRES/1455 (17 January 2003), 
preambular paragraph 7. 
II 	S/RES/1267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraphs 2, 14. Although the Council also reaffirmed 
its earlier demand that the Taliban cease providing sanctuary and training for international 
terrorists [see preambular paragraph 8 and operative paragraph 1, reaffirming the demand made 
earlier by the Council in SIRES/l214 (8 December 1998), operative paragraph 13], the fact that it 
noted in operative paragraph 14 that the sanctions would be terminated once the Taliban had 
handed over Bin Laden to authorities in a country where he had been indicted suggests that 
the most important objective of the sanctions regime was to ensure the capture of Bin Laden. 
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the organization of terrorist acts against other States; cooperated with efforts to bring 
indicted terrorists to justice; and closed terrorist camps within its territory.' 2 
In January 2002, the Council determined that the Taliban had failed to comply with 
the existing objectives of the sanctions regime. Unlike previous resolutions on the subject, 
however, resolution 1390 (2002) did not explicitly state conditions the satisfaction of which 
would lead to termination of the sanctions regime." Instead, the Council stated that the 
sanctions would be reviewed after twelve months and either continued or improved, in 
keeping with "the principles and purposes" of resolution 1390 (2002).' 4 On two subsequent 
occasion, when strengthening further the implementation of the sanctions, the Council has 
again noted that the sanctions would be improved after a certain period of time, without 
articulating the conditions that must be satisfied before the sanctions could be terminated." 
16.3 The scope of the Taliban/A1 Qaida sanctions regime 
The Taliban/A1 Qaida sanctions regime was initially imposed against the Tafiban in 
general and consisted of a combination of aviation and financial sanctions. Under the aviation 
sanctions, all States were required to deny aircraft permission to land in or fly over their 
12 	S/RES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraphs 1, 2, 3. Operative paragraphs 23 and 24 
of the same resolution also reinforce that these were the objectives of the regime. 
13 	The Council had done this in resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000): see S/RES/1267 (15 
October 1999), operative paragraph 14; SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraphs 
23, 24. 
14 S/RES/1390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraph 3. It is unclear why the Council decided to 
alter its approach and leave the objectives of the sanctions regime vague. One interpretation 
could be that as the objectives had been explicitly stated and endorsed in previous resolutions, 
there was no need to reiterate those objectives. Another interpretation, however, could be that 
the resolution was deliberately crafted to keep the objectives of the sanctions regime vague, so 
that it would be more difficult to terminate the sanctions. The fact that the Council has adopted 
two major resolutions, each of which modified significantly the contours of the Taliban/A1 
Qaida sanctions regime, suggests that the exclusion of specific references to tangible 
objectives is more than a mere oversight. 
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territories if owned or operated by the Taliban. 16  Under the financial sanctions, States were 
required to freeze finds and other financial resources owned directly or indirectly by the 
Taliban." Subsequently, the regime has been strengthened a number of times, with the focus 
of sanctions shifting more towards Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaida. 
In December 2000, the Security Council imposed a combination of arms, 
representative, financial, chemical and aviation sanctions. Under resolution 1333 (2000), 
States were required: to prevent the provision to the Taliban of arms and related materiel, 
as well as military expertise and assistance; 18 to close all offices on their territories belonging 
to the Taliban and Afghan airlines; 19 and to impose targeted financial sanctions against 
Usama Bin Laden and members of the Al Qaida organization; 2° to prevent the sale to 
Taliban-controlled areas of a particular chemical used in the production of opium; 21 and to 
15 	S/RES/1455 (17 January 2003), operative paragraph 2 (noting that sanctions would be improved 
after twelve months); SIRES/1526 (30 January 2004), operative paragraph 3 (deciding that the 
sanctions would be further improved in eighteen months, or sooner if necessary). 
16 	SIRES/1267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraph 4(a). The Council exempted from the 
sanctions regime flights pursuant to a humanitarian need, such as those connected with the 
Hajj pilgrimage. Any exempted flights needed to be approved in advance by the 1267 
Committee. 
17 	S/RES/1267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraph 4(b). The Council provided for the 
possibility of exceptions to the financial sanctions for situations of humanitarian need, as 
determined by the 1267 sanctions committee. It terminated the application of these exceptions 
in January 2003, however, when it streamlined the process for exemptions from the financial 
sanctions by then imposed against Usama Bin Laden, the Al Qaida, the Taliban and associates 
of those entities: SIRES/1452 (20 December 2002), operative paragraph 4. 
18 	SIRES/l333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 5. The Council outlined a number of 
exemptions from the arms embargo, however, for non-lethal supplies intended for humanitarian 
use, as approved by the 1267 Committee, and for protective clothing exported to Afghanistan 
for the personal use of United Nations personnel, representatives of the media, and 
humanitarian workers: ibid, operative paragraph 6. 
19 SIRES/l333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraphs 8(a), 8(b). 
20 	S/RES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 8(c). 
21 	S/RES/I333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 10 
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prevent all aircraft flying to or from Taliban-controlled territories from landing in, departing 
from or over-flying their tenitories.22 
In January 2002 the Council adopted resolutions 1388 (2002) and 1390 (2002), 
which consolidated the sanctions by terminating certain components of the sanctions regime 
and streamlining others. Among the measures explicitly terminated were the sanctions against 
Ariana Afghanistan Airlines 23 and the ban which had been imposed against aircraft owned or 
operated by the Taliban. 24 Certain other measures lapsed due to the fact that the Council did 
not reaffirm them. Those measures included the representative sanctions imposed against the 
Taliban, the sanctions against the provision to Taliban- controlled territory of a particular 
chemical substance, and the aviation sanctions against flights to or from Taliban- controlled 
territory. Through resolution 1390 (2002), however, the Council also streamlined and 
strengthened the remaining sanctions. It also broadened the application of those sanctions, 
both in terms of the targets of the sanctions and of their geographical application. The 
Council thus decided that all States would implement financial, travel and arms sanctions 
against Usama Bin Laden, Al Qaida, the Taliban, and associates of those entities, as 
designated by a list maintained by the 1267 Committee. The Council thus required States: to 
22 	S/RES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 11. The Council provided for the 
possibility of exemptions from these aviation sanctions for flights approved in advance by the 
Committee on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligations such as the 
performance of the Hajj, or on the grounds that the flight would promote discussion of a 
peaceful resolution of the conflict in Afghanistan, or was likely to promote Taliban compliance 
with the objectives of the sanctions regime: ibid. The Council also provided for exemptions for 
flights being undertaken for humanitarian purposes by organizations approved by the 1267 
committee: ibid, operative paragraph 12. 
23 	In resolution 1388 (2002), the Council terminated the ban on Taliban-controlled aircraft, in so far 
as it applied to Ariana Afghanistan Airlines: S/RES/1388 (15 January 2002), operative 
paragraph 1. In operative paragraph 2 of that same resolution, the Council also terminated the 
requirement that States close all offices belonging to Ariana Afghanistan Airlines. 
24 
	
S/RES/1390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraph I. 
728 
Appendix 1 6. The sanctions regime agaisnt Afghanistan/the Taliban/A1 Qaida 
freeze the financial and economic resources of those entities;25 to prevent the entry into or 
transit through their territories of individuals appearing on the "black-list"; 26 and to prevent 
the provision to those entities and individuals of arms and related materiel, expertise and 
assistance. 27 Moreover, the implementation of &motions was no longer linked primarily to 
activities taking place within Afghanistan. Thus, for example, the arms embargo was upon 
the provision of arms and related materiel, expertise and assistance not only to Taliban-
controlled territory in Afghanistan, but to the Taliban, Bin Laden, Al Qaida and their 
associates, no matter where they might be located. 
In January 2003, the Council adopted resolution 1455 (2003), by which it decided 
to improve the implementation of the sanctions. 28 The scope of the sanctions remained the 
same, however. 
16.4 The administration, monitoring and enforcement of the 
Taliban/A1 Qaida sanctions regime 
The Security Council has created three subsidiary entities to facilitate the 
implementation of the Afghanistan/Taliban/AI Qaida sanctions regime: a sanctions 
committee, a Committee of Experts and a Monitoring Mechanism. In addition, the Council 
has bestowed various responsibilities upon the Secretary-General related to scrutinising the 
25 
	
SIRES/1390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraph 2(a). The Council subsequently permitted 
exemptions from these financial sanctions where such funds, assets or resources were 
necessary for "basic" or "extraordinary" expenses: SIRES/1452 (20 December 2002), operative 
paragraph 1. It also qualified that States might allow for frozen accounts to earn interest and to 
receive outstanding payments owed under contracts, agreements or obligations that had arisen 
prior to the application of sanctions: SIRES/1452 (20 December 2002), operative paragraph 2. 
26 	SIRES/1390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraph 2(b). An exemption was provided from this 
prohibition where necessary for the fulfilment of a judicial process or as otherwise approved by 
the Taliban/AI Qaida sanctions committee. 
27 	SIRES/1390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraph 2(c). 
28 	SIRES/l455 (17 January 2003). 
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implementation of sanctions, in particular by reporting on the humanitarian implications of the 
application of sanctions. 
16.4.1 The Afghanistan/Taliban/A1 Qaida Sanctions Committee 
The Security Council established a Sanctions Committee in the same resolution 
which initiated the Afghanistanifaliban/A1 Qaida sanctions regime. 29 The Committee has 
been referred to by a number of names, including the "1267 Committee", the "Afghanistan 
Committee" and the "Taliban/A1 Qaida Committee". 
Establishment and mandate of the Taliban/A1 Qaida Committee 
In addition to being assigned the standard collection of sanctions committee tasks, 
the new committee was also requested to report on the humanitarian implications of the 
sanctions and to determine appropriate arrangements to improve monitoring of the 
implementation of the sanctions. The Committee's tasks therefore included reporting to the 
Council on its work and with its observations and recommendations, and: (a) Seeking from 
all States information regarding the action they had taken to implement the sanctions;" 
(b) Considering information brought to its attention by States concerning sanctions violations 
and recommending appropriate measures in response thereto; 31 (c) Making periodic reports 
to the Council on the impact of the sanctions, including their humanitarian implications; 32 
(d) Making periodic reports to the Council on information submitted to it regarding alleged 
violations of the sanctions, identifying where possible persons or entities reported to be 
29 	SIRES/1267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraph 6. 
30 	SIRES/1267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraph 6(a). 
31 	SIRES/1267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraph 6(b) 
32 	SIRES/1267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraph 6(c). 
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engaged in such violations;33 (e) Designating the aircraft and funds or financial resources 
subject to the sanctions;34 (f) Deciding upon requests for exemptions from the sanctions; 35 
(g) Examining the reports and information submitted to it by States; 36 and (h) Determining 
appropriate arrangements to improve monitoring of the implementation of the sanctions?' 
The mandate of the 1267 Committee was subsequently modified in accordance with 
the modifications made to the scope of the Taliban/A1 Qaida sanctions regime. Thus, in 
December 2000, with the adoption of resolution 1333 (2000), the Committee was 
requested: (a) To establish and maintain a list of all points of entry and landing for aircraft 
within the territory of Afghanistan under Taliban contro1; 38 (b) To establish and maintain a list 
of individuals and entities designated as being associated with Usama bin Laden; 39 (c) To 
decide upon requests for exemptions from the sanctions;4° (d) To establish and maintain a 
list of approved organizations and governmental relief agencies which were providing 
humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan; 41 (e) To make relevant information regarding 
implementation of the sanctions publicly available through appropriate media; 42 (f) To 
consider a visit to countries in the region by the Chairman of the Committee to enhance the 
full and effective implementation of the sanctions;43 and (g) To make periodic reports to the 
33 
 
SIRES/1267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraph 6(d). 
34 
 
SIRES/1267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraph 6(e). 
35 	SIRES/1267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraph 6(f). 
36 	S/RES/1267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraph 6(g). 
37 	S/RES/1267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraph 12. 
38 
 
SIRES/1333, operative paragraph 16(a). 
39 
 
SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 16(b). 
SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 16(c). 
41 	S/RES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 16(d). Organizations on the list could then 
be exempted from the aviation sanctions for activities involving the provision of humanitarian 
supplies, in accordance with operative paragraph 12 of the same resolution. 
42 	S/RES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 16(e). 
43 	S/RES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 16(0. 
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Council on information submitted to it regarding possible violations of the sanctions and to 
make recommendations for strengthening the effectiveness of the sanctions. 44 
In July 2001 the Council adopted resolution 1363 (2001), establishing a monitoring 
mechanism for Afghanistan. At the same time, the Council also requested the Committee 
to report to it on the implementation of resolution 1363 (2001). 46 In January 2002, when it 
adopted resolution 1390 (2002), the Security Council requested the Committee to report on 
its work to the Council with its observations and recommendations and to undertake the 
following tasks: (a) To update regularly the list of individuals and groups associated with 
Usama Bin Laden, Al Qaida and the Taliban; 47 (b) To seek from States information 
regarding action taken to implement the sanctions and any further information the Committee 
may consider necessary;48 (c) To make periodic reports to the Council on information 
submitted to it regarding the implementation of the sancfions; 49 (d) To promulgate guidelines 
and criteria necessary to facilitate the implementation of the sanctions;" (e) To make 
information it considers relevant, including the list referred to in paragraph 2 above, publicly 
available through appropriate media; 51 and (f) To cooperate with other relevant Security 
Council Sanctions Committees and with the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 6 
of its resolution 1373 (2001). 52 
44 	SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 16(g). 
45 	S/RES/1363 (30 July 2001), operative paragraph 3. For further details relating to the 
establishment and activities of the monitoring mechanism, see the discussion below. 
SIRES/1363 (30 July 2001), operative paragraph 6. 
47 	S/RES/1390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraph 5(a). 
48 	S/RES/1390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraph 5(b). 
49 	S/RES/1390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraph 5(c). 
50 S/RES/1390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraph 5(d). 
51 
 
SIRES/1390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraph 5(e). 
52 SIRES/1390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraph 5(f). 
732 
Appendix I 6. The sanctions regime agaisnt Afghanistan/the Taliban/A1 Qaida 
In resolution 1452 (2002), the Council also added the following additional tasks to 
the Committee's list of responsibilities: (a) To maintain a list of the States whose notifications 
of intent to take advantage of the exemption from the financial sanctions for basic expenses 
had not been rejected by it [the Committee];53 and (b) To consider requests for exemptions 
for extraordinary expenses.54 
In resolution 1455 (2003), adopted in January 2003, the Security Council added 
the following responsibilities to the already significant list of tasks assigned to the Committee: 
(a) To communicate to Member States the list of individuals and groups associated with 
Usama Bin Laden, Al Qaida and the Taliban at least every three months; 55 (b) To consider a 
visit to selected countries by the Chairman of the Committee and/or Committee members to 
enhance the full and effective implementation of the sanctions; 56 and (c) To circulate a 
written assessment to the Council of actions taken by States to implement the sanctions. 57 In 
resolution 1455 (2003) the Council also requested that the Chairman of the Committee: 
(a) Report orally every 90 days on the work of the Committee and the Monitoring Group 
and on the reports received from States on steps taken to implement the sanctions; 58 and 
(b)Provide the Council by 1 August 2003 and by 15 December 2003 with detailed oral 
assessments of Member State implementation of the sanctions, with a view to 
recommending further measures for Council consideration to improve the sanctions. 59 
Activities of the Afghanistan/Taliban/A1 Qaida Committee 
53 SIRES/1452 (20 December 2002), operative paragraph 3(a). 
54 	S/RES/1452 (20 December 2002), operative paragraph 3(b). 
55 	S/RES/1455 (17 January 2003), operative paragraph 4. 
56 	SIRES/1455 (17 January 2003), operative paragraph 11. 
57 	S/RES11455 (17 January 2003), operative paragraph 15. 
58 	S/RES/1455 (17 January 2003), operative paragraph 9. 
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In the course of its activities, the 1267 committee has issued: four annual reports, 6° 
as well as various other reports pursuant to resolutions 1333 (2000), 1390 (2002) and 
1455 (2003), listing submissions received from States concerning the steps they had taken 
to comply with the sanctions. 61 The Committee's annual reports demonstrate a progressively 
more active agenda. In its first annual report the Committee provided no recommendations, 
simply reaffirming in its conclusions its commitment to working closely with other sections of 
the United Nations system, and expressing appreciation for the cooperation received from 
Member States, international organizations and the Secretariat. 62 In its second annual report, 
the Committee again made no significant recommendations. It noted, however, that it had 
welcomed and endorsed the recommendations made to it by the Committee of Experts, 
which had led to the establishment of the Afghanistan monitoring mechanism. 63 In its third 
annual report, the Committee noted that the global character of its mandate, as modified by 
resolution 1390 (2002), provided both greater opportunities and greater challenges, as it 
sought to achieve its objectives. 64 The Committee described its list of individuals and entities 
belonging to or associated with the Taliban, Bin Laden and Al Qaida as a "critical tool" for 
59 
	
SIRES/1455 (17 January 2003), operative paragraph 14. 
60 
	
S/2000/1254 (29 December 2000), annex: Report of the Security Council Committee established 
pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Afghanistan (hereafter "First report of the 
1267 Committee"), containing a summary of the Committee's activities between its 
establishment in October 1999 and 28 December 2000]; S/2002/101 (5 February 2002), annex: 
Report of the 1267 Committee for 2001; S/2002/1423 (26 December 2002), annex: Report of the 
1267 Committee for 2002; S/2004/281 (8 April 2004): Report of the 1267 Committee for 2003. 
61 	S/200/282 and Add.1 (4 April and 31 August 2000), annexes [listing reports received from 
States outlining measures taken to implement the sanctions outlined in resolution 1267 (1999)]; 
S/2001/326 and Add.1 (4 April and 21 November 2001), annexes [listing the reports received 
from States outlining measures taken to implement the sanctions outlined in resolution 1333 
(2000)]; S/2002/736 (9 July 2002), annexes [listing the reports received from States outlining 
measures taken to implement the sanctions outlined in resolution 1390 (2002)]. 
62 First report of the 1267 Committee, above note 60, paragraphs 21-22. 
63 Report of the 1267 Committee for 2001, above note 60, paragraphs 22-23. 
64 Report of the 1267 Committee for 2002, above note 60, paragraph 43. 
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the effective implementation of the sanctions. 65 It was important that the list be constantly 
modified and updated, as well as widely disseminated, in order to serve as well as possible 
the objectives of the sanctions regime. 66 The Committee noted that the work of the 
Monitoring Group had become "indispensable" for the effective discharge of the 
Committee's mandate, 67 but it stressed that in order to achieve fully the objectives of the 
Security Council in the application of the sanctions, there would also need to be increased 
interaction between the Committee, the Monitoring Group, and other bodies active in the 
"fight against terrorism" — both within and outside the United Nations system.68 
16.4.2 The Role of Secretary-General 
When the Security Council established the Afghanistan/Taliban/A1 Qaida sanctions 
regime, it requested the Secretary-General to report to it if the Taliban had complied with its 
obligations under the sanctions regime before 14 November 1999, in which case the 
Council might decide that the sanctions would not come into operation. 69 At the same time, 
the Council also requested the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance to the 
1267 Committee." 
In December 2000, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General: (a) To 
appoint the Committee of experts referred to below; 71 (b) To consult with relevant Member 
States to put into effect the Afghanistanaaliban/A1 Qaida sanctions; 72 (c) To report on the 
65 	Ibid, paragraph 44. 
66 	Ibid, paragraph 45. 
67 	Ibid, paragraph 46. 
68 	Ibid, paragraph 48. 
69 	S/RES/1267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraph 3. 
70 	S/RES/1267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraph 11. 
71 	S/RES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 15(a). 
72 	SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 15(b). 
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implementation of the sanctions, assess problems in enforcement, make recommendations 
for strengthening sanctions enforcement, and evaluate the actions taken by the Taliban to 
comply with the aims of the sanctions; 73 and (d) To review the humanitarian implications of 
the sanctions and to report to the Council within 90 days with an assessment and 
recommendations, to report at regular intervals thereafter on humanitarian implications and 
to present a comprehensive report on the issue, including recommendations, no later than 30 
days before the expiration of the measures imposed by resolution 1333 (2000). 74 
In July 2001, the Council requested the Secretary-General to establish the 
Afghanistanaaliban/A1 Qaida monitoring mechanism.75 At the same time, it also requested 
him to make the necessary arrangements to support the work of the monitoring mechanism, 
as an expense of the Organization and through a United Nations Trust Fund, and to keep 
the 1267 Committee informed of the financial arrangements supporting the mechanism. 76 
In January 2002, the Council requested the Secretary-General to assign the 
Afghanistailfaliban/A1 Qaida Monitoring Group to monitor, for a period of twelve months, 
the implementation of the sanctions. 77 In January 2003, the Council requested the Secretary-
General to reappoint experts to the Monitoring Group,78 and to ensure that the Monitoring 
Group and the 1267 Committee and its Chairman had access territorial integrity sufficient 
expertise and resources to discharge their responsibilities. 79 
73 SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 15(c). 
74 	SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 15(d). 
75 
 
SIRES/1363 (30 July 2001), operative paragraph 3. For details relating to the monitoring 
mechanism, see below. 
76 SIRES/1363 (30 July 2001), operative paragraph 9. 
77 	S/RES/1390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraph 9. 
78 	SIRES/1455 (17 January 2003), operative paragraph 8. 
79 	SIRES/1455 (17 January 2003), operative paragraph 10. 
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Activities relating to humanitarian implications of the sanctions 
In 2001, the Secretary-General submitted four reports to the Council on the 
humanitarian implications of the sanctions. 8° In those reports, the Secretary-General noted 
that the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan was dire, with the health situation being among 
the worst in the world, refugees and displaced persons numbering over 2.6 million people, 
and a devastated economy. 81 Although that situation could not be attributed to the sanctions, 
the direct impact of sanctions on the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan had been "limited 
but tangible". 82 The most direct impact of the sanctions had been upon the national airlines, 
Ariana Afghan Airlines, as the sanctions made it increasingly difficult for Ariana to carry out 
essential maintenance. 83 In addition, intemational civil aviation safety had been affected, as 
regional and international contacts between the Afghanistan civil aviation authorities and 
80 	S/2001/241 (20 March 2001): Report of the Secretary-General on the humanitarian 
implications of the measures imposed by Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 
(2000) on Afghanistan; S/20011695 (13 July 2001): Report of the Secretary-General on 
humanitarian implications of the measures imposed by Security Council resolutions 1267 
(1999) and 1333 (2000) on Afghanistan; S/2001/1086 (19 November 2001): Report of the 
Secretary-General on the humanitarian implications of the measures imposed by Security 
Council resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000) on Afghanistan; S/200111215 (18 
December 2001): Report of the Secretary-General on the humanitarian implications of the 
measures imposed by Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000) on 
Afghanistan. It should be noted that the report of November 2001 (S/2001/1086) consisted of a 
short statement that it had not been possible to undertake the task of reporting on 
humanitarian implications due to the "precarious security situation in Afghanistan". In his 
December report the Secretary-General also noted that due to developments in Afghanistan he 
was not in a position to report on the humanitarian implications of the sanctions. He did, 
however, outline some observations relating to the experience of monitoring the humanitarian 
implications of sanctions. 
81 	S/20011241, ibid, paragraph 15. 
82 	S/2001/24I, ibid, paragraph 16 [citing an earlier report, prepared by the United Nations Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and submitted to the 1267 Committee in December 
2000]. 
83 	S/20011241, ibid, paragraphs 22-24; 5/2001/695, above note 80, paragraphs 22-30 [containing a 
number of recommendations for potential action by the 1267 Committee, which aimed to ensure 
that Ariana could undertake basic maintenance of its fleet and provide training to its staff, 
provided that the International Air Transport Authority (IATA) had certified that such actions 
were indeed necessary for Ariana to meet safety requirements]. 
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external bodies had been prohibited mder the sanctions." The application of the sanctions 
had also been accompanied by the devaluation of the Afghan cun-ency ("the Afghani"), 
which had lost 18 per cent of its value relative to the US dollar from December 2000 to 
February 2001. 85 Although the currency subsequently stabilized, the initial devaluation 
potentially led to an initial deterioration in the humanitarian situation, as a result of decreased 
purchasing power.86 The Secretary-General also warned that the Taliban authorities had 
engaged in a sustained campaign against the sanctions, blaming them for deteriorations in the 
humanitarian situation. 87 This had had a flow-on effect of its own, making the operating 
environment for international humanitarian organizations difficult 88 On a more positive note, 
the Secretary-General noted that, on the whole, the mechanism for providing various 
humanitarian exemptions from the sanctions was operating smoothly. 89 
In his final report on the humanitarian implications of sanctions, the Secretary-
General observed that the process of reviewing the impact of sanctions had resulted in useful 
reflections and discussions within the monitoring mechanism, the 1267 Committee and the 
Security Council on the implications of sanctions. He suggested that the Security Council 
might wish to consider establishing a similar procedure for future sanctions regimes, in order 
84 	The report noted that the 1267 Committee had refused requests from the Afghan civil aviation 
ministry to fly to Pakistan for technical meetings: S/2001/241, ibid, paragraph 25. 
85 	Ibid, paragraphs 27-28. The report noted that currency traders had marked the Afghani down 
as it had become clear that further sanctions were going to be imposed. 
86 	S120011241, ibid, paragraph 28 [noting the potential link between the devaluation of the 
currency and a deterioration in the humanitarian situation] S/20011695, above note 80, 
paragraph 35 [noting that the Afghani had stabilized]. 
87 	S/20011241, ibid, paragraph 34; 5/2001/695, paragraph 62; S/2001/1215, above note 80, 
paragraph 8. 
88 	S1200111215, ibid, paragraph 6. 
89 	S/2001/241, paragraphs 33, 36; S12001/695, paragraph 54; S/200111215, paragraph 7. 
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to monitor and assess potential unintended consequences on the civilian population of 
targeted countries. 90 
16.4.3 States 
The Security Council has requested, called upon or urged States to undertake a 
range of activities connected to the implementation, monitoring and enforcement of the 1267 
sanctions regime. The Council has thus: urged all States to cooperate with efforts to ensure 
that Usama Bin Laden was turned over to authorities in a country where he had been 
indicted, or to a country where he would be brought to justice; 91 called upon all States to act 
in accordance with the sanctions, notwithstanding the existence of any conflicting legal rights 
or obligations; 92 called upon States to bring proceedings against persons and entities within 
their jurisdiction that violated the sanctions and to impose appropriate penalties; 93 called 
upon all States to cooperate fully with the 1267 Committee, including by supplying 
information it sought" requested all States to report to the 1267 Committee on steps taken 
to implement the sanctions;95 urged all States maintaining diplomatic relations with the 
Taliban to reduce significantly the number and level of the staff at Taliban missions and posts 
and to restrict or control the movement within their territory of all ieiiiaining staff; 96 urged 
90 	S/2001/1215, ib id , paragraph 9. 
91 	S/RES/I 267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraph 5. 
92 	SIRES/1267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraph 7; SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), 
operative paragraph 17. 
93 
 
SIRES/1267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraph 8; SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), 
operative paragraph 18. 
94 SIRES/1267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraph 9; SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), 
operative paragraph 19; SIRES/1390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraph 7; SIRES/1455 (17 
January 2003), operative paragraph 7. 
95 
 
SIRES/i267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraph 10; S/RES/1333 (19 December 2000), 
operative paragraph 20; SIRES/1390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraph 6. 
96 	S/RES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 7. 
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States to take steps to restrict the entry into or transit through their territory of senior Taliban 
officials;97 called upon all States to cooperate with the monitoring mechanism; 98 urged all 
States to take immediate steps to enforce and strengthen, through legislative enactments or 
administrative measures, the measures imposed under their domestic laws or regulations 
against their nationals and other individuals or entities operating on their territory, to prevent 
and punish violations of the sanctions and to inform the 1267 Committee of the adoption of 
such measures, and invited States to report the results of all related investigations or 
enforcement actions to the Committee; 99 urged all States to cooperate fully with the 
Monitoring Group; m° and called on all States to submit an updated report on steps taken to 
implement the sanctions and on all related investigations and enforcement action, including a 
comprehensive summary of frozen assets of listed individuals and entities within Member 
State territories.' °I 
16.4.4 The Afghanistanfraliban/A1 Qaida Committee of Experts 
In December 2000, when it adopted resolution 1333 (2000), the Council requested 
the Secretary-General to appoint a committee of experts to make recommendations on 
improving the monitoring of the Afghanistan/Taliban/A1 Qaida sanctions. 1°2 The Committee 
of Experts was requested to report to the Council within sixty days on how to monitor the 
97 	SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 14. The Council noted, however, that this 
request did not apply where officials were travelling for humanitarian purposes, including 
religious obligations such as the performance of the Hajj, or where it promoted the peaceful 
resolution of the conflict in Afghanistan or compliance with the objectives of the sanctions 
regime. 
98 	SIRES/1363 (30 July 2001), operative paragraph 7. 
99 	SIRES/1363 (30 July 2001), operative paragraph 8; S/RES/1390 (16 January 2002), operative 
paragraph 8; S/RES/1455 (17 January 2003), operative paragraph 5. 
100 	SIRES/1390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraph 7; SIRES/1455 (17 January 2003), operative 
paragraph 7. 
101 	S/RES/1455 (17 January 2003), operative paragraph 6. 
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arms embargo against the Taliban and the closure of terrorist training camps.'" In its report, 
the Committee of Experts outlined the activities it had taken to fulfil its mandate and made a 
number of key recommendations.'" 
As part of its operations, the Committee of Experts consulted with a range of actors, 
including representatives of the States sharing a border with Afghanistan and of two States 
considered to have a major strategic interest in events in Afghanistan — the United States and 
the Russian Federation.'" The Committee concluded that the arms embargo and the closure 
of the terrorist training camps could best be monitored by strengthening mechanisms that 
were already in place in the six countries bordering Afghanistan. 106 It therefore 
recommended that the Council establish an office for sanctions monitoring and coordination, 
consisting of a Headquarters team and a number of Sanctions Enforcement Support Teams, 
each working alongside the border control services in the countries neighbouring 
Afelanistam m Among the Committee's other recommendations were: that the 
Headquarters Office be located in Vienna; that the Sanctions Enforcement Support Teams 
be based with existing United Nations offices in the countries neighbouring Afghanistan; that 
the Council consider specifying a prohibition against aircraft turbine fuel and fluids and 
lubricants for use in armoured vehicles, as part of the arms embargo.'" 
102 	SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 15. 
103 	S/RES/I 333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 15(a). 
104 	S/2001/511 (22 May 2001): Letter dated 21 May from the Secretary-General addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, enclosure [containing the Report of the Committee of 
Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1333 (2000), paragraph 15 (a), 
regarding monitoring of the arms embargo against the Taliban and the closure of terrorist 
training camps in the Taliban-held areas of Afghanistan]. 
105 	Ibid, paragraphs 11-19 [listing the range of actors with which the Committee of Experts met] 
106 	Ibid, paragraph 94. 
107 	Ibid, paragraph 96. 
108 	Ibid, paragraphs 97-102. 
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16.4.5 The Afghanistan/TalibanJA1 Qaida Monitoring Group 
In July 2001, after considering the report of the Committee of Experts, the Security 
Council requested the Secretary-General to establish a monitoring mechanism, whose 
mandate would extend for the remaining period of the sanctions which had been imposed 
under resolution 1333 (2000).' °9 The mechanism would: (a) Monitor the implementation of 
the sanctions;" ° (b) Offer assistance to States bordering the territory of Afghanistan under 
Taliban control, and other States as appropriate, to increase their capacity regarding the 
implementation of the sanctions;" I and (c) Collate, assess, verify, report and make 
recommendations on information regarding violations of the sanctions." 2 The monitoring 
mechanism would consist of two bodies: a Monitoring Group and a Sanctions Enforcement 
Support Team. " 3 
Following the establishment of the monitoring mechanism, the Monitoring Group's 
mandate was extended for two further periods of twelve months.' 14 Its final mandate expired 
in January 2004, when it was replaced by the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring 
109 	S/RES/1363 (30 July 2001), operative paragraph 3. 
SIRES/1363 (30 July 2001), operative paragraph 3(a). 
SIRES/1363 (30 July 2001), operative paragraph 3(b). 
112 	SIRES/1363 (30 July 2001), operative paragraph 3(c). 
113 
 
SIRES/1363 (30 July 2001), operative paragraph 4. The Monitoring Group would be based in 
New York and would consist of up to five experts. Its mandate would be to monitor the 
implementation of the sanctions, including in the fields of arms embargoes, counter-terrorism 
and related legislation, as well as money laundering, financial transactions and drug trafficking: 
S/RES/1363 (30 July 2001), operative paragraph 4(a). The Sanctions Enforcement Support Team 
would be located in the States neighbouring Afghanistan and would consist of up to fifteen 
members with expertise in areas such as customs, border security and counter-terrorism: 
S/RES/1363 (30 July 2001), operative paragraph 4(b). The Sanctions Enforcement Support Team 
would report at least once a month to the Monitoring Group, and the Monitoring Group would 
report to the 1267 Committee: S/RES/1363 (30 July 2001), operative paragraph 5. 
114 S/RES/1390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraphs 9, 10; SIRES/1455 (17 January 2003), 
operative paragraphs 8, 12, 13. 
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Team ("the 1526 Monitoring Team')." 5 The Sanctions Enforcement Support Team was 
never actually deployed, however, due to the complex situation that developed on the 
ground in Afghanistan after 11 September 2001. 
As part of its reporting responsibilities, the Monitoring Group submitted six 
reports. 116 As the reports have all been issued subsequent to the overthrow of the Taliban in 
late-2001, they address a situation that had changed substantially since the initial application 
of sanctions. The reports contain detailed accounts of the activities of the Monitoring Group 
during the reporting periods, as well as observations and recommendations for improving the 
implementation of the sanctions. 
In the report circulated by the Monitoring Group in January 2002, the Group's 
major recommendations were: (a) That the arms embargo be maintained against the Taliban, 
Al Qaida and their sympathizers and that consideration be given to an arms embargo upon 
the whole of Afghanistan; " 7 (b) That the financial sanctions against individuals and entities 
associated with the Taliban, Al Qaida and Usama Bin Laden be maintained and monitored 
for full compliance; 118 (c) That an effective border control service be implemented by the 
Afghan authorities as a matter of priority; " 9 (d) That the Sanctions Enforcement Support 
115 	For discussion of the 1526 Monitoring Team, see below. 
116 	S/2002165 (15 January 2002), annex: First Report of the Monitoring Group on Afghanistan 
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1363 (2001); S/2002/541 (15 May 2002), 
enclosure: Report of the Monitoring Group pursuant to Resolution 1390 (2002); S/2002/1050 
(17 December 2002), enclosure: Second report of the Monitoring Group Pursuant to 
Resolution 1390 (2002); S1200211338 (17 December 2002), enclosure: Third report of the 
Monitoring Group Pursuant to Resolution 1390 (2002); S/2003/669 (8 July 2003), enclosure: 
Report of the Monitoring Group established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1363 
(2001) and extended by resolutions 1390 (2002) and 1455 (2003); S/2003/1070 (2 December 
2003), enclosure: Second Report of the Monitoring Group established pursuant to Security 
Council resolution 1363 (2001) and extended by resolutions 1390 (2002) and 1455 (2003). 
117 	First Report of the Monitoring Group on Afghanistan, ibid, paragraphs 46-47. 
118 
 
[bid, paragraph 53. 
119 	Ibid, paragraph 49. 
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Teams, which had not been deployed due to the complex situation on the ground 
subsequent to September 11 2001, should be maintained, but that their name should be 
changed to Monitoring and Advisory Teams and that experts with skills and expertise in 
financial investigations should be added to those teams; u° (e) That there be international 
verification of the closure of drug production facilities and terrorist training camps and 
facilities in Afghanistan. 121 Many of these recommendations were taken up and acted upon 
by the Security Council in resolution 1390 (2002). 
In its reports issued pursuant to resolutions 1390 (2002) and 1455 (2003), the 
Monitoring Group has arranged its recommendations into five groups: i) Recommendations 
for improving the operation of the consolidated list; Recommendations for improving the 
implementation of the financial sanctions; Recommendations for improving the 
implementation of the arms sanctions; iv) Recommendations for improving the 
implementation of the travel sanctions; and v) Recommendations for increasing the number 
of reports received from States on measures taken to implement the sanctions. 
i. Recommendations for improving the operation of the consolidated list 
Among its suggestions on improving the operation of the consolidated list, the 
Monitoring Group has recommended: (a) That the list of individuals and entities associated 
with the Taliban, Al Qaida and Bin Laden should contain the minimum criteria needed to 
enhance implementation. It should therefore contain names according to their "correct 
cultural construction" so that they can be recognized by implementing authorities, it should 
contain as many "identifiers" as possible, to avoid potential cases of mistaken identity, it 
120 	Ibid, paragraphs 50, 54. 
121 	Ibid, paragraphs 51, 55. 
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should be produced in all of the official languages of the United Nations, and it should be 
disseminated as widely as possible to ensure implementation; 122 (b) That the United Nations 
consolidated list should be used by all States as an authoritative reference for the 
implementation of sanctions against the Taliban, Al Qaida and Usama Bin Laden and their 
associates; (c) That the list be updated regularly, that States submit to the 1267 Committee 
for possible addition to the list the names and identifying information of all persons believed 
to be members of or associated with Al Qaida or the Taliban; (d) That States assist the 
1267 Committee in better identifying individuals or entities already on the list, providing 
confirmation of details such as date and place of birth, passport numbers for all known 
nationalities and physical description; (e) That the 1267 Committee establish a mechanism 
capable of responding immediately to inquiries concerning the identification of persons being 
detained as suspected members or associates of Al Qaida or the Taliban; 123 (f) That the list 
be issued in a revised format; that all individuals known to have attended Al Qaida training 
camps must be considered suspected terrorists and their names should be submitted for 
designation on the liSt; 124 and (g) That States keep the list up to date. 125 
ii. Recommendations for improving implementation of the financial sanctions 
Among its suggestions for improving the implementation of the financial sanctions, 
the Monitoring Group has recommended: (a) That States should become parties to the 
122 	Report of the Monitoring Group pursuant to Resolution 1390 (2002), above note 116, 
paragraphs 68-73; Report of the Monitoring Group Pursuant to resolution 1455 (2003), 
above note 116, paragraph 164. 
123 	Second report of the Monitoring Group Pursuant to Resolution 1390 (2002), above note 116, 
paragraphs 126-133. 
124 	Third report of the Monitoring Group Pursuant to Resolution 1390 (2002), above note 116, 
paragraphs 95-98; Report of the Monitoring Group Pursuant to resolution 1455 (2003), 
above note 116, paragraph 165. 
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International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism; 126 (b) That 
States involved in the trade of rough diamonds should participate in the Kimberley 
Process; 127 (c) That States should assist each other as much as possible in the investigation 
and sharing of intelligence concerning individuals believed to be members or associates of Al 
Qaida or the Taliban, in order to ensure that the application and maintenance of financial 
sanctions is justified; (d) That bank secrecy rules should not be an obstacle to the provision 
to the Monitoring Group of information requested by it concerning individuals and entities 
alleged to have links to Al Qaida; (e) That the 1267 Committee establish procedures 
regarding the possible granting of humanitarian exceptions to the sanctions; (f) That States 
should review their laws and procedures regarding oversight of charities, in order to ensure 
that they are not used to funnel funds to individuals and entities associated with Al Qaida and 
the Taliban; (g) That banking institutions submit to appropriate national authorities reports on 
suspicious transactions; (h) That an international organization be granted responsibility for 
working with States to ensure that hawala and other alternative systems for the transfer of 
money are not exploited or misused by terrorists; 128 (i) That assets belonging to individuals 
and entities on the list should not be released without prior approval from the 1267 
Committee; and (j) That Member States should be encouraged to introduce mechanisms to 
125 	Report of the Monitoring Group Pursuant to resolution 1455 (2003), above note 116, 
paragraph 166. 
126 Report of the Monitoring Group pursuant to Resolution 1390 (2002), above note 116, 
paragraph 74; Report of the Monitoring Group Pursuant to resolution 1455 (2003), above 
note 116, paragraph 167. 
127 Report of the Monitoring Group pursuant to Resolution 1390 (2002), above note 116, 
paragraph 75. 
128 Second report of the Monitoring Group Pursuant to Resolution 1390 (2002), above note 116, 
paragraphs 134-143. 
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enable electronic transfers, particularly international ones, to be monitored for suspicious 
activity. 129 
iii. Recommendations for improving implementation of the arms sanctions 
Among its suggestions for improving the implementation of the arms sanctions, the 
Monitoring Group has recommended: (a) That arms-producing States should become 
members of the Wassenaar Arrangement, work towards the standardization of "end-use?' 
certificates, and register and license all nationals operating as arms brokers or dealers; 13° (b) 
That States should take steps to require the registration of all arms brokers dealing from 
their territories, to criminali7e the operation of non-registered arms brokers, and to ensure 
the strict use of end-user certificates in any transactions involving the provision of arms and 
related materie1; 131  (c) That all Member States should be encouraged to become party to 
the 1991 Montreal Convention and the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression 
of Terrorist Bombings; (d) That Member States be encouraged to participate in the 
Container Security Initiative; and (e) Member States should be encouraged to adopt the 
recommendations made by the Secretary-General in his report dated 20 September 2002 
on small arms.'" 
iv. Recommendations for improving implementation of the travel sanctions 
129 Third report of the Monitoring Group Pursuant to Resolution 1390 (2002), above note 116, 
paragraphs 99-102. 
130 	Report of the Monitoring Group pursuant to Resolution 1390 (2002), above note 116, 
paragraphs 76-78. 
131 Second report of the Monitoring Group Pursuant to Resolution 1390 (2002), above note 116, 
paragraphs 146-151. 
132 	Third report of the Monitoring Group Pursuant to Resolution 1390 (2002), above note 116, 
paragraphs 105-107. For the report of the Secretary-General on small arms, see: S/2002/1053 (20 
September 2002): Report of the Secretary-General on small arms. 
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Among its suggestions on improving the implementation of the travel sanctions, the 
Monitoring Group has recommended: (a) That States should ensure that their border control 
officials are given adequate resources, training and technology to improve their ability to 
detect falsified documents; and (b) That the 1267 Committee issue guidelines to States on 
action to be taken in the event that a designated individual attempts to enter or transit their 
territory; 133 (c) That the 1267 Committee consider all individuals on the consolidated list to 
be actual or suspected Al Qaida terrorists, so that Member States can detain, prosecute or 
extradite them to another country that has issued a warrant or return them for detention in 
their country of origin; and (d) That Member States ensure that they put in place appropriate 
measures to comply fully with the travel sanctions. 134 
v. Recommendation for increasing the number of reports from States 
On the subject of increasing the number of reports received from States on 
measures taken to implement the sanctions, the Monitoring Group has recommended that 
the 1267 Committee encourage those States which had not yet complied with their 
obligation to submit such reports to do so. 135 
133 Second report of the Monitoring Group Pursuant to Resolution 1390 (2002), above note 116, 
paragraphs 144-145. 
134 Third report of the Monitoring Group Pursuant to Resolution 1390 (2002), above note 116, 
paragraphs 103-104. 
135 Second report of the Monitoring Group Pursuant to Resolution 1390 (2002), above note 116, 
paragraphs 152-153; Report of the Monitoring Group Pursuant to resolution 1455 (2003), 
above note 116, paragraph 163. 
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16.4.6 The Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team ("the 1526 
Monitoring Team") 
In January 2004, the Council decided to establish for a period of eighteen months an 
Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team. 136 The mandate of "the 1526 
Monitoring Team", which would comprise up to eight experts, included: (a) submitting 
written reports to the 1267 Committee on the implementation of the Taliban/A1 Qaida 
sanctions, including concrete recommendations; 137 (b) analysing reports submitted by States 
pursuant to resolution 1455 (2003); 138 (c) facilitating areas of convergence between the 
1267 Committee and the Counter-Terrorism Committee; 139 (d) reporting to the 1267 
Committee on a regular basis; 14° and (e) assisting the 1267 Committee in preparing its oral 
and written reports to the Counci1. 141 The 1526 Monitoring Team was due to submit its first 
report in July 2004. 
16.5 Notable aspects of the Taliban/AI Qaida sanctions regime 
Among the more notable aspects of the Afghanistan/Taliban/A1 Qaida sanctions 
regime are the manner in which the sanctions are no longer linked to a particular geographic 
territory, the use of a time limit for one period of the regime, and the incorporation into the 
sanctions regime of consideration of the humanitarian implications of the sanctions. Perhaps 
the most notable aspect of the Afghanistan/Taliban/A1 Qaida sanctions regime is the manner 
in which its initial geographic target, of entities and individuals operating within the territory of 
136 	SIRES/1526 (30 January 2004), operative paragraph 6. 
137 	S/RES/I 526 (30 January 2004), operative paragraph 7. 
138 	S/RES/I 526 (30 January 2004), Annex. 
139 	Ibid. 
140 	Ibid. 
141 	Ibid. 
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Afghanistan, expanded to incorporate entities wherever they were, without the necessity of 
any connection with the territory of Afghanistan. 142 Although the imposition of other sanction 
regimes — indeed of most sanctions regimes - had carried consequences beyond the 
geographical territory of the target, 143 never before had the Council imposed a sanctions 
regime without there being some nexus to a geographical centre for the activities of a 
targeted entity. 
The employment of both a time-delay and a time-limit was also a notable 
development it the Council's sanctioning practice. In respect of time-delays, the Council 
provided for a one-month time-delay in respect of the initial sanctions against the Taliban 
and in respect of the first set of modified sanctions against the Taliban, Usama Bin Laden 
and m  Qaida.144 In respect of the time-limit, the Council followed the precedents 
established in the sanctions regimes against Ethiopia and Eritrea and Siena Leone by 
deciding in December 2000 that the additional measures against the Taliban would terminate 
after twelve months, unless it (the Council) were to decide otherwise." 5 In its subsequent 
142 	Even before the Security Council dropped the geographical nexus Afghanistan, the question of 
the territory to which the sanctions applied had been difficult to determine at a given time, as 
the territories controlled by the Taliban changed so rapidly and continually: see S/2001/1226 
(20 December 2001): Letter dated 14 December 2001 from the Chairman of the Security 
Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Afghanistan 
addressed to the President of the Security Council. This issue has also arisen, however, in 
respect of other sanctions regimes targeting non-State actors, such as the UNITA, Rwanda 
and Sierra Leone sanctions regimes. 
143 	There are many examples of this, such as the freezing of overseas assets belonging to targets 
such as Iraq, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro) and UNITA. 
144 	S/RES/1267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraph 3 (providing that the initial sanctions would 
enter into force on 14 November 1999); S/RES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 22 
(providing that the modified sanctions would enter into force one month later). In subsequent 
modifications to the sanctions regime, however, the Council provided that the additional 
sanctions were to ome into effect immediately. See, e.g., SIRES/1390 (16 January 2002), 
operative paragraphs 1, 2. 
145 	SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 23. 
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resolutions, however, the Council did not incorporate such time-limits." 6 Moreover, in 
resolutions 1390 (2002) and 1455 (2003), the Council failed to articulate explicit objectives 
for the sanctions, thus making it unclear what conditions would need to be fulfilled by those 
targeted before the sanctions would be terminated. 
From the time it initiated the Afghanistan/Taliban/A1 Qaida sanctions regime, the 
Security Council has been mindful of the humanitarian implications of the sanctions. The 
Council included as one of the 1267 Committee's initial responsibilities the task of reporting 
on the humanitarian implications of the sanctions.' 47 In its presidential statement of 7 April 
2000, the Council underlined that sanctions were not aimed at the Afghan people, reaffirmed 
its decision to assess the humanitarian impact of the sanctions, and encouraged the 1267 
Committee to report in that respect as soon as possible." 8 In resolution 1333 (2000), the 
Council took a number of steps to ensure that the issue of the humanitarian impact of the 
sanctions was being addressed adequately. Thus, the Council reaffirmed the necessity for 
sanctions to contain adequate and effective exemptions to avoid adverse humanitarian 
consequences on the people of Afghanistan, and for them to be structured in a way that 
would not impede the provision of international humanitarian assistance." 9 The Council also 
requested the Secretary-General to report on the humanitarian implications of the 
146 	See, e.g., SIRES/1390 (16 January 2002), operative paragraph 3; SIRES/1455 (17 January 2003), 
operative paragraphs 1, 2. 
147 	S/RES/1267 (15 October 1999), operative paragraph 6(c). The 1267 Committee in fact included a 
section on the humanitarian implications of the sanctions in its annual reports for 2001 and 
2002: see, e.g., S/2002/101, paragraphs 28-31; S/2002/1423, paragraph 41. 
148 	S/PRST/2000/12 (7 April 2000). For the Committee's action on this question, see note 147, ibid. 
149 	SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), preambular paragraph 16. 
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sanctions, 15° and it noted that, in considering the imposition of additional measures to 
achieve the goals of the sanctions regime, it would take into account the Secretary-General's 
impact assessment with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of the sanctions and avoiding 
humanitarian consequences.' 5 
With the adoption of resolution 1390 (2002), however, the consideration of 
humanitarian implications of the sanctions appeared to have become less of a priority, 
however, s the Council did not incorporate a request for reporting on the humanitarian 
implications of sanctions in either resolution 1390 (2002) or resolution 1455 (2003). It is 
noteworthy, however, that both the 1267 Committee and the Monitoring Group have 
recently reported on humanitarian complications arising from the application of the 
sanctions. 152 As a result of these concerns, the Council adopted resolution 1452 (2003), by 
150 	S/RES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph I5(d). For further details relating to this, 
see the section above on the responsibilities of the Secretary-General under the sanctions 
regime. 
151 	SIRES/1333 (19 December 2000), operative paragraph 25. 
152 	See, e.g., S12002/1050, paragraph 42 [noting that legal challenges were being made by 
individuals on the list, arguing that they should be granted access to frozen funds necessary 
for subsistence], paragraph 136 [recommending that the 1267 Committee should establish 
procedures regarding the possible granting of humanitarian exceptions to the financial 
sanctions]. 
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which it provided for the possibility of exemptions from the financial sanctions for "basic" or 
"extraordinary" expenses.' 53 
153 
	
SIRES/1452 (20 December 2002), operative paragraph 1. 
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17. The Ethiopia and Eritrea sanctions regime 
The Security Council imposed sanctions against both Ethiopia and Eritrea in May 
2000, in an attempt to induce them to cease hostilities and engage in a meaningful peace 
process. The sanctions, which were imposed for an initial period of twelve months, 
consisted of an arms embargo. The sanctions terminated at the end of the twelve-month 
period, when the Council decided not to renew the regime. 
17.1 The constitutional basis for imposing sanctions against 
Ethiopia and Eritrea 
In late-January 1999, the Security Council expressed grave concern at escalating 
arms build-up that was occurring on both sides of the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia.' 
At the time, the Council also expressed its strong support for the mediation efforts that had 
been undertaken by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and in particular for the 
Framework Agreement which had been approved by the OAU's Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management, and Resolution in December 1998. 2 Two weeks later, after 
conflict broke out between the two countries, the Security Council stressed that the situation 
constituted a threat to peace and security3 and demanded an immediate halt to hostilities. 4 
The Council also urged all States to end sales of arms to both Ethiopia and Eritrea. 5 
SIRES/1226 (29 January 1999), preambular paragraph 2. 
S/RES/1226 (29 January 1999), operative paragraph 1. For the text of the Framework Agreement, 
see: S/I 998/1223 (28 December 1998), Letter dated 24 December 1998 from the representative 
of Ethiopia addressed to the President of the Security Council, annex. 
SIRES/1227 (10 February 1999), preambular paragraph 4. 
SIRES/1227 (10 February 1999), operative paragraph 2. 
SIRES/1227 (10 February 1999), operative paragraph 7. 
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In May 2000, after a fresh outbreak of hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the 
Council adopted resolution 1297 (2000), in which it noted that it was deeply disturbed by 
the renewed Instilities,6 and stressed that the situation constituted a threat to peace and 
security.' The Council demanded that both parties immediately cease all military actions and 
refrain from the further use of force. 8 It further demanded that the parties resume substantive 
peace talks, under OAU auspices, on the basis of documents which had served as the basis 
for earlier negofiations.9 The Council also warned that, if the hostilities did not cease, it 
would meet again in 72 hours to take steps to ensure that the parties complied with its 
demands.' ° 
Five days later, as hostilities were continuing, the Council adopted resolution 1298 
(2000), imposing sanctions against both Ethiopia and Eritrea. In that resolution, the Council 
determined that the situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea constituted a threat to regional 
peace and security" and, acting under Chapter V11,12 imposed an arms embargo against 
both Eritrea and Ethiopia." The Council also invoked Chapter VII of the Charter in a 
subsequent resolution related to the sanctions regime. 14 
6 	SIRES/1297 (12 May 2000), operative paragraph 2. 
7 	SIRES/1297 (12 May 2000), preambular paragraph 9. 
S/RES/1297 (12 May 2000), operative paragraph. 
9 	S/RES/1297 (12 May 2000), operative paragraph. 
io 	S/RES/1297 (12 May 2000), operative paragraph. 
S/RES/1298 (17 May 2000), preambular paragraph 13. 
12 	SIRES/1298 (17 May 2000), preambular paragraph 14. 
13 	S/RES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 6. 
14 	S/RES/1320 (15 September 2000), operative paragraph 10. 
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17.2 The objective(s) of the Ethiopia/Eritrea sanctions regime 
The overall objective of the sanctions against Ethiopia and Eritrea was to bring 
about a peaceful, definitive settlement to the conflict between the two countries. 15 The 
specific objectives of the Ethiopia/Eritrea sanctions regime were: that both parties cease 
military action immediately and refrain from the further use of force; 16 that the parties 
withdraw their forces from military engagement and take no action that would aggravate 
tensions;" and that the parties reconvene substantive talks aimed at achieving a definitive 
peaceful settlement of the conflict. 18 
18 
 
17.3 The scope of the Ethiopia/Eritrea sanctions regime 
The Ethiopia/Eritrea sanctions consisted of an arms embargo against the territories 
of both those countries. More specifically, the Council required all States to prevent (a) the 
sale or supply to Eritrea and Ethiopia of arms and related materie1; 19 and (b) the provision 
to Eritrea and Ethiopia of technical assistance or training related to the provision, 
manufacture, maintenance or use of arms and related materie1. 20 Although the Council 
outlined a number of exemptions from the arms embargo,2 ' the scope of the measures 
applied remained unchanged for the duration of the sanctions regime. 
is 	S/RES11298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 17. 
16 	S/RES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 2. 
17 	S/RES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 3. 
SIRES/I298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 4. The Security Council stipulated that such 
talks should be carried out under OAU auspices, on the basis of the "Framework Agreement" 
and other arrangements suggested by the OAU as recorded in a Communiqué issued by the 
OAU current Chairman on 5 May 2000: S/2000/394, 
19 	S/RES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 6(a). 
20 	SIRES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 6(b). 
21 	See, e.g., S/RES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 7 [exempting from the sanctions 
regime supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian use, as 
approved in advance by the Committee]; S/RES/1312 (31 July 2000), operative paragraph 5 
[exempting from the sanctions regime equipment and related materiel for the use of the United 
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17.4 The administration, monitoring and enforcement of the 
Ethiopia/Eritrea sanctions regime 
In order to facilitate the administration, implementation and enforcement of the 
sanctions against Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Security Council bestowed responsibilities upon 
both the Secretary-General and a Sanctions Committee. 
17.4.1 The Secretary-General 
When the Council established the sanctions regime, it requested the Secretary- 
General to undertake the following tasks: (a) To provide the necessary assistance to the 
Ethiopia and Eritrea Sanctions Committee; 22 (b) To receive reports by States on steps taken 
to implement the sanctions;23 (c) To report to the Council within fifteen days, and then every 
sixty days from the establishment of the sanctions regime, on the steps taken by Ethiopia and 
Eritrea to comply with the objectives of the sanctions regime; 24 and (d) To report to the 
Council in the event that there were a peaceful, definitive settlement of the conflict, in which 
case the sanctions would be terminated.25 
Nations Mine Action Service, as well as the provision of related technical assistance and 
training by that Service]; S/RES/1320 (15 September 2000), operative paragraph 10 [exempting 
from the sanctions regime arms and related materiel for the sole use in Ethiopia or Eritrea of the 
United Nations, as well as equipment and related materiel, including technical assistance and 
training, for use solely for demining within Ethiopia or Eritrea under the auspices of the United 
Nations Mine Action Service]. 
22 	S/RES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 10. 
23 SIRES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 11. Although the Secretary-General received 
these reports, it was the 1298 Committee that submitted a report to the Council listing the 
reports received from States: see S/2001/39 (12 January 2001), annex: Report of the Security 
Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1298 (2000) [containing a report 
pursuant to paragraph 11 of resolution 1298 (2000), listing the reports it had received from 
States detailing the measures they had taken to implement the sanctions]. 
24 	S/RES/I298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 15. 
25 	S/RES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 17. 
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17.4.2 The Ethiopia and Eritrea Sanctions Committee 
When the Security Council initiated the Ethiopia and Eritrea sanctions regime, it also 
established, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Sanctions 
Committee.26 The Committee (the "1298 Committee" or the "Ethiopia/Eritrea Committee") 
was to report to the Council on its work and with its observations and recommendations, 
and regional organization undertake the following responsibilities: (a) Seeking from all States 
information regarding the action they had taken to implement the sanctions;27 
(b) Considering information brought to its attention by States concerning sanctions violations 
and recommending appropriate measures in response thereto; 28 (c) Making periodic reports 
to the Security Council on information submitted to it regarding alleged violations of the 
sanctions, identifying where possible persons or entities, including vessels and aircraft, 
reported to be engaged in such violations; 29 (d) Promulgating guidelines to facilitate the 
implementation of the sanctions;" (e) Deciding upon requests for exemptions from the 
sanctions; 3 1 (f) Examining the reports submitted by States to both it and the Secretary-
Genera1; 32 and (g) Making relevant information publicly available, including through 
information technology. 33 
26 	SIRES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 8. 
27 
 
SIRES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 8(a). 
28 	SIRES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 8(b) 
29 	S/RES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 8(c). 
30 	SIRES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 8(d). 
31 
 
SIRES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 8(e). 
32 	S/RES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 8(f). 
33 	S/RES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 13. 
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In the course of its activities, the Ethiopia/Eritrea committee issued two annual 
reports,34 and one report listing the reports received from States on steps taken to 
implement the sanctions. 35 The main observation the Committee made was that, as it did not 
have any specific monitoring mechanism to ensure the effective implementation of the arms 
embargo, it relied solely on the cooperation of States and organizations in a position to 
provide pertinent information and it was therefore constrained in the discharge of its 
mandate.36 
17.4.3 States 
When the Council established the Ethiopia and Eritrea sanctions regime, it called 
upon all States to act strictly in conformity with the sanctions, notwithstanding the existence 
of any conflicting legal rights or obligations.37 It also requested States to report to the 
Secretary-General on steps taken to give effect to the sanctions," and to report information 
on possible violations of the sanctions. 39 
S/200011259 (29 December 2000), annex: Report of the Security Council Committee established 
pursuant to resolution 1298 (2000) [hereafter "First report of the 1298 Committee", 
containing a report on the activities of the Committee from May-December 2000]; S/20011503 
(18 May 2001), annex: Report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to 
resolution 1298 (2000) [hereafter "Final report of the 1298 Committee", containing a report 
on the activities of the Committee from 1 January to 16 May 2001, when the Committee was 
dissolved]. 
35 S/2001139 (12 January 2001): Letter dated 29 December 2000 from the Chairman of the 
Security Council Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1298 
(2000) concerning the situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea addressed to the President of 
the Security Council [Report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to 
resolution 1298 (2000), containing a report pursuant to paragraph 11 of resolution 1298 
(2000), listing the reports received from States on measures taken to implement the sanctions]. 
36 See First report of the 1298 Committee, above note 34, paragraph 7; Final report of the 1298 
Committee, above note 34, paragraph 8. 
37 
 
SIRES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 9. 
38 	S/RES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 11. 
39 	S/RES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 12. 
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17.4.4 International and regional organizations 
When the Council established the Ethiopia and Eritrea sanctions regime, it requested 
the Chairman of the OAU to consider dispatching urgently his Personal Envoy to the region 
to seek immediate cessation of hostilities.° At the same time, the Council also called upon 
international and regional organizations to act strictly in conformity with the sanctions, 
notwithstanding the existence of any conflicting legal rights or obligations.4 ' 
17.5 Termination of the Ethiopia/Eritrea sanctions regime 
When the Council initiated the sanctions regime against Ethiopia/Eritrea, it decided 
that the sanctions would be imposed for an initial period of twelve months. 42 At the end of 
that period, the Council would decide whether to extend the sanctions, based on an 
assessment of whether the Governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea had complied with the 
objectives of the sanctions regime. 43 On 15 May 2001, the Council adopted a presidential 
statement, confirming that the sanctions regime would indeed expire the following yda .44 In 
that statement, the Council emphasized the importance of the Algiers Peace Agreement, 
which the parties had signed on 12 December 2000, 45 recognised that the signing of the 
Algiers Agreement was consistent with the objectives of the Ethiopia/Eritrea sanctions 
regime, and stated that, under the existing circumstances, it had not extended the sanctions 
beyond the expiration date of 16 May 2001. The Council urged the parties, however, to 
40 
	
S/RES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 5. 
41 
	
SIRES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 9. 
42 
	
S/RES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 16. 
43 
	
Ibid. 
44 
	
S/PRST/2001/14 (15 May 2001). 
45 
	
S/2000/1183 (13 December 2000), Identical letters dated 12 December 2000 from the 
representative of Algeria addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the 
Security Council, annex. 
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focus their efforts on reconstruction, development and reconciliation rather than on weapons 
procurement and other military activities, and expressed the intention take appropriate 
measures if the situation between Eritrea and Ethiopia again threatened regional peace and 
security. 
17.6 Notable aspects of the Ethiopia/Eritrea sanctions regime 
The Ethiopia and Eritrea sanctions regime was notable largely because it became the 
regime of the shortest duration yet imposed by the Security Council — twelve months. It also 
provided the first instance of the Council establishing a concrete time-limit for a sanctions 
regime, and it remains the only occasion on which a time-bound sanctions regime has not 
been extended.46 Finally, the Ethiopia and Eritrea sanctions regime was the first U.N. 
sanctions regime to be imposed against multiple State targets. 47 
46 SIRES/1298 (17 May 2000), operative paragraph 16 (deciding that the sanctions were 
established for twelve months and that the Council would decide at the end of that period 
whether Ethiopia and Eritrea had complied with the objectives of the sanctions regime and thus 
whether to extend the sanctions). The Council has also experimented with time-limits in its 
oversight of the Sierra Leone, Afghanistan/Taliban/A1 Qaida, and Liberia/1343 sanctions 
regimes. For further discussion of the manner in which the Council has employed time-limits, 
see Chapter 8, section 8.3.2. 
47 	Although the former Yugoslavia sanctions regime was ultimately implemented against more 
than one State, at the time of its establishment it was levelled against a single target — 
Yugoslavia. 
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18. The second Liberia sanctions regime ("Liberia II") 
In March 2001, in the same resolution by which it terminated the sanctions regime 
imposed against Liberia in 1992 and dissolved the 985/Liberia Sanctions Committee, the 
Security Council took the unusual step of imposing a new sanctions regime against Liberia.' 
The main objective of the new sanctions regime was to halt the Liberian Government's 
support of armed rebel groups in neighbouring countries, and in particular of the Sierra 
Leonean rebel group the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). With the improvement of the 
situation in Sierra Leone, the focus of the sanctions turned to Liberia's continuing support for 
rebel groups in other neighbouring countries, including Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire. The 
sanctions regime initially consisted of a blend of targeted sanctions, including arms, diamond 
and travel sanctions. In May 2003 the Council expanded the sanctions regime slightly, 
adding sanctions against Liberian exports of timber and timber products and applying further 
travel sanctions. In December 2003 the Security Council terminated the Liberia II sanctions 
regime, replacing it with a third Liberian sanctions regime. 2 
18.1 The constitutional basis for imposing a new sanctions regime 
against Liberia 
When the Security Council established the second sanctions regime against Liberia, 
it expressed deep concern at the evidence presented by the Panel of Experts on Sierra 
Leone that the Government of Liberia was actively supporting the Sierra Leonean rebel 
group the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), including by participating in the trade of 
1 	 For details relating to the earlier sanctions regime against Liberia, see Appendix 8, above. 
For details regarding the Liberia III sanctions regime, see Appendix 20, below. 
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diamonds, which represented a major source of income for the RUF. 3 It then determined 
that the active support provided by the Liberian Government for armed rebel groups in 
neighbouring countries, and in particular for the RUF in Sierra Leone, constituted a threat to 
international peace and security. 4 It then noted that it was acting under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations before imposing sanctions. 5 
In May 2002, when the Council extended the sanctions, it determined that the active 
support provided by the Liberian Government for armed rebel groups in the region, 
including the RUF, constituted a threat to international peace and security, 6 and noted that it 
was acting under Chapter VII of the Charter.' In May 2003, when the Council again 
extended the initial sanctions and introduced additional timber and travel sanctions, it 
determined that the active support provided by the Liberian Government for armed rebel 
groups in the region, including to rebels in COte d'Ivoire and former RUF combatants who 
continued to destabilize the region, constituted a threat to international peace and security,8 
and noted that it was acting under Chapter VII of the Charter. 9 
3 	S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), preambular paragraph 4. For discussion of the report of the Panel 
of Experts on Sierra Leone, see section 14.4, above. For the report itself, see: S/2000/1195 (20 
December 3)00), enclosure: Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security 
Council resolution 1306 (2000), paragraph 19, in relation to Sierra Leone. On a number of 
previous occasions the Council had expressed grave concern at reports that support was being 
provided to rebel groups in Sierra Leone: see, e.g., S/PRST/1999/1: Presidential statement dated 
7 January 1999; SIRES/l231 (11 March 1999), operative paragraph 5. 
4 	S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), preambular paragraph 8. 
5 	SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), preambular paragraph 9. 
6 	SIRES/1408 (6 May 2002), preambular paragraph 11. 
7 	SIRES/1408 (6 May 2002), preambular paragraph 12. 
8 	SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), preambular paragraph 13. 
9 	S/RES/1478 (6 May 2003), preambular paragraph 14. 
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18.2 The objective of the Liberia II sanctions regime 
The major objective of the 1343 Liberia sanctions regime was to ensure that the 
Liberian Government stopped providing support for the RUF in Sierra Leone and other 
armed rebel groups in the region. In order to achieve that overall goal, the Council 
demanded that the Liberian Government take the following concrete steps: (a) Expel all 
RUF members from Liberia and prohibit all RUF activities on its territory, 10 (b) Cease all 
financial and military support to the RUF and take steps to ensure that no such support was 
provided from Liberia or by Liberian nationals;" (c) Cease all import of Sierra Leone rough 
diamonds controlled through the Certificate of Origin regime of the Government of Sierra 
Leone, in accordance with resolution 1306 (2000); 12 (d) Freeze funds or financial resources 
or assets that were made available by its nationals or within its territory for the benefit of the 
RUF or entities owned or controlled by the RUF;13 and (e) Ground all Liberia-registered 
aircraft operating within its jurisdiction until it updated its register of aircraft pursuant to 
Annex VII to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944 and provide 
the Council with updated information concerning the registration and ownership of each 
aircraft registered in Liberia. 14 The fact that those demands constituted the objectives of the 
1343 sanctions regime was reinforced by the manner in which the Council noted that the 
sanctions would be terminated won a decision by the Security Council that the Liberian 
Government had taken the concrete steps stipulated.15 
io 	SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 2(a). 
1i 	SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 2(b). 
12 	S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 2(c). 
13 
 
SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 2(d). 
14 	S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 2(e). 
15 	See, e.g., S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11. 
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In addition to outlining the above particular objectives of the 1343 Liberia sanctions 
regime, the Security Council also noted that the steps to be taken by the Liberian 
Government were intended to lead to progress in the peace process in Sierra Leone." It 
therefore called upon President Taylor of Liberia to help ensure that the RUF took the 
following steps: (a) Allow the United Nations Mission in Serra Leone (UNAMSIL) free 
access throughout Sierra Leone; (b) Release all abductees; (c) Enter their fighters in the 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process; and (d) Return all weapons and 
other equipment seized from UNAMSIL: 
In May 2002, when the Security Council extended the sanctions regime for a further 
period of twelve months, it noted that the Liberian Government had complied with the 
demand that it update its register of aircraft pursuant to Annex VII to the Chicago 
Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944 and that it provide the Council with 
updated information regarding the registration and ownership of aircraft registered in 
Liberia: 8 The Council decided, however, that Liberia had failed to comply with the other 
four key demands and thus extended the sanctions for a further twelve months: 9 The 
objectives of the sanctions therefore continued to be compliance with the remaining 
demands outlined in resolution 1343 (2001). 29 The Council also stressed that its demands 
were intended to lead to consolidation of the peace process in Sierra Leone and to further 
progress in the peace process in the Mano River Union as a whole.21 
16 	S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 3. 
17 	S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 3(a)-(d). 
18 	S/RES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 2. 
19 	SIRES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraphs 1, 5. 
20 	SIRES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraphs 1, 3, 5. 
21 	S/RES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 3. 
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In May 2003, when the Council again extended the initial sanctions and 
incorporated the additional timber and travel sanctions, it reaffirmed that the objective of the 
sanctions I 'mined achieving the compliance of the Liberian Government with the demands 
outlined in resolution 1343 (2001).22 It also stiessed again that the demands it was making 
of the Liberian Government were intended to consolidate peace and stability in Sierra Leone 
and to build and strengthen peaceful relations among the countries of the region. 23 
18.3 The scope of the Liberia II sanctions regime 
When the 1343 sanctions regime was established, it consisted of a mixture of 
sanctions against arms, diamonds and the travel of senior officials in the Liberian 
Government and armed forces, as well as of their spouses. Under the arms sanctions, all 
States were required to prevent the sale or supply to Liberia of arms and related materiel 
and equipment, as well as the provision to Liberia of training or assistance related to the 
provision, manufacture or use of arms and related materiel and equipment. 24 Under the 
diamond sanctions, all States were required to prevent the direct or indirect import of all 
rough diamonds from Liberia, whether or not those diamonds originated in Liberia. 25 Under 
the travel sanctions, States were required to prevent the entry into or transit through their 
territories of senior members of the Liberian Government and armed forces, as well as the 
22 	See, e.g., SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraphs 1, 3, 10, 12, 17. 
23 	SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 3. 
24 	S/RES/I343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraphs 5(a), 5(b). The Council did provide for some 
exemptions from these sanctions, however, for non-lethal military equipment intended solely 
for humanitarian or protective use, as approved by the 1343 Committee, and for protective 
clothing for the personal use of United Nations personnel, media representatives, and 
humanitarian and development workers: see SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraphs 
5(c), 5(d). 
25 	SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 6. The diamond sanctions were initially 
imposed for a period of twelve months, but they have since been extended for two additional 
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spouses of those individuals and any other individuals providing financial or military support 
to rebel groups in countries neighbouring Liberia, and in particular the RUF in Sierra 
Leone.26 
In May 2002, the Council foreshadowed a potential contraction in the scope of the 
sanctions, by deciding that rough diamonds controlled by the Liberian Government through 
an effective Certificate of Origin would be exempt from the sanctiorts. 27 In May 2003, the 
Council expanded the scope of the 1343 sanctions regime, adding timber sanctions and 
targeted travel sanctions. The timber sanctions required all States to prevent the import of all 
round logs and timber products originating in Liberia. 28 The travel sanctions required all 
periods of twelve months: see SIRES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 5; S/RES11478 (6 
May 2003), operative paragraph 10. 
26 	S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 7(a). The Council outlined certain exemptions 
from the travel restrictions, however, providing that they would not apply in the following 
circumstances: (a) where the application of the sanctions would require a State to deny entry to 
its own nationals [operative paragraph 7(a)]; (b) to representatives of the Liberian Government 
travelling on official business to United Nations headquarters or to official meetings of the 
Mano River Union, ECOWAS or the OAU [operative paragraph 7(a)]; and (c) when travel was 
justified on the grounds of humanitarian need or where it would promote Liberian compliance 
with the objectives of the sanctions regime or assist in the peaceful resolution of conflict in the 
subregion: [operative paragraph 7(b)]. 
27 	S/RES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraphs 8. The exemption would only become 
operative, however, once the 1343 Committee had reported to the Council that an effective and 
internationally verifiable Certificate of Origin regime was ready to become fully operational. At 
the time of writing the exemption has still not entered into force. In May 2003, however, the 
Council reaffirmed its decision that the exemption would come into effect once an effective and 
internationally verifiable Certificate of Origin regime was ready to become fully operational: 
SIRES/l478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 14. 
28 	S/RES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 17. A year earlier the Council had foreshadowed 
the potential for the logging industry to be sanctioned, by calling upon the Liberian 
Government to demonstrate, including through the establishment of transparent and 
internationally verifiable audit regimes, that the revenue derived from its shipping and timber 
industries was being used for legitimate social, humanitarian and development and not for 
purposes that violated the objectives of the sanctions regime: S/RES/1408 (6 May 2002), 
operative paragraph 10. Before it eventually applied the logging sanctions, the Council noted 
that it considered that the audits commissioned by the Liberian Government did not 
demonstrate that the revenue derived from the shipping and timber industries was being used 
for legitimate social, humanitarian and development purposes, nor that it was not being used in 
violation of the sanctions: S/RES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 16. This decision by 
the Council is interesting for two reasons. First, it suggests that if compliance with the 
objectives of the sanctions regime is not forthcoming from the Liberian Government, then the 
next area that is likely to be sanctioned is the shipping industry. Second, the Council's 
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States to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals determined by 
the 1343 Committee to be in violation of the arms sanctions imposed by paragraph 5 of 
resolution 1343 (2001). 29 In September 2004 the Council outlined an exemption from the 
arms sanctions, providing that they would not apply to arms and related materiel and 
technical training and assistance intended solely for support or use by the United Nations 
Mission in Liberia (UN4EL). 3° 
18.4 The administration, monitoring and enforcement of the 
Liberia H sanctions regime 
The Security Council bestowed responsibilities for the administration, 
implementation and enforcement of the 1343 Liberia sanctions regime upon a range of 
actors, including a sanctions committee, a Panel of Experts, and the Secretary-General. 
18.4.1 The 1343/Liberia II Committee 
The Security Council established the 1343 Liberia Sanctions Committee (the "1343 
Committee" or the "Liberia II Committee") in the same resolution which imposed the new 
sanctions regime against Liberia. 31 The 1343 Committee was eventually dissolved in 
December 2003, at the same time that the 1343 sanctions thgime was terminated. 32 
The mandate of the 1343 Committee 
As part of its initial mandate, the 1343 Committee was entrusted with the standard 
responsibilities usually assigned to sanctions committees, as well as some that were 
decision to apply sanctions on the basis that the Liberian Government had not demonstrated 
that its revenue was not being used to violate the sanctions might be interpreted to have 
followed a rationale of "guilty until proven innocent". 
29 	SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 28. 
30 	SIRES/1509 (19 September 2003), operative paragraph 12. 
31 
 
SIRES/l343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 14. 
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particular to its circumstances. Its tasks therefore included reporting to the Council on its 
work and with its observations and recommendations, and: (a) Seeking from all States 
information regarding the actions taken by them to implement the sanctions; 33 (b) Taking 
appropriate action on information concerning alleged violations of the sanctions, identifying 
where possible persons or entities reported to be engaged in such violations, and making 
periodic reports to the Cotmcil; 34 (c) Promulgating guidelines to facilitate the implementation 
of the sanctions;35 (d) Deciding upon requests for exemptions from the sanctions; 36 (e) 
Designating the individuals subject to the travel sanctions and updating that list regularly; 37 (f) 
Making relevant information, including the list of individuals subject to the travel sanctions, 
publicly available through appropriate media, including through the improved use of 
information technology; 38 (g) Making recommendations to the Council on increasing the 
effectiveness of the sanctions and on ways to limit any unintended effects of the sanctions on 
the Liberian population; 39 (h) Cooperating with other relevant Security Council Sanctions 
Committees, in particular the 1132/Sierra Leone Committee and the 864/Angola (UNITA) 
Committee;49 and (i) Establishing a list of RUF members present in Liberia, whom the 
Liberian Government was required to expel in accordance with the objectives of the 
sanctions regime.4' 
32 	S/RES/I521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraph 1. 
33 	SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 14(a). 
34 	S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 14(b). 
35 
 
SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph I4(c). 
36 	S/RES/I343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 14(d). 
37 
 
SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 14(e). 
38 	S/RES/I 343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 14(f). 
39 	S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 14(g). 
40 	S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 14(h). 
41 SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 14(i). 
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In May 2002, the Council modified the Committee's mandate marginally. It 
reaffirmed that the Committee's responsibilities continued to include all of the tasks outlined 
in resolution 1343 (2001) except for the maintenance of a list of RUF members who were 
present in Liberia and whom the Liberian Government was required to expe1. 42 It also 
requested that the Committee consider, and take appropriate action on, information brought 
to its attention concerning any alleged violations of the first sanctions regime imposed against 
Liberia, whilst that sanctions regime had been in force. 43 The Council's decision to ask the 
1343 Committee to assume responsibilities relating to the earlier sanctions regime raised 
interesting legal issues, as the Council was effectively asking the Committee to explore and 
act upon violations of a terminated sanctions regime, thus leading to the potential conclusion 
that it was effectively resurrecting that earlier regime. 
Activities of the 1343/Liberia Committee 
In the course of its activities, the 1343 Committee issued two annual reports:" As 
part of its activities in 2001, the Committee: established the lists requested by the Council of 
RUF members subject to expulsion from Liberia and of individuals subject to the travel 
sanctions;45 considered applications for exemptions from the travel sanctions; 46 considered 
42 	S/RES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 13. It is possible, however, that the Security 
Council's explicit reaffirmation of the Committee's tasks as those articulated in "paragraphs 14 
(a) to (h)" was an oversight. See, e.g., the Committee's annual report for 2002: S/2002/1394 (20 
December 2002), paragraph 5 [stating that in paragraph 13 of resolution 1408 (2002) the Security 
Council had requested it to continue with its mandate as set out in resolution 1343 (2001)]. 
43 S/RES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 14. 
44 	S/2002/83 (18 January 2002), annex: Report of the Security Council Committee established 
pursuant to resolution 1343 (2001) concerning Liberia, (hereafter "First report of the 1343 
Committee", containing a summary of the activities of the Committee from its establishment on 
7 March 2001 until 31 December 2001); S/2002/I394 (20 December 2002), annex: Report of the 
1343 Committee for 2002. 
45 First report of the 1343 Committee, ibid, paragraphs 5, 6. 
46 	Ibid, paragraph 8. 
771 
Appendix 18. The Liberia II sanctions regime 
requests from individuals seeking to have their names removed from the travel ban list; 47 and 
received 42 replies from States regarding actions taken by them to implement the 
sanctions.48 In addition, the Chairman of the Committee conducted a fact-finding mission to 
the region, visiting Mali, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Nigeria. 49 The purpose of the 
mission was to ascertain the probably impact of the sanctions, to reiterate to the Liberian 
Government the demands of the Security Council under resolution 1343 (2001) and to 
present that Government with the list of RUF members subject to expulsion. In its 
observations, the Committee noted that, in the absence of a specific monitoring mechanism 
to ensure the implementation of the 1343 sanctions regime, it was reliant upon States and 
organizations to come forward and provide it with pertinent information." 
As part of its activities in 2002, the Committee: considered applications for 
exemptions from the travel sanctions;" conducted four reviews of the list of those banned 
from trave1; 52 received 10 additional replies from States regarding actions taken to 
implement the sanctions;" addressed letters to States in pursuit of alleged violations of the 
sanctions;54 engaged in correspondence with the Liberian Government concerning its 
obligations to establish a Certificate of Origin Scheme for its diamond trade and to report to 
the Committee the results of a transparent and internationally verifiable audit of its shipping 
47 	Ibid, paragraphs 8, 9. 
48 	Ibid, paragraph 11. 
49 	'bid, paragraph 15. 
50 	Ibid, paragraph 19. 
51 	Report of the 1343 Committee for 2002, above note 44, paragraph 8. 
52 	Ibid, paragraph 9. 
53 	Ibid, paragraph 11. 
54 'bid, paragraphs 12-17. 
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and timber industies; 55 and participated in five joint informal meetings with two other 
sanctions committees — the 1132/Sierra Leone Committee and the 864/Angola (UNITA) 
Committee.56 As it had done in its annual report for 2001, the Committee again observed 
that that, in the absence of a specific monitoring mechanism to ensure the implementation of 
the 1343 sanctions regime, it was reliant upon States and organizations to come forward and 
provide it with pertinent information. 57 
18.4.2 The Secretary-General 
When the Security Council initiated the 1343 Liberia sanctions regime, it requested 
the Secretary-General to report to it on the following topics: (a) The extent to which the 
Liberian Government had complied with its obligations under the sanctions regime and 
progress made towards the achievement of the objectives relating to the cessation of 
support for RUF operations in Sierra Leone; 58 (b) A preliminary assessment of the potential 
economic, humanitarian and social impact on the Liberian population of possible follow-up 
action by the Council in relation to the recommendations to be made by the Panel of 
Experts;59 and (c) A report on the steps taken by the Liberian Government to improve its 
capacity in air traffic control and surveillance in accordance with the recommendations of the 
Panel of Experts and any advice which might be provided by the ICAO.° At the same time, 
55 	'bid, paragraph 19. 
56 	!bid, paragraph 20. 
57 	Ibid, paragraph 23. 
58 	S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 12. 
59 
 
SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 13(a). 
60 	SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 13(b). 
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the Council also requested the Secretary-General to establish, for a period of six months, a 
Panel of Experts to investigate the implementation of the 1343 Liberia sanctions regime. 61 
In February 2002, when the Council decided to re-establish the Panel of Experts on 
Liberia for a period of five weeks, it requested the Secretary-General to appoint no more 
than five experts to the Pane1. 62 In May 2002, when the Council extended the sanctions, it 
requested the Secretary-General to undertake the following tasks: (a) To report to it by 21 
October 2002, and thereafter at six-monthly intervals, on whether Liberia had complied with 
the requirements of the sanctions regime; 63  and (b) To establish, for a period of three 
months, a Panel of Experts consisting of no more than five members.' 
In January 2003, when the Security Council decided to re-establish the Panel of 
Experts for an additional period of three months, it again requested the Secretary-General to 
appoint no more than five experts to the Pane1. 65 In May 2003, when the Council expanded 
the scope of the sanctions regime to include logging sanctions and additional travel sanctions, 
it requested the Secretary-General to undertake the following additional tasks: (a) To submit 
to it by 7 August 2003 a report on the possible humanitarian or socio-economic impact of 
the logging sanctions; 66 (b) To submit to it by 21 October 2003 and at six-monthly intervals 
thereafter, a report on whether Liberia had complied with the requirements of the sanctions 
61 	S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 19. For details relating to the mandate and 
activities of the Panel of Experts on Liberia, see below. 
62 S/RES/1395 (27 February 2002), operative paragraph 5. For details relating to the re-
establishment and mandate of the Panel, see below. 
63 S/RES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 11. 
64 S/RES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 16. 
65 	S/RES/1458 (28 January 2003), operative paragraph 6. For details relating to the re- 
establishment and mandate of the Panel, see below. 
66 S/RES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 19. 
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regime;67 and (c) To establish, for a period of five months, a Panel of Experts consisting of 
up to six members to investigate the implementation of the sanctions, and to provide the 
necessary resources for the Panel's activities. 68 
18.4.3 States 
In addition to the steps States were obligated to take under the 1343 Liberia 
sanctions regime,69 they were also requested by the Security Council to take certain 
additional extra measures to improve the regime's implementation. The additional requests 
were sometimes been addressed to States in general and sometimes directed at States in the 
region or regional organizations such as ECO WAS. 
i. 	States in general 
In March 2001, when the Security Council initiated the sanctions regime, it directed 
a number of initiatives at States in general, by: (a) Calling upon States and relevant 
international organizations to offer assistance to diamond-exporting West African States 
seeking to establish Certificate of Origin schemes; 7° (b) Calling upon the international 
community to provide the necessary assistance to prevent the proliferation and illicit 
trafficking of light weapons in West Africa, and thus to facilitate the implementation of the 
ECOWAS moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Aims 
and Light Weapons in West Africa; 71 (c) Requesting all States to report to the 1343 
67 	SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 20. 
68 	S/RES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 25. 
69 	Those obligations are outlined in section 18.3, above. 
70 	SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 16. 
71 S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 17. 
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Committee on steps taken to implement the sanctions;72 (d) Calling upon States to take 
appropriate measures to ensure that individuals and companies in their jurisdiction acted in 
conformity with United Nations sanctions and to take the necessary judicial and 
administrative actions to end illegal activities by those individuals and companies; 73 
(e) Calling upon all States to act strictly in accordance with the sanctions notwithstanding the 
existence of any conflicting legal rights or obligations; 74 and (f) Urging all States to cooperate 
fully with the 1343 Committee and the Liberia Panel of Experts, including by supplying 
information on possible violations of the sanctions. 75 
In February 2002, when the Council re-established the Panel of Experts for a 
further period of five weeks, it requested all States to cooperate fully with the Pane1. 76 In 
May 2002, when the Council extended the sanctions regime, it directed additional initiatives 
at States in general, by: (a) Reiterating its call upon States and relevant international 
organizations to offer assistance to the Liberian Government and other diamond exporting 
counties in West Africa with their Certificate of Origin regimes; 77 (b) Requesting all States 
to report on measures taken to implement the sanctions; 78 (c) Calling upon States to take 
appropriate measures to ensure that individuals and companies in their jurisdiction acted in 
conformity with United Nations sanctions and to take the necessary judicial and 
administ ative actions to end illegal activities by those individuals and companies;79 
72 	SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 18. 
73 	SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 21. 
74 SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 22. 
75 S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 24. 
76 	SIRES/1395 (27 February 2002), operative paragraph 6. 
77 	S/RES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 9. 
78 	SIRES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 15. 
79 	S/RES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 18. 
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(d) Requesting all States, and in particular aims exporting countries, to exercise the highest 
degree of responsibility in weapons transactions to prevent the illegal diversion and re-
export of those weapons; 8° and (e) Urging all States to cooperate fully with the 1343 
Committee and the Liberia Panel of Experts." 
In January 2003, when the Council re-established the Panel of Experts for an 
additional period of three months, it urged all States to cooperate fully with the Pane1. 82 In 
May 2003, when the Council expanded the scope of the sanctions regime, it directed the 
additional initiatives at States in general, by: (a) Reiterating its call upon States and relevant 
international organizations to offer assistance to the Liberian Government and other diamond 
exporting counties in West Africa with their Certificate of Origin regimes;" (b) Calling upon 
States to take appropriate measures to ensure that individuals and companies in their 
jurisdiction acted in conformity with United Nations sanctions and to take the necessary 
judicial and administrative actions to end illegal activities by those individuals and 
companies;" and (c) Urging all States to cooperate fully with the Panel of Experts on 
Liberia.85 
Regional States 
In March 2001, when the Security Council initiated the sanctions regime, it directed 
a number of initiatives at regional States, by: (a) Demanding that all States in the region take 
action to prevent armed individuals and groups from using their territory to launch attacks 
80 	SIRES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 19. 
81 	SIRES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 21. 
82 	SIRES/1458 (28 January 2003), operative paragraph 7. 
83 	SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 15. 
84 	SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 27. 
85 	SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 33. 
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upon neighbouring countries, aid refrain from any action that might further destabilize the 
situation on the borders between Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone .," (b) Urging all diamond 
exporting countries in West Africa to establish Certificate of Origin regimes for the trade in 
rough diamonds; 87 and (c) Calling upon all regional organizations to act strictly in 
accordance with the sanctions notwithstanding the existence of any conflicting legal rights or 
obligations.88 
In May 2002, when the Council extended the sanctions regime, it directed additional 
initiatives at regional States, by: (a) Demanding that all States in the region cease providing 
military support to armed groups in neighbouring countries, take action to prevent aimed 
individuals and groups from using their territory to launch attacks upon neighbouring 
countries, and refrain from any action that might further destabilize the situation on the 
borders between Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone;89 and (b) Inviting ECOWAS to report 
regularly to the 1343 Committee on activities taken by its members to implement the 
sanctions." 
In May 2003, when the Council expanded the scope of the sanctions regime, it 
directed additional initiatives at regional States, by: (a) Calling upon all States in the region, 
and in particular Liberia, to participate actively in all regional peace initiatives, particularly 
those of ECO WAS, the International Contact Group, the Mano River Union and the Rabat 
Process;91 (b) Reiterating its demand that all States in the region cease providing military 
86 	S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 4. 
87 	S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 16. 
88 S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 22. 
89 	SIRES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 4. 
90 	SIRES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 12. 
91 S/RES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 4. 
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support to armed groups in neighbouring countries, take action to prevent armed individuals 
and groups from using their territory to launch attacks upon neighbouring countries, and 
refrain from any action that might further destabilize the situation in the region; 92 (c) Inviting 
ECO WAS to report regularly to the 1343 Committee on activities taken by its members to 
implement the sanctions and to implement the ECOWAS Moratorium on small arms and 
light weapons; 93 (d) Calling upon States of the subregion to strengthen the measures they 
had taken to combat the spread of small arms and light weapons and mercenary activities 
and to improve the effectiveness of the ECOWAS Moratorium; 94 and (e) Calling on the 
Member States of ECO WAS to cooperate fully with the Panel of Experts on Lib eria. 95 
18.4.4 International organizations 
When the Council established the 1343 Liberia sanctions regime, it called upon 
relevant international organizations to offer assistance to the Liberian Government and other 
diamond exporting countries in West Africa with their Certificate of Origin regimes,96 and it 
called upon all relevant international organizations to act strictly in accordance with the 
sanctions notwithstanding the existence of any conflicting legal rights or obligations. 97 
92 	SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 9. 
93 	S/RES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 21. 
94 	S/RES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 22. 
95 	S/RES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 30. 
96 	SIRES/I343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 16. The Council reiterated that call in: 
S/RES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 9; SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative 
paragraph 15. 
97 
 
SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 22. 
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18.4.5 The Liberia II Panel of Experts 
When the Security Council established the 1343 sanctions regime against Liberia, it 
also requested the Secretary-General to establish a Panel of Experts. 98 The Panel would 
operate for a period of six months and it would consist of no more than five experts. 99 The 
Panel was given a mandate to undertake the following tasks: (a) To investigate violations of 
the sanctions;' °9  (b) To collect information on the compliance of the Liberian Government 
with the demands articulated by the Counci1; 101 (c) To investigate possible links between the 
exploitation of natural resources and other forms of economic activity in Liberia, and the 
fuelling of conflict in Sierra Leone and other neighbouring countries, as highlighted by the 
Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone; 192 (d) To collect information linked to the illegal activities 
of individuals who had violated the arms sanctions against Sierra Leone ., 193 (e) To report to 
the Council with observations and recommendations on the matters within its mandate; 194 (f) 
To keep the 1343 Committee updated on its activities ., 105 and (g) To bring relevant 
information to the attention of the States concerned and to allow them the right of reply. 106 
In February 2002, the Council decided to re-establish the Panel of Experts, for a 
period of five weelcs. 1°7 The mandate of the re-established Panel was to conduct a follow-
up assessment mission to Liberia and neighbouring States in order to investigate and compile 
98 	SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 19. 
99 	Ibid. 
100 	SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph I9(a). 
S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph I9(b). 
102 	S/RES/I343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 19(c). 
103 	SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 19(d). 
104 
 
SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 19(e). 
105 	S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 19(f). 
106 	SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraph 20. 
107 	SIRES/1395 (27 February 2002), operative paragraph 3. 
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a brief independent audit of the Liberian Government's compliance with the Council's 
demands under the sanctions regime, as well as of any violations of the sanctions and to 
report to it with its observations and recommendations on those matters. I°8 The Panel would 
again consist of no more than five experts, drawing as much as possible on the expertise of 
the original Panel. 
In May 2002, when the Council extended the sanctions, it requested the Secretary-
General to establish for a period of three months a Panel of Experts consisting of no more 
than five members. I°9 The Panel of Experts was mandated to conduct a follow-up 
assessment mission to Liberia and neighbouring States, to investigate and compile a report 
on the Liberian Government's compliance with the Council's demands under the sanctions 
regime, on the potential economic, humanitarian and social impact on the Liberian population 
of the sanctions, and on any violations of the sanctions, and to report to the Council with its 
observations and recommendations." ° The Council also requested the Panel of Experts to 
bring information collected to the attention of the States concerned for prompt and thorough 
investigation and, where appropriate, to allow them the right of reply.' " 
In January 2003, the Council decided to re-establish the Liberia Panel of Experts, 
for a period of three months." 2 The Panel would again consist of no more than five experts, 
drawing as much as possible upon the expertise of those who had served on the previous 
Pane1. 113 The re-established Panel would conduct a follow-up assessment mission to Liberia 
108 	S/RES/1395 (27 February 2002), operative paragraph 4. 
109 	S/RES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 16. 
Ibid. 
HI 	S/RES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 17. 
112 	S/RES/1458 (28 January 2003), operative paragraph 3. 
113 	S/RES/1458 (28 January 2003), operative paragraph 6. 
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and neighbouring States, in order to investigate and report on the Liberian Government's 
compliance with the Council's demands under the sanctions regime, as well as on any 
violations of the sanctions."" The Panel would also conduct a review of the audits made of 
how the Liberian Government was utilizing its revenue from shipping and timber and would 
report to the Council with its observations and recommendations regarding those tasks. 115 
The Council again requested the Panel of Experts to bring information collected to the 
attention of the States concerned for prompt and thorough investigation and, where 
appropriate, to allow them the right of reply. 116 
In May 2003, the Council requested the Secretary-General to establish for a period 
of five months a Panel of Experts of up to six members. The Panel would undertake the 
following tasks: (a) Conducting a follow-up assessment mission to Liberia and neighbouring 
States, in order to investigate and report on the Liberian Government's compliance with the 
Council's demands under the sanctions regime, as well as on any violations of the 
sanctions; 117 (b) Investigating whether any revenues of the Liberian Government were being 
used in violation of the sanctions regime; 118 (c) Assessing the possible humanitarian and 
socio-economic impact of the logging sanctions and making recommendations through the 
1343 Committee on how to minimize any such impact; 119 and (d) Reporting to the Council 
through the Committee with its observations and recommendations on how to improve the 
114 	SIRES/1458 (28 January 2003), operative paragraph 4 
115 	Ibid. 
116 	S/RES/1458 (28 January 2003), operative paragraph 5. 
117 	SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 25(a). 
118 	SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 25(b). 
119 	SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 25(c). 
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effectiveness of implementing and monitoring the sanctions. 12° In addition, the Council again 
requested the Panel of Experts to bring information collected to the attention of the States 
concerned for prompt and thorough investigation and, where appropriate, to allow them the 
right of reply. 121 
Activities carried out by the Liberia Panel of Experts 
In the course of its various mandates, the Liberia Panel of Experts submitted six 
reports to the Security Counci1. 122 In its reports the Panel outlined detailed findings on the 
implementation and violation of the various components of the 1343 Liberia sanctions 
regime, as well as numerous recommendations for further action by the Security Council. In 
its First report, issued in October 2001, the Panel outlined extensive findings on: Liberia's 
role in &stabilizing the region; 123 the relationship between transportation and the illicit flow 
of weapons, in violation of the Liberian arms embargo ., 124 the sources of the Liberian 
120 	SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 25(d). 
121 	SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 26. 
122 	S/2001/1015 (26 October 2001), enclosure: Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security 
Council resolution 1343 (2001), paragraph 19, concerning Liberia (hereafter "First report 
of the Panel of Experts on Liberia"); S/2002/470 (19 April 2002), annex: Report of the Panel of 
Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1395 (2002), paragraph 4, in 
relation to Liberia (hereafter "Second report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia"); S/2002/1115 
(25 Cctober 2002), annex: Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security 
Council resolution 1408 (2002), paragraph 16, concerning Liberia (hereafter "Third report 
of the Panel of Experts on Liberia"); S/20031498 (24 April 2003), annex: Report of the Panel of 
Experts appointed pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 1458 (2003), 
concerning Liberia (hereafter "Fourth report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia"); S/2003/779 
(7 August 2003), annex: Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to paragraph 25 
of resolution 1478 (2003) concerning Liberia (hereafter "F(th report of the Panel of Experts 
on Liberia"); and S/2003/937 (28 October 2003), annex: Report of the Panel of Experts 
established pursuant to paragraph 25 of resolution 1478 (2003) concerning Liberia 
(hereafter "Sixth report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia"). 
123 First report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia, ibid, paragraphs 93-140. 
124 	Ibid, paragraphs 141-308. 
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Government's revenue, as well as on the Government's expenditure; 125 and on the 
implementation of the travel sanctions. 126 
In relation to Liberia's role in destabilizing the region, the Panel reported that the 
measure taken by the Liberian Civil Aviation Authority to address problems in the Liberian 
aircraft registry had been adequate and it recommended that the Security Council consider 
lifting its order that Liberia ground its aircraft and that it allow Liberia to reopen an aircraft 
register in coordination with the ICA0. 127 Referring to instances of aircraft registration fraud 
in the region, the Panel also recommended that the Council require aircraft owned, operated 
or insured by certain companies to be grounded immediately, until full records were 
provided for each aircraft and until each aircraft had been inspected by the Civil Aviation 
Authority in the county of registration: 28 
In relation to the illicit flow of arms, the Panel recommended that: the arms embargo 
be extended; all Member States should abstain from supplying weapons to the Mano River 
Union countries; an arms embargo be imposed against armed non-state actors in the Mano 
River Union countries; and the ECO WAS moratorium on small arms should be broadened 
to provide an information exchange mechanism for a weapons procured by ECOWAS 
Member States. 129 The Panel also recommended that Member States investigate any arms 
transactions they had conducted involving particular companies, and that they inform any 
other State involved in the transaction, as well as the 1343 Sanctions Committee, of the 
125 	'bid, paragraphs 309-444. 
126 	Ibid, paragraphs 445-459. 
127 	'bid, paragraphs 6, 300. 
128 	Ibid, paragraphs 13-14, 304. 
129 Ibid, paragraphs 24-25, 305-306. 
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results of their investigations ., 130 and that a United Nations working group be established to 
develop a standardized End-User Certificate for arms fransactions. 131 
In relation to the Liberian Government's revenue and expenditure, the Panel noted 
that timber production was a source of revenue for "sanctions-busting" and recommended 
that the Liberian Government should commission an independent audit of its revenue from 
the timber industry and that the United Nations should impose a ban on all round log exports 
from Liberia."2 Referring to the diamond sanctions, the Panel encouraged Liberia to 
establish an effective Certificate of Origin scheme and echoed the recommendations made 
earlier by the Sierra Leone Panel of Experts that further international controls should be 
developed to ensure the effectiveness of Certificate of Origin schemes.'" In relation to 
revenue derived from the Liberian shipping registry, the Panel recommended that steps 
should be taken to audit that revenue in order to ensure that it was being used for 
development purposes. 134 
In relation to the travel sanctions, the Panel recommended that the 1343 Committee 
should respond more effectively to individual requests about the operation of the sanctions 
and that it should post a "travel ban web-page", explaining the criteria for placing names on 
the travel ban list, describing how individuals could apply for an exemption from the travel 
ban and listing exemptions that had been granted.'" The Panel also recommended that a 
130 	Ibid, paragraphs 26, 307. 
131 	Ibid, paragraphs 27, 308. 
132 	Ibid, paragraphs 40, 350. 
133 	Ibid, paragraphs 48-49, 385-386. 
134 	Ibid, paragraphs 59, 444. 
135 	'bid, paragraphs 62, 456. 
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photographic database be compiled of key individuals on the list, and that the list should be 
updated regularly. I 36 
The Panel also made some general recommendations for continued monitoring of the 
implementation of the 1343 Liberian sanctions regime, suggesting that an officer be 
employed within the United Nations Secretariat with responsibility for monitoring 
compliance with the sanctions, 137 and that the mandate of the Panel itself be renewed to 
enable it to undertake assessment missions to the region. ' 38 
In its Second report, issued in April 2002, the Panel outlined findings in relation to: 
Liberia's internal conflict and the role of the RUP, 139 the link between air transportation and 
the illicit trade in arms;14° the role of the diamond trade in the region; 141 the sources of 
government revenue and expenditure; 142 the travel sanctions; 143 and the impact of sanctions 
upon Liberia.' 44 
The Panel's recommendations were more limited in its second report. In relation to 
the implementation of the arms sanctions, the Panel reported that it had found credible 
evidence that the Liberian Government was continuing to violate the arms embargo. The 
Panel thus recommended that: (a) The arms embargo should be maintained and violations of 
the embargo should continue to be monitored; 145 (b) The ECOWAS moratorium on small 
136 	Ibid, paragraphs 63-64,457-458. 
137 	'bid, paragraphs 66, 463. 
138 	Ibid, paragraphs 67-68,464-465. 
139 Second report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia, above note 122, paragraphs 33-54. 
140 	Ibid, paragraphs 55-101. 
141 Ibid, paragraphs 102-137. 
142 	Ibid, paragraphs 138-157. 
143 	Ibid, paragraphs 158-167. 
144 Ibid, paragraphs 168-176. 
145 	Ibid, paragraphs 4, 71. 
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arms should be broadened to an information exchange mechanism for weapons of all 
types; 146  (c) All aims-producing and exporting countries should stop supplying weapons to 
the Mario River Union countries; 147 and (d) An immediate embargo should be imposed on 
all non-State actors in the Mano River Union countries, including on the dissident groups 
constituting the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). 148 
recommendations connected to the implementation of the arms embargo, but focussing upon 
the role of air transportation in violations of the embargo, the Panel recommended that: 
(a) Liberia be requested to supply the 1343 Committee with a full report detailing 
information on the recent crash of a plane believed to be engaged in violations of the 
embargo; 149 and (b) That an independent investigation be conducted into the crash in order 
to verify information to be provided by Liberia on the that crash. 15° 
In relation to the diamond sanctions, the Panel noted that the flow of export 
diamonds from Liberia had continued to be reduced due to the sanctions, but that diamonds 
were nevertheless continuing to be smuggled from Liberia in violation of the diamond 
sanctions. 151 The Panel thus recommended that the United Nations should encourage 
Member States to assist the Liberian Government in setting up a credible and transparent 
certification scheme which was independently audited by an internationally recognized audit 
company. 152 In relation to the travel sanctions, the Panel noted that a number of complaints 
had been received from listed individuals, requesting to know the grounds upon which they 
146 	Ibid, paragraphs 4, 68-69. 
147 	Ibid, paragraphs 4, 70. 
148 	Ibid, paragraphs 4, 72. 
149 	Ibid, paragraphs 6, 100. 
150 	Ibid, paragraphs 7, 101. 
151 Ibid, paragraph 9, 102-118, 136. 
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had been listed. 153  The Panel believed that the existing list was too long and "cumbersome" 
and it recommended that the list be reduced to include Liberian cabinet members and other 
key government officials, as well as those individuals identified by the Panel as having been 
involved in sanctions violations or having obstructed investigations into sanctions 
violations.' 54 
In comments on the impact of the 1343 Liberia sanctions regime, the Panel noted 
that there was a broad perception in Liberia that the sanctions were affecting average 
people, largely due to an effective public relations campaign against the sanctions by the 
Liberian Govemment. 155 The Panel suggested that the United Nations had not done a good 
job of defending the sanctions, nor of publicizing the scope of the sanctions or the findings of 
the Panel itself, and it recommended that further copies of the Panel's reports be distributed 
in Liberia and that the United Nations Office in Liberia (UNOL) hold a series of workshops 
to balance the one-sided discussion of sanctions within Liberia. 156 The Panel did note, 
however, that the sanctions had caused "some collateral damage", including: contributing to 
the significant depreciation of the Liberian dollar and a steep increqce in inflation; 157 making it 
more difficult for international non-governmental organizations to receive funding from 
152 	lbid, paragraphs 10, 137. 
153 
 
Ibid. paragraph 13. 
154 	Ibid. 
155 	See, in general: ibid, paragraphs 168-176. One example of this campaign was the distribution of 
posters with a graphic of a skull and crossbones, stating: "Sanctions: Killing our Economy; 
Arms embargo: Killing our People; UN, UK, US: Liberian Children Deserve to Live". A copy of 
the poster was included as annex IV to the Panel's Second report. 
156 	Ibid, paragraph 173. 
157 	Ibid, paragraph 174. 
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donors for projects in Liberia; 158 and resulting in the World Bank suspending relations with 
Liberia until the sanctions had been lifted." 9 
In its Third report, issued in October 2002, the Panel outlined findings in relation to: 
Liberia's internal conflict and regional instability; 160 the implementation of the arms 
embargo; 161  civil aviation; 162 the implementation of the diamond sanctions; 163 sources cf 
government revenue and expenditure;' 64 and the travel sanctions.' 65 The Panel also outlined 
observations in relation to the humanitarian impact of the sanctions regime: 66 
The Panel's recommendations in its third report were again more limited. In relation 
to the arms embargo, the Panel recommended that: (a) The arms embargo be maintained 
and that violations continue to be monitored; 167 (b) The arms embargo be extended to all 
armed non-State actors in the region, including LURD and that aims-exporting countries 
should stop supplying arms to the Mano River Union countries; 168 (c) A United Nations 
working group be established, in order to develop the modalities for a standardized end-
user certificate that would contain a minimum collection of details relating to the authority 
158 	Ibid, paragraph 175. 
159 	Ibid, paragraph 176. 
160 	Third report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia, above note 122, paragraphs 44-58. 
161 	Ibid, paragraphs 59-108. 
162 	Ibid, paragraphs 109-123. 
163 	Ibid, paragraphs 124-157. 
164 	'bid, paragraphs 158-196. 
165 	Ibid, paragraphs 197-204. 
166 	For the Panel's comments on the humanitarian impact of the sanctions, see: ibid, paragraphs 
19-22 (on the humanitarian impact of the sanctions regime in general), 96-99 (on the 
humanitarian impact of the arms embargo), 138-143 (on the humanitarian impact of the diamond 
sanctions), 162-171 (on the potential humanitarian impact of the proposed sanctions against 
the shipping and logging industries), 201-204 (on the humanitarian impact of the travel 
sanctions). 
167 	!bid, paragraphs 8, 100. 
168 	!bid, paragraph 8. 
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issuing the certfficate .,169 (d) The ECOWAS/PCASED moratorium be used more effectively 
to monitor and combat illicit trafficking and "sanctions-busting', 17° (e) End-user certificates 
be submitted to ECOWAS as part of the procedure to obtain waivers br the import of 
arms into West Africa -, 171 and (f) The moratorium should be broadened and should become 
an information exchange mechanism for all types of weapons procured by ECOWAS 
members. 72 
In relation to civil aviation, the Panel recommended that: (a) The Liberian civil 
aviation authorities should ensure that its aircraft were registered under the new Liberian 
prefix (A8) as soon as possible, so that aircraft could no longer operate under the old prefix 
(EL); 173 and (b) Liberia should investigate frilly, and present to the 1343 Committee within 
three months its findings on, the incident referred to in the Panel's second report, in which an 
aircraft suspected of having been involved in violations of the arms embargo had crashed. 174 
In relation to the implementation of the diamond sanctions, the Panel recommended that 
Liberia should finalize a credible plan of action for introducing a credible certification of 
origin scheme, with the aid of international support. 175 
In relation to the revenue and expenditure of the Liberian Government, the Panel 
recommended that the Government publish the results of the systems audit being conducted 
by the international auditing firm Deloitte & Touche of the revenue derived from the maritime 
169 	Ibid, paragraphs 8, 101. 
170 	Ibid, paragraphs 8, 102. 
171 	Ibid, paragraphs 9, 104. 
172 	Ibid, paragraphs 9, 105. 
173 	Ibid, paragraphs 10, 122. 
174 	Ibid, paragraphs 12, 123. 
175 	Ibid, paragraphs 14-15, 157. 
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and forestry industries, as well as of the expenditures made with that revenue." 6 On the 
subject of the humanitarian impact of the sanctions, the Panel concluded that the sanctions 
had had a negligible impact on the humanitarian situation in Liberia.' 77 As in its second 
report, the Panel noted that sanctions had had a psychological impact upon the Liberian 
civilian population and that the Liberian Government had used the imposition of the sanctions 
as an excuse for its failure to improve services and to engage in reform. 178 
In its Fourth report, issued in April 2003, the Panel outlined findings in relation to: 
Liberia's internal conflict and regional instability; 179 the implementation of the arms 
embargo; 18° civil aviation; 18 ' the implementation of the diamond sanctions; 182 sources of 
government revenue and expenditure; 183 and the travel sanctions: 84 The Panel again made 
fewer recommendations than in earlier reports, including that: (a) The ECOWAS/PCASD 
moratorium on the import, export and manufacturing of small arms in West Africa should be 
strengthened through international assistance and technical support; (b) An international 
mechanism be established to harmonize and verify all end-user certificates for weapons; 
(c) The Liberian Civil Aviation Authority should cooperate fully with its responsibilities and 
should register all of its aircraft; (d) International mining and geological consultants should be 
engaged in order to define which areas should be classified as "conflict free", such that 
176 	Ibid, paragraphs 17, 196. 
177 	Ibid, paragraph 19. 
178 	Ibid, paragraphs 21-22. 
179 Fourth report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia, above note 122, paragraphs 33-68. 
180 	Ibid, paragraphs 69-113. 
181 	Ibid, paragraphs 114-124. 
182 	Ibid, paragraphs 125-147. 
183 	'bid, paragraphs 148-164. 
184 	Ibid, paragraphs 165-169. 
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diamonds from those locations might be considered fit for export; and (e) Financial sanctions 
should be imposed against certain individuals.'" 
In August 2003 the Liberia 11 Panel of Experts submitted its Fifth report, containing 
observations and recommendations on the possible humanitarian and socio-economic 
impact of the timber sanctions. 186 The Panel's methodology for analysing the humanitarian 
and socio-economic impact of the timber sanctions focussed upon assessing the impact of 
the timber sanctions upon seven factors: (1) revenue and taxes; (2) employment; (3) indirect 
benefits; (4) social services; (5) human rights; (6) investment; and (7) environment.'" The 
Panel's observations included that the sanctions would: (a) deprive armed State and non-
State actors of timber revenue; (b) result in decreased human rights violations associated 
with the timber industry; and (c) cause long-term consequences for the Liberia's 
redevelopment.'" Its recommendations included that: (a) the Council should impose a 
moratorium on all commercial activities in the extractive industries; (b) increased emergency 
aid should be provided; (c) the Liberian timber sector should be reformed in order to 
achieve good governance; and (d) Member States, civil society and U.N. field presences 
should be encouraged to monitor and report sanctions violations.' 89 
185 	Ibid, paragraph 10. 
186 	
S120031779 (7 August 2003), annex: Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to paragraph 25 
of Security Council resolution 1478 (2003) concerning Liberia (hereafter "Fifth report of the 
Liberia II Panel of Experts"). 
187 	See: Fifth report of the Panel, ibid, paragraphs 7-14. 
188 See: Fifth Report of the Panel, ibid, paragraph 15. 
189 See: Fifih Report of the Panel, ibid, paragraph 17. 
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In October 2003 the Panel submitted its sixth and final report.'" In its Sixth report, 
the Panel outlined observations and recommendations relating to the arms, diamonds, timber 
and travel sanctions. In its observations on the arms sanctions, the Panel noted that porous 
borders and insecurity in neighbouring countries had made the full enforcement of the arms 
embargo impossible and that only one shipment of arms had been blocked.'" With respect 
to the diamond sanctions, insecurity and seasonal climactic factors had led to a decline in 
diamond production, but diamonds were continuing to flow on to the international market 
and existing certification schemes in neighbouring countries were failing to prevent such 
flows.'" In connection with the timber sanctions, the Panel noted that there had been few 
violations, but that that was likely due to war and the rainy season — the test would come in 
November 2003, when conflict was expected to decrease and the rain to abate.'" Referring 
to humanitarian and socio-economic impact, the Panel noted that the Liberian economy 
would suffer the loss of no less than 50 per cent of its export income as a result of the timber 
sanctions.'" With respect to the travel sanctions, the Panel noted that the ban was being 
violated consistently, with a number of people on the travel black-list having been seen or 
contacted outside Liberia.'" 
The recommendations outlined by the Panel included: (a) That all sanctions should 
be maintained; 196 (b) That the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) should play a 
190 	S/20031937 (28 October 2003), annex: Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to paragraph 25 
of Security Council resolution 1478 (2003) concerning Liberia (hereafter "Sixth report of the 
Liberia II Panel of Experts"). 
191 	'bid, paragraphs 9(b)-(c). 
192 	Ibid, paragraphs 9(d), 130-40. 
193 	Ibid, paragraphs 9(g), 147-8. 
194 	Ibid, paragraph 8. 
195 	Ibid, paragraphs 9(i), 175-80. 
196 	lbid, paragraphs 10(a), 157. 
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monitoring role to ensure that sanctions were not being violated; 197 (c) That financial 
sanctions should be imposed against all accounts, assets and property owned and controlled 
by Charles Taylor; 198 (d) That the diamond sanctions should remain in place until a closely 
monitored, internationally acci edited certification scheme could be effectively implemented 
within the context of broad sector reform; 199 (e) That the Liberian forestry sector should be 
reformed under standards of good governance;299 and (f) That a national "sensitization 
campaign" should be launched to inform Liberians about the justification for sanctions. 291 
18.5 Termination of the Liberia II sanctions regime 
In December 2003, just over two and a half years after it initiated its second 
sanctions regime against Liberia, and three months after Charles Taylor had resigned as 
Liberian President and had departed Liberia to take refuge in Nigeria, the Security Council 
terminated the 1343 sanctions regime and replaced it with a third Liberian sanctions regime. 
In the process, the Council recalled the various resolutions associated with the 1343 
sanctions regime,202 and noted that the changed circumstances in Liberia, including the 
departure of former President Taylor and the formation of the National Transitional 
Government of Liberia, required the revision of its determination for action under Chapter 
197 	Ibid, paragraphs 10(b), 110. 
198 	Ibid, paragraph 10(d). 
199 	Ibid, paragraphs 10(e), 142. 
200 	'bid, paragraphs 10(g), 159. 
201 	Ibid, paragraph 10(h). 
202 	S/RES/I521 (22 December 2003), section A, preambular paragraph 1. 
794 
Appendix 18. The Liberia II sanctions regime 
VII in order to reflect altered circumstances. 203 It then decided to terminate the second 
Liberian sanctions regime and dissolved the 1343 Committee.' 
18.6 Notable aspects of the Liberia II sanctions regime 
The second Liberia sanctions regime was noteworthy in a number of respects. First, 
it was the first sanctions regime that was imposed to succeed an earlier sanctions regime 
against the same target. 205 Second, it constituted the first time that the Security Council 
imposed mandatory sanctions against logging. Third, it represented another instance, along 
with those of the sanctions regimes against Ethiopia and Eritrea, Sierra Leone and the 
Taliban/A1 Qaida, in which the Council utilized time-limits in the application of sanctions. 206 
Fourth, the Council again experimented with time-delays in order to provide the target with 
an opportunity to avoid the eventual application of the sanctions by complying with the 
203 	SIRES/1521 (22 December 2003), section A, preambular paragraph 2. 
204 	S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraph I. 
205 	Although the Council has acted in other sanctions regimes to terminate the existing sanctions 
and reimpose new sanctions [see, e.g., the Sierra Leone sanctions regime: section 14.3, above], 
in the case of Liberia the Council actually terminated the whole sanctions regime and dissolved 
the existing Sanctions Committee, before applying a completely new sanctions regime against 
the same target and establishing a new Sanctions Committee. 
206 	The arms sanctions applied for an initial period of fourteen months [S/RES/1343 (7 March 
2001), operative paragraphs 5, 9], which has subsequently been extended for two further 
periods of twelve months [S/RES/1408 (6 May 2002), operative paragraph 5; SIRES/1478 (6 May 
2003), operative paragraph 10]. The diamond and travel sanctions, which came into effect two 
months after the application of the arms sanctions, were applied for an initial period of twelve 
months [SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraphs 6, 7, 8], which has subsequently 
been extended for two further periods of twelve months [SIRES/l408 (6 May 2002), operative 
paragraph 5; SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 10]. The logging sanctions, have 
been applied for an initial period of ten months, beginning on 6 July 2003 [SIRES/1478 (6 May 
2003), operative paragraph 17]. Interestingly, the Council did not set a time-limit for the 
additional travel sanctions applied in May 2003: SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraph 
28. It is questionable, however, whether the relevant provisions in and of themselves would 
result in the termination of the sanctions at the end of the time-period specified. The provisions 
state that the relevant sanctions would terminate after the stipulated period if the Council 
decides that the Liberian Government had complied with the conditions of the sanctions 
regime. 
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necessary conditions under the sanctions regime."' Fifth, as noted above, the Security 
Council adopted a flexible approach to the characterization of the relevant threat to 
international peace and security, first characterizing that threat as the active support provided 
by the Liberian Government for armed rebel groups in neighbouring countries, and in 
particular for the RUF in Sierra Leone, 298 then characterizing it as the active support 
provided by the Liberian Government for aimed rebel groups in the region, including the 
RUF,209  then again as the active support provided by the Liberian Government for aimed 
rebel groups in the region, including to rebels in Cote d'Ivoire and former RUF combatants 
who continued to destabilize the region. 219 Sixth, the Council bestowed responsibilities 
relating to the implementation of the sanctions upon a range of actors, including the 
Secretary-General, the 1343 Committee, and a Panel of Experts on Liberia. Seventh, the 
Council experimented for the first time with the idea of requiring an audit of the revenue and 
expenditure of a target, in order to determine whether the revenue was being spent in a 
manner that did not violate the sanctions. Finally, the Council demonstrated a particular 
interest in the humanitarian impact of the sanctions, requesting substantial reporting on the 
matter. 
207 	Interestingly, the Council employed a mixture of immediate operation and time-delays in its 
application of the 1343 Liberia sanctions regime. The arms sanctions came into effect 
immediately, whilst the diamond and travel sanctions entered into force two months later: 
SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), operative paragraphs 8, 9. See also: First report of the 1343 
Committee, above note 44, paragraphs 16, 17. See also SC/7058 (4 May 2001): Statement to the 
media by the President of the Security Council [noting that the diamond and travel sanctions 
subsequently came into effect after the Council considered the matter during consultations on 
4 May 2001, when the members of the Council decided that the steps taken by the Liberian 
Government had not been sufficient to postpone the application of those additional sanctions]. 
Similarly, when the Council established the logging sanctions and imposed additional travel 
sanctions, the logging sanctions were to come into effect two months later, whilst the travel 
sanctions entered into force immediately: SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), operative paragraphs 17, 
28. 
208 	SIRES/1343 (7 March 2001), preambular paragraph 8. 
209 	SIRES/1408 (6 May 2002), preambular paragraph 11. 
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210 
	
SIRES/1478 (6 May 2003), preambular paragraph 13. 
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19. The sanctions regime against certain actors in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 
The Security Council imposed sanctions against certain actors in the Kivu and Ituri 
regions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in July 2003, in an attempt to 
foster progress in the DRC peace process. The sanctions, which were imposed for an initial 
period of twelve months, consist of an arms embargo. The sanctions remain in place at the 
time of writing. 
19.1 The constitutional basis for imposing the DRC sanctions 
regime 
After a number of years of taking action to address the situation in the DRC,' the 
Security Council eventually imposed sanctions against certain actors in the DRC in July 
2003. At that time, the Council welcomed the conclusion of the Global and All Inclusive 
Agreement on the Transition in the DRC,2 whilst expressing deep concern at the 
continuation of hostilities in the eastern part of the DRC, particularly in North and South 
Kivu and Ituri, and by the grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law 
that accompanied those hostilities. 3 The Council then noted that the situation in the DRC 
continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region, 4  and stated 
that it was acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,' before imposing the sanctions. 6 
SIRES/1493 (28 July 2003), preambular paragraph 11. The Council had originally made a 
determination of a threat to the peace an early resolution relating to the mandate of the United 
Nations Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC). See: SIRES/1291, preambular paragraph 
20 (determining that the situation in the DRC constituted a threat to international peace and 
security in the region). 
SIRES/l493 (28 July 2003), preambular paragraph 5. 
SIRES/1493 (28 July 2003), preambular paragraph 6. 
SIRES/1493 (28 July 2003), preambular paragraph 11. 
S/RES11493 (28 July 2003), preambular paragraph 12. 
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19.2 The objectives of the DRC sanctions regime 
The broad objective of the sanctions was to foster progress in the DRC peace 
process.' The Council noted that it would review the situation in the DRC in twelve months, 
with a view to renewing the sanctions if no significant progress had been made in the peace 
process, including in particular if support were still being provided to aimed groups, if there 
were no effective ceasefire, and if there had not been progress in the disarmament, 
demobilization, repatriation, reintegration or resettlement ("DDRRR") of foreign and 
Congolese armed groups. 8 
19.3 The scope of the DRC sanctions regime 
Under the DRC sanctions regime, all States were initially required to take the 
necessary measures to prevent the supply of alms and related materiel and the provision of 
military assistance, advice or training to all foreign and Congolese armed groups and militias 
operating in the territory of North and South Kivu and of Ituri, as well as to groups not party 
to the Global and all-inclusive agreement, in the DRC.9 Exempt from the sanctions, 
however, are supplies to MONUC, the Interim Emergency Multinational Force led by 
France, and non-lethal military equipment intended for humanitarian or protective use, as 
well as related technical assistance and training: 9 
S/RES/1493 (28 July 2003), operative paragraph 20. For details on the scope of the sanctions 
regime, see section 19.3, below. 
7 	See: SIRES/1493 (28 July 2003), operative paragraph 22 (in general). 
Ibid. 
9 SIRES/1493 (28 July 2003), operative paragraph 20. 
lo SIRES/1493 (28 July 2003), operative paragraph 21. In order to be exempt, such training and 
assistance had to be notified in advance to the Secretary-General and his Special 
Representative [see also operative paragraph 21]. 
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19.4 The administration, monitoring and enforcement of the DRC 
sanctions regime 
When it first imposed the DRC sanctions regime, the Council did not establish a 
Sanctions Committee. Initially it bestowed responsibilities relating to the administration and 
monitoring of the sanctions upon the Secretary-General and the United Nations Organization 
Mission in the DRC (MONUC). The Council has subsequently established both a Sanctions 
Committee and a Group of Experts, whilst also reaffirming MONUC's monitoring role. 
19.4.1 The Secretary -General 
When the Council established the DRC sanctions regime it requested the Secretary-
General to play an administering role by receiving notifications from States who wished to 
take advantage of the exemption for the provision of technical assistance and training for 
humanitarian or protective non-lethal military equipment" 
19.4.2 The United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) 
When the Council established the DRC sanctions regime, it requested MONUC to 
deploy military observers in North and South Kivu and in Ituri and to report to it regularly 
on information concerning arms supply and the presence of foreign military. 12 In March 
2004 the Council expanded MONUC's sanctions monitoring role, requesting it to use all 
means to inspect the cargo of aircraft and any transport vehicle using the ports, airports, 
military bases and border crossings in North and South Kivu and in Ituri." At the same time, 
11 	SIRES/1493 (28 July 2003), operative paragraph 21. 
12 	S/RES/I493 (28 July 2003), operative paragraph 19. 
13 	S/RES/1533 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 3. 
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the Council also authorized MONUC to seize arms and related materiel violating the DRC 
sanctions." 
19.4.3 The DRC Sanctions Committee 
In March 2004, ten months after it had initiated the DRC sanctions regime, the 
Council established a Sanctions Committee to oversee the sanctions administration." The 
1533 Committee's mandate included: (a) seeking from all States information regarding 
action taken to implement the sanctions; 16 (b) taking appropriate action on alleged sanctions 
violations as contained in the reports of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of 
Natural Resources in the DRC;" (c) presenting regular observations and recommendations 
to the Council on its work, including on strengthening the sanctions;" (d) considering lists to 
be compiled of sanctions violators, with a view to making recommendations for future 
measures to be taken in that regard;" and (e) receiving notifications from States concerning 
exemptions.2° 
19.4.4 The DRC Group of Experts 
In March 2003 the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to establish 
for a period of approximately three months a Group of Experts on the DRC sanctions. 21 The 
mandate of the Group, which was to consist of no more than four experts, ficluded: 
(a) analysing information gathered by the United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC 
14 	S/RES/1533 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 4. 
15 	S/RES/1533 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 8. 
16 	S/RES/1533 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 8(a), 9. 
17 	SIRES/1533 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 8(b). 
18 	SIRES/1533 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 8(c). 
19 	SIRES/I533 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 8(d). 
20 	SIRES/1533 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 8(e). 
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(MONUC) regarding the implementation of the sanctions; 22 (b) gathering and analysing 
information gathered in the DRC and other countries regarding the flow of arms and related 
materiel, as well as on networks operating in violations of the sanctions; 23 (c) recommending 
measures to improve the capacity of States to implement the sanctions; 24 (d) reporting to the 
Council with recommendations and through the 1533 Committee on the implementation of 
the sanctions; 25 (e) keeping the 1533 Committee abreast of its activities; 26 (f) exchanging 
with MONUC information that would facilitate MONUC's monitoring mandate; 27 and 
(g) providing the 1533 Committee with a list of individuals who had violated the sanctions, 
as well as of those who had supported those individuals. 28 The DRC Group of Experts was 
due to submit its first report in July 2004. 
19.4.5 States 
In March 2004, the Council requested all States, and in particular those in the 
region, to report to the 1533 Committee on action taken to implement the sanctions. 29 At 
the same time, the Council also urged all States to cooperate fully with the 1533 Committee, 
the DRC Group of Experts and MONUC. 3° 
21 	S/RES/1533 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 10. 
22 	S/RES/1533 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 10(a). 
23 	SIRES/1533 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 10(b). 
24 	S/RES/1533 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 10(c). 
25 	SIRES/1533 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 10(d). 
26 	S/RES/1533 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 10(e). 
27 	SIRES/1533 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 10(f). 
28 	SIRES/1533 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 10(g). 
29 	SIRES/1533 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 9. 
30 	SIRES/1533 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 12. 
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19.5 Notable aspects of the DRC sanctions regime 
One notable aspect of the DRC sanctions regime is the manner in which the Security 
Council has again adopted a time-limit in the application of sanctions. Another is the fact that 
the Council seemed to employ a minimalist approach by opting not to establish subsidiary 
bodies to oversee the administuttion, monitoring or enforcement of the sanctions. The 
Council has subsequently changed track quite forcefully on that aspect, establishing both a 
Sanctions Committee and a Group of Experts and strengthening MONUC's monitoring and 
enforcement responsibilities. It was important for the Council take such steps, as the DRC 
sanctions regime targets a class of actors, the identification of whom requires substantial 
administrative and monitoring follow-up. In the absence of a clear determination of which 
individuals were associated with the targeted actors, it would have been unclear to States 
which actors should be the target of the sanctions. Now that the Council has established 
both a Sanctions Committee and a Group of Experts, with responsibility for compiling a 
concrete list of actors against which the sanctions must be applied and receiving reports 
from States outlining steps taken to implement the sanctions, it is more likely that attention 
will be focused upon implementing the sanctions effectively. It is fortunate that the Council 
decided — even if belatedly — to strengthen the monitoring and implementation of the DRC 
sanctions. If it had not done so, the DRC sanctions regime may have turned out to be an 
example of how not to apply sanctions. 
804 
20. The third Liberia sanctions regime ("Liberia 
In December 2003, in the same resolution by which it had terminated the second 
sanctions regime imposed against Liberia, by resolution 1343 (2001), the Security Council 
for the second time took the unusual step of imposing a new sanctions regime against 
Liberia.' The 1521 sanctions regime has a number of objectives, including: securing the 
observance of a ceasefire and the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
of 18 August 2003; bringing about the establishment of an effective Certificate of Origin 
regime for trade in Liberian diamonds; and ensuring that the Transitional Government of 
Liberia gains full authority and control over Liberian timber producing areas and that 
government revenues from the timber industry are used for the benefit of the Liberian 
people. 
20.1 The constitutional basis for imposing the Liberia III sanctions 
regime 
When the Security Council established the Liberia III sanctions regime, it expressed 
serious concern at the recent findings of the Liberia Panel of Experts that the 1343 sanctions 
continued to be breached, particularly via the flow into Liberia of arms.' Whilst welcoming 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the former Government of Liberia, 
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for 
For details relating to the earlier two sanctions regimes against Liberia, see sections 5.8 and 
5.18, above. 
SIRES/1521 (22 December 2003), preambular paragraph 3. For those findings by the Panel, see: 
S12003/779 (7 August 2003), annex: Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to 
paragraph 25 of resolution 1478 (2003) concerning Liberia; and S/2003/937 (28 October 
2003), annex: Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to paragraph 25 of 
resolution 1478 (2003) concerning Liberia. 
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Democracy in Liberia (MODEL),3 the Council noted with concern that the ceasefire and the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement were not being implemented throughout Liberia: 1 It then 
determined that the situation in Liberia and the proliferation of arms and armed non-State 
actors, including mercenaries in the subregion continued to constitute a threat to international 
peace and security in West Africa, in particular to the peace process in Liberia, 5 and noted 
that it was acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, 6 before proceeding to apply sanctions.' 
In March 2004, the Council noted with concern that the actions and policies of 
former Liberian President Charles Taylor and other persons, in particular depleting Liberian 
resources and removing from Liberia funds and property, had undermines Liberia's 
transition to democracy. 8 It further expressed concern that former President Taylor 
confirmed to exercise control over and to access misappropriated Liberian funds and 
property, 9 determined that the situation constituted a threat to international peace and 
security in West Africa, in particular to the peace process in Liberia, m and, acting under 
Chapter VII," imposed financial sanctions against former President Taylor and his 
immediate family and former senior colleagues. 12 
3 	SIRES/1521 (22 December 2003), preambular paragraph 4. 
4 	S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003), preambular paragraph 6. 
5 	SIRES/1521 (22 December 2003), preambular paragraph 8. 
6 	S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003), preambular paragraph 9. 
7 	S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraphs 2, 4, 6, 10. 
8 	S/RES/1532 (12 March 2004), preambular paragraph 2. 
9 	SIRES/1532 (12 March 2004), preambular paragraph 4. 
10 	S/RES/1532 (12 March 2004), preambular paragraph 5. 
SIRES/1532 (12 March 2004), preambular paragraph 6. 
12 	S/RES/1532 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 1. 
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20.2 The objectives of the Liberia III sanctions regime 
With the establishment of the 1521 sanctions regime, the Security Council took the 
innovative step of outlining particular objectives linked to different components of the 
sanctions regime. Thus the objectives of the arms and travel sanctions were to ensure that: 
the Liberian ceasefire was being fully respected and maintained; disarmament, 
demobilization, reintegration, repatriation and restructuring of the security sector had been 
completed; the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement were being fully 
implemented; and that significant progress had been made in establishing and naintaining 
stability in Liberia and the subregion. ' 3 The objective of the diamond sanctions was to 
ensure the establishment of an effective Certificate of Origin regime for trade in Liberian 
diamonds." Finally, the objective of the timber sanctions were to ensure that: the 
Transitional Government of Liberia gained full authority and control over Liberian timber 
producing areas; and that government revenues from the timber industry were not being 
used to fuel conflict or in violation of the Security Council's resolutions, but rather that they 
were being used for legitimate purposes for the benefit of the Liberian people. ° 
20.3 The scope of the Liberia III sanctions regime 
The 1521 sanctions regime initially consisted of a mixture of arms, travel, diamond 
and timber sanctions. Under the arms sanctions, all States were required to prevent the sale 
or supply to Liberia of arms and related materiel and equipment, as well as the provision to 
Liberia of training or assistance related to the provision, manufacture or use of arms and 
13 	S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraph 5. 
14 	S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraph 8. 
15 
 
SIRES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraphs 11, 12. 
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related materiel and equipment." Under the travel sanctions, all States were required to 
prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of all persons who constituted a 
threat to the peace process in Liberia, including senior iitmbers of the former Liberian 
Government and armed forces, as well as the spouses of those individuals and any other 
individuals providing financial or military support to rebel groups in countries neighbouring 
Liberia." Under the diamond sanctions, all States were required to prevent the direct or 
indirect import of all rough diamonds from Liberia, whether or not those diamonds 
originated in Liberia." Under the timber sanctions, all States were required to prevent the 
import into their territories of all round logs and timber products originating in Liberia.' 9 
In March 2004, the Council strengthened the Liberia In sanctions regime, imposing 
financial sanctions against former Liberian President Charles Taylor and members of his 
immediate family and senior officials of his former Government 20 
16 	SIRES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraph 2. Exemptions were provided from the 
arms sanctions for: UNMIL; and international training and reform programme for the Liberian 
armed forces and police; non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or 
protective use; and protective clothing for United Nations personnel, representatives of the 
media and humanitarian and develop workers: S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative 
paragraph 2(d)-(f). 
17 	S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraph 4(a). In that provision the Council also 
clarified that nothing obliged a State to refuse entry to its own nationals. The Council further 
provided for the possibility of exemptions from the travel sanctions where the 1521 Committee 
determined that travel was justified on the grounds of humanitarian need or religious 
obligation, or where it would further the objectives of the Council's resolutions for the creation 
of peace, stability and democracy in Liberia and lasting peace in the subregion: SIRES/1521 (22 
December 2003), operative paragraph 4(c). 
18 	S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraph 6. 
19 	S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraph 10. 
20 	SIRES/i532 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph I. The Council provided for the possibility of 
exemptions from the financial sanctions where necessary for: basic expenses (operative 
paragraph 2(a)); extraordinary expenses (operative paragraph 2(b)); or due to the fact that it 
was subject to legal or administrative lien (operative paragraph 2(c)). The Council also decided 
that States might allow for frozen accounts to receive outstanding interest or other payments 
owed prior to the application of the financial sanctions: operative paragraph 3. 
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20.4 The administration, monitoring and enforcement of the 
Liberia III sanctions regime 
The Security Council bestowed responsibilities for the administration, 
implementation and enforcement of the 1521 Liberia sanctions regime upon a range of 
actors, including a sanctions committee, a Panel of Experts, the Secretary-General, and the 
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). 
20.4.1 The 1521/Liberia III Committee 
The Security Council established the 1521 Liberia Sanctions Committee (the "1521 
Committee" or the "1521 Liberia Committee") in the same resolution which imposed the 
new sanctions regime against Liberia. 2 ' 
As part of its mandate, the new Committee was tasked with reporting to the Council 
on its work and with its observations and recommendations, and: (a) Monitoring the 
implementation of the sanctions, taking into consideration the reports of the Panel of Experts 
also established by resolution 1521 (2003); 22 (b) Seeking from all States, particularly those 
in the subregion, information regarding the actions taken by them to implement the 
sanctions; 23 (c) Deciding upon requests for the various exemptions outlined from the 
sanctions;24 (d) Designating the individuals subject to the travel sanctions and updating that 
list regularly; 25 (e) Making relevant information, including the list of individuals subject to the 
travel sanctions, publicly available through appropriate media; 26 and (f) Considering and 
21 	S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraph 21. 
22 	SIRES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraph 21(a). 
23 	S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraph 21(b). 
24 	S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraph 21(c). 
25 	S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraph 21(d). 
26 	SIRES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraph 21(e). 
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taking appropriate action on information brought to its attention concerning any alleged 
violations of the 1343 sanctions regime imposed against Liberia, whilst that sanctions regime 
had been in force. 27 
In March 2004 the Council, when the Council applied financial sanctions against 
former President Taylor and his family members and associates, it also added to the 1521 
Committee's responsibilities. The Committee was thus requested to undertake the following 
additional tasks: (g) identifying individuals and entities subject to financial sanctions, 
circulating that list to all States, and posting it on the Committee's website; 28 (h) maintaining 
and updating the list;29 (i) assisting States, where necessary, in tracing and freezing the funds 
and other financial and economic resources subject to the financial sanctions;3° and 
(j) seeking from all States information regarding the actions taken by them to trace and 
freeze such funds and other financial and economic resources. 31 
20.4.2 The Secretary-General 
When the Security Council initiated the 1521 Liberia sanctions regime, it requested 
the Secretary-General to report to it on progress made towards achieving the sanctions 
regime's objectives.32 At the same time, it also requested him to establish, for a period of 
five months, a Panel of Experts to investigate the implementation of the 1521 Liberia 
27 	S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraph 21(f). The Council's decision to ask the 
1521 Committee to assume responsibilities relating to the 1343 sanctions regime raised the same 
legal issues that had arisen when the Council requested the 1343 Committee to consider 
information relating to violations of the first Liberia sanctions regime. For discussion, see 
sections 18.4 and 18.6, above. 
28 	SIRES/1532 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 4(a). 
29 	SIRES/1532 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 4(b). 
30 	S/RES/1532 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 4(c). 
31 	S/RES/1532 (12 March 2004), operative paragraph 4(d). 
32 	S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraph 26. 
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sanctions regime. 33 In June 2004 the Council further requested the Secretary-General to 
appoint no more than five experts to the re-established Liberia ifi Panel of Experts, as well 
as to make the necessary financial arrangements to support the Panel's work. 34 
20.4.3 States 
When the Council initiated the Liberia III sanctions regime, it demanded that all 
States in West Africa take action to prevent aimed individuals and groups from using their 
territory to prepare and commit attacks on neighbouring countries and to refrain from any 
action that might contribute to further destabilization of the situation in the subregion. 35 At the 
same time it also called upon States, relevant international organizations and others in a 
position to do so to offer assistance to the National Transitional Government of Liberia 
(NTGL) in achieving the objectives of the sanctions, including the establishment of an 
effective certificate of origin regime for diamonds, the establishment of NTGL control over 
timber producing areas and the establishment of oversight mechanisms for the Liberian 
timber industry to ensure that all Government revenues were used for legitimate purposes 
and not to fuel conflict or otherwise to violate the Council's resolutions. 36 
In June 2004, when the Council re-established the Liberia III Panel of Experts, it 
urged all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other organizations and interested 
parties to cooperate fully with the 1521 Committee. 37 
S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraph 22. For details relating to the mandate and 
activities of the Panel of Experts on Liberia, see below. 
34 
 
SIRES/1549 (17 June 2004), operative paragraph 3. 
35 
 
SIRES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraph 3. 
36 	SIRES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraph 15. 
37 
 
SIRES/1549 (17 June 2004), operative paragraph 7. 
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20.4.4 The Liberia III Panel of Experts 
When the Security Council established the 1521 sanctions regime against Liberia, it 
also requested the Secretary-General to establish a Panel of Experts. 38 The Panel would 
operate for a period of five months and it would consist of up to five experts. 39 The Panel 
was given a mandate to undertake the following tasks: (a) To conduct a follow-up 
assessment mission to Liberia and neighbouring States, in order to investigate and report on 
the implementation, as well as any violations, of the sanctions; 4° and (b) Assessing progress 
made towards achieving the objectives of the 1521 sanctions regime.'" 
The 1521 Liberia Panel of Experts submitted its first report in June 2004. 42 In its 
report, the Panel outlined observations and recommendations relating to each of the arms, 
diamond and timber sanctions. The Panel also touched upon some technical details relating 
to the travel sanctions, without making any substantive observations or recommendations. 43 
With respect to the arms sanctions, the Panel found no evidence of weapons 
trafficking into Liberia over the preceding eight months. 44 Nonetheless, organised smuggling 
networks remained, with the potential to fuel regional instability. The Panel thus 
recommended that the arms sanctions should remain and that the ECO WAS moratorium on 
small arms should be implemented. 
38 	SIRES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraph 22. 
39 	SIRES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraph 22. 
40 	SIRES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraph 22(a). 
41 	S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraph 22(b). 
42 	S/2004/396 (1 June 2004), annex: Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to paragraph 22 of 
Security Council resolution 1521 (2003) concerning Liberia. 
43 	For brief discussion of the travel sanctions, see ibid, paragraphs 153-6. 
44 For the Panel's observations and recommendations concerning the arms sanctions, see ibid, 
paragraphs 3 and 59. 
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In connection with the diamond sanctions, the Panel noted that due to poor 
domestic security, diamond mining in Liberia had virtually ceased." The National 
Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) had begun taking steps towards establishing an 
effective certificate of origin scheme for trade in rough diamonds, with a view to joining the 
Kimberley Process. The Panel recommended that those positive develops should be 
encouraged by the international community through the provision of financial and technical 
support. 
With respect to the timber sanctions, the Panel observed that there was no evidence 
of widespread timber exports." Nevertheless, until the Forestry Development Authority was 
operational and security achieved, the conditions necessary to lift the sanctions could not be 
met, as the revenue from forestry and the security forces used by logging companies could 
be a course of regional instability. Referring to the humanitarian and socio-economic impact 
of the timber sanctions, the Panel noted that there had been some adverse consequences as 
a result of the application of the sanctions, including loss of employment and tax revenues. It 
contended however, on the basis of a poll it had conducted, that many Liberians viewed the 
sanctions as positive steps towards establishing durable peace and sustainable development. 
After the Panel had submitted its first report, the Council decided to re-establish it 
for a further period of six months. The re-established Panel's mandate included the following 
tasks: (a) conducting a follow-up mission to Liberia and neighbouring States, in order to 
45 	For the Panel's observations and recommendations concerning the diamond sanctions, see 
ibid, paragraphs 5 and 94. 
46 	For the Panel's observations and recommendations concerning the timber sanctions, see ibid, 
paragraphs 6, 119-20. For its observations and recommendations concerning the humanitarian 
and socio-economic impact of the timber sanctions, see paragraphs 7, 151-2. 
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investigate and compile a report on the implementation and violations of the sanctions;47 
(b) assessing progress made towards achieving the objectives of the sanctions; 48 
(c) monitoring implementation of the financial sanctions imposed by resolution 1532 (2004) 
and providing the 1521 Committee with any information that would help to identify 
individuals and entities subject to the financial sanctions;49 and (d) assessing the socio-
economic and humanitarian impact of the sanctions; 5° and (e) submitting a mid-term report 
to the Council, through the 1521 Committee, no later than 30 September 2004, and a final 
report no later than 10 December 2004. 5 ' 
20.4.5 United Nations operations 
In its oversight of the Liberia ifi sanctions regime, the Council has called upon a 
number of United Nations operations to play a role with respect to sanctions monitoring and 
enforcement. When the Council initiated the Liberia ILI sanctions regime, it welcomed the 
readiness of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNM1L) to assist both the 1521 
Committee and Panel of Experts in monitoring the implementation of sanctions, and it 
requested the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the United Nations 
Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (UNMICI) also to assist the Committee and Panel by forwarding 
any information relevant to the implementation of the Liberia III sanctions, in the context of 
enhanced coordination among United Nations missions and offices in West Africa.52 
47 S/RES/1549 (17 June 2004), operative paragraph 1(a). 
48 SIRES/1549 (17 June 2004), operative paragraph 1(b). 
49 S/RES/1549 (17 June 2004), operative paragraph 1(c). 
50 	S/RES/1549 (17 June 2004), operative paragraph 1(d). 
51 	S/RES/1549 (17 June 2004), operative paragraph 2. 
52 	S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003), operative paragraph 23. 
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20.5 Notable aspects of the Liberia III sanctions regime 
The Liberia DI sanctions regime is notable largely as an example of many of the 
sanctions innovations implemented by the Security Council in the early years of the twenty-
first century. It consists of a range of different targeted sanctions measures, most of which 
are applied for particular objectives. The Council established both a Sanctions Committee 
and a Panel of Experts in order to administer and monitor sanctions implementation, and it 
also called upon United Nations operations present in the region to play a role in sanctions 
monitoring. The Liberia 111 sanctions regime also represents yet another instance in which the 
Council has utilized time-limits in the application of sanctions. 
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